Abstract: This paper investigates the role of verbs of appearance as argumentative indicators analysing the uses of the Italian verb sembrare (‘seem’) in a sample of 40 texts chosen from a corpus of reviews, editorials and comment posts. An analysis conducted within the framework of the Argumentum Model of Topics, shows that the verb, in its evidential-inferential uses, indicates specific argument schemes of the symptomatic as well as the causal type.
Keywords: argumentative indicators, Argumentum Model of Topics, causal argumentation, inferential evidentiality, Pragma-Dialectics, symptomatic argumentation, syntagmatic argument schemes, verbs of appearance

1. Introduction
This paper addresses the relations between verbs of appearance and argument schemes, taking as an example the Italian verb sembrare (‘to seem’) in its function as an argumentative indicator[i]. In the framework of Pragma-Dialectics, the notion of argumentative indicators has been defined as including “all words and expressions that refer to any of the moves that are significant to the argumentation process” (van Eemeren, Houtlosser & Snoeck Henkemans, 2007, p. 2). Such argumentative clues can belong to different classes of linguistic items, ranging from verbs to conjunctions and to various kinds of discourse markers[ii]. Within Pragma-Dialectics, argumentative indicators have been considered, above all, from the point of view of the analyst facing the task of argumentative reconstruction. In this perspective, it has been underlined that indicators may work at different levels, signaling, for example, the engagement of the interactants in a particular stage of a critical discussion[iii], argumentative moves or the presence of a particular argumentation scheme. From a linguistic point of view, it is crucial to acknowledge that the usefulness of indicators for the analyst depends on their usefulness for the participants engaged in an argumentative interaction. Like other aspects of textual or conversational structure, the construction of argumentative relations at the different levels mentioned above is, in the first place, the participants’ task; functional categories are emic, not etic (Pike 1954). What justifies the attribution of an indicator function to a linguistic expression is, then, the potential of the expression to guide interlocutors and readers in this task. In any particular context, this potential will depend both on the expression’s functions coded in a relatively stable manner in the linguistic system (e.g. in the lexicon or in the domain of recurrent syntactic constructions and discourse routines) and on the specific pragmatic configuration (Bazzanella & Miecznikowski 2009) the expression is used in. As we will argue in our paper, corpus-based linguistic analysis, focused on single expressions and their contexts of occurrence, can fruitfully contribute to a better understanding of argumentative indicators in this sense.

Like other verbs of appearance interlinguistically (e.g. English to seem, Spanish parecer), the verb sembrare has been attributed an evidential function in the linguistic literature when occurring in certain syntactic and pragmatic contexts[iv]. Evidentials specify “the kind of justification for a factual claim which is available to the person making that claim […]” (Anderson, 1986, p. 274). The typological analysis of evidential systems has shown that frequently grammaticalized types of justifications for assertions, otherwise called information sources, means/ways of acquiring knowledge or modes of knowing, are direct experience (eventually distinguished according to perceptual modality), inference, and report/hearsay (cf. Willett 1988). Research on lexical evidentials (e.g. Squartini 2007) suggests that these cognitive categories are relevant also in linguistic systems that do not grammaticalize evidentiality, and it is in this line of thinking that the notion of evidentiality is currently used to analyze the semantics of appearance verbs.

Evidentiality and argumentation are related because the justification of claims is, of course, the defining feature of one of the central moves in argumentative discourse. However, an important difference between evidentially marked utterances and full-fledged argumentative moves is that, in the former case, the speaker signals the presence of evidence in favor of his or her assertion and categorizes that evidence in a generic fashion, whereas in the latter case, the speaker establishes a discourse relation between the assertion and one or more specific arguments given in the text. By consequence, speakers can use evidentials both to support argumentation, contributing to establish argument-conclusion relations present in a critical discussion, and as an alternative to argumentation, merely suggesting the relevance of evidence without actually formulating any arguments. Recent studies at the semantic-argumentative interface (Miecznikowski, 2011; Rocci, 2008, 2012, 2013) have concentrated on the argumentation supporting function of modal and evidential expressions, arguing that, in argumentative contexts, these expressions function as indicators strengthening and categorizing argument-conclusion relations. One of the basic ideas is that the evidential categorization of modes of knowing in an utterance restricts the range of argument schemes with which the utterance is compatible. In the present analysis, we will develop this idea, showing that sembrare constructions preferentially occur with certain argument schemes and insisting in the role of the verb’s lexical meaning at this regard. Argument schemes will be analyzed and reconstructed using the Argumentum Model of Topics (Rigotti & Greco Morasso 2010).

In section 3, after having presented our data, we will provide an overview of the syntactic constructions of sembrare associated with evidential meanings and explain why these constructions are good candidates to function as argumentative indicators. We will then focus on sembrare as an indicator of argument schemes. We will discuss existing research on copulative constructions with appearance verbs as indicators of argument schemes (section 4), before presenting the results of our corpus study (section 5).

2. Data
The data considered in this paper consist of 40 texts taken from a mixed corpus of reviews, editorials and posts published in the comment spaces associated with reviews and editorials.[v]. The texts in our corpus have been collected from the Italian daily newspapers La Stampa and La Repubblica and from four thematic websites about art exhibitions (www.mostreinmostra.it), music (www.fullsong.it), haute cuisine (www.passionegourmet.it) and consumer electronics (www.digital.it).

The choice of these text genres is motivated by the important role argumentation plays in them and by the variety of activity fields they cover. In editorials, journalists express an opinion, mostly on a political matter, backing it up by arguments. In reviews, experts or consumers evaluate an object on the basis of firsthand experience as well as field-specific knowledge and values (Miecznikowski, in press). Comment spaces allow for a lot of variation in terms of text genres. Argumentation is common in most types of posts, however. On one hand, users react to the standpoints and arguments put forward in the text they comment on; on the other hand, on the metacommunicative level, users formulate opinions about the text as such, usually backing up their judgment by at least one argument[vi].

3. Sembrare constructions
The verb sembrare semantically presupposes two participants, namely an experiencer and an experienced. The experience in question can be entirely mental or involve perception.

The mental/perceptual process undergone by the experiencer is expressed by various syntactic constructions in which the experiencer role is either expressed by an indirect object NP or left implicit. The main form-function patterns attested with sembrare are the following:
I. Copula constructions asserting similarity between two elements (a, b), the first having a set of properties identical to a set of properties of another individual:
1. [Marco]a sembra [suo padre]b .
‘Marco looks like his father’.

II. Copula constructions and infinitive constructions asserting the existence of clues to attribute a property B to an individual a and warranting the implicature, under certain circumstances, that the speaker indeed attributes B to a:
2. [Marco]a (mi) sembra [affamato/aver fame]B .
‘Marco seems hungry/to be hungry (to me)’.

In (2), the speaker states that Marco has a set of (unspecified) properties that normally warrant the attribution of the property ‘to be hungry’. Without contextual clues to the contrary, the hearer may infer that the experiencer (here: the speaker) holds the weak belief that Marco is hungry.

III. Constructions with a complement clause in subject function. These directly and explicitly attribute a belief to the experiencer, presupposing that this belief is based on available evidence:
3. (Mi) sembra [che Marco sia stanco]p.
‘It seems (to me) that Marco is tired’.

In type I contexts, the experiencer usually coincides with the speaker and is left implicit. The experience encoded by sembrare is that of grasping the results of a process of comparison and the verb does not have an evidential function in this construction[vii].

In contexts of the types II and III sembrare can fulfill evidential functions under two conditions. The first condition is that the experiencer hold the (albeit weak) belief p. This depends on context in II, whereas the experiencer’s holding a belief is encoded grammatically in III, where the complement clause strongly suggests the presence of a proposition, i.e. of a third order entity that can be attributed a truth value and thus become a term of a belief relation[viii] When this condition is fulfilled, sembrare denotes a complex situation in which someone holds a belief on the basis of some available evidence. The second condition is that the experiencer coincide with the speaker and that the experience take place in the moment of speech. In that case, exemplified by (2) and (3) above, the verb has a performative character (Faller 2002), i.e. knowledge acquisition is not reported, but presented as achieved in the moment of speech, and the relation between p and the available evidence is mapped onto the ongoing speech event.

When sembrare is used evidentially, it always signals an indirect mode of knowing, i.e. either inference or hearsay/report. In this paper, we will be concerned especially with the verb’s inferential uses. Example (2) above is a typical case: if the speaker holds the belief that Marco is hungry, this belief is based on a reasoning process that takes into account a set of Marco’s properties in combination with further, more general, premises. In what follows, we will take a closer look at the type of reasoning sembrare is compatible with.

4. Symptomatic argumentation
In the pragma-dialectic approach, three main types of argument schemes are distinguished, namely those based on a symptomatic relation, those based on a relation of analogy and those based on a causal relation (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992, pp. 98-99). In symptomatic argumentation, the argument (minor premise) and the standpoint have a common referent (X) but different predicates, as visualized in the scheme:

Y is true of X
Because Z is true of X
ANDZ is typical (characteristic/symptomatic) of Y
(van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1992, p. 98)

The property attributed to ‘X’ in the minor premise is a symptom of the property ascribed to it in the standpoint. The major premise states the association between entities or situations which justifies the relation between the argument and the standpoint. The critical questions underlying symptomatic argumentation are the following:

– Is Z indeed typical of Y?
– Is Z not also typical of somethingelse (Y’)?
(van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1992, p. 99)

According to Garssen (1997, p. 77-101) the category of symptomatic argumentation encompasses different subtypes of arguments such as those based on a classification, on genus-species relations, on definition and on evaluation critieria.

Van Eemeren, Houtlosser & Snoeck Henkemans (2007, p. 160) identify copulative constructions in which the predicative is an adjective or noun containing the copula to be, or its modal variants to seem/appear, as particularly suitable to form the standpoint or the minor premise in a symptomatic argumentation. According to these scholars, the abovementioned copulative constructions are good candidates to signal symptomatic argumentation because the copula normally refers to states rather than to events or processes, mirroring the nature of symptomatic argumentation, which is about qualities and features rather than about events or processes.

In analogy with van Eemeren’s, Houtlosser’s & Snoeck Henkemans’ (2007) proposal, also Italian sembrare can be hypothesized to be associated with symptomatic argument schemes. Lexical semantic arguments lend further support to this hypothesis. One of the core elements of the meaning of sembrare is the idea of similarity. This idea is present not only in the type I contexts discussed in the previous section, but also in inferential uses. In the type II contexts, in particular, the identification of clues to the presence of a property B often relies on a process of categorization by which a specific individual or situation is matched to a category (proto)type:
(4) Sembra una beffa la conclusione del processo Mills-Berlusconi. Dopo anni di preparazione, mesi di udienze, non abbiamo neanche un verdetto sulla colpevolezza o meno dell’ex premier Berlusconi.
‘The conclusion of the Berlusconi Mills’ trial seems a farce. After years of preparation, months of hearings, we do not even have a verdict on the guiltiness or innocence of the former Prime Minister Berlusconi’.
(La Repubblica, editorial, February 2012)

In example (4), the speaker categorizes a trial as a farce. One plausible reconstruction of this process of categorization is that the author compares what he has observed to his idea of typical farces:
The conclusion of the Mills’Berlusconi trial seems a farce
Because after months of preparation the trial has not produced a verdict (i.e. no goal has been reached and, by consequent, the participants’ acts appears to be meaningless) (and it is typical of farces that one cannot recognize any sense in people’s acting).

The schema of similarity activated by sembrare fosters the establishment of a link between the minor premise, in which a property is attributed to the first term of comparison, and the major premise, in which the same property is recognized as being typical of the classes of farces.

5. Sembrare and argument schemes in editorials, reviews and comments
5.1 Analytical approach
Sembrare occurs 52 times in our corpus. 39 occurrences are performative; among these, 2 are of type I construction, 17 of type II and 20 of type III. In order to find out which are the argument schemes compatible with sembrare, we have analyzed the local co- and context of all tokens in order to determine plausible implicit premises and have reconstructed the inferential relations applying the Argumentum Model of Topics (Rigotti, 2006, Rigotti, 2009a, Rigotti & Greco-Morasso, 2010).

Compared to the pragma-dialectical approach to argument schemes illustrated in the preceding section, AMT allows for a more detailed analysis of implicit premises. According to AMT, the inferential structure of any argumentation presupposes the presence of both procedural and material premises. Procedural premises have the form of maxims that define the inferential connections at issue. They are based on loci, pieces of an ontology shared by the speech community which “bind the truth value of the standpoint to the acceptance by the considered public of propositions referring to specified aspects of the ontology of the standpoint” (Rigotti, 2006, p. 527). Material premises are of two types: the endoxon, a major premise that refers to shared general knowledge and is often left implicit, and the datum, a factual (minor) premise that is often (but not necessarily) made explicit. In order to generate relevant arguments, as represented in the schema in fig. 1, procedural and material components must be combined in a double syllogistic structure (Fig.1):

Fig.1: The Argumentum Model of Topics.

5.2 Sembrare as an indicator of symptomatic argumentation
Our data confirm the role of sembrare as an indicator of symptomatic relations. The verb is indeed compatible with symptomatic argumentation in each of its constructions. More specifically, the attested subtypes of argument schemes exploit ontological relations from definition, from the parts to the whole, from implications and from concomitances.

To illustrate this group of argument schemes, we will reconstruct an example taken from an editorial of the Italian daily newspaper La Stampa about a speech in support of democracy as a prerequisite for peace, which Pope Wojtyła delivered in occasion of the disorders in Iraq during 2003:
(5) Dunque siamo grati dal profondo del cuore a Giovanni Paolo II per la costanza e la determinazione con cui ha levato la voce (una voce anche fisicamente piu’ alta e chiara, sembra che stia assai meglio ed è questo un altro motivo di consolazione).
‘Therefore we are deeply grateful to John Paul II for the persistence and the determinacy with which he has raised his voice (a voice also physically louder and clearer, it seems that he is in much better health and this comforts us even more).’
(La Stampa, editorial, April 2003)

In (5), the verb sembrare indicates that that the speaker is committed to the proposition ‘John Paul II is in much better health’ on the basis of the fact that the Pope’s voice is louder and clearer than before. This piece of evidence is a datum made explicit in the text. As to the ontological relationship between a loud voice and a state of good health, it can be conceptualized in different manners. The example might be analyzed as an instance of reasoning from the effect to the cause, if we view a loud voice as a result of the proper functioning of a healthy organism. Alternatively, it could be hypothesized that good health and a loud and clear voice are properties that are frequently associated in the experience of the speaker and the hearer, giving rise to argumentation by concomitance.

Yet another solution could be proposed, in virtue of the fact that the journalist, in this text, has chosen to institute John Paul’s voice as a discourse referent and to attribute a property to it. The journalist seems to underline the object-like status of the Pope’s voice, rather than the event of the Pope using his voice. For this reason, a part-whole relationship might be relevant in this example. If we assume that the voice is a relevant part of a person and that loudness and clearness are synonyms of healthiness when applied to a voice, the property of healthiness can be transferred from the voice to the entire person, through a maxim like the one proposed in the following reconstruction (Fig. 2):

Fig 2. Argumentative reconstruction exploiting a locus from the parts to the whole

The validity of the transfer is, of course, questionable. As underlined by van Eemeren & Garssen (2009), only absolute structure-dependent properties, such as those expressing colours or materials, are always transferrable. The choice of sembrare, which signals weak commitment, is congruent with such a context.

5.4. Sembrare as an indicator of causal argumentation
As we have seen discussing the preceding example, symptomatic argumentation does not exclude causal schemes (from the effect to the cause). In a number of contexts, however, causality – be it from the effect to the cause or from the final cause (Rigotti 2009b) – is even the most prominent ontological relation warranting the inferential transition from argument to conclusion. We have found cases of this type mostly in contexts in which speakers refer to the field of human action. In this use of sembrare, the preferred syntactic construction in the corpus is the complement clause construction.

The example we propose is taken from a post published on the website of the Italian daily newspaper La Repubblica, which comments on an editorial about Silvio Berlusconi’s defeat in the 2011 elections:
(6) La saga SB [Silvio Berlusconi] è stata una tragedia italiana che ha fatto rivivere atteggiamenti machisti ed incolti che ci hanno riportato indietro di decenni quando il nostro Paese nuotava ancora nell’analfabetismo e le nonne si stupivano della nuova invenzione della televisione. Fortunatamente sembra che il Paese sia uscito dallo stato ipnotico in cui i vari programmi televisivi lo avevano affogato.
‘The saga of SB [Silvio Berlusconi] has been a tragedy characterized by a revival of machism and uncultivated attitudes that have taken us decades back, when our country was still swimming in illiteracy and grandmothers were amazed in front of the new invention of television. Luckily, it seems that the country has woken up from the hypnotic state in which the various television programs had drowned it.’
(La Repubblica, post commenting on an editorial, June 2011)

The author claims that the country has got out of ‘the hypnotic state in which the various television programs had drowned it’. The arguments supporting this claim are largely left implicit, which is related to the highly interactive and inter-textual situation typical of forum discussions. In order to reconstruct the writer’s argumentation, we have supplied the missing premises on the basis of linguistic and contextual clues and we have interpreted the metaphorical expression “getting out of an hypnotic state”, hypothesizing that the author intends to stress the citizens’ regaining consciousness and agency (Fig. 3):

Fig. 3: Argumentative reconstruction exploiting a locus from causes

The fact that citizens have not reelected Berlusconi is highly salient in this comment space and can therefore function as a datum although it is not mentioned. The presence of the adverb ‘luckily’ in the standpoint as well as the claim that the country was in a state of backwardness due to Berlusconi’s government show that the author considers Berlusconi’s defeat as an advantage for the Italian people, an opinion that emerges also in other parts of the text. Considering La Repubblica’s political orientation, the author can assume that many readers share this opinion as an endoxon. The maxim at work is causal and is part of an ontology of human action (agents normally act in such a way as to obtain results that are advantageous for them), making it possible to reconstruct the pragmatic reasoning of agents. As a result, a certain state of mind of agents is infered from these agents’ deeds. Like in (5), the reasoning is defeasible, due to the defeasibility of the maxim (agents may act without being fully aware of their acts’ consequences).

