ISSA Proceedings 1998 – The Nature Of Symptomatic Argumentation

1. Introduction

There seems to be general agreement among argumentation theorists that argumentation schemes are principles or rules underlying arguments that legitimise the step from premises to standpoints. They characterise the way in which the acceptability of the premise that is explicit in the argumentation is transferred to the standpoint. The argumentation scheme that has been used by an arguer determines the specific relation that is established between the explicit premise and the standpoint that is being justified. This relation is not a formal but a pragmatic relation.

Argumentation schemes play an important role in the evaluation of argumentation. In order to evaluate an argumentation, one must first determine which argumentation scheme is employed. Then it can be established whether the premise is in an adequate way linked to the standpoint. For this purpose, one has to answer the critical questions that go with the argumentation scheme that has been used.

The pragma-dialectical typology of argumentation schemes is designed to enable an adequate evaluation of argumentation. In this typology, three types of argumentation are distinguished:

1. *symptomatic* or 'token' argumentation, where there is a relation of concomitance between the premise and the standpoint;
2. *comparison* or 'similarity' argumentation, where the relation is one of resemblance; and
3. *instrumental* or 'consequence' argumentation, where there is a causal relation between the premise and the conclusion.

These three argumentation types are categorised based on the way in which the argumentation scheme concerned is to be evaluated. With each type of argumentation go corresponding assessment criteria that pertain to the relation that is characterised in the argumentation scheme. This means that a new

argumentation scheme should be distinguished only when it can be shown that "new" assessment criteria are needed to evaluate the corresponding type of argumentation.

Each of the pragma-dialectical argumentation schemes represents a category that can be subdivided into a number of subtypes. The reason for distinguishing between subtypes is that evaluating the argumentations concerned requires more specific evaluation criteria. Argumentation based on analogy is, for instance, a subtype of comparison argumentation which is to be distinguished because the critical question 'Are the things that are compared (X and Y) comparable' needs further specification. This way of classifying the argumentation schemes results in a typology that meets the requirements of an adequate classification: its categories are clearly demarcated, homogeneous, mutually exclusive, and non of them is superfluous.

2. Theoretical and empirical research

In my doctoral dissertation on the pragma-dialectical typology of argumentation schemes I have tried to answer two questions (Garssen 1997: 3-4). My first aim was to examine whether the pragma-dialectical typology of argumentation schemes is an optimal starting point for evaluating arguments. My second aim was to determine whether, and to what extent, the relations between premises and standpoints as they are perceived by ordinary language users, correspond with the pragma-dialectical argumentation schemes.

In order to answer the question whether the pragma-dialectical typology is an optimal starting point, I made a comparison between the pragma-dialectical typology and other typologies of argumentation schemes – or similar notions like types of argumentation or modes of argument. This is a first step in establishing whether the typology is exhaustive. In this way it can be investigated whether the wide and varied argumentation types distinguished by others are all captured by the pragma-dialectical typology. In this endeavour, I analysed all major modern theoretical approaches of argumentation schemes. Broadly speaking, there are three kinds of approaches. First, those approaches that focus on evaluating arguments. These are the approaches inherent in the classification of types of argument in American textbooks on argumentation and debate. But they also include the classification of Hastings and that of Schellens. An approach that focuses on finding arguments is the New Rhetoric of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca. Finally, there is Kienpointner's approach, who puts the emphasis on the description of argumentative discourse by means of argumentation schemes. My

analysis makes it clear that there are notable similarities between the different classifications of argumentation schemes. This can largely be explained by the fact that the authors made use of the same sources and also influenced each other. Of course, there are many differences too. The first striking difference is the number of categories. In some classifications only three types of argument are distinguished, in others more than fifty. Other differences are related to the way the classifications are organised.

My comparison of the pragma-dialectical argumentation schemes with the argumentation schemes proposed by others showed that there is a large conceptual overlap between the typological accounts that can be found in the various approaches examined. In most cases, the argumentation schemes appear to correspond well with one of the pragma-dialectical argumentation schemes. Some can be seen as a variant of one of these schemes, while others can be regarded as a subtype. There is therefore no need to amend or expand the pragma-dialectical typology of argumentation schemes.

With regard to the treatment of causal argumentation and comparison argumentation, most approaches seem to agree. Leaving minor differences aside, these two types are in most approaches treated in the same way. This can not be said, however, of symptomatic argumentation.

According to the pragma-dialectical conception of this type of argument, in symptomatic argumentation, the argument is presented as if it is an expression, a phenomenon, a sign or some other kind of symptom of what is stated in the standpoint (Van Eemeren en Grootendorst 1992: 97). In the literature no analogon of this conception can be found that covers all the possible variants of symptomatic argumentation.

In the empirical part of my study, I have investigated to what extent the pragma-dialectical argumentation schemes correspond with the pre-theoretical intuitions of ordinary language users. My empirical investigation focused on the question of whether the different types of argumentative relations as perceived by ordinary language users do match the pragma-dialectical argumentation schemes. Since no similar research regarding the intuitions of ordinary language users has hitherto been conducted, a new research method had to be developed. To this end, I have carried out several feasibility tests.

The nature of my research question posed an important restriction on the formulation of the instruction that was to be given to the respondents: is should

not contain any information concerning the argumentation schemes. Two methods of research appeared suitable: a characterising-grouping test and a critical response test. The characterising-grouping test is a pencil and paper test that actually combines two tests. First, the respondents had to characterise in their own words the relation between the premise and the standpoint in a series of twelve argumentations. Subsequently, they had to classify the argumentations in a number of groups and explain their groupings. Both the respondents' characterisation of the relation between premises and standpoints and their classification of the argumentations provide clues as to how the different kinds of relation between premises and standpoints are perceived.

The results of the characterising-grouping test indicate that the relation between the premise and the standpoint is adequately interpreted by the respondents. Most of them were able to offer informative and pragmatically appropriate reconstructions of the unexpressed premise, instead of just connecting the premise to standpoint by way of the so-called 'logical minimum'. Many characterisations that were given of the premise-standpoint relation indicated that the respondents had a more or less clear conception of causal argumentation and also of comparison argumentation. They were also quite capable of reconstructing the unexpressed premise of symptomatic argumentation. Most of them, however, did not explicitly refer to the specific kind of relation used in the latter type of argumentation. These results were confirmed by the results of the grouping test. In that test, the respondents classified the argumentations based on a relation of analogy quite well and the argumentations based on a causal relation reasonably well. Only a few, however, succeeded in classifying the symptomatic arguments correctly.

The critical response test is an altered replication of the characterising-grouping test: the respondents had to react to the argumentation by criticising the relation between the premise and the standpoint. The fact that there is a correspondence between their critical reactions and the standard critical questions going with the argumentation schemes indicates that they had a notion of the specific type of relation between the premise and the standpoint that was involved.

The results of the critical response test confirm the results of the characterising-grouping test. Most critical reactions indicate that the respondents discerned a relation between the premise and the standpoint that is pragmatic in nature – and that is more specific and more informative than the so-called 'logical minimum'. Many critical reactions could be interpreted as critical questions that go with the

argumentation schemes concerned. Not all critical reactions of the respondents, however, contained explicit or implicit references to the argumentation schemes. In their reactions to comparison argumentation, the respondents very often made use of verbal indicators of the relation of analogy; in reacting to instrumental argumentations, they sometimes used verbal indicators of the causal relation; in reacting to symptomatic argumentations, they only rarely used verbal indicators of the relation of concomitance, used in symptomatic argumentation.

All the results of my empirical research indicate that the respondents were not so familiar with the concept of symptomatic argumentation. These results show that symptomatic argumentation is more difficult to understand than the other two argumentation types. The results of both the theoretical part and the empirical part of my dissertation make clear that symptomatic argumentation is a more heterogeneous category than the other two. A specification of the various variants of symptomatic argumentation is required to provide a better insight in its nature. A first step in this endeavour of making an inventory of the different uses of symptomatic argumentation is to start analysing how this type of argument is conceptualised in other approaches and next to determine how the pragma-dialectical notion of symptomatic argumentation relates to similar types of argument distinguished by others.

3. Symptomatic argumentation

Now I shall discuss some notions of symptomatic argumentation as proposed in modern approaches of types of argument. Most textbooks on argumentation and debate that are since the beginning of this century published in the United States pay attention to reasoning and the evaluation of argumentation. There are usually chapters on types of argument and the tests that go with them. The classifications and tests that are offered enable the debater to evaluate his own arguments and to anticipate counter argumentation. A representative classification is that of McBurney and Mills presented in *Argumentation and Debate Techniques of a free society* (1964).

McBurney and Mills distinguish between four basic kinds of argument: sign argumentation, causal argumentation, argumentation based on examples and argumentation based on analogy. According to McBurney and Mills, an argument from sign gives an indication that the proposition is true without attempting to explain why it is true. All arguments from sign are based on the (stated or implied) assumption that two or more variables are related in such a way that the presence of absence of one may taken to be an indication of the presence of

absence of the other. This definition might give the impression that McBurney and Mills' conception of sign argumentation is very similar to the pragma-dialectical notion of symptomatic argumentation. There are however some striking differences. According to McBurney and Mills, the effects of a given cause are in a typical sign argumentation employed 'as signs that this cause has operated or is operating'. Take the following argumentation:
Frank must be at home because the kitchen is a mess.

What is stated in the standpoint is seen here as a cause of what is stated in the premise. It follows that the link between the premise and the standpoint is of the causal type. To regard this type of argument as sign argumentation is confusing: in fact, it blurs the distinction between causal argumentation and sign argumentation. In the pragma-dialectical typology this kind of argumentation would be regarded as causal argumentation.

Another well-known textbook on argumentation and debate is *Argumentation and debate; critical thinking for reasoned decision making by Freeley* (1993). Freeley also distinguishes sign argumentation but he uses a different definition than McBurney and Mills. According to Freeley, sign argumentation is based on a substance-attribute relation. Since every subject (object, thing, person, event) has certain distinguishing attributes or characteristics (size, shape, colour) the attributes may be taken as signs of the substance, or the other way around. This definition agrees with the pragma-dialectical notion of symptomatic argumentation.

In his dissertation A reformulation of the modes of reasoning in argumentation (1962) Hastings gives a more elaborated classification of types of reasoning, or – as he calls them – 'modes of reasoning'. His classification servers as a basis for the typology of Schellens and also for Waltons' list of argumentation schemes. In his classification, Hastings distinguishes verbal, causal and free-floating argumentation. In the verbal argumentation types, the premise is linked to the standpoint by making use of word meaning or a definition. This happens in an argumentation such as the following:
This is a sonnet because it is a poem with 14 lines.

The premise is linked to the standpoint by means of the general statement: sonnets are poems with 14 lines. Verbal argumentation also includes argumentation based on a value judgement, as in the following argumentation:

This movie is good because it has a very realistic plot.

Both argumentation based on a definition and argumentation based on a value judgement can be seen as symptomatic argumentation. In the *New Rhetoric* (1969), Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca distinguish two sorts of argumentative relations that are based on the structure of reality: sequential relations and the relation of coexistence.

In arguments which display both types of relation a link is established between two elements in order to promote a transfer of approval from the accepted to the not yet accepted. Sequential relations are causal in nature. According to Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, cause and effect are on the same phenomenal plane. This is not the case with the elements that are linked by means of coexistence relations. An essential property of argumentation relying on a coexistence relation is that one element is presented as being more fundamental than the other is. The relation between the person and the act is here seen as prototypical. The idea we have of the person is thus considered more essential than that of his acts. It is possible to argue from the person to the act but also the other around. One can for instance, say that Frank is trustworthy because he is never late, but one could also argue that Frank will not be late because he is trustworthy. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca consider the argument from authority as a special variant of this kind of argumentation. Other types of argument based on a relation of coexistence include that of the group and its members and argumentation based on a double hierarchy.

In his Dutch book *Redelijke argumenten* ('Reasonable arguments', 1985), Schellens presented a typology that is partly based on Hastings' Typology. Schellens makes a distinction between argumentation based on rules and argumentation based on regularity. A subtype of argumentation based on rules is argumentation with the argumentation scheme based on rules of behaviour. In this type of argumentation a certain kind of action is promoted by referring to certain conditions. The argumentation is based on a relation of concomitance between the conditions and the required action. There are still many other conceptions of sign or token argumentation. My exposé is only meant to give you an idea of the many variants of symptomatic argumentation. For a better understanding of symptomatic argumentation, more systematic analysis is needed. One important way to get a clearer idea of this type of argumentation, is to examine more carefully which type of standpoint can be supported by

symptomatic argumentation and what kind of premises can be used to support, and what combinations are possible.

