ISSA Proceedings 2014 – Self-Argumentative Words: The Case Of Nature And Natural

• by: Zsófia Várkonyi, L.L.L., University of Orléans, France

Abstract: The words nature and natural operate in a specific way while used in an argumentation. Observation confirms that these words are never used with a negative argumentative orientation. This functioning will be illustrated on a corpus of sequences of public debate about same sex marriage. The hypothesis according to which this fact is due to the intrinsic semantic properties of these words will be examined.

Keywords: nature / natural, point of view, semantics, argumentative potential

1. Introduction
Several words seem to be arguments in themselves: the choice of those words tend to determine a statement’s argumentative potential. This idea, far from being new, has been sustained for a long time by various branches of Argumentation Within Language, a semantic theory developed by the French scholars Ducrot and Anscombre (1983). Its basic thesis consists in the claim that any sentence in any language can be used as an argument for some (but not any!) conclusion (Raccah, 2002). Consequently, this argumentational potentiality ought to be taken into account while semantic descriptions of sentences, and their components, are carried out. This potentiality can be described after shrewd observation of language use and a generalization of the observations results. That also means that observation of language use, in this framework, is not a purpose but a way towards abstraction. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2014 – A Cognitive Style Parameter Of Argumentation

• by: Lev Vasilyev, Department of Linguistics, Kaluga State University, Kaluga, Russia

Abstract: A cognitive style is is viewed as individual traits in argumentation organization and processing. A parameter of CS is cognitive complexity (CC) / simplicity (CS). We studied how 200 Russian respondents used Toulmin functions in reconstructed argumentation of an education article. Claims given by both style groups were mostly of policy and evaluative. Evidence (Data) did not differ significately. Warrants mostly had grouping semantics in both CC and CS. Backings and Reservations (Rebuttals) were more actively used by CC-respondents, Quantifiers – by CS-respondents.

Keywords: argument components, argument interpretation, cognitive style, poles of a cognitive style, cognitive complexity, cognitive simplicity, functional semantics, the Toulmin Model

1. Introduction
People’s communicative activities are interpretative. In our perception of situations we often distort the initial state of affairs. According to psychological research such distortions are neither intentional nor accidental. They are based on personal peculiarities of people. The cognitive style approach is one of possible approaches that help operationalize such peculiarities in people.

According to psychological research cognitive style is an individual-specific mode of processing information about the environment manifested in peculiarities of perception, analysis, structuring, categorization and evaluation of a situation. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2014 – A Mediator As A Pragma-Dialectical Critical Designer Of Acceptance

• by: Anton Vesper, Department of Philosophy of Technology, Brandenburg University of Technology Cottbus-Senftenberg , Cottbus, Germany

Abstract: Starting from the layout of the five components of the pragma-dialectical research program a mediator, the third intermediary in a mediation session, is characterized as a critical analyst and as a designer, i.e. a practitioner, of acceptance. On the spot of the mediation session she analyses the discourse and puts forward proposals to improve argumentative reality. Consequently the mediator is characterized as a pragma-dialectical critical designer of acceptance.

Keywords: argumentative strategy, critical question, facilitate, mediation, mediator, pragma-dialectical critical designer of acceptance, pragma-dialectics, research program.

1. Introduction
The research program of pragma-dialects has five components: the philosophical component, the theoretical component, the component of analysis, the empirical component, and the practical component (van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson & Jacobs, 1993, pp. 21-25; van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004, pp. 11-41). The target of this paper is to present the mediator as a pragma-dialectical critical designer of acceptance. In order to achieve this target I show why a mediator can be characterized as a critical analyst and as a practitioner within the research program of pragma-dialectics. Thus, in this paper I particularly refer to the component of analysis that rests upon the research results from the theoretical component, and to the practical component of the research program. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2014 – How To Put It Vaguely

• by: Laura Vincze, Department of Educational Sciences, University of Macerata, Italy

Abstract: The paper examines speakers’ possible goals in employing vague expressions in a gas bill, as well the harmful effects such expressions can have on addressees (i.e. consumers). The paper tries to demonstrate that vagueness does not exclusively boil down to lexical vagueness, i.e. uninformative words (Channell 1994). Vagueness also means not explicitating relevant information but giving them as presupposed, the speaker taking for granted that the addressee is already familiar with such content.