5.5. Discussion
The data we have examined shows that sembrare can indicate symptomatic argumentation in any of its constructions, while it tends to be associated to causal relations only in the most pragmaticalized one (the one in which it functions most clearly as a propositional operator, rather than as a predicate attributed to a specific subject). The semantic relationship between causal reasoning and the lexical meaning feature /similarity/ is also rather weak. Both observations lead to the hypothesis that the possibility to express causal reasoning might be mediated by the dominant evidential function of the complement clause construction, which shifts language users’ attention from the lexeme’s core meaning to the pragmatic operation of indicating an indirect mode of knowing.

Nevertheless, that functional generalization is not complete. Even in complement clause constructions, sembrare is not compatible with any argument scheme, and symptomatic and causal arguments share some relevant features. One of these is that the various argument schemes of this group are based on loci that we can define “syntagmatic”, following Rigotti (2006):
we speak of syntagmatic loci to indicate all the classes of arguments that refer to aspects that are ontologically linked to the standpoint, either directly or indirectly, such as[..] the relationship between the whole and its constituent parts; included in this group of loci are also the classes of arguments which assume as their hooking point those pieces of world, traditionally called causes, effects, circumstances and concomitances, that condition the state of affairs the standpoint refers to.
(Rigotti, 2006, p. 528)

The term syntagmatic loci has been adopted in the AMT framework (e.g. Rigotti, 2007) to oppose these to the paradigmatic ones, in which the argument and the standpoint refer to ontologically independent states of affairs and are rather linked by relations in absentia such as opposition or analogy. The AMT model distinguishes, moreover, the intermediate class of complex loci encompassing those cases which present features of both syntagmatic and paradigmatic argument schemes. A typical example of a complex locus is the locus from authority, which establishes a causal relation between the qualities of an author and the truth of his or her discourse, while there is no direct ontological relation between the state of affairs referred to in the standpoint and the communicative situation in which the authoritative discourse is uttered.[ix]

Sembrare appears to be compatible with syntagmatic loci and, in the hearsay reading of the complement clause construction, with the complex locus of authority as well (e.g. A quanto dicono, sembra che la sinistra vincerà le elezioni, ‘According to what they say, the right wing will win the elections’).

Another restriction, which regards causality, is that sembrare is not equally compatible with any causal argument scheme. We have found several instances of argumentation from the effect to the cause, but none from the cause to the effect, neither in inferences concerning the past or present nor in predictions. The following set of constructed examples illustrates this tendency. Whereas the conclusion introduced by sembra in (7a) can easily be derived from the premise expressed in the preceding statement, this is not the case in (7b), where sembra (in contrast to other solutions such as deve ‘must’) is acceptable only if additional perceptual or hearsay evidence is assumed to be available in the context:

(7a) Marco ha una faccia stanchissima. Sembra che abbia fatto tardi ieri sera .
‘Marco has a very tired face. It seems he went to bed late, yesterday night.’

(7b) ?Marco ha fatto tardi ieri sera. Sembra che sia stanchissimo. [perceptual or hearsay evidence required].
‘?Marco went to bed late yesterday night. It seems that he is really tired’.

In predictions, inferential sembrare seems to be less acceptable with the future tense than when it is combined with a periphrasis such as stare per, which indicates a phase immediately prior to an event, or with alethic dovere ‘must’ with future reference, which indicates a situation that will cause an event:

(8a) (Mi) sembra che stia per/debba cadere. ‘
(To me), it looks as if he/she/it is about to fall.’

(8b)?(Mi) sembra che cadrà. ‘
(To me), it looks as if he/she/it will fall.’

A possible explanation of these patterns is a temporal one: by choosing inferential sembrare speakers typically signal that the available datum allows to infer a simultaneous state of affairs. This is compatible with the basic scheme of symptomatic argumentation (cf. section 4) and is evident in the cases illustrated by the examples (1) to (5) discussed in previous sections; but this analysis applies also to (a). The extension to causal inferences about the past illustrated by (6) and (7) could be mediated by the passato prossimo, since one of the functions of this tense is to denote a resultant state. The resultant state is, by the way, communicatively highly relevant in our example (6). We are aware of apparent exceptions to this generalization such as the use of sembrare in weather forecasts or with the passato remoto:

(9) (observing the sky): Sembra che pioverà.
‘It seems it will rain.’

(10) Mi sembra che il centro commerciale fu costruito negli anni ’70.
‘As far as I know, the shopping mall was built in the Seventies’.

However, these examples may be considered instances of mixed loci that share less properties with inferential uses of sembrare than with the verb’s hearsay uses, which, according to our data, are not subject to any temporal restriction. In (10), a context type that is not attested in our corpus, the knowledge source is recall from memory, whereas (9), for cultural reasons, may be framed as a semiotic practice of sign reading rather than being an instance of genuine causal reasoning[x]. Further research on appearance verbs expressing inferences about the past and the future is needed to corroborate this hypothesis.

6. Conclusion
The empirical study presented in this paper has shown that evidential uses of Italian sembrare can be used to introduce a standpoint and that they constrain the set of relevant argument schemes. The lexical meaning of sembrare makes this verb compatible with symptomatic as well as certain causal argument schemes which may be subsumed under the wider category of syntagmatic or mixed argument schemes. According to a hypothesis that has to be checked against a larger and more varied set of data, inferential uses (a) show a preference to express a temporal relation of simultaneity between the datum and the conclusion, which (b) can be extended to reasonings about non simultaneous causes and effects, especially when the verb is combined with temporal and modal markers that encode a posteriority or anteriority relation between an event and a state[xi].

Lexical semantic analysis, syntactic analysis and the argumentative reconstruction of texts are all necessary to understand which inferential processes are encoded by evidential constructions and to define their function as argumentative indicators in discourse. Perception and appearance verbs combine epistemic stance marking and evidential meanings and often occur in contexts in which the justifications at the basis of the uttered proposition are left implicit. Their polysemy and dependance on syntactic constructions calls for a fine-grained, context-sensitive semantic analysis.

The investigation of evidential and modal verbs usefully completes the growing body of research on discourse markers as argumentative indicators. Discourse markers, for example conclusion introducing connectives or concessive markers are useful to the analyst to recognize stance and argumentative moves, while evidentials and modals appear to be particularly relevant to argumentative analysis with regard to stancetaking and argument schemes.

Acknowledgements
We would like to thank the participant to the 8th Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (ISSA) for their very helpful comments and suggestions.

NOTES
i. The study presented is part of a research on the relationship between inferential uses of perception verbs and argumentation conducted at the Università della Svizzera italiana (“From perception to inference. Evidential, argumentative and textual aspects of perception predicates in Italian”, SNF grant n.141350, direction: Johanna Miecznikowski and Andrea Rocci, cf. http://www.perc-inferenza.ch).
ii. Discourse markers are particles, connectives, sentence adverbs or more complex lexical expressions that do not contribute to the propositional content of their host utterance, are syntactically poorly integrated and whose primary function is to relate utterances to their co- and context at the textual, inferential or interactional level. See Bazzanella (2006) for a more detailed discussion of the category and Miecznikowski et al., 2009, for a corpus based analysis focussed on argumentative functions of the discourse connective allora in Italian.
iii. According to the Pragma-Dialectical framework (e.g. van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992), argumentation takes place within the context of a critical discussion involving protagonists and antagonists that critically test standpoints in order to reduce a difference of opinion. According to that model, the subtasks, or stages, defining a critical discussion are the confrontation stage (a difference of opinion is made explicit), the opening stage (the interactants commit themselves to resolve the difference of opinion and agree upon some basic assumptions and rules), the argumentation stage (arguments are put forward to justify or refute standpoints), and the concluding stage.
iv. Appearance verbs and evidential uses of perception verbs have been studied in Romance and Germanic languages by Usoniene, 2001, Pietrandrea, 2005, Cornillie, 2007, 2009, Aijmer, 2009, Diewald & Smirnova, 2010, Strik Lievers, 2012, Musi, in press a, b. For a diachronic perspective cf. Gisborne & Holmes, 2007 and Whitt, 2011 on English and Musi, 2014 on Italian sembrare.
v. The corpus has been compiled within the project From perception to inference. We would like to thank Martina Cameroni, Giuliana Di Febo and Francesca Saltamacchia for their contribution to data collection.
vi. See Miecznikowski & Musi (submitted), who adopt a genre perspective to investigate the relationship between reviews published online and the posts published in the corresponding comment spaces.
vii. The process of comparison is presupposed by the propositional content of p (similarity), whereas evidential operators are independent of the content of the proposition in their scope. In fact, in (1), the speaker commits herself to asserting the results of the comparison process, leaving the mode of knowing proper unspecified: (1) is both compatible with a situation in which the speaker has seen how Marco and Marco’s father look and infers the similarity relation on that basis, and with a situation in which the speaker has come to know about the resemblance between father and son by hearsay.
viii. According to Lyons’ classification of ontological entities (1977, pp. 438-452), taken up also in Functional Discourse Grammar (Dik, 1997), propositions are third order entities which can be judged in terms of truth value, whereas (differently from second order entities, i.e. states of affairs) they cannot be located in space and time.
ix. Cicero proposes, in his Topica (see Riposati, 1947, pp. 34-35), a distinction between intrinsic loci (alii in eo ipso de quo agitur haerent, ‘some [loci] are linked to the subject of the discussion’), and extrinsic loci (alii assumuntur extrinsecus, ‘other [loci] are derived from outside’). This topical taxonomy has been further elaborated by Boethius in his De Topiciis Differentiis (see Stump, 2004), who also suggests a third category of loci medii situated between the intrinsic and the extrinsic loci.
x. It may be relevant, at this regard, that Italian modal verbs behave atypically as well in meteorological contexts, as shows the use of deve in Deve piovere ‘it will rain’, discussed by Squartini, 2004 and Rocci, 2013:143.
xi. As far as future reference is concerned, the role played by lexical and modal verbs implying posteriority relations has been examined by Miecznikowski, under review, on the basis of an Italian corpus of economic predictions.

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Abstract: Our paper aims to examine several aspects of the epideictic genre according to the tradition of the Brussels School of Rhetoric. We study, at first, the confused notions as a specific material for the rhetorical art, and, in particular, for the epideictic genre as they contribute to create the social concord. Then, we establish a relationship between disagreement and epideictic genre after the Perelman’s New Rhetoric. Here, our idea is to show how disagreement feeds the argumentative nature of this third rhetorical genre. In a democratic society, the epideictic genre needs to work well to allow disagreement; and likewise, disagreement requires always a well-functioning epideictic. According to Perelman, if the epideictic genre constitutes the foundations of the rhetorical system, or even its “crowning”, it is also the center, the mobile part of this system, in other words: its limbs.
Keywords: Chaim Perelman, confused notions, concord, disagreement, epideictic genre, Eugène Dupréel, rationality, rhetoric.

1. Introduction
Our paper aims to examine several aspects of the epideictic genre according to the tradition of the “Brussels School of Rhetoric” started with Eugène Dupréel and Chaim Perelman. We study how, in the epideictic genre, the “confused notions” contribute to create social concord. The relationship between disagreement and epideictic genre in Perelman’s New Rhetoric will then be considered to show how disagreement feeds the argumentative nature of this third rhetorical genre.

To start with, taking as a frame the perspective of Emmanuelle Danblon, in which rhetoric is a technè and the orator is a craftsman, we would like to show how the “confused notions” (in the sense given by Eugène Dupréel) could be shaped in a specific way, according to the desired rhetorical purpose, to become efficient tools, which will be destined to a “good use” by the orator.

2. “Using value” of confused notions and its role in the epideictic genre
2.1. Origins of the confused notions
Already before the First World War, Eugène Dupréel had suggested a re-establishment of the “confused thought”, wishing to exceed the classical dichotomy clarity vs. darkness. Confusion and instability, like clarity and stability, are essential components of some notions, especially values as justice, happiness, merit or freedom. In Dupréel’s conception, notions are not a reflection of the world but a tool with an acting value:
Avant d’être classées comme connaissances claires ou confuses, les connaissances servent à quelque chose, à la vie des individus et des sociétés; les mensonges même ont leur utilité, on ne les produirait pas sans cela. La connaissance est donc une valeur d’action. […] Une notion, tout ce que désigne un mot ou une phrase, cela n’est pas élaboré par un souci de correspondance avec un objet réel, c’est un instrument dont on se sert et dont la valeur se mesure d’abord à son rendement. (Dupréel, 1949, p. 332).

Before being classified as clear or confused knowledge, knowledge is used to something, in the lives of persons and societies; lies even have their uses, they will not happen without it. Knowledge is therefore an acting value. […]. A notion, everything that refers to a word or phrase, is not developed by a desire to match with a real object; it is a tool that is used and its value is measured primarily to performance[i].

Notions contain an extensible semantical core that allows us to progress towards a practical knowledge. Actually, the function conferred to the confused notions is to allow an agreement in domains where formal demonstration is impossible (i.e. the Humanities), and in particular to allow adherence to a philosophical truth. Indeed, due to the great precariousness of this kind of truth, that adherence is its only support:
Ne travaillant pas, comme le savant, entre une intention précisée et un mode de vérification fixé d’avance, ne déterminant qu’en cours de route son intention, le philosophe verra toujours son œuvre moins formellement accomplie et non formellement vérifiée: en fait il ne peut compter que sur l’adhésion gagnée, sur l’accord avec lui-même et l’accord avec les autres esprits, ce qui n’est jamais un critère, mais un état de chose, difficile et précaire. […] Au contraire, la valeur d’une vérité philosophique aura bien plus besoin, pour s’imposer, de l’unanimité dans l’adhésion car, en dehors de la conviction de celui qui la découvre, cette approbation d’autrui est en fait son seul appui; or, c’est justement cette adhésion qui se montre plus précaire et moins probable. (Dupréel, 1939, pp. 289-290).

Not working, as the scientist, between a specified purpose and a verification mode fixed beforehand, determining only on the way his intention, the philosopher will always see his work less formally completed and not formally checked: actually he can only rely on membership earned, on agreement with himself and the agreement with the other spirits, which is never a criterion, but a state of things, difficult and precarious. […] On the contrary, the value of a philosophical truth will much more need to impose unanimity in membership because, apart from the conviction of the person who discovers it, the approval of others is in fact his only support; however, it is this membership that is more precarious and less likely.

To be able to adjust the scope of the notion to a context of use, one needs to require to the reasonable, which Dupréel called “excellence confuse” (Dupréel, 1949, p. 294). Human being is able to make choices without dogmatism, because a way exists to review these choices (Dupréel, 1949, p. 295). For instance, a part of Dupréel’s Traité de morale touches on the values of justice and honor as confused notions. According to him, confusion is a fact that allows to act in a living and human world.

Dupréel speaks about a tool, and not about a material. Moreover, he devotes very little attention to which technè has to be optionally used to transform these confused notions into a tool. His students, Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, make this point in their article “Les notions et l’argumentation”. Returning on what are exactly confused notions, they explain that argumentation involves playing on its plasticity, through two technaï: either opposing two notions through flexibility on the one hand and curing on the other hand, or extending the semantical core of a single notion.

For the first case, the orator presents to the audience an opposition between two notions: he offers his own view as modern, flexible and rich in potential, while the conception of his opponent is downgraded as old, frozen and outdated. In the second case, and for the notions which the value is clearly established and prior the argumentation, another technè is used: the extension of the notion (with amplification or restriction of its semantical core):
Cette technique qui consiste à figer le concept de l’adversaire tout en donnant plus de souplesse à celui qu’on défend, est généralement adoptée lorsque l’appréciation sur le concept doit résulter, en partie au moins, de l’argumentation. Par contre, dans le cas où la valeur de la notion est nettement établie et préalable à l’argumentation, c’est une autre technique portant plutôt sur l’extension de la notion, qui est généralement employée. (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1989 [1955], p. 136).

This technique consisting in freezing the concept of the adversary while providing more flexibility to one we defend, is generally used when appreciating that the concept must result, partially at least, from the argumentation. Contrariwise, if the value of the notion is clearly established prior to the argument, this is another technique involving the extension of the concept, which is generally used.

The common values, celebrated in the epideictic genre, are included in this last kind of notions. Public discourses celebrate those values to preserve social concord – homonoia for the Greeks. They are destined to introduce a proairesis, a disposition to act in a good way. In this case, notions are amplified to the maximum in order to appear, as blatant as the sensitive evidence (Danblon, 2002, 130-134). On the other hand, regarding the deliberative genre, decisions have to be taken for the good functioning of the city; regarding the forensic genre, decisions concern the establishment and qualification of past events. Both decisions are bouleutics and derive from public debates. The purpose of the technè is either to make a choice between two notions, or to narrow the semantical core of a notion, questioning respectively what is useful or what is just in a specific case.