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Issa Proceedings 1998 – The History Of The Enthymeme

1. Introduction **[i]**

Enthymemes are on the agenda of modern rhetoric, argumentation theory, conversation and discourse analysis, formal and informal logic and critical thinking. However, in the various approaches to enthymemes there are many and sometimes large differences with respect to the definition of an enthymeme. In some cases the definitions do not even seem to refer to the same language phenomenon:

Some modern definitions of an enthymeme

An enthymeme is a truncated of abbreviated argument – (…) with either a missing premiss or an unstated conclusion (Crossley and Wilson, 1979: 106).

Enthymemes are arguments in which the support is matched to the questions and objections of the recipient (Jackson and Jacobs, 1980: 262).

The enthymeme does not require a particular linguistic frame, it is a form of thought, rather than a form of composition. (Nash 1989: 206)) This argument has all the earmarks of the enthymeme: the opening proposition, the syllogistic statement of contraries or incompatibles, the conclusion which is in effect a reformulation of the opening proposition (Nash, 1989: 210).

An enthymeme is an argument in which the speaker for pragmatic reasons left certain parts implicit, which means that at the logical level of analysis the missing part must be added in order to render the argument valid, while at the pragmatic level the particular assumption on which the argument relies has to be shown (Van Eemeren en Grootendorst, 1992).**[ii]**

These are just some examples. There are many other definitions that resemble one of them, but may differ in one aspect or another. This variety in definitions is puzzling. Are the differences only differences in stressing some aspect or another of essentially the same meaning, or do they reflect major theoretical differences? My main concern in this paper is to investigate and explain these differences, which I will do by giving you a historical overview. It is important to look into this, because it is often tacitly assumed that there is general consensus on what an enthymeme is, while in my view this is not the case. As a result of that, discussions on enthymemes sometimes suffer from a confusion of tongues. There are some thorough and helpful recent studies on the history of the enthymeme (e.g. Burnyeat, 1996; Braet, 1997), but these focus on one particular historical period, whereas I think that we need an overview of all the relevant periods.

2. The sophistic and the aristotelian view

It is often claimed that the concept of the enthymeme is derived from Aristotle. It is true that he was the first (as far as we know) to develop a theory of enthymeme, in his *Rhetoric,* but there are some clear indications that, at that time, a technical enthymeme notion was already in use in rhetoric. Aristotle for example does not give a definition when he first mentions the enthymeme, and he complains that handbooks on rhetoric do not devote sufficient attention to the enthymeme.

It makes sense that Aristotle's notion of the enthymeme stems from the dominant rhetorical tradition of his time, which was that of the sophists. In several sophistic handbooks, dating from the fourth century b.C., the enthymeme is indeed mentioned. In these handbooks, it has the general meaning of the word in ancient Greek everyday language-use: the enthymeme is a thought or a consideration. But the word 'enthymeme' also has a more technical use in the sophistic handbooks (the technical meaning is sometimes ascribed to Isocate): the enthymeme belongs in the context of juridical debates, and in that of weighing the pro's and cons in cases in which the truth is unclear and something can be said for both sides. In these contexts, the enthymeme is used to point out contradictions in the suspect's story or between the suspect's statements and that which is generally believed to be acceptable in society. This definition of an enthymeme as an argument based on contradictions I call the sophistic definition. The *sophistic definition* has lived on, for it can be found in Roman times in Quintillian for example, and also in modern definitions, as in the definition by Nash I gave earlier. Striking is that, in the sophistic definition, logic (syllogisms) does not play a role, nor does the nowadays prominent aspect of the missing part of an enthymeme.

Aristotle, in his *Rhetoric*, actually does not mention that an enthymeme is based on contradictions. He mainly seems to adopt the general idea of an enthymeme as a thought or a consideration in a context in which the truth is uncertain and deliberation is required. In other words, Aristotle places the enthymeme in the rhetorical context. Even today there is much debate on what Aristotle understood to be an enthymeme. At the centre of this discussion is Aristotle's description of an enthymeme as a *syllogismos tis*. This can be interpreted in several ways: it can mean 'a syllogism of a kind' or 'a kind of syllogism'. *Syllogismos* itself can mean one of two things: it is either an argument that is deductively valid, or it has the more strict meaning of a categorical syllogism, with its minor-major structure, two premises**[iii]**, and with one of the four syllogistic forms Aristotle discerns in his *Analytica Priora* (written after the *Rhetoric*). It is unclear which of the two, or maybe both at the same time, Aristotle applies in the *Rhetoric*. In any case, as

both Burnyeat and Braet claim, Aristotle's *syllogismos* cannot automatically be translated into the word 'syllogism' in its modern, logic-oriented meaning.

In Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, only four examples of arguments are explicitly presented as enthymemes, some of which Aristotle took from existing literary sources. Some other examples, although not presented as such, are now generally considered to be enthymemes as well. Three of these examples are:

Aristotle's examples of enthymemes
1. No man is free, for he is a slave of money or of fate. (*Rhet*. 2.12.2:94b4-6)
2. If peace should be made when it is most profitable and useful, than peace should be made when luck is still on one's side. (*Rhet*.3.17.17:18b36-38)
3. Dorius was the winner in a contest in which a laurel wreath was the price, for Dorius won the Olympic Games (*Rhet*. 1.12.13).

According to Aristotle, enthymemes function in a rhetorical context: that is why they are rhetorical arguments. He further states that, as a result of this, the content of enthymemes is about things that are alterable, like human acts. The premises of enthymemes do not contain certainties nor generally accepted facts – in enthymemes the premises consist of probabilities (*eikota*) or signs (*semeia*). Furthermore, Aristotle says that enthymemes are supposed to be brief, since the audience is not expected to be able to handle complicated reasoning, and therefore what is known to the audience may be left implicit. Finally, Aristotle states that enthymemes contain topoi. All these statements together constitute what I call the *aristotelian definition* of an enthymeme.

Several aspects of the aristotelian definition are subject to debate. A relevant issue here is that it is unclear whether Aristotle regarded the aspect of unstated or implicit parts as necessary for an argument to be an enthymeme. Aristotle is not definite on this point. Some authors, for example Burnyeat (1996: 106), stress that Aristotle only mentions the possibility of a part being implicit: nowhere does he say that this has to be the case. As did Van Eemeren and Grootendorst before him, Braet proposes instead to differentiate between two levels of analysis, one being the pragmatic level, where it is decided what is to be left implicit. If something is implicit, this requires the second level, the logical level, where a premise is supplied (1997: 103).

A second issue with respect to the aristotelian definition is how the topic structure of enthymemes relates to the syllogistic structure in its strict meaning. Are the two structures compatible, and if not, why did Aristotle call an

enthymeme a syllogismos tis? Solmsen (1929) was of the opinion that Aristotle's *Rhetoric* contains a so-called double theory of enthymemes: one based on the topic structure, and one based on the syllogistic structure. Breat (1997: 106-107), however, points out that these structures are not incompatible. He claims that they rather reflect again two different levels, the logical and the pragmatic level. At the pragmatic level, the topical structure has to do with argumentation schemes. At the logical level, forms of argument and logical rules of inference are relevant. The references to the syllogistic structure in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* may well be later additions, a point made by Burnyeat (1996: 105).

The conclusion from this is that Aristotle's theory of the enthymeme seems to rely on two different lines of thought. One, which seems to be the earliest, is his concern with the rhetorical context, argumentations in practice and the topic of the (pragmatic) approach. The other one, which may be a later addition, seems to be the application of categorical syllogisms to rhetorical arguments, which resulted in the syllogistic (logical) approach to enthymemes. I agree with Van Eemeren and Grootendorst as well as with Braet that, for argumentation theorists, it is fruitful to distinguish between a pragmatic and a logical level, and to give attention to both in an analysis.

3. The boethian definition

In Roman times different definitions of enthymeme were in use. Some are clearly aristotelian in origin, others are clearly not. For example, Quintillian, in his Topica, refers to arguments based on contradiction as enthymemes. This calls to mind the sophistic definition. But in Quintillian's *Institutio Oratoria* he applies logical rules to formally represent enthymemes (he uses post-aristotelian propositional logic to do so, but this does not change the point). To formally represent enthymemes is in itself an aristotelian thought, and not a sophistic one. And Quintillian stresses that parts of an enthymeme are implicit, which is also not an element of the sophistic description, but of the aristotelian view.

According to Boethius, an enthymeme is an imperfectus syllogismus: Enthymema est *imperfectus syllogismus,* cujus aliquae partes, vel propter brevitatem, vel propter notitiam prae termissae sunt. (I.MPL. 64: 1050b) (An enthymeme is an imperfect syllogism, of which some parts have been left out, either for reasons of brevity or because they are assumed to be common knowledge, S.G.)

The boethian definition of an enthymeme has become famous, and it can generally be found in handbooks up to the Middle Ages. The question, however, is what was

understood by *imperfectus:* in what sense is an enthymeme considered to be imperfect? Are enthymemes imperfect because they do not deal with certainties but with probabilities only? Or does imperfectus mean that an enthymeme is incomplete because a premise is missing? Interestingly, Isidor de Sevill gives both these interpretations when he describes the enthymeme. According to him, an enthymeme is an *imperfectus syllogismus* because it consists of two parts rather than three. This is a reference to the form of enthymemes, and to the logical level. Furthermore, De Sevill explains that an enthymeme is imperfectus because it uses subject material that does not belong to the domain of the syllogism and is directed at convincing an audience. He gives an example about whether or not to go out to sea when the weather is bad, which is a clear case of deliberation on human acting. This part of De Sevill's definition is a reference to the rhetorical context of enthymemes and to the pragmatic level.

4. The logical definition

In the Middle Ages formal logic obtained its more dominant position over rhetoric. From Aristotle's work generally only the logical aspects got attention. Handbooks on logic from the Middle Ages often have Boethius' definition: an enthymeme is a syllogismus imperfectus. But imperfectus at this point in time only means 'imperfect because of the form' – a premise is missing and has to be added. Descriptions of the enthymeme as a 'truncated', 'abbreviated', 'shortened' or 'hidden' syllogism also date back to this period. The idea that, in an enthymeme, a premise is implicit (and not a conclusion) stems from the Middle Ages as well. According to earlier approaches, either a premise or the conclusion was missing.

Aristotle's typology of arguments and argument standards was neglected, and rhetorical arguments where not considered to be a separate kind of arguments with their own standards. Now there were only syllogisms, and all of them were what Aristotle called apodictic syllogisms. Enthymemes were apodictic syllogisms as well, the only difference being a difference in presentation. This view of an enthymeme as a syllogism in which a premise is omitted I call the *logical definition* of enthymemes.

During the Renaissance period, the humanists again appreciated the fact that in enthymemes parts are left implicit, and some found that, for that reason, enthymemes were more appealing to the reader. But this aspect of enthymemes was not attributed to Aristotle, since he was then thought of as being 'too formal' and 'too strict', and concerned with logic only.

In our times the logical definition is still current among logicians and others. The logical definition is often considered to be the only definition of an enthymeme, as in the Oxford Concise Dictionary: *The enthymeme according to the Oxford Concise Dictionary* (1988)

Enthymeme (Logic). Syllogism in which one premiss is not explicitly stated.

Characteristic of the logical approach is that, on the one hand, the pragmatic aspect of enthymemes is recognised: the speaker or writer has left a part implicit. In fact, from a logical perspective it makes no sense at all to recognise this. On the other hand, in the reconstruction the pragmatic aspects are not taken into consideration: the reconstruction is done solely in logical terms.

5. *The argumentation-theoretical and the modern rhetorical definition*

Recently, some new definitions have been formulated as well. One of these is the definition in which the logical level and the pragmatic level are distinguished, as is done by modern argumentation theorists, e.g. in pragma-dialectics. This results in definitions like the one formulated by Van Eemeren and Grootendorst that I gave earlier. It is also the view that Braet adheres to. This view is characterized by attention for both logical and pragmatic aspects. I call this the *argumentation-theoretical definition*.

Another definition comes from the modern, revived interest in rhetoric. Important here is the generative rhetoric of Bitzer (1959), based on the idea that speakers should only use reasons that the audience itself would come up with if a question-answer strategy were applied. This generative aspect can be found in the definition of an enthymeme by Jackson and Jacobs, also quoted earlier. I call this the *modern rhetorical definition*. Interestingly, it is rather close to what Aristotle seems to have had in mind first when talking about enthymemes in his *Rhetoric*.

