ISSA Proceedings 2014 – "'Rule Of Law,' 'Freedom,' And 'Democracy': Domestic And International Building Blocks Of Contemporary Russian Political Ideology"

Abstract: We analyze the definitional arguments of Vladimir Putin relative to the terms 'democracy,' 'freedom,' and 'rule of law.' We examine the definitional relationships among these terms in Putin's rhetoric, with a focus on "rule of law." We look at primary appeals targeting domestic Russian audiences as well as Putin's message to the American people on possible US air strikes against Syria, looking for the definitional construction of rule of law in the discourse.

Keywords: Putin, Russia, democracy, freedom, rule of law, argument by definition, rhetorical choices, translation

1. *Introduction*
Periods of national transition are, by definition, times of change. Sometimes that change is sought, driven by a desire to move to a different place or time. When that happens, change is guided by a rhetorical and argumentative transformation of needs and desires. Although material conditions are clearly part of the equation producing national change, the interpretation of those conditions is at least as important. As Zarfesky (1997) notes,

Although some of the political science literature still mistakenly regards problems as empirical conditions to be found, a growing number of writers recognize that they are categories to be created.

He continues, "*To define a condition as a problem is to invoke a frame of reference within which the condition is assessed, causality and blame are determined, and solutions are considered*" (1997, p. 6).

Change, in other words, is directed through definition of the situation. Burke approaches this in different language, suggesting the labels and descriptions of

situations must 'encompass' those situations in ways that coherently account for the diverse elements evident in the situation (Burke, 1973, p. 109). Periods of national transition typically highlight themes/grounds related to national identity, in addition to those that concern more tangible or material components of the 'problem' defined in the situation; this requisite element of national identity brings both rhetorical opportunities and constraints to those advancing arguments either for or against specific changes.

In this paper, we sketch our approach to understanding definitional argument in periods of national transition. We discuss definitions of situation, considerations involved in definition of key terms, current approaches to definitional argument, and critical procedures for interpreting definitions of situation. We then analyze the presidential discourse in Vladimir Putin's third term as President, looking specifically at how the terms 'Rule of Law,' 'Freedom,' and 'Democracy' become redefined through argument by definition.

2. *Argument by definition*
Definitions of situation constitute personal and public motives for actions. Arising out of symbolic interaction theory, the theory presupposes the understanding that "Human behavior is based upon the *meaning* the person attaches to objects, events, relationships, or activities of other individuals" (Cox, 198-199. Emphasis added). Or, as Burke puts it, much our "reality" is but an extension of our terms that, according to Burke, select, reflect, and deflect. All interpretations are therefore necessarily partial and contestable (Burke, 1966, pp. 45-46). At the public level, factors affecting the viability of competing definitions of a situation include:

* the adequacy of the definition to encompass the situation;
* the resonance of the definition both with widely shared cultural attitudes, values, and beliefs and with the underlying historical memories; and
* the invention of acceptable analogies between the current situation and previous national or cultural experiences.

Definition of situation "*refers to both individual interpretations as well as 'culturally... shared perceptions and interpretations of situations considered identical or similar....*'" (Cox, 1981, p. 199, citing Gould and Kolb).

Definitions of situations are constructed from language – that is, from words.

Collectively, these words form definitions that are salient to the context and can adequately encompass it. The collective definition – that is, the meaning of a definition of a situation – transcends the meaning of the individual words in the sense that the 'interinanimation' of those meanings creates a broader, higher order of meaning that is not reducible to the unitary meanings of each term (Richards, 1936, pp. 47-66). Yet the definition of the situation is in the most literal sense a collection of individual words. Occasionally, some of the terms in a definition of a situation may be neologisms, but even then the other terms will have conventional meanings (some clearly more ambiguous than others); and if the definition of the situation is to obtain resonance with the public, key terms must carry historical weight. In constructing a definition of a situation, political actors may redefine the individual terms employed in the definition even before it is constructed; moreover, by putting individual terms in relation to each other, the 'interinanimation' among the terms has the effect of redefining the terms in that particular context.

In our analysis of definitions of individual terms, we are guided in part by work on both 'persuasive definition' and ideographs. The concept of a persuasive definition comes from Stevenson, who emphasized that terms have both descriptive and emotive meanings (Walton, 2001, p. 118). Drawing upon the work of Ogden and Richards, "descriptive meaning" is understood as "the core factual or descriptive content of a word, while the 'emotive meaning' represents the feelings or attitudes (positive or negative) that the use of the word suggests" (Walton, 2001, p. 118). Stevenson's theory is that a persuasive definition works "by redefining the descriptive meaning of the word while retaining its old familiar emotive meaning" (Walton, 2001, p. 118). We embed our application of persuasive definition in our consideration of ideographs, a concept advanced by McGee (1980).

An ideograph is a one-term summation of an ideological commitment (e.g., 'democracy'). These are common words that carry historic freight in a given culture: they have a history of significant usage in the culture, and the public has become conditioned to respond more-or-less automatically to the words (but not necessarily to any particular meaning for the words) (McGee, 1980). In the U.S., words such as 'freedom,' 'democracy,' and 'rule of law' are examples of ideographs to which the automatic response is favorable: the public is for 'freedom,' for 'democracy,' etc. Conversely, words such as 'tyranny' or

'communism' are words that generate automatic opposition. In each of these examples, the precise "descriptive meaning" of the words is ambiguous, and there is great range in historical usage of what the term may mean – a diachronic panoply of significant applications of the term. Despite, or perhaps because of, descriptive ambiguities, these are the words from which ideology is constructed; they are the "building blocks of ideology" (McGee, 1980, p. 7). The legitimacy of a particular ideological construction at a given point in time (which McGee calls the synchronic structure of the ideology) is bolstered by selective appropriation of historical instances in which the ideographs align with the descriptive meaning of the term as it is used in the synchronic construction.

Although concerns with the relationships between definition and argument have been evident since the classical period, the domain of definitional argument is less developed than other aspects of argumentation theory. In an important keynote address to the 1997 Alta Conference on argumentation, Zarefsky (1997) maintained not simply that definitions are important in argumentation (although he did do that, citing among other sources his own self-described aphorism, "The power to persuade is, in large measure, the power to define"), but also that definitional argument may take multiple forms, which he identified as argument *from* definition, *about* definition, and *by* definition.

The distinctions among these forms of definitional argument are important: *argument from definition* proceeds in a deductive form, with the definition taken as an essential or true premise. As many examples demonstrate, argument from definition tends toward "stalemate" because advocates and opponents simply reject the definition, the foundational premise, offered by the other side (Zarefsky, 1997, p. 4). *Argument about definition* tends toward a similar fate. Citing Schiappa, Zarefsky suggests that arguments about definition, that is, arguments about the "'real' nature" of something, become abstracted too quickly, losing connection with people's real life experiences and hence with their values and commitments. This leads to "unproductive impasses" in the argumentation, another form of stalemate (Schiappa, cited in Zarefsky, 1997, p. 4).

The third form of definitional argument developed by Zarefsky is *argument by definition*, and this is the form upon which we will elaborate. In argument by definition, "The key definitional move is simply stipulated, as if it were a natural step along the way of justifying some other claim." In this sense, the key argumentative step of defining one's terms

"is taken by making moves that are not themselves argumentative at all. They are not claims supported by reasons and intended to justify adherence by critical listeners. Instead they are simply proclaimed as if they were indisputable facts" (Zarefsky, 1997, p. 5).

Yet arguments *by* definition are critical moves that are often deployed in the construction of broader situational definitions. Zarefsky notes that in the examples of argument by definition that he discusses "what is really being defined is not a term but a situation or frame of reference" (1997, p. 5). He suggests four types of argumentative moves that can be employed in producing arguments by definition. These are associations, dissociations, ambiguities, and frame-shifting language (1997, pp. 7-9). Of these, we will focus on two techniques of association suggested by Zarefsky:

1. *"expanding the meaning of a 'term of art,'"* that is, of a *"seemingly common and non-technical term that, when placed in a particular context, normally is given precise meaning,"* (*e.g.*, rape of the environment).

2. *using persuasive definitions: "A persuasive definition is one in which favorable or unfavorable connotations of a given term remain constant but are applied to a different denotation. In this way, connotations surrounding the original term are transferred to a different referent"* (1997, p. 7), (*e.g.*, the war on drugs).

In our analysis of argument by definition in the contemporary political discourse of Vladimir Putin, we rely heavily on such associative argumentative moves.

We also use the method of textual indexing advanced by Burke, who suggests a "Theory of Indexing" key terms in a text as a procedure by which a critic can discover and "prove" what may be non-obvious "motives" in a text (Burke, 1964, pp. 145-172). In a discussion of "our words for motive," Burke maintains that these words (he gives an example of "duty") are "in reality words for situations," as we have construed or defined those situations (1935, pp. 29-31). We contend that the indexical structures also reveal evidence of redefinitions of terms. We see them as techniques by which to identify the interinanimated meaning of terms when used in relation to each other in specific texts. The four indexical structures suggested by Burke are: Association, Dissociation, Progression, and Transformation (Burke 1964, pp. 145-172)

The use of words in ways that create transparent patterns of association is the

clearest illustration of argument by definition, and persuasive definitions could be an example of that. In contrast, dissociation is primarily concerned with the creation of oppositions. These may be polarities (e.g., freedom or death) or more subtle forms of dialectical play between terms.

3. *Putin's use of argument by definition*

Turning, then, to Vladimir Putin, one might argue that he has been moving toward the Russian version of a 'reset' in relations with the West almost since he became President in 2000. Still, for much of his first two terms, he argued that Russia was "a European nation." Recently, however, by turning the country's focus eastward, Putin has moved Russia into another period of transition, what he terms the "Third Revolution," reanimating the historical and traditional separation of Russia from the West. In doing this, Putin has recontextualized and redefined many of the terms associated with Western ideologies: *rule of law*, *freedom*, even *democracy* itself.

Putin began this reorientation by reclaiming Russian history, including the Soviet period, reviving a sense of nationalism, and identifying both with a renewed relationship between the citizen and the state. The interinanimations of these elements with the reconstituted ideographs of Western democracy produces the "New Russia," oriented eastward rather than toward the West, proud of its 1000 year history, glorifying the defeat of Germany in the Great Patriotic War, with its own interpretations of freedom and democracy.

To explicate the definitional moves that result in this reanimated Russia, we focus primarily on 4 speeches given in Putin's current term as President: a speech on Russia Day (June 12) 2013; a pair of remarks celebrating the 20th Anniversary of the Russian Constitution (December 12 and 13, 2013); and the address on the annexation of Crimea (March 18, 2014). These speeches illustrate Putin's use of definitional argument to reconstitute *freedom* as prosperity and well-being; *democracy* as an instrumental value rather than a terminal one; and the *rule of law* as law-and-order. In addition, we examine Putin's letter to the American people, published in *The New York Times*, September 11, 2013.

Russia Day is a relatively new holiday, established to celebrate Russian history and to encourage greater national pride at a time when the Russian people were looking outward for moral leadership and validation. There is an instrumental overlay to most of Putin's speeches, and this one is no exception, as Putin

collapses all 3 terms that are of interest here into a process-oriented marker melded with a history lesson. After a sentence that encapsulates a decade of economic change and hardship following the fall of the Soviet Union (ironically, probably the period of greatest personal freedom and freedom of speech in post-Soviet Russia), Putin declares that the character of the Russian people brought the country through the transition and "set our country firmly on a development track that is inseparable from the ideas of democracy and respect for human rights and the rule of law." (June 12, 2013).

Putin's public approach to governance describes Russia as something of a work in progress, constantly in transition, moving along an arc of progress demarcated by ticks on a yardstick visible primarily to Putin. The goal is a "better quality of life" for all Russians, and "democratic procedures, the federal system, the market economy and guarantees for human rights" all "must work" toward this goal. By assuming that the purpose of democratic process, rule of law, and human rights is to progress along this continuum toward a better life, he reduces them to an instrumentality of economic prosperity. Their value lies not in their intrinsic worth as values of a free people, but, rather, in their ability to move the country along the continuum. As instrumentalities, then, if progress is deemed insufficient, they can be modified, truncated, or even eliminated in the interest of progress toward the goals.

By referendum on December 12, 1993, the Russian people approved the Constitution that is in force today. It was one of the earliest acts of the new Russian Federation and represented a major move toward democratization. Last year—2013—marked the 20th anniversary of the passage of the Russian Constitution; the country celebrated that anniversary with a concert and, the next day, a meeting between the Constitutional Court Judges and the President. Presented with a perfect opportunity to discuss the rule of law in Russia, Putin did not disappoint. Again, however, his instrumentalist approach to democratic values prevailed.

As Putin notes, "The Constitution validated the unwavering priority of our people's rights and freedoms and raised the status of the state itself … to a new, democratic foundation." Certainly, the Constitution instantiated the democratic process that followed the years of Soviet rule. Yet Putin sees the Constitution as the initiator of the path to the country's goals, not as the guarantor of rights and democratic process:

"The Constitution opened a new, constructive path to development on the basis of clear goals, intentions and values. ...It represents a long-term strategy for Russia's development, a foundation for strengthening public stability...." (December 12, 2013)

The Constitution, then, functions much as ordinary laws do – providing stability, order, continuous development.

Two events in the past year have grabbed the world's consciousness and focused attention on Russia: Syria and Crimea. In Syria, as the U.S. pondered its response, Putin published an open letter to the American people in *The New York Times* (September 11, 2013). The date was not lost on many. We believe such a move is unprecedented, and even today it is hard to imagine a similar letter from Obama – or any U.S. President – appearing in a Russian newspaper. Putin attributes his strategy to the diminished contact between the U.S. and Russia, and interestingly, ascribes this action to a desire to preserve world order and stability. In the letter, Putin uses a slippery slope argument to set up the definitional move that underlies his message. A strike by the U.S., should it occur, would escalate the conflict and enable it to spread beyond Syria. It would destabilize the Middle East and North Africa even further. And, it would "throw the entire system of international law and order out of balance" (Putin, 2013).

Setting aside the merits or lack thereof with regard to Syria, here we see Putin's conflation of rule of law, international law, and order. In other words, the purpose of the rule of law is order; it is not a guarantor of citizen rights, but serves to strengthen the state. Surely, one purpose of laws is order; but the concept 'rule of law' is a philosophical approach designed to spare citizens the capriciousness of the rule of individuals. Thus its promise is consistency of treatment and a form of justice. In Putin's construction, however, the purpose of law melds into the state's desire to suppress chaos.

Putin posits the conflict in Syria not as a struggle for democracy, but as a conflict between "government and opposition in a multireligious country." [NYT September 11, 2013] In Putin's view, to attempt to restore order from the outside would not only violate international law, it would undermine international law in the world community. After scolding the U.S. about its tendency toward interventionism and belief in its own exceptionalism, Putin urges America to join non-interventionist efforts to resolve the issue. A grateful Obama put any plans he

had for a military strike against Syria on hold.

About 6 months later, following the successful completion of the Sochi Olympics, Russia stunned the world by annexing Crimea; on March 18, Putin spoke to the Duma and other Federal officials, as well as the people of Russia, Crimea and the world.

We noted at the beginning of this paper that the legitimacy of a particular ideological construction at any given point in time is bolstered through selective appropriation of historical instances in which the ideographs employed by a rhetor align with the descriptive meaning of the term as it is used in the synchronic construction. It follows, therefore, that if the denotation of a term is materially different in one society – as compared to another society – that single term can be deployed to achieve differing effects in international discourse. Similarly, if a term has one set of associations in one societal milieu, but conjures up a different set of associations in a different milieu, its use (or the choice of a different term instead) can serve varying rhetorical purposes depending on the audience.

A specific instance of speaking to different audiences can be seen on the official website of the Russian presidency – http://www.kremlin.ru/ . This Russian language site provides the text of all official statements, pronouncements, and speeches by Vladimir Putin. But there also exists an English language web page – http://eng.kremlin.ru/ – that mirrors the Russian language site; it provides official government translations of the materials presented originally in Russian.

We studied fourteen public statements by Vladimir Putin that touch upon the themes *democracy, freedom*, and *rule of law.* (Four of these speeches are analyzed here in some detail.) We compared the Russian and English versions of all fourteen statements – primarily to ensure that our English language analysis was based on a correct understanding of the actual Russian statements, but also to determine if there were any substantive differences between the versions heard and read by Russians and the translated versions accessible to English speakers. On the whole there is a high level of conformance between the Russian and English texts: the translations correspond very closely to the source files in content and tone. That is, an English reader can gain from the translations both a reliable understanding of Putin's meaning and a good "feel" for his rhetorical posture. This makes it possible for us to analyze his speeches with a great degree

of confidence in our conclusions.

An important exception is the critical speech given by Putin on the annexation of Crimea into the Russian Federation. This was a major political appearance, and here one can discern substantive differences between word choices and phrasing uttered by Putin in comparison to the "equivalent" passages quoted in English below.

We are not concerned with instances where Western readers would simply disagree with the Russian President. Rather, there are a number of instances in which the Russian and English versions of Putin's speech create – and, we contend, purposely so – completely different impressions on his domestic and foreign audiences. We discuss these by type.

3.1 *Great and small*
We have great respect for people of all the ethnic groups living in Crimea. This is their common home, their motherland, and it would be right – I know the local population supports this – for Crimea to have three equal national languages: Russian, Ukrainian and Tatar.

