Filmmaker Clifford Bestall takes a personal journey to the heart of one of South Africa’s most dangerous neighbourhoods and through the stories of some of its residents reveals a rich seam of today’s urban South African experience.

A short documentary shot in South Africa. We follow four teenagers growing up in Manenberg, a suburb of Cape Town, where gangsters roam and drug use is rampant. Lauren-Lee, Ryaad, Cameron and Cohen are among the few teens who still attend school. They hope a high-school diploma will get them out of Manenberg. But there’s another promise that keeps them attending: senior prom. They save up all year to rent a fancy car and to buy ball gowns and tuxedos. The post-exam prom is their Cinderella moment: one magical evening when the dream of escaping their bleak reality seems like it just might come true.

We must keep alert, so that the sense of these words will not be forgotten again. Ur-Fascism is still around us, sometimes in plainclothes. It would be so much easier, for us, if there appeared on the world scene somebody saying, “I want to reopen Auschwitz, I want the Black Shirts to parade again in the Italian squares.” Life is not that simple. Ur-Fascism can come back under the most innocent of disguises. Our duty is to uncover it and to point our finger at any of its new instances—every day, in every part of the world. Franklin Roosevelt’s words of November 4, 1938, are worth recalling: “I venture the challenging statement that if American democracy ceases to move forward as a living force, seeking day and night by peaceful means to better the lot of our citizens, fascism will grow in strength in our land.” Freedom and liberation are an unending task.

In 1942, at the age of ten, I received the First Provincial Award of Ludi Juveniles (a voluntary, compulsory competition for young Italian Fascists—that is, for every young Italian). I elaborated with rhetorical skill on the subject “Should we die for the glory of Mussolini and the immortal destiny of Italy?” My answer was positive. I was a smart boy.

I spent two of my early years among the SS, Fascists, Republicans, and partisans shooting at one another, and I learned how to dodge bullets. It was good exercise.

In April 1945, the partisans took over in Milan. Two days later they arrived in the small town where I was living at the time. It was a moment of joy. The main square was crowded with people singing and waving flags, calling in loud voices for Mimo, the partisan leader of that area. A former maresciallo of the Carabinieri, Mimo joined the supporters of General Badoglio, Mussolini’s successor, and lost a leg during one of the first clashes with Mussolini’s remaining forces. Mimo showed up on the balcony of the city hall, pale, leaning on his crutch, and with one hand tried to calm the crowd. I was waiting for his speech because my whole childhood had been marked by the great historic speeches of Mussolini, whose most significant passages we memorized in school. Silence. Mimo spoke in a hoarse voice, barely audible. He said: “Citizens, friends. After so many painful sacrifices … here we are. Glory to those who have fallen for freedom.” And that was it. He went back inside. The crowd yelled, the partisans raised their guns and fired festive volleys. We kids hurried to pick up the shells, precious items, but I had also learned that freedom of speech means freedom from rhetoric.

Read more: https://web.archive.org/http://www.nybooks.com/articles/ur-fascism/

Prof.dr. Emile Schrijver

Op 5 april 2018 nodigen de Tilburg University/Katholieke Theologie en de Katholieke Raad van het Jodendom de Algemeen directeur van het Joods Cultureel Kwartier en hoogleraar van de geschiedenis van het Joodse boek aan de UvA, Prof. dr. Emile Schrijver, uit om de jaarlijkse Kardinaal Willebrandslezing te geven met de titel “Identiteit en tradities onder druk”. De coreferenten Prof.dr. Dineke Houtman, hoogleraar Judaica aan de Protestantse Theologische Universiteit en Dr. Bill Banning, docent godsdienst en levensbeschouwing op het d’Oultremontcollege te Drunen, gaan in op de vraag wat christenen van de joodse benadering kunnen leren. Een benadering die allereerst gaat om het doen, het leven volgens de Torah in plaats van de christelijke aanpak van puur doorgeven van het geloof.

Emile Schrijver benadrukt in zijn lezing het grote belang dat het jodendom hecht aan het doorgeven van de joodse leer van generatie op generatie (le dor wa-dor). Schrijver illustreert dat met verschillende citaten en voorbeelden uit de geschiedenis, zoals het volgende citaat uit de Misjna (de eerste neerslag van de mondelinge leer uit de tweede eeuw na de jaartelling): “Mozes ontving de Torah van Sinaï, en gaf haar door aan Jozua; Jozua gaf haar weer door aan de ouden, de ouden aan de profeten; en de profeten leverden haar over aan de mannen van de grote vergadering. Zij hadden drie spreuken: wees voorzichtig met oordelen, vorm veel leerlingen en maak een omheining om de Torah.”