Places where confused notions can be found might be compared to a kind of “marketplace”, in which the orator can somehow shop around; this metaphor was previously used by Wilhelmus De Pater, talking of Aristotle’s Topics (De Pater, 1965)[ii]. These stores could take the form of the law to be interpreted or great universal declarations like, e.g., Human Rights. Indeed, those expressions of topoi, as commonly accepted premises, form the starting point of the argumentative reasoning. The confusion of the notion allows, as Perelman said, to an agreement on the formula even if disagreements subsist on the interpretation. In that way, we might say it becomes more a tool for concord than a tool for agreement.

In Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s paper, notions are thus presented as tools for persuasion, but after they have been shaped by the technè in accordance with the rhetorical purposes. One may suggest that the confused notions exist beforehand, in the “marketplace”, as raw materials to be shaped, and finally become a tool. We would like to go further on that process that allows to precise the conception of rhetoric as a craft.

2.2. Rhetoric as a craft, “using value” of the confused notions as a material fort the rhetorical art
Emmanuelle Danblon, in L’homme rhétorique, recalls Vernant’s work about craft in Myth and Thought among the Greeks, and then applies it to the rhetorical art:
D’un point de vue naturaliste, la rhétorique se révèle être l’art de tous les artisanats. Elle n’est pas d’une discipline, elle est de toutes les disciplines. Elle exerce l’homme à utiliser son environnement naturel: celui des sociétés humaines. (Danblon, 2013, p. 84).

From a naturalistic point of view, the rhetoric appears to be the art of all crafts. It belongs not to a single discipline, it belongs to all disciplines. It exerts the man to use his natural environment: the human societies.

Following Vernant, in an antique conception of the work (in a craftsmen’s society), the point is the using value of the artefact, not its market value. This artefact matches with a special need for a specific user. The question of this need, the purpose of the craft is dominant in the process, and much more important than the technè implemented:
The artisan and his skill exist for the sake of the product, the product for the sake of the need. It could not be otherwise, as long as the product of work was considered only from the point of view of its use value, not its exchange value. As for its use value, the product is defined by its service to the person who uses it. (Vernant, 2006 [1965], pp. 295-296).

For Danblon, in that framework, the rationality of the craft is directly linked to its efficiency. And so it goes in the rhetorical art, whose worth emerges only if its efficiency is sufficient to impact on man’s action and on the running of the City. As far as the rhetorical activity is concerned, the purpose is to take decisions, and, in Aristotle’s conception, decisions that lead to Happiness in the City.

In the classical Greek society of the 5th century, where the first theories of that discipline emerged, the place given to the craftsman has moved. It became associated to menial tasks, whereas the craftsman, before, had occupied a much more prestigious and prevalent position. At the same time, Sophists were leading the first technical reflections about rhetorical technè. That technè was quite different of the craftsman’s technè: while the craftsman implements a poïésis (he creates an artefact out of himself), the orator commits a praxis (he acts on the world) (Vernant, 2006 [1965], p. 291). However, as Danblon has noticed, the category of “using value” is very relevant to us. Furthermore, it could directly be linked to Dupréel’s acting value.

Vernant adds that this model of craft, transferred to intellectual matters, leads to a model of “demiurgic creation” mentioned by Plato and Aristotle. The spirit of the final product exists outside of the craftsman, because it’s defined by its uses: the house (built) preexists at the future house to be built, such as vases, and other artefacts in general. What is important is not the market value but the benefit for the user: to be safe, to carry water… So there’s something like a “matrix”, available for the craftsman, allowing varied shapes of materials. Craftsman’s activity is, according to Vernant, guided by an eidos, prior, fixed and immutable:
The technè aims, in effect, to produce an eidos, such as health or a house, in a certain matter. Such a production presupposes the exercise of a dunamis for which the technè, in a sense, provides the method of use. (Vernant, 2006 [1965], p. 289).

To maintain the parallel with rhetoric, confused notions as materials could be shaped according to the context and the purpose, since technè, as we said, depends on the type of decision to be generated. The orator draws on his store, the topical heritage which we mentioned previously, where he could find raw materials. If the orator is a craftsman, that store contains the eidè with which he needs to practice his art.

But that conception of eidos might directly lead to a Platonic vision, and seems hardly compatible with the efficiency sought by the Sophists or with Dupréel’s acting value. However, if the eidos is linked to a using value, and that shaping confused notions allows creating new eidè, this hurdle is avoided. Indeed, the orator’s marketplace is only composed of shaped material that could be shaped again, according to the uses encountered or to be encountered, whose meaning will never be defined once and for all. Actually, in the rhetorical art, there is not any raw material: topical heritage is linked to a specific period and is constituted by uses; always moving, and liable to be modified by critics. The dynamic aspect of the notions prevents them from being treated as Platonic ideas.

This point of the “using value” leads to another question: the good use of confused notions, in particular in the epideictic genre. Values, confused notions by excellence, keep a privileged relationship with this genre. Perelman has noted that confused notions without critique leads directly to propaganda; so it is necessary to implement them in a whole rhetorical system.

3. Epideictic as a condition of disagreement in Perelman’s New Rhetoric
From their early works, and contrary to popular belief even in our scientific field, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca give a prominent and leading position to the epideictic genre. There is something very intuitive in their minds. For them, the epideictic is the first of the three genres: even before the deliberative and the judicial. However, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca do not ignore the specific gaps of the epideictic genre in comparison to the two other genres. These gaps give the epideictic a special and marginal nature. In the epideictic genre, there is no opponent, no controversial issue, no debate, and no decision-making.

As a genre of circumstance, the epideictic seems secondary, even unimportant in the rhetorical perspective. In a certain sense: a soft and “feminine” genre (against the two others, which are considered more “virile”). We think usually that the epideictic orator speaks in order to say nothing because the subject of the discourse is not controversial; everything in the speech has already been deliberated on. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca oppose this opinion. There is a real ambiguity because they appear to make a marginal (and not “serious”) genre a primary one. What’s more, they denounce the misunderstanding of epideictic. They propose to rediscover its rhetorical and argumentative nature: its place in the field of argumentation.

For them, the consequences of this misunderstanding were dramatic for rhetoric as a discipline. They make a link between the dismemberment of rhetoric in particular since the nineteenth century, and the negative perception of the epideictic genre in public opinion and scientific field. We can read what Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca wrote about it:
C’est cette incompréhension du rôle et de la nature du discours épidictique – qui, ne l’oublions pas, existait bel et bien, et s’imposait donc à l’attention – qui a encouragé le développement des considérations littéraires en rhétorique et a favorisé, entre autres causes, l’écartèlement de celle-ci entre deux tendances, l’une philosophique […], l’autre littéraire. (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1952 [1950], pp. 15-16).

It’s this misunderstanding of the role and the nature of epideictic discourse – which, let us not forget, existed and therefore was well known – which encouraged the development of literary considerations in rhetoric, and encouraged, with other implications, the breakup of rhetoric into two tendencies: one philosophical […] and the other, literary.

For Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca rhetoric has to be understood as something coherent and efficient. This requires above all, an understanding of the epideictic genre as a place of “communion” and as a mood of gathering. We could suppose that Perelman came to discover rhetoric (and therefore epideictic) through his reflections on legal agreement between two sides as well as the conditions necessary to find this agreement.

However, this would be an incorrect interpretation. Upon closer examination, we find that Perelman is not interested, first of all, by agreement, but by disagreement. He is especially interested in how disagreement can give rise to argumentative invention and rhetorical opportunities. For him, disagreement is not a drama, the sign of an error, or the evidence of our irrationality. He is radically opposed to Descartes and all the radical positivists. Perelman argues that there may be two (or x) contrary positions on the same subject without any of these having to be necessarily irrational. Argumentative rationality can also be found in the exploration of disagreement between the parties. For Chaim Perelman, it would be misleading to identify agreement with good choice and/or rationality.

A large part of Perelman’s work aims to analyze the possibilities of a reasonable disagreement; and how such a disagreement can be explored through argumentation. This is how Perelman presents his intellectual itinerary in a letter to the young Marcel Côté (a Canadian doctoral candidate) dated from January 1982:
L’inspiration fondamentale pour l’élaboration de la théorie de l’argumentation ne me vient pas du droit mais de la philosophie [la question étant] d’où vient le désaccord entre les philosophies. Ce n’est qu’à partir de 1953 que j’ai commencé à m’intéresser sérieusement au raisonnement juridique. (Perelman, 1982).

The fundamental inspiration for in the elaboration of a theory of argumentation does not come to me from law but from philosophy; [the question, for me, to find] where the disagreement between the two philosophies has its source. It is only from 1953 onwards that I became interested in legal reasoning.

To recapitulate, Chaim Perelman encountered rhetoric and epideictic through the lens of disagreement. However, one of his first texts on rhetoric, “Logique et rhétorique” (published in 1950, and co-authored with Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca), provides a clear focus on epideictic to rehabilitate it.

Interested in the concept and practice of disagreement, Perelman focuses on the genre, which seems most radically distinct from disagreement and which is the least clearly argumentative of the three genres. There is something contradictory here. That is why we need to assume a political and rhetorical link between disagreement and epideictic. A link that Perelman did not explain, but which is implied in his work; a crucial link for understanding what rhetoric really is. That is to say, to see rhetoric as a truly “human work” that can lead the way for a “sense of responsibility and freedom” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1952 [1950], pp. 42-43). The Perelmanian idea, because it is humanistic aims to express the connection between disagreement and the epideictic genre; to challenge the apparent dichotomy between the two. In a democratic society, epideictic needs to work well to allow disagreement; and likewise, disagreement requires always a well-functioning epideictic. This idea is represented in the table below (see fig. 1).

To be clear: we need to ask ourselves, what would disagreement without epideictic? It would be, no doubt, a permanent cacophony; civil conflict, and maybe even chaos. This is why, it is always necessary to regularly nourish the intensity of adherence to certain values to ensure the communion around these values. In the same way, what would epideictic genre be, without disagreement? It would certainly be a dictatorship of enforced agreement and all forms of propaganda and authoritarianism.

It is for this reason that rhetorical argumentation only has sense if one places value on adherence. At the same time, this adherence, by nature conditional (i.e. it is a fact, not a right), must exclude the use of violence or coercion. Rhetorical and political balance hangs on this relationship.

Fig. 1: The epideictic genre and the disagreement

Perelman does not give the epideictic genre a unique place: he even gives it two. He makes the epideictic genre the basis of his system of rhetoric: since without epideictic, no rhetoric is possible. Furthermore, he also makes it the center of his system: since without epideictic, no disagreement, nor justification, is possible. Summing up, according to Perelman, it is the role of this genre, which is seen as marginal, to ensure the functioning of the whole system of rhetoric around it. Not only does the epideictic genre make rhetoric possible; but also it makes rhetoric practical, and even practicable. It constitutes the roots and the living substance of rhetoric as in the diagram below (fig. 2). This stark and revealing distinction is laid out in the two paragraphs from the programmatic article quoted previously:
Ne voyant pas nettement de but au discours épidictique, les anciens étaient donc enclins à le considérer uniquement comme une sorte de spectacle, visant au plaisir des spectateurs et à la gloire de l’orateur, par la mise en valeur des subtilités de sa technique. Celle-ci devient donc un but en soi. Aristote lui-même [la critique est peu charitable, mais passons] ne semble saisir que l’aspect agrément, apparat, du discours épidictique. Il ne perçoit pas que les prémisses sur lesquelles s’appuient les discours délibératifs et judiciaires, dont l’objet lui paraît si important, sont des jugements de valeur. Or ces prémisses, il faut que le discours épidictique les soutienne, les confirme. (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1952 [1950], p 14).

Not seeing a clear objective for epideictic discourse, the ancients were thus inclined to consider it only as a sort of spectacle, which pleased spectators and gave glory to the orator, through the showcasing of the orator’s subtle techniques. In this way it thus became a goal in and of itself. Aristotle himself [in an unkind critique, but let’s leave this aside] appears to understand only its pleasing aspect, its pomp and circumstance. He does not understand that the premises on which deliberative and judiciary discourses base themselves, and whose function he values so much, are in fact value judgments. However, these premises must be sustained and confirmed by epideictic discourse.

Without epideictic discourse to support or confirm certain values, which are seen as important for a certain community, speakers would be unable of making value judgments. Speakers would be deprived of the capacity to argue. In fact, the formulation of judgments in the deliberative or judicial arena implies always the availability of values for judgment, principles to criticize, and commonplaces to denounce. Without epideictic discourse, without roots, without premises at our disposal, no one could ever formulate anything but senseless and valueless discourses.

Fig. 2: Basis and center of Rhetoric

However, if the epideictic genre constitutes the foundations of the rhetorical system, or even its “crowning”, it is also the center, the mobile part of this system, in other words: its limbs. This is why the third genre of rhetoric enables the articulation of the whole edifice of rhetoric. It helps rhetoric to be applied and tested. In other words, the epideictic is not only an enabling condition of the judicial and deliberative discourses, their roots, but it is also the very source of their permanent vitality. Indeed, the epideictic seeks to create a “communion” between free and responsible citizens:
Cette communion ne détermine pas un choix immédiat, détermine toutefois des choix virtuels. Le combat que livre l’orateur épidictique est un combat contre des objections futures; c’est un effort pour maintenir la place de certains jugements de valeur dans la hiérarchie ou éventuellement leur conférer un statut supérieur. […] Aussi le genre épidictique est-il central dans la rhétorique. (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1952 [1950], p 14).

This communion while it does not determine an immediate choice, it does however determine virtual choices. The struggle which the epideictic orator leads, is a struggle against future objections; it is an effort to maintain the place of certain value judgments in the hierarchy, or maybe to give them a superior status. […] In this way, the epideictic genre is central in rhetoric.

This genre ensures the stability and the circulation of values. It articulates the continuity and coherence between the past, present and future of the community. In this regard, Perelman goes further than Aristotle. On the one hand, he makes epideictic discourse a place of dialogue between this three temporalities; on the other hand, he makes of it a place, which, in this dialogue, opens the way for a struggle to come, based on these same values. This struggle cannot always take place here and now, because it is neither the time nor the place. This is implied in the rules of the genre. Hence, the deliberative and judicial genres exist to offer an arena for this struggle to take place in the future.

From now on, we can say that the epideictic genre cannot be placed outside the field of argumentation. Adherence now and elsewhere is not pre-established. It would be an illusion to believe that the conditions for a communion of conscience could be inscribed in the nature of things. At the same time, if the struggle is delayed for now, it is to allow epideictic discourses to protect the community against itself, against all the threats of discord, fear, and disenchantment. This is why the epideictic genre, is in no case a collection of empty commonplaces or trivialities beyond discussion.

4. Conclusion
In a bold way, and to conclude, we could say that Perelman underlines the precarious character of values and adherence to these, which is present in the epideictic genre. He invites us to recognize this fragility as an opportunity and not as a drama.
The act of speaking to reinforce the established order does not seek to deny the existence of problems. Neither is it a question of denying the fragility of the values that are being defended. On the contrary, the aim is to manifest the fact that there is a problem and that the values being defended are indeed fragile ones.
Concretely, if there would be no problem, and if values would not be fragile, or confused, there would simply be no need to speak up to set the problem in context.

NOTES
i. Unless otherwise specified, the translations are done by the authors of the paper.
ii. We would like to thank Emmanuelle Danblon and Victor Ferry for this reference.

References
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Danblon, E. (2013). L’homme rhétorique: Culture, raison, action. Paris: Éditions du Cerf.
De Pater, W.A. (1965). Les topiques d’Aristote et la dialectique platonicienne: Méthodologie de la définition. Fribourg: Ed. St. Paul.
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Dupréel, E. (1939). Esquisse d’une philosophie des valeurs. Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan.
Dupréel, E. (1949). Essais pluralistes. Paris: PUF.
Mayeur, I. (2015). Les notions confuses comme matière de l’activité rhétorique: postérité d’un héritage dupréelien. In L. Nicolas (Ed.), Le fragile et le flou: Apprivoiser la précarité, un art rhétorique, forthcoming.
Nicolas, L. (2009). La fonction héroïque: parole épidictique et enjeux de qualification. Rhetorica: A journal of the History of Rhetoric, XXVII, 2, 115-141.
Perelman, Ch. & Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. (1952). Rhétorique et philosophie: Pour une théorie de l’argumentation en philosophie. Bruxelles: Presses universitaires de Bruxelles.
Perelman, Ch. & Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. (1989 [1955]). Les notions et l’argumentation. In Rhétoriques (pp. 123-150). Bruxelles: Presses universitaires de Bruxelles.
Perelman, Ch. & Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. (1969 [1958]). The new rhetoric: A treatise on argumentation (trans. by J. Wilkinson and P. Weaver). Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.
Perelman, Ch. (1978). L’usage et l’abus des notions confuses. Logique et Analyse, 81, 3-17.
Perelman, Ch. (1979). L’originalité de la pensée d’Eugène Dupréel (à l’occasion du centenaire de sa naissance). Bulletin de la classe des Lettres et des Sciences morales et politiques, LXV, 60-71.
Perelman, Ch. (1982). Letter to Marcel Côté (January 4, 1982). Archives and Libraries of the ULB – Fonds Chaim Perelman: BE.ULB – A&B – ARCH.089PP (box 21).
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Sennett, R. (2008). The craftsman. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Abstract: One of the crucial problems of argumentation schemes as illustrated in (Walton, Reed & Macagno, 2008) is their practical use for the purpose of analyzing texts and producing arguments. For this purpose, argumentation schemes will be analyzed as prototypical combinations between two distinct levels of abstraction, i.e. semantic (or material) relations and types of reasoning. These two levels can justify an end-means criterion of classification, representing the intended purpose of an argument and the means to achieve it. This criterion is strictly bound to the pragmatic purpose of an argumentative move and the ontological (semantic) structure of the conclusion and the premises.
Keywords: abstraction, argument, argumentation schemes, classification, semantic relations, types of reasoning

1. Introduction
Argumentation schemes have been developed in argumentation theory as stereotypical patterns of inference, abstract structures representing the material (semantic) relation and logical relation between the premises and a conclusion in an argument. They can be regarded as the modern interpretation and reconsideration of the ancient maxims of inference (Walton, Reed & Macagno, 2008; Walton & Macagno, 2006). Many authors in the last fifty years have proposed different sets and classifications of schemes (see Hastings, 1963; Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969; Kienpointner, 1992a, 1992b; Walton, 1996; Grennan, 1997; Walton, Reed & Macagno, 2008; van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004). These approaches raise crucial problems concerning the criteria used for distinguishing and classifying the schemes, and defining the structure of an argumentation scheme. These apparently purely philosophical questions are becoming increasingly important for practical purposes, in particular the application of the schemes to the field of education (Macagno & Konstantinidou, 2013; Nussbaum, 2011; Duschl, 2008; Kim, Robert Anthony & Blades, 2012; Rapanta, Garcia-Mila, & Gilabert, 2013) and Artificial Intelligence (Mochales & Moens, 2009; 2011).