Keywords: Gas Bills, Grice, Cooperation Principle, Presupposition, Vagueness, Violations of conversational maxims, Withholding information.

1. Introduction

1.1 Vagueness
The notion of vagueness has been mainly investigated in philosophy (Russell 1923; Keefe 2000) with the challenge posed by the Sorite Paradox: how many sand grains make a “sorite”, a heap of sand? In semantics it is recognized that fuzzy boundaries are a characteristic of words. Take for instance Labov’s (1973) continuous transition between cups and bowls; the borderline between them is not clear-cut, but fuzzy and graded. As Anolli (2001) puts it, things deviate progressively from a standard (or prototypical) type, and we enter a semantic vagueness zone, where the same object could be, in turn, a bowl, a mug or a glass. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2014 – Two Kinds Of Arguments From Authority In The Ad Verecundiam Fallacy

• by: Douglas Walton, Centre for Research in Reasoning, Argumentation & Rhetoric, University of Windsor, Canada & Marcin Koszowy, Department of Logic, Informatics & Philosophy of Science, University of Białystok, Poland

Abstract: In this paper, an argumentation scheme for argument from an administrative authority is formulated along with a matching set of critical questions used to evaluate it. The scheme is then compared to the existing scheme for argument from expert opinion. The hypothesis is explored that it is the ambiguity between the two types of authority that is the best basis for explaining how the fallacy of appeal to authority works.

Keywords: administrative authority, argument from authority, argument from expert opinion, argumentum ad verecundiam, Bocheński, deontic authority, epistemic authority, Locke.

1. Introduction
There is now a considerable literature, both in argumentation studies generally and in artificial intelligence research on argumentation, on argument from expert opinion. This form of argument was traditionally categorized as an informal fallacy by the logic textbooks, but in recent years a revolution has taken place, and it is now regarded as a legitimate argument. It is nevertheless a dangerous one that can go wrong in some instances and be quite deceptive as a rhetorical tool for strategic maneuvering in argumentation. Hence we have the problem of distinguishing between the fallacious and non-fallacious cases. When this form of argument is legitimate, it is important to recognize its defeasible nature. It provides the user only with presumptive reasoning for accepting the conclusion, subject to further investigations and to critical questioning. Through the studies of this form of argument in the recent literature, we now have a pretty good idea of how it works as a defeasible argument, and we even have formal and computational argumentation systems that have been built in artificial intelligence and that can accommodate argument from expert opinion as a standard form of argument. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2014 – Cognitive Science And The Model Of Emerging Truth

• by: Mark Weinstein, Educational Foundations, Montclair State University, USA

Abstract: This paper looks at the developing field of cognitive science showing how its epistemic power can be explained using key constructions from my model of emerging truth (MET). The MET sees warrants as tied to a field of models in definable relationships that account for the relative power of the arguments in which they are employed. The paper identifies epistemologically crucial model relationships in various strands of cognitive science accounting for its explanatory potential.

Keywords: argument, brain, cognitive science, epistemology, MET, psychology, truth, warrants

1. Introduction
This paper continues an agenda that has exercised me for more than two decades (Weinstein, 1990; 1994 are early contributions. Weinstein, 2013b is a recent sustained effort). The core of my approach can be succinctly states as follows: evaluating arguments put forward whether in defense or attack essentially requires being able to give a comparative estimate of the strength of the warrants employed, whether tacit or overt (Weinstein, 2006). This challenges much of the theory of argument, since it precludes dialogical and dialectical considerations from being definitive, focusing rather on epistemology. Read more