

ISSA Proceedings 2014 - The Role Of Prosodic Features In The Analysis Of Multimodal Argumentation

Abstract: This paper aims to contribute to our understanding of multi-modal argumentation by examining the role of prosodic features in persuasive messages. Standard analyses of advertisements already assign a key role to visuals in understanding, reconstructing and assessing the argument. I present reconstructions of TV commercials that take into account verbal, visual and prosodic components. Because prosodic features are here especially relevant to reinforcing the argumentation, they should not be neglected in argumentation analysis.

Keywords: argumentation, multimodal discourse, nonverbal communication, prosodic features.

1. Introduction

Contemporary studies on argumentation broaden the scope of argumentation research beyond verbal and include analyzing the role of images (Birdsell & Groarke 1996; Birdsell & Groarke 2007; Groarke, 1996; Groarke & Tindale 2013....), music (Branigan 1992), gesture (Gelang & Kjeldsen, 2010) and other nonverbal elements in argumentation discourse. The need to deal with other than merely verbal elements in the argumentation process is perhaps most obvious especially in view of technological developments that alter our means of communication (and argumentation), as well as the ever present influences of the media and advertising industry in shaping public opinion, values, interests, and incitements to action. Groarke (1996, p.10) points out the perhaps plainest reason to develop an account of visual arguments that are in some cases crucial to persuade an audience: "Visual appeals are especially pervasive in everyday discourse, in which visual images propound a point of view in magazines, advertising, film, television, multi-media, and the World Wide Web".

Multimodality expands research to other modes of argument besides visuals

which could equally be persuasive, and may be used by arguers in everyday discourse as a sole means of argumentation, or consist in the simultaneous use of several such modes. Film or television commercials, for instance, combine verbal and visual mode but also music, framing, prosodic features such as voice quality, intonation, etc. However, the multimodality of argumentation constitutes a challenge to argumentation analysis because decoding and analyzing non-verbal argument importantly differs from more traditional, verbal argumentation analysis. Differences in analysis have resulted in a dispute among argumentation scholars on whether non-verbal elements, for instance images, could ever be considered as arguments (Fleming 1996; Blair 1996...). Over the recent two or so decades it has become more accepted (though far from being accepted widely, or beyond doubt) that arguing without words is possible (Groarke 2002; Kjeldsen 2012; Lake & Pickering 1998). Gilbert (1994), who has given analyses of argumentation in everyday discourse, suggested another view on multi-modality in argumentation that includes logical, emotional, visceral and kisceral arguments. He states that these modes may sometimes merely 'strengthen' or 'repeat' each other", but also that kissing, touching, or feeling could be considered as argument provided it is being used to convince or persuade.

Gelang & Kjeldsen (2010) state that argumentation can occur in a host of different forms of expression, including speech, pictures and nonverbal behavior. Authors who investigate the role of nonverbal communication in argumentation, especially the use of gestures and facial expression, claim that nonverbal elements can function as arguments contributing to the speaker's ethos, in their case politicians, because "recipients of a message in a rhetorical situation create their perception of the speaker through a holistic perspective" Gelang & Kjeldsen (2010, p. 567)

In summary, the analysis of argumentation in every rhetorical situation thus has to be multi-modal, because messages by which speakers intend to persuade audiences consist not only of a verbal part, but also feature nonverbal elements that can contribute to the strength of argument, or may even stand as arguments themselves. In this paper, we shall particularly deal with the ways in which non-verbal elements known as prosodic features may contribute to argumentation discourse.

2. Prosodic features and nonverbal communication

Prosodic features refer to both voice and speech cues of the speaker. They include

features such as pitch, temporal structure, loudness and voice quality, emphasis and accentuation, but also (non)fluencies of the speaker. An extensive literature on nonverbal communication research has generally strengthened the view that such features have an important communicative role. For instance, Vroomen, Collier & Mozziconacci (1993, p. 577) write:

A speaker may indicate, through prosodic means, to which information the listener should pay particular attention (accentuation, emphasis), and he may provide cues about the syntactic organization of the utterance (phrasing). The communicative function of prosody is most readily associated with the expression of emotion and attitude.

Besides a correlation between prosodic features and emotions (Davitz, 1964; Scheerer, 1993; Vroomen, Collier & Mozziconacci 1993; Neuman & Strack, 2000), prosodic features are connected to the perception of a speaker's personality, credibility, in short his *ethos* (Kramer, 1977, 1978; Berry 1990, 1992; Kimble & Seidel, 1991; Zuckerman & Miyake, 1993; Hickson, Stacks & Moore, 2004; Zuckerman & Sinicropi, 2011). Past research has particularly confirmed that prosodic features (among other elements of nonverbal behavior) are associated with persuasiveness of the speaker and changing of attitudes (Burgoon, Birk & Pfau, 1990; Knapp 2002). For instance, fluency, variations in pitch, higher intensity (i.e. louder speech) and faster tempo are connected with greater persuasiveness.

Although the connection between prosodic features and perceived qualities of a speaker are based mostly on stereotypes, numerous researches have suggested that such findings likely hold in real-world situations. For instance, Levin & Hall (1985), Knight and Alpert (1985) support a connection between the pathologies of a person and his prosodic features. To give another example, clinically depressed people tend to exhibit a lower speech rate, owed also particularly long pauses in their speech. Acoustic measurements, moreover, confirm that patients can change their vocal characteristics after undergoing therapy (Ostwald, 1961). The presence of stereotypical vocal characteristics is consistent with extant research which shows both female and male speakers to regularly perceive themselves in fairly stereotypically ways (Kramer, 1977, 1978; Berry 1992; Knapp 2002).

Based on this as well as similar empirical research (e.g., Smith et al.1975; Surawski & Ossof, 2006; Bartsch, 2009 etc.), one can conclude that a lower vocal

pitch, a faster speech rate, and a relative absence of non-fluencies generally goes along with higher ratings for speaker's competence and dominance. Zuckerman and Driver's (1989) research on vocal attractiveness proposed that, similar to attractive faces, attractive voices may also elicit a more positive interpersonal impression. They found that professional judges, for instance, were able to agree on whether voices are attractive or not and that more attractive voices were associated with more favorable impressions of personality. As mentioned earlier, attractive voices include lower pitch, absence of nasality and extreme harshness. Subsequent work has largely replicated such results, showing that vocal attractiveness can be compared to effects of physical attractiveness (e.g., Berry 1990, 1992; Zuckerman et al. 1990; Zuckerman & Hodgins 1993). Speakers with more attractive voices are thus more favorably perceived by others. These insights are, of course, regularly sought to be exploited in public sphere communication such as advertising, radio and television, business communication (telephone announcements, customer service), and politics, among others.

Here, nasality makes for a vocal characteristic considered to be particular undesirable in public speaking. As Bloom, Zajac & Titus (1999, p. 279) state:

Highly nasal voices were rated as being lower in "status" (occupation, ambitious, intelligent, educated, influential), lower in social solidarity (friendly, sympathetic, likeable, trustworthy, helpful), and were negatively correlated with perceptions of persuasiveness.

Prosodic features have thus clearly been shown to be of importance for the assessment of a speaker's personality and her persuasiveness, but also for the recognition of speakers' emotional states. One of the early researches in nonverbal communication, Davitz (1964, p. 13) found that "regardless of technique in experiment, all research confirms that emotional state of a person can be recognized on the basis of vocal nonverbal expression," a claim being supported in recent studies (Scherer, 1993; Neuman & Strack, 2000). Scherer (1986) has even hypothesized about a universality of vocal expression of emotions, the most important cues for emotion recognition being variations in tempo and pitch such that, for instance, happiness goes along with high pitch (higher frequency), variability in frequency changes, higher intensity (loudness) and greater tempo – sadness being associated with the polar opposite. How might such insights be used in rhetoric and argumentation research?

3. Prosodic features and argumentation

Prosodic features are readily connected to a speaker's ethos (credibility, trustworthiness, honesty, benevolence) which has since antiquity been central to the process of persuasion. The Aristotelian Rhetoric (1.2. 1356a, 1991, p. 38), for instance, states:

There is persuasion through the character whenever the speech is spoken in such a way as to make the speaker worthy of credence; for we believe fair-minded people to a greater extent and more quickly [than we do others] on all subjects in general and completely so in cases where there is not exact knowledge but room for doubt.

The credibility of the speaker is thus important whenever there is intent to persuade, and most importantly so for testimonial claims. As Govier (1993, p. 93) explains:

Testimonial claims are especially important for a variety of reasons. Human knowledge is utterly dependent upon our acceptance, much of the time, of what other people tell us. Only thus can we learn language and pass on knowledge from generation to generation; only thus have we access to times, places, and cultures we do not and cannot experience ourselves.

Although testimonial claims also feature in judicial or political discourse, advertising contrasts as almost fully relying on testimonies of those who experience a certain product or are involved in its development. Discussing importance of the speaker's credibility in testimonial claims, Govier distinguishes normative credibility, which depends on a person's sincerity, honesty, and reliability, from her rhetorical credibility, which depends on the impression a speaker gives "the extent to which one is *regarded as* believable, and is believed, by others." And she (1993, p. 94) characterizes such rhetorical credibility in exemplary fashion when stating:

People who are white and male, who dress well, look professional, appear middle class or upper middle class, speak without an accent in a deep or low-toned voice, and seem unemotional, rational and articulate, tend in many contexts to have more rhetorical credibility than others. Often those who lack such qualities are, in effect, rhetorically disadvantaged.

On this view, the manner of speaking as well as performance in general (clothing,

body movements, body space etc.) are epistemically irrelevant, but rhetorically relevant. But could prosodic features or nonverbal elements be argumentatively relevant *in general*?

Gelang & Kjeldsen (2010, pp. 567 – 571) have recently claimed that nonverbal communication performs an argumentative function, or purpose, by contributing to speaker`s *ethos*. They provide examples drawn from the analysis of political discourse, where politicians are perceived in a certain manner as based on nonverbal signs, they suggest that, in some cases, such nonverbal behavior can be taken as a premise:

Moderate physical movement can in some circumstances be taken as a premise for the claim that a person is suitable as president; because it signals that the speaker is in control, where other people would be steered by their emotions.

We now pursue this idea, and wish to suggest that prosodic features can likewise be taken as a premise in specific argumentative situations. As will be illustrated with several examples of television commercials, prosodic features can, in certain cases, either contribute to the strength of argument, or else function as their crucial part.

3.1 Prosodic features as contributors to the strength of an argument

Prosodic features generally make some additional, broadly situated contribution to what, in abstraction thereof, is some non-situated argument-content. For instance, higher pitch of the verbal message and faster tempo may illustrate the speaker`s happiness; lower pitch, quiet and slow speech may indicate depression, or sadness; staccato rhythm may see a speaker be perceived as strict, bossy, dominant and representing an authority, etc. Prosodic features are frequently used in television commercials to stress certain selling-points, or to establish one.

3.1.1 Always liners

One example of this is provided by a TV commercial for female hygiene products, [i] include a commercial for Always liners which, incidentally being in Polish, perfectly shows to non-Polish speakers that the verbal part of the message is irrelevant towards grasping the claim, and the reasons offered in support. As is well common knowledge, women tend not feel good during the menstruation period, lack energy, be tired, and feel uncomfortable, sometimes even anxious. But, or so the commercial suggests vividly, using the Always product, women may

do what they please and nevertheless feel clean, comfortable – as shown by using visuals – but also happy, enthusiastic, energetic, vibrant – as presented through prosodic features connected with happiness such as high pitch, high intonation endings, wide pitch ranges, faster tempo. The chain of reasoning one might thus associate to this commercial is roughly this: Although menstruating, you feel good and vibrant when using Always liners. So, if you want as much, buy Always.

Besides pitch, intonation, tempo and pitch range, several other features can contribute to the strength of an argument. Word emphasis, rhythm and intensity (or loudness) can also be very important. Word emphasis often serves the purpose of identifying the most important word in a sentence, reveals new information, and generally differentiates parts of the speech according to communicative importance. Verbal message, for instance, can be presented in *staccato* rhythm (speech with pauses between words or even between syllables characterized with tense articulation), which is specific for giving orders in a strict manner that indicates dominance, and establishes authority, or in *legato* rhythm with smooth transition between syllables and lax articulation. Loudness and intensity may also serve a function as louder speech is frequently perceived as more persuasive.

3.1.2 Depression

A rather good example for the usage of these features is a commercial that advertises services for people who deal with depression.**[ii]** Its main intention is to raise awareness of depression, stating it to be a disease-like condition that can be cured if approached in a right way. The final claim is: If you suffer from depression, you need to get help. How do prosodic features contribute to this message? The female voice over, reading the message, displays a specific voice quality (a whispery voice suggesting empathy, compassion, and gentleness) and intonation (asking questions and giving answers). Content-wise, the message points to personal insights on depression. For instance, “Did you know that you can also feel it physically?”

Word emphasis is crucial in revealing new information when stating: “you KNOW you can feel it emotionally” – thus suggesting this is common knowledge – “But did you know you can ALSO feel it physically?” The function of emphasis, here, is to point out that depression has more than one symptom, besides emotional consequences (being widely known), pain can also be physical. The ad continues: “There ARE treatments that work on both emotional and unpleasant physical symptoms,” emphasizing ways to deal with this pain. An additional prosodic

feature in this commercial is the speech pause, used in a stylistic function to stress the part of the message preceding the pause. For instance, “Where does depression hurt? (pause) EVERYWHERE. Who does depression hurt? EVERYONE.” By stressing the words “everywhere” and “everyone” the problem of depression receives emphasis; there is no need to explain it further. “Everywhere” here indicates that it is indeed a serious and complex condition for which a patient needs expert help. It is not a simple headache which can be cured with a right pill. And who does depression hurt?

By stressing “everyone” there is no need to explain that the whole family is suffering, that patient`s children, spouses, friends and coworkers feel it too. Everyone is affected by someone`s depression. This effectively yields another reason why those suffering from depression should seek expert help, as they can help not only themselves but everyone around them.

3.1.3 *Evian*

Unlike the two previous examples, the third one, a commercial for Evian water[**iii**] , is based on the testimony of the product itself. The chain of reasoning is simple: if a product looks clean and healthy, if it sounds clean and healthy, then it is healthy. The commercial combines the verbal mode, explaining where the sources of the water are from (the cleanest water sources in untouched nature), the visual mode (scenes of mountain tops covered with snow), music (instrumental), but also the prosodic features typical of a female speaker with very attractive voice quality, a whispery phonation type, and slower tempo. Her speech is being characterized by enhanced pronunciation of the consonant [s], her speech resembles the sound of flowing water and wind.

3.1.4 *Comparison*

The argumentation in the commercial on depression is based on the simultaneous use of verbal and visual modes, while prosodic features, music and framing so to speak “straighten” the argument. This is an example of the use of prosodic features where, were one to remove or somehow alter these, the argument-content would remain the same, but it`s the argument would overall be a weaker one.

The argumentation in the *Always* example was based on the testimony of the product user stating something like: If you want to be like me or feel like me, use this product. Argumentation in the depression example is based on the argument

from authority: a person who knows more gives advice. In addition, this person is empathic, gentle and truly wants to help (information conveyed by specific prosodic features). Similarly working in combination, different modes of argument combine in supporting the claim that Evian water is clean and healthy, and therefore should be purchased. In all three commercials prosodic features work in combination with other modes of argument in a multimodal discourse giving an additional strength to the argument. An easy test to determine situations where prosodic features are crucial is to ask whether their absence, or modification, can change the argument-content. If this is the case, such features are in fact essential for the argument-content.

3.2 Prosodic features as an essential part of an argument

In certain situations prosodic features may function as more than just additional elements strengthening the argument; rather, they can be key for understanding the overall message, but also crucial parts of an argument. An example is provided by a Volkswagen television commercial. **[iv]**

Here, a specific lifestyle, or an attitude to life, is connected to a specific accent of a speaker. The main character speaks English with a recognizably Jamaican accent, stereotypically connected with a particular life-philosophy that values being relaxed, easygoing, carefree, and happy. Other people in this commercial, being his colleagues, are depicted as being frustrated, in a bad mood, frowning, while the protagonist spreads joy wherever he goes (in an elevator, by the coffee machine, at the meeting, etc.), constantly reminding others to look at the bright side of life. At one of the important moments in this commercial, his colleagues ask whether he isn't in fact from Minnesota, something he confirms. So why does a white American from Minnesota speak his native language with a Jamaican accent? Answer: because he is happy, carefree, and easygoing. Why so? Because he drives Volkswagen, or so the viewer learns when his moody co-workers, after having taken a drive in his Volkswagen car, return in a much better mood, smiling, and also speaking with a Jamaican accent. Jamaican English is here presented not only through vowel pronunciation, but also through its specific syntax. In this commercial, then, the manner of speaking is more important than the verbal message.