The purpose of this paper is to address the problem of classifying the schemes starting from the analysis of their nature and structure. The different components of the natural patterns of arguments will be distinguished, and in particular the quasi-logical and the semantic levels. These distinctions will be used to show the shortcomings of the existing classifications, and to propose a new model based on the pragmatic purpose of an argument, which is regarded as a move (speech act) in a dialogue.

1. Types of reasoning and semantic-ontological connections
The relationship between the premises and the conclusion of an argument can be reconstructed based on generic principles. What guarantees the inferential passage is a specific major premise that includes the predicates occurring in the minor premise and the conclusion. In order to reconstruct and motivate the inferential structure, we need to distinguish the specific principle of inference from two other different levels: 1) the general rules of inference, i.e. the generic, semantic-ontological connections between the predicates of the argument that establish the acceptability of an argument; and 2) the logical rules governing the formal disposition of the terms or propositions in an argument, i.e. the rules of commitment establishing the acceptance of an argument. These levels of abstraction will be referred to as “specific topoi,” “generic topoi,” and “rules of commitment” (or logical rules).

2.1 Specific topoi
In the Topics, Aristotle pointed out a crucial difference between the topoi (or rather generic topics) and the idia (the specific topics) (Rubinelli, 2009, pp. 59-70). According to Aristotle, the specific topoi represent propositions that relate to specific disciplines, such as ethics, law, or medicine, which are used to draw specific conclusions. For instance, in the third book of the Topics some specific principles of inference concerning the classification of “what is better” are set out (Topics, 116a 13-18). Specific topics can be used both as an instrument for invention, namely for generating and finding the premises of an argument, and as premises warranting the conclusion (De Pater, 1965, p. 134; Stump, 1989, p. 29). For instance, a specific topos concerning one of the possible ways of classifying an action as “better” than another can be directly used to support the conclusion. We can analyze the following case:
Saving the money for buying a house is more desirable than spending it on expensive cars, because a house is more lasting than a car.

The reasoning can be represented as follows:
Minor premise – A house is more lasting than a car.
Major premise – That which is more lasting or secure is more desirable than that which is less so
Conclusion – A house is more desirable than a car.

The specific topos indicating one of the possible “operational” definitions of “to be better” directly warrants the conclusion. In specific domains of knowledge, specific topoi can be listed as instruments of invention, pre-packaged arguments that be used for supporting prototypical viewpoints. For example, ancient and modern treatises on legal topics (or rather on the specific commonly accepted principles of reasoning) indicate hundreds of topics that can be used by lawyers in certain circumstances, such as the following ones:
When a man and a woman refer to each other with the name of “spouse”, marriage is not proven, but is presumable. (Everardus, Loci Argumentorum legales, 54, 13th paragraph)
Where a person does an act, he is presumed in so doing to have intended that the natural and legal consequences of his act shall result. (Lawson, 1885, p. 262)

These propositions are used in law to support specific conclusions, i.e. prima facie cases that can be rebutted when additional information comes in. Such arguments, however, have the purpose of shifting the burden of production, leaving up to the other party to provide contrary evidence.

Specific topoi provide relations between specific concepts (“acts”), which are abstracted from their individual occurrences (this specific act). These specific rules of inference are the subject matter of a further process of abstraction, leading from concepts to categories of concepts or meta-concepts, the generic topoi.

2.2 Generic topoi – semantic-ontological relations
Generic topics can be considered as abstractions from the specific ones, or more correctly, an abstraction from a large number of specific topics. They provide classes of both necessary and defeasible inferences. In the first class fall some maxims setting out definitional properties of meta-semantic concepts, i.e. concepts representing semantic relations between concepts, such as definition, genus, and property. For example the locus from definition, which establishes the convertibility between definition and definiendum, represents also the essential logical characteristic that a predicate needs to have in order be considered as a “discourse signifying what a thing is.” Other loci, such as the ones based on analogy or the more and the less, are only defeasible, as they represent only usual commonly accepted relationships.

In the Topics, Aristotle focuses most of his analysis on the topics governing the meta-semantic relations between concepts, i.e. genus, property, definition, and accident. Cicero reduced the Aristotelian list of topoi to 20 loci or maxims, grouping them in generic categories (differences) and dividing them in two broad classes, the intrinsic and the extrinsic topics. While the first ones proceed directly from the subject matter at issue (for instance, its semantic properties), the external topics support the conclusion through contextual elements (for instance, the source of the speech act expressing the claim). In between there are the topics that concern the relationship between a predicate and the other predicates of a linguistic system (for instance, its relations with its contraries or alternatives). We can represent Cicero’s topics as follows:

Figure 1: Cicero’s classification of generic topics

This classification was the model that was taken into account by several dialectical theories, of which the most important, due to its influence on the further medieval accounts, is the one developed by Boethius in De Topicis Differentiis.

2.3 Rules of commitment – Logical form
The Latin and medieval dialectical tradition accounted for a type of loci that was not based on any semantic, metaphysical, or ontological relationship between concepts. These loci are not aimed at increasing the acceptability of a conclusion based on the acceptability of the content of its premises. Rather, they represent relations of acceptance (or commitment) between propositions. For instance, the acceptance of (or commitment to) the consequent of a conditional proposition follows from the acceptance of – or commitment to – the conditional and the antecedent thereof (Cicero, Topica, 53, 1-25). These “formal” topics were analyzed in particular in the dialectical theories of the 12th and 13th century. Such theories conceived the categorical syllogisms as proceeding from topics from the whole to the part, called “dici de omni” and “dici de nullo.” These topics were grounded not on the semantic-ontological content of the propositions, but only on the meaning of the quantifiers (Green-Pedersen, 1984, p. 256).

This distinction between semantic-ontological and formal (logical) topics suggests an analysis of the different rules of inference in which the semantic-ontological topics are combined with the logical rules. Formal topics can be thought of as representing the highest level of abstraction, which groups together more generic principles different and somehow similar argument structures (Searle, 2001, p. 19). For example, the ancient topics from antecedents or “dici de omni” formalize the deductive pattern of modus ponens normally used in dialectics. However, many acceptable and reasonable arguments, such as reasoning from example or sign, follow formal patterns different from the deductive ones (see also Blair, 2007; Godden, 2005). In addition to the deductive rules, also the inductive ones need to be accounted for, and the type of reasoning called “abduction” (Pierce, 1992, pp. 140-141), “retroduction” (see Greenland, 1998, p. 545; Poole, 1988) or reasoning from best explanation (Josephson & Josephson, 1996, p. 15).

The prototypical relationship between the types of argument and the logical level of abstraction can be summarized in the table below, where three most important types of reasoning (or categories of arguments of the highest level) are distinguished:

Figure 2: Types of argument and types of reasoning

This classification suggests the possibility of analyzing arguments from a multi-logical perspective, in which the logical form can be described using distinct types of reasoning, which in turn can include various logical rules of inference (MP, MT…). However, in the Latin and medieval tradition, the formal rules of inference are treated as maxims and not as distinct levels of abstraction. For this reason, the two levels of the general, semantic topics and of the logical rules are not distinguished, and the possible interconnections between them are not taken into account.

The modern theories of argument schemes or argumentation schemes inherited this model, proposing classifications essentially mirroring the ancient approach. The rules of commitment are treated at the same level as the semantic-ontological topics, and not as distinct levels of abstraction. This approach can be extremely helpful for quickly identifying common characteristics in the arguments that are frequently used, but it leads to classificatory problems. A possible solution is to acknowledge the discrepancy between logical form and semantic content as a divergence in kind, and try to show how these two levels can be interconnected. The starting point is the model that, by merging the two levels, best mirrors the multi-logical approach to natural arguments: the model of argumentation schemes (Walton, Reed & Macagno, 2008).

2. Argumentation schemes as imperfect bridges
Argumentation schemes are stereotypical patterns of inference, combining semantic-ontological relations with types of reasoning and logical axioms and representing the abstract structure of the most common types of natural arguments. The argumentation schemes provided in (Walton, Reed & Macagno, 2008) describe tentatively the patterns of the most typical arguments. However, by failing to distinguish between the two levels of abstraction, under the label of “argumentation schemes” fall indistinctly patterns of reasoning such as the abductive, analogical, or inductive ones, and types of argument such as the ones from classification or cause to effect.

In order to design a system for classifying the schemes, it is useful to understand the limits thereof, and investigate how the two distinct levels of abstraction are merged. For example the argument from cause to effect will be taken into account (Walton, Reed & Macagno, 2008, p. 168):

This argumentation scheme is based on a defeasible modus ponens, which is combined with a semantic causal relation between two events. The semantic-ontological level is merged with the logical one, and this combination represents only one of the possible types of inferences that can be drawn from the same semantic-ontological connection. The actual relationship between the two levels of abstraction is much more complex. For example, we consider the classic Aristotelian causal link between “having fever” and “breathing fast,” and see how this cause-effect relation can be used to draw a conclusion on the basis of different logical rules:
1. He had fever. (Fever causes breathing fast). Therefore, he (must have) breathed fast.
2. He did not breathe fast. (Fever causes breathing fast). Therefore, he had no fever.
3. He is breathing fast. (Fever causes breathing fast). Therefore, he might have fever.
4. He is has no fever. (Fever causes breathing fast). Therefore, he may be not breathing fast.
5. You may have fever. When I had fever, I was breathing fast, and you are breathing fast.

These cases illustrate how different logical rules can be followed to draw a conclusion from the same semantic connection, in this case a causal relation. Cases (1) and (2) represent instantiations of defeasible axioms, i.e. the defeasible modus ponens (in 1), and the defeasible modus tollens (in 2). Cases 3 and 4 proceed from abductive reasoning. In (3) the conclusion is drawn by affirming the consequent, while in (4) the denial of the antecedent can be rephrased by contraposition as “not breathing fast is caused by having no fever,” leading to a conclusion drawn abductively (Walton, Reed & Macagno, 2008: 173). Finally, in (5) the conclusion is based on an inductive generalization, based on a single case. The prototypical nature of the relationship between semantic relations and logical rules (types of reasoning and axioms) hides, in this sense, the lack of correspondence between these two levels. For this reason, a classification system of the argumentation schemes based on these criteria would be inaccurate. Different criteria are needed, accounting for this twofold nature of the schemes.

3. A means-end classification
Argumentation schemes can be conceived as the combination of semantic (or topical) relations with logical rules of inference. A classification based on the semantic link can provide an instrument for bringing to light the material relation between premises and conclusion. However, the same semantic relation can be combined with various logical rules, and lead to various types of conclusion. For example, causal relations are the ground of the argument from cause to effect, but also or arguments from sign and practical reasoning. A classification based only on the semantic content would blur these fundamental differences. For this reason, it is necessary to find an overarching classificatory principle.

Argumentation schemes can be thought of as instruments for reconstructing and building arguments (intended as discourse moves), i.e. analytical or invention tools. For this reason, in order to provide a classificatory system to retrieve and detect the needed scheme it can be useful to start from the intended purpose of an argumentation scheme. From an analytical point of view, the analysis of an argument in a discourse, a text, or dialogue presupposes a previous understanding of the communicative goal (and, therefore, the “pragmatic” meaning) of the argument and the components thereof. For example, an argument can be aimed at classifying a state of affairs, supporting the existence of a state of affairs, or influencing a decision-making process.

This teleological classification needs to be combined with a practical one, as the generic purposes of a move need to be achieved by means of an inferential passage. In this sense, the classificatory system needs to account for the possible means to achieve the pragmatic purpose of an argument. Not all the semantic (material) relations that are at the basis of the schemes can support all the possible conclusions or purposes of an argument. Definitional schemes are aimed at supporting the classification of a state of affairs, and are unlikely to lead to the prediction or retrodiction of an event. Similarly, a pattern of reasoning based on the evaluation of the consequences of an action or an event can be used to establish the desirability of a course of action brining it about, but cannot reasonably lead to the truth or falsity (or acceptability) of a proposition. For this reason, the analysis of the pragmatic meaning (i.e. the purpose) of an argument provides a criterion for restricting the paradigm of the possible means to achieve it. The crucial problem is to find categories of argument purposes that can establish criteria for distinguishing among classes of semantic relations, which in turn can be specified further according to the means to achieve such goals.

The first distinction to be made is based on the nature of the subject matter, which can be a course of action or a state of affairs. In the first case, the goal is to support the desirability or non-desirability of an action, while in the second one the schemes are aimed at providing grounds for the acceptability of a judgment on a state of affairs. The ancient dialectical accounts (see Cicero, Topica and Boethius, De Topicis Differentiis) distinguished between two types of argumentative “means” to bear out a conclusion, i.e. the “internal” and the “external” arguments. The first ones are based on the characteristics of the subject matter (such as arguments from definition or cause), while the others derive their force from the source of the statement, i.e. from the authority of who advances the judgment or the proposal (arguments from authority). This first distinction can be represented as follows:

Figure 3: Basic purposes of an argument

The acceptability of a conclusion can be supported externally in two ways. If the argument is aimed at establishing the desirability of a course of action, the authority can correspond to the role of the source needed for recommending or imposing a choice (“You should do it because he told you that!”). Otherwise, the popular practice can be a reason for pursuing a course of action (“We should buy a bigger car. Everyone drives big cars here!”). When external arguments are used to support also a judgment on a state of affairs, the relevant quality of the source is not the speaker’s authority (which is connected with the consequences of not complying with the orders/conforming to common behavior) but rather with his superior knowledge. The quality of the source can be also used negatively to show that a source is not reliable (it is not a good source), and that consequently the conclusion itself should be considered as doubtful (ad hominem arguments). The external arguments can be represented as follows:

Figure 4: External arguments

Internal arguments need to be divided into the two categories of arguments aimed at assessing the desirability of a course of action, and the ones supporting the acceptability of a judgment. Courses of action can be classified as desirable or not depending on the quality of their consequences (the course of action is a condition of a resulting positive or negative state of affairs) or their function in bringing about a desired goal (an action is productive of a pursued state of affairs):

Figure 5: Internal practical arguments

The arguments used to provide grounds for a judgment on a state of affairs can be divided according to the nature of the predicate that is to be attributed. The most basic differentiation can be traced between the predicates that attribute the existence of a state of affairs (the occurrence of an event or the existence of an entity in the present, the past, or the future), and the ones representing factual or evaluative properties. The arguments supporting a prediction or a retrodiction are aimed at establishing whether or not an event has occurred or will occur, or whether an entity was or will be present (existent). The arguments proceeding from casual relations (in particular from material and efficient causes) bear out this type of conclusion. The other type of predicates can be divided in two categories: factual judgments and value judgments. The first type of predicates can be attributed by means of reasoning from classification, grounded on descriptive (definitional) features and supporting the attribution of a categorization to an entity or an event (Bob is a man; Tom is a cat). Value judgments are classifications that are not based on definitions of categorical concepts (to be a cat) but rather on values, or rather hierarchies of values. Such judgments proceed from criteria for classifying what is commonly considered to be “good” or “bad.” Also the reasoning underlying the attribution of evaluative predicates, such as “to be a criminal,” can be considered as belonging to this group of arguments. These latter patterns are grounded on signs of an internal disposition of character, which in its turn is evaluated. The distinctions discussed above are summarized in figure 6 below.

Figure 6: Establishing the acceptability of a judgment on a state of affairs

This system of classification of argumentation schemes is based on the interplay between two criteria, the (pragmatic) purpose of an argument and the means to achieve it. This dichotomic model can be used both for analytical and production purposes. In the first case, the speaker’s intention is reconstructed by examining the generic purpose of his move, and then the possible choices that he made to support it, based on the linguistic elements of the text (Macagno & Zavatta, 2014; Macagno & Walton, 2014, Ch. 5; Macagno & Damele, 2013). Depending on the desired level of preciseness, the analysis can be narrowed down until detecting the specific scheme, i.e. the precise combination of the semantic principle and the logical rule supporting the conclusion. In this fashion, the analyst can decide where to stop his reconstruction. This analytical model can be of help also for educational purposes, as it can be adapted to various teaching needs and levels (detecting arguments in a text; reconstructing implicit premises, etc.). For production purposes, the nature of the viewpoint to be argued for opens up specific alternative strategies to support it, which in turn can be determined by the characteristics of the conclusion.

