ISSA Proceedings 2014 – The Role Of Prosodic Features In The Analysis Of Multimodal Argumentation

• by: Gabrijela Kisicek - Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Department of Phonetics, University of Zagreb, Croatia

Abstract: This paper aims to contribute to our understanding of multi-modal argumentation by examining the role of prosodic features in persuasive messages. Standard analyses of advertisements already assign a key role to visuals in understanding, reconstructing and assessing the argument. I present reconstructions of TV commercials that take into account verbal, visual and prosodic components. Because prosodic features are here especially relevant to reinforcing the argumentation, they should not be neglected in argumentation analysis.

Keywords: argumentation, multimodal discourse, nonverbal communication, prosodic features.

1. Introduction
Contemporary studies on argumentation broaden the scope of argumentation research beyond verbal and include analyzing the role of images (Birdsell & Groarke 1996; Birdsell & Groarke 2007; Groarke, 1996; Groarke & Tindale 2013….), music (Branigan 1992), gesture (Gelang & Kjeldsen, 2010) and other nonverbal elements in argumentation discourse. The need to deal with other than merely verbal elements in the argumentation process is perhaps most obvious especially in view of technological developments that alter our means of communication (and argumentation), as well as the ever present influences of the media and advertising industry in shaping public opinion, values, interests, and incitements to action. Groarke (1996, p.10) points out the perhaps plainest reason to develop an account of visual arguments that are in some cases crucial to persuade an audience: “Visual appeals are especially pervasive in everyday discourse, in which visual images propound a point of view in magazines, advertising, film, television, multi-media, and the World Wide Web”. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2014 – Institutional Constraints Of Topical Strategic Maneuvering In Legal Argumentation. The Case Of ‘Insulting’.

• by: Harm Kloosterhuis - Erasmus School of Law, Erasmus University College, Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Netherlands

Abstract: Strategic maneuvering refers to the efforts parties make to reconcile rhetorical effectiveness with dialectical standards of reasonableness. It manifests itself in topical selection, audience-directed framing and presentational devices. In analyzing strategic maneuvering one category of parameters to be considered are the constraints of the institutional context. In this paper I explore the institutional constraints for topical selection for the legal argumentative activity type insulting. I will make a distinction between statutory constraints, constraints developed in case law and constraints regarding language use and the logic of conversational implicatures

Keywords: conversational implicatures, insulting, legal argumentation, speech act theory,

1. Introduction
Frans van Eemeren explains in Strategic Maneuvering in Argumentative Discourse (2010, p. 40) how the theoretical reconstruction of argumentation should incorporate strategic maneuvering of parties in a discussion. Strategic maneuvering refers to the efforts parties make to reconcile rhetorical effectiveness with dialectical standards of reasonableness. It manifests itself topical selection, the audience-directed framing of the argumentative moves, and in the purposive use of presentational devices. In analyzing strategic maneuvering the following parameters must be considered:

(a) the results that can be achieved,
(b) the routes that can be taken to achieve these results,
(c) the constraints of the institutional context and
(d) the mutual commitments defining the argumentative situation (Van Eemeren 2010, p. 163). Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2014 – Arguments By Analogy (And What We Can Learn About Them From Aristotle)

• by: Manfred Kraus - Philologisches Seminar, University of Tübingen, Tübingen, Germany

Abstract: The paper contributes to the debate about arguments by analogy, especially the distinction between ‘deductive’ and ‘inductive’ analogies and the question how such arguments can be ‘deductive’, yet nonetheless defeasible. It claims that ‘deductive’ and ‘inductive’ are structural, not normative categories, and should not be used to designate argument validity. Based on Aristotle’s analysis of enthymemes, examples, and metaphors, it argues that arguments from analogy are complex arguments that involve inductive, abductive, and deductive components.

Keywords: abduction, analogy, comparison, deduction, enthymeme, example, induction, metaphor, similarity.