This is pretty innocuous in English, but there are two subtle differences from the Russian – one insignificant, but the other crucial to an understanding of Putin's ultimate geopolitical strategy in the region. Putin actually says, "We respect // have respect for" the various nationalities that make up the local population: nothing in the Russian equates to great respect. More importantly, he uses a common term – *malaya rodina* 'home region' – for "motherland" that presages his later use of the 19th century term *Malorossiya* in reference to all of eastern and southern Ukraine – that portion of the country he needs to control in order to have a land route to Crimea and the Transdnestria region of Moldova, two areas he claims want reunification with the Russian Federation. This is, we believe, the first verbal hint of his ultimate goal.

3.2 *Now and then*
Putin claims that the 1954 decision of Nikita Khrushchev to declare Crimea a portion of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic – a decision that makes geographical sense, but was of no political consequence within the structure of the USSR – was illegal. "What matters now is that this decision was made in clear violation of the constitutional norms that were in place even then." One can agree

or disagree with Putin's judgment. However, in the Russian, the text more properly reads: "What is important to us is (something quite) different – this decision was made...." This is important to me; this is important to Russia.

Putin readily admits that the 1954 decision was a mere formality, since it never occurred to Khrushchev or anyone else that the Soviet Union would ever fall apart. "It was only when Crimea ended up as part of a different country that Russia realized that it was not simply robbed, it was plundered." So, all Russia has done in reclaiming Crimea is take back what had been stolen from it, stolen, presumably, by the Ukrainians.

3.3 *Riots in the streets*
Putin claims that he understands and even supports the protesters

"who came out on Maidan with peaceful slogans against corruption, inefficient state management and poverty. The right to peaceful protest, democratic procedures and elections exist for the sole purpose of replacing the authorities that do not satisfy the people."

But, he says, those who stood behind the events in Ukraine leading to the overthrow of President Yanukovych had a different agenda: "*They resorted to terror, murder and riots. Nationalists, neo-Nazis, Russophobes, and anti-Semites executed this coup.*"

Anyone who followed reports of the Maidan uprising knows how violent the protests became. A peaceful demonstration against the government decision not to engage with the European Union for economic and political reasons soon turned nasty. Protesters and the troops deployed to control them battled continuously. Extreme right-wing (nationalist) groups and neo-Nazi skinheads provided muscle in support of the protest. Both pro- and anti-government forces were accused of murdering supporters in the other camp. And many citizens of Ukraine who are of Ukrainian descent (a large segment of population is Russian) do indeed hate the Russian Federation as the successor to a Soviet Union that treated them brutally before, during, and after World War II.

What is wrong with the statement quoted above – beyond the obvious hyperbole and over-simplification – is that in Russian the text actually reads, "... *terror, murders, and pogroms.*" In pre-Soviet Russia Ukrainian Cossacks were used by the czar's representatives to carry out pogroms against Jews in their midst. The

word itself is guaranteed to inflame passions against all Ukrainians. But neither the Maidan uprising nor any of the events that followed had anything to do with anti-Semitic impulses among the Ukrainian population. We would contend that the use of *riots* in the English text is a deliberate attempt to mask from Western readers the inflammatory, anti-Ukrainian subtext of this speech. Had the government translators written what Putin actually said, the single word *pogrom* could have undermined any sympathetic reading Westerners might have attributed to this speech.

3.4 *Imposters and executioners*
The word pogroms, which appears about one-third of the way into this speech, introduces a particularly inflammatory segment of Putin's rhetoric – a segment that is masked in the English version. We will highlight two other choices that clearly show the intent behind this speech, which was to make a direct appeal to Russian sensibilities, while hiding that appeal from outside observers by carefully redacting the official translation.

Putin states, "*It is also obvious that there is no legitimate executive authority in Ukraine now.*" To the extent that the elected President has fled the country and most of his inner circle has been replaced in the government without general elections, this claim has credibility. A certain level of interregnum certainly obtained. What is most interesting at this juncture is the manner in which Putin describes that situation: "*Many government agencies have been taken over by the imposters....*"

'*Imposter*' is a fascinating choice made by the government translators: while not incorrect, it clearly lacks the connotative power of the source word – "*samozvanets*" – it represents in the original Russian. Literally that word means '*the self-proclaimed*.' But psychologically it refers unambiguously to the interregnum that occurred at the beginning of the 17th century when Ivan the Terrible died without an heir to the throne (having killed his own son in a fit of insane rage) and to the ascendance of the so-called 'False Dmitry' – a peasant, supported by certain noblemen, who claimed he was that son, still alive and come to claim his rightful place on the throne. This period in Russian history, called the Time of Troubles, led to the installation of the Romanov dynasty that ruled until the 1917 socialist revolution. Upon hearing this word most Russians will immediately think of the chaos and political instability that characterized the period. It is obvious that Putin has chosen his words carefully, playing on their

desire for stability, harkening back to the chaos and strife that characterized the Yeltsin years, and striking fear in the minds of the citizenry. '*Imposter*' can never evoke to a Westerner the visceral impact generated by "*samozvanets*" in the hearts and minds of Russians.

Putin goes on to say, "This is not a joke – this is reality.…Those who opposed the coup were immediately threatened with repression. Naturally, the first in line here was Crimea, the Russian-speaking Crimea." One could quarrel with Putin regarding his characterization of the protesters in Ukraine and the manner in which they treated those who supported Yanukovych. But the translation is accurate, insofar as it goes. Unfortunately, the English rendition leaves out one small element: "*Those who opposed the coup were immediately threatened with repression and execution.*"

All of the differences in content, tone, and psychological appeal described above make it clear that the Russian government sees its English language website as a rhetorical vehicle to influence Western opinion in ways that differ from its attempts to influence the opinions of the Russian speaking electorate at home. Putin carefully chooses the ideographs he deploys in his public pronouncements. Obviously, his official translators are equally careful in making their rhetorical choices.

The English version of this speech represents the culmination of the definitional moves made by Putin following his inauguration. He constructs the situational definition through a series of carefully selected analogies, thereby illustrating the themes running through the other speeches we have examined: *rule of law* (and *order*), instrumental values, *democracy*, and *freedom* not as intertwined reflexive concepts but as separate concepts that must work to strengthen the state. Thus Putin defines the situation relative not only to Crimea, but also to the West. In so doing he emphasizes themes related to national identity:

"*Everything in Crimea speaks of our shared history and pride. This is the location of ancient Khersones, where Prince Vladimir was baptized. His spiritual feat of adopting Orthodoxy predetermined the overall basis of the culture, civilization and human values that unite the peoples of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. The graves of Russian soldiers whose bravery brought Crimea into the Russian empire are also in Crimea.*
… we are one people. Kiev is the mother of Russian cities. Ancient Rus is our

common source and we cannot live without each other."

Each of these points is an ideograph that carries historical weight and reveals personal and public motives for action. Thus, Putin revealed his synchronic definition of the situation: Russia restored, protecting its people from the depredations of the West. This line of argument also foreshadows the anti-Western [especially anti-American] propaganda that has become commonplace in Russian media.

4. *Conclusion*
Hill and Gaddy interpret Vladimir Putin as a statist, appointed to serve the Russian state and restore its greatness. He is, from this perspective, an executor of the state's interests: The demise of the USSR meant a weakening of the Russian state, its institutions, its reach and influence. Thus, restoring Russia's power has been a clearly stated goal of Putin's tenure from the beginning.

To achieve this goal, Putin must first redefine the situation of the post-Soviet world and Russia's place in it. In doing so, he can change the underlying premises of future action....

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ISSA Proceedings 2014 – Some Considerations Concerning Pragmatism And Dialectics In Argumentation Theory

Abstract: As Argumentation theory's philosophical fundament stemming from Aristotle is scarcely capable to cover the dynamic and the subjective traits of today's argumentative practice, an update is advisable. The philosophies of Dialectics and Pragmatism allow to form some new basic concepts which on the one hand embed argumentation into general human activities and on the other hand relate it to the subjective views of individuals, which, however, need to be kept open (concept of transsubjectivity).

Keywords: Dialectics, dialogue, inquiry, objection, orientation, Pragmatism, rationality, reflection, subjectivity, transsubjectivity.

Introduction
Pragmatism and Dialectics seem to be well considered in contemporary argumentation theory. Pragmatism is taken up in the general focus on the practice of argument, particularly in the attention to the relevant speech

activities; and dialectics is present in the exercise to take the other person not only as an addressee but as a participant of the argumentative process and to care about differences of opinions. It is true, that in all the established approaches these traditions play a certain role; and in the "Pragma-dialectic" school of Amsterdam they are even exposed as the constitutive parts of the theory.

I think, however, that both, Pragmatism and Dialectics, deserve a more profound consideration.

Why: Because they can, if they are ingeniously combined, provide the appropriate philosophical fundament for argumentation theory, which we are missing. So here is my thesis: We have no sound philosophy of argument – we rather dwell in the remains of the Aristotelian theories, replenished with several other antiquated philosophies like metaphysical realism, naïve empiricism and cartesian dualism. All this is outdated and can no longer work as a philosophical fundament for modern argumentation theory. The result of this lack is a remarkable uncertainty about the basics, hence, a variety of approaches and perspectives and opinions about all the fundamental determinations of aims and means, powers and limits of argumenttation. Of course in the present short paper I can only give a cursory impression of the thought directions which I propose. I hope that it will at least raise some interest for these topics, whose elaboration can be found in my book.**[i]**

What I will do here is the following: I will first discuss the commonplace that good or reasonable argumentation has to be "rational"; and I will claim that the usual concept of rationality is unsufficient for the determination of perfection in argument (Sect. 1). Then I will give a short characterization of pragmatist thinking by way of discussing the relationship between theory and practice. This leads to the concept of "orientation" and hence to the aim of argument as "maintenance and advancement of orientation" (Sect. 2). After this I will expose some elements of dialectical thinking. Argumentation is here to be taken as a reflexive activity. It proceeds on two levels, ground- and meta-level and between two parts of the arguing subject (Proponent and Opponent) and thus takes up a principally dialogical structure. The recognition of reflexivity opens up the theory for the additional dimension of change (Sect. 3). Finally I will propose to establish "transsubjectivity" as the constitutive principle of reasonable argumentative practice (Sect. 4).

Section 1 – Argumentation as a rational

We will easily agree about the statement that argumentation is or should be a rational enterprise. Charles Willard spoke of rationality as the "Gold Standard" for argumentation**[ii]**, and by Ralph Johnson it was even described as "Manifest Rationality"**[iii]**. However, when it comes to the question what that means and whether we have a sufficiently clear and unified concept of rationality the agreement might rather vanish.

Obviously there are different areas in which the term appears, and obviously very different things can be referred to with the word "rationality". In Logic it stands for consistency and precision, in technical fields it connects aims with appropriate means, in economics it refers to maximum benefit at given costs, in ethics it demands conformity with established norms and in science the recognition of evidence in the search for truth. Do we encounter here five different forms or aspects? But of what? What is the connecting link between them? And what is their relationship to arguments?

Probably it is the assumption that the regard of rationality in one or more senses makes an argument universally acceptable. But this assumption is also far from being clear. I will only emphasize one problematic aspect. If the said forms of rationality are related to argumentation they are regarded as "criteria of rationality". However, when these are applied to real problem situations, then a gap opens up between the abstract standards and the concrete material. In order to overcome this gap, there is more needed than the abstract criteria: The meaning of the term "rational" needs to be opened and possibly adjusted with elements of the particular situations. Yet the way to do this, cannot be completely standardized**[iv]**.

Therefore reasonable argumentation must be conceived in such a way that its characteristics exceed the static and abstract general criteria of rationality. Classical German philosophy made a distinction between "Verstand" and "Vernunft". "Verstand" stood for the human capacity to recognize and follow general rules and criteria. It was seen that these were bound to the limits of the present understanding of the social and natural world. "Vernunft", on the other hand, was the capacity to transcend these limits. It was, as Hegel has put it, the "Capacity of the Unconditioned".**[v]**

The English speaking world, however, did not so much ponder over this

distinction and therefore there are no equivalents established in English. I have here taken "Reason" as a translation for "Vernunft" (because of the English title of Kant's opus maximum: "Critique of pure Reason"). Hoping that the meaning of this distinction can reach my audience I would now state that "Reason" is the heart of the philosophical fundament of argumentation theory. Consequently it is clear that no strict criteria can ever be sufficient to define reasonable argumentation. What can be done to specify reason in argument, if not in a criterion or rule, so at least in a principle of attitude, is exposed in my last section about "transsubjectivity". But in order to set the ground for its understanding I must first expose the main ideas of pragmatist and dialectic philosophies.

Section 2 – A flashlight on pragmatism
The pragmatist way of thinking is, in my opinion, the silver bullet to solve the problems around the question of how to determine the status of claims and conclusions in relationship to mere opinions on the one side and true knowledge on the other. If claims were no more than opinions ("standpoints") then why do we engage in arguing about them? – Why not simply state: "This is what I mean and if you don't like it, let it be"? And if conclusions were truths – How could we achieve them by mere talking, i.e. without carrying out a specific investigation about the issue?

Indeed I think that the argumentative thesis is located between the two. It is more than opinion and less than knowledge. This can be clarified when taking up pragmatist thinking. With 'pragmatist thinking' I do not mean a non-specific reference to practical life or to the performance aspect of speaking. I rather refer to the great and revolutionary ideas of the philosophy of pragmatism, as they were present in the thinking of e.g. Kant, Vico, Nietzsche; then Peirce, Mead, Dewey and finally Dingler, Lorenzen and Janich.

The essence of philosophical pragmatism concerns the relationship from practice to theory: All the relevant qualities of theory, but in particular the meaning of concepts and the truth or falsehood of sentences, are clarified with regard to human practice**[vi]**; i.e. with regard to the practical circumstances of the issue that is named by a concept and the sentences that are taken to describe or prescribe the issue. In short, the fundamental insight of pragmatist thought puts practice as primary to theory.

This leads to a specific way of viewing: All sorts of theory, i.e. distinctions,

concepts, sentences, theoretical systems, are taken as "orientations" in practice. Their usefulness and their possible truth are defined by their orientation value. And this seems realistic: We have accepted certain distinctions (such as e.g. the distinction between day and night) and certain theories (such as e.g. classical mechanics) as "true", insofar as we conceive our actions within the restrictions, that they demand; and we trust these actions to be successful in the respective areas of practical life.

Now the pragmatic term of "orientation" allows to determine the area of human life in which argumentation is located. This area is inquiry; inquiry in its widest sense – from usual problem solving to scientific research, from juridical questioning to philosophical reflection. Inquiry is the condition of the alert human being. It is a twofold activity with a cognitive and a practical layer. In the practical layer it is test and exploration. In the cognitive layer, however, it is argumentation: Here we pose claims which, if they are taken seriously, become theses that are to be justified with reasons and defended against objections.

Hence, argumentation typically occurs, when orientation is lacking; i.e. when there is not enough knowledge and experience to be oriented in some new situation. The orientation gap can appear in different forms: As a question, a doubt, as a problem, or as a difference of opinions (however, only when this is not interesting and enriching, but disturbing).

In this view the specific function of a thesis becomes evident: It is meant to reconstruct orientation. And the subsequent argumentative process of justifying and critically examining the theses is a unique method to find out whether that thesis is suitable to function as "New orientation". If the argumentation comes to a successful end, it results in a conclusion that has passed the intellectual test. After this we can dare to act upon it viz. proceed in the practical layer of our inquiry.

A thesis which is in this sense "valid" is no longer a mere opinion. It has been reflected (through possible objections), i.e. it has immersed into instances of "the other" and it has come up as "the same" (which can imply that it has been modified) but more stable and better understood.

On the other hand a valid conclusion is not yet knowledge. Knowledge, in the pragmatist sense, must be anchored in successful human practice which shapes

the world. (Therefore the question whether a conclusion, that is argumentatively valid, can be regarded as "true" or as "knowledge" has to be determined not in argumentation but in future praxis.)

Section 3 – A flashlight on dialectics
The essence of philosophical dialectics is the insight into the reflexive structure of human thinking. Aristotle spoke of "Noesis noeseos"**[vii]**. Mind is able to bend back to itself, objectify itself and produce the amazing relationship of self-identity and non-identity.

I have taken argument as aiming at the advancement of orientation. If this is meant to be an *autonomous* endeavor it must comprise not only a performing but also a supervising instance that cares for keeping on tracks. Thus, argumentation is basically reflexive. If this is understood, some features become obvious which seem to be blurred to date. I will shortly highlight three of them.

The first is, that argument proceeds simultaneously on two levels – in modern terms: On object- and metalevel. Some scholars have been more or less aware of this. The Amsterdam school shows a certain presentiment of it in the relationship between opening stage and argument stage. A lot more distinctive is Maurice Finochiaro's notion of meta-argumentation**[viii]**. But even there the relationship between ground- and metalevel is not yet completely understood because the two layers are regarded as separable. In argumentation this is not so. The practice of arguing cannot be separated from constructing the theory in which we seek to comprehend that practice. The only way to secure argumentation theory is via argumentative practice. In usual examples of the theory-practice relationship this is different. Take e.g. boxing. (I refer to this example because the Amsterdam school has several times chosen a picture of two men in a fistfight as a cover illustration of their books – which may expose, in an innocent manner, their view of theory and practice of argument.) Boxing has become a real discipline because it has been theorized. Certainly the theory has been build up and improved through inquiry – comprising the observation and the analysis of relevant boxing episodes, of tentative variations of those episodes etc. Any conclusions of such inquiry, however, are not determined by boxing but by argument. Insofar practice and theory are separated here.