Het einde van de 9^de of aan het begin 10^de eeuw markeren een nieuwe vorm van overdracht, de codex, naar het gebonden boek, dat het mogelijk maakt om grote teksten door te geven, allereerst voor de overdracht van het Heilige Schrift. Schrijver gaat vervolgens in op de traditionele vorm van een gedrukte bladzijde van de Talmoed, die zich kenmerkt door een centrale tekst die is omgeven door commentaarteksten. ”De oorsprong ligt in de cultuur van discussiëren, bevragen en problematiseren die eigen is aan de joodse cultuur.”

In de loop van de 13^e eeuw verschijnen steeds meer handschriften met gecentreerde hoofdteksten en flarden commentaar daaromheen geschreven. Dit wordt de traditie van het ‘open boek’ genoemd, een levende en bewegende traditie. Teksten zijn niet definitief, anderen mogen er nieuw licht op laten schijnen. Deze toevoegingen worden vaak opgenomen in nieuwe versies van de tekst en genieten meestal dezelfde autoriteit als de brontekst.

Overdracht vindt natuurlijk ook plaats via de kunsten, onderwijs, en via religieuze tradities, gebruiken waarbij Schrijver diverse voorbeelden aanhaalt.
Deze voorbeelden laten zien dat het jodendom groot belang hecht aan het overleveren, van generatie op generatie, van kennis en dat het openstaat voor nieuwe ontwikkelingen. Maar, zegt Schrijver, na de emancipatie is er veel veranderd. “De emancipatie die bijvoorbeeld in Nederland in 1796 al leidde tot een burgerlijke gelijkstelling van joden, maar de emancipatie die ook tot een verregaande ontkerkelijking geleid heeft van de joden, tot een verwijdering van grote groepen joden van hun religieuze kern, of religieuze bron zo men wil, en tot vervreemding van veel joden van de geloofsgroep.”

“Minder dan 20% van de maximaal 50.000 joden die in Nederland leven zijn lid van een kerkgenootschap, maar de meesten van die anderen voelen zich joods en voelen zich onderdeel van de joodse groep en geven daar op een of andere wijze uitdrukking aan.” Ook zijn er verschillende soorten van binding met het jodendom en de joodse identiteit. Schrijver illustreert dit aan de hand van de ‘schijf van vijf’ van Ido Abraham (proefschrift 1986)- 1. de joodse religie, cultuur en traditie; 2. Israël, Zions verlangen en zionisme; 3. de holocaust, of Soja en antisemitisme, vervolging en overleving; 4. iemands persoonlijke levensgeschiedenis en 5. de Nederlandse cultuur en omgeving.

Schrijver vraagt zich vervolgens af waar de toekomst ligt van de joodse traditie en joodse identiteit, een toekomst van insluiting, niet op uitsluiting gerichte woorden, waar we allemaal van kunnen leren, joden, christenen en moslims.

Geïnspireerd door de recente afscheidsrede van Hans Vuijsje, de vroegere directeur van Joods Maatschappelijk werk, sluit Schrijver zijn betoog af:
“Daarvoor is moed nodig, moed om inclusiever te worden, moed om nieuwe ontwikkelingen te benoemen, te adresseren en zo nodig te omarmen. Er moet ook geïnnoveerd worden en geïnvesteerd worden in onderwijs, in cultuur, in religieuze en in niet-religieuze scholing en in mensen, mensen die zich willen committeren aan de gemeenschap en zich daarvoor willen inzetten. Het is nodig om flexibiliteit aan de dag te leggen, misschien ook om minder rigide definities aan te leggen van wie er wel en wie er niet mee mogen doen, want exclusiviteit stoot niet alleen buitenstaanders af, maar ook menig ‘binnen-staander’. De traditionele instituties zullen actief, creatief moeten nadenken over het herdefiniëren van hun traditionele rol. Dat geldt voor religieuze en niet-religieuze instituties en veronderstelt ook een heel heldere kijk op wat men wenst te behouden, naast al die noodzakelijke verandering.
Zingevingsvragen zijn van alle tijden en in deze ontkerkelijkte tijden is de maatschappelijke behoefte aan zingeving alleen maar groter aan het worden.
Daar hebben wij allemaal een opgave, om op die vragen creatieve antwoorden te bedenken. Joden, christenen en alle anderen die zich hierdoor aangesproken voelen.”

