ISSA Proceedings 1998 – Ad Baculum Is Not A Fallacy!

ISSAlogo19981. Practical Arguments
Our point of departure is the practical syllogism. The invention is Aristotle’s and the interpretation we give it is Anscombe’s (Anscombe, 1957). As is well-known, the standard syllogism is a discursive entity, an n-tuple of declarative sentences, of which the terminal member is the conclusion and the rest are premisses. In contrast, a practical syllogism is a mixed structure, part discursive and part non-discursive. The difference shows up in the conclusions of the two structures. In a standard syllogism, the conclusion is a sentence; in a practical syllogism the conclusion is an action. It is useful to compare practical syllogisms with deontic or prudential arguments. A simple example of such is:
1. If you are late home from the movies, you’ll irritate and worry your mother
2. So, you shouldn’t be late.

It is easy to construct what we could call the practical syllogisation of this argument. It is the ordered pair in which the first member is the premiss of the deontic argument

1* If you are late home from the movies, you’ll irritate and worry your mother.

and in which the second member, the conclusion, is not the sentence which bids the addressee not to be late, but is simply the addressee’s not being late.Thus the conclusion of our practical syllogism is the action advocated by the conclusion of the preceding deontic argument.

The distinction between deontic-prudential arguments and practical syllogisms calls to mind the old maxim that talk is cheap. `Cheap’ in turn suggests `suboptimal’, and, in some respects, this is precisely what can be claimed by deontic-prudential arguments in contrast with their practical syllogisations. It is one thing to get an addressee to concede that he should do such-and-such; it is another, and often better thing, that he actually do it. Better the cheque in the mail than `The cheque is in the mail’. We may say in a quite general way that a practical syllogism is the consummation of a deontic arguer’s intent.

In this note we propose to expand the concept of practical syllogism in a slight but natural way. We shall attempt to show that modest though the extension might be, it produces results of genuine consequence for the theory of argument. In our proposal, a second way of being a practical syllogism is one in which one or more of the premisses is an action rather than a sentence. It is a point worth emphasising that the conclusions and, as we now may say, the premisses that make for practical syllogisms are role-specific. Any action by any agent at any time, make for a true proposition, namely the proposition ascribing that action to that agent at that time. Any of these truths is available in principle as the conclusion or as a premiss of some or other bit of argument that may chance at a time to bubble out of the dialectical soup of the human community. Such arguments are not made into practical syllogisms in consequence of this fact; for it is the actions themselves, not the sentences they make true, that are the irreducible components of practical syllogisms. In Aristotle’s conception of it, the action that is the conclusion must be the action of the party to whom the argument is addressed. In our extension of it, the action that is the premiss of a practical syllogism must be the action of the maker of the argument, not his addressee. So there is an agent-specific asymmetry between, as we shall now say, conclusionally practical syllogisms and premissorily practical syllogisms. Read more

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ISSA Proceedings 1998 – The Dialectic Of Quasi-Logical Arguments

ISSAlogo1998To the memory of Theodoor Jan Krabbe (1941-1996) [i]

1. Introduction: The Self-Gratulatory Argument
There can be no doubt that this is a perfect morning for the study of quasi-logical arguments. Otherwise, to say it bluntly, our hosts wouldn’t have put it on the program. Or would it be quasi-logical to say so? Anyhow, quasi-logical arguments are what’s up, and I’m much honored that you have all come to join me in this enterprise.
Of lectures on the quasi-logical there are exactly two types, either they are long or else they are short. Fortunately, I hate long lectures. This is fortunate for you, but also for me. Why may I rejoice in my own abhorrence of lengthy lectures? Well, that can be argued thus: suppose I liked long lectures, then I would certainly give one right now and be bound to hearing it out; but to hear my own long lecture would be a bad thing, since I happen to hate long lectures. So am I ever happy to hate long lectures!
That was an argument. Was that a quasi-logical argument? Yes, it was. It was meant to give you a taste of the quasi-logical, that is, to put it briefly, of a style of reasoning that unwarrantedly takes on the trappings of logical or mathematical rigor.[ii]

So, if this was a quasi-logical argument, what is its dialectic? Now wait. Give me a break. We’ll get to that later. It is certainly my intention in this lecture to show some of the dialectic of this argument; that is to expound in a profile of dialogue some of the moves and countermoves available to its discussants. But first I want to turn logic against quasi-logic and offer a logical analysis of this quasi-logical argument. Later on, I hope to show that such a logical analysis provides part of a profile of dialogue; that it constitutes part of the dialectic, but not all of it.