The second consequence of the reflexive structure is, that argumentation is in principle dialogical. We have to admit not just one agent in the arguing subject

but always two. I have named them "proponent" and "opponent". These names describe only roles, they do not stand for any personal or emotional attitude between the partners; not the slightest adversariality is meant.**[ix]** The two roles can be taken over even by one person in his or her reasoning process. The central point in assuming a dialogical structure is, that argumentation is always done by two agents – one, who carries out the steps of a justification and another one who critically supervises the performance.

Again this is not comprehended by all argumentation theorists. Here the Amsterdam school is simply right, but others have criticised them for various reasons. I will shortly flash on two positions which try to evade the demand for principally assuming a dialogue in argument. First there is the often cited article of Anthony Blair, criticising the ubiquity of the dialogical structure**[x]**. This position works with a concept where a dialogue is a two parties' exchange of utterances, guided by certain fix rules. Certainly these dialogue games exist. And that they cannot serve as models for all argumentative practice is evident – but this evidence is due to the narrow concept of dialogue which is here presupposed. A somehow contrary position is presented by Christopher Tindale in the wake of the Russian scholar Michail Bakhtin**[xi]**. Here the word 'dialogue' stands for a communicative endeavour that is carried out in mutual acknowledgement. With such a wide concept argument is indeed (or should be) always dialogical; but now this ascription is no more specific for argumentative practice – instead for any serious and good willing human encounter.

The third consequence of the reflexive structure of argument is a specific kind of change due to the deepening of reflection. This possibility is, in my opinion, the most significant of those consequences. I mean the following: When a seemingly selfevident presupposition is questioned and put up to consideration, then reflection becomes intensified – it gets deeper (or higher). And now, in the deepening of reflexion all the relevant instances and factors of argumentation can change. Theses can change, arguments can change, and so can issues and even the arguers themselves. They can loose their shapes viz. transform themselves in mutual influencing. (I have developed the "square of dimensions" in order to cover as much as possible of these happenings**[xii]**).

It is amazing that the circumstances and possibilities around this dynamics are hardly recognised in contemporary argumentation theory. My explanation for this fact is the ongoing imprint of the old logical paradigm viz. the unmitigated

opposition between logical and rhetorical approaches. I believe there is quite some effort necessary to give philosophical dialectic its appropriate place in the theorising of argument.

Section 4 – Reason in argument: the principle of transsubjectivity
In a last section I will try to shed a little light upon what I consider the most important element of the philosophy of argument. Argumentation is not only instrumental but requires a specific attitude and education in the personality of the arguer: It is the firm conviction that one's subjective certainties (i.e. prejudices, vested interests and even the contemporary knowledge) have to be subordinated under the aim of truly understanding and shaping the human world. This conviction is the secret spirit of reasonable argumentation. It is only partly externalisable in prescriptive norms or rules. The most explicit instruction may be the hint to respect objections to one's own theses and arguments. (Still it is clear that even this can be done within the limits of subjectivity, i.e. as a mere habitual reaction.)

As far as I know, the best articulation of this spirit, is Paul Lorenzen's "Principle of Transsubjectivity". Lorenzen was the founder of Operative Mathematics and Dialogue Logic in Germany during the 50ies and 60ies. This is well known. Less known is, that in his late work he engaged in constructing a framework of concepts and principles for reasonable ethics and politics. Very soon he realised that all the specific norms which could be considered, had to be based upon the willingness to work upon one's subjectivity. This willingness he proposed to articulate in a general principle: "Transsubjectivity".

"Transsubjectivity is not a fact, but it is not a postulate either. Transsubjectivity is simply a term characterizing that activity in which we are always already involved if we begin to reason at all... Transsubjectivity... is still subjectivity, but a subjectivity which is aware of its own limits – and tries to overcome them.... No person can do more than try to overcome his/her subjectivity" (Lorenzen 1969, pp 82f)

Please note that here we envisage something like a middle course between the sheer acknowledgement of subjectivity and a complete self surrender. I will not go into further considerations about a more conscious implantation of this principle into argumentation. I would only like to finally state:

Without a commitment to the principle of transsubjectivity (of course not necessarily under this name) all arguing will be no more than sophistry.

NOTES

i. See Wohlrapp (2014)

ii. See Willard (1989), p 158.

iii. See Johnson (2000).

iv. See Wittgenstein's argument against the demand for rules to guide the rule application, Wittgenstein (2009), §85 (see also Wittgenstein (1967), p. 154).

v. See Hegel (1830), § 45.

vi. See Peirce's famous pragmatist maxim: "Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object." Peirce (1965), 258, Collected Papers 5.402 (How to make our Ideas clear).

vii. See Aristotle (1935), Metaphysics 1074b 34.

viii. See Finocchiaro (2013).

ix. See Govier's considerations about a kind of adversariality between Opponent and Proponent in Chapter 14.2. (Adversariality and Argument) of her book Govier (1999).

x. See Blair (1998).

xi. See Tindale (2004), 94-98.

xii. See Wohlrapp (2011) and, more extensive, Wohlrapp (2014), Chapter 6.

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ISSA Proceedings 2014 – Consideration On The Notion Of Reasoning

Abstract: I started my discussion from Ralph H. Johnson's view, and examined the phenomenon that theorists have used the notion of reasoning in different way and tried to explain why they use it in a confusing manner. I compared the notion of reasoning with the notions of argument and argumentation. I also pointed out some misunderstood concepts related to reasoning, such as soundness, completeness and validity. And hence proposed a new definition of reasoning.

Keywords: Argument, Argumentation, Reasoning

1. *Introduction*

It is known to us that informal logic has been developed over thirty years since the late 1970s last century. During decades, discussions that mainly concerns on the issues on interpretation, construction and evaluation of argumentation have led to remarkable accomplishment. Although they first started from the demand of pedagogical reform that launched by students and teachers in universities of Canada by rejecting the way symbolic logic treated to our daily arguments, these research were carried out from distinct perspectives, and rapidly developed in north America, Europe and now Asia. Gradually researchers gained accumulated agreement that the strict and artificial symbolic language only can never be enough for us to construct and evaluate arguments in natural discourse.

And argumentation theory has been benefited from examining the way we look at logic. Under this naturalizing turn of logic, reasoning has also been studied from a different manner than what traditional symbolic logic has done. Not only did researchers start to pay attention to those who deduction and probability were hard to resolve, but among them, they incorporate a number of various reasoning types to reasonable use in different contexts.

However, although the discussion of reasoning has all the way accompany discussion on argumentation theory (a broad sense including informal logic so), it is still far away from what we should achieve. As Ralph Johnson has pointed out, if we type "the theory of reasoning" and try to look up through *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, then we will find no entry, nor standard indices of *The Philosopher's Index*, whereas the other related concepts are given intensive discussion, say, "rationality" (Johnson, 2000). As we have seen, although different reasoning under different contexts has been studied under the title of informal reasoning, there is still little research on the notion reasoning itself from a perspective of philosophy. However, understanding reasoning means not only how much we know about itself, but also vital in understanding the other related concepts. As Johnson also pointed out the First Form of Network problem, it is significant for us to understand the concept and the interrelationship of critical thinking, problem solving, metacognition, argumentation, informal logic and reasoning (Johnson, 2000). And only in understanding these definition and interrelationship of them all can we situate what we have known in a comprehensive and confusion-avoiding location, which leads to the Second Form of Network Problem "How does reasoning relate to argumentation? How is reasoning related to

rationality? to intelligence? to knowledge? to thinking? to argument?"**[i]**And to constitute a "theory of reasoning", Johnson made a list for us to answer:

1. What is reasoning? Is reasoning either identical to, essentially the same as, or else reducible to, inference, implication, and entailment… How does reasoning differ from thinking?
2. What is the relationship between reasoning and rationality? Are they the same concept under different guises? And what about reasoning and intelligence? reasoning and knowledge?
3. Is there a discernible pattern in the historical development of the various exemplifications of reasoning? And what can we learn from various historical theories of reasoning?
4. Are there universal principles of reasoning? Or are substantive principles of reasoning always field dependent?
5. What is an appropriate conceptual scheme (or framework) for the theory of reasoning? How can reasoning be most plainly categorized?
6. What are the criteria of adequacy that a theory of reasoning must satisfy?**[ii]**

Beside Johnson, Finocchiaro also had clarified what he called the theory of reasoning "By theory of reasoning I mean the attempt to formulate, to test, to clarify, and to systematize concepts and principles for the interpretation, the evaluation and the sound practice of reasoning. I claim that the theory of reasoning so defined is a legitimate philosophical enterprise which is both viable and important. " (1984, p. 3). To sum up, if there is anything we call "theory of reasoning", then the first issue for us to approach is to answer the question "what is the notion of reasoning?"

2. *The popular definitions of reasoning*

2.1 *Operational view*
In realm of formal logic, reasoning and argument have been defined as a sequence of formulas, the very last of which is conclusion and the remainders are premises. Each formula comes either from the set of axioms or follows from the previous members by application of specific reasoning rules. This definition is widely applied in various branches of symbolic logic, and even has been regarded as a standard definition in logic to introduce into other disciplines. There are also, although privately, some logicians even believe that the application of reasoning rules themselves is already reasoning, for instance, *modus ponens*. However,

more commonly, logicians treat reasoning and argument as the same thing; and they have no interest in differentiating these two notions. These logicians hold the view that it makes no sense in distinguishing reasoning and argument as they have little difference in the dealing way in symbolic language system, in that all the corresponding natural language have been abstracted into formulas composed of mere variables and connectives that represent specific meaning.

According to this, reasoning as well as argument can be classified into different categories, by criteria that how strong the link between premises and the conclusion. Hence, we have deduction and induction. By deduction, it refers to those reasoning whose conclusion follows necessarily from premises that have been known as true; while by induction, it refers to reasoning that the conclusion is probably true, instead of being necessarily true, if their premises are true.

Looking at this point of view, we can see that scholars agree on it regard reasoning as purely abstract operation (or calculation). It is by no means that I am denying that reasoning has close relationship with abstract calculation, however, in daily life, there is not a single kind of real reasoning can be carried out regardless of real subject and real environment that subject has been situated. For instance, we can of course complete an abstract operation of mathematical proof by systematic calculation. However, we must complete it out of some real reasons. We may do it to complete our homework, or to satisfy our curiosity, or sometimes just for time-killing. But any reason is out of human practical purpose, which means real reasoning that conducted by human subject can never be separated from practical appeals. This is to say, by real reasoning, it by no means equals to abstract mathematical operation, rather, it is a kind of practical activity that also closely related to pragmatic environment and specific context. This also explained that why results from psychological experiments went so against logic.**[iii]** Although formal logicians regard reasoning as pure abstract operation through their normative concern and characteristic of discipline, if we treat the operation view as the only legitimate manner to study reasoning, we simply overlooked the diversity and flexibility of human reasoning in real life. And real reasoning has so much for us to explore, it deserves a new and complete consideration of its notion.

2.2 *Inferential view*
Unlike formal logicians who concentrate on transformation of logical structure between statement forms and the truth-value calculation of formulas in symbolic

system, informal logicians paid more attention on considering the content and context of reasoning from a pragmatic point of view. One popular point of view goes that reasoning is inference, or a sequence of inference. Take these definitions for example,

Dagobert D. Runes:
*"Reasoning is the process of inference; it is the process of passing from certain propositions already known or assumed to be true, to another truth distinct from them but following from them; it is a discourse or argument which infers one proposition from another, or from a group of others having some common elements between them."***[iv]**

Douglas Walton:
*"Reasoning is the making or granting of assumptions called premises and the process of moving toward conclusions (end points) from these assumptions by means of warrants."***[v]**

Stephen Toulmin:
*"The term reasoning will be used, more narrowly, for the central activity of presenting the reasons in support of a claim, so as to show how those reasons succeed in giving strength to the claim."***[vi]**

These definitions seem that they emphasized the centre status of the roll that inference played in process of reasoning, and supporting structure played in inference. Beside the scholars I mentioned above, Jaakko Hintikka, C.L. Hamblin are also on the list, which reflects how popular this point of view is. However, it seems to me that, the definition that defines reasoning to inference or superimposition of inference seems too narrow, which reminds us to be vigilant. According to Johnson, inference is "the transition of the mind from one proposition to another in accordance with some principle; at its best, guided by the theory of probability."**[vii]** If we admit reasoning equals to inference, then we simply overlooked the fact that reasoning can be very flexible. Reasoning can not only be proceeded forward to the product of our mind, but also backward to the state of mind that can complete our problem space. For instance, problem solving is very typical. In many cases we search the arithmetic from not only beginning stage to end stage, but also do it inversely to search problem space. And sometimes it even goes circular, like $A \vDash A$. And second, reasoning can repeat, stop and restart whenever the subject wants to, for

instance, mathematical calculation. If we calculate the value of n in equation "n = m+1", we can start from wherever "m = 1, n = 2; m = 2, n = 3; m = 3, n = 4......" or stop whenever we like to stop in this sequence. And if it is in need, we can surely repeat the process from necessary part. And third, reasoning can conduct not only in language but also on image, and sometimes reasoning on image can speed up our reaction. Fourth, reasoning can correct itself, and correctional reasoning takes place frequently among our everyday life.

So the question is, can inference behave the same all? Or, even if it can, do inference and reasoning follow the same process or proceed in same mental mechanism? The answer to these questions would be very tricky and it is better for us to combine the related discipline's results, say, cognitive psychology. However, before that, we have to be careful with this inferential view.

3. *Conceptual confusion*
Till now, it seems that the notion of reasoning has been confused with a bunch of related concepts. Among those concepts I see argument is a highly appearing term. If we look at the views we have discussed above, it would not be surprise for us to see the confusion between the notion of argument and reasoning. In fact, not only in formal logic, but also in informal logic it has also been full of this conceptual confusion. For instance Toulmin (1984), after defined "reasoning" as I mentioned above, he immediately offered his definition of "argument", which says "An argument, in the sense of a train of reasoning, is the sequence of interlinked claims and reasons that, between them, establish the content and force of the position for which a particular speaker is arguing." From here we can observe, for Toulmin, the chain of inference makes reasoning, and the chain of reasoning makes argument. This point of view is endorsed by countless scholars which spreaded widely within informal logic. It seems make sense in the first place. However, if inference cannot be as equal as the only component of reasoning as we had expected, then how come the longer length and larger size of reasoning makes argument? If the notion of reasoning and the notion of argument only differ in its complexity, then what is the distinction between these two in nature?

The problem lies whenever we mentioned the notion of reasoning, we seldom really separate it from the notion of argument. There are countless logic textbooks starting with introduction to argument and then immediately tell students that reasoning can be classified as deduction and induction... as if "argument" and "reasoning" are the same words which can be used in turn. No

matter in formal logic and informal logic, the notion of reasoning has all the way been bundled with the notion of argument. However, even we often try to convince other people by displaying our line of reasoning, it by no means that they are the same thing essentially in equal. One can surely experience that we always reason before we argue. And even Newton had indeed been hit by an apple which inspired him the law of gravity, he would never had composed his paper by the way he was inspired. Instead, he would certainly choose the normative treatment according to his own discipline. Why? Because reasoning is different from arguing.

Besides, if we trace the earlier root of history all the way back to this confusion, we would find that even in Aristotle's works, he also used these two terms as interchangeable, although he did distinguish reasoning and argument. And hence Aristotle influenced all the way that we look at reasoning and argument.

4. *Clarification*

In order to clarify this confusion, we still have to return to formal logic, where validity has been complained quite a lot since last century. If we look at formal logic, no matter proposition logic, predicate logic, or non-monotonic logic, although formal logicians had studied logic by making use of symbolic mathematical treatment, their research object are human reasoning with distinctive characteristics, instead of single argument in everyday life. Precisely, what they study is the abstract form of reasoning; and symbolic systems are used to simulate the specific reasoning phenomenon with different characteristics. Theoretically, anyone can construct a symbolic system without considering its interpretation meaning. If all the propositions of this system are valid under the semantic interpretation that the system tried to describe and simulate, then it means this system successfully re-displayed this kind of reasoning phenomenon that the system tried to simulate. And in turn, if all the semantic interpretation can find its corresponding proposition within formal system, it means that the system constructed can completely show the reasoning phenomenon that the system intends to simulate. In this sense, formal logic used strict mathematical tools to describe, simulate and predict the different characteristics of reasoning phenomenon. And validity should be understood as the micro nature of both syntactic system and semantic model. It functioned as a kind of media which connects and guarantees the macro nature of symbolic system constructed can fit its semantic interpretation very well. In other words, what formal logic study is

reasoning, instead of argument as informal logicians have focused on. Therefore, the term "validity", "soundness" and "completeness" should be understood from the macro nature of logic system and its corresponding semantic interpretation that the formal system tries to capture. However, those criticisms from informal logicians had mixed the difference between reasoning form that formal logicians focused on and the real arguments that we come across in daily life. For instance, if we take $A \vDash A$ as an argument, then it surely is not a successful one, however, if we take it as a piece of self-evident reasoning, then no one can deny it is no wrong.

