ISSA Proceedings 2014 – The Role Of Pragmatic Argumentation Referring To Consequences, Goals And Values In The Justification Of Judicial Decisions

• by: Eveline T. Feteris - Department of Speech Communication, Argumentation Theory & and Rhetoric, University of Amsterdam, Netherlands

Abstract: In this contribution I discuss the role of pragmatic argumentation referring to consequences, goals and values in complex structures of legal justification. From a pragma-dialectical perspective I describe the stereotypical patterns of legal justification in hard cases and specify the different ways in which these stereotypical patterns can be implemented in different contexts in which judges give a decision that they justify by referring to consequences, goals and values.

Keywords: argumentation, argumentation from consequences, goal argumentation, legal argumentation, legal values, justification of legal decisions, pragmatic argumentation, pragma-dialectics.

1. Introduction
In the justification of their decisions it is not uncommon for courts to use pragmatic argumentation in which they refer to the consequences of applying a legal rule in a specific case. In a ‘hard case’ in which the applicability of the rule is controversial, courts may argue that the consequences of applying the rule in the standard meaning would be ‘absurd’ in light of the purpose of the rule. An example of the use of pragmatic argumentation referring to undesirable or ‘absurd’ consequences in such a hard case can be found in the decision from the US Supreme Court in the famous case of Holy Trinity Church v. US (143 U.S. 457) from February 29, 1892.[i] In this case the Supreme Court had to decide whether or not the act prohibiting the importation of foreigners and aliens under contract to ‘perform labour’ in the United States (chapter 164, 23 St. p. 332) was applicable to an English Christian minister who had come to the United States to enter into service of the Protestant Episcopal Holy Trinity Church in the city of New York as rector and pastor. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2014 – Ubiquity, Ambiguity, And Metarationality: Searching For The Fallacy Of Composition

• by: Maurice A. Finocchiaro - Department of Philosophy, University of Nevada, Las Vegas, USA

Abstract: “Ubiquity” is the hypothesis that fallacies of composition are ubiquitous; “ambiguity” the hypothesis that “fallacy of composition” has at least three distinct meanings, often confused; and “metarationality” the hypothesis that the best places to search for fallacies of composition are meta-arguments whose conclusions attribute this fallacy to ground-level arguments. While testing these working hypotheses, I have found some historically important cases, for example, a step in the theological argument from design, as critiqued by Hume.

Keywords: argument of composition, composition, compositional argument, design argument, fallacy of composition, Hume, meta-argumentation, metarationality, parts vs. whole

1. Introduction
There are both theoretical and practical motivations for wanting to study the fallacy of composition.

From a theoretical point of view, such a study is a special case of a key and well-established branch of logic and argumentation theory. In fact, with some slight but not much exaggeration, one could reconstruct the past fifty years of this field largely as a series of footnotes to Hamblin’s Fallacies (1970), and/or as a series of developments that culminate organically with Woods’s Errors of Reasoning (2013). And, as we shall see, the fallacy of composition is special not only in the sense of being a specific case of fallacies, but also in the sense of being especially important. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2014 – On The Persuasive Power Of The Best Explanation Argument

• by: Rodolfo Gaeta & Nelida Gentile - Department of Philosophy, University of Buenos Aires, Argentina

Abstract: Scientific realists claim that scientific realism must be accepted because it is the best explanation of the success of science. But arguments to the best explanation are objectionable. We explore the possibility that the greater or lesser resistance to those inferences depends on differences about the persuasion criteria that correspond to each context: participants of philosophical discussions usually apply stricter criteria than the ones considered to be persuasive in other kinds of argumentation.

Keywords: argument to the best explanantion, non-miracle argument, scientific realism.

1. Introduction
This paper focuses on the inference to the best explanation (IBE) as a kind of argumentation in philosophy of science. Several scientific realists argue that scientific realism is the best explanation for the success of science. But serious objections have been raised against IBE. Given the controversy generated by the IBE argument, this paper explores the possibility of the fact that the degree of resistance to accepting the inference to the best explanation depends on differences which are related to the persuasion criteria that corresponds to each context. We distinguish four different contexts in which IBE is used:

a) the common sense knowledge context;
b) the scientific research context;
c) the philosophy of science context: when talking about scientific theories some philosophers contend that the truth of a theory and the existence of the unobservable entities it posits are the best explanation of its success;
d) the philosophy of science context again, but in a higher level: when some philosophers argue that scientific realism is true because it explains the success of science better than the antirealist claims. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2014 – The Strategic Function Of Argumentative Moves In Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Reports

• by: Anca Găţă - Department of French, “Dunărea de Jos” University of Galaţi, Romania

Abstract: A CSR report may be viewed as part of a virtual critical discussion in which the company acts as a protagonist claiming that their behaviour is responsible towards society. Social actors may be represented as virtual antagonists in the critical discussion who (virtually) doubt or critique this standpoint. This paper presents several argumentative moves used in CSR reports to build a better image of the business and persuade various audiences that the company acts responsibly towards society.