What would a logical analysis of the long lecture argument amount to? Generally, a logical analysis of an argument consists of two parts: a reconstruction and a critical evaluation. To reconstruct the argument, we notice that the argument gives the impression of being tightly reasoned and logical. We therefore try to reconstruct it as a logical derivation.[iii] One thing we need to attend to is the occurrence of a suppositional subargument that needs to be put into a more explicit format. As a first line of proof one may enter:

(1) I hate to hear long lectures.

(This may, in context, be taken to constitute a fact.)
As an unexpressed (and unproblematic) premise we may add:

(2) For all X, if I hate X, X is a bad thing for me. Read more

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ISSA Proceedings 1998 – Arguing From Clichés: Communication And Miscommunication

ISSAlogo1998You should always try to avoid the use of clichés. (anonymous)

1. Clichés Don’t Grow on Trees – Introducing Clichés
Following the unprecedented growth and dissemination of information and the widespread access to it through the media, we are increasingly experiencing the use of clichés, old and new, unchanged and altered, famous and anonymous: ‘Life imitates art’, ‘All the world’s a stage’, ‘It’s a small world’, ‘Money talks’, ‘Time is money’, ‘Money does not grow on trees’, ‘Traduttore, traditore’, ‘Cherchez la femme’, ‘the man in the street’, ‘political correctness’, ‘I promise to love you until death do us part’, ‘Men and women are different: Vive la différence!’, ‘Elementary, my dear Watson’, and so on. These frequently recycled expressions are looked upon as unquestionable truths or at least as ‘le mot juste’ by many people.  Some, however, dismiss them as “clichés”.
This paper is devoted to clichés. Not to discard them, but to make some observations about their relevance to argumentation and their potential for miscommunication. Actually, we claim that certain clichés are crucial to argumentative discourse, and that their capacity for building arguments is closely linked to their liability to trigger divergent interpretations.
We propose a pragmatic and rhetorical approach to the concept of cliché and its functions in argumentation. This approach takes into consideration three major elements in the dynamics of clichés, the disregard of which may lead to misinterpretations:
1. there is no complete overlap between the form and the function of the lexical entitities that underlie clichés
2. many clichés exhibit a balance between a general scope and a specific focus on certain topoï for which a particular audience is expected to have a particular preference at a particular time in a particular context
3. there is an inherent tension between the explicit and the implicit functioning of a cliché in argumentation

Cliché is a word with a negative ring to it. When you say “This is a cliché” about an opinion voiced by a partner in conversation, you usually imply that s/he is yielding to popular unreflected opinion, that s/he is just repeating something constantly circulating in the mental marketplace of a certain discourse community. A cliché is then seen as a commonplace, the collective consensus speaking through the mouth of an individual without involving his/her own critical thinking (Lerner: 1956, Ricks: 1980). Maybe what a cliché stands for is not blatantly untrue to a rational observer, as a prejudice usually is. But it is still likely to be seen as a crude and simplified way of looking at things that deserve a deeper and less biased consideration.
It is not easy to come to grips with clichés because their form does not display any regular patterns, their structure is difficult to capture and their occurrences impossible to predict. Whether the coinage of clichés is ascribed to well-known or to anonymous sources, it is their distribution and frequency that eventually decides their subsequent evolution.
Generally speaking, cliché seems to be a rather elitist word. Popular wisdom is not likely to come as close to the truth as a well-educated, highly trained and critical mind, such as the typical academic intellectual. Cliché, with its derogatory value load, is a word that Plato, that outspoken critic of the masses, could have used. It would have come less natural to Aristotle with his respect for ‘doxa’, for tradition and general opinion. We will side with Aristotle on this issue and try to show that clichés fulfil no negligible role even in informed discourse, rational argumentation and creative problem-solving dialogue. Read more

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ISSA Proceedings 1998 – Argument Mediation For Lawyers: The Presentation Of Arguments

ISSAlogo19981. The logic of law
Most lawyers have some awareness of logic, although the awareness is normally limited. The logical connectives ‘… and …’ and ‘ … or …’ are known, and maybe even the ambiguous interpretation of a composite sentence of the form ‘a and b or c’ is familiar. Some might regard the connective ‘if …, then …’ as the abstract form of a legal rule and the rule of inference Modus Ponens as the general template of legal reasoning.
Why do lawyers pay so little attention to logic? The main problem is that logic in its classical appearances (such as propositional or predicate logic) is not sufficiently satisfying as a model of legal argument: it is too far from the argument forms that lawyers use in practice. In recent years, there has been a large amount of research on the development of logical tools for legal argument (see, e.g., the work of Gordon [1993, 1995], Hage [1997], Lodder [1998], Prakken [1993, 1997] and Verheij [1996]). Argument forms that have been studied include arguments concerning exceptions to rules, conflicts of reasons and rule applicability.
The logical tools that have recently been developed can be categorized under three headings: defeasibility, integration of logical levels, and the process character of argument [Verheij et al., 1997]. Defeasibility is a characteristic of arguments and, in a derived sense, of conclusions. A conclusion is defeasible if it is the conclusion of a defeasible argument. Defeat occurs if a conclusion is no longer justified by an argument because of new information. For instance, the conclusion that a thief should be punished is no longer justified if it turns out that there was a legal justification for the theft, such as an authorized command.

