ISSA Proceedings 2014 – Argumentative Norms: How Contextualist Can They Be? A Cautionary Tale

• by: Harvey Siegel, Department of Philosophy, University of Miami, Coral Gables, USA

Abstract: Are argumentative norms contextual? Yes: argument quality sometimes depends upon criteria that are context-relative. But this contextual dimension of argumentative norms depends upon a kind of context-independence: That a given argument is strong in its context is a claim that is not itself dependent upon any particular context. Consequently, there is an in-principle limit on the degree to which argumentative norms can be rightly regarded as contextual.

Keywords: argument, argumentation, argument norms, argument purposes, contextualism, epistemological relativism

1. The case for and limits of contextualism

“Argumentation is always situated: it always occurs in context.”
(Van Eemeren and Garssen 2012b, p. xiii)

It is true, as van Eemeren and Garssen say, that argumentation always occurs in context: to engage in argumentation, an arguer must be in some context or other. But are argument norms similarly contextual? That is, are the norms governing argument quality relative to or dependent upon the context in which the argument is either asserted or evaluated? Let contextualism[i] be the view that criteria of argument quality vary by context: According to contextualists, whether an argument is good or not, and how good it is, depends upon the context in which it is either uttered or evaluated. Many authors have urged that contextualism, or something like it, is true.[ii]

There is an obvious prima facie case for contextualism which rests on the fact that the ‘good-making’ features of arguments seem to vary by context: What makes an argument good in a scientific context seems to differ in some respects from what makes an argument good in a court of law, a conversation among friends, or a marketing strategy discussion in the corporate boardroom. That is, it seems to be the case that the quality of arguments sometimes depends upon criteria that are context-relative. For example, scientific arguments at least often have to meet criteria of explanatory adequacy; legal arguments often have to meet criteria of evidence admissibility; etc. So it seems that the norms of argument quality are relative to context: an argument can be good although it doesn’t meet legal criteria of evidence admissibility if it is offered or evaluated in a scientific or corporate boardroom context; an argument can be good although it doesn’t meet criteria of explanatory adequacy if it is offered or evaluated in the context of a court of law or a conversation around the dinner table. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2014 – Reasonableness In Context: Taking Into Account Institutional Conventions In The Pragma-Dialectical Evaluation Of Argumentative Discourse

• by: A.F. Snoeck Henkemans & J.H.M. Wagemans, Department of Speech Communication, Argumentation Theory, and Rhetoric, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Abstract: In this paper, we raise the question of how to take institutional conventions into account in a pragma-dialectical evaluation of argumentative discourse. First, we describe the main steps of the pragma-dialectical evaluation procedure and provide an explanation of the types of norms and rules involved. Then, we present an overview of various types of discrepancies between institutional conventions and pragma-dialectical norms and discuss their implications for the pragma-dialectical evaluation of argumentation in context.

Keywords: argumentation, deontic rules, evaluation, fallacy judgments, institutional conventions, non-deontic rules, pragma-dialectics.

1. Introduction
Over the last couple of years, the pragma-dialectical research program has focused on the development of tools for the analysis and evaluation of argumentative discourse in specific institutional contexts, such as the domains of legal, political, medical, and academic communication.[i] An important reason for taking the institutional context into consideration is that the aims and conventions of a certain context of argumentative activity may influence the evaluation of the argumentation put forward in that context. Within the pragma-dialectical approach, fallacy judgments are considered to be context-dependent. At the same time, the norms to be applied by the evaluator are regarded as generally applicable to all contexts of argumentative activity:

Although we agree […] that fallacy judgments are in the end always contextual judgments that depend on the specific circumstances of situated argumentative acting, we do not agree that the norms underlying these judgments are context-dependent. In our view, the norms expressed in the rules for critical discussion are general – who knows even universal – norms for sound argumentation that are not limited to one particular type of argumentative activity (Van Eemeren and Houtlosser, 2007, p. 64). Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2014 – Theory Of Argumentation: The Argumentological Twist Is Necessary

• by: Viktor Tchouechov, Department of Philosophy, Academy of Public Administration, Minsk, Belarus, Viktor Tchouechov, Department of Philosophy, Academy of Public Administration, Minsk, Belarus

Abstract: Today we need some kind of background knowledge of argumentation theory. It is the philosophy of argumentation, or argumentology. Argumentology studies ontological, epistemological etc. fundamentals of argumentation. Argumentological ontology answers the following question: “Does a Homo arguer really exist as a theoretical problem?” Argumentological epistemology deals with the problem of cognitive backgrounds of theory and practice of argumentation. Argumentological methodology comprises logical, rhetorical, and dialectical approaches to argumentation.

Keywords: argumentology, dialectic, epistemology, Homo arguer, logic, ontology, rhetoric of argumentation.

1. Introduction
Nowadays theory of argumentation (TA) is the field of research and study with vague basic principles and intellectual tools of the domain conceptualization. There are a lot of definitions of the term ‘argumentation’ (‘argument’). Indeed, according to Ch. Perelman “for argumentation to exist, an effective community of minds must be realized at a given moment” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1971, p. 14). On the contrary, L. Groake stresses that “photographs, drawings, cartoons, logos, symbols, film footage, dramatic performances, etc. may all function as elements of visual arguments. One can find examples of visual arguments which are expressed in entirely visual ways, but most combine visual and verbal cues”. (Groake, 2007, p. 535). F. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst and T. Kruiger define argumentation as “social, intellectual, verbal activity serving to justify or refute an opinion, consisting of a constellation of statements and directed towards obtaining the approbation of an audience” (van Eemeren, Grootendorst & Kruiger, 1987, p. 7). In this case one may consider the following problems: Is argumentation rational or not only rational entertainment? Is argumentation a verbal or not only verbal construction? Is argumentation a set of words or both a set of words and a variety of images? What is more we can add that some other problems exist. What is an argument (ation) layout? What is the aim and the peculiarities of argumentation? All these questions are usually problematic in almost all contemporary theories of argumentation and their academic presentations. So what should we do in this case? We think in order to answer the questions correctly; we need some kind of background knowledge of argumentation or the philosophy of argumentation that is called argumentology. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2014 – About An Emotion, Indignation, And Its Argumentation. The Case Of The Argumentum Ad Selectivum