Prof.dr. Dineke Houtman reageert op Schrijvers lezing vanuit een protestantse invalshoek. Het christendom wordt gekenmerkt door catechese en geloofsleer en overdracht; het jodendom en het joodse onderwijs door de praktijk van het joodse leven, door de joodse les, en Hebreeuwse en joodse gebruiken.
Wat ze voornamelijk heeft geleerd van het jodendom is het verhalen vertellen en vragen stellen, aldus Houtman.
We moeten ons niet alleen maar richten op didactische methoden maar ook op meer inhoud, een meer geleefde overdracht, zoals bijvoorbeeld de passiespelen, fabels, schilderen, dansen e.d. Een stap terug naar de verbeelding om het fris te houden en terug naar de warmte van de gemeenschap. Die warmte is nodig voor geloof en traditieoverdracht.

De derde spreker van deze middag, de liberaal-katholiek Bill Banning is vooral geraakt door de visie van het ‘open boek’ als levende en bewegende traditie, waaruit het inzicht spreekt dat een tekst nooit op zichzelf betekenis heeft, maar “bediscussieerd, bevraagd, geproblematiseerd en geactualiseerd dient te worden”. Ook de vele vormen van joodse geloofsoverdracht spreken hem aan alsmede het gegeven hoe de joodse emancipatie sinds eind 18^de eeuw, evenals de katholieke emancipatie van 1853, uiteindelijk heeft geleid tot ontkerkelijking en vervreemding van de religieuze kern. De joodse en christelijke gemeenschappen staan voor gelijkwaardige uitdagingen om überhaupt te overleven.

Kardinaal Adrianus Simonis, emeritus aartsbisschop van Utrecht, op de piano tijdens de pauze.

Vervolgens gaat Banning in op drie punten die nodig zijn om de jongere generatie te boeien voor zingeving en in het verlengde daarvan wellicht zelfs voor een gelovige levensvisie en levenswijze. Hij kiest hiervoor de narratieve benadering, want “in dialoog met het narratieve geschiedt kerk”. In en door verhalen komen mensen tot leven.

Hiervoor is 1. eerlijkheid en moed vereist; inclusief de diepte- en hoogtepunten middels verhalen; 2. luisteren naar jonge mensen – en hun vaak heftige zingevingsvragen, willen luisteren naar hun verhalen; 3. verantwoord, doordacht en vooral geactualiseerd verhalen vertellen – zoals in de Talmoed die omgeven is door commentaarteksten, waarin ze tot leven komt.

Ook Banning houdt een pleidooi voor een inclusieve en narratieve benadering. Religieuze ‘meerstemmigheid’, waardoor het samenleven op school wordt bevorderd. Ook wijst hij op het belang van nieuwe nieuwsgierig makende onderwijstools en spelmateriaal.
Oude tradities moeten worden ‘ont-stold’ om ze in deze tijd weer toegankelijk te maken.

De middag wordt afgesloten met een levendige publieksdiscussie. De woorden van de sprekers die pleiten voor een meer (religieuze) meerstemmigheid en diversiteit hebben Kardinaal Adrianus Simonis, emeritus aartsbisschop van Utrecht, niet echt bereikt: het woord van Jezus dient als enig leidraad.

Zie ook: http://rozenbergquarterly.com/joseph-semahs-bladen-bij-pessachim-schets-van-een-methode-voor-talmoedische-landschapsvormen/

Marcus Mosiah Garvey, Jr., ONH (17 August 1887 – 10 June 1940), was a Jamaican political leader, publisher, journalist, entrepreneur, and orator who was a proponent of the Pan-Africanism movement, to which end he founded the Universal Negro Improvement Association and African Communities League (UNIA-ACL). He also founded the Black Star Line, a shipping and passenger line which promoted the return of the African diaspora to their ancestral lands.

Prior to the 20th century, leaders such as Prince Hall, Martin Delany, Edward Wilmot Blyden, and Henry Highland Garnet advocated the involvement of the African diaspora in African affairs. Garvey was unique in advancing a Pan-African philosophy to inspire a global mass movement and economic empowerment focusing on Africa known as Garveyism. Promoted by the UNIA as a movement of African Redemption, Garveyism would eventually inspire others, ranging from the Nation of Islam to the Rastafari movement (some sects of which proclaim Garvey as a prophet).