The argumentation in this commercial can be reconstructed, Toulmin-style, as follows:

Ground: Happy person in a firm speaks with Jamaican accent (but is not from Jamaica).

Warrant: People with Jamaican accents are perceived as happy

Claim: Volkswagen auto bring happiness to people

Final claim: Buy Volkswagen auto

The second example, an Amnesty International commercial on violence against women, also makes use of accent and pronunciation as a crucial part of an argument.**[v]** It intends to raise awareness of both the perpetrators and the victims of violence, particularly by countering the stereotypical view according to which perpetrators are generally of low social status, lack education, and come from rural areas and – similarly, that female victims are weak, poor, uneducated, and unintelligent. Its main message is: Everybody can be a perpetrator, and everybody can become a victim. Do not judge people based on their appearance alone.

This message is predominantly communicated through prosodic features, while the commercial itself instantiates an argument from example, in turn based on the findings of sociolinguistic research on language attitudes showing people with some accents to be perceived as more sophisticated, educated, and as belonging to a higher social stratum. Both the male and the female speaker use Received Pronunciation (RP) British English, being a strong signal of their socioeconomic position, at least for native British English audiences (see, e.g., Trudgill 1995; Coupland & Bishop, 2007; Andersson & Trudgill, 1990; Giles, Scholes & Young 1983). Although the most extensive research on language attitudes has occurred for British English, similar findings for many different languages regularly demonstrate the important not only of what has been said, but also how, e.g., Labov (1966, 1972), Lippie-Green (1997) for American English, Hawkings (1993) for French, Kontra (2003) for Hungarian, Pomerantz (2002) for Spanish, Bezooijen (2002) for Dutch, Kišiček (2012) for Croatian. Invariably, accent is connected with the perception of speakers' status, occupation, intelligence, economic situation and prestige.

The commercial makes use of these insights, in order to launch an argument, as the commercial presents what in effect is an "audition for the best perpetrator." During the audition, however, the viewer cannot see the candidates, merely their fists. This body part then is a nonverbal metonymy. The audition is conducted by a female, who the audience can only hear speak, with all the qualities that

representing her as an educated, strong, intelligent women with authority and dominance. She even chuckles the moment that the perpetrator displays his aggressiveness by growling. Not intimidated, however, she does not take the obviously aggressive “candidates” seriously. This changes, however, when she faces the third candidate who speaks in perfect RP English with an attractive voice quality. Initially, his tempo is reduced, showing him to be under control, calm but dominant; then his manner of speaking changes, and towards the end he is annoyed because the female speaker interrupted him. These prosodic features typically reveal aggressiveness: louder speech (yelling), modulation (staccato rhythm), determined, dominant, giving orders. Also the female speaker changes features of her speech toward the end, as she begins to stutter, and speaks quietly, being on the verge of tears. Whether this argument is strong or weak may perhaps be discussed, but prosodic features remain a crucial part of it. By removing or changing the specific accent from the argumentation, the message would no longer be clear, nor would the claim be the same.

4. Conclusion

This paper has briefly discussed the importance of prosodic features in multimodal argumentative discourse. The term “prosodic features” covers all aspects of the manner of speech, including voice quality, accent and pronunciation (e.g., of vowel and consonants), tempo, rhythm, intensity, intonation, word emphasis, and (non)fluencies. Based on several examples of TV commercials, it was shown that not only what is being said, but also how it is said can contribute, positively as well as negatively, to the strength of an argument. Prosodic features, however, can sometimes take on an even more important role. Being more than mere contributing factors in these cases, they can be essential for successful making an argument.

Although this paper deals with TV commercials, rather than real-life argumentative situations, one may tentatively conclude that one’s manner of speaking influences one’s persuasive abilities. Thus, features of speech can identify the speaker as being a certain type of human being – determined or weak, clever and educated, or not, etc. These identifications, in turn, can be used as premises in specific situations.

21st century public discourse is multimodal, and there is a need to recognize more than a mere verbal, or propositional, mode of argument, something that currently challenges analysts who seek to identity different modes of

argumentation. As van den Hoven & Yang (2013, p. 422) conclude:

The argumentative reconstruction of multimodal public discourse is a necessary element of advanced media-literacy in a world in which multimodality is the standard and a critical attitude of experts is desirable.

The argumentative reconstruction of multimodal public discourse should take prosodic features into account; the appeal to ear, as it were, should not be disregarded and its role in argumentative discourse properly analyzed.

NOTES

- i. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jdyKqbnW7YU>
- ii. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9EyXUY8ubc8>
- iii. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EFwGTACz-8>
- iv. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gDovzhqwS7g> (3:12 - 4:16)
- v. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FzOZey7ZGMk>

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ISSA Proceedings 2014 - Institutional Constraints Of Topical Strategic Maneuvering In Legal Argumentation. The Case Of 'Insulting'.

Abstract: Strategic maneuvering refers to the efforts parties make to reconcile rhetorical effectiveness with dialectical standards of reasonableness. It manifests itself in topical selection, audience-directed framing and presentational devices. In analyzing strategic maneuvering one category of parameters to be considered are the constraints of the institutional context. In this paper I explore the institutional constraints for topical selection for the legal argumentative activity type insulting. I will make a distinction between statutory constraints, constraints developed in case law and constraints regarding language use and the logic of conversational implicatures

Keywords: conversational implicatures, insulting, legal argumentation, speech act theory,

1. Introduction

Frans van Eemeren explains in *Strategic Maneuvering in Argumentative Discourse* (2010, p. 40) how the theoretical reconstruction of argumentation should incorporate *strategic maneuvering* of parties in a discussion. Strategic maneuvering refers to the efforts parties make to reconcile rhetorical effectiveness with dialectical standards of reasonableness. It manifests itself *topical selection*, the *audience-directed framing* of the argumentative moves, and in the purposive use of *presentational devices*. In analyzing strategic maneuvering the following parameters must be considered:

- (a) the results that can be achieved,
- (b) the routes that can be taken to achieve these results,
- (c) the constraints of the institutional context and
- (d) the mutual commitments defining the argumentative situation (Van Eemeren

2010, p. 163).

In chapter 10 of his study - 'Setting up an agenda for further research' - Van Eemeren proposes further research to the theoretical exploration of these four parameters for specific argumentative activity types. In this paper I want to do this for a specific legal argumentative activity type: the discussions about the accusation of *insulting*. In these discussions there is often disagreement because language users can opt for *indirect insulting*. The problem of indirect insulting is that there is a difference between sentence- and speaker meaning. This difference results in problems regarding the interpretation and reconstruction of the argumentation for and against the accusation of insulting. This aspect of insulting has received little attention in legal research and it is my aim in this contribution to solve some of these problems by providing a theoretical framework for the analysis of strategic maneuvering in legal discussions about insulting, using the parameters distinguished by Van Eemeren. I will focus on topical selection and the parameter institutional constraints by giving a specification of the argumentative activity type *adjudication in cases about insulting* and an analysis of the constraints of this activity type. I will make a distinction between statutory constraints, constraints developed in case law and constraints regarding language use and the logic of conversational implicatures.

2. The statutory constraints of the institutional context

In order to shed some light on the constraints of the institutional context let us first take an example of an accusation of insulting, taken from Dutch case law. 10 March 2009 the Supreme Court of the Netherlands ruled in a case about the accusation of insulting. The case was about article 137c of the Criminal Code, which makes insulting statements about a group of people a crime. The Supreme Court acquitted a man who stuck a poster in his window with the text 'Stop the cancer called Islam' of insulting Muslims. According to the district court and the court of appeal, this statement was insulting for a group of people due to their religion, considering the strong connection between Islam and its believers. But the Supreme Court argued that criticizing a religion, is not automatically also insulting its followers. According to the Supreme Court the appeal court gave too wide an interpretation of the expression 'a group of people according to their religion' in Article 137c. People expressing themselves offensively about a religion are not automatically guilty of insulting its followers, even if the followers feel insulted. The Supreme Court ruled that 'the statement must unmistakably refer to

a certain group of people who differentiate themselves from others by their religion'. While people may not insult believers, they can insult their religion. The sole circumstance of offensive statements about a religion also insulting its followers is not sufficient to speak of insulting a group of people due to their religion.

Discussions about the accusation of insulting can be analysed as species of the argumentative *activity type adjudication*. Van Eemeren argues that argumentative discourse in practice takes place in different kinds of activity types, which are to a greater or lesser degree institutionalized, so that certain practices have become conventionalized. Activity types and the speech events that are associated with them can be identified on the basis of careful empirical observation of argumentative practice.^[1] One of the activity types Van Eemeren (2010, p. 147) distinguishes is *adjudication*:

Adjudication aims for the termination of a dispute by a third party rather than the resolution of a difference of opinion by the parties themselves. It is commonly understood as taking a dispute to a public court, where a judge, after having heard both sides, will make a reasoned decision in favor of either one of the parties. The judge determines who is wrong and who is right according to a set of rules. Most of these rules are tantamount to specifications of rules for critical discussion aimed at promoting that the dispute be terminated in a reasonable way.

Now how is the practice of discussions about insulting conventionalized? Which institutional rules and constraints are relevant? In the following I will make a distinction between three types of rules: *statutory* rules, rules from case law and rules regarding language use. In the first place there are statutory rules about this criminal act in the penal code. The relevant statutory rule in the example 'Stop the cancer called Islam' is Article 137c of the Dutch Penal Code:

Article 137c

He who publicly, verbally or in writing or image, deliberately expresses himself in a way insulting of a group of people because of their race, their religion or belief, or their hetero- or homosexual nature or their physical, mental, or intellectual disabilities, will be punished with a prison sentence of at the most one year or a fine of third category.

This rule contains the following partially complex necessary conditions for the application: (1) there is an act of insulting of (2) a group of people, (3) there is an intention to insult, (3) the insult is in public, (4) verbally or in writing or image, (5) because of race, religion or belief, or hetero- or homosexual nature or physical, mental, or intellectual disabilities. This structure implies that a successful defence of the standpoint that someone is guilty of the criminal act insulting contains a coordinative argumentation of five arguments based on the five necessary conditions in the norm. A successful attack of this standpoint results in single or multiple argumentation, based on a refutation of one or more of the five necessary conditions.

3. *Constraints developed in case law and linguistic constraints*

In the second place there are rules developed in case law. These rules refine and specify the five necessary conditions, but the *case law* about 137c also resulted in a new condition for the application. According to the rules from case law about the application of article 137c three questions should be answered. The first question is whether or not an utterance is an insult and whether or not the other conditions of 137c are fulfilled. If the utterance is an insult and the other conditions are fulfilled, the next question is whether or not the utterance is part of a public debate. And if the insult is an utterance in a public debate the third question is whether or not the utterance is unnecessary offensive.

Let us now focus on the first question: is the utterance insulting? Here the relevant rules are not legal, but *linguistic* in nature. This third category of rules are conventionalized *semantic* and *pragmatic* rules. In answering the question about the insulting nature of the utterance a distinction has to be made between *direct* and *indirect* insulting. In order to qualify an utterance as a direct insult the words themselves and semantic rules may often suffice, but often one may require the *context* to understand the actual meaning of the words. It could be clear, for instance, that the tone of the entire text is ironic. Those few words which in isolation may be construed as insulting, would then in their totality, in conjunction, be ironic and hence have an entirely different meaning.

As I have shown in Kloosterhuis (2012) the cases of *indirect* insulting are often more complicated to analyse. In these cases semantic rules are not sufficient as basis for the qualifications that an utterance is an insult. Here we need *pragmatic* rules. Let us look at some examples. According to Dutch case law the following utterances count as insult Kloosterhuis (2012):

1. Calling a police-officer a 'homo'.
2. Greeting a police-officer with 'Heil Hitler'.
3. Saying 'I am gonna fuck you' to a police-officer.
4. Having a tattoo or a bomberjack with the text '1312' or 'ACAB' (All Cops Are Bastards).
5. Referring to a passage in the Bible where Pilatus washes his hands.
6. Saying or implicating that the Holocaust did not happen

These utterances are less clear than direct insults. This vagueness often results in discussions about meanings, between parties, between parties and judges and between judges. In example 1 for instance - Calling a police-officer a 'homo' - the judge of the district court ruled that the utterance 'homo' is not insulting, but a neutral term. In contrast with this decision the court of appeal decided that this utterance 'in context' had to be considered as an insult. Another form of defence to the accusation of insulting in these case is that there was no intention to insult. And sometimes the meaning - or to be more precise the propositional content - of a word is disputed. One of the counterarguments against the accusation of an insult in the ACAB-cases (example 4) was that ACAB does not mean 'All Cops Are Bastards' but 'Acht Cola Acht Bier' ('Eight Cola Eight Beer').

4. *Constraints related to the logic of conversational implicatures*

The interesting problem with the examples like 'I am gonna fuck you' is that there is a (possible) difference between the sentence meaning and the speaker meaning. According to Grice's theory about conversational implicatures a speaker or writer can use utterances as 'I am gonna fuck you' and defend that there was no insult meant. To explain this logic of the conversational implicatures in cases of indirect insulting, we should first give a precise definition of the *speech act insulting*. In the analysis of speech act theory, language users performing speech acts have illocutionary and perlocutionary purposes. The successful and performance of an illocutionary act will always result in the effect that the hearer understands of the utterance produced by the speaker. But in addition to the illocutionary effect of understanding, utterances normally produce and are often intend to produce, further perlocutionary effects on the feelings, attitudes and subsequent behaviour of the hearers. An assertive speech act as asserting or argumentation may result in the perlocutionary effect of convincing or persuasion and a commissive speech act as a promise may create expectations. Searle (1971) claims that there are five and only five types of illocutionary acts:

1. *assertive* illocutionary acts that commit a speaker to the truth or acceptability of the expressed proposition, for example making a statement.
2. *directive* illocutionary acts that are to cause the hearer to take a particular action, for example requests, commands and advice.
3. *commissive* illocutionary acts that commit a speaker to some future action, for example promises and oaths.
4. *expressive* illocutionary acts that express the speaker's attitudes and emotions towards the proposition, for example congratulations, excuses and thanks.
5. *declarative* illocutionary acts that change the reality in accord with the proposition of the declaration, for example baptisms, pronouncing someone guilty or pronouncing someone husband and wife.

The successful performance of illocutionary acts is dependent on the fulfillment of different conditions (Searle 1971, p. 47; van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1984, p. 21). A successful performance of a speech act results in a perlocutionary effect, for example being convinced in case of the illocutionary act argumentation. Within the framework of speech act theory we are now able to give a more precise definition of the effect '*being insulted*': *being insulted is a perlocutionary effect that is intended by the speaker or writer and that is based on rational considerations on the part of the addressee.***[ii]**

The next question now is how the perlocutionary effect of being insulted is related to the five types of illocutionary acts in cases of indirect insulting. How, in other words, is a language user capable of inferring an 'insult' from an assertion, a promise, a question, a compliment or a declaration? According to Van Eemeren and Grootendorst the associated perlocutions are connected to the essential condition or illocutionary point of the illocutionary act.**[iii]** There are five and only five illocutionary points.

- (1) The assertive point is to say how things are.
- (2) The directive point is to try to get other people to do things.
- (3) The commissive point is to commit the speaker to doing something.
- (4) The declarative point is to change the world by saying so.
- (5) The expressive point is to express feelings and attitudes.

Now it is clear from these illocutionary points that none of the five illocutionary acts is related in a direct conventional way with the perlocution 'being insulted'. Calling a police officer a homo or comparing an employer with Pontius Pilatus are

assertive illocutionary acts, in which a proposition is presented as representing a state of affairs, with an associated perlocution as accepting a description or being convinced, but not being insulted. Saying 'I am gonna fuck you' to a police-officer is a commissive illocutionary act – a promise or a threat – in which the speaker commits himself to carrying out an action. The associated perlocutionary effects of commissives are accepting the promise or being intimidated, but not being insulted. Greeting a police-officer with 'Heil Hitler' is an expressive illocutionary act with an associated perlocution as accepting the greeting but again – not being insulted.

So, the question now is: how is it possible to derive the perlocutionary effect 'being insulted' from illocutionary acts whose associated perlocutionary effects is primary a different one. The key to an answer to this question is treating the examples as forms *conversational implicatures* as analyzed by Grice. In order to analyze the difference between sentence meaning and speaker meaning, Grice (1975, pp 26–30) postulated a general Cooperative Principle and four maxims specifying how to be cooperative:

- * *Cooperative Principle*. Contribute what is required by the accepted purpose of the conversation.
- * *Maxim of Quality*. Make your contribution true; so do not convey what you believe false or unjustified.
- * *Maxim of Quantity*. Make your contribution as informative as is required for the current purposes of the exchange. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.
- * *Maxim of Relation*. Be relevant.
- * *Maxim of Manner*. Be perspicuous; so avoid obscurity and ambiguity, and strive for brevity and order.