Keywords: adjudication, appeal to emotions, argumentation, argumentative move, audience demand, critical discussion, CSR report, organizational rhetoric, pragma-dialectic approach, strategic maneuvering.

1. Introduction
CSR is defined as the attitude companies adopt towards society, consisting in responsible business practice. CSR discourse has become lately a strategic issue for companies and their marketing operations. The methodological framework of this study is the pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation. In this framework, businesses and other social actors are represented as parties in a difference of opinion. CSR discourse may thus be viewed as a fragment of a virtual critical discussion in which the company acts as a protagonist and claims that their corporate business behaviour is responsible. Other social actors may be represented as virtual antagonist(s) who doubting or critique this standpoint. They may be held as having not agreed to the main standpoint at issue.

This study identifies several argumentative moves used in CSR reports to help the company prove to stakeholders and to the public opinion that the company acts responsibly towards society. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2014 – Rules Is Rules: Ethos And Situational Normativity

• by: Michaela A. Gilbert - Department of Philosophy, York University, Toronto, Canada

Abstract: One question in the debate between the rhetorical and dialectical approaches concerns the availability of rules and standards. Are there objective standards, or are they changeable and situational? In Part One I briefly identify three concepts, context, audience and ethos. In Part Two I focus on ethos and how it is endemic to argument with familiars. Part Three shows that ethos concerns many local factors is situational. Finally, in Part Four, it is shown how the pragma-dialectical Rule 1 is situational.

Keywords: context, ethos, pragma-dialectics rhetoric, Grice, familiars, argumentation.

“If rational means scientific, there can be little doubt that most people are irrational” (Burke 1984, 17)

1. Introduction
I am going to distinguish, for the purposes of this talk, between rhetoric and dialectics in a particular way. I do not mean this to be the only difference or the essential difference, but the one I am focusing on for this discussion. I want to say that dialectics is concerned with rules that are to one degree or another independent of a particular audience or context, while rhetoric takes rules as being relative to audience and context. This is not to say that audience is completely irrelevant to dialecticians, but rather that the rules and their applications do not vary much as audiences change.

In my paper, “Natural Normativity” (Gilbert 2007), I argued that rules emerge from the interaction of interlocutors in a natural way governed primarily by social mores, face goals, and relationships. There are three important components of this interaction: ethos, audience and context. It will be noticed first that each of these is a sub-species of the subsequent. Ethos refers to an individual, and an audience is composed of individuals. Audiences occur in contexts that delineate who and what they are. Contexts are overarching and range from extremely broad to relatively narrow and concrete. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2014 – Towards A Foundation For Argumentation Theory

• by: G.C. Goddu - Department of Philosophy, University of Richmond, Virginia, USA

Abstract: I shall present and analyze numerous principles that argumentation theorists do agree upon (and some closely related one which they do not) and argue that the set presented here offers at best limited grounds for cross-theoretical evaluation.

Keywords: Acts, expressions, informational content, reasons, arguments, repeatable, abstract object

1. Introduction
Argumentation theorists disagree about many things. For example, is conductive reasoning distinct from deductive or inductive reasoning? Could a painting or a judo flip be an argument? How many types of fallacies are there? Are there any enthymemes? Is relevance an independent condition of a good argument? Can a non-virtuous arguer give a good argument? Are arguments better construed as acts or as propositions or as sentences? Are all arguments dialectical? Answering these sorts of questions are among the current challenges of argumentation theory.

One impediment to answering these questions is that differing answers are often grounded in different theoretical frameworks. Hence, the issue is not merely one of trying to marshal ‘the best’ reasons for a particular answer to one of these questions, but rather to produce ‘the best’ overall theory. But now a new problem emerges – how do we assess, across theories, whether theory X is right for saying an argument can have an infinite number of premises say, while theory Y is wrong for saying an argument cannot? We could of course try to adjudicate theories in the standard way in terms of simplicity, explanatory depth and breadth, etc., but such comparisons rarely generate a neat linear ordering. One theory may have advantages in one area of explanation, but do worse in another. Even worse, the theories may not agree on even the basic ontology and not agree on what sort of thing an argument is (or could be). Hence, one might doubt that it is possible to construct a fully adequate theory of argumentation. Read more