This model relies on the analyst’s or the speaker’s reconstruction or awareness of the purpose of a move, which can be partially identified by taking into consideration the nature of the subject matter (whether it is a decision or a judgment). The purpose then opens up possible choices according to the generic goal of the communicative act. The speaker’s intention can be further specified by detecting the most generic strategy chosen to provide a basis for the acceptability of the conclusion. In this case, in order to reconstruct the move or provide an argument, the analyst or the speaker can choose whether to use some properties of the subject matter or to appeal to an external source. In the first case, the means used to achieve the goal are determined by the nature of the subject matter. In particular, the crucial distinction is between the classification and the prediction or retrodiction of an entity or state of affairs. This choice leads to a further specification of the nature of the viewpoint that the speaker intends to support with his argument (is the event a future or a past one? is the classification a value judgment or does it consist in the attribution of factual properties?), and then to the specific means that can be used to achieve this precise purpose (argument from values, from definition, etc.). In case of decision-making, the argumentation schemes are classified according to the same interrelation between goal and generic strategies. The internal arguments can be divided between reasoning from consequence and reasoning from means to goal.

An alternative to the internal, more complex arguments, is provided by external arguments, where the choice of backing the conclusion by means of the opinion of a knowledgeable and reliable source can be further made more specific by distinguishing between the kinds of sources (experts or the majority of people) and the nature of the support (knowledge or reliability).

The semantic relation characterizing a scheme can be “shaped” according to different types of reasoning, i.e. logical forms. For instance, the desirability of a course of action can be assessed internally by taking into consideration the means to achieve a goal. However, this pattern of reasoning can be stronger or weaker depending on whether there is only one or several alternatives. The paradigm of the possible means will determine whether the reasoning is abductive or deductive, resulting in a conclusion more or less defeasible. The same principle applies to the other semantic relations, such as the ones proceeding from cause or classification, which can be shaped logically according to inductive (or analogical), deductive, or abductive types of reasoning.

3. Conclusion
The classification of argumentation schemes is a problem from which their development and application depends. Given their number and complexity, their use becomes problematic without a system guiding their selection. In order to organize the schemes in a useful and accessible way, it is crucial to understand their nature and their components. Argumentation schemes are the result of a combination of two levels of abstraction: semantic (or topical) relations, and logical forms. Semantic relations provide a criterion of classifying the arguments based on the content of their major premise, and represent what makes a conclusion more acceptable than the premises. The logical forms (the types of reasoning and rules of inference) instantiate the rules of acceptance, i.e. how a premise supports a conclusion based on the relation between the antecedent and consequent, or between the quantification of the predicates in the premises and the conclusion. The possible combinations between them are extremely complex. Argumentation schemes are imperfect bridges between these two levels. They are the most frequent and common combinations that characterize the fundamental arguments used in everyday argumentation. They are incomplete abstractions, simplified and prototypical patterns that cannot be organized according to the aforesaid semantic and logical levels.

In order to classify the schemes, it is necessary to find a criterion of classification transcending both levels of abstraction, and leading to a dichotomic system, which can be used proceeding both from the affirmation of a disjunct, and from exclusion of the alternative. The classificatory system proposed in this paper is not based on what an argument is, but rather on how it is understood and interpreted, i.e. on its communicative purpose. In this fashion, a classification system can mirror the actual practices of reconstructing and using arguments. The purpose of an argument is connected with the means to achieve it, which are determined by the ontological structure of its conclusion and its premises. On this view, it is possible to suggest a course of action, to predict an event, or to classify an entity, depending on the nature of the predicate(s) attributed in the premises that support or can be used to support the conclusion. The system of classification becomes a tree of dichotomic choices aimed at reconstructing or achieving a communicative goal.

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Abstract: This paper investigates the functions of emotions in decision-making processes following the disclosure of a bad news in medical argumentation, by taking into account suggestions from psychology and argumentation. I embrace the hypothesis that emotions, due to their capability of unifying the objects of our thought, strongly contribute to reasonable decisions. I claim that a proof that hints to this can be found at the interactional as well as at the inferential level of analysis.
Keywords: Argumentum Model of Topics, bad news, decision-making processes, doctor-patient interaction, emotions, inferential structure, interactional analysis

1. Introduction
Emotions plays a crucial role in doctor-patient interactions, especially in case of bad news’ disclosure; in such highly emotive frameworks a competent usage of emotions through communication strategies can really make the difference in improving patients’ acceptability of heavy treatments and of diseases’ consequences. This competence is often strongly influenced by doctors’ ability to handle in an adequate way their own emotions as well as by the ability to take into account patients’ possible emotive reactions. However, it is not often the case that doctors are able to reach a fruitful communication and an adequate handling of emotions, and this leads to misunderstandings and produces undesired emotive and cognitive reactions in patients. Two are the main approaches to doctor-patient interaction which can be found in literature, namely the patient-centred approach and the disease-centred approach (Bensing, 2000; Mead & Bower, 2000).

This paper aims to contribute to the study of doctor-patient interactions’ dynamics by connecting existing studies in health communication and psychology with argumentation studies, in order to demonstrate the crucial role of argumentatively played out emotions. For what concerns the theoretical and methodological framework, we follow the Pragma-Dialectical approach (Eemeren van, 2004) for the interactional analysis and the Argumentum Model of Topics (henceforth AMT) for the analysis of the inferential structures of arguments (Rigotti, 2009; Rigotti & Greco Morasso, 2010).
In medical argumentation studies there is a gap in the analysis of doctors’ argumentatively played out emotions, which concerns both the interactional as well as the inferential level of analysis. The reasons why doctors’ emotions emerging in argumentation during this type of communicative practice have a strong influence in patients’ acceptability of treatments and of disease consequences remain still unclear.

In this study I propose to combine a fine-grained argumentative and inferential analysis of doctors’ experienced emotions in doctor-patient interactions concerning the disclosure of a bad news. Three are the main aims of this paper. Firstly, I set out to explore the role of doctors’ argumentatively played out emotions in the management of the painful communication and of the subsequent patients’ decision-making processes. Secondly, I will investigate the importance for doctors to take into consideration the possible patients’ emotions and the importance of arguing in favor of them, and lastly I will prove that emotions have an evaluative and unifying function which can be retrieved in the inferential structure of arguments.

2. Two distinct approaches to doctor-patient interaction
First of all, the disease-centered approach reduces the relationship doctor-patient to a mere formality lacking of a human and existential value, which is on the basis of every cure strategy. It conceives the doctor as the only expert and the doctor’s only focus is on the disease in itself, so that all his professional efforts and human attentions are devoted only to the cure of the disease. As a consequence of that, the patient is induced to adopt a behavior of compliance, that consists in obeying and adhering to doctors’ decisions, preventing him from reaching an autonomous opinion (RPSGB, 1997).

On the contrary, the patient-centered approach puts the patient as a whole at the center of its interest; the doctor gives crucial importance to psychological and social conditions of the patient, taking into consideration patients’ emotive dynamics and considering the consequences of emotive reactions in decision-making processes, in order to be able to better understand the actual will of the patient and subsequently to be able to better guide him in painful decisions. This is possible only caring about communicative and relational aspects between doctor and patient; adopting such an approach instead of a disease-centered approach implies a shift of focus from the cure of the disease to the care of the person, and from the compliance to the concordance, which refers to a process of knowledge power and decision sharing in doctor-patient interaction, producing a radical change of the cure’s intrinsic relationship and of what every participant expects from the other. In short, adopting a patient-centered approach favoring concordance means considering the patient as an expert of his own illness situation and of his reaction to bad news communication and treatment (RPSGB, 1997).

For the purposes of this study, which combines studies from communication, psychology and argumentation theory, it is interesting to notice the semantic foundations of the distinction of these two approaches; indeed, also a semantic analysis of the two verbs to cure of and to care for, respectively representing the disease-centered approach and the patient-centered approach, lays stress on the different perspective given to the medical communication by the adoption of these two types of approaches. In order to highlight this distinction, I analyzed these verbs following an approach known as Congruity Theory (Rigotti & Rocci, 2001; Rocci, 2005). This theory starts from the assumption that a whole argumentation is based on a conceptual structure, proceeding from relations to concepts, and therefore the analysis of argumentation presupposes the analysis of concepts, that is the semantic analysis. In short, this theory provides the necessary and conceptual instruments necessary to tackle both the semantic and the pragmatic aspect of discourse. More specifically, the meaningfulness of the units that make up the nodes of discourses is accounted for semantically in terms of predicate-argument frames, where predicates impose presuppositions to their arguments places and licenses semantic entailments. The semantic analysis of the two verbs to cure of and to care for is shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Semantic analysis of the verbs “to cure of” and “to care for”.

The verb to cure of presupposes that X1 is a human being with a degree in medicine, that X2 is a living being and that X3 is a disease. The subsequent entailments are that X1 heals X2 from X3 or that X1 attempts to heal X2 from X3. Here the verb is clearly bound to the concept of disease, where the focus is on the disease per se. On the contrary, the verb to care for presupposes as first argument a living being, that is able to help X2, and furthermore it presupposes that is X2 is a living being, who is in need for help, where the entailment is that X1 gives the necessary help to X2. This verb perspective is related to the concept of illness, and here the focus is on the fact of being ill of a person in his whole and uniqueness.

3. Emotions emerging in argumentative doctor-patient interactions
It is in this scenario that I propose to consider emotions emerging in argumentative doctor-patient interactions as able to strongly influence the modality of communicative approach adopted, and strongly determine an adequate or inadequate management of the painful disclosure of a bad news, such as the communication of the impossibility to surgically intervene in pancreatic cancer (for more details see the case study in Section 5).

I will refer to emotions as they are conceived according to the modern theories of emotions in social psychology and psychology of emotions; the central core of these theoretical frameworks is based on the assumption that emotions are rational, so that they are conceived as a useful mean to reach reasonable decisions, as stated also by the neuroscientist A. Damasio (Damasio, 1994; Damasio, 1999).

However, it is only when one is aware of his own emotions that can inhibit an action prompted by them (Lambie, 2008; Lambie 2009). I embrace this hypothesis that in order to make a reasonable choice, one should be aware of his own emotions. Nevertheless, one step further still needs to be done; I claim that emotions’ awareness is strongly played out argumentatively. Furthermore, in support of this claim, I take into consideration the research trend “emotions, rationality and decision” (Lambie & Marcel, 2002) according to which every-medium and long-term goal must undergo to review according to deliberative rationality, which often takes place in argumentation, and this process is strongly influenced by aware emotions.

4. Corpus and methodology
Concerning the corpus, data were collected at the highly specialized practice of oncologic pancreatic surgery at the Hospital of Verona (Italy), where patients arrive after a diagnostic day-hospital. In order to support the main claim of the paper, namely that the awareness of doctors’ emotions and the consideration of patients’ expected emotive reactions emerging in argumentation strongly influence the final outcome of the medical consultation, data were collected looking at the threefold perspective of the doctor-patient interaction, of the doctor-psychologist interaction, and of the patient-psychologist interaction. Indeed, data consist of audio-recordings of 15 doctor-patient interactions concerning the moment of the disclosure of the bad news of the impossibility to surgically intervene, of 15 doctor-psychologist interactions about doctor’s emotive resonance after the communication of the news, and finally of 15 patients-psychologist interactions about the emotive reactions after the news communication and the impressions about the way in which the doctor managed the painful communication. The first type of data permitted an in-depth analysis of argumentative dynamics, whereas the second and the third type of data permitted to have a confirm of the claim through a retrospective clue.

The methodology used for the reconstruction of argumentative structures at the interactional level follows Pragma-Dialectics, whereas for the analysis of the inferential structure of arguments I use the approach known as Argumentum Model of Topics (Rigotti & Greco Morasso, 2010).

5. A case study: highly specialized medical consultation after a diagnose-oriented day-hospital as a peculiar activity type
According to Van Eemeren stating that “the various communicative activity types are empirical conceptualizations of conventionalized communicative practices” (Eemeren van, 2010, p. 145), I propose to conceive the “highly specialized medical consultation after a diagnose-oriented day hospital” as a peculiar activity type with its own specific characteristics and purposes, resulting in an activity type, which is clearly different from the other types of medical consultations. With reference to this, in inoperable oncologic patients, we can identify three stages of this peculiar activity type, namely the stage of the communication of the impossibility to surgically intervene, the stage of the communication of the need to do a chemotherapy and the phase of the choice of the most suitable chemotherapy. A peculiarity of this activity type can be identified in the fact that when patients arrive to the consultation, it is the second time that patients see the doctor (patients met the doctor during the day-hospital), so that the stage of the patient examination and clinic history has already been made during the day-hospital.
Furthermore, it is important to notice that the communication of the impossibility to surgically intervene represents a very highly emotive interaction due to the painful communication of the bad news disclosure referring to the impossibility of an effective cure.

In order to carry out the main aim of the study, the features of the phases of the two distinct types of interactional approaches in managing the communication in this activity type were identified. On the one hand, concerning the patient-centered approach, we can find the following features; patients’ awareness degree concerning illness’ construal is ascertained, the bad news communication of the impossibility to do a curative surgical intervention follows, and lastly the most suitable treatment is discussed and negotiated, so that patients’ opinion is taken into account and is endorsed. In this interactional approach doctors show a great ability to argue and to use emotions in argumentations as well as to show an empathic behavior. On the contrary, the features characterizing the disease-centered approach are the following; patients’ awareness degree concerning the disease is not ascertained, bad news communication follows, and the most suitable treatment is given as a factual data, without discussion and negotiation. We observe in the best cases the presence of an only poor argumentation, and emotions, both of the doctor and of the patient, are not taken into consideration.

5.1 Patient-centeredness: an argumentative analysis
In what follows I will show three argumentative reconstructions pertaining to a patient-centered interaction; the first one shows the standpoint of a patient after that the doctor has communicated him the impossibility of the surgical intervention at the moment, the second one shows the doctor’s standpoint after the communication of the bad news, and the third one shows the doctor’s standpoint during the phase of the choice of the most suitable treatment.

In the first argumentative reconstruction the standpoint of the patient “I want to do the surgical intervention now” is supported by the argument of analogy “when I had breast cancer the doctors did the surgical intervention before doing chemotherapy” and by two emotive arguments “I fear that if we wait with the intervention other cancer cells could spread in other organs” and “I fear that if we wait with the intervention the cancer could become bigger”, as shown in table 2:

Table 2. Argumentative reconstruction of the patients’ argumentation.

In what follows I will illustrate the argumentative reconstruction of the doctor’s argumentation; the standpoint “our advice is to do a chemotherapy before doing a surgical intervention” is justified by four argumentative lines, as we can see in table 3: the first argues about the danger of doing a surgical intervention at the present moment, the second argues about the utility to do a chemotherapy before the surgical operation, and the third acts on emotions. On the one hand the assertion that doctors want the best cure for the patient is justified by 1.3.1, and in the last analysis by 1.3.1.1. On the other hand the argument that doctors want the best cure for the patient is justified by the subordinate argument 1.3.2, where we can observe an empathic behavior. Finally the fourth argumentative line, brings reasons in favor of the impossibility to do the surgical intervention at the present moment.

Table 3. Argumentative reconstruction of the doctor’s standpoint.

Finally, in the last phase, namely that of the choice of the most suitable treatment, the doctor’s standpoint is “I advice a type of aggressive chemotherapy called Folfirinox even though it has many side effects”. In order to justify the importance of doing this aggressive treatment, the doctor proposes three argumentative lines; the last one lays stress on the doctor’s consciousness of the emotive state of the patient, which attempts to make the argument more acceptable for the patient, as we can see in table 4.

Table 4. Argumentative reconstruction of the doctor’s standpoint.

The analysis of a patient-centered medical interaction based on the awareness of doctor’s emotions and of the patient’s possible emotive reactions as well as on an empathic behavior demonstrates that emotions emerging in argumentation play an important role in supporting patients in bad news disclosure as well as in guiding patients about the decision making process of treatment choices; in this framework the most important criterion are patients’ preferences. Such kind of interactions favor a shared decision making process

aimed at reaching a treatment on which both physician and patient agree, by discussing the pros and cons of possible treatment options in such a way that the views of both parties are taken into account
as stated by F. Snoek Henkemans (Snoek Henkemans, 2012, p. 30). Furthermore they enable
a reasoned compliance of the patient, where the patient takes a certain course of action advised by a doctor because she has understood and believes in the inner motivations behind it
as stated by Rubinelli and Schulz (Rubinelli & Schulz, 2006, p. 357). What is more, this approach permits to support the emotive involvement of the patient during the bad news disclosure as well as during the decision-making process of the treatment choice.

We can find a confirm of these statements from a retrospective clue in the doctor-psychologist interaction about the doctor’s emotions during the bad news communication, as we can see from the excerpt below;
(1)
Ps: how did you feel during the communication of this bad news?
D: I felt at ease because I had already introduced the discussion about a possible cancer during the previous visit..
Ps: what emotions do you feel now?
D: I must admit that sometimes I feel very sad in communicating the bad news, when patients have the same age of me, as in this case… I sometimes empathize

The importance of emotions’ awareness is confirmed by the evidence of the fact that the doctor is aware of his own emotions and succeeds in an empathic behavior.