As Johnson had pointed out, if we want to clarify the notion of reasoning, then it is better for us to understand it in a network of its related concepts. To understand the notion of reasoning, one has to understand its relationship with argument, as well as the relationship with argumentation. To free the notion of reasoning from the bundling of argument, I think there are some key points that we have to consider:

– Reasoning is a mental process. Although logicians may feel uneasy about this point as it seems drifted away from encompass of logic, we have to face it. In saying so, one must realize that the notion of reasoning has become into a broad sense. The truth is, the notion of reasoning was too narrow from what I have discussed above. And this narrowness seriously hindered our understanding of reasoning and placed a lot of terms that caused confusion in degree. For instance, under the previous narrow sense of reasoning, problem solving, critical thinking and argumentation would seem close but still difficult to explain each other in a proper relationship. However, under this broad sense of reasoning, these concepts would be covered as application of reasoning practice that conducted through the product of reasoning, which will be discussed later. Only in admitting this, can we make distinction between reasoning and argument, in that, argument, no matter oral or written, is a kind of product of reasoning process. While argumentation is essentially a kind of social activity that is the application of the product of reasoning.

– Reasoning has practical purpose which leads reasoning to be situated in diverse contexts. As we have discussed before, in real life, there is no such reasoning can be conducted without any practical purpose, even conducting mathematical proof. This is to say, to study reasoning under different titles requires exploration that differs from formal logic which focused on the nature of symbolic system and its

corresponding interpretation; rather, we should take more things into account as the research for real reasoning process can never be satisfied with the only mathematical treatment. And real reasoning is real because it conducted in a real environment that lots of factors have to be taken into account. This is to say, as Finocchiaro had proposed, if there is anything can be called the theory of reasoning, it has to incorporate "the attempt to formulate, to test, to clarify, and to systematize concepts and principles for the interpretation, the evaluation and the sound practice of reasoning."**[viii]**

– Reasoning seeks to obtain products of mind which can be belief, argument, plan, solution, and image, etc. This explained why people prefer to persuade others by displaying their reasoning line, as it is an effective convincing method by simply revealing how they arrive at their mental product. This is to say, reasoning differs from argument in persuasion. Argument aims to convince other people that might disagree with the arguer, but reasoning has no such function, in that reasoning is only proceeded to arrive something. If anything is in charge of being convincing, that's argument. So, construct argument means selecting useful things among all sorts of reasoning products. And it can explain why the theory of argument always related to dialectics and pragmatics, for they are all related to convincing.

– Reasoning has operation (or calculation) level. Cognitive psychology has proved that human can conduct mental operation by not only language but also image. This also explains why for many years formal logic has been taken as the born legitimate discipline aims to study reasoning and why visual image could also influence our state and product of mind. Although real reasoning takes place everywhere in our life, we surely have the ability to calculate or to operate on abstract state of mind while conducting reasoning. And by operation and calculation, we obtain our thinking product. However, the quality of this ability differs from context to practical environment which reasoning is being conducted.

What is reasoning? After so much discussion, it is time for us to consider the notion of reasoning from a distinctive perspective. In saying reasoning in the realm of informal logic, it is a kind of mental process which proceeds through mental operation to arrive at thinking products under practical environment. This seems like a descriptive definition; however, it helps us to understand reasoning under a real and broad environment of our daily life. And in saying theory of reasoning, it aims to capture and explain the conceptual natures and principles of reasoning that is conducted by real subject in pragmatic environment; it aims to

formulate, interpret and evaluate the practice of reasoning.

5. *Conclusion*

Although for all the time, the notion of reasoning has been used in a very narrow sense while the notion of argument to the contrary very broad, we finally have to clear up the conceptual confusion that caused from this narrowness. To better understand reasoning, we should look at formal logic from a fair angle and check its definition by contrast of argument and argumentation.

Finally I discussed the fundamental natures that reasoning has, and explained the new definition of reasoning and the main contents that a theory of reasoning should cover.

To sum up, the theory of reasoning comes from also the philosophical demand and the practical needs of our understanding of real reasoning that takes place in everyday life. In this point, it has no conflict with formal logic treatment as they function differently in study of reasoning. Formal logic is more interested in abstracting the mathematical rules of human reasoning phenomenon; and the theory of reasoning is interested in understanding real reasoning with its relationship of the related concepts and practical application in real life.

To complete informal logic, the theory of reasoning plays significant role in the development of the theory of argument and argumentation, only in clarity of the fundamental issues of reasoning that the related concepts can gain greater progress in understanding themselves.

Besides, the theory of reasoning should be friendly with its related disciplines as cognitive science needs a cooperative work. And in doing this, it can explain the conflict conclusions that are from research of distinctive disciplines. In this sense, the theory of reasoning can function as bridge for us to coordinate with each related disciplines. In turn, the development of other subjects can also help us understand reasoning.

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ISSA Proceedings 2014 ~ Chinese Understanding Of Interpersonal Arguing: A Cross-Cultural Analysis

Abstract: China has a longstanding tradition of stressing the values of harmony and coherence, and Chinese society has always been alleged to be a group where conflict avoidance is viewed more positively than direct confrontation and argumentation. In order to evaluate the validity of this claim, this paper sketches Chinese people's feelings and understandings of interpersonal arguing by reporting results of a data collection in China, using measures of argumentativeness, verbal aggressiveness, argument frames, and personalization of conflict. Chinese and U.S. data differed in complex ways, but did not show Chinese respondents to be more avoidant. The Chinese correlations among variables were a reasonable match to expectations based on Western argumentation theories. The paper offers evidence that Chinese respondents had a more sophisticated understanding of interpersonal arguing than their U.S. counterparts, and were more sensitive to the constructive possibilities of face-to-face disagreement.

1. *Introduction: Chinese orientations to interpersonal arguing*
Most of the existing literature on argumentation and communication studies suggests that the Chinese culture has long stressed the values of harmony, coherence, and holism, implying that Chinese people would prefer non-confrontational, non-argumentative, and conflict avoidance approaches over direct argumentation and confrontation in their social lives (Jensen, 1987, Leung, 1988; 1997; Lin, Zhao, & Zhao, 2010; Oetzel & Ting-Toomey, 2003; Oetzel et al, 2001; Triandis, 1995). Accordingly, Chinese society has always been regarded as a group where conflict avoidance is viewed more positively than direct confrontation and argumentation, and Chinese people's understanding of, and attitudes towards, interpersonal arguing have been supposed to differ significantly from those of Western people, whose culture has appreciated, from its very beginning, the importance of argumentative practices.

Moreover, it has also been argued by many scholars that, within Chinese social-cultural tradition, there is indeed a lack of argumentation and debate, a deprecation of speeches, and even a disinterest in logic (Becker, 1986; Kennedy, 1980). This longstanding tradition has not only contributed to a deficiency of argumentation studies in ancient China, but has also shaped in an important way the Chinese people's orientations to interpersonal arguing behaviors in modern times (Oliver, 1971; Kincaid, 1987). In the last decades, a considerable amount of work has been done to argue against the absence of argumentation and its study in ancient China (Garrett, 1993; Jensen, 1992; Lu & Frank 1993), but there seem to be few studies that examine what the modern Chinese people's orientations to interpersonal arguing really are, and whether they do differ from those of Westerners in a significant way. The purpose of this paper is to address these last two questions with empirical findings. In what follows, we first explain the instruments we have used to sketch understanding of interpersonal arguing, then we present the results of our study and make comparisons between the Chinese and the U.S. data, and finally we end with some discussion concerning Chinese orientations to confrontation and argumentation.

2. *Sketching Chinese people's understanding of interpersonal arguing*

There are quite a few possible approaches to providing an empirical summary of Chinese people's views on arguing, and in fact we have already addressed this topic in a different way (Xie, Shi, Evans & Hample, 2013). However, this paper is also part of a systematic cross-cultural project in which we are trying to compare different nations and cultures on the same instruments. The project's intention is to establish some general findings and comparisons that can be explored further with other methods and aims. To that end, we have decided to make use of several instruments that we believe have clear implications for most arguing behaviors and orientations. These instruments have all been developed in the United States, which immediately raises questions about their relevance to other cultures. However, even the finding that these concepts lack importance elsewhere in the world would be substantially informative.

2.1 *Argumentativeness and verbal aggressiveness*

The first instruments bear on people's motivations and orientations to interpersonal arguing. These are argumentativeness (Infante & Rancer, 1982) and verbal aggressiveness (Infante & Wigley, 1986). These both represent approach/avoid motivations that are relevant to arguing, but they differ in their

motivational targets. Argumentativeness is the predisposition to engage or attack the other person's evidence, reasoning, or position. Verbal aggressiveness is the predisposition to attack the other person's character, background, or identity. Being argumentative is constructive and has a host of positive consequences, but being verbally aggressive is destructive and is corrosive to relationships (Rancer & Avtgis, 2006).

Some prior research has applied these concepts in China (or, in several cases, Taiwan). Only a little of this work bears very directly on the present project, but it may be worthwhile to summarize it all in one place. Lin, Rancer, and Kong (2007), using Chinese-language materials, found that Chinese college students' argumentativeness scores were associated with communication practices in their families of origin. Students with high argumentativeness scores tended to come from consensual or pluralistic families rather than protective or lassiez-faire ones. Consensual and pluralistic families have in common that they emphasize conceptual development in their conversations, whereas protective families cut off substantive discussion to prevent stress and lassiez-faire families do not pursue either conceptual or social goals. Yeh and Chen (2004), also using non-English materials, compared the argumentativeness of residents of mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. They discovered that argumentativeness was positively associated with assertiveness and independent self-construals, and was negatively correlated to interdependent self-construals and social traditionalism. Students living in mainland China had the highest argument-approach scores compared to students living in Taiwan or Hong Kong, and Taiwanese students had the lowest argument-avoid results.

Bresnahan, Shearman, Lee, Ohashi, and Mosher (2002) found that in China, Japan, and the U.S., men had higher argumentativeness and verbal aggressiveness scores than women. Chinese participants had higher verbal aggressiveness scores than Japanese or American respondents. The researchers also discovered that U.S. participants responded more aggressively to a personal complaint than people from China or Japan. Hsu (2007) compared U.S. and Taiwanese undergraduates, and found Americans to be higher in argumentativeness. Hsu found no sex difference among Taiwanese respondents on the argumentativeness measure. Hsu also compared English- and Chinese-language versions of the instrument for Taiwanese respondents and found no mean differences and a correlation of .79 between them.

Considered together these results are rather mixed, mainly due to the differences between mainland and Taiwanese samples, which are hard to interpret in the present context. However, the results are theoretically sensible (see Rancer & Avtgis, 2006), and afford evidence that the argumentativeness and verbal aggressiveness constructs and measures have validity in China. The current project will re-test some of the inconsistent findings, particularly the male-female differences and the comparisons of U.S. and Chinese college students.

2.2 *Argument frames*

Argument frames refer to the expectations and understandings that people have for interpersonal arguing (Hample, 2003). These scales were developed to provide a summary answer to the question, "What do people think they are doing when they are arguing?" The frames fall into three categories, which are held to be in order of argumentative sophistication. The most basic group consists of the primary goals for arguing. Those goals are *utility* (obtaining some benefit), displaying *identity*, asserting *dominance*, and *play*. All of these are self-centered motivations that treat the other person as no more than a means to achieving one's own objectives. The second group, in contrast, takes the other arguer into account in a more genuine way. These frames include *blurting* (non-blurters adapt to the other person), *cooperation* (as opposed to competition), and *civility*. The final group of frames has only one measure, called *professional contrast.* This lists a number of paired descriptors that argumentation professionals have one view about and many ordinary arguers have the opposite (e.g., is argument an alternative to violence, or an invitation to it?). High scores on this scale indicate agreement with the professionals. Development of the measuring scales has taken place over the years (Hample, Richards, & Skubisz, 2013; Hample, Warner, & Young, 2009).

Except for some unreported work in our own multinational project, we are unaware of these measures having been used in countries or cultures outside the U.S. However, they should serve their summarizing function and provide a useful platform for comparing U.S. and Chinese orientations to interpersonal arguing.

2.3 *Taking conflict personally*

The final set of topics investigated here concerns the personalization of conflict (Hample & Cionea, 2010; Hample & Dallinger, 1995). People vary in the degree to which they take conflict personally (TCP). Again, a battery of scales is employed to measure this set of predispositions. *Direct personalization* is the most

immediate measure of a person's inclination to take conflicts personally. *Stress reactions* include both physical and psychological stress experiences connected to conflict. *Persecution feelings* refer to the belief that other people are participating in the conflict in order to victimize the respondent, rather than to settle any substantive issue. *Positive* and *negative relational effects* measure people's estimates that conflicts can enhance or damage personal and workplace relationships. Finally, *valence* is a general summary of whether the respondent enjoys or dislikes interpersonal conflict.

The TCP instruments have been applied outside the U.S. (Avtgis & Rancer, 2004), but not in China to our knowledge. The Bresnahan et al. (2002) finding that Americans responded more aggressively to complaints than Chinese respondents did may be helpful, although the relationships between TCP and aggression have proved to be complex (Hample & Cionea, 2010). Comparing U.S. and Chinese respondents on the TCP measures should enhance our understanding of how arguments are approached and conceptualized in these nations because interpersonal arguments often involve disagreements and goal incompatibility.

2.4 *Summarizing argument orientations*
Collecting data on all these instruments at once permits more information than if they were explored in separate studies. We intend to examine two sorts of information: means and correlations. Whether college students from the two countries have similar mean scores will be informative, and this analysis may permit us to say that students from one country are higher or lower on some particular measure. But a more theoretically provocative question is whether the instruments have the same dynamic interconnections in both countries. Do the measures have the same connections to one another in the U.S. and China? It is possible that national means could be comparable but the correlations could differ, or the reverse. By examining both sorts of outcomes, we hope to begin a comparative sketch of U.S. and Chinese arguing profiles.

3. *Method*
3.1 *Respondents*
Respondents were 235 first year students at two Chinese universities, Sun Yat-sen University (N = 212, 90% of the sample) and South China Normal University (N = 23, 10% of the sample). Both universities are comprehensive multi-disciplinary institutions, located in Guangzhou, the biggest city in the Southern part of mainland China. Sun Yat-sen University is the best university in this area, ranking

as one of the top ten universities in mainland China. Its enrolled students are normally elites in their generation. All the respondents were native Chinese, approximately a half of them were local (i.e. from Guangdong province), and the other half were from different parts throughout China. 86 of the respondents were men (37%) and 149 (63%) were women, and they were all about the age of 19. Respondents at Sun Yat-sen University majored in Law, and those at South China Normal University were Education majors.

3.2 *Procedures*
Survey instruments were in Mandarin, using the Chinese-language versions published in Xie, Shi, Evans & Hample (2013). Data were collected in classes. Completing a booklet typically took about half an hour.

3.3 *Measures*
Reliabilities, means, standard deviations and sample sizes for all measures are in Table 1.

Civility	***	.59	8	2.89	.38	419	3.39	.48
Prof Contrast		.85	7	3.63	.76	419	3.54	.63
Personalization of Conflict								
Direct Personal	***	.72	7	2.58	.54	192	3.15	.55
Persecution	***	.68	6	2.74	.55	192	2.54	.68
Stress	**	.65	4	3.02	.68	192	2.84	.58
Pos Relational		.80	7	3.49	.57	192	3.42	.53
Neg Relational	***	.81	5	2.70	.63	192	3.09	.74
Positive Valence		.79	7	2.77	.65	192	2.89	.71

Note: The Chinese data were recorded on 1 – 5 Likert scales, as were the US data. A higher number means more of the named construct. In the Chinese data, items 2 and 9 were dropped from the civility scale and item 30 dropped in the stress scale, in the standard orderings, to increase reliability. The U.S. data were taken from the data sets for Hample, Han, and Payne (2010) and Hample, Richards, and Skubisz (2013). The "compare" column reports the significance levels of *t* tests between the countries.

Table 1: Means, Standard Deviations, Cronbach's alphas, and Number of Items for Chinese and U.S. Samples Note: The Chinese data were recorded on 1 – 5 Likert scales, as were the US data. A higher number means more of the named construct. In the Chinese data, items 2 and 9 were dropped from the civility scale and item 30 dropped in the stress scale, in the standard orderings, to increase reliability. The U.S. data were taken from the data sets for Hample, Han, and Payne (2010) and

Table 1: Means, Standard Deviations, Cronbach's alphas, and Number of Items for Chinese and U.S. Samples

Measure	compare	alpha	# items	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD
				China			US	
Argument Predispositions								
Arg-avoid	***	.77	10	2.92	.58	420	3.11	.64
Arg-approach	*	.81	10	3.18	.57	420	3.05	.67
VA-antisocial		.73	10	2.40	.50	420	2.45	.63
VA-prosocial	***	.73	10	3.84	.52	420	3.39	.52
Argument Frames								
Identity	**	.72	8	3.38	.48	419	3.51	.55
Play		.69	4	2.69	.74	419	2.60	.87
Dominance	***	.84	6	2.32	.73	419	2.63	.70
Cooperation	***	.70	6	4.13	.51	419	3.64	.49

* p < .05 ** p < .01 *** p < .001

Argumentativeness and verbal aggressiveness are both twenty item scales, each composed of two subscales. Argumentativeness includes argument-avoid and argument-approach. Verbal aggressiveness includes both an antisocial and a prosocial subscale. Reliabilities for all four subscales were acceptable (see Table 1).