6. *Conclusion*

There are different views on enthymemes, and they are all partly rooted in history. All in all, six main notions of an enthymeme can be found in the literature: the sophistic definition (the enthymeme is an argument based on contradictions or contraries), the aristotelian definition (the enthymeme is a rhetorical argument, based on probabilities or signs), the boethian definition (an enthymeme is an *imperfectus syllogimus*), the logical definition (the enthymeme is a syllogism in which one premise is omitted), the argumentation-theoretical definition (an enthymeme is an argumentation in which a premise is left implicit at the pragmatic level, which means that a premise has to be added at the logical level),

and the modern rhetorical definition (the enthymeme is an argument matched to the questions and objections of the recipient).

These definitions are not in all respects mutually exclusive, they do overlap. And perhaps, underlying the definitions, there is something of a shared core meaning of the concept of enthymeme, and maybe it is worthwhile (although not easy) to try and formulate that core in one definition of enthymemes that all of us can use. However, it can be useful, and it need not necessarily be a problem, to have different definitions of the enthymeme. But it is important to be aware that, when talking about enthymemes, you may be thinking of one thing while at the same time your audience may well be thinking of something entirely different.

NOTES

i. This paper is a summary of Chapter 2 of my doctoral dissertation Problemen met de begrijpelijkheid van argumentatie met een verzwegen argument (working title; translation: Problems with the understandability of argumentation with a missing premise), 1999 (forthcoming).

ii. This is not a literal quote, but rather my representation of the view presented by Van Eemeren and Grootendorst.

iii. I use 'premise' and not 'premiss'.

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ISSA Proceedings 1998 – Language, Words And Expressive Speech Acts

This essay is in three parts; each subsequent part shorter than the previous. In the first I discuss the *Principle of Pragmatic Emotionalization*, (Gilbert, 1997a) and the role of emotion in argumentation. The specific issue concerns the role of emotional messages in argument. This is used as a foundation for the second part where I will describe the role of expressive speech acts, or, as I will call them, emotional message acts, in everyday argumentation. Finally, I say a very few words regarding the question as to whether or not we are doing Argumentation Theory or Psychology in studying emotional argumentation.

To begin with, I must reiterate that the role of emotion is significant and can be crucial to both the comprehension of a position and the resolution or settlement of an argument. I have argued these points at length elsewhere, and rather then repeat myself in the limited time available, in this discussion I shall simply assume the following. Emotions invariably enter into argumentation (Gilbert, 1996). Emotional interaction can be observed and structured as informational cues (Gilbert, 1995, 1997).

(3) Arguments can have emotional data, warrants or claims (ibid.).

1. The Principle of Pragmatic Emotionalization
The *Principle of Pragmatic Emotionalization* [PPE] is a cornerstone in interpreting the role that emotion plays in argumentation.
The principle relies on a discord or inconsistency between the words being

uttered and the message being communicated. Put another way, when emotion and logic are in agreement, there is no difficulty; we know how to deal with such situations. Emotion plays the role we expect it to, communicating information about our internal states, feelings, beliefs and desires. However, in other circumstances, our communicative tools tell us that there is something wrong, a discordance. In these interactions the principle plays an important role. The principle is as follows.

The Principle of Pragmatic Emotionalization:
Given that a communicator is presenting an emotional message that is inconsistent with the logical message, then the recipient may assume that
1. the logical message may not be reliable, and/or
2. the complete message may be compound, and/or
3. the goals of the communicator may have been misidentified, and/or
4. the communicator's position may not have been fully exposed.

In short, the PPE gives us license to assume that an emotional factor that has not been made explicit is a significant component of the argument. In that case, one must turn to non-logical techniques relying upon the tools human communicators normally use when interacting. Emotion can enter an argument in two different ways. First, it can be open, straightforward and consistent with the discursive messages presented. I want to call this "open emotion." Open emotion is present when it is itself the topic of discussion, or when it is consistent with the topic of discussion. Thus, if I am having an argument with my wife and the issue is one of emotional significance to both of us and, as a result, emotions begin to become evident, there is no surprise or confusion. Similarly, if, as part of my argument I am relating the trials suffered by refugees and my voice shows emotion, then there is no puzzlement as to why it is there. Indeed, one may well be surprised when someone ought be expressing emotion and is not. Open emotion is present all the time, most especially in non-academic or non-clinical arguments (Gilbert, 1995.)

Emotional messages convey information that is often vital to understanding an opposer's position. Emotional messages tell us, for example, whether or not to believe someone's statement. Someone, for example, apologizing in a flat toneless voice will, typically, not be thought sincere. Emotional messages also indicate an individual's degree of commitment by demonstrating how strongly they feel about the position at issue. Certainly, one can be wrong. You might think that Trudy is

upset about something when really she is upset, but not about what you think she is upset about. Similarly, Ralph might care very much about the topic of your disagreement, but not be someone who shows emotion. But while this might be thought to be a difficulty peculiar to emotional argumentation, in reality the same pitfalls lie in wait for discursive communication. We frequently interpret someone's words wrongly, misunderstand their message, or mis-ascribe beliefs. The realm of logical language is as vague and imprecise as is the language of emotions.

A classical speech act contains four parts: the utterance act, the propositional act, the illocutionary act, and the perlocutionary act. In van Eemeren & Grootendorst (1984: 21) *Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions*, illocutionary acts have, following Searle (1969), list four kinds of conditions for speech acts. These are
1. preparatory conditions;
2. propositional conditions;
3. sincerity conditions;
4. essential conditions. They are separately necessary and conjointly sufficient to delineate a communicative action.

If we think about emotional expression as a speech act then it can be quite confusing. After all, the whole idea of emotionality is that it is beyond or, if preferred, behind the words (if, indeed, there are words at all.) So, it is better not to think of emotional expressions as forming speech acts, but rather as involving *message acts*. The key difference between a speech act and a message act is that the latter de-emphasizes the verbal. Rather than putting the linguistic in the forefront as the primary carrier of information, the message act views communication as a package of information drawing on various forms of communication and as many modes as required. Indeed, being realistic about language and communication quickly leads one to the conclusion that words are merely a small part of the communication process. Yet, for some reason, words are glorified to the extent that other forms of communication are relegated to peripheral roles.

Van Eemeren & Grootendorst (1984:22) state: "… we believe we may … say that the understandability of illocutionary acts in colloquial speech depends strongly on *pragmatic* conventions. One indication is that *implicit* and *indirect* illocutionary acts are as a rule understood perfectly and the speaker can also assume in principle that they will be understood, so that it is plausible that other

conventions besides strictly semantic ones will (also) play a role." In other words, there's no real argument but that a good deal of communication, even speech acts, takes place "implicitly" or "indirectly", i.e., without words. So, words are not required for communication.

What then is the relationship between words and language? I have no difficulty at all in conceptualizing language as containing words as one communicative tool, but since we know that words alone are imprecise and underdetermine meanings, other clues are required. This is important: Nondiscursive communications are required in order to clarify discursive communication. Words alone tell us nothing, or, mislead us as to the intended message. (See Willard, 1989:91-111.) Out of context, in isolation, removed from innuendo, action, nuance, tone, insight, history, and interaction words require great precision to communicate clearly. The most carefully wrought legal decisions, the most precisely worded academic tracts are subject to misinterpretation, heated dispute as to meanings, involved analyses, and even, today, deconstruction. A position's being put into words is hardly a guarantee that it will be clear and unambiguous. Meanings are not manifest.

Expressive speech acts are, at the very least, the handmaiden of meaning. When genuine, (a requirement for any speech act,) they can clarify, amplify, and precise the intended message. Is a particular sequence of words to be taken as a threat? Or a warning? Or a description? This may depend on the degree of anger evinced in an associated expressive speech act occurring concurrently with the illocutionary speech act. Alternatively, as in an argumentation, we might want to say that a given speech act can be viewed or re-interpreted through the various modes. This would mean that a proposition expressed by a speech act would itself not be understood linguistically, but be re-interpreted as a message with manifold aspects. Indeed, we pay lip service to the idea that propositions are not invisible sentences, but when the chips are down they are always treated that way.

The desire among rationalists, or, as I prefer, neo-logicists, to embrace precision and vainly seek the rules and procedures that will render arguments clear and unambiguous icons of reason is understandable. Virtually every Argumentation Theorist is in the field because she believes that the study of argumentation, its advancement and propagation will lead to a better, less violent world. Animals fight over territory, slay each other, and behave in brutish non-rational fashion, or so it is thought and so the entire history of Western philosophy leads one to believe. And the crucial difference between ourselves and The Animals is that we

have language, or, more accurately in some instances, a finer and richer language. We think, speculate, form hypotheses, create theories, and otherwise use our mental talents for amusement and diversion. Animals do not do this. They do not have competing theories of the creation of the world, they do not argue interminably over the legitimacy of mind-body dualism, they do not even play Scrabble. So, if we are going to be "better" or "higher" than our animal cousins, we must rely on that talent we have that they do not: I.e., the ability to use a word processor (I know that anthropologically adept listeners will have tales of apes and chimps that can read and write. I would mention them myself, but I am concerned not to alarm our confreres).

You will say that I am being facetious, and you may be right, but only partly so. We know that animals have emotions, desires, and feelings. I can tell when my dog, Bojay, is happy, excited, aroused, angry, or content. As a result of being able to read his desires I can say that I have, at least once, had an argument with him. That is, we each wanted to do different things, and I, ultimately, yielded to his greater want. Neo-logicists do not want to allow that we can argue with animals. I do not pretend to understand why, but it seems to loom large in their thinking. It has something to do with the notion of 'rational,' a predicate that is intended as an honorific for styles of communication not available to the lower species. Emotions will not serve as a species differentiator: We can freely acknowledge that animals have feelings, i.e., we see animals interacting with each other on nature programmes, exhibiting anger, affection, amusement, and so on in ways that we recognize. They seem to communicate, to send messages, to conduct exchanges, in ways that are recognizable to us. Sometimes it is as if they are a parody of our own emotional interactions. When apes beat their chests, approach and flee and clash and combat, we can feel the underlying similarity to schoolyard posturing, the barroom brawl, corporate fencing, and, dare I say it, the odd academic symposium.

The neo-logicist finds this unacceptable not because he does not like animals or thinks they never show traits that are worthwhile, indeed I am sure many are vegetarians. Rather, it is because of the high standards he holds for humans. We must always have reasons, and the reasons we have must be articulated, defended, and laid out in such a way as to persuade any other human who is capable of entertaining and understanding the hypotheses and defenses put forward. We are not persuaded by sentiment, raw feeling, pre-dispositions, or other non-rational aspects of the human messaging system. We, the neo-logicist

would have us believe, are never persuaded, but only convinced. We sift through data, examine warrants, and determine carefully how these are applied to the presented claims. We are disinterested, we are objective, we hear the arguments presented and weigh them carefully to se how they tell against the positions we hold.

All of this, of course, is nonsense.

2. Expressive Message Acts

The classical speech act has four key components. These are the *utterance act*, the *propositional act*, the *illocutionary act*, and the *perlocutionary act* (Eemeren, 1984:19). Mapping this onto the emotion story, we can discuss the *message act*, the *information act*, the *illocutionary act*, and the *perlocutionary act*. That is, given the considerations above, the first two categories must be broadened, while the latter two can retain their original terminology. Just to confuse things, and in the tradition of Austin, I will also use *emotional message act* to indicate the entire activity analogous to the speech act.

A message act, being analogous to an utterance act involves an expression of emotion that is identifiable to the recipient or observer. There are many emotions, and we are typically adept at identifying them. Sillince (1994), for example, identifies 40 ranging from anger to boredom. Certainly, emotional acuity varies widely within the population and is, as well, culturally relative (In most cultures, for example, women are more adept at identifying emotions than are men). But the message act in most situations can be recognized, and, importantly, its appropriateness can also be identified.

This is important because it means that the *Principle of Pragmatic Emotionalization* can come into play and signal situations where the normal situation is being skewed. To this extent, the PPE can be considered analogous to Grice's *Principle of Cooperation* in the sense that when things seem incorrect, a different interpretation must be sought.

The emotional message act is the actual demonstration of emotional content itself. It communicates to the audience that a specific emotion is present in the actor. The emotional information act, on the other hand, is the communicative assertion that some causal relationship exists between the expression of emotion and the issue at hand. The information can be of several types. For example, it might be that the issue is emotionally charged for me, or that you are making me angry, or that I am frustrated, or that I am alarmed, or that you are in danger,

and so on. On the linguistic side, the information act corresponds to the propositional act wherein a particular predication takes place. There is a predication taking place in the message act as well. A protagonist is communicating the information that there is a certain relationship between the presence of an emotion as exhibited in the message act and the interaction taking place. These predications take the general form:

S is experiencing emotion E as a result of I.