1. Introduction
Arguments by analogy have been a much-disputed subject recently. The most controversial issues in that discussion have been whether or not there are different types of analogical arguments, whether they are to be regarded as basically inductive or deductive or as a completely distinct category of argument of their own, whether or not they involve any hidden or missing premises, and whether it is possible for analogical arguments to be deductive and yet defeasible. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2014 – Evidence-Based Practice: Evidence Set In An Argument

• by: Tone Kvernbekk - Department of Education, University of Oslo, Norway

Abstract: Evidence-based practice (EBP) is currently a dominating trend in many professional areas. But what do we want evidence for in EBP? Evidence generally speaks to the trustworthiness of our beliefs, but EBP is practical in nature and truth is not really what is at stake. Rather we are after effectiveness in bringing about changes. What we need evidence for is a prediction to the effect that what has worked in one context will also work here. In this paper I argue that is makes good sense to view this prediction as the conclusion of an argument. To set the evidence in an argument will structure our thinking and help us focus on what kinds of evidence we need to support the likelihood that an intervention here will work.

Keywords: Argument, causal role, EBP, effectiveness, enablers, evidence, external validity, local facts, RCT, stability of context

1. Introduction
There exists a vast literature on EBP, hardly surprising given the status of ‘evidence-based’ as a buzzword in contemporary professional debates, such as education, medicine, psychiatry and social policy. Researchers are responding in many ways to political demands for better research bases to inform and guide both policy and practice; some by producing the kind of evidence it is assumed can serve as a base for practice; others by criticizing or even rejecting the whole enterprise of EBP – the latter frequently, but not exclusively, couched in terms of worries about instrumentalization of practice and restrictions in the freedom of professionals to exercise their judgment. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2014 – Shameful Corinthians: A Pragma-Dialectical Analysis Of 1 Corinthians 6:12–20

• by: Niilo Lahti - School of Theology, University of Eastern, Finland

Abstract: Biblical scholars have fundamental differences in defining Paul’s argumentative and rhetorical goal in 1 Corinthians 6:12–20. There is no convincing explanation for why the apostle brings 6:12–20 up in the letter. I conduct a pragma-dialectical analysis to account for the argumentation, rhetoric and their interplay in 6:12–20. It turns out that Paul aims at shaming the audience in order to break their resistance.

Keywords: 1 Corinthians, argumentation, Bible, New Testament, Paul, pragma-dialectics, rhetoric, shame, strategic maneuvering, theology.

1. Introduction
Biblical scholars have had significant difficulties in interpreting the argumentation in 1 Corinthians 6:12–20 (Goulder 1999, p. 341; Rosner 1998, p. 336). Two frequent and general problems are brought up to motivate the upcoming analysis of the section in the letter.

The first problem deals with the goal of the section. What does Paul want to argue in the section? Two alternative standpoint options are common (Rosner 1998, p. 336):
a. The apostle argues that the Corinthians should stop a specific behavior, that of having relations with harlots (Drake Williams III 2008, p. 20; Fee 1987, p. 250; Rosner 1998, pp. 341-342);
b. Paul wishes to smother a broader phenomenon: sexual immorality (Conzelmann 1975, p. 108; Lambrecht 2009, p. 486; Rosner 1998, pp. 337-338). Topically speaking, the two themes are related. The question arises, which of the two notions supports the other. Does Paul employ sexual immorality to support the avoidance of harlots or vice versa?

Furthermore, why does the apostle bring up the issue in the first place? Is the control of the Corinthians’ sexual morality an objective in itself for him or does Paul use it to achieve another goal? Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2014 – Pragma-Dialectical Rules And The Teaching Of Argumentation In Philosophy For Children

• by: Celso López & Ana María Vicuña - Instituto de Filosofía, Facultad de Filosofía, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Santiago, Chile

Abstract: A Philosophy for Children teacher must model a discussion that complies with a critical ideal of reasonableness and use effectively all tools necessary to attract the students’ involvement and participation in a meaningful philosophical dialogue. We distinguish the stages of a Philosophy for Children class where the pragma-dialectical rules and the pedagogical devices instrumental to enhance the students’ participation in a community of inquiry ought to be applied.

Keywords: Community of Inquiry, Philosophical dialogue, Philosophical novel, Philosophy for Children, Pragma-dialectical rules

1. Introduction
The Philosophy for children program, created by Matthew Lipman (Lipman, 1980, 1991), centers around the building of a Community of Inquiry through the practice of philosophical dialogue. The Community of Inquiry is considered as a way to foster critical and cooperative thinking through the balance between competition and cooperation in an atmosphere of mutual respect and understanding, similar to the scientific community in that it pursues similar goals through identical methods (Lipman, 1998, p. 57). The Philosophy for Children teacher is a member of the Community of Inquiry with no special privilege but she must see to it that the logical rules that conduct critical thinking are respected and guide the dialogue among the participants. Read more