According to Grice it is common knowledge that people generally follow these rules for efficient communication and, so long as there are no indications to the contrary, assume that others also adhere to the maxims. Cases in which the speaker leaves certain elements implicit, yet the listener still understands what he means over and above what he 'literally' says, can then be explained by assuming that, in combination with the cooperative principle, these maxims enable the language users to convey conversational implicatures. So, if a speaker is able to adhere to the maxims, yet deliberately and openly violates one of the maxims, even though there is no reason to suppose that he has completely abandoned the

cooperative principle, then it is possible to derive a conversational implicature.

In order to give a more precise description of inferring conversational implicatures Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984) propose to combine the maxims of Grice with Searles conditions for the performance of illocutionary acts. For the performance of an assertive the preparatory conditions are that the speaker has reasons for acceptance the truth of the propositional content and the sincerity condition is belief. For the performance of a commissive the propositional content condition is that the propositional content represents a future course of action of the speaker, the preparatory condition is that the speaker is able to perform this course of action and the sincerity condition is intention. For the performance of a directive the propositional content condition is that the propositional content represents a future course of action of the hearer, the preparatory condition is that the hearer is able to perform this course of action and the sincerity condition is desire. For the performance of a declarative there are no special propositional content conditions, the preparatory condition is that the speaker is capable of bringing about the state of affairs represented in the propositional content solely in virtue of the performance of the speech act and the sincerity conditions are belief and desire. For the performance of an expressive there are no general propositional content, preparatory and sincerity conditions. But most expressives have propositional content conditions (you cannot apologize for the law of *modus ponens*), the preparatory condition that the propositional content is true and the sincerity condition about a state of affairs that the speaker presupposes to obtain.

These conditions presuppose Grice's Cooperation Principle and can be viewed as specifications of the four maxims. Let us now try to explain how a hearer is able to derive an insult in our examples. The line of reasoning of the public prosecution defending the standpoint that an utterance counts as an insult would be as follows.

Someone who calls a police-officer a homo implicates an insult by openly violating one of the maxims. When the assertive is not true, the speaker violates the maxim of quality, or in terms of the conditions for performing an assertive, the speaker infringes the preparatory and sincerity conditions. When the assertive is true the speaker violates the maxim of relevance, or in terms of the conditions for performing an assertive, the speaker violates the essential rule, because there is no sense or point.

The fired employee who compares his employer with Pontius Pilatus does not say that his dismissal is like the condemnation of Jesus, but he is implicating it by openly violating the maxime of quality, or more precise the preparatory and sincerity conditions for an assertive illocutionary act.

Someone who greets a police-officer with 'Heil Hitler' implicates an insult by openly violating the maxime of relation, or more precise the sincerity conditions for performing an expressive illocutionary act. Someone who promises or threatens a police-officer to fuck him implicates an insult by openly violating the maxime of quality of relation, or more precise the preparatory and sincerity conditions for performing a commissive illocutionary act.

Saying or implicating that the Holocaust did not happen counts as an insult because it is (or counts as) a violation of the maxime of quality. In terms of the conditions for performing the assertive illocutionary act this utterance can be analyzed as a violation of the preparatory and maybe also the sincerity conditions for performing an assertive illocutionary act.

5. Conclusion: the constraints of topical strategic maneuvering in cases of indirect insulting

The analyses of insulting shows that there are three kinds of institutional constraints of strategic maneuvering: statutory constraints, constraints developed in case law and constraints regarding language. In cases of indirect insulting the rules of conversational implicatures are highly relevant constraints for the analysis of topical strategic maneuvering. The examples of indirect insulting illustrate two important characteristics of conversational implicatures. The first is that the presence of the implicature must be capable of being worked out for even if it can in fact be intuitively grasped, unless the intuition is replaceable by an argument, the implicature (if present at all) will not count as a conversational implicature. The second characteristic is that a conversational implicature is always *contextually cancellable* if one can find situations in which the utterance would simply not carry the implicature (Grice 1989:44). In other words, in using an 'indirect insult' there is *plausible deniability*. These two characteristics are the explanation for the *topical space* in discussions about the accusation of an indirect insult. The party who claims that a certain illocutionary act carries the implicature 'insulting' and the perlocutionary effect 'being insulted' claims that there are good arguments for this standpoint, given the conventional meaning of the utterance and the conventional rules for conversations. Because of the

plausible deniability the accused can argue that there was no insult at all. In the examples mentioned this was precise one of the types of argumentation to defend the standpoint that there was no insult.

Let us to illustrate this point take a closer look to the argumentation in the case 'Stop the Cancer called Islam' Is it possible to analyze this utterance as implicating an insult because the writer openly violates one of the maxims or conditions for performing a directive illocutionary act? The analysis of the utterance as an open violation of the maxime of quality and the sincerity conditions for the performance of an assertive - Islam is not a cancer - can easily be countered with the argument that it was meant metaphorically. The analysis of the utterance as a violation of the maxime of relation and the essential condition for an assertive, can be countered by arguing that this utterance was part of a public debate. This was in fact the point the defence made in this case.

NOTES

i. Unlike theoretical constructs such as a critical discussion and other ideal models based on analytic considerations regarding the most pertinent presentation of the constitutive parts of a problem-valid procedure for carrying out a particular kind of discursive task (Van Eemeren 2010, p. 145).

ii. In order to make clear what this perlocutionary effect involves Van Eemeren (2010, p. 37) makes the following distinctions. First, he distinguishes between effects of the speech act that are intended by the speaker or writer and consequences that are brought about accidentally. Van Eemeren reserves the term act, in contradistinction with 'mere behavior', for conscious, purposive activities based on rational considerations for which the actor can be held accountable. As a result, bringing about completely unintended consequences cannot be regarded as acting, so in such cases there can be no question of the performance of perlocutionary acts. According to Van Eemeren a rough and ready criterion for distinguishing between the performance of perlocutionary acts and the bringing about of unintended consequences is whether the speaker can reasonably be asked to provide his/her reasons for causing the consequences in question. Second, Van Eemeren distinguishes between consequences of speech acts whose occurrence may be regarded to be based on rational considerations on the part of the addressee and consequences that are divorced from reasonable decision-making, like being startled when someone shouts boo.

iii. Van Eemeren en Grootendorst (1984, p. 53) are of the opinion that there is a

conventional relation between illocutionary acts and associated perlocutionary effects. They describe the associated perlocution as 'something like the rationale' for performing the illocution; it is, as it were, in the nature of the illocution to bring about the perlocution. Central in their analysis is the relation between the essential condition or illocutionary point of the illocutionary act and its rationale. They explain that the relation between the illocution argumentation and the perlocution convincing can be characterized as 'conventional' in Lewis (1977) sense of regularity, normativity and mutual expectations

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ISSA Proceedings 2014 - Arguments By Analogy (And What We Can Learn About Them From Aristotle)

Abstract: The paper contributes to the debate about arguments by analogy, especially the distinction between ‘deductive’ and ‘inductive’ analogies and the question how such arguments can be ‘deductive’, yet nonetheless defeasible. It claims that ‘deductive’ and ‘inductive’ are structural, not normative categories, and should not be used to designate argument validity. Based on Aristotle’s analysis of enthymemes, examples, and metaphors, it argues that arguments from analogy are complex arguments that involve inductive, abductive, and deductive components.

Keywords: abduction, analogy, comparison, deduction, enthymeme, example, induction, metaphor, similarity.

1. Introduction

Arguments by analogy have been a much-disputed subject recently. The most controversial issues in that discussion have been whether or not there are different types of analogical arguments, whether they are to be regarded as basically inductive or deductive or as a completely distinct category of argument of their own, whether or not they involve any hidden or missing premises, and whether it is possible for analogical arguments to be deductive and yet defeasible.

Since the mid-1980s Trudy Govier has repeatedly argued in favor of a view that arguments by analogy should best be regarded as a distinct type of argument, and not as a species of either induction or deduction (Govier 1985; 1987; 1989; 2002), by denying that any universalist generalizations need to be included as unstated or missing premises in such arguments. In response to her view, while basically agreeing with her distinction between ‘inductive’ and a priori analogies, Bruce N. Waller (2001) has tried to restate the case for a deductivist reconstruction of the latter, whereas Marcello Guarini (2004) attempted to show that Waller’s reconstruction was unsubstantiated. Fábio Perin Shecaira, in turn, has defended

Waller's deductivist analysis by introducing some modifications (2013, p. 429) and by declaring analogy arguments that do not fit Waller's schema to be "defective or sub-optimal instances of their kind" (pp. 407-408; 421). In response to the dispute between Waller, Govier, and Guarini on the possibility of 'deductive' arguments by analogy, Lilian Bermejo-Luque has recently (2012, and forthcoming) proposed a new unitary schema for arguments by analogy as complex second-order speech acts to explain how such arguments can be 'deductive', but nonetheless defeasible. Independently from Bermejo-Luque, but in a way in some respects not dissimilar to her approach, James Freeman, in an analysis of Govier's distinctions (2013), has insisted on the necessity of the insertion of a *ceteris paribus* clause and of qualifiers in *a priori* analogies and defended their status as defeasible *a priori* arguments.

I will propose an alternative solution. I would myself prefer to view arguments by analogy within a greater range of argument types that derive from comparisons and similarities (see also Doury 2009), including examples, or even metaphors, and analyze them as complex compound arguments that involve various different types of inferences. I further hold that Aristotle's logic and rhetoric already provides the tools needed for such an analysis of arguments by analogy.

In a first section, I will briefly analyze the main points of disagreement between scholars on arguments by analogy. I will then argue that categories such as 'deductive' and 'inductive' are structural, not normative categories, and should therefore not be used to designate argument validity ('conclusiveness'). In a next step, I will sketch the main features of Aristotle's theories on arguments involving similarities and comparisons, and will finally demonstrate how arguments from analogy can be reconstructed as complex arguments that involve inductive, abductive, and deductive components.

2. *Types of analogies*

Govier, Waller and Guarini all agree that there are two types of arguments by analogy: one that operates from empirical data and yields only probable conclusions, and one that proceeds from analogies invented *ad hoc* and allegedly leads to conclusive inferences. The disagreement is on whether or not the latter can therefore be regarded as deductive. Govier calls those *a priori* analogies. Waller also adds as a third kind what he calls "figurative analogies" (2001, p. 200), that is analogies that do not actually argue for a certain claim, but simply illustrate a statement for the sake of better understanding (see also Garssen

2009). These are not to be regarded as arguments at all. Bermejo-Luque calls those “explanatory analogies” (2012, p. 6), and appears to further add also a non-discursive, “cognitive-exploratory” function of analogies, in which they act as cognitive tools in that they offer a kind of cognitive proposals for making new objects and phenomena more familiar to us. But the emphasis is on the two primarily argumentative types.

Govier’s analysis of a typical ‘inductive’ analogy runs as follows (1989, p. 141):

(1)

1. A has features x, y, z.
2. B has features x, y, z.
3. A has feature f.
- 4*. Most things which have features x, y, z, have feature f.
5. Thus, probably, B has feature f.

In this reconstruction, the fourth premise “is starred because, the way most arguments by analogy are worded, it would not be explicit in the argument. It would be unstated.” (p. 141). One should note the qualifier “probably” in the conclusion! While she agrees that such arguments may require some inductive generalization, what she sees involved here is “a hasty generalization – typically a generalization from a single case.” (p. 142). Her example is that war and slavery have a lot in common, yet slavery was abolished by citizen action; hence it should be possible to abolish war by citizen action. Typically, in an ‘inductive’ analogy, “the reality and empirical detail of the analogue matter”, and the conclusion “predicts a result for the primary subject” (p. 142). This is why Guarini (2004, p. 166), just as William R. Brown (1989, p. 162), prefers to call them ‘predictive’.

Govier’s master example for what she calls a priori analogy is Judith Jarvis Thomson’s famous example of the desperate violinist that is hooked on another human being for life support (Thomson 1971, p. 48-49; Govier 1989, p. 142), an ad hoc example that was meant to support the claim that a woman that had gotten pregnant from rape had no moral obligation to keep the foetus alive. According to Govier, in an a priori analogy, the analogue is “constructed”, it “can be entirely hypothetical and may, in fact, be positively fanciful.” (1989, p. 142).

Her analysis of such an a priori analogy is slightly different from that of an ‘inductive’ one (p. 144):

(2)

1. A has x, y, z.
2. B has x, y, z.
3. A is W.
- 4'. It is in virtue of x, y, z, that A is W.
5. Therefore, B is W.

There is no qualifier such as “probably” here, as there was in ‘inductive’ analogy. On the contrary, Govier even suggests that from premise 4’ (which seems to be presupposed in some way) it is only a short step to the universal premise:

4*. *All* things which have x, y, z are W.

This is what Govier calls a “U-claim”, a universal claim. In the case of the desperate violinist, the ‘U-claim’ would be something like “*No-one* has an obligation to support at his or her own inconvenience the life of another human being to which he or she has been unvoluntarily linked.” This premise would make the argument deductively valid. But it would also make premises 1 and 3 logically redundant and thus eliminate the analogy as superfluous. And, what is more, it is clearly an overstatement unwarranted by premises 1 and 3. Based on these considerations and on Stephen F. Barker’s objections that it is often “not possible to state a suitable universal premise” and that “the universal premise [...] is nearly always more dubious than the conclusion” (Govier 1989, p. 144; see Barker 1965, pp. 280-290), she is inclined to reject such a deductive reconstruction, and to accept at best that some ‘U-claim’ may be implied, but not presupposed by the argument as an implicit premise (1989, p. 148). She argues that the cases are epistemologically prior to the generalization, and that hence a priori arguments by analogy work better directly from case to case rather than by way of a detour via what she calls a U-claim. In fact: “The trick about analogies – and their charm as well [...] – is that we are often able to see or sense important resemblances between cases without being able to spell them out exhaustively [...]” (p. 148). This is why she postulates for those analogies a special a priori, but non-deductive category.

Waller, by contrast, finds no sufficient reason “for denying the deductive status of such arguments by analogy” (2001, p. 204), just because the U-claim is hard to formulate or not immediately recognizable. He holds that analyzing an a priori analogy “is not a matter of finding the fixed and final universal principle that

rightly governs the analogy" (p. 207). Rather, the analogy forces the audience to think hard and reflect upon their own principles and their implications, so that the analogy does not establish the principle, but gets the audience to recognize the principle (p. 208). In this way, while preserving the deductive status of such analogies, Waller on the other hand denies them any inductive power. According to him, "there is not a shred of induction about them." (p. 201).

In her reply to Waller, Govier criticizes this view and argues that, if the U-claim were in fact implicit as an unstated premise, as Waller claims, it would be much less required from the audience to think so hard to arrive at it (Govier 2002, p. 156). This criticism of Govier's, however, appears to underrate the cognitive capacities of audiences, which Aristotle acknowledged when emphasizing the role of the audience in supplying unstated premises in enthymemes (e.g. *Rhetoric* I 2, 1357a17-21).

To overcome this controversy, Bermejo-Luque (2012) intends to construct a unitary structural schema for both 'inductive' and a priori analogies by analyzing them as complex second-order speech acts to explain how such arguments can be 'deductive', but nonetheless defeasible. Based on a Toulminian analysis of arguments and a linguistic-pragmatic model of interpretation, by laying strong emphasis on ontological and epistemic qualifiers that qualify the inference-claim as well as the analogue and also the connecting warrant, she proposes to reduce the difference between 'inductive' and 'deductive' analogies to a matter of such qualifiers (pp. 16-22).

Likewise reducing arguments from analogy to a Toulminian warrant structure by switching the order of some premises in Govier's analytic schema, and thus reducing differences between types of arguments from analogy to an assessment of ground adequacy and the epistemic status of the warrant, Freeman (2013) also insists on the necessity of the insertion of a *ceteris paribus* clause and of qualifiers in a priori analogies, lest they be subject to counterexamples (pp. 180-183), and defends their status as defeasible a priori arguments. With Shecaira (2013) he shares the belief that synthetic a priori warrants are typical of moral arguments (Freeman 2013, pp. 179-180).