As with straightforward verbal communication, the context must be relied upon to fill in the blanks. This includes the kind of emotion and what it is a result of.

The next aspect is the illocutionary act, and that is the action that is performed in doing the communicative episode. That is, it is the force of the experience taken as a communicative event. In the classic example of promising, one "makes a promise" by uttering a variety of words under certain identifiable circumstances. Similarly, the expression of emotion under circumstances recognizable by most humans also performs a complex action beyond the mere presence of the emotion itself. These include the following.

S makes an accusation

S makes a threat

S makes an appeal

S gives a warning

S intimidates T

S cajoles T

S appeals to T

S threatens T

S blames T

S frightens T

S accuses T

S alienates T

S condescends to T

S bores T

S pacifies T

Each of these actions can occur linguistically or nondiscursively. More importantly, the emotional act can occur at the same time that a linguistic act is occurring. That is, S might be performing the speech act of making a proposal while at the same time performing the emotional message act of making a threat.

Indeed, each also has its corresponding perlocutionary act, as in causing fright, alarm, tenderness, and so on. The intended perlocutionary effect of the emotional message act may well be much more important to the dynamics of a given argumentation then the actual linguistic facade. Such situations occur, for example, when someone is speaking kind words, but the emotional message act is much harder, perhaps even threatening.

In sum, the emotional message act carries a significant weight in argumentation, especially if we desire to understand the positions of the players, their goals, desires and needs. By dismissing expressive speech acts and not exploring them we miss a great part of actual argumentation, which, in turn, means it escapes our observation and regulation. Simply stating that emotion play no role in argumentation is not only wrong, but shortsighted. It is shortsighted not only because those who believe in the importance and efficacy of emotional expression are dismissed (Campbell, 1994), but because far too much of what happens in the very human process that is argumentation occurs on the emotional level.

3. Why Is This Argumentation Theory Rather Than Psychology?

The third aspect of this inquiry is to ask the question regularly asked of me, "Why is this Argumentation Theory rather than Psychology?" First, I have to express my puzzlement at the very asking of the question. Presumably, there is some demarcation between subjects that the discipline police feel is sufficiently clear so as to be able to patrol. But even leaving that issue aside, the question is still puzzling. It is puzzling because it seems obvious to me that Argumentation Theory must have to do with psychology. After all, argument involves emotions, attitudes and desires, and those are foursquare within the psychological arena. Perhaps, then, the real issue is that the questions are psychological rather than philosophical, and this may well be the case (provided, of course, that we give the discipline police their due). But the answer to that must be, I am an Argumentation Theorist as well as a philosopher, and an Argumentation Theorist must go where the argument goes.

The fear takes us back to the discussion in section (1) about the concerns of the neo-logicists, as well as other matters (for example pedagogical issues (Gilbert, 1995a.)) That is, if Argumentation Theory is going to be a careful and controlled discipline then it is infinitely easier for it to pay attention to the external, the quantifiable, and the public. As soon as we permit the fuzzy, the implicit, the hard to isolate and point at in our borders, then the kind of precision the neo-logicist wants goes by the board. The Holy Grail of the Informal Logician, the Pragma-

Dialectician, is the sort of argument that follows careful rules, keeps everything on the table, open and public. It is the goal of "settlement" which, according to Pragma-Dialectics occurs when there is a critical discussion in which no one is attached to the outcome. Maybe there is such a thing; I have never found one.

So, my answer is that emotion plays a significant role in argumentation, regardless if one is using "settlement" or "resolution" as the ideal framework. As a result, obstacles to a successful conclusion of an argument can arise if rules for the proper and improper utilization of emotional argument are not clearly identified. It is quite possible that psychological insights are and will be required in order to properly dissect and analyze the forms of argument used in the emotional mode, and, to that extent, psychology is part of Argumentation Theory.

So, the final answer is that the study of the emotional mode in argumentation is Argumentation Theory because, once one accepts that emotions are an integral component of argument, their study deals directly with how one ought conduct oneself in an ideal argument.

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ISSA Proceedings 1998 – Dialethic Dialogue

1. Introduction

In this paper we discuss the use of the Hamblin/Mackenzie Formal Dialectic (HMFD) for the classical/non-classical debate about the status of contradictions and of non-trival inconsistent theories. Some of the central issues have been addressed in (Mackenzie and Priest 1990), and we discuss their stance.

It will be argued that the Mackenzie-Priest stance poses difficulties for the classical viewpoint. These are difficulties which have to do with debating the questions. In a discussion of the difficulties about the debate, argument will be presented which is deeply pessimistic about the resolution of these debate difficulties. The question for us is, "How can the argument continue? Can such profound difference be amenable to rational or reasonable argument?"

We begin by setting out a HMFD system in a condensed form, with focus on the features which are salient to the question of the debate. The system contains certain restrictions which are classical in nature. These restrictions give HMFD an apparently strong bias against dialetheism.

We consider how the HMFD restrictions work in practice, and see if they need to be modified so as to better serve the debate about dialetheism without begging the question. In this context, we consider some comments of (John Woods 1997) about both the argument against disjunctive syllogism and the well known set theory paradox in the Russell-Frege correspondence.

The comments were made in response to a dialogue system presented in (Girle "Belief Sets and Commitment Stores" 1997).

2. Hamblin/Mackenzie Formal Dialectic (HMFD)

There are many formal dialogue systems. (We note in passing: Barth and Martens 1984, Hamblin 1970, Mackenzie 1979, 1984, Walton 1984, and Walton and Krabbe 1995.) Despite differences between the systems, they have several things

in common.

There are four main elements in most dialogue-logics. First, there is interaction between dialogue participants – the minimal case being two participants. The interaction is represented in the obvious way as a sequence of locution events. The dialogue-logic also has syntactic stipulations concerning the types of locutions with which the logic will deal. The locutions include: statements, responses of various sorts, questions of various kinds, and withdrawals. Locutions are used by the participants in a dialogue to form a sequence of locution events. In setting out a dialogue we number locutions to indicate their order in the dialogue. These numbers are somewhat like the numberings of formulas in a proof.

The second element is a set of commitment stores, one for each participant in the sequence. Commitment stores are neither deductively closed nor necessarily logically consistent. The third element is a set of Commitment Store Rules. Each participant's commitment store is added to and subtracted from according to what statements, questions, answers and withdrawals are used by participants in the dialogue, subject only to the rules. For example, there may be a rule that if a participant asserts that P, then P is added to everyone's commitment store. If anyone disagrees, then they must explicitly deny P. Such a condition gives expression to the notion that we mostly believe what people say. A participant's commitment store does not have to be logically consistent. Its logical consistency becomes an issue only if the other participants in the dialogue detect prima face logical inconsistency and demand that the inconsistency be resolved. We return to the question of prima face inconsistency later.

The fourth element is a set of Interaction Rules to stipulate the legal sequence of locution events. For example, a question of the form "Why do you believe that P ?" must be followed by the reasons, or premises, from which one is to draw the conclusion that P, or a denial that one believes that P. These rules immediately make the dialogue into a joint activity. Breach of the rules indicates a failure in the joint activity. A joint activity need not be a co-operative activity. It can be competitive. For example, it can be mutually counter-persuasive, where each participant is trying to persuade the other of a proposition contrary to their present belief.

We set out some of the rules for the dialogue-logic, DL3 (Girle 1997), which is based on the systems DL (Girle 1993), DL2 (Girle 1994), and BQD (Mackenzie 1979, 1984). For DL3 there are just twoparticipants, X and Y. In setting out rules

below we will use S for the speaker and H for the hearer. There are nine sorts of locutions allowed: statements of three kinds, declarations, withdrawals, tf-questions, wh-questions, challenges, and resolution demands.

* The categorical statements are statements such as P, not P, P and Q, P or Q, If P then Q and statements of ignorance (I do not know whether or not P). The last is abbreviated to \(*i P.* The reactive statements are grounds (Because P), abbreviated toP.
* The logical statements are immediate consequence conditionals such as: If P and P implies Q, then Q.
* A term declaration is the utterance of some term, say t.
* The withdrawal of P is of the form I withdraw P, I do not accept P, not P, or I no longer know whether P. The first and second are abbreviated as \(mi P.
* The tf-questions are of the form Is it the case that P?, abbreviated to P ?.
* The wh-questions are of the form What (when, where, who, what, which) is an (the) F ?. The strict logical form is (Qx)Fx, where Q is the interrogative quantifier, and for each such formula there will be an associated statement (Ex)Fx. (Mackenzie 1987)
* A challenge is of the form Why is it supposed to be that P?, abbreviated to Why P?.
* The resolution demands are of the form Resolve P.
Each locution event is represented in the formal representation of a dialogue in an ordered triple of a number, an agent and the agent's locution. The number is the number of an event in the dialogue sequence. For example, the statement P uttered at the nth step in the dialogue by X is represented as X, P. We also allow for justification sequences. They are four-tuples consisting of the antecedent of a conditional, the conditional, its consequent, and a challenge of the consequent. For example: If P then Q, Q, Why Q? We set out some of the rules of DL3, with comments on their significance and operation.

There are seven Commitment Store Rules. We set out three:
(C1) Statements : After an event S, P, where P is a statement, unless the preceding event was a challenge, P goes into the commitment stores of both participants.
(It is assumed that everyone agrees with statements unless and until they deny them or withdraw them. The inclusion of the full ordered pair is so that there is a record in the commitment store of thehistorical order of the locutions included.)

(C2) Defences : After the event S, P, when: Why Q? and Q are in the speaker's commitment store, the justification sequence : If P then Q, Q, Why Q?, and P and If P then Q go into the commitment stores of both participants.

The challenge: Why Q? is removed from the commitment stores of both participants.

(If someone gives reasons for a statement Q, then the reason, its assumed conditional connection, and exactly what is justified go into the commitment stores of both participants. This allows us to keep track of why statements are in the commitment stores.)

(C4) Challenges : After the event S, Why P?, the challenge, Why P?, goes into the commitment stores of both participants.

If P is not in the hearer's commitment store then: P goes into the hearer's commitment store.

If P is in the speaker's commitment store, it is removed.

If the P is present in the speaker's commitment store as part of a justification sequence, the justification sequence is removed.

(Although it might seem strange to put P into the hearer's commitment store, the hearer can withdraw it or deny it (see (v)(a) below and C3 above).

Also, if P is in the speaker's commitment store it is withdrawn because, if the speaker has no problem about the statement, the challenge should not have been issued. It should be noted that this is not an altogether unproblematic explanation. The speaker might want to discern whther or not the hearer has reasons for asserting P other than the speaker's.

Further details of other Commitment Store rules are set out in the table below.

There are eight Interaction Rules. We set out five in detail. The rest are summarised, in some sense, in the table below.

(i) Repstat : No statement may occur if it is in the commitment stores of both participants.

This rule prevents vain repetition and helps stop begging the question. From an everyday rhetorical perspective it is unrealistic, but in the ideal dialogue it is appropriate.

(ii) Imcon : A conditional whose consequent is an immediate consequence of its antecedent must not be withdrawn.

(iii) LogChall : An immediate consequence conditional must not be withdrawn.

(These rules, (ii) and (iii), prevent the withdrawal or challenge of logical principles. These are the focus of our attention later in this paper.)

(v) Chall : After S, Why P? the next event must be , H, Q, where Q is either

(a) a withdrawal or denial of P, or

(b) the resolution demand of an immediate consequence conditional whose consequent is P and whose antecedent is a conjunction of the statements to which the challenger is committed, or

(c) a statement of grounds acceptable to the challenger.

We require, at this point, a definition of what an acceptable statement of grounds is: A statement of grounds, Because P, is acceptable to participant S iff either P is not under challenge by S, or if P is under challenge by S then there is a set of statements to each of which S is committed and to none of which is S committed to challenge, and P is an immediate modus ponens consequence of the set. This definition is discussed at length in Mackenzie [1984]. (When the challenge is issued, the person challenged can either (a) deny any adherence to P, or (b) throw the challenge back to the challenger by pointing out that the challenger is committed to P, or (c) give a reason acceptable to the challenger).

S Locution at Step n S Store H Store
H Response

S Locution at Step n S Store H Store H Response

(vi) Resolve : The resolution demand in S, Resolve whether P can occur only if either

(a) P is a statement or conjunction of statements which is immediately inconsistent and to which its hearer is committed, or

(b) P is of the form If Q then R and Q is a conjunction of statements to all of which its hearer is committed, and R is an immediate

consequence of Q, and the previous event was either , H, I withdraw P or , H, Why R? (The rule above opens the way for keeping statements consistent).