Six of the argument frames subscales were used in the present study. Scales for blurting and utility were still under development in the U.S. at the time the current project was planned. First order frames include identity display, dominance assertion, and play. Cooperation and civility represent the second order frames. The professional contrast instrument was included, and of course reflects the third order of framing. The reliability for play was very slightly less than what was wanted, and the reliability for the civility measure was low even after two items were dropped (see Table 1).

The six Taking Conflict Personally (TCP) subscales are direct personalization, persecution feelings, stress reactions, positive relational effects, negative relational effects, and valence. One item needed to be omitted from the stress scale to increase internal consistency. Reliabilities for persecution feelings and stress reactions were a bit low, but the other instruments had acceptable Cronbach's alphas (see Table 1).

3.4 *Comparison data*

U.S. data used for comparison to the present results were reported in Hample, Han, and Payne (2010) and Hample, Richards, and Skubisz (2013), and further details about the two data sets can be found in the original reports. These data were collected online from undergraduates at the University of Maryland, a large public university in the U.S. Mid-Atlantic Region. Combined sample size from the two studies was about 420 for several measures, but only 192 for the TCP instruments. These data are also summarized in Table 1.

Table 2: Sex Differences in China and the U.S.

	China Male	Female	U.S. Male	Female
Argument Predispositions				
Arg-avoid	2.82	2.97	3.06 b	3.13 b
Arg-approach	3.22	3.16	3.05	3.05
VA-antisocial	2.54 a	2.32	2.71 ab	2.33
VA-prosocial	3.70 b	3.91 ab	3.23	3.46 a
Argument Frames				
Identity	3.39	3.38	3.56 b	3.49 b
Play	2.81 a	2.62 b	2.96 a	2.45
Dominance	2.43	2.26	2.78 ab	2.57 b
Cooperation	3.95 b	4.24 ab	3.54	3.68 a
Civility	2.89	2.88	3.44 b	3.37 b
Prof Contrast	3.48	3.73 ab	3.53	3.55
Personalization of Conflict				
Direct Personal	2.55	2.60	2.96 b	3.23 ab
Persecution	2.71 b	2.75 b	2.48	2.56
Stress	2.82 b	3.14 ab	2.54	2.95 a
Pos Relational	3.46	3.50	3.43	3.41
Neg Relational	2.68	2.72	3.05 b	3.11 b
Positive Valence	2.91 a	2.69	3.13 ab	2.80

Notes: The notation "a" indicates that this score is higher than the other sex's score within that nation at p < .05, two-tailed. For example, Chinese men had a significantly higher verbal aggressiveness (antisocial) score than Chinese women. The notation "b" indicates that this score is higher than the same sex's score in the other nation at p < .05, two tailed. For example, U.S. men had a higher score on argument-avoid than did Chinese men.

Table 2: Sex Differences in China and the U.S.

4. *Results*

4.1 *Sex differences*

As summarized earlier, prior research has reported that men tend to have higher argumentativeness and verbal aggressiveness scores in both China and the U.S. Table 2 shows the relevant results for this study.

Notes: The notation "a" indicates that this score is higher than the other sex's score within that nation at p < .05, two-tailed. For example, Chinese men had a significantly higher verbal aggressiveness (antisocial) score than Chinese women. The notation "b" indicates that this score is higher than the same sex's score in the other nation at p < .05, two tailed. For example, U.S. men had a higher score on argument-avoid than did Chinese men.

Chinese men and women displayed some different patterns. Men were significantly higher in verbal aggressiveness (antisocial), interest in arguing for

play, and in general valence for conflict (valence is scored so that high scores indicate positive affect). Chinese women were higher in verbal aggressiveness (prosocial), cooperative orientations to argument, professional contrast scores, and feelings of stress while engaged in conflict. The general pattern here is that, compared to Chinese women, Chinese men were more aggressive and less advanced in their understandings and expectations about interpersonal arguing. Sex differences in the U.S. are not of special interest here, except to notice that many of the same sex differences in China were also present in the U.S. data.

Same sex comparisons between the two countries are of more interest. First consider the men. Compared to U.S men, Chinese men had higher verbal aggressiveness (prosocial) scores, were more cooperatively oriented, felt more persecution in conflicts, and had greater stress reactions. U.S. men, on the other hand, were more avoidant when faced with an argument, were more antisocial, made more use of arguments to display own identity, were more oriented to domination purposes for arguing, saw arguments as more civil, took conflicts more personally, were more pessimistic about relational consequences of conflict, but enjoyed conflicts more. The pattern here is somewhat delicate, but Chinese men seemed to try to be more pleasant in argument and had markedly more stress and persecution feelings. U.S. men seemed to have a more intense ambivalence about arguing: they wanted to avoid it, but made more use of it for identity and dominance displays, worried more about negative repercussions, but took more pleasure in conflicts.

Cross-national differences also appeared for women. Chinese women, compared to those in the U.S., were more avoidant, made more use of arguing for identity and dominance displays, were more civil, took conflicts more personally, and were more pessimistic about the relational consequences of conflicts. U.S. women were more prosocial, more playful, more cooperative, more sophisticated in their understanding of the activity, and felt more persecuted and stressed by conflicts. Again, this comparative pattern is complex, but it may be that U.S. women were more engaged in arguing for both good or ill, whereas Chinese women tended to be more avoidant and personal in their arguments.

4.2 *National mean differences*
Table 1 displays the mean scores for both countries, along with results of significance tests between them. Compared to U.S. respondents, Chinese students had higher approach motivations, were more prosocial in their intentions, were

more cooperative, felt more persecuted, and experienced more stress. Chinese respondents also were less avoidant, made less use of arguments to display identity or assert dominance, were less civil, took conflicts less personally, and were less pessimistic about the relational consequences of conflicts. This pattern is mixed. Chinese respondents were more inclined to participate in arguments, but not for every reason (e.g., they did not orient to identity functions). They reacted negatively to conflicts in some respects (persecution and stress) but not others (personalization and negative relational consequences). Chinese respondents' politeness orientations were also mixed, compared to Americans'. Chinese students reported that they were comparatively less civil, but more cooperative and prosocial. Overall, the comparisons of Chinese and U.S. orientations show that the two nations' students have many differences, but these do not congeal into a clear statement to the effect that one nation enjoys arguments more, avoids them more, is more polite during them, or understands them in a simple and dramatically different way.

Table 3: Correlations among Measures, Chinese Sample

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
1 Arg-avoid															
2 Arg-approach	-.40														
3 VA-prosocial	.08	.12													
4 VA-antisocial	.09	.26	-.31												
5 Identity	-.18	.48	.07	.26											
6 Play	-.25	.42	-.07	.28	.37										
7 Dominance	.15	.06	-.35	.36	.23	.27									
8 Cooperation	.12	.10	.34	-.16	.15	-.10	-.27								
9 Civility	-.27	.10	-.01	-.16	-.04	.09	-.24	-.09							
10 Prof Contrast	-.26	.21	.18	-.17	.10	.10	-.36	.19	.37						
11 Dir personal	.34	-.27	-.28	.31	.01	-.07	.48	-.14	-.34	-.43					
12 Persecution	.46	-.31	-.21	.20	-.04	-.21	.43	-.03	-.39	-.35	.68				
13 Stress	.58	-.40	.03	-.01	-.10	-.35	.13	.15	-.25	-.27	.44	.56			
14 Pos Relation	-.27	.38	.32	-.05	.36	.26	-.26	.19	.28	.40	-.48	-.41	-.28		
15 Neg Relation	.46	-.26	-.17	.13	-.14	-.21	.31	-.08	-.39	-.41	.61	.57	.41	-.56	
16 Pos Valence	-.55	.51	-.07	.08	.34	.49	-.03	-.14	.31	.33	-.44	-.55	-.59	.50	-.51

Note: Correlations of |.13| or more are statistically significant at p < .05, two-tailed.

Table 3: Correlations among Measures, Chinese Sample Note: Correlations of |.13| or more are statistically significant at p < .05, two-tailed.

4.3 *Dynamic associations in China*

Table 3 reports correlations among the measures, restricted to the Chinese data. First, let us consider the subscales for each group of measures.

The relationships among the argumentativeness and verbal aggressiveness measures were conceptually expectable. Argument-avoid and argument-approach were correlated substantially and negatively, as were the prosocial and antisocial

subscales of verbal aggressiveness. A noticeable positive correlation between argument-approach and VA-antisocial also appeared, and this matches the measures' common status as a sort of assertiveness.

The frames measures also showed substantial associations among themselves. The first order frames (identity, play, and dominance) were all positively associated. The second-order frames, cooperation and civility, were not associated at significant levels, although both had positive connections to professional contrast scores. Conceptually, cooperation and civility ought to have been positively correlated, but the other results match theoretical understandings of the constructs.

Finally, the subscales of TCP were also intercorrelated. The measures that are sometimes collected into one measure in the U.S. (called "core TCP") are direct personalization, persecution feelings, and stress reactions, and these three subscales were positively and very substantially associated in Table 3. The positive and negative relational consequences subscales had their expectable large negative correlation, and the negative consequences scale was directly associated with the core TCP measures. Valence had very strong correlations with the other subscales, all in the conceptually expectable directions.

Some mention should also be made of noticeably strong patterns from one scale battery to another, especially for particularly important measures. Conflict valence was strongly correlated with nearly every other measure in the study, indicating that this instrument affords very good predictions of how much a Chinese respondent will enjoy interpersonal conflicts. Another key measure is professional contrast, which summarizes the sophistication with which participants understand face-to-face arguing. Professional contrast scores were also well predicted here. Those with the most sophisticated understandings were also those with the highest scores on argument-approach, prosocial motivations, cooperativeness, civility, optimism about relational consequences, and enjoyment of conflict; these people also had the lowest scores for avoidance, antisocial motivations, dominance impulses, core TCP, and pessimism about relational consequences of interpersonal conflicts. Chinese respondents who were most eager to engage argumentatively were those who saw the identity, dominance, and play uses for arguing; who had notably low scores on the core TCP measures; who believed that conflicts improve relationships; and who enjoyed the experience of an interpersonal conflict. The most antisocially aggressive

individuals in the sample were also sensitive to the identity, dominance, and play potentials for arguing; had low scores for cooperation, civility, and professional contrast; and tended to take conflict personally.

Table 4: Correlations among Measures, U.S. Sample

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
1 Arg-avoid															
2 Arg-approach	-.63														
3 VA-prosocial	.12	.05													
4 VA-antisocial	.08	.08	-.52												
5 Identity	.08	.03	-.13	.29											
6 Play	.10	-.05	-.19	.32	.48										
7 Dominance	.01	.12	-.37	.51	.27	.31									
8 Cooperation	.13	-.06	.44	-.31	.12	-.15	-.27								
9 Civility	-.05	.02	.26	-.19	.12	.17	-.26	.25							
10 Prof Contrast	.06	-.05	.25	-.25	.08	.03	-.26	.30	.53						
11 Dir personal	-.15	.34	.09	-.06	.01	-.19	.01	.13	-.08	-.08					
12 Persecution	.11	.11	-.04	.17	.13	-.03	.10	-.00	-.09	-.10	.60				
13 Stress	-.28	.41	.21	-.13	-.12	-.32	-.05	.13	-.08	-.06	.39	.36			
14 Pos Relation	.12	-.17	.01	.02	.11	.27	.19	.01	.06	.03	-.18	-.21	-.25		
15 Neg Relation	-.08	.14	-.04	.16	.01	.06	.16	-.12	-.15	-.14	.04	-.06	.17	.09	
16 Pos Valence	.43	-.41	-.13	.16	.24	.27	.16	-.02	.06	.09	.08	.26	-.27	.08	-.45

Note: Correlations of |.12| or more are statistically significant at $p < .05$, two-tailed, for correlations not involving the Taking Conflict Personally measures. For those, the parallel value is |.15|.

4.4 *Comparisons of Chinese and U.S. associations*

Finally, Table 4 reports correlations parallel to those in Table 3, but drawn from the U.S. samples. Since those associations were discussed in the original reports, here we will only take notice of similarities and differences when comparing Tables 3 and 4 with one another.

In sum, comparison of Tables 3 and 4 reveals a number of differences in detail that might be worth pursuing in the future, but the overall patterns are generally comparable. This means that correlational analyses do not point to any radically different variable-to-variable dynamics in China, as compared to the U.S. The variables seemed to be performing similar functions in both countries.

5. *Discussion*

In general, the results in our study and its comparisons to the U.S. data indicate that Chinese and U.S. respondents were often similar, but still differed in complex ways in their understanding of interpersonal arguing, and several findings worthy of discussion appeared.

The most striking one is that our study did *not* show that Chinese respondents were more avoidant of confrontation and interpersonal argumentation, compared to Westerners. On the contrary, the national mean scores show that Chinese respondents actually had higher argument approach motivations and higher verbal aggressiveness scores than the U.S. students. This shows that Chinese were comparatively less avoidant to confrontation, and more oriented to participate in interpersonal argumentation. Hence the allegation that China is a nation where conflict avoidance is viewed more positively than direct confrontation and argumentation seems to be problematic. The results of our study have disproved this claim, and have made its flaws much more apparent.

As we mentioned in the first part of this paper, many scholars have argued for

this allegation from the perspective of traditional Chinese philosophy and culture. The gist of their argument could be summarized as follows: the values of harmony and coherence are prominently stressed within Chinese culture and philosophies (namely, Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism), but confrontation and argumentation are threats to the realization of these values, since they involve disagreement and goal incompatibility. This would seem to undermine interpersonal relationships, so they will be strongly discouraged in Chinese social life. This appears to be an over-simplification of the way these cultural values could influence ordinary people's thinking and behaviors. It may also reflect an unsophisticated understanding of the ways in which face-to-face arguing can be socially productive. In fact, given that the prevailing values of harmony and coherence in Chinese culture, the cogency of the avoidance position boils down to the correctness of two other claims: that in Chinese philosophical theories the realization of those values *do preclude* confrontation and argumentation, and that in Chinese people's social-cultural practices conflicts and argumentative behaviors are *truly recognized* as damages to interpersonal relationships. We believe that neither of these two premises is correct, but here we only take issue against the latter one.

Consider first the argument frames results. These measures were designed to reveal the understandings that people have for interpersonal arguing. Compared to U.S. undergraduates, Chinese respondents made less use of arguments to display *identity* or assert *dominance*, were noticeably more *cooperatively* oriented, and had higher scores on *professional contrast*. All these results implied that Chinese people indeed had a more sophisticated understanding of arguing. They could better keep their self-centered motivations under restraint, and take the other arguer into consideration in a more genuine way. Hence in China interpersonal arguing was far more than a confrontation of disagreements and a struggle of achieving one's own objectives. Chinese respondents seemed more attuned to the socially constructive potentials of interpersonal arguing than were the U.S. participants.

Next consider the results from the measures of personalization of conflict and verbal aggressiveness, both of which are supposed to reflect people's views of arguing as being destructive and corrosive to relationships. Chinese respondents were more prosocial, they took conflicts less personally, and were less pessimistic about the relational consequences of conflicts. Moreover, the correlations among

the measures also revealed that Chinese respondents who were most eager to participate in arguing were those who believed that conflicts improve relationships, and who enjoyed the experience of an interpersonal conflict. These results could be taken to mean that in their social lives Chinese people were actually less inclined to recognize interpersonal arguing as damaging to interpersonal relationships.

Interpersonal arguing is as common and important a sort of interpersonal communication in China as in the U.S. In fact, the present study gives evidence that Chinese undergraduates were more sophisticated in their understandings of arguing than Westerners. This implies that interpersonal arguing may well be more pleasant and constructive in China than in the U.S. Our data leads to conclusions that are quite unlike those of some previous scholars.

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ISSA Proceedings 2014 – Denying The Antecedent Probabilized: A Dialectical View

Abstract: This article provides an analysis and evaluation for probabilistic version of arguments that deny the antecedent (DAp). Stressing the effects of premise retraction vs. premise subtraction in a dialectical setting, the cogency of DAp arguments is shown to depend on premises that normally remain implicit. The evaluation remains restricted to a Pascalian notion of probability, which is briefly compared to its Baconian variant. Moreover, DAp is presented as an exam-question plus evaluation that can be deployed as a learning assessment-instrument at graduate-level.

1. *Introduction*

We treat the evaluation of DAp, a probabilistic version of what classical logic correctly treats as the formal fallacy of *denying the antecedent* (DA), i.e., the deductively invalid attempt at inferring the conclusion $\sim c$ from the premises $a\text{->}c$ and $\sim a$, where a stands for antecedent, c for consequent, and $\sim$ for negation. Examples include:

1. Had my client been at the crime scene (a), then he would probably be guilty (c). But he wasn't ($\sim$a), so he probably isn't ($\sim$c).
2. If the lights are on (a), then probably someone's at home (c). But the lights are out ($\sim$a), so probably no one is ($\sim$c).
3. If the product sells (a), then our marketing measures should probably be trusted (c). But it doesn't ($\sim$a), so measures should be reviewed ($\sim$c).