3. *Deduction, induction, abduction*

Some confusion in this controversy derives from the fact that in discussions of arguments from analogy terms such as 'deductive' and 'inductive' are oftentimes

applied in a normative sense, implying that a deductive argument is equivalent to a logically conclusive argument, the conclusion of which follows with necessity, whereas an inductive one yields only a plausible or probable conclusion (see Bermejo-Luque 2012, pp. 2-3; 4; 21; explicitly rejected by herself in forthcoming, note 4 and section 4). This dichotomy, as Hitchcock (1980, p. 9) points out, can only be exhaustive if one is willing “to label ‘inductive’ all arguments which are not deductively valid.” In contrast to this, *pace* Hitchcock’s defence of induction and deduction as types of argument validity (p. 9), I would adhere to the view that ‘deduction’ and ‘induction’ are essentially structural categories and should not be employed as normative terms. Based on Aristotelian logic, a deduction (Aristotle’s term for which is *sylogismós*) would be structurally defined as an inference from a universal rule and a statement about a particular case being an instance of that rule to a particular assertion about that case, as in the famous example: “All human beings are mortal; Socrates is a human being; hence Socrates is mortal.” When cast in syllogistic form, in deductive arguments the middle term is always the subject in one premise, but the predicate in the other. It is easy to interpret this category in a normative sense, since, given that the premises are true, deductive arguments in standard form typically yield conclusive results, and in fact Aristotle himself reserves the term *sylogismós* to conclusive deductive arguments only (see *Posterior Analytics* I 1, 24b18-26). But by far not all formally deductive arguments are logically conclusive, as soon as negations and quantifiers get involved. Consider the following: “All human beings are mortal; Fido is not a human being; hence Fido is immortal.” (It is assumed that Fido is a dog). From a structural point of view, this argument is formally deductive; but it is clearly fallacious (and would hence not count as a *sylogismós* for Aristotle).

Inductive arguments, by contrast, infer from the particular to the universal (Aristotle, *Topics* I 12, 105a13-16; *Posterior Analytics* I 1, 71a8-9; *Rhetoric* I 2, 1356b14-15: “a proof from a number of similar cases that such is the rule”). Such an inductive argument, however, can be obtained by simply switching propositions within a standard deductive argument, such as when from “Socrates is a human being” and “Socrates is mortal” it is inferred inductively (and in this case by chance correctly) that human beings in general are mortal. Aristotle lists such arguments in his taxonomy of enthymemes from signs (*Rhetoric* I 2, 1357b10-13; *Prior Analytics* II 27, 70a16-20), but explicitly remarks that this type of argument is defeasible, since it is not properly deductive (*Rhetoric* I 2, 1357b13-14). In syllogistic interpretation, the middle term takes the subject

position in both premises, such as in the following example: "Socrates is a philosopher; and Socrates is bearded; hence philosophers are bearded." It is easy to see that in such an argument the conclusion will need a qualifier to make it acceptable if not even valid. For it may be perfectly reasonable to say that the argument does prove that some philosophers are bearded, or perhaps even that as a rule philosophers are *likely* to be bearded. Yet one single counterexample (such as Kant or Wittgenstein) will suffice to refute any general conclusion such as "All philosophers are bearded."

However, in addition to deduction and induction, there is yet a third conceivable structural type of argument, which is generally termed 'abduction'. In an abductive argument what is inferred it is the subsumption of a case under a general rule. The middle term in this case takes the position of predicate in both premises. Using again the obvious standard example, from "Socrates is mortal" and "human beings are mortal", it may be inferred that the most reasonable explanation for the observed fact will be that "Socrates is a human being". Arguments of that type are also acknowledged as enthymemes by Aristotle (*Rhetoric* I 2, 1357b17-19; *Prior Analytics* II 27, 70a20-24). Of course, as Aristotle himself remarks, even if the premises are true, this type of inference will at no point be safe (*Rhetoric* I 2, 1357b19-21). Indeed, the Socrates in question may as well happen to be a dog or some other animal.

4. Aristotle on arguments by similarity

Aristotle, in his *Rhetoric* and *Posterior Analytics*, calls these latter two types of inferences enthymemes, since, even if all premises are true, the conclusion will only follow with a certain probability. But, as we have seen, they are at the same time quite appropriate descriptions of the structures of induction and abduction. But Aristotle also says something else, namely that, just as the enthymeme is the rhetorical variant of deduction, the example (*paradeigma*) is the rhetorical variant of induction. This, I take it, is as good a description of analogy as any. Whereas in scientific induction a maximum number of examples must be accumulated to make the induction persuasive, in rhetoric – for reasons of brevity – this is mostly reduced to one single example (or very few), but this one example has to be a particularly significant one: "[T]he example is understood as a kind of *qualitative* induction in which the fewer number of particular references is compensated by the fact that they are plausible in connection with the circumstances and the audience." (Gabrielsen 2003, p. 350; cf. Bermejo-Luque, forthcoming, section 2,

on quantitative vs. qualitative analogies).

In almost identical words, in the *Rhetoric* as well as in the *Prior Analytics*, Aristotle states that arguing by example works neither from part to whole (as induction does) nor from whole to part (as deduction does), but from part to part or from like to like, “when both come under the same genus, but one of them is better known than the other” (*Rhetoric* I 2, 1357b27-30; *Prior Analytics* II 24, 69a13-16; see Gabrielsen 2003, p. 351). This is exactly parallel to John Wisdom’s description of analogy arguments as “case-by-case” reasoning (Wisdom 1957, cited in Govier 1989, p. 141). Aristotle’s example is that Pisistratus, when he asked for a bodyguard, became a tyrant; hence it is inferred that when Dionysius asks for a bodyguard, he is aiming at tyranny (*Rhetoric* I 2, 1357b19). How does this example work? According to Gabrielsen’s reading, “a ‘part to part’ example must be perceived as an unpronounced combination of an inductive and a deductive inference.” (Gabrielsen 2003, p. 351). In Govier’s terms, this would clearly qualify as an ‘inductive’ analogy, since the case adduced is taken from the experience of real life, and the generalization drawing on it (“people who ask for a bodyguard, usually aim at tyranny) would typically be used to predict another case.

Aristotle further says that examples may either be taken from reality or may simply be invented (*Rhetoric* II 20, 1393a28-31). In my view, this is the same distinction as Govier’s between ‘inductive’ and a priori analogies. Invented examples, he adds, are subdivided into comparisons and fables; the examples he offers for the comparison type are in fact quite similar to the standard examples for a priori analogies: it is, he says, as if one were to say that magistrates should not be chosen by lot, since that would be similar to choosing an athlete for a sports competition by lot instead of by his strength, or to choosing any of the sailors for helmsman (II 20, 1393b4-8). The examples/comparisons are in this case clearly invented *ad hoc*, and in quite fanciful manner so as to highlight the paradox. Fables (also clearly a fictional genre) may be interpreted as extended forms of such a priori analogies.

Even Aristotle’s theory on the metaphor in the *Poetics* can be adduced here, since it is based on similarities, and also in view of its cognitive and explanatory power (as Bermejo-Luque has observed, 2012, p. 8). Moreover, Aristotle notes that metaphors can be constructed from genre to species, or from species to genre, but also directly from species to species. Interestingly, he mentions a fourth kind,

which he calls “by analogy”, the structure of which is that A relates to X just as B relates to Y; hence in this case the analogy consists in the relationship between two pairs of terms (*Poetics* 21, 1457b7-9).

In a later passage of the *Rhetoric* (II 25, 1402b13-14), Aristotle states that enthymemes can be derived from four sources: probabilities, examples, infallible signs, and signs; again we find the example featuring prominently among sources for argument. And here Aristotle explicitly adds that we argue from examples, “when they are the result of induction from one or more similar cases, and when one assumes the general and then concludes the particular by an example” (1402b16-18). He thus links examples to the general realm of similarities; and he analyzes arguments by example as a two-step process, in which in a first step a general statement is established by way of induction, and then from there a particular case (the target claim) is again deduced. Hence in his view, arguments from example do argue from case to case, but they do so via a general principle.

5. *Another unitary scheme for arguments by analogy*

Based on what we can learn about arguments by various kinds of similarities from Aristotle, I would myself propose the following unitary analysis of arguments by analogy: I endorse the view that arguments by analogy are complex arguments that encompass at least two separate argumentative stages. In a first stage, from the analogue case, by way of an argument from example, a general statement is inductively inferred. This is very clearly the case in so-called ‘inductive’ analogies, since in those cases one or more empirically observed examples serve as the starting point. In a subsequent stage, from this general rule another particular case (the target claim) is inferred deductively. But these two steps can’t be exhaustive. In fact, before the deduction to the target claim can be executed, it will have to be made sure beforehand that the target case is at all an instance of that general rule. This, however, will have to be done by an abductive reasoning based on some other characteristics of the target case. So we have actually a three-stage argument. But this abductive stage has mostly been overlooked in recent reconstructions.

Things may perhaps be slightly different for *a priori* analogy. Look at Waller’s reconstruction of the structure of such arguments (2001, p. 201):

(3)

1. We both agree with case *a*.

2. The most plausible reason for believing *a* is the acceptance of principle *C*.
3. *C* implies *b* (*b* is a case that fits under principle *C*).
4. Therefore, consistency requires the acceptance of *b*.

Shecaira observes that Waller's schema "does not represent analogical arguments simply as deductive inferences, but rather as complexes of two inferences only one of which is deductive" (2013, p. 407; cf. also p. 424). On our account, however, his analysis in fact involves no less than three inferences. For anyone acquainted with abductive reasoning, premise 2 unmistakably evokes one of the most common standard descriptions of abduction (an "inference to the best explanation", see Harman 1965; Lipton 2001; cf. Wellman's "explanatory reasoning" as "reasoning from a body of data to a hypothesis that will render them intelligible", 1971, p. 52; see Freeman 2013, p. 190). But so does premise 3 (a "case fitting under a principle") for the target case. Shecaira comes very close to this insight, when he repeatedly speaks of principle *C* as the "most plausible (i.e., the best) reason for believing *a*" (2013, p. 429), or notes that this move "resembles an inference to the best explanation" (pp. 430; 435), but at no point he gets beyond calling it, rather vaguely, "a non-deductive sub-argument" (p. 453; cf. pp. 409; 430). Yet if Waller's analysis is valid, it seems to suggest that in the case of a priori analogies the inductive stage is replaced by a second abductive reasoning that subordinates the *ad hoc* invented analogue to some principle that is already in some way part of the commitment store of the audience (cf. Waller 2002, p. 213).

This would account for the differences most analysts have observed between these two basic types of arguments by analogy. But since we learn from Aristotle that both inductive and abductive reasonings are by their very definition defeasible, because they are always open to refutation by counterexample, this means that no argument by analogy can be ultimately conclusive. This seems to be trivial for 'inductive' analogies. The general statement attained inductively in those arguments necessarily needs to be constrained by a qualifier such as 'probably' or 'presumably', which will render the ultimate conclusion only a probable or presumable one as well. Bermejo-Luque is certainly right in emphasizing the role of those qualifiers (2012, pp. 16-22). But contrary to what most analysts assume, this equally holds for a priori analogy.

Both Waller and Guarini invoke a number of arguments that challenge the conclusiveness of Thomson's violinist analogy (Waller 2001, pp. 208-210; Guarini

2004, p. 159), to the effect that, even if the analogy as such holds, it may be abductively related to some different moral intuition such as that one is in fact morally obliged to support any other human being's life at whatever cost. Freeman's insistence on the necessity of the insertion of a *ceteris paribus* clause in such arguments, lest they be subject to counterexamples, points in the same direction (2013, pp. 180-182). And both Guarini and Bermejo-Luque point out that, since all similarities allow for a more or less, arguments by analogy must also allow for degrees of strength (Guarini 2004, p. 159-160; Bermejo-Luque 2012, pp. 16; 23).

Freeman (2013, p. 192) ultimately argues that the *epistemic* distinction between arguments based on *a priori* and *a posteriori* warrants is more fundamental to a general theory of arguments than *structural* categories (such as inductive and deductive, which in his view mainly concern "the criteria and methods of assessing *connection adequacy*", p. 188), but that another distinction is equally fundamental, namely that between conclusive and defeasible arguments, so that the category of defeasible *a priori* arguments is not only not impossible, but even one out of four fundamental categories in a fourfold system of basic types of arguments (see Freeman 2014, p. 3).

If they are generally defeasible, what, then, is it that makes *a priori* analogies appear so compelling? There may be a number of explanations. First, there is most certainly the deductive element that comes as the last stage and makes one easily overlook the defeasible abductive or inductive parts. Second, just because in an *a priori* analogy the analogue is deliberately constructed *ad hoc*, it is of course constructed in such a way as to ideally support the claim, which makes its compelling force appear much stronger than in 'inductive' analogies from empirical data (cf. Bermejo-Luque, forthcoming, section 2, on qualitative *a priori* vs. quantitative *a posteriori* analogies). Furthermore, since in *a priori* analogies both the analogue and the target claim are subordinated to a common general principle in a similar way, namely by an abductive move, they somehow appear to concur in supporting that general principle, so that it seems to get double support (Govier once – perhaps inadvertently – actually says that it is "from A and B" that we move to the U-claim, 1989, p. 148). And finally, the ontological and epistemic qualifiers that, as Bermejo-Luque and Freeman rightly point out, would be needed in most of the propositions involved, are as a rule suppressed, which is something that frequently happens in rhetorical arguments such as enthymemes.

All this may explain why a priori analogies appear so particularly compelling that they are even sometimes interpreted as essentially deductive (in the sense of conclusive) arguments. Although Govier acknowledges the fact that her hypothetical reconstructions of a priori analogies “produce, in effect, a two-stage argument” consisting of “an inductive argument from one case to a universal statement” and “a deductive argument subsuming the subject case under that universal statement.” (Govier 1989, p. 151), nonetheless, in her accompanying diagrams (p. 150-151) the arrows emblemizing an inference all invariably point the same way downward, as if the entire argument were deductive.

6. Conclusion

In conclusion, then, we may say that a lot was to be learned about arguments by analogy and other arguments from similarities from Aristotle. Based on Aristotelian categories, a reconstruction of arguments by analogy seems possible that explains both the commonalities and the differences of ‘inductive’ and a priori analogies and their respective persuasive force. According to this reconstruction, arguments by analogy can be interpreted as complex compound arguments that involve inductive, abductive, and deductive elements. Since inductions are mostly, and abductions generally defeasible, the final step, although formally deductive, rests on defeasible premises and is hence in itself defeasible. On this view, both ‘inductive’ and a priori analogies have basically the same structure; they are invariably defeasible, but allow for degrees of strength.

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ISSA Proceedings 2014 - Evidence-Based Practice: Evidence Set In An Argument

Abstract: Evidence-based practice (EBP) is currently a dominating trend in many professional areas. But what do we want evidence for in EBP? Evidence generally speaks to the trustworthiness of our beliefs, but EBP is practical in nature and truth is not really what is at stake. Rather we are after effectiveness in bringing about changes. What we need evidence *for* is a prediction to the effect that what has worked in one context will also work *here*. In this paper I argue that it makes good sense to view this prediction as the conclusion of an argument. To set the evidence in an argument will structure our thinking and help us focus on what kinds of evidence we need to support the likelihood that an intervention *here* will work.

Keywords: Argument, causal role, EBP, effectiveness, enablers, evidence, external validity, local facts, RCT, stability of context

1. Introduction

There exists a vast literature on EBP, hardly surprising given the status of 'evidence-based' as a buzzword in contemporary professional debates, such as education, medicine, psychiatry and social policy. Researchers are responding in many ways to political demands for better research bases to inform and guide both policy and practice; some by producing the kind of evidence it is assumed can serve as a base for practice; others by criticizing or even rejecting the whole enterprise of EBP - the latter frequently, but not exclusively, couched in terms of worries about instrumentalization of practice and restrictions in the freedom of

professionals to exercise their judgment.

EBP is practical in nature. It is commonly called the *what works* agenda and its focus is the use of the best available evidence in the bringing about of desirable goals, both for client and society. This is indeed my preferred minimal definition of EBP; the production of desirable change, or conversely how we intervene to prevent certain undesirable outcomes. It is vital to note that EBP is deeply causal: we intervene into a “system” which already produces an output in order to change that output in a desirable direction. These interventions should be based on evidence that shows what works. To say that something (an intervention of some kind) works, is to say that doing it brings us the effects we want. For short, do X and it will lead to Y.