We set out the key points in a Rule Operation Table. There are rows for each of the speaker's, S, locutions. There are two commitment store columns for the resultant entries to the speaker's, S, and hearer's, H, commitment stores. We use plus and minus to indicate what is being added to or subtracted from the commitment stores of speaker and hearer. There is a column for any required next locution from the hearer.

There are three points to note.
First, commitment stores contain much more than just categorical statements. They contain relevant portions of the dialogue content. Questions and challenges are important parts of that content.
Second, a participant's commitment store does not have to be logically consistent. Its logical consistency becomes an issue only
if the other participants in the dialogue detect prima face logical inconsistency and demand that the inconsistency be resolved.
Third, some of the allowed responses are more complex than can be fitted into the box in the table. Detail will be found in (Girle
1997).

The table shows constraints the logic imposes on a dialogue. They impose a discipline, but can allow utterly inconsequential debates (see Stewart-Zerba and Girle 1993).

3. The Disjunctive Syllogism Debate
There is a well known classical principle called ex falso quodlibet (Anything follows from a contradiction).
$((P \& - P) - Q)$
There is also the classically valid argument form called Disjunctive Syllogism:
$(P \lor Q)$
$- P$
So: Q

A great deal of ink has been expended by non-classical logicians in arguing that Disjunctive Syllogism is not valid. The argument nearly always begins with the standard proof of ex falso quodlibet. It is argued that ex falso quodlibet is invalid, and that Disjunctive Syllogism is sufficient to enable the proof to go through. So, something is seriously wrong with Disjunctive Syllogism.

The standard proof is as follows:
** 1. (P & -P) Assumption
* 2. P 1, Simplification
* 3. (P V Q) 2, Addition
* 4. -P 1, Simplification
* 5. Q 3, 4, Disjunctive Syllogism

6. ((P & -P) – Q) 1 – 5, CP

Step 5 is supposedly the key.
Even though it is clear that Disjunctive Syllogism is not alone sufficient for ex falso quodlibet, and even though some might argue that Addition is more questionable, that is not the point of what is to be considered here. It does not matter which step we take to be the most vulnerable, any will do. If we agree that there is a "bad step" somewhere, we can look at each of them. And in each case we have a real problem on our hands.

John Woods has used the dialogue logic set out above to show that we can hardly begin to debate this situation.

The Rule is:
(vii) Resolution : After the event S, Resolve whether P the next event must be , H, Q, where Q is either
(a) the withdrawal of one of the conjuncts of P, or
(b) the withdrawal of one of the conjuncts of the antecedent of P, or
(c) a statement of the consequent of P.

(a) does not apply, because the statement at issue is a conditional. As for (b), R is not able to withdraw any of the conjuncts of the antecedent without, eventually, have to repudiate the whole proof. As for (c), R will be forced acknowledge that Q.

It might be asked, "Why does R not withdraw or deny the conditional: If (P V Q) and – P, then Q ?"

The reason is that the conditional is an immediate consequence conditional. And there are two crucial Rules concerning such conditionals:
(ii) Imcon : A conditional whose consequent is an immediate consequence of its antecedent must not be withdrawn.
(iii) LogChall : An immediate consequence conditional must not be withdrawn.

John Woods points out: We might think that the dispute now moves to the question of whether DS is a principle of logic. That is not an askable challenge until it is established that DS is not a rule of logic. Girle's rules oblige us not to challenge DS unless it is invalid.

But its invalidity is precisely what [the participants] are deadlocked over. The present result easily generalizes. DL3 is unable to resolve any disagreement about any "logical principle". What can be done? We turn to suggestions from (Priest and Mackenzie
1990).

4. Suggestions

Priest and Mackenzie point out that the Rules Imcon and LogChall give effect to a priori rules and principles. The immediate consequence conditionals to which they refer are conditionals which give effect to rules and principles which must be arrived at by some a priori method. If the method is classical, then we get Disjunctive Syllogism and ex falso quodlibet for free, no matter whether we want them or not. If the method is non-classical, then we don't get them. If the debate is between classical and non-classical logicians, questions are begged.

Priest and Mackenzie suggest that to deal with questions such as the question of what counts as a valid principle we should shift to a posteriori Rules. In other words, we should note what principles are accepted by people, or used by people in argument. These should become our principles.

In an a posteriori investigation, the immediate conditionals are simply a set of statements priveledged in the dialogue; and as such, they need not be regarded as logically valid by logicians, and it is even possible that they need not all be in conditional form. Equally, from this point of view an immediate inconsistency is simply a set of statements whose acceptance renders one liable to a resolution demand without further ado.

There is an immediate objection to this suggestion. The classicalist may well disagree with the "empirical" approach. We are trying to settle what the a priori Rules are. To move to a posteriori Rules pre-empts the debate, or shifts us to a different debate. There is really no direct way through this sort of objection.

We might suggest negotiations of some sort. Can a subset of valid argument schemas be agreed to, and those used for immediate consequence conditionals? To such a suggestion it might be responded that we can hardly settle questions of truth and necessity by negotiation. Of course, it is not only the classical logician who can play this game.

The sub-set of valid arguments is hardly likely to include any argument schemas unacceptable to the non-classical logician. There is a sense in which that suggestion can be seen as a non-classical ploy.

5. True Contradictions
The problems with Disjunctive Syllogism fade into the background when we turn to one of the main doctrines of dialethicism. The claim is that some contradictions are true. They are, of course, also false. But the second value is no problem.
In particular, the traditional "paradoxes" of set theory are seen as the facts about set theory. The paradoxes are presented in (Priest 1995) as indelible signs that we have reached the limits of thought. True contradictions in set theory, philosophy, language, and many other areas of intellectual endeavour, show us that we are at the limits of thought, and of course, beyond the limits also.
John Woods presents the usual argument from set theory in terms of dialogue logic, and argues that the classical dialogue logic shows that the Russell set just does not exist.

We will not translate Woods' inimitable account into the formalities of dialogue logic. That task is left to the reader. We simply reproduce Woods' version of what he calls "Frege's Sorrow". Russell is S and Frege is H.
1. S: If R (the set of all non-self-membered sets) exists then R is a member of R and R is not a member of R.
2. H: Yes.
3. S: By the axioms we both accept, R exists.
4. H: Agreed.
5. S: So we're in trouble.
6. H: You can say that again.
7. S: Since our resolution rules tell us to drop a conjunct if a statement in our committment store is an immediate contradiction, let's drop "R is a member of R".
8. H: But there is also a rule about honouring immediate consequences of what's left, i.e., "R is not a memeber of R". The trouble is that "R is not a member of R" immediately restores "R ia a member of R"; and we're right back where we started.
9. S: Worse still, the rules drive us into and endless cycle of resolution and paradox rebirth.
10. H: Of course, there is no prospect under the rules of wriggling out of Excluded Middle, is there?

11. S: No; it's a principle of logic.
12. H: But look, S. You've shown that if R exists then R is a member of R and R is not a memeber of R.
13. S: Unfortunately.
14. H: Now the consequent of that conditional is a logical falsehood, n'est ce pas.
15. S: Yes, and of course its negation is a logical truth.
16. H: Right, AND we can't give up that logical truth and we can't give up your fateful conditional.
17. S: Nor can we give up modus tollens, another principle of logic.
18. H: Which, together with the conditional and our logical truth produces as an immediate consequence the negation of its antecedent.
19. S: You mean, that R doesn't exist, after all?
20. H: Yip.
21. S: So arithmetic isn't toppling?
22. H: Yip

So ends the Woods dialogue. But, for the dialethicist, steps 10 and 11 are problematic, obviously. Priest would want to say that we should accept the consequences of our argument: R is a member of R and R is not a member of R.
Since the premises were true, both conjuncts of the feared conjunction are true also. If you believe that true premises and valid argument give true conclusions, then believe also that the contradiction is true.
But, for us the question becomes: How can we debate the status of excluded middle, and the truth of contradictions? We are, essentially, in the same situation as we were with Disjunctive Syllogism.

6. Conclusion
It looks as though the debate ceases, unless classical logicians are prepared to give way, and in that case the debate ceases anyway.

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ISSA Proceedings 1998 – Looking At Argumentation Through Communicative Intentions: Ways To Define Fallacies

1. American print media argumentation and the notion of fallacy

The paper has three closely related purposes to fulfill. The first main purpose is to identify American print media arguers' communicative strategies; establish a cause-effect relationship between the illocutionary forces of argumentative discourses as illocutionary act complexes and their perlocutionary effects; and, as stated in the title of the paper, to present ways to define fallacies by looking at argumentation through communicative intentions of the authors of the discourses. The second purpose is to present a tool with which it would be possible to describe the means by which emotional appeal is created. The third purpose is to make a clear distinction between an illocutionary force of asserting/claiming and that of stating, and demonstrate the importance of this distinction in the study of argumentation.

In order to identify fallacies, we should first make it clear how we define the notion of fallacy in this paper. To do that, we have to define the type of dialogue we deal with in the American print media. D. Walton identifies ten specific types of dialogue according to the goals parties seek to achieve. A dialogue is defined as "an exchange of speech acts between two speech partners in turn-taking sequence aimed at a collective goal" (Walton 1992: 19). With the exception of the genre of interview, whose analysis will not be a focus of our study since the goal of an interview is seeking information, not arguing points of view, American print media do not contain direct dialogues but rather are sites of a deferred type of dialogue where the two parties' reactions are presented in monologues separated from each other in time and space. However, this type of dialogue allows American print media authors to carry on an ongoing discussion of various issues. The real target audience of an American print media arguer is not an "official" antagonist in discussion, but the reader who is presumed to be a real antagonist in dispute, since to communicate news and opinion to the reader are the two main mass media functions. The real goal of both parties in most American print media dialogues is not to arrive at the truth of a matter, but to win a dispute. In other words we witness in the American print media a deferred persuasion dialogue. In terms of extent to which the American print media deferred dialogue resembles the critical discussion in the format of a direct dialogue, three types of American print media discussion can be identified.

The first type of American print media discussion, the most similar to critical

discussion, occurs in the genre of letters to the editor whose authors react directly either to an editorial or to another letter to the editor. The dialogue is focused on one specific topic, and the parties of the dialogue advocate opposite positions on the issue. Obviously, both parties in the discussion are rather concerned to defeat the official active opponent but the main goal, however, of either party still remains to achieve persuasion of the passive reader. The second type of American print media discussion is manifest on the Pro/Con section of a newspaper or magazine. Again, the discussion focuses on one particular topic. The arguers do not react directly to an opposing discourse because neither party is familiar with the particular discourse their discourse will be juxtaposed with. While they are only asked to submit a text in support of a position in the argument they advocate, because of the specificity of the topic, they often show good knowledge of opposing arguments and rebut them. The third type of American print media discussion may be reconstructed on a larger scale across various American print media sources. Publications can be found in different American newspapers or magazines that focus on a number of related issues, including an issue common to both opposing parties, but one will find almost no rebuttals of specific arguments contained in the opposing discourse. Obviously, the last type of American print media discussion is the least similar to the critical discussion we deal with in real dialogue.

In this paper we shall consider two discourses contained in two articles published in the *Health* magazine's Pro/Con section (September 1993). According to our classification this discussion belongs to the second type of American print media discussion. Both parties' primary goals are to achieve persuasion of the reader. That is why we ought to use a rhetorical audience-oriented discourse analysis rather than a dialectical resolution-oriented one. Since, therefore, our interest will be centered on the factors affecting the cogency of argumentative discourse, we will use the traditional "rhetorical" notion of fallacy where a fallacy is an argument that "seems to be valid but is not so" (Hamblin 1970: 12).

In seeking persuasion, every arguer develops a communicative strategy of persuasion. The key element of a communicative strategy is to choose targets of appeal and prioritize them. While there is a wide variety of targets of appeal, it is possible to identify three major ones: people's reason, emotions, and aesthetic feeling. An appeal to people's reason is based on the rational strength of argumentation. Emotional appeal is based on arousing in the reader or hearer

various emotions ranging from insecurity to fear, from sympathy to pity. Aesthetic appeal is based on people's appreciation of linguistic and stylistic beauty of the message, its stylistic originality, rich language, sharp humor and wit.

Rational appeal is effective in changing beliefs and motives of the audience because it directly affects human reason where beliefs are formed. Emotional appeal is persuasively effective because it exploits or runs on concerns, worries, and desires of the people. Aesthetic appeal is persuasively effective because, if successful, it changes people's attitudes to the message and through the message to its author. People will be more willing to accept the author's arguments after they have experienced the arguer's giftedness as a writer or speaker of the message.