Garveyism intended persons of African ancestry in the diaspora to “redeem” the nations of Africa and for the European colonial powers to leave the continent. His essential ideas about Africa were stated in an editorial in the Negro World entitled “African Fundamentalism”, where he wrote: “Our union must know no clime, boundary, or nationality… to let us hold together under all climes and in every country…”

Prof.em. Richard Falk

The Middle East is heating up again, in part due to President Trump’s decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital. The Trump administration has also incited upset with its unconditional support for Israel’s aggressive policies, which violate basic principles of international law and threaten the region with the eruption of military confrontations. For an assessment of the latest developments in the Middle East, C.J. Polychroniou spoke to Richard Falk, a professor emeritus of international law at Princeton University, former UN special rapporteur for Palestinian human rights and author of scores of books and hundreds of academic articles on international relations and international law.

C.J. Polychroniou: Richard, let’s start with Donald Trump’s decision to officially recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and to move the US embassy there by May of this year. First, is this legal from the standpoint of international law, and second, what are likely to be the long-term effects of the US recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital on the region as a whole?

Richard Falk: There is no question that Trump’s Jerusalem policy relating to recognition and the move of the American embassy is provocative and disruptive, underscoring the abandonment by Washington of even the pretense of being a trustworthy intermediary that can be relied upon by both sides to work for a sustainable peace between the two peoples. Some critics of the initiative are saying that the US is free to situate its embassy in Jerusalem, but it isn’t Israel, as the status of the city is undetermined and East Jerusalem, where the “Old City” is located, is considered to be an “occupied territory” in international humanitarian law.

Recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel is a clear violation of international humanitarian law, which rests on the central proposition that an occupied territory should not be altered in any way that changes its status and character without the consent of the occupied society. It also is a unilateral rejection of a near universal consensus, endorsed by the United Nations, that the future of Jerusalem should be settled by negotiations between the parties as a part of a broader peacemaking process. Israel had already violated both international law and this international consensus by annexing an enlarged Jerusalem, and declared that the whole city, within expanded boundaries, would be the “undivided, eternal capital” of Israel. It is notable that the UN General Assembly on December 21, 2017, approved by an overwhelming majority of 128-8 (35 abstentions) a strong condemnation of the US move on Jerusalem, with [the US’s] closest allies joining in this vote of censure.

It is difficult to predict the long-term consequences of this diplomatic rupture. It depends, above all, on whether the US government manages to restore its claim to act as a conflict-resolving intermediary. The Trump administration continues to insist that it is working on a peace plan that will require painful compromises by both Palestine and Israel. Of course, given the unconditional alignment of Washington with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Israel, and the orientation of those entrusted with drafting the plan, it is highly unlikely that even President Mahmoud Abbas and the Palestinian Authority will be inclined to enter a diplomatic process that is virtually certain to be weighted so heavily in favor of Israel. Yet as many have come to appreciate, nothing is harder to predict than the future of Middle Eastern politics. At the same time, Jerusalem has an abiding significance for both Islam and Christianity that makes it almost certain for the indefinite future that there will be formidable regional and international resistance to subsuming Jerusalem under Israeli sovereign control.

Israel appears bent on restricting Iran’s rising influence as a regional power in the Middle East. How far do you think the US can go in assisting Israel to contain Tehran’s strategy for empowering Shias?

Israel and Saudi Arabia are both, for different reasons, determined to confront Iran, and quite possibly, initiate a military encounter with widespread ramifications for the entire region, if not the world. A quick glance at the Syrian conflict suggests how complex and dangerous is this effort to destabilize the Iranian governing process, with the dual objectives of destabilizing the governing process mixed with the more ambitious goal of causing civil strife of sufficient magnitude as to produce a civil war, and ideally, regime change.

The Israeli adherence to this recklessness seems partly motivated by its overall security policy of seeking to weaken any country in the region that is hostile to its presence and has the potential military capability to threaten Israeli security in a serious manner. Israel has been so far successful in neutralizing each of its credible adversaries in the region (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria) with the exception of Iran. In this sense, Iran stands out as the last large unfinished item on Israel’s geopolitical agenda. The question of Israel’s real intentions [is] hard to pin down, as the alleged Iranian threat is also frequently manipulated by Netanyahu and other Israeli leaders to mobilize domestic support for sticking with an aggressive foreign policy. In this latter context, Israeli security specialists express an appreciation of the risks of an actual military confrontation with Iran.