Here,
(1) states a counterfactual conditional ("had"),
(2) an indicative one ("are"), and that in
(3) might even sustain a deontic reading ("should"). Disregarding such differences, we proceed to treat such DAp-arguments on the following schema, its formal version becoming clearer soon:

(DAp) If a then probably c. But not a, so probably not c.
$Pf(c)=Pi(c|a)>Pi(c)$. But $Pi(a)=0$, so $Pf(\sim c)>Pi(c)$.

As should be uncontroversial, if natural language instances of DAp instantiate a probabilistically valid inference, or argument, then only if the relevant probability values are right. A probabilistic version of modus ponens (MPp) can be stated as the conditional probability of c given a, i.e., P(c|a), where P(c|a) directly depends on P($\sim$c|a) whenever $P(c|a)=1-P(\sim c|a)$ holds, which is the complement-relation of Pascalian probability (see Sect. 5.3 on the Baconian). A probabilistic version of denying the antecedent (DAp), $P(\sim c|\sim a)$, contrasts by depending on not one, but three values: $P(c|\sim a), P(a), P(c).$ This asymmetry between MPp and DAp is mirrored by one between probabilized versions of modus tollens (MTp) and affirming the consequent (ACp), not being treated here (see Oaksford & Chater,

2008; 2009).

As will be seen below, since particularly $P(c|{\sim}a)$ is necessary to evaluate DAp, but need not be readily available from context, evaluations of DAp regularly remain conditional on analysts' assumptions with respect to $P(c|{\sim}a)$. Our main objective is to present one such assumption—broadly one of relevance, referred to as AR, below—then trace AR's effects on arguers' dialectical commitments, in a context where PROPONENT (PRO) argues MPp, and OPPONENT (OPP) responds with DAp. On assumption, PRO can respond to OPP's DAp either by retracting or subtracting prior commitment; the first proves to be a delaying-tactic, and the validity of OPP's DAp is shown to depend on commitments reconstructed for PRO.

We introduce DAp as an exam-question (Sect. 2), then discuss the choice of logic (3.1), the projection of linguistic forms onto logical forms (3.2), and the retraction vs. subtraction distinction (3.3). Having provided an evaluation (4), we argue for the plausibility of AR (5.1), explain how retraction delays interaction (5.2), and briefly contrast this broadly Pascalian result with a Baconian notion of probability. Our conclusions are in Sect. 6.

2. *DAp as an exam-question*

An evaluation of a probabilistic version of denying the antecedent (DAp) in a dialectical setting might be assigned as an exam-question, such as the following, where PRO argues MPp in lines 1 and 2, to which OPP responds, in line 3, by denying PRO's antecedent, and subsequently raising the claim in line 4, thus arguing DAp. Assuming OPP to have the last word—OPP-statements "trump" PRO-statements— PRO's response options are limited to either of those in lines 5a or 5b, provided OPP is committed to PRO's claim in line 1. So, in line 6, can PRO reasonably deny OPP's claim in line 4?

(1) PRO: a makes c more probable.
(2) PRO: a is the case.
(3) OPP: a is not the case.
(4) OPP: So, not c is more probable.
(5a) PRO: I retract (2).
(5b) PRO: I subtract (2), i.e., I agree to (3).
(6) PRO: But I disagree with (4).

Task: Assume that (3) trumps (2), i.e., that OPP has the last word, and that OPP

commits to (1). Evaluate line (6) as reasonable, or not, vis-à-vis (1-4), for both the variants (5a) and (5b). Trace and justify additional assumptions.

We now present a task-solution that presupposes an evaluation of DAp vis-à-vis a Pascalian notion of probability.

3. *Evaluating DAp*

3.1 *Choice of Logic*

As holds generally for argument-evaluation, an evaluation of DAp proceeds via a projection of natural language material (aka linguistic form) onto a logical form, itself provided through analyst-choice among available logics. The logic employed below is inductive, consistent with the Kolmogorow-axiomatization of probability, thus modeling a Pascalian notion of probability. As our evaluation of DAp holds relative to this logic only, external criticism of the evaluation should elaborate on inadequacies in the Pascalian notion of probability, if any (see Sect. 5.3).

3.2 *Linguistic and Logical Form*

The application of logical forms (Lo-F) to linguistic forms (Li-F) yields a reconstruction of Li-F at Lo-F level, technically a projection of the Li-F onto the Lo-F. Analysts must subsequently ask: Is a particular Lo-F validity-assessable, i.e., is the projection *complete*? It will be only if the Li-F readily provides information necessary to evaluate the Lo-F with respect to validity. Conversely, incomplete projections only require analysts to add information at Lo-F level**[i]**. Once completed, the evaluative result may then be read-off, and transferred to the Li-F. The yield is an evaluation conditional on information added.

To appreciate the projection of statements containing 'probable' and its cognates, compare the Li-F and potential Lo-F instances, below, where $Pi(c|a)>Pi(c)=1-Pi(\sim c)$ states the initial probability of c given a, Pi(c|a), to exceed the initial probability of c, Pi(c), which equals one minus the probability of the logical complement, $\sim$c, since $P(\beta)=1-P(\sim\beta)$ holds, and similarly for conditional probabilities: $P(\beta|\alpha)=1-P(\sim\beta|\alpha)$.

Above, we had seen PRO to utter the Li-F 'a makes c more probable' in line (1). Onto which Lo-F, now, should this utterance be projected?

(i) a makes c more probable – $Pi(c|a)>Pi(c)=1-Pi(\sim c)$
(ii) a makes c more probable than not c. – $Pi(c|a)>Pi(\sim c)=1-Pi(c)$

(iii) … than not c given a. – *Pi(c|a)>Pi(~c|a)=1−Pi(c|a)*
(iv) … than not c given not a. – *Pi(c|a)>Pi(~c|~a)=1−Pi(c|~a)*

The Lo-F in line (i) yields perhaps the most faithful projection, as its content most closely mirrors that of 'a makes c more probable'. While (ii) to (iv) need not be implausible candidates, they nevertheless add content to PRO's utterances. We return to (i) in Sect. 4.

Except for the point-probability *Pi(c)=Pi(~c)=0.5,* the utterances in (i) and (ii) mutually and directly imply their negations. After all, (i) compares *Pi(c|a) to Pi(c),* so *Pi(c|a)* is also compared to Pi(~c), the latter being the complement of Pi(c), as in (ii). Similarly, (iii) compares Pi(c|a), again merely internally, to its complement, Pi(~c|a). In contrast, (iv) compares *Pi(c|a) to Pi(~c|~a),* which, importantly, does not directly dependent on Pi(c|a). Note that Pi(~c|~a) had, in Sect. 1, been seen to state a probabilistic version of denying the antecedent (DAP).

On the assumption that contents expressed by *Pi(a), Pi(c), Pi(c|a), and Pi(c|~a)* are contingent, when Pi(c|~a) cannot simply be obtained from PRO's Li-F, then Pi(c|~a) should be stipulated in view of PRO's commitments with respect to Pi(a), Pi(c), Pi(c|a), effectively compensating for cases where PRO avoids an explicit commitment with respect to Pi(c|~a). Sect. 4 will identify one such compensation, consisting in an assumption of relevance assumption (AR). First, we turn to PRO's dialectical options in lines 5a and 5b (see Sect. 2).

3.3 *Retraction vs. Subtraction*
A non-formal version of the retraction vs. subtraction distinction is found, among others, in Godden & Walton (2004). In probabilistic terms, to retract amounts to PRO no longer holding a commitment with respect to the probability of a. As we now argue, retraction would only be represented unfaithfully as a PRO-update to the unspecific commitment Pf(a)=[0,1], where the subscripted 'f' indicates the final probability after retraction. To subtract, in contrast, amounts to having stated that a is false, and can be represented as a PRO-update to the specific commitment P(~a)=1.

One may assume that, having used MPP at time t0, PRO is at time t1 committed to *Pi(c|a)>Pi(c) and Pi(a)=1*. After retraction, her commitments at t2 could update to Pi(c) and Pf(a)=[0,1], where [0,1] marks the closed interval from zero to one, including the end-points, and Pi(c) is the prior probability of c. Alternatively, at t2,

PRO's commitments could update merely to Pi(c). In the first case, given Pf(a)=[0,1], PRO cannot meaningfully maintain a commitment to *Pi(c|a)>Pi(c), for if Pf(a)=[0,1]* and Pi(c|a)>Pi(c) together entail anything, then they entail the probability of c given a to be greater than the probability of c, for any value of *P(a)=1−P(~a)=[0,1]*. But this is incompatible with the probability of a impacting on the probability of c. So a could not, in any standard sense, remain relevant to c, for a would now raise the probability of c come what may, given any probability-value of a, including 0 and 1 (see Sect. 5.2). To avoid as much, retraction should be modelled such that, at t2, PRO updates her commitments merely to Pi(c).

After subtraction, PRO's commitments with respect to a have been updated from Pi(c|a)>Pi(c) and Pf(a)=1, at t1, to Pi(c|a)>Pi(c) and Pf(~a)=1, at t2. They now starkly contrast with PRO's commitment at t1. Such flipping—aka 'take it back and claim the opposite'—makes it conditionally relevant for PRO to incur a comparative commitment with respect to Pi(c|~a) vs. Pi(c). Note that this is unlike the case of retraction. In both cases, of course, OPP may well ask PRO to compare Pi(c|~a) with Pi(c). In the exam-case (Sect. 2), this comparison was not made.

What may one reasonably assume about this comparison on behalf of PRO? Introduced as part of the evaluation of DAP in the next section, the assumption (AR) compares Pi(c|~a) with Pi(c). Along with other assumptions, AR will be seen to yield the very conclusion OPP seeks to establish with her DAP argument: Pf(~c)>Pf(c).

4. *Conditional evaluation of DAp*

4.1 *PROPONENT and OPPONENT commitments*
In evaluating the OPPONENT's DAp, one supposes that 'if a then c', i.e., a→c, can be interpreted probabilistically such that P(a→c)=P(c|a), an assumption referred to as 'the equation' (Oaksford & Chater, 2008; 2009). One should start from the weakest possible PROPONENT-commitment in this context (see Sect. 3.2), namely that a provides some support to c, as expressed in (7). Again, Pi(c) marks the initial or prior, and Pf(c) the final or posterior probability.

(7) *Pf(c)=Pi(c|a)>Pi(c)* – [PROPONENT-commitment]**[ii]**

As we saw, if inductive support is measured over the closed interval from 0 to 1, and reflects a Pascalian notion of probability, then a degree of support for a

proposition α entails that of its complement via *P(α)=1−P(~α)*, and likewise for conditional probabilities via *P(α|β)=1−P(~α|β).* Moreover, Pi(c|a) is given by the principle of conditionalization (PC), aka the definition of conditional probability:

(PC) *Pi(c|a)=P(c&a) / P(a)* – [definition of conditional probability]

Since *P(c&a)=P(a|c)P(c)*, by substitution, the PC yields Bayes' theorem (BT)**[iii]**, to which we return in Sect. 4.3:

(BT) *P(c|a)=(P(a|c)P(c)) / P(a)* – [Bayes' theorem]

With retraction (see Sect. 3.3), the support for c in the absence of a can only depend on the prior probability Pi(c). So, if conditionalization on a results in Pi(c|a)>Pi(c), as stated in (7), then retracting a leaves the probability of c at its prior value, Pi(c). This is what Godden and Walton's (2004) claim—that retraction does not incur new commitments—amounts to when using probabilities. As OPP was to have the "last word" (see Sect. 2), one is concerned not with retraction, but with subtraction of a, i.e., conditionalization on ~a. Hence, OPP is committed to (8), which says that ~a is negatively relevant to c, as ~a makes ~c more probable than it was initially:

(8) *Pf(~c)=Pi(~c|~a)>Pi(~c)* – [OPPONENT-commitment]
Already in genuinely probabilistic contexts, where *0<P(α)=1−P(~α)<1*, the inequalities in (7) and (8) depend on suitable probability values. As the next subsection shows, such values need not be readily available in a given natural language context.

4.2 *Finding Pi(~a|~c)*
To illustrate the issue, assume that—unlike the extremal cases in Sect. 2, where either P(a)=0 or P(a)=1—PROP assigns 0.5<Pi(a)<1, so that a is more probable than not, and moreover choses the likelihood, Pi(a|c), such that Pi(c|a) is rendered sufficiently high for the purpose at hand, i.e., beyond some threshold, t, to which we return in the next section. But assume also that PROP remains uncommitted to the exact value of Pi(c). Therefore, Pi(c) need not be fixed, but can in fact range over the interval satisfying Pi(c|a)>Pi(c) given the chosen likelihood, Pi(a|c). To reach a probabilized dialectical scenario, assume finally that PRO responds to OPP's objection by adopting OPP's claim that 0.5<Pi(~a)<1. When evaluating this move, one must conditionalize on Pi(~a) to find Pi(~c|~a). Because of PRO's loose stance with respect to Pi(c) before hearing OPP's objection, however, that

Pi(a)>0.5, and that Pi(c|a) were deemed sufficiently high simply does not entail a definite value for Pi(~a|~c), nor only values that—upon conditionalization on ~a—leave Pi(~c|~a) sufficiently low (see Sober, 2002). But some such discrete value is required to calculate with this instance of Bayes' theorem: *Pf(~c|~a)=(Pi(~a|~c)Pi(~c))/Pi(~a)*. See Oaksford and Chater (2008; 2009) and Wagner (2004) for an analytical characterization of the bounds that arise when letting *0.5<P(c|a),P(~c|~a)<1*, so that both terms count as probabilistically supported, or confirmed, if *0.5<P(a),P(~a)<1*.

The commitments in (7) and (8) are here treated as contingencies, and so do not express general truths about probabilistic support relations between antecedents and consequents. Hence, particularly OPP's desired conclusion—that ~c is sufficiently probable given ~a—won't follow from any old assignment of probability values, even if *0<P(α)=1−P(~α)<1*. The next subsection supplies information that leaves OPP's claim—that *Pf(~c|~a)>Pf(c|~a)*—acceptable through introducing the assumption AR on behalf of PRO.

4.3 *Bayes' Theorem, Jeffrey Conditionalization, and AR*

In our example in Sect. 2, Pi(a) and Pi(~a) were assigned the values zero or one. In both extremal cases, however, premise subtraction remains ill-defined in the context of Bayes' theorem. After all, when P(a)=1, then a is treated as indubitable, upon which the theorem ceases to offer guidance for the subtraction of a; likewise when P(~a)=1. In fact, subtraction of what is beyond doubt does widely count as an arational move in this context, a move BT does not guide one way or another. Therefore, rather than employ BT, one can turn to Jeffrey conditionalization (JC) in order to address premise subtraction (see, e.g., Jeffrey, 2004):

(JC) *Pf(c)=Pi(c|a)Pf(a)+Pi(c|~a)Pf(~a)* – [Jeffrey conditionalization]**[iv]**

In our case, when the proponent claims that a makes c more probable (see Sect. 2), she can be assumed committed to Pf(c)>t³Pi(c), where t is a threshold given by a probability value arbitrarily smaller than Pf(c), and at least as large as Pi(c). Further, if Pf(a)=1 and so Pf(~a)=0, i.e., a is true, then (JC) reduces to its left hand term:

(9) *Pf(c)=Pi(c|a)Pf(a)>t*

As an assumption of relevance (AR) that will be crucial for our evaluation, the

proponent's initial claim—that a raises the probability of c to a value above some threshold t—may be assumed to entail the following:

(AR) If ~a (also) raises the probability of c, then at most to t, i.e., Pi(c|~a)£t.

Sect. 5.1 will argue why it is reasonable to assume AR on behalf of Pro. Let us first complete the evaluation of DAp.

4.4 *Evaluative result*

When, per our example-case, a is subtracted because a is deemed false, i.e., Pf(~a)=1, and so Pf(a)=0, then—in analogy to (9)—JC reduces to its right hand term:

(10) *Pf(c)=Pi(c|~a)Pf(~a)£t*

Because Pi(c|~a)=1−Pi(~c|~a), it follows for the standard threshold of probabilistic support t=0.5 that, upon subtracting a, i.e., Pf(~a)=1, the value of Pf(c) falls below t only if Pi(~c|~a)>t.**[v]** The evaluation, therefore, depends not only on the initial assumption Pf(c)>Pi(c), as stated in (5), but additionally on AR—i.e., Pi(c|~a)£t—and t=0.5, which together effectively state OPP's desired conclusion (i.e., line 4 in Sect. 2). After all, once Pi(c|~a) falls to, or below, the value 0.5, then c can no longer receive sufficient support in the event that ~a, since—analogously to (9)—we have it that *Pf(~c)=Pi(~c|~a)P(~a),* and so if *P(~a)=1, then Pf(~c)=Pi(~c|~a).*

Hence, rather than *Pf(c)=Pi(c|a)>Pi(c)*, as in (7), PRO would have had to be committed to:

(11) *Pf(c)=Pi(c|a)>t>Pi(c) and Pi(c|~a)£t*, for t=0.5,

for OPP to establish probabilistic support for ~c by subtracting a. Therefore, with a view to the example in Sect. 2, (5b) is unreasonable given AR. In contrast, line (5a) is at least not immediately unreasonable. But, as Sect. 5.2 argues, (5a) delays the evaluation that becomes available under AR.