Obviously, there is nothing intrinsically wrong with emotional or aesthetic appeals. In fact, we believe that maximum persuasive effect can be achieved if an arguer uses all three of the appeals, his rational appeal being reinforced with appeals to emotions and aesthetic feeling of the people. Problems can arise when an arguer uses emotional and aesthetic appeals to avoid arguing issues at hand (Rybacki & Rybacki 1995: 143). Emotional and aesthetic appeals are an important part of the process of persuasion but we believe that in argumentation emotion or aesthetic creativity should not supplant reason. Our investigation will be based on the presumption that, unless in times of crises when an emotionally appealing message with no strong arguments provided to support the claims finds a ready response in a frustrated and/or exalted audience and is constantly repeated, persuasion based primarily or solely on appeal to emotions has a short-lasting effect. It is especially true when people read an argumentative message in a newspaper or magazine in a quiet atmosphere of their living room. In this case the author of such a message has to be particularly careful as to the logical structure of the message and validity of the arguments.

Having said that, let us ask ourselves two questions: Why do authors of American print media argumentative messages commit fallacies in their argumentation committing which they could easily avoid? Why in particular do they commit deliberate fallacies? We believe we may answer the questions this way. The reason why authors of American print media argumentative messages commit so many especially deliberate fallacies lies in the fact that in order to maximize the persuasive effect of the messages, these arguers often tend to adopt a communicative strategy to rely primarily on emotional and aesthetic appeals, not rational appeal, in their persuasion of the audience. What happens then is that

logical neatness and impeccability of argumentation of the discourse are sacrificed for emotionality of the message and its attractiveness to the reader. As a result such a discourse may contain an abundance of fallacies in reasoning that in fact are fallacies of appeal.

To demonstrate the point we are in need of a comprehensive analysis that could cover both logical and linguistic or communicative aspects of the discourse. We are in need of an analytic instrument that could not only help expose discourse argumentation structure, but also show us how the arguer's communication technique weaves into his discourse to increase its persuasiveness and why it may fail to do so due to a fallacy.

No discourse analysis, especially with an emphasis on fallacies, can be successfully performed without prior identification of the role of the discourse interpreter. How is the interpreter different from an ordinary audience member? To what extent is the interpreter willing to reconstruct unexpressed premises the discourse contains? Answers to those questions will determine whether this or that argument, this or that illocutionary act can be considered fallacious or merely weak.

When looking at a discourse the interpreter reads the message, identifies the chains of arguments presented in the message (logico-semantic analysis), identifies communicative intentions expressed by the author (pragma-stylistic analysis) and demands reasonable fulfillment of commitments the author must take producing this or that illocutionary act. The interpreter of the discourse is thus a recipient of the message whose only difference from an ordinary newspaper or magazine reader is that the interpreter does not only rely on his common sense in understanding argumentation but is equipped with an apparatus of the logico-semantic and pragma-stylistic analysis, and who, thus, is able to assess the author's communicative intentions, identify fallacies, and make educated hypotheses as to the persuasiveness of the message. For the same reason that the goal of our discourse analysis is to assess a discourse impact on an ordinary reader, our analysis will not include maximal reconstruction of unexpressed premises but rather one that is most likely to be done by the reader.

2. Logico-semantic and pragma-stylistic analysis of discourses

The authors of the articles to be analyzed discuss the United States Congress's decision to maintain the prohibition for HIV-infected immigrants to enter the United States. The author of the first (left) discourse supports the decision and

the author of the second (right) discourse strongly disagrees with it. It allows us to reconstruct the opposite main claims as C1 (Fig. 1) and C2 (Fig. 2), respectively. In the discourse argumentation structure schemes both claims are contoured with a dotted line as an indication that they are implied in the texts.

3. Logico-semantic analysis of the first discourse
The first discourse's argumentation structure may be presented by the following argumentation scheme (*Figure 1*). From a logico-semantic point of view the discourse is well organized. There exists a strict distinction between different parts of the overall discourse argumentation manifested in the fact that the arguments the arguer uses in the first paragraph, with the exception of HIV is contagious, are not employed in the argumentation of the second paragraph and vice versa. It must also be noted that both the first and the second paragraphs begin with the most important arguments of their respective parts. These arguments are 1.2.1 and 1.1.4.1.1. The argumentation scheme shows that the arguments' positions in the argumentation structure are different. Hence different are the functions the arguments are meant to fulfill. 1.2.1 is the strongest argument of the "third" row of arguments closest to the main explicitly expressed claim 1.2. This argument is the arguer's second most important claim well supported by 1.2.1.1, 1.2.1.2, and 1.2.1.3. Its strength is in the fact that not only will the argument sound reasonable to the reader (appeal to reason) but it describes a life-threatening situation for the audience (emotional appeal to fear). The latter will be examined in the pragma-stylistic analysis of the discourse. 1.2.4.1.1, unlike 1.2.1, is situated at the very bottom of the vertical chain of arguments of the second paragraph. The importance of the argument is in the fact that it serves as a solid foundation for the second paragraph argumentation.

Figure 1

4. Pragma-stylistic analysis of the first discourse

Before starting a pragma-stylistic analysis of the discourse, let us clarify some of its conceptual and terminological aspects. In the pragmatic part of the analysis we will approach both discourses as written speeches. Hence such terms as speaker, hearer, illocutionary act, and illocutionary force are used in the paper interchangeably with the terms arguer or author of the discourse, reader, sentence. This approach, based on the framework of Searle and Vanderveken's illocutionary logic, will allow us to achieve our major goal – to identify the authors' communicative intentions. As has already been stated, the author's communicative strategy is not restricted to rational appeal. He also tries to influence the readers through appealing to their emotions. The first sentence is of great interest for a pragmatic analysis for several reasons. First, the speaker performs a complex illocutionary act consisting of two elementary ones: an illocutionary act of informing:

Strictly as a health issue and warning:

(b) if more HIV-positive immigrants come into the country, more Americans will get the virus and die.

Second, the same pragmatic composition is repeated in the first sentence of the second paragraph. Third, as we have already mentioned the propositional content of the first sentence not only is the most important argument, but also carries the strongest emotional appeal in the discourse.

(a) is defined here as an illocutionary act of informing, because the speaker's main intention is to let the reader understand the way he will approach the

subject in this and subsequent sentences. It also permits him to deflect accusations that he is anti-gay, anti-foreign, anti-HIV-infected people.

(b) is a warning for the American readers about extremely unfavorable consequences awaiting them if the ban is lifted. An important question concerning the claim considered above is does the arguer legitimately use appeal to fear or is it an example of an ad baculum fallacy? We believe the answer is that arguer legitimately uses appeal to fear for the following reason. The arguer does not simply exploit the sense of self-preservation in the audience, he provides valid argumentation to support his proposition throughout the whole discourse. Following Walton (Walton 1992: 165), we consider this argument a valid argument from negative consequences.

The arguer keeps on tailoring his argumentation as explicit or implicit argumentation from consequences throughout the most part of the discourse. This proposition also contains an appeal to fear:

(c) With an influx of infected immigrants the virus could easily start moving in the heterosexual community, as it has in some other countries.

The speaker uses in this sentence the subjunctive mood that together with other characteristics of the illocutionary force indicates that we deal with conjecturing here. The speaker takes a lesser commitment to defend the proposition allowing room for an "emergency escape" by saying *I am not warning you about or predicting anything, I am just offering a conjecture*.

It must be noted that the pragmatic analysis of the sentence poses a question as to why the speaker abruptly decreases the illocutionary strength of his illocutionary acts thus bringing down the strength of the whole discourse as an illocutionary act complex. Compared to the previous illocutionary act of warning, that has one the strongest illocutionary forces, the arguer suddenly chooses to produce an illocutionary act that has one the weakest illocutionary forces. The lower degree of the illocutionary point of (c) may, of course, be explained by the author's intention to express a lower degree of certainty he has about the probability that the influx of HIV-infected immigrants will occur to show his confidence in the wisdom of the American public who will not allow this to happen. However, the readers may just as well understand the illocutionary act as an indication that the author lacks evidence to predict this course of events. It is this ambiguity that makes this proposition, pragmatically, one of the weaker arguments in the discourse.

The second means the speaker uses to balance the weaker illocutionary force of the conjecture is the complex illocutionary act of stating *HIV is not only contagious, we do not have a cure for it.* We argue that in the class of assertive illocutionary forces we need to clearly distinguish an illocutionary force of stating, because to do so is important for the study of argumentation. Searle and Vanderveken (Searle & Vanderveken 1985: 183) believe that *state, assert* and *claim* name the same illocutionary force. The study of the role the illocutionary acts play in argumentation shows, however, that there are major differences between the illocutionary force of stating a fact, on the one hand, and the illocutionary force of claiming/asserting that something is a fact, on the other. In the case of stating a proposition, this proposition is presented as a fact that does not require additional argumentation to support the proposition, while in the case of asserting/claiming the same proposition is presented as an opinion of the speaker that it is a fact, which does require additional support for the proposition. As we will show in the following chart, stating has an illocutionary force distinctly different from that of asserting/claiming.

5. Comparative chart of illocutionary forces of asserting/claiming and stating

	Asserting/Claiming	Stating
Mode of achievement of illocutionary point	Representing a state of affairs in the form of the speaker's opinion that the state of affairs is a fact, which requires further proof of the truth of the proposition	Representing a state of affairs in the form of a fact, which does not require further proof of the truth of the proposition
Preparatory conditions	1. The speaker has evidence for the truth of the proposition; 2. It is not obvious to both the speaker and the hearer that the hearer knows the proposition; 3. The speaker anticipates that hearer will not agree with him about the truth of the proposition; 4. The speaker believes that he must defend the truth of the proposition	1. The speaker has evidence for the truth of the proposition; 2. It is not obvious to both the speaker and the hearer that the hearer knows the proposition; 3. The speaker anticipates that the hearer will agree with him about the truth of the proposition; 4. The speaker does not believe he must defend the truth of the proposition

Degree of strength of the illocutionary pointThe degree of strength of

illocutionary point is considered the medium one for assertive illocutionary forces because the speaker commits himself to defend the truth of the propositionThe degree of strength of illocutionary point is lower than the medium one for assertive illocutionary forces because the speaker does not commit himself to defend the truth of the propositionPropositional content conditionsAny propositionProposition identified as

1. documented data;

2. axiom;

3. well-known fact

4. generally accepted beliefSincerity conditionsThe speaker believes in the truth of the proposition The speaker believes in the truth of the propositionDegree of strength of the sincerity conditionsThe degree of strength of the sincerity conditions is considered the medium one for assertive illocutionary forcesThe degree of strength of the sincerity conditions is higher than the medium one for assertive illocutionary forces because speaker so strongly believes in the truth of the proposition that he does not believe he must defend it

Let us clarify the relation between what we find in the chart and argumentation.
As our analysis shows, the same argument can be presented by the speaker in various forms: in the form of predicting, conjecturing, asserting, claiming, warning, stating, etc. Probably in most cases arguments are presented either in the form of claiming/asserting that something is a fact or stating a fact. If the speaker presents a proposition by stating it, he presupposes that the hearer will not have objections to accept the fact as a fact. This is why, if the audience has reasonable doubts to believe that the proposition is a fact and demands further arguments to defend the truth of the proposition, the illocutionary act of stating must be considered unsuccessful, since as such the audience has not accepted it. For the audience it is an act of claiming/asserting that the proposition is a fact. To avoid such an outcome, the speaker can present the proposition as his personal opinion from the start, performing an illocutionary act of claiming/asserting. However, in this case the speaker must unconditionally commit himself to provide supporting arguments, anticipating doubt.

The distinction between these illocutionary forces is an important one in argumentation because very often an arguer presents his arguments as facts whose truth does not need further defense. By doing that the arguer commits a fallacy of evading the burden of proof (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992: 117).

In terms of pragmatics, we may define the fallacy as *intentional evasion* because the speaker evades the responsibility to express the right communicative intention – the intention the illocutionary act with the kind of proposition should possess.

A good example of the fallacy would be the claim contained in the concluding paragraph of the discourse:
(d) Lifting the ban on HIV-infected immigrants is a promise that Bill Clinton made to garner votes from gay rights groups (1.1)
The proposition is presented as a statement of an indisputable fact, but the reader is very unlikely to accept the proposition as a fact.

The reader will most probably perceive the illocutionary act as a claim because the proposition does not belong to any of the four categories of propositions of stating. Consequently, the reader will demand of the speaker the fulfillment of the commitment to provide argumentative support for the proposition. This example is especially striking since (d) is put forward in the last paragraph of the discourse as one of the conclusions to the discourse argumentation.
As we see in Figure 1, the arguer evades fulfilling the commitment to prove the proposition. This makes the proposition more vulnerable to refutation and thus the perlocutionary effect of the illocutionary act and of the whole discourse - persuading the audience – is in jeopardy.