The very term ‘evidence-based practice’ obviously draws attention to evidence. Generally, epistemologists seem to agree that the term ‘evidence’ denotes that which serves to confirm or disconfirm a theory (claim, belief, hypothesis) (e.g. Achinstein, 2001; Kelly 2008). The basic function of evidence is thus summed up in the word *support*. Evidence speaks to the truth value and the trustworthiness of a claim, and is therefore relevant to all belief formation processes, whether in research or in daily life, including the ones where we form beliefs about the causal relation between action and result, input and output. This basic function can, I submit, in principle be performed by all sorts of data, facts and personal experiences. Indeed, it is worth pointing out that all people have first-hand experiences of the causal kind that we are talking about here. To act as an agent means to intervene in the world and have an influence on it (Menzies and Price, 1993). At the same time, ‘evidence-based practice’ has led to many misunderstandings about the role of evidence as well as to the crux of the matter being overlooked. What is really at stake is the *claim* that the evidence is evidence for. Evidence is in a sense a servant; good evidence provides us with good reason to believe that the claim is true.

I shall in this paper argue that setting evidence is an argument makes good sense for the practical enterprise of EBP; it serves to clarify and structure our thinking about what we need to know. But to see that, we first have to look at the basic causal structure of EBP and the EBP orthodoxy concerning admissible forms of evidence as well as assumptions concerning uses of evidence. Thus, this paper is mainly a laying-out of the premises I suggest are needed to bolster the conclusion that EBP will be well served by setting the evidence in an argument.

2. *The causal nature of EBP*

The short version of the causal nature is that EBP is causal because it is about the *bringing about* of desirable results. That is to say, we have a causal connection between an action or intervention and its effects; between X and Y. The long version of the causal nature of EBP takes into account the many forms of causation; direct, indirect, necessary, sufficient, probable, generic, actual, etc. and develops a more complex and sophisticated picture. In educational contexts, as, I assume, in political contexts, this causal complexity goes highly unrecognized. However, for my purposes in this paper a simplified X-Y relation will by and large do.

My own field is education; a complex field with many factors that interact and influence each other in many different ways. Interventions also vary in nature, from simple actions to highly complex school-wide projects which may take two or three years to run. It is essential to be aware that, regardless of field, any intervention is inserted into pre-existing conditions. The causal system into which we intervene already produces an output; we just wish to change it because we are not entirely happy with the output – in education, student achievement is a typical output of this sort. The already existing output is termed the *default value* (Hitchcock, 2007, p.506); the value we would expect a variable such as student achievement to have in the absence of intervening causes. The default assumption is that the system will persist in its state and keep producing the default results unless we do something or something happens. The default, Hitchcock stresses, it not that the state or value in question *is* this or that, but that it will remain this or that unless something happens to change it. When a set of variables all take on their default value and business is run as usual, they cannot by themselves take on a different value. This is a natural principle of causal reasoning, Hitchcock thinks. We tend to assume that if a variable should take on a deviant (or unexpected) value, there must be some outside variable or event that explains it. That is, to change the value of our target variable, whether student achievement or some other desirable outcome, we have to intervene somehow. This certainly seems to be a tacit presupposition of EBP.

For various reasons, the causal theory that best suits the logic of EBP is the manipulationist theory of causation (e.g. Pearl, 2009; Sloman, 2005; Woodward, 2003, 2008). Let us suppose that X produces Y as its default result. To change the value of Y, we must change the value of X. Thus, if we set the value of X to x_i

rather than x_k , then the value of Y should follow in train and change to y_i rather than y_k . This is precisely what the manipulationist theory of causation tells us: there is an intimate connection between causation and manipulation such that causal relationships are eminently exploitable for the purpose of change. This is one of the reasons why this theory of causation is so popular in disciplines which are to bring about change and development as well as give recommendations for practice and policy.

The point of intervening is that we set the value of X to x_i from outside the system rather than letting X be decided by the other variables in the system. That is to say, we manipulate X in order to further the changes in Y we deem desirable, naturally on the assumption that X actually leads to or brings about Y. As Judea Pearl puts it,

The simplest type of external intervention is one in which a single variable, say X_i , is forced to take on some fixed value x_i . Such an intervention, which we call "atomic," amounts to lifting X_i from the old functional mechanism $x_i = f_i(p_i, u_i)$ and placing it under the influence of a new mechanism that sets the value x_i while keeping all other mechanisms unperturbed (2009, p. 70).

There is, however, more to intervention than this quote tells us. First, it changes the value of Y, even though this is not explicitly mentioned in Pearl's definition. Changing Y is the main aim of educational interventions and usually the reason why we intervene in the first place (e.g. to improve student achievement). Second, the intervention changes the entire causal model because it cuts the effect (y_k) off from its normal causes (x_k). When we have intervened on X, the system no longer continues in its default state. Business is no longer run as usual, but is now running in a different way, one we think (or hope) should bring about the desired result or at least increase its probability. Third, the intervention disrupts the relationship between X and its parents. The value of X is no longer determined by the default running of the system, but by the intervention. All other influences on X have been blocked and/or cut off. As the equation in the quote indicates, X_i is lifted from the influence of P, its parents, and U, an error term representing the impact of omitted and/or unknown variables, and its value is decided by a new mechanism, namely the intervention. I prefer to interpret this in line with the causal agency advocated by Menzies and Price, although Pearl himself states that intervention does not necessarily have to involve human activity. But in education interventions require agency, hence my adoption of Menzies and Price's view on

this point.

This is not the place to discuss manipulationist theory in detail, but a couple of issues deserve mention. First, there is Pearl's view that causal mechanisms (X-Y relations) are autonomous. He thus argues that our intervention on one causal connection leaves the other connections in the system undisturbed. This presupposition seems deeply problematic to me. Educational practice is best understood as an open system where events, actions and factors are somehow locked together, obviously to varying degrees. If factors hang together, the change in Y will depend more on the total structure and it is a mistake – however tempting it is – to look at only small chunks or individual causal mechanisms. In complex systems we cannot assume that intervention on one mechanism leaves all other mechanisms intact. Second, it seems to be a presupposition of manipulationist theorists that X is already a part of the system. For example, Christopher Hitchcock (2007) argues that X-Y relations are internal to the system and that interventions therefore involve exogenous changes to X. My point here is twofold. Firstly, in education a teacher, as an agent *within* the system can decide to make changes in input X; this qualifies as an intervention in the broad sense of the term, but it comes from inside the system and is thus not exogenous. Second, there are many EBP cases where X is exogenous and inserted into the system as a new element. I view these two points as unproblematic amendments to the manipulationist theory of causation. The main point is that X be manipulable and that the intervention alters the causal system.

It is the ambition of EBP to provide knowledge that *works*; that is, to provide knowledge about how causal input X can be changed to produce desired changes in output Y. For example how implementation of a reading instruction program can improve the reading skills of slow readers, or how a school-wide behavioural support program can serve to enhance students' social skills and prevent future problem behaviour. But not only that – we wish to know what works generally. That means not only that the effect (output, result) in question is reproducible in principle, but that we know how to achieve it regularly and can plan for it. This kind of practical causal knowledge is future-oriented, in the sense that we, on the basis of experience or other empirical evidence, form the expectation that the desirable results obtained somewhere can somehow be reproduced.

3. What does the evidence tell us?

As suggested above, the basic function of evidence is to speak to the truth value

of beliefs. In the EBP case, both advocates and critics simply assume that the evidence speaks to the truth of the belief that there is a causal connection between X and Y, and that this is all the evidence there is (or all we need).

In a similar manner, both advocates and critics often understand EBP to include a hierarchy of evidence as part of its definition. There are various versions of this hierarchy; what they have in common is that they all rank randomized controlled trials (RCTs) on top, and that professional judgment is ranked at or near the bottom (see e.g. Pawson, 2012). The standard criticism is that such hierarchies unduly privilege certain forms of knowledge and research designs, undervalue the contributions of other research perspectives, and especially that they undervalue professional experience and judgment. The privileging of RCT evidence is evident in e.g. the US Department of Education's *User Friendly Guide*. EBP literature, such as the *User Friendly Guide*, provides evidence-ranking schemes (which tell us that the best evidence comes from RCTs), it provides advice guides (which tell us to choose an educational intervention that is backed by good (RCT) evidence, and it often provides "warehouses" (where we find interventions backed by good evidence). Together these three different functions make up the foundation of what has become known as the EBP orthodoxy (see e.g. Cartwright and Hardie, 2012). There is another element to the orthodoxy that I shall return to below.

There are good reasons to adopt the EBP orthodoxy and even better reasons not to adopt it. The principle behind evidential ranking schemes is *trustworthiness* – our evidence needs to be trustworthy or reliable in order to do its job, which is to speak to the truth value of claims and beliefs. It is no accident that RCTs have established themselves as the gold standard. Nancy Cartwright (2007) divides all research methods in two; *clinchers* and *vouchers*. RCTs are clinchers: methods that are deductive and whose logic is such that if all the specific assumptions of the trial are met, a positive result will logically entail the conclusion. The evidence provided is thus sufficient for the conclusion; one might even say that it guarantees it. The evidence, in turn, is guaranteed by the research design. In RCTs we compare groups that are the same with respect to all relevant (causal) factors except one. Random assignment is supposed to ensure that the groups have the same distribution of causal and other factors. The standard result of an RCT is a "treatment effect" (expressed in terms of effect size): average effect in treatment group minus average effect in control group. We assume that the difference between the two groups needs a causal explanation, and since other

factors (supposedly) are equally distributed we infer that the treatment, our intervention, is the cause of the outcome. It works; we might be tempted to conclude.

RCTs are strong on internal validity. If we obtain an average positive result and the conditions of the trial are met, we may safely conclude that the causal claim in question is true, X does indeed bring about Y and the evidence supports it. But internal validity is purchased at the expense of external validity, or generality. As Nancy Cartwright (2007) argues, what RCT evidence shows is strictly speaking that the X-Y relation holds where the trial was conducted, for that particular study group (see Cartwright for a detailed discussion of the limitations of the research design). It by no means shows that the X-Y relation holds generally across differing contexts. This fact is not discussed in the EBP literature. Rather, we seem to take it for granted that RCT evidence shows that the causal X-Y relation holds in general, that something works in general. The fact that it does not, is a major premise in the argument for why it is important to set evidence in an argument.

There are several sides to the limitation of RCT evidence. First, we here come across a problem that is also found in the manipulationist theory of causation; namely that one does not distinguish between *finding* and using causes. Manipulationist theory and empirical research designs alike focus on finding causes. To investigate whether X causes Y, we see if the two are correlated once we have controlled for other possible causes of Y. We hold various background factors fixed, manipulate the values of X and observe whether the values of Y change in train. Basically we conclude that X causes Y if the probability of Y is higher with X than without it, and the evidence we get supports our view. But *using* causes to bring about desired changes is another matter altogether. I am tempted to say that both manipulationist theory, RCTs and EBP only tell us half the story. They all think in terms of methodology geared at finding causes. When it comes to using causes, it is not the relation between X and Y that matters the most. When we implement an intervention we either change an X that is already part of the system, or we insert it into the system. Either way the pre-existing system, *practice*, has to be taken into account when we use causes. Hence, what matters is that the probability of Y given X-in-conjunction-with-systemi is larger than the probability of Y given not-X-in-conjunction-with-systemi. And the RCT tells us nothing about this. As Cartwright (2009) points out, the formula that

shows that X is a cause of Y, for example expressed in terms of a treatment effect, need not be the right formula for telling whether X will produce Y when we implement it in some concrete system. When we implement X, we generally also change other factors in the system, not only the ones causally downstream from X. But the RCT evidence does not tell us whether X will also affect A, B, and C, and if so how that will affect Y.

The second ramification of the limitation of RCT evidence is a corollary of the first, and concerns the EBP orthodoxy. This orthodoxy also demands faithfulness in implementation, termed fidelity. If you are to implement in your context an intervention that an RCT tells you has worked somewhere, you should do it exactly as it was done there. Take for example a school-wide behavioural program (Arnesen, Ogden and Sørli, 2006). Components, principles and guidelines are decided in advance, and so is their order and manner of implementation, although the authors concede that some local adjustment is necessary. But basically implementers must be loyal to the procedures prescribed by the program developers. If actual implementation deviates from prescribed implementation, we no longer know exactly *what* it is that works, the argument goes, and the program suppliers cannot be held responsible for the results. Variations in the efficacy of X are generally due to deviant or unsystematic implementation, the EBP orthodoxy holds. The orthodoxy presupposes similarity of contexts and generality of X-Y relation. The demand for fidelity in EBP is misguided, as it tacitly assumes that the RCT evidence showing the effect of X on Y is all you need.

But what do practitioners need evidence *for*? I propose that what practitioners, say teachers, want evidence for, is a prediction that X will work *here*, in my classroom, were I to implement it. The RCT evidence only speaks indirectly to that question, by telling you that X worked *somewhere*. But how do you get from *somewhere* to *here*? This is where the usefulness of an argument comes in.

4. *Setting evidence in an argument*

Let me back up a little. It is important that we take on board the fact that contributions to an outcome both can and generally do come from different sources. This sounds commonplace, but is easily forgotten; we tend to look for *the* cause and if we implement an intervention it is only natural that this intervention is salient for us and we ignore other factors. But the overall effect on Y depends on how all these factors add up; thus, an intervention is part of a team of causes and enabling factors which work together.

What, then, should a practitioner look for when trying to make a decision about whether to implement X or not? Which facts must be collected if I am to hedge my bets that X will work *here*? When is the fact that X worked *there* relevant to the prediction that it will also work *here*? We cannot take it for granted that it will, no matter how large the effect size emanating from the RCT evidence. We cannot simply export a causal connection and insert it into a different context and expect it to work. Causal principles are local, Cartwright argues, and it is easy to agree with her. Educational practitioners love to point out that students are different, teachers are different, curricula are different, headmasters are different, parents are different, and school cultures are different. So how can the RCT evidence be made relevant?

I assume that what practitioners want to know is whether an intervention is worth trying in their own concrete context. Will X work here, that is, make a positive causal contribution here if I implement it? RCT evidence does not tell them that. What it does tell them, is that X made a positive contribution to Y somewhere, *and* that given this positive contribution, we may infer that certain enabling factors were present which allowed X to do its work and make its way to Y. That is to say, the other factors necessary for producing the outcome must also be in place – it is vital to remember that our intervention is part of a constellation of causes which together bring about Y. An effectiveness prediction that X will work here must take the whole constellation into account, as well as possible. It is this task that is made easier and more systematic by thinking of the effectiveness prediction as the conclusion of an argument and that the job is to gather the premises which lead up to the conclusion.

What works *somewhere*, as shown by the RCT evidence, can be made relevant to what will work here. But a number of other facts must be collected if we are to say something about X-in-conjunction-with-system, which is what we want:

* In “our” context *here* we already get an outcome, a default result, concerning the student achievements in question, but we want to improve them. How are these results produced? What factors are present in our context and how do they combine to produce the result?

* This constellation of causes is called the causal principle for the outcome (Cartwright and Hardie, 2012) and it is needed to connect the alleged cause with the desired effect.

* Mapping the local causal principle is not enough. Next we have to look at the proposed intervention X and ask whether it can play a positive causal role for producing the desired effect in our setting. How can it work? There is no substitute, Cartwright and Hardie insist, for thinking thoroughly about how X might work if implemented.

* Next we look at the factors that must be in place if the intervention is to be able to play its causal role. Which are they? Are they present? If not present, can they be easily procured? Do they outweigh any disabling factors that might be in place? It is important to remember that some of these enablers may be absences of hindrances. Arnesen, Ogden and Sørli (2006) provide examples of such local facts, despite their adherence to the EBP orthodoxy and the principle of fidelity. For example, they argue that there must not be personal conflicts among the staff if the behavioural program is to work positively. That is, a conflict is a contextual disabler which hinders or obstructs the working of the program. Conversely we might say that its absence is an enabler. Another local enabling factor is the fact that staff norms and values at least do not contradict the values inherent in the program to be implemented.

* Not only must the necessary enablers be in place, their organization must also be stable. The stability of the system into which we contemplate inserting X is of vital importance for our chances of success. If the system is shifting and unstable, X may never be able to do its work and produce Y. This fact is well-known to teachers, but perhaps not really recognized by EBP proponents. But teachers seek to stabilize the environment, by structuring it in different ways: creating and enforcing rules of conduct, establishing habits and ways of doing things – in short, creating a stable environment which at least to some degree makes for predictability and thus allows us to expect with some confidence that our plans will work out. Time-honoured educational domains such as curriculum theory and didactics can be viewed in this light: they provide knowledge and advice on how to create the stable conditions necessary for goal achievement in general. But since we are trying to predict whether X will work if we implement it, the stability conditions we assess must be linked to X.

* It should be noticed that this kind of “mapping” is not about listing similarities between *somewhere* and *here*. Similarities are not important for this kind of generalization. Rather, what it takes is that we have some idea about what a good constellation of factors surrounding X might be, factors which enable X to make a

positive contribution to Y. This constellation need not be the same; it can vary from context to context. The important thing is that we map the enablers, procure them if necessary, and that we avoid or remove the disablers.