• by: Danièle Torck, VU-University, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Abstract: This paper is about Indignation (defined as Anger about something Unjust) in everyday argumentation, when it becomes the object of an argumentative construction involving the pathos (genuine or phony emotion), the logos (legitimacy of the sets of beliefs and judgments concerning the state of affairs that generated the emotion) and the ethos (righteousness of the Indignant Person or Institution). I will focus on a frequent refutation in public discourse of someone’s Indignation, that is its Selectiveness.

Keywords: Indignation, expression of strong emotion, pathos, logos, ethos, selectiveness, Stephane Hessel (2010)

Introduction
At the origin of this paper, there was the international popularity of the word ‘Indignation/Outrage’ in 2011 and the debates and polemics in France following the editorial success of Stéphane Hessel’s little book, Indignez-vous!’(American title: ‘Time for Outrage!’). As a discourse analyst, my main interest is in the approach of an Emotion (Indignation) in every day argumentation, following Plantin (2011) and Micheli (2010): the expression of emotion can be used as a persuasive argument to bring people into action, and can be evaluated as such, but the emotion may first need to be legitimized, and this process of legitimization will concern the three means of persuasion and their interaction: Pathos (genuine or phony emotion), Logos (righteousness of the object of indignation, legitimacy of the sets of beliefs and judgments concerning the state of affairs that generated the emotion) and Ethos (righteousness of the Indignant Person or Institution).

I will first specify the meaning of the word Indignation, and then will make a brief reference to approaches to Indignation in philosophy and argumentation studies. I will illustrate this argumentation of Indignation with examples mostly taken from the French media, the Internet and small publications concerning the Stephane Hessel controversy. This will be followed by an exploration of the frequent denunciation of the Selectiveness of Indignation, and a reflection on its argumentative value. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2014 – Bingo! Promising Developments In Argumentation Theory

• by: Van Eemeren, Frans H., ILIAS, University of Amsterdam & Leiden University, The Netherlands

Abstract: On the occasion of the publication in 2014 of the new Handbook of Argumentation Theory, which provides an overview of the current state of the art in the field, van Eemeren identifies three major developments in the treatment of argumentation that he finds promising. First, there is in various theoretical traditions the trend towards empiricalization, which includes both qualitative and quantitative empirical research. Second, there is the increased and explicit attention being paid to the institutional macro-contexts in which argumentative discourse takes place and the effects they have on the argumentation. Third, there is, particularly in the dialectical approaches, a movement towards formalization, which is strongly stimulated by the recent advancement of artificial intelligence. According to van Eemeren, if they are integrated with each other and comply with pertinent academic requirements, the developments of empiricalization, contextualization and formalization of the treatment of argumentation will mean “bingo!” for the future of argumentation theory.

Keywords: contextualization, dialectical perspective, empiricalization, formalization, pragma-dialectics, rhetorical perspective, state of the art

1. Changes in the state of the art of argumentation theory
Since the conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation held in Amsterdam in July 2014 was the eighth ISSA conference, argumentation theorists from various kinds of backgrounds have been exchanging views about argumentation for almost thirty years. My keynote speech at the start of this conference seemed to me the right occasion for making some general comments on the way in which the field is progressing.

I considered myself in a good position to strike a balance because during the past five years I have been preparing an overview of the state of the art in a new Handbook of Argumentation Theory. I have done so together with my co-authors, Bart Garssen, Erik C. W. Krabbe, A. Francisca Snoeck Henkemans, Bart Verheij, and Jean H. M. Wagemans. In this complicated endeavour we have been supported generously by a large group of knowledgeable reviewers and advisors from the field. On the 2 July reception of the ISSA conference the Handbook was to be presented to the community of argumentation scholars. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2014 – Argumentation In Hierarchical And Non-Hierarchical Communication

• by: Ekaterina Vargina, Philological faculty, St. Petersburg State University, St. Petersburg, Russia,

Abstract: There are two major patterns of communication – hierarchical and non-hierarchical, depending on the communicative intention of the speakers. Hierarchical communication is a monologue or a pseudo-dialogue while intrinsic dialogism is a feature of non-hierarchical communication. Some argumentative strategies are characteristic to either hierarchical or non-hierarchical pattern. A line can be drawn between dialogue as an aim and dialogue as a form of communication. Both verbal and non-verbal arguments are considered.

Keywords: communicative intention, hierarchy, non-hierarchical, monologue, pseudo-dialogue.

1. ‘Vertical’ and ‘horizontal’ rhetoric
Rhetoric is an art of using arguments, that is, an art of using language to achieve certain goals. There have been many studies of argumentative strategies, rhetoric devices, kinds of pathos. The effectiveness of these strategies and devices can be evaluated with regards to various kinds of addressees. The task of my report is to specify two principally different strategies – “vertical” or hierarchical and “horizontal” or non-hierarchical.

These two major patterns of communication depend on the communicative intention of the speakers. Intentions can be very different, and if we approach language as a set of tools, we choose the instrument according to the job we want to do. Another question to ask is how we want the job to be done and what social costs we are prepared to bear. Read more