5. *Discussion*

This section briefly discusses why AR is reasonable, shows retraction to be a delaying-tactic, and inquires whether the evaluative result transfers to a non-Pascalian notion of probability.

5.1 *The reasonability of AR*

Recall that, because the example in Sect. 2 lacked information on Pi(c|~a) that our inductive logic did require in order to evaluate DAp, Sect. 4.3 had introduced an assumption of relevance (AR) on behalf of PRO, namely *Pi(c|~a)£t for t=0.5.* The evaluative result (Sect. 4.4) was then seen to depend on AR. Evaluating AR requires considering whether PRO can deny AR, provided she is committed, at t1, to both *Pf(c)=Pi(c|a)>Pi(c) and Pi(a)=1*, then retracts only the latter commitment by updating, at t2, to P(~a)=1 (see Sect. 3.3). A straightforward way of addressing this consists in considering if PRO remains consistent were she to deny AR. As we saw, Pi(c|a)>Pi(c) expresses that a is positively relevant to c. So, at t1, does PRO incur a contradiction were she to commit to Pi(c|a)>Pi(c), but reject Pi(c|~a)£Pi(c)?

What if PRO were to reject Pi(c|~a)£Pi(c), i.e., accept Pi(c|~a)>Pi(c), and so be committed both to Pi(c|a)>Pi(c) and to Pi(c|~a)>Pi(c)—in words: both a and ~a raise the probability of c. In this case, were a and ~a to provide the same probabilistic support to c, i.e., Pi(c|a)=Pi(c|~a)>Pi(c), then PRO would well have avoided the commitment that c and a are probabilistically independent—which is expressed by Pi(c|a)=Pi(~c|a). But without the assumption AR qualifying the support that a and ~a lend to c as a differentially large support, the question would arise why PRO had initially offered a in support of c, when ~a could have served as well. Hence, not so much to remain consistent, but to remain relevant: at t1, if ~a shall provide some support to ~c, then such support should be lower than the support that a confers onto c, exactly as expressed by AR.

In contrast, interpreting PRO's Li-F 'a makes c more probable' from the outset to mean 'a makes c more probable than not c given a', i.e., *Pf(c|a)>t£Pf(~c|a)*, necessitates setting the threshold to t=0.5, since *Pf(c|a)=1−Pf(~c|a)*. Moreover, if P(~a)=1, then OPP's conclusion Pf(~c|~a) takes a value greater than t, which in turn shows how PRO's subtraction of a, i.e., the change in commitment from P(a)=1 to P(a)=0, establishes, or concedes, the cogency of OPP's DAp.

Besides AR, the two complement-relations P(α)=1−P(~α) and P(β|α)=1−P(~β|α) for conditional probabilities remain crucial to our evaluation, because information not provided at Li-F was inferred by means of these relations. We discuss both in Sect. 5.3, and now proceed to argue that, here, retraction is at best a delaying-tactic.

5.2 *Retraction as a delaying-tactic*

In Sect. 3.3, we had seen that retraction amounts to avoiding a commitment with respect to the probability of a, including a lose commitment such as P(a)=[0,1]. Assume, then, that PRO has successfully avoided as much, and so is committed, at t2, merely to Pi(c|a)>Pi(c), and Pi(c). As argued above, this set of commitments allows PRO to disagree, in line (6) of Sect. 2, with OPP's claim that Pf(~c)>Pf(c). The disagreement is not immediately unreasonable because, after retraction, information necessary for OPP—and for analysts—to establish Pf(~c)>Pf(c) was seen to be unforthcoming from PRO's commitments.

As PRO had, at t1, claimed that P(a)=1, even after retraction, OPP can demand that PRO commit to some comparison of Pi(c|a) with Pi(c|~a) vis-à-vis the threshold t=0.5, provided this OPP-move is not otherwise blocked. Moreover, provided that PRO would act in an irrelevant manner were she to reply with a comparison other than AR—as argued in Sect. 5.1—then OPP can still establish her claim in line (6). So when interlocutors can elicit commitments and criticize irrelevant claims, retraction merely delays the OPPONENT's conclusion, minimally by one turn.

These considerations all highlight the role of the assumption AR. As AR compares Pi(c|~a) and Pi(~c|~a), being terms directly related via the complement principle Pi(c|~a)=1−Pi(~c|~a), it should be of interest to compare this evaluation with a Baconian notion of probability, where this principle does not hold.

5.3 *Baconian probability*

Jonathan L. Cohen (1980) has coined the term 'Baconian' for a notion of probability whose central assumptions differ from those of its Pascalian counterpart. Crucially, Baconian probabilities are non-additive; therefore, the above complement-relations do not generally hold, and also conditional probabilities may be defined differently. Being ordinal values, Baconian probabilities can be compared but, unlike Pascalian probabilities, one cannot readily add, subtract, multiply, or divide them (see Cohen, 1980; Schum, 1991; Hajek & Hall, 2002; Hájek, 2012; Spohn 2012).

For our case, which was seen to depend on AR, it may thus well be the case that, for instance, *Pi(c|a)=0.8>Pi(c)=0.5*, while nevertheless Pi(~c|a)=0, rather than Pi(~c|a)=0.2, as the complement-principle of the Pascalian calculus has it. So, a may make c more probable to an extent e, without it being entailed that the

probability of ~c given a is calculated as 1−e. The scale of Pascalian probability runs upward from disproof to proof, while the Baconian scale runs upward from non-proof, or no evidence, to proof (see Cohen, 1980). Evidence for α having been provided thus remains compatible with no evidence having been provided for its negation, ~α.

Baconian probability is particularly applicable to the legal domain. For instance, the probability that a defendant is guilty may be assumed to be determined by evidence typically provided by the prosecution. Is the prosecutor's evidence less than conclusive, however, then whatever evidence is lacking will, on the Pascalian notion, entail a corresponding disproof of the defendant's guilt (compared the first example in Sect. 1). On the Baconian notion, in contrast, the prosecutor's evidence in support of the defendant's guilt compares independently to evidence forwarded on behalf of the defendant's innocence, or lack thereof. In the absence of such evidence, then, the probability of the defendant's innocence would (hopefully) register at 0. And if disproving evidence is forwarded, the probability of the defendant's innocence (hopefully) registers at values independent of the probability of the defendant's guilt.

We cannot claim to have done any justice to the Baconian notion of probability, but may nevertheless conclude that the evaluative result (Sect. 4) need not without further ado transfer to a non-Pascalian notion of probability. So analysts are required to decide, for the particular case and in view of the natural language material, whether a Baconian or a Pascalian notion of probability is more appropriate.

6. *Conclusion*

Presupposing a Pascalian notion of probability, we have provided an analysis and evaluation for probabilistic version of arguments that deny the antecedent (DAp). Stressing the effects of premise retraction vs. premise subtraction in a dialectical setting, the cogency of DAp arguments was shown to depend on a premise that normally remains implicit, namely $P_i(c|\sim a)£t$, for t=0.5, which we had identified as a relevance assumption. Moreover, premise retraction was shown to be a delaying-tactic as long as the opponent can ask the proponent to incur new commitments. Generally, the cogency of DAp arguments was seen to depend on commitments ascribed to the proponent. As we have stressed, the evaluative result is restricted to a Pascalian notion of probability, which was briefly compared to its Baconian variant. On these qualifications, the abstract version of

DAp presented in Sect. 2 can be deployed as a learning assessment-instrument at graduate-level.

NOTES

i. Other tweaks are subtracting information, and changing its order (permutation); both modifications, however, normally presuppose possessing information that is necessary for an evaluation.

ii. (7) leaves open the exact degree of support; one of its measures, $S(c|a)$, can be defined as: $S(c|a)=Pi(c|a)-Pi(c)>0$ (Korb, 2003, 44; Howson & Urbach, 1993, 117).

iii. Dropping the subscripts, BT comes in two equivalent versions:

(BT) $P(c|a)=(P(a|c)P(c)) / P(a)$

(BT*) $P(c|a)=P(a|c)P(c) / (P(a|c)P(c)+P(a|{\sim}c)P({\sim}c))$

One reaches BT* by substitution in BT, since $P(a)=P(a|c)P(c)+P(a|{\sim}c)P({\sim}c)$. Here, $P(a|c)$ and $P(a|{\sim}c)$ express likelihoods, namely the probability of a given c, and the probability of a given $\sim$c, respectively. $P(a|c)$ can be read as the impact of a on $P(c)$. $P(a|{\sim}c)$ is also known as the false positive rate. To express the classically valid modus pones inference with (BT), if aÉc is true, then $P(c|a)=1$. So the rate of exceptions, $P({\sim}c|a)$, is zero since $P(c|a)=1-P({\sim}c|a)$. See Oaksford and Chater (2008; 2009).

iv. (JC) has the posterior probability of the conclusion, $Pf(c)$, depend on the posterior probability of the antecedent, $Pf(a)=1-Pf({\sim}a)$, as well as the prior probabilities $Pi(c|a)$ and $Pi(c|{\sim}a)$, the latter two terms being mutually independent. Jeffrey conditionalization generalizes the Bayesian theorem, where (BT) corresponds to the limiting case that arises by setting one of JC's summands to 1. To verify, recall that $Pf(c)=Pi(c|a)$. Since

P(a&c)=P(c&a)=P(a|c)P(c)=P(c|a)P(a), by substitution, if Pf(a)=1, then the expression Pf(c)=Pi(c|a)Pf(a)+Pi(c|~a)Pf(~a) reduces to Pf(c)=Pf(a&c), so Pf(c|a)=P(a|c)P(c)/P(a) becomes Pf(c|a)=Pf(a&c). The case is analogous when Pf(~a)=1.

v. To assume that Pi(~c|~a)>t for t=0.5 amounts to a probabilized version of the conditional perfection strategy—where, as part of the analysis, -> is perfected to <-> —for this very assumption renders the conditional 'a then c' convertible, probabilistically speaking.

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ISSA Proceedings 2014 ~ An Argumentative Approach To Policy 'Framing'. Competing 'Frames' And Policy Conflict In The Roşia Montană Case

ABSTRACT: This paper proposes a new theorization of the concept of 'framing', in which argumentation has a central role. When decision-making is involved, to 'frame' an issue amounts to offering the audience a salient and thus potentially overriding premise in a deliberative process that can ground decision and action. The analysis focuses on the Roşia Montană case, a conflict over policy that led, in September 2013, to the most significant public protests in Romania since the 1989 Revolution.

KEY WORDS: decision, deliberation, frame, framing, metaphor, policy, practical argument, Roşia Montană

Introduction
This article develops an approach to framing theory from the perspective of argumentation theory (Fairclough & Fairclough 2012, 2013) by analyzing the public debate on the proposed cyanide-based gold mining project at Roșia Montană (Romania). It puts forward a view of 'framing' as a process of offering an audience a salient and potentially overriding premise that they are expected to use in deliberation leading to decision and action (Fairclough 2015, Fairclough forthcoming b). It also aims to make an empirical contribution to the study of the

Roșia Montană case, a policy conflict that has set the Romanian government and a multinational company against the Romanian population and, in September 2013, led to the most intense public protests since the fall of communism. The outcome was the rejection by the Romanian Parliament of a draft law that would have given the green light to the largest open-cast gold mining operations in Europe.

This study is part of a larger project that analyzes a corpus of over 600 Romanian press articles, covering the months of August and September 2013, with a twofold purpose: (a) to develop and test an argumentative conception of the process of framing; (b) to gain insight into how four major Romanian newspapers have attempted to reflect and influence the public debate, by finding out which aspects of the policy conflict were selected and made salient in the media, and how they were intended to function in the process of public deliberation. For reasons of space, we will not analyze this corpus here, but illustrate the framework with a smaller corpus of campaign material (leaflets, slogans, placards, website information).

ROȘIA MONTANĂ: A Brief Overview
Roșia Montană is a *commune* of 16 villages, located in the Western Carpathians, in an area rich in gold and other precious metals, but also in natural beauty and tradition. It has a recorded history of over 2000 years and has been a gold-mining area since Roman times. The region is however plagued by a range of socio-economic problems which demand a strategy of sustainable development (Plăiaș 2012). The controversial mining project advanced by the Canadian corporation Gabriel Resources Ltd. in partnership with the Romanian state (renamed Roșia Montană Gold Corporation, henceforth RMGC, in 2000) has claimed to provide just such a solution, by "bring[ing] one of the world's largest undeveloped gold projects to production" (*The Roșia Montană Gold & Silver Project: A Project for Romania* 2014). The project would require large-scale cyanide-leaching procedures in order to extract an estimated 314 tons of gold and 1,480 tons of silver from 4 open-cast pits over a 16-year period. While the economic benefits to the Romanian state were invariably presented by the corporation as extraordinary, Romania's projected equity stake in the company was only 19.31%, the other 80.69% being owned by Gabriel Resources, according to company data in 2014.

Mădroane (2014) has investigated the Canadian company's argument in favour of the project in terms of the framework for analyzing and evaluating practical

arguments developed by Fairclough & Fairclough (2012). According to this framework, a practical proposal is advanced on the basis of premises specifying the intended goals and circumstances of action and a means-goal relation, and is evaluated via an argument from consequence. The circumstances include natural, social and institutional facts that enable or constrain the action. Some of these facts constitute the 'problem' to be resolved by means of the proposed action (as 'solution'). RMGC's overall problem-solution argument, as summed up on the company's website (under the heading *Proiectul Roșia Montană/ Roșia Montană Project* n.d.) rests upon circumstantial premises that represent the area as being in a disastrous situation in four areas – economy, environment, patrimony, community – and lacking any viable alternatives for sustainable development. Joint economic benefits (for the corporation, the local area and the Romanian state), as intended goals of action, are prominent on the website, and a number of commitments (as constraints on action) are emphasized. The company claims to be committed to norms of environmental and archaeological protection and rehabilitation, and to respecting the local population's right to property and right to work. Aiming to address all the problems of the local area, the company allegedly holds the key to transforming an "impoverished community with no real alternative" (problem) in accordance with a "vision" (goal) of "prosperity, growth, clean environment", offering a "long term future for Roșia Montană" (*The Roșia Montană Gold & Silver Project: A Project for Romania* 2014). At the centre of the RMGC campaign to win over public opinion in Romania has been the "packaging" of the project as *the* much-needed answer to the economic and social problems of the region, as well as a welcome contribution to Romania's economic growth.

From the very beginning, the Roșia Montană project has been extremely controversial due to the perceived infringement of existing legislation (mining laws, property rights, national heritage protection, planning regulations), the confidentiality of the terms of the concession licence, the intense pressure exerted by RMGC via aggressive lobbying and advertising campaigns, as well as the superficial nature of the public consultation process and the suspicion of institutional corruption. Expert analyses of the project have pointed out numerous risks and potentially unacceptable costs: the permanent destruction of the local environment, together with long-term environmental and public health risks; the irretrievable loss of ancient cultural heritage (Roman mine galleries); the destruction and displacement of local communities; the comparatively small economic benefits to the Romanian state (the small number of jobs created during

the mining operations). The alleged benefits have been dismissed in scientific reports and studies published by reputable national and international research institutions, including the Romanian Academy, the Bucharest Academy of Economic Studies, and the Union of Romanian Architects. Through the ongoing *Save Roșia Montană* Campaign, the Alburnus Maior Association (an NGO set up by Roșia Montană inhabitants in 2000) has become the main pillar of an increasingly strong public protest movement. As a consequence, the technical review of the Environmental Impact Assessment report, a crucial step for RMGC in the process of obtaining the environmental permit, was suspended in 2007. However, the process was resumed in 2010, in the general context of economic recession. On August 27, 2013, the Romanian Government sent to Parliament a draft law which was removing all legal obstacles and giving the corporation significant new powers. Instantly, this sparked off strong public protests in many Romanian cities, lasting over 6 weeks: at the peak of these protests, 20,000-25,000 people were demonstrating daily on the streets of Bucharest. At the moment of writing, the company has lost significant ground following the parliamentary rejection of the special draft law (on November 19, 2013, by the Senate, and on June 3, 2014, by the Chamber of Deputies) and several other unfavourable court decisions. For details of the case see Goţiu (2013); Egresi (2011); Cocean (2012); Vesalon & Creţan (2013); see Chiper (2012) for a discourse-analytical approach.

Analytical Framework: Arguments And Frames

3.1. Practical arguments and deliberative activity types
Practical argumentation is argumentation about what ought to be done, as opposed to theoretical argumentation about what is the case (Walton 2006, 2007a, 2007b; Walton et al. 2008). Deliberation is an argumentative genre in which practical argumentation is the main argument scheme. Van Eemeren (2010, pp. 142-143) distinguishes among *genres*, *activity types* and concrete *speech events*. A particular policy debate (e.g. on the Roșia Montană mining project) instantiates the more abstract category of policy debate as activity type, which in turn instantiates the abstract genre of deliberation. Deliberation is a genre common to many activity types; its intended outcome is a normative-practical conclusion that can ground decision and action. Policy making involves the weighing together of reasons in favour and against particular courses of action (i.e. deliberation), and on this basis putting forward a policy decision.

Practical argumentation can be viewed as argumentation from circumstances, goals and means goal relations (Fairclough & Fairclough 2011, 2015, forthcoming a, b):

The agent is in circumstances C.

The agent has a goal G.