In sum: local facts are as necessary as they are overlooked. I by no means claim that the issues listed above comprise an exhaustive list of facts a practitioner needs to map in order to hedge his or her bets that a given intervention will work should it be implemented *here*. Yet it should be evident from this set of issues that it takes a lot of deliberation to figure out the chances that an intervention might work. Setting all these different kinds of evidences into a (reasonably) clear argument structure helps us sort them out and see what facts we need to ascertain. Inspired by Cartwright and Hardie, here is what I propose:

Premise 1: The intervention in question, X, worked *somewhere*; that is, it played a positive causal role in achieving Y for at least some of the individuals in the study group. The RCT evidence tells us that, and it also indicates how strong the causal influence of X on Y is, given that all other factors are held fixed (the effect size). We should remember, however, that effect size is a statistical entity and only informs us of the aggregate result. A positive aggregate result is perfectly compatible with negative results for some of the individuals in the study group.

Premise 2: Which factors govern the default production of Y *here*? The RCT evidence does not tell us that.

Premise 3: The intervention can play the same role *here* as it did *there*. The RCT evidence does not tell us that.

Premise 4: The enabling factors necessary for the intervention to play a positive causal role for Y are in place here, or we can get them. The RCT evidence does not tell us that.

Premise 5: The system (context) *here* is stable enough so that the intervention will have time to unfold and work. We know the main factors influencing this stability and we know how to maintain them. The RCT evidence does not tell us that.

Conclusion: Yes, the intervention will most likely work here. There are always unknown factors that might disable or hinder its workings; despite these we think it is worth implementing it. Or we may conclude that since the vital enablers are missing and they are too expensive to get, chances are that this intervention will

not contribute positively to Y in our context.

This tentative argument structure can guide you to what kind of evidence you need to ascertain. As should be plain, the RCT evidence alone will not be enough.

5. *Conclusion*

I have in this paper addressed one aspect of evidence-based practice, namely the fact that a lot more evidence is required in practice than is normally assumed by proponents and critics of EBP alike. The EBP literature, whether written by critics, adherents or researchers, focuses on RCT evidence as the kind of evidence on which practice should be based. Organizations such as CampbellCollaboration and McREL, which collect and vet evidence and produce meta-analyses, adhere to the EBP orthodoxy and the evidence hierarchy and view RCTs if not as the only admissible kind of evidence, then certainly as the preferable kind of evidence. Critics problematize this view point and argue that other kinds of evidence should count as well.

What none of them do, I have argued, is to address the question of what practitioners really need evidence *for*. If we assume that what practitioners really want to know is whether a proposed intervention will work for *them*, in their classroom, then it immediately transpires that RCT evidence is not enough. There are two reasons for this. The first is that RCT evidence only pertains to the first of the five premises I have suggested above. The second is that contrary to popular belief, RCT evidence does not show that a causal relation (X-Y) holds in general, it just shows that it holds for the study group from which the evidence emanates. In order to make a decision about whether we actually should implement the intervention in question *here*, we need to collect a good many local facts and put all our evidences together in an argument structure which allows us to make a sensible all-things-considered judgment. We must never lose sight of the fact that *here* denotes an already existing practice, a causal system, and that any output has many antecedent events. Changing a factor in the system or inserting a new one will bring changes to the entire system; changes which may affect our desired outcome in good or bad ways. RCT evidence may be highly trustworthy, but it does not even provide half the story. Putting all the different kinds of evidences in a structure will help us think systematically about what we need to know. Thus, EBP as a practical enterprise is indeed well served by setting all the necessary evidences in an argument.

I would like to end this paper with a remark about EBP itself: EBP is much more complicated than advocates and critics alike tend to think. It is essential to distinguish between finding and using causes, and it seems to me that using them to bring about desired results is much more complicated than finding them in the first place. EBP is thus no magical bullet for improving student achievements, but nor is it impossible. As a minimum it requires practitioners who can think for themselves; the EBP orthodoxy is seriously misguided.

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ISSA Proceedings 2014 - Shameful Corinthians: A Pragma-Dialectical Analysis Of 1 Corinthians 6:12-20

Abstract: Biblical scholars have fundamental differences in defining Paul's argumentative and rhetorical goal in 1 Corinthians 6:12-20. There is no convincing explanation for why the apostle brings 6:12-20 up in the letter. I conduct a pragma-dialectical analysis to account for the argumentation, rhetoric and their interplay in 6:12-20. It turns out that Paul aims at shaming the audience in order to break their resistance.

Keywords: 1 Corinthians, argumentation, Bible, New Testament, Paul, pragma-dialectics, rhetoric, shame, strategic maneuvering, theology.

1. Introduction

Biblical scholars have had significant difficulties in interpreting the argumentation in 1 Corinthians 6:12-20 (Goulder 1999, p. 341; Rosner 1998, p. 336). Two frequent and general problems are brought up to motivate the upcoming analysis of the section in the letter.

The first problem deals with the goal of the section. What does Paul want to argue in the section? Two alternative standpoint options are common (Rosner 1998, p. 336):

- a. The apostle argues that the Corinthians should stop a specific behavior, that of having relations with harlots (Drake Williams III 2008, p. 20; Fee 1987, p. 250; Rosner 1998, pp. 341-342);
- b. Paul wishes to smother a broader phenomenon: sexual immorality (Conzelmann 1975, p. 108; Lambrecht 2009, p. 486; Rosner 1998, pp. 337-338). Topically

speaking, the two themes are related. The question arises, which of the two notions supports the other. Does Paul employ sexual immorality to support the avoidance of harlots or vice versa?

Furthermore, why does the apostle bring up the issue in the first place? Is the control of the Corinthians' sexual morality an objective in itself for him or does Paul use it to achieve another goal?

The second problem deals with the placement of the section as a part of 1 Corinthians (Fee 1987, p. 250). Does Paul have a certain strategy in his ordering of the different argumentative sections? Or is his approach random (Murphy-O'Connor 1996, p. 253)? I will argue that he has placed the section strategically with a specific intention. In this endeavor, I will occasionally refer to the previous argumentative sections 4:18–5:13 and 6:1–11 to support my claims. My general claim is that Paul has certain long-term *dialectical* and *rhetorical aims* that he tries to achieve in the section 6:12–20 (van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2002, pp. 134-135).

I will conduct a pragma-dialectical analysis of 1 Corinthians 6:12–20 in order to solve the problems discussed above. After the analysis, I will draw some conclusions.

2. Analysis

I will apply only those tools and aspects of pragma-dialectics that I deem necessary for the purposes of this study. I will analyze the argumentative section in two main parts. The first one consists of the construction of the *analytic overview* (van Eemeren et al. 1993, pp. 60-61; van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992, pp. 93-94; van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004, pp. 118-122; van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2002, p. 134), which, in turn, entails establishing the following steps:

1. Standpoint(s);
2. Common starting points;
3. Arguments;
4. Argumentation structure.

The analytic overview belongs to the so-called standard pragma-dialectical analysis (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992; van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004). The first three points listed above correspond with the order of the discussion stages of the ideal model for critical discussion: *confrontation stage*, *opening*

stage and *argumentation stage* (van Eemeren et al. 1996, pp. 280-283; van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004, pp. 57-62; van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2002, pp. 132, 138-139). The fourth and last stage, the *concluding stage*, is missing in the section 6:12-20 and consequently it is left unconsidered in the analysis. After the identification of the standpoint(s), common starting points and arguments, the argumentation structure is reconstructed.

The second part consists of the analysis of the *strategic maneuvering* which is dealt with theoretically in the extended pragma-dialectical model (van Eemeren 2010). The analytic overview functions as a basis for its analysis. The strategic maneuvering will be assessed by scrutinizing the three inseparable aspects of it which are analytically distinguished from each other: the *topical potential*, *audience demand* and *presentational devices* (van Eemeren 2010, pp. 93-101, 108-113, 118-122; van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2002, pp. 139-141).

2.1 Analytic overview

In the introduction, two alternatives were presented as possible standpoints: stopping relations with harlots and sexual immorality. To map where and how they occur in the text, in Figure 1 I have divided the section into three subsections based on the occurrences of these two topics:

Figure 1: Section 6:12-20 divided into three parts based on the occurrences of the concepts “sexual immorality” and “harlot”

I.

12. All things are permitted for me, but all things are not beneficial; all things are permitted for me, but I will not allow myself to be brought under the power of any.

13. Foods for the stomach and the stomach for foods, but God will abolish both it and them. But the body is not for *sexual immorality* but for the Lord, and the Lord for the body.

14. God both raised up the Lord and will also raise us up by His power.

II.

15. Do you not know that your bodies are members of Christ? Would I then take the members of Christ and make them members of a *harlot*? Let it not be!

16. Or do you not know that he who joins oneself to a *harlot* is one body with her? “The two” for he says, “shall become one flesh”.

17. But he who joins oneself to the Lord is one spirit with Him.

III.

18. Flee *sexual immorality*! Whatever sin that a man does is outside the body, but he who commits *sexual immorality* sins against his own body.

19. Or do you not know that your body is the temple of the Holy Spirit who is in you, whom you have from God, and you are not your own?

20. For you were bought with a price. Therefore glorify God in your body!

Sexual immorality (πορνεία) occurs in subsection I in verse 13b. In general, verses 12–14 hold non-confrontational speech acts. Paul does not explicitly refer to the Corinthians besides in verse 14, in which he includes himself in the audience (ἡμεῖς ἐξεγερεῖ). The apostle does not bring up any apparent dispute in subsection I. Closest to a confrontation is the notion that sexual immorality is not for the body in verse 13b.

In subsection II, in verses 15–17, Paul confronts the recipients directly (Lambrecht 2009, p. 482). He asks them in verse 15a whether they do not know that their bodies are members of Christ. Then, he makes clear in verses 15bc that the Corinthians should not become members of a harlot. The phrases of “one body,” “one flesh” and “joins oneself” in verse 16 indicate that Paul refers to a sexual relation (Butting 2000, p. 83). Subsection II deals with why sex with harlots in particular should be avoided.

Subsection III begins with a command to flee sexual immorality in verse 18a (Byrne 1983, p. 612). Paul returns to the broader topic he brought up in verse 13b. The argumentation in verses 18–20 supports the order to flee sexual immorality.

2.1.1 *Standpoint(s)*

With regard to the standpoint, fleeing sexual immorality (18a) is a too abstract goal to render it as a plausible main aim. Instead, preventing sex with harlots (15bc) is a more concrete and feasible goal for Paul to attempt to achieve, when addressing a single community. It is not feasible to render avoiding prostitutes as a subordinate argument to fleeing sexual immorality. In that case, the argumentation would appear roughly as follows: “You should flee sexual immorality, since you should not have sex with harlots.” The reasoning becomes understandable when the arguments are reversed: “You should not have sex with

harlots, since you should avoid sexual immorality.”

Furthermore, in the two previous argumentative sections, Paul employs the generalization of a problem to support a more concrete instance of that problem. In 4:18–5:13, he employed the general teaching to exile sinners (5:9–11) as an argument to drive out the single fornicator (5:2). In 6:1–11, he argued that lawsuits in front of unbelievers are shameful (6:5a, 6), since lawsuits in general are shameful (6:7a). Because of this pattern, I suppose that the current section functions similarly.

2.1.2 *Common starting points*

In verse 12, Paul states that everything is free to him (see also 10:23). Several scholars treat this as a Corinthian slogan (Barrett 1968 p. 144; Conzelmann 1975, pp. 108-109; Dodd 1995, p. 40; Fee 1987, p. 251; Murphy-O'Connor 2009, p. 24; Rosner 1998, p. 346; Thiselton 2000, pp. 459-460). However, in my mind, the exaggerative formulation reflects Paul's own view (Dodd 1995, pp. 39, 54), since the apostle had a habit to put forward *hyperbole* (Lausberg 1998, pp. 263-264, 410-411; Thurén 2000, pp. 202-203, 212). This is not to say that the apostle does not account for a Corinthian view, too. The recipients likely considered themselves free in many respects. However, the apostle wants to appear the expert of freedom by stating that everything is permitted to him. He wishes to promote his *ethos*. Paul also wants to begin to argue from a common ground.

The phrase “foods for stomach” (and vice versa) reflects common sense that is in itself obvious. I interpret the following phrase in verse 13a about God abolishing as referring to the eschatological judgment. In the previous argumentative sections, 4:18–5:13 and 6:1–11, the apostle refers to eschatological matters (5:5 and 6:2–3). In 6:13, Paul contrasts the negative destruction in the last judgment with the positive resurrection in verse 14, which also occurs at the end of times.

A distinct *presentational device* (see, chaps. 2.2 and 2.2.3) in the current argumentative section, and in the two previous sections, is the “do you not know that” – question. Paul uses it to convey common starting points (Wuellner 1986, p. 53). The idea is that the Corinthians should have taken into account the apostle's particular teaching from a previous visit or letter (see, Hurd 1965, pp. 43-58). Consequently, verse 15a is considered a common starting point.

However, verses 16a and 19 are not common starting points, even though they

hold an almost identical formulation of the rhetorical question. Instead, they are arguments, because they are supported by starting points in verses 16b and 20a (Wuellner 1986, p. 67). The word “or” in the “do you not know” -questions indicates that the Corinthians should have deduced the conclusion from the starting points that support the arguments inherent in the rhetorical questions (Lambrecht 2009, p. 483).

In verse 16b, Paul quotes Genesis 2:24, which belongs to the presumably authoritative religious writings to him and to the recipients (Drake Williams III 2008, p. 20; Heil 2005, pp. 103-105, 122). Consequently, I render the quote as a common starting point. In verse 20a, the apostle alludes to the sacrifice of Christ (see also 7:23) (Lambrecht 2009, p. 484). God has bought the Corinthians, and believers in general, to himself with Christ’s blood (Conzelmann 1975, p. 113; Goulder 1999, p. 347; Fee 1987, p. 265). This is a fundamental event that establishes the faith of the recipients and belongs to the common starting points.

2.1.3 *Arguments*

The rest of the text consists of arguments (verses 13b, 16a, 17-19 and 20b). There is no concluding stage, unless one considers verse 20b as belonging to it. I render 20b as a positive repetition to flee sexual immorality which occurs in verse 18a (Fee 1987, p. 265; Lambrecht 2009, pp. 484-485). To be able to glorify God in the body, one needs to flee sexual immorality. The phrases are immediately connected and should be considered as a single argument.

As stated above, the “or do you not know” -questions in verses 16a and 19 are considered as arguments, since they are supported by common starting points.

To sum up, Figure 2 portrays the stages of the ideal model as they appear in section 6:12-20. The text between the two symbols ‘[S]’ indicates the sole standpoint. It does not occur until the midway of the section. The symbols ‘[O]’ and ‘[A]’ similarly indicate the opening and argumentation stages, respectively. Most of the opening stage appears in the first half of the section. The argumentation stage is prominent in the last half of the text. This ordering of the text indicates that Paul approaches the argumentative situation indirectly, making use of *insinuatio* (Kennedy 1999, pp. 103-104; Lausberg 1998, pp. 121, 124, 132-133, 684). The reason for this is assessed in the analysis of strategic maneuvering (chap. 2.2).

Figure 2: Stages of the ideal model in 1 Corinthians 6:12-20

12. [O] All things are permitted for me, but all things are not beneficial; all things are permitted for me, but I will not allow myself to be brought under the power of any.
13. Foods for the stomach and the stomach for foods, but God will abolish both it and them. [O] [A] But the body is not for sexual immorality but for the Lord, and the Lord for the body. [A]
14. [O] God both raised up the Lord and will also raise us up by His power.
15. Do you not know that your bodies are members of Christ? [O] [S] Would I then take the members of Christ and make them members of a harlot? Let it not be! [S]
16. [A] Or do you not know that he who joins oneself to a harlot is one body with her? [A] [O] "The two" for he says, "shall become one flesh". [O]
17. [A] But he who joins oneself to the Lord is one spirit with Him.
18. Flee sexual immorality! Whatever sin that a man does is outside the body, but he who commits sexual immorality sins against his own body.
19. Or do you not know that your body is the temple of the Holy Spirit who is in you, whom you have from God, and you are not your own? [A]
20. [O] For you were bought with a price. [O] [A] Therefore glorify God in your body! [A]

2.1.4 Argumentation structure

The argumentation structure, in Figure 3, is constructed based on the assessment of the standpoint, common starting points and arguments (chaps. 2.1.1, 2.1.2 and 2.1.3) and the division of the text displayed in Figure 1. The three subsections frame three argumentative wholes (see, Lambrecht 2009, p. 480).