We find another confirm of the importance of argumentation from another retrospective clue in the psychologist-patient interaction about the outcome and impressions of the bad news communication after the consultation, as we can see from the excerpt below;
(2)
Ps: and did you understand why it is important to do chemotherapy before the surgical intervention?
P: yes I understood that doing chemotherapy is important in order to let the cancer decrease and to do the surgical intervention in a second moment
Ps: was it important for you to hear about this?
P: Yes the doctor was very clear in clarifying many aspects of my disease and of the cure the exams confirmed the presence of a carcinoma however nobody told us why it was important to do chemotherapy first and wait with the surgical intervention

5.2 Disease-centredness: doctors disregarding their own emotions and patients’ emotive reactions
In order to highlight the potential benefits of the patient-centered approach, I will hereby illustrate the inadequacy of the disease-centered approach: we will show some excerpts in which it is evident that the doctor does not argue in favor of his standpoint, and that this causes misunderstandings in the communication, because the patient does not understand the actual situation and does not have the possibility to ask for questions and remarks, as stated also by S. Bigi (Bigi, 2012). Furthermore, the doctor does not take into consideration the possible emotive reactions of the patient and this clearly contributes to misunderstandings. It is remarkable the case of a patient that did not want to do the surgical intervention after chemotherapy because she did not understand that it was the most effective cure. The day after the consultation the patient came back for another consultation because she did not want to do the surgical intervention after chemotherapy and she was confused about the therapeutic approach to follow, as we can see from the excerpt below;
3)
P: Yesterday I asked you if it was possible to avoid the surgical intervention and you answered me that I absolutely need to do this intervention, without explaining me why.

Then, the patient goes on arguing why she did not want to do the surgical intervention, and the doctor answers “I only wish you that we meet in the operation theatre”, as we can see from the excerpt below;
(4)
P: I read that when the cancer is in the pancreas tail, after chemotherapy the cancer may disappear and so I may avoid the surgical intervention
D: I told you yesterday the answer is no. After chemotherapy you must do the surgical intervention.
I only wish you that we meet in the operation theatre.
P: but why?
D: because you may not be candidate to the surgical intervention and then continue with chemotherapy/ the surgical intervention is unavoidable it is the best solution because continuing with chemotherapy is not effective/ the disease could spread in other organs
P: if you wish me that I will be able to do the surgical intervention, then I wish it also myself

The patient asks for reasons and the doctor argues that the patient could not be candidate to the surgical intervention and then continue with chemotherapy, that it is not the best solution because continuing with chemotherapy is not effective. Here we observe a shift in the patient’s reasoning, after an even poor argumentation, which however hints at an empathic response.

Concluding, we can observe that no argumentation or poor argumentation which does not consider doctors’ emotions as well as possible patients’ emotive reactions and which disregards empathy produces misunderstandings and difficulties in accepting diseases’ consequences and treatments. In such a framework, the most important criterion seems to be identifiable in medical evidence, and we observe an unilateral aprioristic decision-making process, where the patient is in passive condition and the doctor decides alone for the patient.

Even in this case we show a confirm of this dis-functional type of interaction from a retrospective clue, namely from the doctor-psychologist interaction about the doctor’s emotions during the bad news communication. The doctor is not aware of his own emotions and is not empathic;
(5)
Ps: the idea to communicate this type of news is painful for you?
D: No, I don’t have any emotive resonance.
Ps: Are you sure? It is impossible.. Are you released?
D: Yes, I am sure. I have already removed the content of the communication.. I do this every day.. I think that this is a sort of defense

We can retrieve another retrospective clue of the importance of an even only poor argumentation hinting at emotions in the patient-psychologist retrospective interaction, as we can see from the excerpt below;
(6)
Ps: do you think the doctor was clearer today in explaining you the clinical situation?
P: Yes today he was clearer and more human… however, yesterday I was very upset about the fact that he wished me to go in the operation theatre.
Ps: probably you were upset yesterday because the doctor wasn’t clear in explaining the reasons of the fact that he wished you to go in the operation theatre. Because if you don’t do the surgical intervention the cure would be only a half cure. Because the best cure consists of chemotherapy and intervention. Because continuing with chemotherapy wouldn’t be effective.
P: Yes now I understand that I must do the intervention and this is all I wish myself.

6. Emotions at the inferential level: the interweaving of psychology and argumentation
Until now this paper focussed on the interactional analysis; however, in order to prove the crucial role of doctors’ emotions in patients’ reasonable decisions, it is necessary to make a more in-depth analysis and to investigate the inferential structure of arguments.

First of all, we need to introduce the theoretical foundations of emotions conceived as evaluative and unifying devices able to connect one argument to its standpoint. Social psychology has argued in favour of the reasonableness of emotions since W. James, who argued that feelings individualize knowledge, telling us how a thing is in conjunction with us, and that feelings unify knowledge, being able to connect past events deriving from our expectations and desires (James, 1884; James, 1890).
In more recent time, the famous neuroscientist A. Damasio reevaluated the Jamesian theory, and lays stress on the necessity of taking into consideration the analysis James made of the “internal world”, in order to shed light on that unified mental configuration which unifies the “objects of the Self” (Damasio, 1999); the central core of his theory concerns the mental evaluation of the situation which determined the emotion.

In this paper I propose that an analysis of the inferential structure of arguments following the approach known as Argumentum Model of Topics (Rigotti & Greco Morasso, 2010) offers a proof of the evaluative and unifying function of emotions as conceived by psychological theories.

The AMT aims at proposing a coherent and founded approach to the study of argument schemes, which can overcome several emerging difficulties, yet being in line with previous achievements on this aspect. In general, modern authors conceive of argument schemes as the bearing structure that connects the premises to the standpoint or conclusion in a piece of real argumentation. In the AMT, the argument scheme combines a procedural (universal and abstract) component, in which an inferential connection (maxim) is activated, with a material component, guaranteeing for the applicability of the maxim to the actual situation considered in the argument (Rigotti & Greco Morasso, 2010). For space reasons, we will focus only on the material component; in the AMT the material component is made up of two components, namely the endoxon and the datum. Endoxa are conceived as “opinions that are accepted by everyone or by the majority, or by the wise men (all of them or the majority, or by the most illustrious of them)” as conceived by Aristotle (Topics 100b, 21). With reference to the datum, it concerns statements that are peculiar pieces of information, concrete facts emerging in the argumentative situation. It is in this framework that I will propose to consider the relevance of emotive endoxa and emotive data.

The single argumentation that I will investigate deals with the doctor’s argumentation at the stage “communication of the bad news” of the activity type. The doctor’s standpoint is “Our advice is to do a chemotherapy before doing a surgical intervention”, motivated by the argument “1.1 We want the best cure for you, we believe this is the best cure for you”, which is in turn supported by two compound arguments: according to the taxonomy of loci the first one can be classified as a locus from all the more, “1.1.1a You could be my sister and if you were my sister I would advice you the same treatment”, and the second one as a locus from termination and setting up, namely “1.1.1b since years we continue to propose this treatment sequence to patients” because “1.1.1b.1 we have always been satisfied by this type of treatment sequence”.

I believe that AMT gives the chance to retrieve the evaluative and unifying function of emotions, integrating emotion and cognition in a unified mental configuration; the emotive and the cognitive component of the reasoning process are respectively retrievable in the material and in the procedural component of the argument scheme resulting in the final conclusion when the decision is achieved.

A careful analysis of the locus from all the more through the Y-structure permits to observe the presence of an emotive endoxon and of an emotive datum in the material component. The conjunction of the endoxon and of the emotive datum creates an inferential effect leading to the first conclusion, which is strongly emotionally determined; the first conclusion that is obtained from the material starting point is equally exploited by the procedural starting point. This point of intersection is crucial in the AMT, indeed it represents the junction between the material and the procedural starting points, and within this work the interweaving between the emotive and the cognitive components. This conclusion perfectly meets the conditions established by the maxim and, conjoined with it allows inferring the standpoint “This cure is recommended for the patient”, as shown in Table 5.

Table 5. Inferential analysis: locus from all the more.

With reference to the locus from termination and setting up, I will analyse the single argumentation “we continue to propose this type of treatment sequence to patients” because “we have always been satisfied by this type of treatment sequence”; again, the emotive and the cognitive component of the reasoning process are respecively retrievable in the material and in the procedural component of the argument scheme resulting in the final conclusion when the decision is achieved. Again, from the analysis of this Y-structure we can observe in the material component the presence of an emotive endoxon and of an emotive datum. The conjunction of the endoxon and of the datum creates an inferential effect leading to the first conclusion “doctors should not terminate to propose this type of treatment sequence”. Again, this conclusion perfectly meets the conditions established by the maxim and, conjoined with it allows inferring the doctor’s standpoint.

Table 6. Inferential analysis: locus from termination and setting up.

7. Conclusion
With this paper, I have contributed to the current debate on the importance of adopting a patient-centred approach in highly emotive medical communicative situations such as highly specialized medical consultations; for this purpose, I proved the crucial importance of argumentation and of argumentatively played out emotions.
Firstly, I have shown the importance of the awareness of doctors’ argumentatively played out emotions in the optimization of the management of the painful communication, in tracing a particular and an effective path in decision-making processes of the patient and in helping the acceptance of the disease’s consequences in terms of both treatments and prognosis.
Secondly, I have shed light on the necessity of taking into account patients’ emotions and possible emotive reactions, in order to manage an optimal painful communication and to favour the acceptability of doctors’ arguments in the patient.
Thirdly, I have shown that the AMT approach gives us the chance to retrieve the evaluative and unifying function of emotions in the inferential structure of arguments, as conceived by psychological theories, integrating emotions (conceived as processes of cognitive evaluation) and cognition in the reasoning process, reflecting a unified mental configuration.

However, much remains to be done, and future work should be devoted to better analyse the relationship between doctors’ empathy and arguments’ acceptability for patients. At the inferential level, the correlation between empathy and locus from all the more should be deepened also with a quantitative study.
On the other hand, the role played out by patients’ emotions should be emphasized and investigated more in depth; the relationship between patients’ argumentatively played out emotions and their standpoint may lead us to better understand some defense dynamics leading to the refutation of doctors’ standpoints for instance, aiming at finding out if a correlation exists between patients’ experienced emotions and the acceptability of doctors’ argumentation.

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Abstract: In this paper, I elaborate the complex scheme of practical reasoning by proposing its context-independent and context-dependent elements. Further, I focus on its means-goal premise (“We should do X, because X leads to Y, and Y is desirable”). I argue that the practical inference can be licenced in three basic ways: when “X leads to” signifies a necessary means, the best means or the means that is good enough.
Keywords: argumentation schemes, inference licence, optimising, practical reasoning, satisficing

We deliberate not about ends but about what contributes to ends. […] Having set the end [deliberators] consider how and by what means it is to be attained; and if it seems to be produced by several means they consider by which it is most easily and best produced. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1112b12-15)

One’s choice is rational only if one did not recognize clearly better reasons for choosing any of one’s forgone alternatives. (Schmidtz, 1995, p. 38)

1. Introduction
Practical reasoning (PR) is reasoning about what (to intent) to do, as opposed to theoretical reasoning, reasoning about what (to believe) is the case. When expressed in language, PR takes the form of practical argumentation (PA), which has been analysed as a separate argument scheme with its own set of premises, inference rules and critical questions (e.g. Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012; Feteris, 2002; Ihnen Jory, 2012; Walton, 2006; 2007).[i]

In this paper, I propose a detailed scheme of complex PA which, while building on previous proposals (esp. Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012), clearly lays out the context-independent and context-dependent elements of PA. I elaborate the scheme by focusing in particular on its causal or means-goal premise (“Let’s do X, because X leads to Y, and Y is desirable”). This premise is crucial, as it points to an inference licencing our step from the premises to the conclusion that X is the reasoned action to be taken. I will argue that in principle, when acting rationally, we are licensed to do three things: the best thing, the thing good enough or the necessary thing. Which of the three applies (and whether it obtains) is determined contextually in deliberation with others who might suggest alternative options. In this way, we end up with a multi-party deliberation where different alternative options are advocated by different parties to argumentation.

2. Practical reasoning as practical argumentation
Aristotle is credited with providing one of the first methodical accounts of PR and deliberation. It has been argued that he was deliberately vague on the distinction between private (internal) and public (collective) deliberation as chief activities of practical reason, in order to expose “a deep analogy between his conceptions of the two domains” (Dascal, 2005, p. 52). Indeed, the limits of private PR can be overcome or reduced by engaging others: “We call in others to aid us in deliberation on important questions, distrusting ourselves as not being equal to deciding” (Nicomachean Ethics, 1112b11).

Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca take up these arguments and claim not only simple similarity between public and private deliberation but rather primacy of the former over the latter:
[…] inward deliberation […] appears to be constructed on the model of deliberation with others. Hence, we must expect to find carried over to this inner deliberation most of the problems associated with the conditions necessary for discussion with others. […] Accordingly, from our point of view, it is by analyzing argumentation addressed to others that we can best understand self-deliberation, and not vice versa. (1969, pp. 14, 41)

Following this tradition, I take an externalist view, where practical reasoning (PR) is in fact practical argumentation (PA) in both a descriptive and normative sense. Using O’Keefe’s (1977) distinction, one can say that PA is a product (argument1) of an argumentative process or activity (argument2) of deliberation. Chief tasks of deliberators such as determining the “most easily and best produced” means (Nicomachean Ethics, 1112b15) and “recognizing better reasons” (Schmidtz, 1995, p. 38) are intersubjective and discursive achievements, rather than subjective and mental ones. And such are the evaluative standards – as captured in dialectical procedures for critically testing the reasonableness of practical arguments (Walton, 2006; 2007). This seems an adequate account given that many intrinsic elements of PA – values, norms, obligations – are collectively constructed and sanctioned, thus making up external reasons for action, often independent from an agent’s desires or intentions (Searle, 2001; Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012). Overall, as convincingly argued by Hitchcock (2002), an externalist argumentative approach takes us away from the perils of “solipsistic, egoistic and antisocial” accounts of individual PR.

3. Detailed scheme of practical argumentation
The scheme of PA presented in Figure 1 stems from a rich literature on practical argument in philosophy and argumentation theory (see Lewiński, 2014, for a more detailed discussion). In particular, it is derived from a recent comprehensive account of PA by Fairclough and Fairclough (2012). While referring to their work for an in-depth analysis of all the premises constituting the scheme (Circumstances, Goal, Values), I will briefly mention four basic advantages of the scheme, focussing further on the last two, and especially on the Means-Goal premise.

First, the scheme shapes the framework of relevance for (multi-party) deliberation. Typically, different parties argue for the contextual betterness of their proposals for action {M, N, O… Z} (see the “M is Best” box). Their deliberation develops then as an argumentative polylogue (Lewiński & Aakhus, 2014) along the lines of possible disagreements over the various elements of the structure (basic premises, inference rules and contextual criteria).

Second, the scheme distinguishes between context-independent and context-dependent elements of PA. Its basic general structure (as per Fairclough & Fairclough: all the white boxes in Figure 1) remains constant, while contextual criteria for choosing “the right means” (below the diagram) fluctuate. This corresponds to the pragma-dialectical distinction between “the general” and “specific soundness conditions” for various “modes of strategic manoeuvring” (van Eemeren, 2010, Chs. 7, 10).

Third, the scheme clarifies the notion of the means-goal premise.
Fourth, it provides a new account of how to criticize and evaluate PA.
I will now discuss in detail these last two points.

4. The means-goal premise and inference licence
Let me start by showing that the simplest formulation of the scheme of PA does not really work. Philosophers and argumentation scholars alike are eager to follow elegant simplicity and claim that “[f]ully spelt out and made explicit, correct [practical] reasoning” (Broome, 2013, p. 260; see Feteris, 2002; Lewiński, 2014) looks more or less like that:
Let’s do X!  – (Conclusion)
because
X leads to Y. –  (Means-Goal premise)
and
Y is our desired goal.  – (Goal premise)

That this scheme does not quite capture the rationality of PA can be shown by producing arguments that clearly follow the scheme but are not so clearly rational:
Let’s stop feeding our children!
because
This will save us lots of money.
and
We really need to start saving.

Here, from acceptable premises (the Goal of saving money is morally acceptable; the Means-Goal relation between stopping feeding children and saving money is technically speaking correct in many contexts) we get a highly objectionable conclusion. That means that there is a problem with the validity of the practical inference drawn here – and in the simple scheme presented above in general. What is missing is the “inference licence” regarding the quality of the link between the desired goal (premise) and the proposed means of action (conclusion).[ii] The Means-Goal inference needs to be thickened beyond asserting simple causality. This, of course, has already been done, but not quite completely. The obvious question to be asked is: “What does it mean that ‘X leads to Y’”?

The most common answer is that X is a means necessary to get to Y. An often quoted Kantian passage captures the rationale for that: “Who wills the end, wills (so far as reason has a decisive influence on his actions) also the means which are indispensably necessary and in his power” (Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, pp. 80-81; cited in Broome, 2013, p. 159). Indeed, the necessity of means is typically considered the paradigmatic type of inference licence in practical reason (Broome, 2002; 2013; Walton, 2007). It is appealing, most notably, because it makes the practical inference valid by standards of classic deductive logic: the “only if X then Y” conditional expressing necessity (formally: Y → X), allows to construct the inference as modus ponens:

Y (Goal premise)
Y → X (Means-Goal premise)
_______________________________
X (Conclusion)

Others, however, object to the idea that reasoning from necessary means provides a paradigm of PR:
If you think about this pattern in terms of real life examples it seems quite out of the question as a general account of practical reason. In general there are lots of means, many of them ridiculous, to achieve any end; and in the rare case where there is only one means, it may be so absurd as to be out of the question altogether. (Searle, 2001, pp. 244-245)

Nevertheless, there surely are cases where arguers build their practical inferences by claiming the necessity of means to be taken, not least in politics where we often hear that “the only way” to fight financial crisis/terrorism/corruption/climate change is X (see Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012; Ihnen Jory, 2012). Before I move to discussing other than necessary, and thus more realistic, cases of PA, let me distinguish between three levels of necessity an arguer might appeal to (Lewiński, 2014, p. 5):
a. conceptual (analytic) necessity (or at least a priori synthetic) determined by the very meaning of the formulated end: “If I want to present at ISSA, then I need to be in Amsterdam in early July.”

b. de iure (conventional) necessity determined by some legal regulations, which may vary across people/countries/regions: “If I want to present at ISSA, then I need to pay the conference fees.”
Note that it is not “indispensably necessary” across the board – it does not apply to those who help organizing ISSA, invited speakers, etc.

c. de facto (practical) necessity determined for different arguers by contextual factors:
“If I want to present at ISSA, then I need to start saving a year in advance.”
vs.
“If I want to present at ISSA, then I need to fill out a travel subsidy form.”