The integration of logical levels is for instance required if reasons are weighed. If arguments lead to incompatible conclusions, weighing of reasons is necessary to determine which conclusion follows. Additional information is necessary to determine the outcome of the weighing process. In some views, this information is on a higher logical level than the facts of cases, and the rules of law. However, since there can also be arguments about the weighing of reasons, the integration of levels is required.
The process character of argument also led to the development of new logical tools. For instance, the defeasibility of arguments cannot be separated from the process of taking new information into account. During the process of argumentation conclusions are drawn, reasons are adduced, counterarguments are raised, and new premises are introduced. In traditional models, only the end products of the process are modeled.

The focus has been primarily on the technical development of the logical tools, and only in the second place on their practical adequacy for modeling legal argument. Presently a convergence of opinions on the necessary logical tools takes shape, and a systematic practical assessment of the logical tools becomes essential.  In the research reported on in this paper, a step towards the practical assessment is made by the development of two experimental computer systems for argument mediation for lawyers. In computer-supported argument mediation, one or more users of the system engage in an argument that is mediated by the system: the system administers the argument moves and safeguards that the rules of argument are observed. It can, if appropriate, give advice to the user.
A new problem for argument researchers, as posed by the development of systems for argument mediation is how arguments should be presented to the users of the system. In this paper, we describe two experimental computer systems, the Argue!-system and the Argumentation Mediator, each using a different way of argument presentation. The two systems are based on a simplified version of Verheij’s [1996] CumulA-model, which is a procedural model of argumentation with arguments and counterarguments.

Section 2 briefly discusses argument mediation and the two experimental systems of the present paper. In section 3, an example case of Dutch tort law is summarized, that will be used to illustrate the two systems of argument mediation. Section 4 contains an introduction of CumulA, the procedural model of argumentation with arguments and counterarguments, that underlies the two experimental systems. Section 5 and 6 contain sample sessions of the two systems. In section 7, the two systems are compared with each other and selected related systems, especially with regards to their underlying argumentation theories and user interfaces. Section 8 suggests a shift from argument mediation systems as theoretical to practical tools.[i] Read more

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ISSA Proceedings 1998 – Argumentation Explicitness And Persuasive Effect: A Meta-Analytic Review Of The Effects Of Citing Information Sources In Persuasive Messages

ISSAlogo1998Argumentative explicitness is commonly acknowledged to be a normative ideal for argumentative practice, but advocates might fear that explicit argumentation could impair persuasive success. The question of the persuasive effects of argumentative explicitness is an empirical one, however. This paper addresses one aspect of this matter, by offering a meta-analytic review of the persuasive effects associated with one aspect of the degree of articulation given to an advocate’s supporting argumentation, namely, whether the advocate explicitly identifies the sources of supporting information.

1. Background
Argumentative explicitness is one commonly-recognized normative good in the conduct of advocates. That is, it is normatively desirable that advocates explicitly articulate their viewpoints: “Evasion, concealment, and artful dodging . . . are and should be excluded from an ideal model of critical discussion” (van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson, & Jacobs 1993: 173). Explicit argumentation is normatively desirable because explicitness opens the advocated view for critical scrutiny. But explicit argumentation might not be instrumentally successful, that is, persuasive, which gives rise to the question: what is the relationship between argumentative explicitness and persuasive effects?
One facet of this question has been addressed by O’Keefe (1997), who reviewed research concerning the persuasive effects of variations in the explicitness of a message’s conclusion (the degree of articulation of the message’s overall standpoint or recommendation). His review suggested that better-articulated message conclusions are dependably more persuasive than less-articulated ones.
This paper concerns the persuasive effects of variation in the explicitness of one facet of a message’s supporting argumentation, specifically, whether the advocate explicitly identifies the sources of provided information. A number of studies have addressed this question, though many of these have never been systematically collected or reviewed. The purpose of the present paper is to provide a meta-analytic review of this research.