(Goal G is generated by a particular normative source – desire, duty, etc.)

Generally speaking, if an agent does A in C then G will be achieved.

Therefore, the Agent ought to do A.

Practical reasoning is a causal argumentation scheme (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004). Actions have both intended and unintended effects, and the same effect can result from a multiplicity of causes. The unintended effects can be such that the action had better not be performed, even if the intended effect (goal) can be achieved by doing A. If this is the case, then a *critical objection* to A has been exposed and the hypothesis that the agent ought to do A has been falsified (or rebutted). A pragmatic argument from negative consequence (the left-hand side of Figure 1) can potentially rebut the practical proposal (conclusion) itself. This argument has the following form:

If the Agent adopts proposal A, consequence (effect) E will follow.

Consequence E is unacceptable.

Therefore, the Agent ought not to adopt proposal A.

A succinct way of representing the type of argumentation in deliberative activity types is as follows, where the conclusion of the practical argument from goals, values and circumstances is tested by a pragmatic argument from consequence (Fairclough 2015, Fairclough forthcoming a, b):

Figure 1. Practical reasoning in deliberative activity types: the deliberation scheme

As Figure 1 suggests, we reason practically from an assessment of the circumstances of action (this includes the problem we have identified, but also

other facts enabling or constraining action), from the goals and values whose realization we are pursuing, from means-goal relations, as well as from premises that refer to the potential consequences of our proposed action, in light of which it may follow that we ought to discard our proposal for action or, on the contrary, we may go ahead with it. If the consequences are, on balance, unacceptable, then the proposal is unreasonable and ought to be abandoned. If however the potential consequences are not unacceptable, or if – in the event that negative consequences should materialize – it would be possible to change course or redress undesirable developments, then the agent may tentatively proceed with A (always subject to future rebuttal, as unacceptable consequences may always come to light at a later date).

A critical objection against a proposal (e.g. an unacceptable consequence or cost) is one that cannot be overridden by other reasons in favour (e.g. by any potential benefit). Deliberation involves a 'weighing' of reasons, and the conclusion is arrived at on balance, in a context of facts that both enable and constrain action, and in conditions of uncertainty and risk. The institutional facts (obligations, rights, commitments) of the legal, political, moral domain (what Searle 2010 calls deontic, desire-independent reasons) are, in principle (though not always in practice) non-overridable. For example, an agent might come to the conclusion that Proposal A ought to be abandoned because it is against the law, full stop, regardless of any benefits that might have counted in favour of going ahead with A.

3.2. Framing theory

According to Entman, writing in 1993, Framing Theory is a good example of a "fractured paradigm", with a highly "scattered conceptualization" at its core. While everybody in the social sciences talks about framing, there is no clear understanding of what frames are and how they influence public opinion (Entman 1993, p. 51). Many often-cited definitions in the literature are vague and unhelpful, e.g. those of frames as "organizing *principles* that are socially shared and persistent over time" (Reese 2001, p. 11), or as "*principles* of selection, emphasis and presentation composed of little tacit theories about what exists, what happens, and what matters" (Gitlin 1980, p. 6). The same type of criticism still occurs twenty years later (see D'Angelo & Kuypers 2010), with Nisbet noting the persistent loose usage of the term 'frame' and every researcher's tendency to "reinvent the wheel" by identifying their own (often highly idiosyncratic) set of

frames, without thereby producing a clear operationalization of the concept that might be used across different sets of data (Nisbet 2010, pp. 45-46).

There is at least one clear definition of 'frames' in the cognitive semantics literature, though this is not the definition that most framing theorists working in political communication and media studies seem to start from. This is Fillmore's (1985, 2006) definition of frames, as developed in Frame Semantics and the FrameNet project (International Computer Science Institute n.d.) – a new dictionary concept, in which words are defined in relation to world knowledge. On this understanding, frames are *structures* of inter-related concepts, such that in order to understand any one concept it is necessary to understand the entire structure (frame). To understand what risk is, one needs to understand the entire RISK frame, involving agents, situations, actions, intended gains or benefits, potential harm and victims, an element of chance, and so on (Fillmore & Atkins 1992). Any one individual concept within a frame will activate the whole frame (e.g. 'week' activates the whole system of calendric terms: 'day', 'month', 'year').

A substantial part of framing theory research seems to be underlain by an understanding of the framing *process*, rather than of *frames* as Fillmorian systems of concepts. On this view, "framing refers to the process by which people develop a particular conceptualization of an issue"; framing therefore involves taking or promoting a particular *perspective* or *angle* on an issue. It is this selective angle that is responsible for the highly vexing phenomenon of "framing effects", where "(often small) changes in the presentation of an issue or an event produce (sometimes large) changes of opinion" (Chong & Druckman 2007, p. 104). The most often cited definition in these terms is Entman's view of framing as *selection* and *salience*:

Framing essentially involves *selection* and *salience.* To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described. Typically frames diagnose, evaluate, and prescribe… (Entman 1993, p. 52).

Entman's selection-and-salience definition is a definition of *framing*, not *frames*. Framing involves inclusion, exclusion, selective emphasis, putting forward a particular conceptualization, a particular angle. I may, for example, choose to

emphasize the benefits of a course of action and correspondingly de-emphasize the costs, in order to sway an audience towards accepting my proposal. However, unless frames are also structures of inter-related concepts, what are we selecting from? How can one element be selected and highlighted unless it is part of a structure where other elements are correspondingly de-emphasized?

Although Entman does not develop his view in relation to a theory of argument, his definition is compatible with an approach from argumentation theory. If the framing process aims to define and diagnose problems, as well as suggest solutions, then it is a form of practical, deliberative reasoning. In framing an issue in a particular way, a communication source is supplying those particular premises that may lead the audience towards a particular conclusion or line of action. The communication source can talk about an issue by means of any complex speech act – argument, narrative, description, explanation; the audience however are expected to use these as sources of premises in the construction of arguments leading to decision and action. I suggest that, from the audience's perspective, the aspects that are being selected and made salient are elements of a DECISION frame.

The gist of the argumentative approach to framing being proposed here is this: to frame an issue is to offer the audience a salient and thus potentially overriding premise in a deliberative process that can ground decision and action. Values, goals, potential consequences, as well as various facts pertaining to the context of action can all be made selectively more salient in an attempt to direct the audience towards a particular, preferred conclusion. This may also involve the use of metaphors (Lakoff & Johnson 1980), analogies and persuasive definitions (Walton 2007a) to redefine facts in rhetorically convenient ways, thus lending support either to the conclusion that the proposed action is recommended or not recommended.

Based on the deliberation scheme, a DECISION frame can be outlined (on the model of Fillmore's RISK frame), including arguers/agents in a situation of incomplete knowledge (uncertainty and risk), putting forward and evaluating proposals for action, amongst which they will choose and decide in favour of one. They have goals and values, and are acting in a context of facts (circumstances), some of which enable or constrain action – for example there are laws, rules, norms that constrain what can be done. Their proposal has potentially negative consequences, some of which will be critical objections against the proposal.

Within this frame, as system of inter-related concepts, various premises can be emphasized in principle as being the most relevant and important reasons, i.e. the ones that should arguably decide which course of action is adopted. For example, it can be argued that a policy proposal should be adopted because it will create jobs, or it can be argued that it should not be adopted because of the negative impact on the environment. What is being made more salient and potentially overriding in these two arguments are the intended positive consequences (goals) and the (unintended) negative consequences, respectively. In a process of weighing reasons, the audience may come to see either the benefits (jobs) or the negative consequences (pollution) as "heavier" or more relevant reasons, and the conclusion (and decision) they will reach may shift accordingly. Alternatively, the circumstances of action may be made salient (the severity of the problem, the external constraints on action, the uncertainty and risks involved) and presented as potentially overriding other reasons.

Briefly, making one element of the deliberation scheme more salient, while correspondingly de-emphasizing others, is expected to result in a shift in the decision for action that the audience will arrive at, given that the salient element is expected to override non-salient elements in the process of weighing reasons. It does not follow, of course, that the audience will be actually influenced in this way, and that they will automatically ground their decisions in the premises made salient through framing. In real-world contexts, framing effects are weakened by the public's exposure to alternative arguments, their ability to come to their own conclusion, as well as by their pre-existing beliefs and values (Sniderman & Theriault 2005; Chong & Druckman 2007).


Figure 2. The relationship between the deliberation scheme and argumentation by analogy or definition

An additional mechanism is often at work, whenever metaphors, analogies or persuasive definitions are embedded under the premises of the deliberation scheme (Figure 2). Premises of the form *a = b* (*a is similar to b*, or *a is a kind of b*) can provide justification for various premises in the arguments from goals or consequences. For example, it can be argued that a policy proposal will have potentially unacceptable negative consequences if these can be seen to amount to a form of *robbery* or *treason*; if this is so, then the proposal should not be adopted. If, on the contrary, the context of action is one of *national emergency* or *crisis* that the proposal can successfully resolve, then it follows that the proposal should go ahead. Similarly, it can be argued that the effects of the policy will be in fact beneficial, because they amount to actually *saving* the Roșia Montană area from either poverty or environmental catastrophe. If the proposed action amounts to salvation from harm or danger, then the action is recommended (Figure 2). The spin or bias that such persuasive definitions or metaphors will introduce into the premises of an argument will be reflected, via their entailments, in the particular conclusion that can be reached on the basis of these premises (Fairclough 2015, forthcoming b).

Analysis

This article is part of a larger study of the August-September 2013 coverage of the Roșia Montană case in four Romanian daily broadsheets: *Adevărul*, *Jurnalul Naţional*, *Gândul* and *Cotidianul*. Our search for the keyword 'Roșia Montană' in the online archives of the newspapers resulted in 670 articles, divided as follows: 323 in *Adevărul*, 217 in *Gândul*, 93 in *Jurnalul Naţional* and 67 in *Cotidianul*. A detailed discussion of this corpus is beyond the scope of this short paper and is being undertaken elsewhere. In order to test and illustrate how the analytical framework described in section 3 can shed light on framing processes, including framing effects, we will discuss a few examples taken from the campaigns in favour and against the mining project, and particularly from the slogans used by the protesters.

The campaign in favour of the project (see RMGC's official website, *RMGC: Roșia Montană Gold Corporation – Proiectul Roșia Montană* n.d.) tended to emphasize the company's intended goals, among which the benefits to the Romanian state and the local area – jobs and local development, income for the Romanian state – and particular circumstances of action: poverty, underdevelopment, as well as people's right to work. In general, the benefits were said to outweigh the costs,

and the impact on the environment and cultural heritage was presented as minimal, with emphasis on the redressive action allegedly in place. Thus, the argument went, given the significant economic benefits to all parties concerned, particularly the Romanian side, and given that these would clearly outweigh any negative impacts, and also given the population's right to work (a deontic reason, in principle non-overridable), the Roșia Montană project ought to go ahead. By contrast, not allowing the project to proceed would not only damage these goals, but would also undermine the local population's rights. Framing the deliberative process in this way, i.e. making these particular premises salient and potentially overriding, was intended to support a decision in favour of the project.

Arguments against the project (e.g. the Alburnus Maior Association website: rosiamontana.org – Campania Salvaţi Roșia Montană n.d.) emphasized primarily a range of unacceptable negative consequences: the destruction of four mountains, the environmental and health impact of the cyanide-based technology (12,000 tons of cyanide would be used and 13 million tons of mining waste produced each year, eventually leaving behind a lake containing 215 million cubic metres of cyanide-contaminated water); the definitive loss of a precious resource that the Romanian state ought to be able to exploit in its own interest. These were presented as negative consequences that cannot be overridden by any benefits, particularly as job creation would be minimal and only for a limited period of time. The argument was also sometimes framed as an issue of inter-generational justice (it is our duty towards future generations to keep the gold in the country for future exploitation) and predominantly as a legal issue: the violation of existing (environmental) laws and (property) rights was deemed unacceptable, and the draft law was also said to be "unconstitutional". Framing the conflict in terms of unacceptable negative consequences that cannot be overridden by any benefits and in terms of non-overridable deontic reasons (rights, duties, laws, the Constitution) was intended to sway the deliberative process in favour of the conclusion that the project ought to be rejected.

The framing of the conflict developed over time, and new premises were made salient in the attempt to influence public opinion. Starting as a battle over the environment, the conflict eventually developed into a battle over democracy and the rule of law in Romania and against the capture of the state by the interests of global corporations (Vesalon & Creţan, p. 449). Reporting on the situation in Romanian last September, an article in *The Guardian* (Ciobanu 2013) cited an

NGO activist as saying the following:

It is very interesting that such a revolt began with a case of protecting the environment, but this is not only about the environment … (…) The Roșia Montană case – in which you see legislation custom made to serve the interests of a corporation – highlights some failures of both democratic institutions and of the economic system, capitalism in a broader sense… Roșia Montană is the battle of the present and of the next decades… It illustrates the end of post-1989 cleavages [communist vs. anti-communist, European vs. non-European] and the emergence of new ones. People today confront a corrupted political class backed up by a corporation and a sold out media; and they ask for an improved democratic process, for adding a participatory democracy dimension to traditional democratic mechanisms.

The conflict therefore was no longer only about the environment, but about how global corporations can buy out national governments and national media and force them to act in their interests, as well as about the population's demand for a truly representative democracy (one slogan was: "Not in my name" ("Nu în numele meu"). The unacceptability of bending legislation so as to facilitate the handing over of Romania's resources to a multinational corporation, mostly for the benefit of the latter and for the personal gain of politicians, was reflected in the slogan: "A corporation cannot dictate legislation" ("Nu corporaţia face legislaţia"). The slogan captured the protest against the subordination of the state to corporate interest – what Monbiot (2001) has theorized as the "captive state", or the "corporate takeover" of states, a situation where the power of multinational corporations is threatening the foundations of democratic government and undermining national sovereignty. Framing the deliberative process in this way made the legal and political aspects salient and potentially overriding, emphasizing that allowing a corporation's interests to prevail was against the Constitution and against Romania's democratic form of government. As deontic constraints on action, these reasons were intended to lend overriding support to the argument against the project.

A widely used metaphor was that of the Roșia Montană project as a case of *robbery*, with slogans saying "Halt the Great Robbery" ("Opriţi Marele Jaf"), or "Thieves" ("Hoţii"), framing the project by primary reference to the rule of law. These metaphors fit into the argument from negative consequence, supporting the premise that the effects will be unacceptable. (On what grounds are the

consequences unacceptable? On the grounds that the whole project amounts to the illegal attempt to appropriate someone else's property.) To say that the project is framed as *robbery* is to say that the premise containing the metaphor is made salient; as a consequence, via its entailments (i.e. if it is robbery, then it is illegal, or a crime), the metaphor will lead to only one possible conclusion: if the project is illegal or criminal, it follows that it should be abandoned (Action A/Policy A is not recommended).

Other metaphors function in a similar way. The protests were called a *revolution* (with placards saying: "Our generation's own revolution" ("Revoluţia generaţiei noastre") or "Europe's Green Revolution", while the government's stance was equated with a *declaration of war* (in publicity material saying: "The Government and RMGC have declared war on us all", "Guvernul şi RMGC ne-au declarat război") or with a *siege* ("do not forget that Romania is now under siege...", "nu uitaţi că România e acum în stare de asediu"), as well as with the attempt to *sell* the country out to a foreign corporation (in slogans saying: "My Romania is not for sale", "România mea nu e de vânzare"). Such metaphors provide justification for various premises in the deliberation scheme and support the conclusion that the project ought not to go ahead.

Conclusion

This paper has tried to make a contribution to framing theory by suggesting that framing is equivalent to a process of making salient, and thus potentially overriding, a particular premise in a deliberative process that the audience is supposed to engage in. This process is supposed to lead the audience to decision and (possibly) action. Based on how they weigh a variety of reasons against each other, which in turn may depend on which reasons have been made salient and which have been omitted, and on what importance or weight has been attached to them in the framing process, the audience is supposed to reach a particular practical-normative conclusion and on this basis a decision to act in a particular way. Framing effects may be stronger or weaker depending on how the framing process interacts with the audience's own beliefs and values, and on the audience's exposure to alternative arguments, as well as their ability to weigh these arguments together in a deliberative process.

What is selected and made salient in the framing process is a particular premise in a deliberation scheme, i.e. a structure with a number of elements which can be selectively filled in or instantiated. Figure 2 shows a range of premises that can

be selected and made salient, in the attempt to direct the conclusion of the arguments involved in the Roșia Montană debate: the circumstances of action, for example the institutional constraints (laws, rights) or the problem that needs solving (poverty); the goals or intended benefits (jobs, national revenue); the unintended negative consequences (environmental degradation, loss of cultural heritage), and so on. In addition, premises that attempt to support the premises of practical reasoning (containing metaphors, analogies, persuasive definitions) can be made salient, and their entailments will be transferred upwards towards particular conclusions (if the project amounts to "robbery", then it is illegal; if it is illegal, it should be abandoned).

This study is developed in several other papers. Fairclough (2015) and Fairclough (forthcoming b) develop the argumentative approach to framing in more detail, with application to the austerity debate in the British media and the parliamentary debate on university tuition fees. Starting from the brief analysis presented here, a systematic analysis of the entire media corpus of 670 media texts, in terms of the framework outlined here, will be carried out in Mădroane (in preparation).

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