Necessity of means, by definition, excludes consideration of alternative options – an issue which seems to be confused in Walton’s (2007) account.[iii] Whenever we find a certain action necessary to reach our goal, then (recall Kant) we should take this action. Alternatively, if the action is necessary yet objectionable on some other grounds, we should abandon our goal (if the only way to get to Amsterdam is to kill my colleagues competing for travel subsidies, I should rather forget about ISSA).

In most cases, however, our goal “seems to be produced by several means” (Nicomachean Ethics, 1112b15). The fact that the goal is “produced” by one means or another, suggests that we consider sufficient, rather than necessary, means. This is an equally recognised form of PA (see Walton, 2007). Sufficient means, while closer to life than strict necessities, generate two serious problems for PA. First, argumentation from sufficient means is logically invalid, as it instantiates the fallacious pattern of affirming the consequent: If we implement the sufficient means X, then we “produce” our goal Y. And since we intend to produce Y, we should implement X. Formally:
Y (Goal premise)
X → Y (Means-Goal premise)
____________________________________
X (Conclusion)

Second, whenever we face a set of options consisting of several mutually exclusive sufficient means, we need to find a way of concluding our reasoning by selecting one of them based on some sort of a criterion. Consider a situation when two colleagues in Lisbon, Portugal, have just been notified their papers were accepted for the ISSA conference (Circumstances). Their Goal is to get to Amsterdam the day the conference starts. A sufficient action would be one that takes them from current Circumstances to the intended Goal. They consider the following set of such actions:
a. “Let’s get in a kayak and start rowing: with good seas we’ll make it by July 1.”
b. “Let’s book a direct KLM flight for € 300, departing from Lisbon on July 1.”
c. “Let’s book a direct TAP Portugal flight for € 200, departing from Lisbon on”.
d. July 1.”

Here, option a) would surely count among Searle’s “ridiculous” means. As for choosing between b) and c) there is clearly some financial incentive, possibly enforced by the university, to go for option c) – it’s considerably cheaper with negligible differences in all other respects (let us assume). If this is so, choosing anything other than c) would be suspicious in terms of rationality of the conclusion. While this is pretty commonsensical, it comes at a certain philosophical cost. According to Searle, it requires, in our PR, “to introduce a fishy-sounding premise, about wanting to do things ‘by the best way all things considered’” (2001, p. 247). This premise, on Searle’s account, amends PR from sufficient means so that it is not logically fallacious anymore (see 2001, pp. 246-247). Yet, it remains fishy for someone who looks for a “deductive logic of practical reason” for at least two reasons: considerations of bestness are not logical considerations, and, by the way, what are they? (“What is meant by ‘the best way,’ and what is meant by ‘all things considered’?”, Searle, 2001, p. 247.)

Searle, however, might be guilty of pushing on PR the “hard” rationality of deductive logic which is inadequate for a form of reasoning driven by the “soft” rationality of merely plausible and thus inherently defeasible inferences (Dascal, 2005). This “soft” rationality requires a dialectical and informal model of argumentation based on the balance of considerations rather than apodictic inference.[iv] On such a model the concept of “better reasons” or “the best way” becomes intelligible and remains connected to the requirements of rationality. Following Schmidtz, “one’s choice is rational only if one did not recognize clearly better reasons for choosing any of one’s forgone alternatives” (1995, p. 38). This, in fact, seems to be the main inference licence in PR, and not only when a set of alternative (ergo: other than necessary) means is considered (see the Means-Goal premise in Figure 1).

As mentioned above in section 2, the task of “recognizing better reasons” is understood here as an intersubjective achievement of arguers engaged in deliberation over what to do, or in PA. On this reading, one is irrational if a clearly better reason was uttered by one of the parties and subsequently dismissed. But why do we need such an inference licence and what does it mean?

First, Schmidtz’s formulation is cleverly negative: “no better reasons”. This allows to include the necessary means under the inference licence (one cannot argue for a “better necessary” means, contrary to Walton’s (2007) conditions), as well as Buridan cases (when facing two equally good options, we are rational by choosing either of them). Second, it has direct application to the cases of alternative options discussed here. Despite Searle’s worries, there is a long tradition in practical philosophy of investigating what “the best way” might be. Briefly, when reasoning or arguing over the best Means to produce our Goals, we can licence our inference through one of the two basic strategies (see Byron, 1998, 2004):
A. Going for “the best”: optimising / maximising. What “the best” is, is typically contextually determined, sometimes loosely (when deciding on the best place to take summer holidays), sometimes in a very strict, administratively defined way (when deciding on the best public procurement offer, or best job or grant application). While the general criteria or parameters for selecting the best course of action can be suggested (see the bottom of Figure 1, also: Hitchcock, 2011; McBurney et al., 2007), their exact set, scope, precision and weight depend on the context and cannot be pre-defined. Therefore, they constitute the fluctuating conditions in the scheme of PA. One can, however, distinguish between simple and subtle optimising:
i. Simple optimising applies when deliberators deal with a “static context”, that is, when the set of alternative options (means of action) is finite and known (Byron, 1998): we should simply take the best dessert from the list. This requires that the issue is phrased through an alternative question (“Do we take tiramisu, crème brûlée, or ice-cream?”; see Biezma & Rawlins, 2012) or a safe Wh-question (“Which of desserts on the list do we take?”; see Hamblin, 1970, p. 216).
ii. Subtle optimising takes place when we are facing an ever-changing “dynamic context” in which the set of options is open-ended and constantly updated (Byron, 1998), a common situation when selling a house: shall we accept € 100.000 or wait for a better offer? What better offers can we get? Such risky questions (Hamblin, 1970, p. 216) call for an on-going calculation of costs and benefits under uncertainty (e.g., it’s retrospectively irrational to spend € 10.000 and lots of time to get an offer that is € 5.000 better).

B. Going for the “good enough”: satisficing by setting a threshold which will fulfil our basic criteria: e.g., “any offer equal to or higher than € 100.000 is a good deal and we should accept it.” This, of course, is not the “best way all things considered” but it is an important and reasonable way to licence conclusions of our PA under many typical circumstances (assuming, of course, the we set the right threshold, which opens another fascinating theoretical issue lying, for instance, at the very foundation of economics):
i. In dynamic contexts, satisficing lets us “economise” on resource-intensive subtle optimising, which requires constant updates and cost-benefit analysis.
ii. In static contexts, it allows for global optimisation by letting us being somewhat “easy” on less important local results: “Yes, I can jog 3hrs a day for optimal fitness but 30min is good enough in the bigger scheme of things.”

In these ways, satisficing also falls under the “no better reasons” principle. In dynamic contexts, we (so far) have no better option than the one which first meets the threshold (the € 120.000 offer is not quite in yet and might never be). In static contexts, while locally merely satisficing, we might be optimising in terms of the bigger plan: one might be better off jogging for 30min only, and then reading a book for 2h30min, than jogging for 3hrs and completely giving up the book.[v]

The basic inference licence in PA is then: there are no better reasons for proposing other courses of action. Only when strengthened with this principle the “X leads to Y” Means-Goal premise is properly licenced and the entire PA generates reasonable, even if expectedly defeasible, results. Since this general principle has three distinct sub-species, there are, then, three principles of reasoned action:
1. doing what’s necessary;
2. doing what’s best; and
3. doing what’s good enough. It is these inference licences that can become criticisable in PA to the effect of undercutting the practical inference.

Before discussing the ways to criticise PA, I briefly mention one more option, which is likely the most common and the least discussed kind of means we consider in our PA. I have called them conducive means in order to convey their presumed worthiness in approaching the desired Goal, despite their being neither necessary nor sufficient means (Lewiński, 2014, p. 6). Conducive means should be considered against a disjunction of other alternatives (for they are not necessary) and in conjunction with other means (for they are not sufficient). Examples of such means are plenty. Consider the one analysed by Ihnen Jory (2012, pp. 33-34): “In order to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions we should invest in building more concentrated solar energy plants (CSP).” Clearly, to do so is not a necessary action to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions, as we can instead drive electric cars, build more wind farms, or even nuclear plants, and still achieve the goal. Equally, it is not a sufficient means: alone, more CSPs will not rid us of all the undesired gas emissions. Still, when supported with other premises of the scheme of PA, and as part of a bigger plan, going for more CSPs might be not a bad conclusion at all. It might be more efficient, or otherwise acceptable, than nuclear plants, or might let us achieve a certain level of mitigation we are satisfied with. Shortly, whether because it is an optimal or a satisfactory means, it takes us some way from current Circumstances to the Goal and is thus presumably reasonable. Following all this, we arrive at the following types of inferences licencing our PA:
a. Doing X is necessary to get to Y
b. Doing X is sufficient (and best / good enough way) to get to Y
c. Doing X is conducive (and best / good enough way) to get to Y

5. Criticising practical argumentation
Among others, Walton stands out as the one who has thoroughly investigated the ways to criticise PA. According to him (Walton, 2006, p. 188; 2007, p. 223), “[t]here are three ways of criticizing practical reasoning:”

1. To attack one of the premises of the argumentation scheme.
2. To undercut the argument by asking one of a number of critical questions that match the scheme – (corresponding to Pollock’s (1995) undercutters).
3. To mount a counter-argument designed to rebut the original argument from practical reasoning by arguing for an opposite conclusion – (corresponding to Pollock’s (1995) rebuttals).

This triad is well-justified given the dominant, triadic view of argument (see Figure 2).

One can, then, criticise the premises, the inference or the conclusion itself. That this actually works (read: is a jointly exhaustive and mutually exclusive classification of types of criticism), can be easily illustrated on a classical syllogism:
Some men should work as slaves.
Socrates is a man.
so
Socrates should work as a slave.

To criticise it we can:
1. Attack one of the premises. Here, the major premise seems vulnerable: “How can you say that some human beings should work as slaves?! It’s absolutely unacceptable!”
2. Undercut it by pointing out that this is not a valid form of syllogism: “Here’s my Venn diagram, it clearly doesn’t follow.” “You can’t reason validly through two particulars.”
3. Rebut it by defeating the conclusion: “Socrates is a free-born citizen of Athens with full rights, so he can’t work as a slave!”

Walton is quite clear that his critical questions regarding given argument schemes fall squarely under the 2nd category: “Critical questions act as undercutters that challenge the inferential link between the premises and the conclusion of a practical inference” (2006, p. 190). When evaluating PA, Walton offers – among other more or less similar formulations – the following list of critical questions (CQs) for the “basic scheme for practical reasoning”(see 2006, pp. 189-190; 2007, p. 234; italics added):
(CQ1) What other goals do I have that should be considered that might conflict with G?
(CQ2) What alternative actions to my bringing about A that would also bring about G should be considered?
(CQ3) Among bringing about A and these alternative actions, which is arguably the most efficient (the best)?
(CQ4) What grounds are there for arguing that it is practically possible for me to bring about A?
(CQ5) What consequences of my bringing about A should also be taken into account?

In view of the schematic representation of PA proposed in Section 3 (see Figure 1), all Walton’s CQs seem to be premise attacks rather than inference undercutters. CQs, rather indiscriminately, address both the main context-independent premises of PA (Goals, Means-Goals) and its context-dependent criteria (side consequences, practical feasibility). One can thus easily (as Walton sometimes does) add additional CQs, for instance regarding conformance with other goals, opportunity costs or likelihood of success. In any case, we would have moved CQs from category 2 (inference undercutters) to category 1 (premise attacks).

Moreover, in the scheme of PA proposed here, the “better than any other actually or potentially proposed action {M,…, Z}” (see “M is Best” box in Figure 1) sub-premise already contains Pollock’s rebuttals. When arguing practically for the bestness of our proposal, we (implicitly or explicitly) claim that “we have a better (contrary) proposal / alternative means / conclusion of PA than you.” This does attempt to rebut others’ conclusions, but only by challenging one of the premises of their PAs. So category 3 (rebuttals) becomes 1 (premise attacks), just as 2 (undercutters) does.

While there is no room to discuss these issues in satisfactory detail – and thus better justifying the account proposed here – I will argue that on the basis of the analysis in the previous section, one can distinguish only three inference licenses and three corresponding critical questions regarding PA, in their intended function of inference undercutters (see Figure 1):
1. Is taking necessary means the right thing? (Maybe we should instead give up the goal, that is, one of my premises?)
2. Is taking the best means the right thing? (Shall we really optimise here? Or be somewhat slack and go for a satisficing strategy?)
3. Is satisficing the right way to proceed? If so, is the threshold set right? Or are we taking it too easy?

6. Conclusion
What I hope to have achieved in this paper is a focused, analytic investigation of the scheme of practical argumentation. This complex scheme moves quite some distance away from a simple argument built of a premise, an inference and a conclusion. But simplicity does not quite capture the reasonableness of practical argument, as is clear in examples that follow the basic scheme but are faulty. What is missing is one of the three inference rules: necessity, bestness or satisfactory goodness of the actions to be taken in view of reaching our goals. These inferences warrant the step from the exigency to be addressed (Circumstances) and the state of affairs to be reached (Goal) following the accepted Values, to the action to be taken (Conclusion).

A number of issues require further theoretical attention. Are we speaking here of argument schemes as basic units of our argumentation or rather of complex argument structures, combining a number of schemes? Or does a fully fleshed our scheme always become a structure? Further, what are exactly the relations between the content of premises and inference licences? While clearly distinct in formal arguments, are they not confusingly similar in informal schemes? Can we at all clearly distinguish between premise attacks and inference undercutters?

In any case, by pursuing such investigations, we are moving towards seeing practical argumentation not as a standalone logical entity, but as an interactive product of deliberation. This deliberation takes shape of a polylogue: a multi-party argumentative activity where relative “rightness” of multiple proposed actions is discussed.

NOTES
i. Note that some argumentation scholars – such as Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969, §62) and pragma-dialecticians (Feteris, 2002; Ihnen Jory, 2012) – use instead the term pragmatic argument or argumentation.
ii. The notion of inference-licence is used by Toulmin (2003/1958) interchangeably with inference-warrant (see p. 91). Toulmin traces the origins of the notion to the work of Gilbert Ryle, who also uses the notion of inference-ticket, “which licenses its possessors to move from asserting factual statements to asserting other factual statements” (1949, p. 121).
iii. Of course, arguers can disagree over whether a means X is necessary or not, with the crucial argument being either the lack or the availability of alternatives (see Ihnen Jory, 2012, pp. 32-33). Once this is settled, however, and the “necessary condition scheme” for PR is used, we cannot without contradiction speak of the selection of means or of “the most acceptable necessary condition” (Walton, 2007, p. 216).
iv “[Soft rationality] deals with the vast area of the ‘reasonable’, which lies between the hard rational and the irrational. The model underlying the idea of soft rationality is that of a balance where reasons in favor and against (a position, a theory, a course of action, etc.) are put in the scales and weighed.” (Dascal, 2005, p. 58).
v. For similar reasons, it has been argued (e.g. Byron, 1998) that satisficing is eventually a species of optimisation, as it aims at finding the optimal balance between overall costs (effort, time, other resources) and benefits (satisfaction of preferences and values) of our actions.

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Abstract: Georgia has undergone remarkable socio-economic changes and political unrest on its difficult road to statehood. Re-establishing itself from the collapsed Soviet Union as an independent, sovereign state has been a painful process. This paper looks at number of speeches delivered by the political leader of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili (presidential term: 2004-2013) in order to analyze argumentative public communication, focusing on how practical arguments in favour of the advocated policies are developed in the selected speeches.
Keywords: critical discourse analysis, Georgia, practical argumentation

1. Introduction
This article analyzes Georgian political discourse, namely annual report speeches of the Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili (presidential term 2004-2013) delivered at the Parliament of Georgia. It draws particular attention to practical arguments and rhetorical devices used in the selected political texts. Although President Saakashvili is acknowledged as a charismatic and persuasive public speaker, I argue that his speeches reveal lack of argumentative communication and fail to suggest a clear political vision while strongly advocating policies.

Over the past two decades, republic of Georgia has undergone remarkable socio-economic and political changes. Re-establishing itself from the collapsed Soviet Union as an independent state has been a painful and rather complex process. The recent history of the country has included the overthrow of communism, revolutionary change of the government and the first constitutional transfer of power through elections (leading to the so called ‘cohabitation’). Georgia’s shift from a former soviet republic into an independent state has been analysed within various disciplines. Historical timeline and accompanying processes have been observed in terms of social or political studies, identity and ideology related debate and other fields of research. In recent times, there has been growing interest in applying discourse analysis to study politics and power. According to the Constitution of Georgia, “The president is authorised to address people and the Parliament, and once a year submits a report to parliament on the most important issues concerning the state”. The present paper looks into 7 institutional the speeches delivered by the president of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili to the supreme legislative body of the country. I am primarily interested in identifying practical arguments in the selected political texts and analyzing relevant schemes pursuant to Critical Discourse Analysis. This paper addresses the following questions: What particular argument schemes is the arguer using to justify particular lines of action (policies)? How can these arguments be evaluated from a dialectical and rhetorical perspectives?