Many HIV-positive people coming into the country would burden the health care system, either with the cost of their own treatment or by spreading the disease to other people, who will wind up in public hospitals is a complex illocutionary act of conjecture. The illocutionary force indicating devices present in the sentence, namely the subjunctive mood, point to this conclusion. Again the speaker seems to avoid using a stronger illocutionary act maybe suggesting that he believes the described course of events will not occur due to the wisdom of the people, who will make the right decision on the matter.

The arguer does not always express his ideas as assertive acts. In some instances he performs directive illocutionary acts. There is a series of three directives in the second paragraph:
Of course, we shouldn't paint with a real broad brush (suggesting)
We want to be compassionate (requesting)
(g) But we do not want to allow in people with expensive medical conditions and

have the taxpayers picking up the tab (urging)

The intention of the speaker is to request that the American people be compassionate but urge them not to allow in people with expensive medical conditions, and have the taxpayers pay for their treatment.
The degree of strength of illocutionary point increases toward (g), because urging expresses a stronger desire of the speaker to get the hearer to do the described action.

6. Logico-semantic analysis of the second discourse
Like in Fig. 1, we see in Fig. 2 a well-organized argumentation. Grounds and their claims almost always follow each other in the text. If we compare the argumentative structure with the actual text we shall see that the


Figure 2

whole argumentation can be broken down to three blocs. The concluding paragraph contains the main explicitly stated claim of the discourse (1.1). The first and the second paragraphs contain arguments in the left part of the scheme; and the third paragraph contains arguments in the right part of the scheme. The second discourse has basically the same argumentative structure as that of the first discourse. It begins with one of the discourse strongest claims and ends with conclusions. The main explicit claim the author makes in the discourse is *This prohibition is really a mask for a hatred of foreigners a hatred of people of color, and a hatred of people who have HIV*. We believe making this claim the arguer commits a non sequitur fallacy. The arguer has neither mentioned anywhere else in the discourse the hatred of those people nor ever talked about the Americans mistreating foreigners or people of different racial background.

We have identified the fallacy, but we have not identified the motives of the arguer to commit this fallacy. The non sequitur fallacy is a fallacy of reasoning, but does the nature of the fallacy concern only the reasoning process? Does the reasoning process explain to us why the author chose to make this fallacious argument? We believe the nature of the fallacy lies beyond only reasoning process – it is to be searched for in the speaker's communicative strategy. Having declared that, let us now turn to pragma-stylistic analysis of the discourse.

7. Pragma-stylistic analysis of the second discourse
The author of the second discourse also seeks to combine rational, emotional and aesthetic appeals in her message. But instead of arousing fear or self-pity in the reader, which was done in the first discourse, the arguer tries to arouse pity for HIV-infected immigrants. Just as in the first discourse, already in the first illocutionary act of claiming (which serves best the purposes of an effective persuasive message as a strong opening point) the reader experiences a maximum impact of the combined rational and emotional appeal, the reader's feeling of pity being the primary target. The arguer continues to seek the goal to appeal strongly to peoples' pity through appeal to social justice throughout the discourse. The question, therefore, one faces analyzing this discourse is whether the arguer commits any ad misericordiam fallacies in her discourse. We believe the answer is yes and we shall further provide arguments for the assertion.

The second and third sentence form an illocutionary act complex of informing. Once the reader is informed about the situation, the speaker performs a strong direct illocutionary act of claiming

(h) It's crazy

Moreover, (h) contains an even stronger indirect illocutionary act with a different illocutionary point. It is an expressive act of protesting. The illocutionary point of expressives consists in expressing the speaker's attitude to a state of affairs (Vanderveken 1990: 105). The main intention of the speaker is to show to the reader that she strongly disapproves of the opponents' views. As is shown in Fig. 2, the propositional content of the sentence becomes an essential part of several valid arguments. This statement, therefore, makes an important contribution both to the discourse rational and emotional appeals. (h) is the arguer's major successful step in pursuing the communicative strategy to combine rational, emotional and aesthetic appeals.

Let us now turn to two illocutionary acts performed in the second paragraph that are of importance for our study. As indicated in Fig. 2, the speaker does not provide any argumentative support for propositions:

(i) The law already requires that immigrants show they are not going to become a public charge
(j) In fact, people with HIV can lead long, productive lives in which they can be taxpayers and contribute to this society

Therefore, the reader will certainly understand that the speaker considers the propositions to be statements of facts. The reader will understand the speaker's communicative intention. So the illocutionary acts will achieve their illocutionary point as illocutionary acts of stating but will the reader accept the illocutionary acts as such? Will the illocutionary acts have their perlocutionary effect?

The propositional content of (i) contains an unclear proposition. The recipient of the message is unlikely to accept the illocutionary act as a statement of a fact because its proposition can hardly be considered a well-known fact or a generally accepted belief. So the answer to the question whether this illocutionary act will have its perlocutionary effect of persuasion should probably be no. As a result, the whole discourse as an illocutionary act complex will have a lesser chance to achieve its perlocutionary effect. In (j) the speaker uses an illocutionary force-indicating device of stating – the parenthetic phrase *In fact*. The speaker uses this phrase to let the reader know that she does not even anticipate any doubt as to the truth of the proposition. The casual *In fact* creates an impression that the proposition is added to the previous one almost in passing, just because it is important to mention but one does not need to discuss it. The reader will understand that the speaker wants him to believe the proposition is a fact, but, again, will the illocutionary act have its perlocutionary effect of persuasion of the reader that the proposition is a fact? The answer has to be yes because the reader will most probably accept the illocutionary act as stating a generally accepted belief.

The third paragraph contains one of the strongest ad misericordiam appeals of the discourse. The speaker performs three illocutionary acts with an illocutionary force of accusing *If they are found to be HIV-positive during legalization procedures, they are deported- despite the fact that they may well have been infected here; And we don't tell them how to avoid infecting others once they go*

home; and *We don't even necessarily tell them that they have the virus*. Accusing is a very strong illocutionary act and the speaker must anticipate stronger objections at least from the accused. Therefore it is imperative that the speaker prove the truth of her accusations. Unfortunately, the arguer does not meet her responsibility, because the accusations remain unsupported.

The high level of emotional appeal is reinforced with an aesthetic appeal. By repeating the structure *we don't tell them* author makes use of repetition, an effective stylistic device often used by media arguers to emphasize a point or to clarify a complex argument (Stonecipher 1979: 118). The introduction of the amplifying word *even* to the structure in the last sentence of the paragraph also contributes to the aesthetic and emotional appeals.

The speaker continues to increase her emotional and aesthetic appeals in the last paragraph of the discourse. The sentence *This prohibition is really a mask for a hatred of foreigners a hatred of people of color, and a hatred of people who have HIV* is marked with the use of the same stylistic device repetition, aimed to make the conclusion aesthetically appealing to the reader. Emotional appeal to pity is evident in the choice of the word *hatred* being repeated. The illocutionary force characteristics the sentence meets allows us to say that an illocutionary act of condemning is performed. The speaker strives to condemn the ban as inhumane and cruel. Since the degree of strength of the illocutionary point of condemning is even higher than that of accusing the speaker has to take even more commitment to prove her point, than when accusing. As the logico-semantic analysis of the discourse has shown, the author of the discourse does not fulfill the preparatory condition of condemning, the commitment is not met. That is why we can conclude that the emotional and aesthetic appeals are misused as they supplant reason. We believe that the arguer commits an ad misericordiam fallacy here because by accusing the ban advocates of this cruelty and injustice toward the immigrants and condemning them of hatred of all sorts of people without adequate argumentation supporting the condemnations the arguer asks the reader to accept C2 because the immigrants deserve pity.

8. Conclusions
Concerning the first purpose of the paper, let us advance the following conclusions. We have analyzed two American print media argumentative discourses whose authors are engaged in the American print media discussion conducted in the format of a deferred persuasion dialogue. Both parties pursue a

rhetorical goal of winning the argument and persuading the reading audience that their position is the right one. The discourses are characterized by two different communicative strategies of persuasion. The author of the first discourse chooses to rely primarily on rational appeal in his message, reinforcing it with an emotional appeal. The first discourse has an illocutionary force of arguing, because in achieving the perlocutionary effect of persuasion the speaker expresses his intention to argue the issues at hand producing logically coherent argumentation. The fact that the claims containing ad baculum appeal have valid arguments supporting them allows us to conclude that the arguer does not use the appeal fallaciously. The author of the second discourse, on the contrary, seems to rely primarily on emotional appeal in her message, sacrificing appeal to people's reason. The arguer focuses on the wrong and inhumane character of the ban, seeking to arouse in the reader a feeling of pity for the victims of the ban but fails to methodically and carefully argue her points thus committing an ad misericordiam fallacy. The arguer reinforces her emotional appeal with aesthetic appeal. By using various stylistic devices she creates an attractive image of the message. The second discourse has an illocutionary force of condemning. Condemning is a more powerful illocutionary act than arguing because it presupposes that the arguer does not merely argue against something because it is not in the best interests of the hearers, but that he argues against something because it is morally or ethically bad or wrong. If successful, condemning should be more persuasively effective than arguing because it appeals to what Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca call the universal audience (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1971: 30) because the proposition of condemning seeks to appeal to people's universal sense of right and wrong. However, the stronger the illocutionary act is the more commitment the speaker has to take to achieve the illocutionary point of the act. The second arguer fails to fulfill her illocutionary responsibility. Consequently, we believe the second discourse as a speech act complex is less likely to achieve its perlocutionary effect of persuasion than the first one.

Concerning the second purpose of the paper we may advance this conclusion. Illocutionary logic can be used as a tool that allows us to show which illocutionary acts are best suited for appealing to people's emotions. Our analysis indicates that, pragmatically, emotional appeals to fear and pity are created by illocutionary acts with high degrees of strength of the illocutionary point, e.g. by warning, accusing, condemning, protesting, and urging.

Concerning the third purpose of the paper it must be noted that it is necessary to distinguish the illocutionary force of asserting/claiming on the one hand from that

of stating on the other. The distinction between these illocutionary forces is an important one in argumentation because very often an arguer presents his arguments as facts whose truth does not need further defense. By doing that the arguer commits a fallacy of evading the burden of proof or, pragmatically, a fallacy of intentional evasion, because he evades the responsibility to express the intention to defend the truth of the proposition.

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ISSA Proceedings 1998 – How

Rhetoric Became A Science

Our day has witnessed the establishment of new disciplines running from women's, to ethnic, to multi-cultural studies, to name but a few representative of this academic current. From antiquity to the end of the 19th century the aspect of Argumentation Theory which was understood as rhetoric was an officially recognised discipline. It was recognised as one of the traditional seven Liberal Arts. How did rhetoric achieve this status? What is there to be learned from the rationales that raised it to this status which is relevant to coming to grips with the status, inclusive of their justifications, their need for models, their self-understandings, of the new disciplines of our day? Can a recovery of the grounds for the establishment of the traditional liberal arts shed light on these and associated questions? To answer, however tentatively, these questions is the aim of this paper.

The seven liberal arts, the quadrivium and trivium, have had an extraordinary run. For two millennia in one form or another they provide the backdrop or the foreground of higher education. But of these seven there is only one which has a source text whose name is coextensive with the art. Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and the trivial art of Rhetoric share this common trait. Moreover through all of the vicissitudes of the history of rhetoric from antiquity through the Christian ages, dark and middle, through the renaissance, and into the modern age, Aristotle's text in sometimes hidden and other times manifest ways has been a source and authority for the discipline of rhetoric.

In order to appreciate what Aristotle accomplished for rhetoric with his *Rhetoric* it is necessary to orient ourselves along an appropriate chronological parameter. Looked at retrospectively from the perspective of 1998 or of 1298, in the decades of William of Moerbke's translation of this work into Latin, it's a done thing. But looked at prospectively, with the assumption that there is nothing in the text which suggests Aristotle anticipated future developments one can search for the conditions which transformed a sometime misprised techne into a Liberal Art. With that said, allow me to focus on a few selected ways of coming to grips with these issues.