In subsection II, the first line of defense for the standpoint occurs. The argumentation deals with why sex with harlots specifically is dangerous. Subsections I and III argue why the more general phenomenon, sexual immorality, should be avoided. The reasons for fleeing sexual immorality constitute the second line of defense.

Figure 3: Argumentation structure of 1 Corinthians 6:12-20

- 1 You should not have sex with harlots (15bc)
- 1.1a You should not become one with a harlot (15b)
- 1.1a.1a You are one with Christ (15a)
- (1.1a.1b) [You cannot be one both with a harlot and with Christ (15-17)]

1.1b Having sex with a harlot makes you one with her (16a)

1.1b.1 Gen: "The two shall become one flesh" (16b)

1.2a Sexual immorality should be fled (18a)

(1.2a.1) [Sexual immorality is not like acceptable urges such as eating (13)]

(1.2a.1.1a) [How food affects the stomach *will not matter* in the end (13a)]

1.2a.1.1a.1 God will *abolish* both (13a)

(1.2a.1.1b) [How sexual immorality affects the body *will matter* in the end (13b)]

1.2a.1.1b.1 Your bodies will be *resurrected* (14)

1.2a.1.1b.1.1 The Lord's body was resurrected (14)

(1.2a.2) [Sexual immorality is a sin against the Holy Spirit (19)]

1.2a.2.1a Sexual immorality is a sin against the body (18b)

1.2a.2.1b The body is the temple of the Holy Spirit (19)

1.2a.2.1b.1 God owns you (20a)

(1.2b) [Having sex with harlots is a case of sexual immorality]

The arguments beginning with 1.1 (subsection II) represent the spiritual danger that sex with harlots specifically causes. Curiously, the argument 1.1a.1b is left implicit. This argument is crucial because it indicates why unity with a harlot is dangerous in view of the unity with Christ: they are mutually exclusive (see, Fee 1987, pp. 251, 257 and Lambrecht 2009, p. 483). Members of the congregation should not be mixed with representatives of sexual immorality. On a more general level, the point is that the holy and the unholy should not be mixed with each other.

The arguments beginning with 1.2 build a bridge between the specific issue of having sex with harlots and the broader phenomenon of sexual immorality (Goulder 1999, p. 345). The implicit argument 1.2b indicates this connection. Two lines of defense, beginning with 1.2a.1 and 1.2a.2, support the notion that sexual immorality should be fled. These correspond with subsections I and III.

In verses 13–14 (subsection I; arguments beginning with 1.2a.1), Paul manufactures a counter-argument to a view that he implicitly attributes to the Corinthians (see, Fee 1987, p. 253). He compares sexual immorality to acceptable human urges. Eating is used as an example of an acceptable urge. Eating is alluded to by foods and stomach. The point of verse 13a is the following: how food affects the stomach, which is a part of the body, *does not matter* in the end. This

is because God will abolish them. Sexual immorality, however, affects the body in a way that *matters* in the end. The body is important because it is meant for resurrection and not for destruction (Conzelmann 1975, p. 111; Lambrecht 2009, pp. 481-482). Paul suggests that the unholy sexual immorality harms the holy resurrection body while acceptable urges do not. Thus, sexual immorality differs from other urges.

From the above reasoning, the alleged Corinthian position may be deduced. The Corinthians may have considered sex with harlots as harmless as, for instance, eating. Paul argues that their view is incorrect. However, the analyst has to be careful in making these assumptions regarding the recipients' stance. The apostle may attribute a false position to the audience in order to make his own case more persuasive. In this case, Paul would commit the fallacy of the *straw man* (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992, p. 126; van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004, p. 181; van Eemeren & Grootendorst & Snoeck Henkemans 2002, p. 177).

In subsection III, Paul argues that sexual immorality should be fled because it is spiritually dangerous. In verse 18b, the apostle states that sexual immorality is a sin against the body and in verse 19 that the body is the temple of the Holy Spirit. From these two notions, the implicit argument 1.2a.2 can be deduced: sexual immorality is a sin against the Holy Spirit. Again, Paul tries to prevent the mixing of the holy and the unholy.

In verse 20a, the apostle suggests that God has bought the Corinthians. In other words, they are his slaves and not free. This runs contrary to Paul's initial position in verse 12: everything is free. During the course of the argumentation the apostle attempts to change the recipients' attitude regarding them being free to its opposite. Already in verses 12-13, Paul qualifies his radical statements (Lambrecht 2009, p. 480). The Corinthians should act according to the will of their master and not according to their alleged freedom. This tactic of Paul functions as an example of his strategic maneuvering which is scrutinized further.

2.2 *Strategic maneuvering*

In the analysis of strategic maneuvering, its three inseparable aspects, which can be distinguished analytically, are assessed: topical potential, audience demand and presentational devices (van Eemeren 2010, pp. 93-101, 108-113, 118-122; van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2002, pp. 139-141). The analysis concentrates on finding answers to the questions brought up in the introduction. Consequently, some

otherwise interesting issues are left unaddressed.

2.2.1 *Topical potential*

Paul chooses to defend a standpoint which holds that the Corinthians should not have sex with harlots. The topic of the standpoint is substantially strong, because it can be regarded as a sexual misconduct. The apostle explicates this connection in the argumentation stage by implicitly suggesting that having sex with harlots is a case of sexual immorality (1.2b). Paul uses the topic to shame the audience (Goulder 1999, p. 342; see, Moxnes 1993, pp. 22-24).

Connecting the specific issue, sex with harlots, to a broader topic, sexual immorality, provides Paul a pool of new arguments. In addition, sexual immorality makes the specific issue explicitly a sin and thus more easily condemnable. Moreover, from a linguistic point of view the topics, sex with harlots (πόρνῃ) and sexual immorality (πορνεία), are easy to connect.

The specific phenomenon described in the standpoint has significant topical potential also because the phenomenon is concrete. The Corinthians, according to Paul, are guilty of a physical sin which also has spiritual implications. It is difficult for the audience to deny the accusation or to interpret their behavior as something else. The concreteness leaves little room for defense: either they are guilty or not.

In the opening and argumentation stages, Paul mentions the three persons of the godhead: God, Christ and the Holy Spirit. That the Corinthians' behavior affects the three persons emphasizes the spiritual danger of having sex with harlots and, perhaps more importantly, the Corinthians' failure. They have failed to glorify God (20b), to take into account that their bodies are members of Christ (15a), and that they have sinned against the Holy Spirit (18b-19).

2.2.2 *Audience demand*

Regarding audience demand, Paul approaches the case indirectly. In verses 12-14, he puts forward mostly starting points. Paul does not put forward the standpoint until midway the section and it is formulated as a rhetorical question. The apostle also refers literally to himself. Why does he choose the *insinuatio*-approach? Characteristically this approach is chosen, when the case is considered difficult for the arguer (Lausberg 1998, p. 121).

A plausible reason for Paul to opt for *insinuatio* is that he contributed to the

problems in the congregation with his preaching prior to 1 Corinthians (Rosner 1994, p. 125; Thurén 2009). Consequently, Paul does not accuse the recipients directly of wrong behavior but criticizes, instead, their lack of drawing the correct conclusions from his previous teachings (verse 15a). In addition, in 5:9–11 the apostle corrects the interpretation of his earlier letter (Hurd 1965, pp. 149-150). Moreover, in 11:2 Paul thanks the audience for taking his message literally. When these features are combined with the apostle's generally hyperbolic presentation, such as that regarding libertinism in 6:12, radical misinterpretations appear plausible.

Paul addresses the whole congregation even though it is not feasible to render all the recipients guilty of sexual misconduct. However, by accusing the whole community the accusation becomes potentially stronger, since the congregation has to share the blame and the shame that follows. Paul wants to claim an authoritative position over the audience and a shared responsibility of the transgression by them helps in this aim.

2.2.3 Presentational devices

Regarding the presentational devices, the hyperbolic formulation in verse 12 reflects Paul's own rhetorical position more than that of the Corinthians (Dodd 1995, pp. 39, 54). In order to correct his earlier teaching on libertinism without losing his ethos, the apostle chooses to begin from a position that the audience allegedly accepts. Towards the end of the section, he has changed his stance on freedom almost completely (verses 19–20). The Corinthians are not free but instead God's slaves. Consequently, they should follow his commands which Paul, as their spiritual father, puts forward. Instead of losing authority, he may have felt it necessary to exaggerate his position to portray himself as the expert of freedom.

Besides establishing common starting points, the "do you not know" -questions are designed to shame the audience (see, Wuellner 1986, pp. 61-62, 72). The Corinthians have failed to take into consideration the apostle's teachings. Paul suggests that they have not realized what consequences the quote from Genesis 2:24 and the notion of them being bought with a price entail. Instead, they have gotten mixed up with unholiness in having relations with harlots. Paul use of the rhetorical questions to shame the audience corresponds with their function and intent in the previous sections 4:18–5:13 and 6:1–11 (Wuellner 1986, pp. 61-62).

3. Conclusion

In the introduction, it was asked, what function section 6:12–20 has as part of 1 Corinthians. Is it placed randomly or strategically as a part of the letter? Is there an underlying train of thought that connects it to the other argumentative sections, especially 4:18–5:13 and 6:1–11?

Regarding the dialectical aim, Paul wants to keep the holy and the unholy separate. He wishes to prevent the Corinthians from uniting with harlots and consequently being part of sexual immorality. This goal corresponds with the aim of sections 4:18–5:13 and 6:1–11. In the former, Paul argues that the recipients should exile the unholy fornicator from their holy congregation. In the latter, the apostle forbids the community of saints to have their lawsuits in front of the unrighteous judges.

Regarding the rhetorical goal, Paul wants to shame the Corinthians by accusing them of sexual immorality. The apostle chooses the topic of sexual misconduct purposefully to inflict the negative feeling. Prolific presentational devices in this attempt are the “do you not know” – questions, which appear also in sections 4:18–5:13 and 6:1–11. In addition, in 4:18–5:13, he brings up the Corinthians’ failure to exile the fornicator as means to shame them. In 6:1–11, the apostle explicitly states that he argues to shame them in verse 5. The recipients going to law before unbelievers is shameful, because, for instance, they are allegedly worthy and able to resolve the issues themselves.

Paul approaches the case indirectly, by way of *insinuatio*. Verses 12–14 consists mainly of common starting points and the standpoint in verses 15bc is formulated as a rhetorical question, which refers to the apostle himself. He cannot blame the Corinthians directly, since he has contributed to the issue at hand with his earlier preaching.

Paul’s overall goal in shaming the audience is to diminish their boasting, for which he blames them in chapters 4 and 5. According to the apostle, the Corinthians think that they do not require his leadership anymore (4:8, 15, 18–19). Paul wants to revive his authority and argue that they still need him, since there are several severe, even shameful, problems in the congregation.

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ISSA Proceedings 2014 - Pragma-Dialectical Rules And The Teaching Of Argumentation In Philosophy For Children

Abstract: A Philosophy for Children teacher must model a discussion that complies with a critical ideal of reasonableness and use effectively all tools necessary to attract the students' involvement and participation in a meaningful philosophical dialogue. We distinguish the stages of a Philosophy for Children class where the pragma-dialectical rules and the pedagogical devices instrumental to enhance the students' participation in a community of inquiry ought to be applied.

Keywords: Community of Inquiry, Philosophical dialogue, Philosophical novel, Philosophy for Children, Pragma-dialectical rules

1. Introduction

The Philosophy for children program, created by Matthew Lipman (Lipman, 1980, 1991), centers around the building of a *Community of Inquiry* through the practice of philosophical dialogue. The Community of Inquiry is considered as a way to foster critical and cooperative thinking through the balance between competition and cooperation in an atmosphere of mutual respect and understanding, similar to the scientific community in that it pursues similar goals through identical methods (Lipman, 1998, p. 57). The Philosophy for Children teacher is a member of the Community of Inquiry with no special privilege but she must see to it that the logical rules that conduct critical thinking are respected and guide the dialogue among the participants.

There is a deep connection between critical thinking and democratic participation. To participate effectively in democracy it is necessary to be able to argue correctly, to have an informed opinion, to express it clearly and to participate in debates both in small groups and in society at large. We restrict the meaning of 'critical thinking' to the fundamental aspect in which most definitions coincide: the ability to participate reasonably in a debate and to solve the controversy reasonably. We consider that the pragma-dialectical rules for a critical discussion (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992, p. 208) provide the fundamental criteria to determine what are a reasonable debate and a reasonable resolution of the controversy. Therefore, the Philosophy for Children teacher will find in them an essential tool for the conduction of philosophical dialogue in the Community of Inquiry.

Through the critical rules for a reasonable discussion, Pragma-dialectics provides the theoretical and the practical tools required to debate reasonably. Our intention in this paper is to show how the Philosophy for Children methodology requires and facilitates the introduction of the critical rules in the classroom. The role of argumentation is crucial both in the building of the Community of Inquiry and in education for citizenship. Because of its cooperative thinking strategies, which facilitate the introduction and practice of the critical rules, the Philosophy for Children methodology seems to us the best tool for the teaching of argumentation.

Certain pedagogical strategies are peculiar to Philosophy for Children. Through them, the process of learning argumentation can be initiated and the critical rules can be mastered. In order to visualize this process, we distinguish the different stages that can occur in a Philosophy for Children class and identify the steps that call for the introduction of the critical rules. This distinction was made in a research project in which we studied the development of democratic attitudes in students and teachers through the implementation of Philosophy for Children (Vicuña & López, 1994). We distinguished five stages:

1. Shared reading of the text,
2. Eliciting questions,
3. Finding relationships between questions,
4. Discussion, and
5. Complementary Activities.

Not all the stages are performed in every class, but usually reading, eliciting questions and discussion are present. We illustrate them by dialogues taken from the program's novels.

2. Stages in a philosophy for children class

In Philosophy for Children a 'philosophical novel' is used as a text from which to start in order to create a common ground for discussion and to connect with the interests of the children. This is a narrative text in which the characters are children who interact with each other and with adults, conversing and wondering about everyday incidents both at home and at school. In them genuine children questions are reflected, which, at the same time, refer to some philosophical problems. This stage prepares the ground for the philosophical discussion that will emerge from the children's different reactions and questions prompted by the story.

For example, in the philosophical novel *Kio & Gus* (Lipman, 1992), designed for children in first and second grade of elementary school, Kio narrates the following incident occurred when he went with his grandfather to have lunch in town:

Next to the table where we were eating was a coatrack. It had a sign that said, 'Watch your hat and coat.' The coatrack was empty, of course, because it was summertime.

The sign bothered me, so I said, 'Grandpa, why does it say: 'watch your hat and coat'?''

He said, 'Because they might disappear'.

So, I guess there are things in the world that will disappear if you don't watch them! Isn't that weird!

By means of this dialogue the story relates to the children's experience of puzzlement concerning what is real. The students may connect with their own personal experiences of situations that cause them to wonder about the permanence of things beyond our perception.

Another example, taken from *Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery* (Lipman, 1982, p. 2), designed for children in fifth and sixth grades of elementary school. Harry, the main character in the novel, after realizing that he has made a mistake in answering to a question from his science teacher, reflects in the following way:

'So, there are things that revolve around the sun that aren't planets,' Harry said

to himself. 'All planets revolve about the sun, but not everything that revolves about the sun is a planet.' And then Harry had an idea. 'A sentence can't be reversed. If you put the last part of a sentence first, it'll no longer be true.

Harry has discovered a logical law. His discovery will lead him to wonder about the meaning of a sentence that starts with the quantifier 'all' and to inquire into the boundaries of logical expressions, such as *all*, *no*, *some*. He will eventually engage some of his classmates' interest into inquiring further about 'thinking about thinking'. This gives an idea of how the students reading the story can identify with the thinking processes of the characters and be stimulated to connect with their own ways of thinking.

Matthew Lipman, creator of the Philosophy for Children program, thought of the novels as a means to capture the complexity of children's experiences and, at the same time, as a way to help them organize them with a sense of unity and wholeness. Each novel contains a story which develops and ends having as background a philosophical theme, such as the knowledge of oneself, thinking rigorously, the discovery of the natural world, the foundation of moral norms, etc. In this way, the students can better understand and make sense of the complexity of their experiences. Besides, every novel refers, from a different perspective, to the philosophical problems discussed in earlier novels.

It could be said that the novels constitute a philosophical knowledge that embraces as in a spiral movement the whole of the children's experience, which is examined in the different levels of learning. This facilitates the students' exchange of different perspectives and helps them overcome the frustration produced by a way of teaching that presents knowledge as parceled in diverse areas without connection between them. The children's need for an integrating experience was among the first things that Lipman realized and he saw that philosophy could provide it.