The article will first discuss analytical framework of the research, that is of Critical Discourse Analysis (Fairclough 2010) and particularly the more recent version of CDA that gives primacy to practical argumentation and deliberation in political discourse (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012). Critical Discourse Analysis is especially relevant due to the focus it has on texts and its encouragement to have a dialogue between disciplines while conducting analysis. Second, I continue with the analysis of 7 institutional speeches with specific attention to practical arguments in favour of the advocated policies – how practical argumentation scheme is used to legitimize foreign policy and implemented and/or planned reforms.

Analysis shows that not only are the premises poorly related to the claim for action, but are also frequently insufficient and unnecessary too. I suggest that vague representations of the goal premise, hence vague political visions or imageries, are characteristic of the practical arguments being made, and the measures that allegedly need to be taken are often insufficient and sometimes unnecessary. There is a complete absence of alternative courses of action and critical examination of such alternatives, and hasty generalisation is one of the most characteristic argumentative fallacies in all seven reports. This seems to correlate with an absence of clear political vision as to which particular goals Georgia ought to be pursuing and what means are, realistically, most likely to deliver a range of desirable goals. Certain common elements found in all seven speeches is a special contribution to this research. Analysis will proceed on focusing on these common characteristics found in all speeches. The final part of the article is dedicated to summarizing main findings and lessons learned.

2. Methodology
The analytical framework of the paper is that of Critical Discourse Analysis (Fairclough 2010) and particularly the more recent version of CDA that gives primacy to practical argumentation and deliberation in political discourse (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012). Being of highly interdisciplinary character, “Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) studies the way social power abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context. With such dissident research, critical discourse analysts take explicit position, and thus want to understand, expose, and ultimately resist social inequality” (Van Dijk 2001, 352).

In their recent book “Political Discourse Analysis a Method for Advanced Students” (2012) Isabela Fairclough and Norman Fairclough describe practical reasoning as a discussion regarding future actions and suggest showing (reflecting and analysing) practical reasoning as part of political discourse:
“The structure of practical reasoning that we suggest is the following (Figure 2.1), where the hypothesis that action A might enable the agent to reach his goals (G), starting from his circumstances (C), and in accordance with certain values (V), leads to the presumptive claim that he ought to do A. It is often the case that the context of action is seen as a ‘problem’ (and is negatively evaluated in view of the agent’s existing values or concerns) and the action is seen as the solution that will solve the problem. As the conclusion that the action might be the right means to achieve the goal or solve the agent’s problem follows only presumptively, we have represented the link from premises to conclusion by means of a dotted line.” (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012).

Thinking of this scheme as one of the most relevant frameworks for analyzing set initiatives in political context, I will apply the above described structure in analysing argumentative communication in annual report texts.

3. Annual reports
2003 was a turning point in the modern history of the republic of Georgia. On November 23rd, a peaceful revolution took place when thousands of demonstrators were led by a young and a charismatic leader Mikheil Saakashvili. In January 2004 Saakashvili was elected president of Georgia with 96% of the vote. The first annual report delivered by President Saakashvili to the supreme legislative body of the country took place in February 2005.

Introductory part of the 2005 report’s text is quite extensive and includes some argumentative discussion. The speech contains 3480 words out of which 1171 are of initiatory character. By the beginning of the report, president develops a rhetorically rich comparative analysis: what did Georgia look like before the Rose Revolution and what it turned into due to the democracy-promoted efforts made by the new government. The narrative highlights “Our achievements” on the one hand and ”Georgia a year ago” in contrast. While developing this opposition the speaker applies simple argumentative structure: “Georgia was a country with no defensive capacity – there was not a single tank and not even a bullet for an hour fight. We had an army in several month hunger.” The speaker’s statement about military weakness of the country is supported by two premises: the lack of relevant equipment and poor conditions for the solders. Achievements of the year, on the other hand, are presented by using specific, detailed cases and examples. Each of the successful fields has its own “concrete hero”. While illustrating successful governance through individual names (and stories) may serve as a powerful persuasive strategy, the risk of developing a fallacy – hasty generalization increases. For instance, the speaker emphasizes the achievements of the finance police through the case of Kvemo Kartli (administrative region in Georgia) department, names the head of operational department, greets him in front of the public and expresses gratitude towards him personally. The same strategy is applied to show the success in the field of education, security and law enforcement – patrol police activities.

One of the fundamental issues highlighted in Georgia’s development agenda, especially after the Rose Revolution, has been related to European and Euro-Atlantic integration. Strengthening cooperative links with NATO has been perceived as one of the best options for enhancing the country’s security and developing realistic perspectives on territorial integrity. Georgia has two breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Osetia, consequently international support in consolidating the state is of utmost importance.

The text of 2005 report, however, is quite limited in terms of elaborating arguments in favour of the implemented foreign policy. NATO integration program is presented as part of the general, so to say ,,Georgia now and before” argument, part of the rhetorically rich sequence of statements:
1.
“No one should question our presence there. Georgia must participate in the processes because our country should restore its territorial integrity through peace. We are not a country in ordinary condition. We are the state that seeks international support today, as never before, to implement peaceful processes. In order to gain peace, it is critically important that a country is strong. Army is a constituent part of it. In summer, during antidrug operation 16 of our best soldiers died. The first woman instructor, Ms. Ia, trained according to American program on Krtsanisi polygon is present here today” (Annual report 2005).

In spite of the issue’s priority, the speaker does not provide even primary explanatory information on peace building activities and operations. Connection between Georgia’s participation in the process and restoring country’s territorial integrity is rather vague. This seems to underestimate the importance of thorough discussion before claiming a specific action. Gratitude and appreciation towards solders is the major context in which the speaker discusses Georgia’s engagement in NATO operations. The sentence on dramatic consequences of the operations (death of 16 solders) is followed by an innovation, a modernisation concept (for example a woman solder trained in accordance to American program) and messages tapping into patriotism, thus disguising (or preventing) alternative assessment of the action. The passage, I believe, serves to create an emotional attitude towards Georgian solders’ involvement in NATO operations in the Middle East.

Goal: “Our country should restore territorial integrity.”
To achieve the set goal the speaker offers to continue participation in NATO peace building operations.
Claim of action: “Georgia must be the part of these processes“.
Circumstances are presented radically: “We are not the state in an ordinary situation”
The value premise behind this short argumentative text is a concern for territorial integrity.

Something that is not explicitly discussed in the provided example above is that, in order to get support from the international alliance, any state needs access to its membership (which Georgia does not have so far). The challenging questions to the claim for action would be: Is participation in peace building operations necessary and sufficient for restoring territorial integrity of Georgia? Is the practice of participation linked to becoming a NATO member state at all? Does Georgia’s quest for NATO integration guarantee facilitation of processes on the long road to alliance membership? According to the information provided at the official web-page of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, (www.mfa.gov.ge) Georgia became the participant of NATO Partnership for Peace program. As part of the program, Alliance member and partner states arrange trainings and quarter teachings. Georgia is actively included in the seminars and conferences dedicated to modern security challenges. The country made an official application in NATO Prague summit in 2002. Another important information is that Georgia contributes to ISAF – International Security Assistance Force – operation. Currently, as a non-member state, it has the second largest military contingent in Afghanistan. In fact, considering the role taken and participation scale, shedding more light on the claimed actions could have lead to more rational judgement. Georgia’s integration to NATO still remains a highly contested issue. While praising Georgia’s reform efforts, achievements and outstanding role in the international alliance operations, the world leaders’ comments challenge the dynamic perspectives of integration: “There are “no immediate plans” for expanding NATO to include Georgia and Ukraine, U.S. President Barack Obama said at the press conference after the EU-US summit in Brussels March 26 (2014)” – Reports daily news online service www.Civil.ge. The below quote (cited on the same online news service) provides incentives on why the question of integration remains debated: “I know that Russia, at least on background, has suggested that one of the reasons they’ve been concerned about Ukraine was potential NATO membership. On the other hand, part of the reason that the Ukraine has not formally applied for NATO membership is because of its complex relationship with Russia. I don’t think that’s going to change anytime soon, obviously,” President Obama said.

President Saakashvili touches upon Georgia’s territorial integrity, security related issues and a foreign policy as interconnected topics in every annual report delivered in the Parliament. Most of the time, in my view, relations between the set goals and means of their implementation are fairly represented. Practical argument on Georgia’s foreign policy in the report of 2006 is as follows:
2.
Circumstance premise: “Georgia has many international friends. On the other hand, they (implying enemies) want to annex territory of our country. We move to NATO standards. Very soon Georgia’s border will be the borders of NATO. Today I am confident to say something that I would be unable to say yesterday- Georgia is one step away from NATO.”

Goal: becoming a NATO member state. Reaching a state where Georgia is a free and a successful country.

Means – goal: identifying concrete means that will deliver this goal, however, is difficult. One of the suggestions of reaching the goal is the following: “If everything continues the way it is going on today, and if no one is able to involve us in a heavy provocation, Georgia and Ukraine (however, I can only speak about Georgia) has a chance indeed to become NATO member states in 2008. And this year we can become official candidates for NATO membership”. Increasing awareness among international community about the situation in Georgia is presented as another means goal/ another opportunity to reach the goal/: “They should know that the teacher from Gali can be arrested when her/his student expresses “Long live to my country”.

Gali is a district in the breakaway region of Abkhazia that has ethnic Georgian population. According to the Human Rights Watch report, “About 47,000 displaced people have returned to their homes in Gali district. But the Abkhaz authorities have erected barriers to their enjoyment of a range of civil and political rights”. The document highlights restricted access to Georgian – language education in the region. The above mentioned means-goal quotation refers to the violation of rights of the ethnic Georgian teacher in Gali district, the threat that any teacher may face. This may implicitly indicate that if Georgia spreads information about the circumstances in breakaway region among the international communities, and sheds light on the human rights conditions, then inequalities will be revealed and Georgia’s need of better international protection will become more explicit.

Claim for action: Seeking international support should continue. The launched initiatives and policies should continue. Through this judgement, I think the president attempts to justify the actions taken by the team he represents and advocate the continuation of the same rout.

Comparative statement on “Georgia before the Rose Revolution and now” continues to retain leading position in the annual report text of 2006. Like in previous case, this time as well it is enriched with stylistic devices. The president begins his speech by questioning: “Where did we start from? Where do we stand now? Where are we going?” The rest of the text fits into this scheme and increases pathetic background with various stylistic and lexical devices, such as: ,,We began from the point where Georgia, as a state had its existence finished… We started from the point where nations and states end their being”. ,,We need to wound our healings.” Necessity of continuing reforms and liberalisation is a key claim for action in the 2006 report script. Circumstance premise in this practical argument is exceptionally extended: 11 different directions asserting economic development can be distinguished in it. Sometimes simple argument schemes are applied within the circumstance premise. Circumstances are described as follows:
1. Impressive economic development;
2. Georgian entrepreneurs can make business in favourable conditions;
3. The country budget accumulated more amount than it has been planned;
4. FDI volume has been increased;
5. GDP has been increased;
6. Inflation decreased;
7. Privatisation has reached unprecedented level;
8. Georgia strengthens its economic ranking internationally;
9. Taxation system has simplified and became orderly;
10. Tourism started to develop;
11. The country’s economy is considered as one of the most liberal in the region;

Above all, the circumstance premise is summarised metaphorically:“This means that we used to be bad students (losers, those who receive low grades) and have now become upper-intermediate level students.” Frequent application of stylistic devices asserts once again that the speaker uses maximum language (lexical) means to have efficient communication and influence audience’s attitudes. In this case, for instance, the new governing team is presented as a bright, hardworking student in contrast to what previous government used to be. Through this particular personification device, efforts are made to relate positive concept to the new government, establish and strengthen affirmative attitudes towards ,,the Georgia after Rose revolution”. The goal premise of the next identified practical argument is poverty reduction – a state of affairs in which poverty has been eradicated. The speaker is quite confident while setting the goal here and provides international organisations’ outlooks as a support to this hopeful attitude: ,After the year of 2009, According to the World bank and International Organisations’ categories, Georgia will not be a poor country any longer. We will leave poverty in the past forever.” Giving a specific date increases the statement’s persuasive affect. Value behind the communication is a concern for everyone’s prosperity. According to the text, all major fields of country’s development (including development of social services, banking system, education etc.) heavily depend on the realisation of rapid reforms. Everything that a county has achieved so far was a result of reforms. Mainstreaming reform into every field of policy planning is an absolutely necessary means of reaching a goal. The means-goal premise (implicitly) delivered here is the following: if we allow radical economic reforms and economic liberalisation proceed, the goal will be achieved.

Even though economic liberalisation and radical reforms in essentially every field are depicted as (almost the only) means to reduce poverty, some analysts question the relevance and outcomes of this policy. The research on “Reforming of Post-Soviet Georgia’s Economy in 1991-2011” asserts that “successes in economic reforms were followed by stagnation, which was particularly exacerbated by the increased scale of corruption. The economic reforms, which were carried out after the ―Rose Revolution, are especially interesting. Along with successful reforms of neo-liberal nature, neo-Bolshevik actions became apparent as the Government started openly infringing property rights (Papava 2013). A lot of space is traditionally dedicated to the statement “Georgia before the Rose Revolution and now” in the text of 2007 report. The representation is realised through antithesis/ oppositions.

Georgia before 2003:
“A ruined state drawn in the mud of failure”
“Frozen in stagnation, a country left backward”
“Totally corrupted”
“A country with criminal mentality”
“Demoralised, hopeless state on its knees, without any dignity”

Georgia after 2003:
“The world’s one of the most dynamically developing country”
“The world’s number one reforming state”
“The world’s leader in fight against corruption”
“Criminal mentality destroyed”
“Proud, new Georgia”
“Sense of national dignity has returned to people”

Quite often development processes and positive outcomes of new government’s reforms are shown through simple argumentative schemes. For instance, while talking about the fairness of updated education system: “Today we live in Georgia, where knowledge is appreciated… Applicants from ordinary families are able to enrol at the universities.” This statement is supported by an example, the case of an applicant, who is at the same time attending the annual report presentation. The president greets the young and motivated person. Bringing this one example as a success story may threaten the rational argumentation and may, as in the case illustrated earlier, lead to hasty generalisation fallacy. The same applies to the following part:
“Corruption is not a problem any longer. The day before yesterday, officers at Tax Office were arrested. The operation was named as a ‘left pocket’ by the prosecutor’s office. A whole corruption scheme has been uncovered. Corruption is totally defeated.”

Fallacy in this particular case seems to be related to hasty generalisation. It may still be possible that beyond this uncovered scheme, corrupted negotiations take place in the Tax office. Besides, Tax Office case is generalized and is presented as an example applicable to all fields. Argumentative passage from the report text of 2007 states the economic growth of the country.

“Last year a Georgian company – The Bank of Georgia appeared on London Stock exchange. Georgian economy used to be made on Validavkaz and Ergneti flea markets before. Now it has moved to London stock exchange. This is an indicator of our country’s growth.”

By the time of delivering this particular report, Newspaper “24 Hours” reports that London Stock exchange hosts the representatives of 70 countries, around 3000 companies. Out of these 3000, only about 1000 companies are represented in premium listing. ,,The Bank of Georgia” is included in the premium listing. Indeed, the success of this joint stock company is remarkable; however a broad statement about country’s economic growth may be estimated as exaggeration.

In the text of 2007, a word “reform” is applied synonymously to positive concepts only, lexical items denoting success, fairness and promising future are used in the same context: “Reforming, charitable work”, “Reformatory and leading parliament.” ,,Our people are hundred times cleverer than those politicians who set themselves against reforms.” ,, Every reform , no matter which field it takes place in, sets itself the only goal: Improving our citizens lives. There is no such a thing as unpopular reforms”.

Conclusion
I would like to summarise some basic findings of the presented research. analysis has shown that although President Saakashvili’s report texts contain some argumentative judgements, still the most part of the corpus is of rhetorical character, enriched with stylistic devices. Practical arguments can be identified in the selected institutional speeches, however quite often claims for action as well as supportive premises have essential clarification shortages. The country’s foreign policy and security related practical reasoning is developed with an absence of clear means leading to the set goals. For instance, the aim for Georgia to become a NATO member state is clear; nevertheless proposed means of reaching this goal profoundly lacks clarifications and seem unnecessary (or even quite wrong). Some of the significant strategies of the speaker persuading the audience are related to using the concepts of fairness, sense of responsibility, accountability. In addition, contrasting the nearest past to the current state – “Georgia before the Rose Revolution and now” gains an important role as a strategy and is widely applied in every annual report. Reforms and quick implementation of economic liberalisation are presented as core of political agenda. Overall, most of the strategies and generally the discourse created by the speaker is used, in my view, to legitimise the power of the ruling team, its political agenda and planned as well as already implemented policies.

Acknowledgements
I wish to express my most sincere gratitude to Open Society Foundations, Central Asia and Caucasus Research and Training Initiative (CARTI) for the invaluable support it has provided to me and to the number of junior researchers from Georgia. I owe my courage to CARTI program mentors and involved fellows of various disciplines from Caucasus and Central Asia.

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