Meta-analytic literature reviews aim at providing systematic quantitative summaries of research studies (Rosenthal 1991 provides a useful general discussion of meta-analysis). Traditional narrative literature reviews emphasize statistical significance (whether a given study finds a statistically significant effect), but this can be a misleading way of characterizing research findings; whether statistical significance is achieved is a matter of, inter alia, sample size. Meta-analytic reviews instead commonly focus on the size of the effect obtained in each study, with these then being combined to give an observed average effect (with an associated confidence interval). In this paper, the effect of central interest is the persuasive outcome associated with variation in information-source citation.
A number of studies relevant to this question are ones commonly characterized as studies of the effects of “evidence” in persuasive messages (e.g., McCroskey 1969; Reinard 1988). The question of interest in these studies is what difference it makes to persuasive effectiveness if the advocate provides evidence supporting the message’s claims. As Kellermann (1980) has pointed out, however, the concept of evidence invoked in this research is not carefully formulated and, correspondingly, evidence research has seen a large number of different experimental realizations of evidence variations (see Kellermann 1980: 163-164). Kellermann has argued quite pointedly for the importance of more careful conceptualization of the relevant message properties.
One of the message variations commonly represented in evidence research is information-source citation. That is, as part of manipulating the presence of “evidence” in a message, investigators have varied whether the message contains explicit identification of information sources. Thus in a number of studies, information-source citation has been manipulated simultaneously (that is, in a confounded fashion) with other variables (e.g., Harte 1972; McCroskey 1966).
The present review thus has a somewhat sharper focus than those in discussions of evidence, by virtue of being concerned specifically with information-source citation (cf., e.g., Reinard 1994). This more careful specification of the message property of interest has also made it possible to locate relevant research not commonly mentioned in discussions of evidence (e.g., Berger 1988). Moreover, given that some studies have manipulated information-source citation in tandem with other variables, the present focus permits one to distinguish cases in which only information-source citation is varied from cases that simultaneously vary information-source citation and other message properties; studies of such joint manipulations are of distinctive interest, precisely because they shed light on the question of the effects of combining information-source citation manipulations with other variations. Read more

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ISSA Proceedings 1998 – Definitions In Legal Discussions

ISSAlogo19981. Introduction
It is well-known that in many a legal dispute the question arises what the exact extension of a predicate is. The difference of opinion in such cases almost always concerns the question as to whether an incident comes under the reach of a concept that is expressed by a particular word or phrase in a legal text in which the rights and obligations of the persons holding legal rights are established (for example a law or agreement). In such cases of difference of opinion the lawyers are forced to declare what a certain word or group of words means in their opinion. And in the discussions that may be carried out they often also give definitions of the words or phrases concerned and will, in principle, have to justify the acceptability of such definitions.
The question now is: how do lawyers – and more particularly judges – deal with this kind of language controversy; what kind of definitions do they give and how do they present and justify them? I attempt in this article to give an interim answer – an interim answer due among other things to the insufficiency of the systematic research I have done into the judgements of judges in The Netherlands.
The article is set up as follows. In paragraph 2 a case is given in rough outline and in paragraph 3 there is the development of part of the legal discussion as a result of that case. In paragraph 4 I go into the question of which types of definition can be distinguished and how the plausibility of each of these different types of definition can be argued. In paragraph 5 I reconstruct part of the legal discussion in the light of the typology of definitions dealt with in paragraph 5. Paragraph 6 constitutes the conclusion of this article.

2. A case: fire in a building[i]
Mr. Matthes owned a house of nine rooms. In 1979 the house was inhabited by Matthes with his wife and four children and also by a tenant and her son. All the rooms were in use by Matthes and the members of his family, except for one room on the first floor which was used by the tenant.
Matthes wanted to take out fire insurance with the Noordhollandse insurance company and submitted an application form for this purpose for an ‘index/extended insurance for private house’. On the reverse of the form it stated:
1. the applicant declares: a. that the private house on which or in which insurance is requested, is of brick/concrete with a hard roofing, with no business or storage and without increased danger to adjoining properties’.

From 17 July 1979 the Noordhollandse insurance company insured the house for the period until 17 July 1989 including fire risk. The policy for extended building insurance dated 2 August 1979 referred to the house with the addition:
2.  ‘serving solely as private house’.

On Monday 3 December 1984 at about eight-thirty p.m. fire broke out in the house resulting in considerable damage. At that time the house was inhabited by Matthes and his wife and a total of five rooms were rented out to three different single gentlemen. Naturally Matthes claimed on the insurance company for the damage which amounted to some 500,000 Dutch guilders. However the company refused payment on the grounds of the insurance since in its opinion the premises insured no longer served as a private house but was used as a room rental business for which during the insured period the use of the insured object was altered, whereas Matthes had not informed the insurance company of the fact. The Noordhollandse appealed to article 293 of the Commercial Code of The Netherlands:
3.  ‘If an insured building is given a different use and is thereby exposed to increased danger, so that the insurer, if such had been in existence before the insurance was given, would not have insured the same at all or not on the same conditions, this obligation is terminated.’ Read more

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