On the other hand, the reading of the text provides the first stage in the building of a Community of Inquiry. Since the reading is shared by all members, they must take turns, listen attentively, pay attention to the turns, respect each other, avoid correcting or mocking a classmate who makes a mistake, etc. This is their first experience of sharing in the community. The teacher must guide this process in a way that generates an atmosphere of respect and empathy which will help prepare for the respect demanded by the critical rules that will be introduced

later.

2.2 Stage 2: *Eliciting questions*

After finishing the reading of the text the students are invited to formulate questions or to share their impressions about the passage just read. The idea is to connect with the genuine interests of the students, so that the philosophical discussion that would ensue is about these interests and not an 'adult agenda' imposed upon the students (Lipman, 1980, pp. 102-128). Their questions and commentaries must relate to the text, not necessarily as an interpretation thereof, but as something that the passage brought to mind. Therefore, it is important to ask the students to explain what the connection is between the reading and their questions and commentaries. In this way, the process of eliciting questions is a search for relevance, but not only in relation to the text, but also in relation to the students' own thinking. This may put the students in a rather vulnerable position, because their classmates may question their ideas or not understand them and they may be forced to clarify their meaning. This latent process of confrontation gives rise to an analysis and scrutiny which leads them to express what they really think instead of repeating opinions inadvertently introduced in their minds by custom or authority figures. In this search for clarifying the students' true thinking it is also important for the teacher to question opinions that are presented with the only purpose of impressing the audience or simply to establish a position of power. The questions and problems presented must be those that really matter to them, so that they will be willing to clarify them by discussion and common reflection.

Consequently, the process of eliciting questions calls for a teacher that helps the students clarify their contributions without 'indoctrination', that is without taking the advantage of reinterpreting what the students say so as to suit the teacher's preferred meaning. This role is fundamental in the building of the Community of Inquiry. It requires the ability to balance *flexibility* and *rigor*; *flexibility* to invite and admit all opinions, and *rigor* to demand that they express clearly their real thinking. Therefore, the teacher must ask the students to reformulate what they want to say until it becomes clear for all. In this way, she ensures a connection with the genuine interests of the students and with the shared interests of the group, in order to achieve both 'thinking for themselves' and 'cooperative thinking'.

From what has been said, it seems clear that the pragma-dialectical rules 1,

(Freedom rule) and 4 (Relevance rule) (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992, p. 208), may be introduced at this stage, by reinforcing that all questions and opinions should be allowed to be expressed and, at the same time, that the proponents must be able to show how they relate to the text just read.

2.3 Stage 3: Finding significant relationships between questions

In the next step the students' questions and contributions are grouped by related themes. The students are invited to find significant relationships between their questions in order to determine the different topics of interest and to decide on the subject of the discussion. This requires a deeper understanding of each contribution and developing sensitivity to relevance. It often occurs that some contributions are too personal and originate a long list of anecdotes which may hinder the coherence and consistency of the discussion. Here again the teacher must balance the student's eagerness to participate against the weight of their contribution towards the cooperative enterprise. An excess of personal anecdotes may stop reflection and make it impossible to go deeper into the proposed theme. Therefore, the teacher must demand that the students go further than their personal experiences and realize that they are part of a more complex and controversial issue. At the same time as the students are invited to connect with their personal experiences as a basis for reflection, they are also made aware that other members of the class have similar experiences and that all this can be seen from a more general perspective.

Once all the questions and comments have been grouped in this manner, the students decide democratically which of the resulting themes they are going to discuss. The authors of the questions that originated the chosen topic must answer them tentatively and commit to a standpoint. Thus, they take a more critical view of their own opinions and become aware of the help that they can get from other members of the class for clarifying and resolving their doubts. This illustrates cooperative thinking. As an example of this process, we may consider the following dialogue from the novel *Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery* (Lipman, 1982, pp. 28-29):

'What I think Laura's saying,' said Jill, 'is that what we call thinking is something we do, like swimming or walking or riding.'

'That's right,' Laura agreed, 'that's just what I mean. When I said before I had a mind, I meant that I mind things. I mind the telephone, or my baby sister, or just my own business. 'Having a mind' is nothing but 'minding.'

But Fran wasn't happy with the solution Jill and Laura had arrived at. 'I agree,' she said, 'that maybe the mind isn't quite the same thing as the brain. I know I said before it was, but I've changed my mind.' Everyone giggled for a while, then Fran went on. 'What I mean is, you can't see electricity, but it's real. So why couldn't our thoughts be something electrical in the brain?'

This time it was Jill's mother who told the girls they would have to continue the conversation in the morning. 'Mom,' said Jill, 'what's a mind?'

Although the conversation narrated does not occur in class but at Jill's home, where Fran and Laura have been invited to stay overnight, it reflects well the kind of interaction that can take place among the children when they are trying to establish relationships between their questions and to clarify the meanings of their contributions. The girls had been talking about the persistency of some memories, like a musical tune and things like that, and the conversation has turned to whether things outside our minds can make us think about them and finally they have asked themselves what is a mind. An adult is present at the end of the dialogue, Jill's mother, but she is not presented as an authority figure that would settle the discussion. The girls' opinions are being refined by their own confrontation and analysis of what they mean by them. They may or may not arrive at a satisfactory opinion about the matter, but even if satisfactory, it would be provisory as long as they are willing to explore and reflect more deeply about it.

2.4 Stage 4: Discussion of the selected themes

Once the discussion themes are selected in the manner explained above, we may say that a genuine interest of the children has been expressed. This stage is previous to the introduction of the pragma-dialectical rule 1, Freedom rule (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992, p. 208), because, in order to identify their genuine interests, the children were invited to compare and establish relationships between their questions or comments and the other children's questions or comments and not to commit to a standpoint yet.

On the other hand, according to Pragma-dialectics, when a language user expresses a standpoint he commits himself to the truth of his standpoint (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992, p. 31), and is under the obligation of defending it, if questioned (Rule 2, Burden of proof rule). In contrast, in Philosophy for Children a standpoint that conforms to the criteria formulated in the pragma-dialectical rules may take some time to be formed and requires some previous

steps.

After the group has decided on which of the proposed subjects is going to be discussed, the person who proposed it must give a preliminary answer. This puts him under the obligation of giving reasons, that is, under the pragma-dialectical critical discussion Rule 2. Demanding reasons is, in fact, one of the basic strategies for conducting a session in Philosophy for Children (Lipman, Sharp & Oscanyan, 1980, pp.121-122). Otherwise it would be very difficult to foster cooperative reflection.

The following dialogue, excerpted from the novel *Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery* (Lipman, 1982, pp. 22-24), shows an exchange of argumentation among children about the schools' quality. (We skip the narrative and give the speakers' names).

Mark: (...) schools are awful everywhere.

Harry: What makes them so bad?

Mark: Grown-ups. They run the schools to suit themselves. (...)

Maria: Well, but someone has to run the schools, and so it has to be the grownups, because they know more than anyone else. It's the same with other things. You wouldn't want to fly on an airplane where the pilot was just a little kid, would you? And you wouldn't want to go to a hospital for an appendicitis operation where the surgeons and nurses were just little kids, would you? So what else is there to do but let grownup people run the schools because they're the only ones who can do it right?

Mark: I didn't think up the idea that kids should run the schools - you did -. (...)

Harry: It isn't a question of whether the grownups should run the schools, or whether the kids should. (...) The real question is whether the schools should be run by people who know what they're doing, or by people that don't know what they're doing.

Maria: What do you mean, 'know what they're doing'?

Harry: Understand, I guess. Whoever runs the schools should understand kids, for instance. I think Mark's right. Lots of times they don't. But the most important thing they need to understand is why we're in school in the first place.

Maria: We're in school to learn.

Harry: Are we? What are we supposed to learn?

Maria: Answers, I suppose. No, no, I take that back. We're supposed to be learning how to solve problems.

Mark: Should we be learning how to solve problems, or should we be learning

how to ask questions?

Harry: We should be learning how to think.

Mark: We do learn how to think, but we never learn to think for ourselves. These teachers don't want to admit it, but I have a mind of my own. They're always trying to fill my mind full with all sorts of junk, but it's not the town junkyard. It makes me mad.

The children are talking to each other after school. Mark states that "the schools are awful everywhere" and, after being questioned by Harry, adds that the adults are guilty, because "they run the schools to suit themselves." This shows that he has spontaneously put himself under the obligation of giving reasons (Rule 2). Due to the questionable character of this reason, it is challenged by Maria. She says that the adults must run the schools, because "*someone* has to run the schools, and so it has to be the grownups, because they know more than anyone else." Next, she offers a counter argument by analogy. In so doing, she is complying with the critical discussion rules (Rule 8, Validity rule) by using a valid argumentative scheme. On the other hand, Mark complains about Maria's argumentation: "I didn't think up the idea that kids should run the schools - you did." That is, he is accusing Maria of violating the critical discussion Rule 3 (Standpoint rule).

Mark's proposition has led to an *aporetic* situation. Harry looks for a new alternative that may help to find a better formulation of what Mark has in mind. He says that the people who run the schools must know what they are doing and this means that they must understand kids. He goes on to state that he agrees with Mark that many times adults don't understand children, but most importantly they need to understand why the children must go to school.

After Harry's intervention Mark can formulate more clearly his standpoints: 'We never learn to think for ourselves.' 'The teachers try to fill our minds with junk.' 'They don't accept that we have minds of our own.'

The discussion ends because no one comes back to this point. The controversy is unresolved, but this is not important from the point of view of Philosophy for Children, since the children lack the necessary information to resolve it. It is important, however, to notice Maria's intervention, when she corrects herself. After she had answered Harry's question, she thinks for a while and takes it back. The stress is put on the cooperation the children get from each other to formulate

and reformulate their thinking, and not in the resolution of the controversy. The critical discussion rules are respected along the process, but the resolution would not be possible at this stage due to the students' lack of the necessary information.

2.5 Stage 5: Complementary Activities: Discussions of concepts

A frequent type of discussion in philosophy is a discussion about concepts. It is difficult sometimes to find a resolution, due to the fact that definitions are often dependent on many factors, especially on the purposes that the arguer has in mind. However, they constitute an excellent training in searching for assumptions, one of the main characteristics of philosophical dialogue (Lipman, 1980, p.119). In the philosophical novel *Pixie* (Lipman, 1982 p. 50) we find the following discussion:

Miranda said, 'Pixie, you know what mother said. We mustn't let anybody in. Rules are rules!' 'But mother didn't mean that we shouldn't let in people that we know,' I insisted. Miranda said, 'There are many weird people that we know and that mother wouldn't allow us to let in.'

It is difficult to decide which interpretation is correct. Both seem right. Although we could find some flaws in Miranda's attitude in trying to impose her authority to Pixie without giving reasons, what she says is true. It adjusts literally to what their parents had said. Pixie's interpretation, on the other hand, appeals to a more contextual prohibition: "Don't open the door to anyone!" is not an absolute prohibition; it does not apply to the people they know or are friends with. Without more information about the parents' intentions, it doesn't seem possible to resolve the discussion between Pixie and Miranda, but the students' discussion and analysis of this situation provides an excellent training in searching for assumptions underlying what people say. It is this kind of training what enabled Mark, in the previous example, to realize that Maria was unduly assigning to him a standpoint.

Discussions about concepts open a route to the critical rules that have to do with faulty assumptions (e. g. Rule 5, Unexpressed premise rule, van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992, p. 208).

Consider, for instance, the following dialogue, excerpted from *El libro de Manuel y Camila* [Manuel and Camila's book'] (Tugendhat, López & Vicuña, 2001, pp.

11-21):

(The children had been discussing about crimes and damages and Sebastián had suggested that killing is not such a serious offense because dead people don't suffer anymore. This caused much wondering to Camila and she talked about it at home. Her uncle suggested a problem that she could propose to Sebastián. We quote just the dialogue indicating the speakers' names).

Camila: Suppose that you have committed a very serious crime and are permitted to choose whether you want to be executed or spend the rest of your life in prison. What would you choose?

Sebastián: I would choose to be executed, because the suffering would be rather short in comparison with the interminable suffering of years in jail.

Manuel: I don't think that you mean it seriously. Death is the worst thing that can happen to you.

Sebastián: Why do you say that?

Manuel: Think about the death penalty. Everybody considers it to be the worst punishment, even though it causes short pain.

Camila: That's it! In the question of death it's not a matter of suffering pain.

(A little later in the story Álvaro addresses Sebastián)

Álvaro: Would you really prefer to be killed?

Sebastián: I don't know, maybe.

Manuel: Only because you think that one doesn't feel pain?

(Sebastián did not answer, but it was apparent that he felt at a loss).

Camila's doubts are cleared away when she realizes that Sebastián is not making a distinction between damage and suffering pain. This insight has been possible through the interaction with her friends. From the perspective of Philosophy for Children, this interaction is successful, since an important distinction has been made. Although Sebastián does not want to admit it, the distinction is valid. This means that the critical discussion rule 9 (Closure rule) should apply and Sebastián should retract his original standpoint. But to demand this would mean to violate the spirit of the community of inquiry.

Dialogues in Philosophy for Children are different from the controversies that are the object of Pragma-dialectics. They are a little fragmentary, if compared with the resolution of a controversy. It should be taken into consideration also that children do not satisfy all the conditions of a rational arguer. Nevertheless, by

participating actively in these dialogues, children develop certain important reasoning strategies, such as establishing distinctions, detecting underlying suppositions, and making adequate definitions of concepts, which will be fundamental for resolving controversies.

3. Conclusion

Philosophical novels provide models of how thinking and dialogue should be. They differ from the controversies examined by Pragma-dialectics in that they emphasize cooperative discussion. Children learn to listen to their classmates' opinions and to value them. Although the reasons they may give may have deficiencies and may reflect a very peculiar way of looking at the world, it is essential that they learn to give reasons for their opinions and be aware that they can learn from others. In contrast, the pragma-dialectical objective is the reasonable resolution of a controversy by applying the critical discussion rules.

However, there is a strong connection between the critical discussion rules and the development of a community of inquiry. It wouldn't be possible without the application of Rule 1. The children learn that all contributions are valid, but they also learn that they must be relevant; they must refer to the pertinent passage of the text. There is complete freedom to formulate questions or comments, as long as they are relevant to the subject under discussion. Cooperation in elaborating a contribution also conducts to tolerance towards the opinions of others and this very tolerance demands that we put ourselves under the obligation of giving reasons.

Some steps are implicit in the applying of Rule 1. To get a speaker to formulate a standpoint and to be prepared to back it up with reasons is a process that has been prepared by the first stages described: reading, formulating questions or comments about the text, and refining this contribution so that it may become a standpoint backed up by reasons. Rule 1 leads to Rule 2.

Rules 3 and 4 were mentioned in connection with the ability to detect underlying assumptions in discussions about concepts. Concepts don't have definitive borders; they can be applied according to context in a more restricted or a more relaxed way. This kind of debate is referred to in Pixie's discussion about the meaning of the word 'anybody' in the sentence: 'we mustn't let anybody in.' Does this mean 'absolutely nobody' or just 'the people we don't know'? Also in the passage where Mark complains that he didn't say what Maria has attributed to

him. If the teacher had been present, she could have pointed out that this was a violation of Rule 3. Knowing Pragma-dialectics would grant her fundamental tools for the fostering of critical thinking.

Rule 5 was mentioned in connection with the discussion of concepts, since it relates to the ability for detecting underlying assumptions, but we did not give examples. Anyway the teacher must know well all the rules, so that she can point out the argumentative flaws during the discussion process. The teacher's corrective role will soon be picked up by the students in what is referred to as 'the self correcting ability of the community of inquiry.'

Rules 7 and 8 are amply respected in the process of cooperative learning. Although Maria had incurred in an argumentative error by violating rule 3, she is still able to present an argument by analogy: 'children are not able to run a hospital; therefore, they are not able to run a school'. Learning argumentatively valid forms, albeit in a diffused way, is a fundamental part of learning to think cooperatively. In order to organize this learning, the pragma-dialectical rules and the analytical tools provided are indeed extremely valuable, especially for making explicit unexpressed parts of the argumentation and for evaluating arguments.

Rule 9 is not clearly emphasized in the novels, as was seen in the case of Sebastián. The model of a critical discussion that ends successfully is missing, but this deficiency can be overcome without altering the cooperative spirit of the community of inquiry. On the contrary, a discussion that is successfully resolved emphasizes this cooperative spirit, since it reflects respect for certain rules previously agreed upon.

Rule 10 is amply respected along this learning process. Clarifying the children's contributions, pointing out to language ambiguities, asking the children to be precise or to explain further the meaning of their expressions is something that the teacher of Philosophy for Children is constantly doing since the very early stages of the program.

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