As is well known Aristotle identifies the enthymeme as the core of what rhetoric as a techne must address. But Aristotle's discussion of enthymemes adumbrates a

foundational role for them in another sense which will turn out to be thematic to the character of Liberal Arts qua arts. What I want to suggest to you today is that this sub-textual element of the *Rhetoric* is a locus classicus for identifying how this work became instrumental in founding a discipline which survived for more than two aeons. The discussion in Book II of enthymemes implicitly defines an empirical domain for rhetoric which involves politics in a complex manner. Book II presents a generalised case for enthymemes whose open ended character allows for further developments, starting in antiquity with the stoic insistence on formalising the discipline of rhetoric as a study of defective syllogisms with missing premises and concluding with modern arguments that enthymemes are divergent syllogisms, that is non-defective, because of their character as probabilistic (Burnyeat). Both views however are grounded in Aristotle's description of enthymemes as proofs based on premises, thereby resembling syllogisms *per se*. But enthymemes differ by the fact that their premises are neither apodeictic nor strictly dialectical. For example they can depend on generalisations which are exemplary in character. But examples in the context of rhetoric, whether fabulous or factual, Aesopian or historical, are inseparable from doxa, that is they are rooted in doxa, in the Greek, they are in, if you will forgive the oxymoron, endoxa.

One of the most revealing cases of such an example with respect to the role that Aristotle's discussion of enthymemes plays in founding rhetoric as a liberal art is the reference to a Socratic maxim at 1393b 4-8, a star instance of a parable: "Parabole is illustrated by the sayings of Socrates. For instance, if one were to say that magistrates should not be chosen by lot; for this would be the same as choosing representative athletes not those competent to contend but those on whom the lot falls, or as choosing any of the sailors as the man who should take the helm, as if it were right that the choice should be decided by lot and not by a man's knowledge."
Assuming that most traditional interpretation of enthymemes, that they are syllogisms based on premises which differ from the premises of apodeictic or dialectical syllogisms so much so that as 2.25 makes clear even examples or paradigms such as Socrates' parable can serve as the ground of a premise of an enthymeme, puts us in a position to ask why the Socratic example is only a case of a potential premise to a rhetorical argument, or, even, why it is only at the best a paradigm argument. In what way does it fail as the basis of a knockdown proof? We can begin by reflecting that it is clear that one does not choose a pilot by lot,

as little in our day as in Aristotle's, since our life depends of this choice. Given the undeniable plausibility of this piece of reasoning, it is incumbent on us to try to understand why it is merely rhetorical, that is: Why is it a parable, a congener of or the basis for the premise of an enthymeme, and not the core of a more certain syllogism? One reason may be that there is a Socratic argument alluded to by this maxim, fully developed in places as diverse as Xenophon's *Oeconomicus* and Plato's *Gorgias*. Implicit in this text is the Socratic identification of the rule of the wise over themselves with the rule of the *phronimos* over the polis. In short it is an allusion to what Socrates famously claimed, that wisdom is title to rule. But as a cursory reading of Book 1 of the Politics indicates, Aristotle's argument that the city is not only natural, but, is also hierarchically complex, entails the denial that political rule is homogeneous with the rule of the wise over themselves, that is, it denies that the public and the private can be so collapsed. What this suggests is that Aristotle's use of the example drawn from Socrates points to and at the same time points away from a higher order, philosophic, level of truth; in a word this use of the Socratic example puts us in touch with the truth of a common place certainty we feel in our bones by thinking how we came to Amsterdam and that it has a higher order truth behind it, a truth which is consistent with *endoxa*, even entailed by it. Although it is not, by any stretch of the imagination, simply accessible to it. As for the self-evidence of the allusion to the Socratic thesis consider the disputed lines at 1398b20 where Alcidamas' version uncertainly bears witness to the same issue.

This use of the Socratic example by Aristotle has three interesting consequences. (1) In general, it shows that Aristotle presents his descriptions of rhetorical devices in a manner which preserves the autonomy of rhetoric as a techne, whereby its roots are emphatically implicit, but are also likewise by-passed in a manner which is consistent with the development of a transmittable discipline, that is, as something teachable, and so, self-contained from theoretical difficulties. (Allow me to illustrate this point with an analogy. Rhetoric, if it were to have turned out to be an art, as it did turn out, in some measure because of Aristotle's efforts, would have had to stand, as it does, to theory as venery does to ornithology. Thus what we see is that one of the modes by which rhetoric becomes a Liberal Art is that it is at once open to and insulated from theoria). But also (2), in particular, the initial theme of the work, that rhetoric is a counterpart to dialectic, is illustrated and hence implicitly adumbrated by this example, because this initial theme has a dialectical counterpoint in Aristotle's

thesis, developed at the end of the *Nichomachean Ethics*, that sophistry mistakenly identified politics with rhetoric. This example points to this nexus of issues because it functions to isolate rhetoric from the pull of politics which has always had a potential to swamp rhetoric's autonomy. It insulates the argument from political theoretical consequences, and, hence, sheds light on how Aristotle reoriented rhetoric away from politics and toward dialectics. In other words, if is true that from the perspective of the *Ethics*, that politics needs to be protected from rhetoric, it is equally true that from the perspective of the requirements of founding rhetoric as an autonomous discipline that it needed to be protected from politics.

(3) In addition the air that enthymemes breath, the endoxa of everyday discourse is doubly illuminated
in this context.

Dialectical reasoning is potentially present whenever the starting point is doxa. Although dialectic is related to the theoretical it is distinguished from the apodeictic *per se* and it is a counterpart of the rhetorical. This is the framework for understanding the status of endoxa as it is used in the *Rhetoric.* The classification of the many meanings of endoxa in Aristotle is well developed in our day. The literature on this matter has displayed many of the denotations of endoxa. These include possible meanings ranging from true and false beliefs of a popular sort, to surface beliefs as distinguished from deep or implicit beliefs, to analogous distinctions of regulative as opposed to substantive beliefs (Klein; Roche). What I want to suggest to you today about the meaning of this word will be illustrated by way of another example drawn from the *Rhetoric*. It is one which, by my lights, is consistent with the main lines of interpretation known to me about the possible senses of endoxa, but which has the advantage of suggesting another lesson about the foundations of the Liberal Arts as they are open to inspection in this work.

At 3.10, in the context of the discussion of ta aot«ia, which Freese translates as "smart," but which I would prefer to translate as "urbanity," Aristotle observes that "easy learning is naturally pleasant to all" (1410b15) from which it follows that "styles and enthymemes that are quickly absorbed are urbane…. this is why superficial enthymemes, those that are obvious to all and need no mental effort, are [effective]… [because]… knowledge of a sort results … [from them]" (1410b20). Moreover as the context makes clear this same criterion, ease of and hence pleasure at learning, decides that metaphor, the direct communication of

an imputation, say, '*a* is *b*,' is rhetorically superior to simile, which only imputes by means of a term of comparison, for example, '*a* is as, or is like *b*.' Let us consider, however briefly, Aristotle on the love of learning as it manifests itself within the whole range of human nature.

"Human beings by nature desire to know." The *Metaphysics* begins with this famous universal proposition rivalled perhaps in the breath of its reach and superficial plausibility by the opening of the *Nichomachean Ethics* and by that of Jane Austen's *Pride and Prejudice.* But while the cognitive bases of these claims are wrapped in the mystery of autobiographica, the evidence for them is elsewhere and accessible. The evidence for the universality of Aristotle's judgement at the beginning of the *Metaphysics* is found in our insatiable curiosity about biographical trivia whether it be of Jane Austen or our next door neighbour. When some strange sight occurs, it interests us qua mere sight sans concern for our interests or well being. When a good public speaker addresses an audience about matters of the first importance, ease of understanding, and hence pleasure at this understanding, governs the choice of illustrations, as Churchill's war time speeches illustrate. But at the level of the *Metaphysics* our need to know is gratified, if it is at all, quite differently. For those caught up by them, the arguments that lead to an open-minded consideration for the need of a Prime Mover will be the source of pleasures concomitant with the actuality of knowing. As a result, this version of the desire to know is to be found at the peak of a demographic pyramid, one whose base is fragmented by phenomena which with Aristotle's aid we can impute to different political regimes, but which Aristotle's contemporaries, or ourselves, can look at through categories drawn from Herodotus or cultural studies and sociology. Be that as it may, 'curiosity,' 'the desire to know,' 'philosophy,' the whole range of human experiences connected with these phenomenae provide the background for endoxa characterised by political or sociological breath and demographic bases and peaks.

Now just as virtue in the *Rhetoric* is looked at from the perspective of the expedient or useful, and considerations of its intrinsic worth are to be found in the *Ethics*, so analogously knowledge, in the *Rhetoric*, is inseparable from pleasure and its connection to the parameters of the persuasive. This suggests that endoxa, whether about 'virtue,' or 'knowledge,' or, as in the Socratic example we are considering today, 'choice of experts,' have two fundamental vectors. The first is horizontal, or sociological and political, the second is vertical, or related to the first in a way that is captured by a distinction made famous by Plato, that is,

the distinction between opinion and knowledge. This will allow for another lesson about the structure of this work that turns out to characterise the Liberal Arts. Before doing so, I will turn to one last illustration of my topic.

The contrast between the treatment of happiness in the *Nichomachean Ethics* and in the *Rhetoric* reveals another instructive feature of endoxa relevant to this paper. In the discussion of happiness at *Rhetoric* 1.5, happiness is taken up as an item in the realm of opinion insofar as it can be circumscribed through a compendium or list of ungraded, unrank-ordered list of variables. This list includes wealth, health, children, a good wife, and so forth. In contrast, in Book I of the *Ethics*, happiness is also introduced as a common place of the world of opinion but there it appears in another guise. Initially, Wealth is contrasted with Pleasure and both, individually, are contrasted with Honor as possible claimants to the content of a happy life, all of which serves as part of the argument for Virtue as its true locus. Here happiness is taken up through a series of synecdoches, and is thus characterised by a context which is potentially dialectical, which, allows for an examination of competitive claims. Both these approaches are endoxic but with a difference. Returning to the *Rhetoric*, one can perform a simple, obvious thought experiment to test the endoxic character of the items on the list of happiness' variables. If we entertain the possibility of replacing one of the Aristotelian variables with its opposite, say health with sickness, we would not expect people, that is we would not expect an interlocutor imagined for the purpose of weighing our sense of endoxa in this context, to agree that illness is part of a happy life. Likewise, imagine someone with no friends, poor, no children, prematurely old, ugly, weak, unathletic: this is no one's notion of a happy life.

A contrast emerges. The *Rhetoric* presents us, for the most part, with the face of endoxa which comes unsorted. It is corrigible and openly open-ended in its corrigibility. It is at once easy and pleasant to survey our opinions about such things as happiness. And so the text invites a consideration of what it is that one knows about the matter in question. It thereby invites a consideration of what one knows about the world.(How would we or Aristotle, for instance, decide whether, say, 'good fortune' is an item on Happiness' agenda?) This endoxic open-endedness is implicitly a training in one of the conditions of thoughtfulness, being open-minded. In contrast the *Ethics*, presents another face of endoxa. It is the aspect of endoxa which is essentially the ground of dialectics, the comparison of competing claims and so their sorting out by means of philosophical arguments.

The way of doing so can't be easily portrayed in a sentence. The former approach is practical in the realm associated with rhetoric namely action. It is artful, not because it is productive, the Ethics criterion of the artful, but rather because it is non-theoretical and because it is an *organon* for instauring a *mathemata*, that is, it is a tool for founding something which literally easily learnable.

What have we learned from this brief survey of Aristotle's text about the foundations of *Rhetoric* which is also fundamental to the Liberal Arts and which may aid us to evaluate and strengthen emergent disciplines? The Liberal Arts share traits in common. In all their incarnations they all teach *technai*, whether it be what is learned through mastering a sequence of Euclidean theorems or an analogous sweep of rhetorical figures. In addition each of these arts is at once autonomous and each is conceptually vectored in two directions. Each has within its notional syllabus a capacity to direct the teacher and student back to its roots. In this sense each is literally radical, arming its pupils with one of the sources and aims of philosophy: the affective and conceptual incentive to seek the foundations of things. As for the other vector, each points, albeit implicitly, towards an end or *telos*. This first comes to sight in the potential meanings of the terms of art, say, enthyme, or topic, which raise the student's view to the consideration of higher order meanings. Consonant with this each has within its purview the capacity to generate questions about the ends of life, a capacity granted to each by their primary capacity to induce, through moments of study, self-forgetting work and learning, the unreflective experience of activity intrinsic in character, an experience which on reflection can raise to consciousness the capacity to rank order matters in ways too complex to enumerate. Finally, and most importantly, the Liberal Arts are modest. They insinuate the tools of rationality, critical reasoning as it is called in our day, through the means of autonomous disciplines, that is disciplines whose scope is determined by modes of study appropriate to a subject matter, and which thus by pass, but leave accessible, their theoretical roots.

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