Saudi motivations are quite different, associated with a fierce regional rivalry that is articulated in terms of the clash between Shia and Sunni Islam, aggravated by the fear that Iran’s influence increased as a result of the Iraq and Syrian Wars, which both seem to have outcomes favorable to Tehran. The sectarian rationale of the conflict seems intended to disguise the more real explanation, which is that there is a power struggle between these two sovereign states to determine which one will achieve regional ascendancy. The sectarian explanation was somewhat undermined by the intensity with which the Saudis and other gulf monarchies used their financial and diplomatic resources to crush the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt despite its strong Sunni identity. It is also no secret that, from the time of the Iranian Revolution in 1979, Tehran looked upon the monarchy governing Saudi Arabia as corrupt and decadent in the same manner as the Shah’s dynastic rule in Iran that was risen up against.

Your focus on how far the US can go in restricting Iran’s influence is difficult to assess at this point. Trump’s virtual repudiation of the agreement on Iran’s nuclear program seems to express a commitment to join with Israel and Saudi Arabia to engage in coercive diplomacy, consisting of intensifying sanctions, covert operations to encourage internal opposition and a variety of military threats. Where this will lead, if indeed it goes forward in defiance of the other parties to the agreement and most important UN members, is anybody’s guess, but it is a highly irresponsible diplomatic gambit that risks a deadly “war of choice.”

Trump’s regional diplomacy, such as it is, has been most notable for giving even greater emphasis to the “special relationships” with Israel and Saudi Arabia than earlier American leaders. Even previously, under Obama, George W. Bush and prior presidents, American strategic interests and national values were subordinate to this posture of unquestioning support, which is the concrete meaning of designating these links as special relationships.

Syria’s civil war continues unabated and the country has become a battlefield for the spread of the influence of various powers in the region, including Turkey and Russia. Do you see a way out of this mess?

The Syrian War is among the most complex conflict patterns in the history of warfare. Not only is there an internal struggle for control of the Syrian state that has been waged by not one, but by several insurgent movements that are not even compatible with one another. There is also a regional proxy war pitting Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar against Iran, with Turkey playing a confusing role that sometimes seems guided by anti-Damascus goals but at other times is preoccupied with curtailing the Kurdish challenge. The various national struggles of the Kurds for autonomous rights, possibly independent political communities, threaten the territorial integrity of several Middle Eastern states, as well as Syria. In addition to all of this, there are major multi-faceted and fluid Russian and American involvements on opposite sides, although not even this opposition is clear-cut and consistent. For a time, there was an almost collaborative effort to defeat ISIS (also known as Daesh) and obtain a Syrian cease-fire, although the basic involvement has been to put Russia on the side of the Damascus government and the US as aligned with the insurgencies.

Because the anti-ISIS dimension of the conflict is at odds with the anti-Damascus dimension, depending on the priority accorded to one rather than the other, alignments are contradictory and shifted over time. Sometimes precedence has been given to achieving regime-change in Damascus by removing Syrian President Bashar al-Assad from power, and in such contexts, it was acknowledged silently that ISIS was the most effective military challenge on the ground being mounted against the Syrian government. At other times, the counterterrorist campaign against ISIS was given uppermost prominence, and there [were] even high-level indications that Washington was willing to live with the Assad regime, a position given added credence recently due to the success of the Syrian government in quelling its opposition, making continued opposition futile politically, and irresponsible ethically. Whenever pragmatism gained the upper hand, Russia and Iran were accepted as partners in these efforts to defeat and destroy ISIS.

All wars eventually come to an end, and I am sure Syria will not be an exception. Yet it is difficult at present to project a solution that brings about more than a cease-fire, and even this kind of ending … is highly elusive, as each of the many parties to the conflict jockeys violently for minor positional advantages to improve its bargaining leverage when the conflict enters some kind of negotiating phase…. Internal wars of this kind, especially with such complex regional and international aspects, can simmer for decades with no clear winner or loser as has been the case in the Philippines and Colombia. It seems as if at present the Syrian government believes it is on the verge of victory and is pressing for an outcome in East Ghouta and Idlib such that it will not be expected to make significant concessions.

The best hope, which has been the case for several years, is that the various parties will recognize that the situation is indeed a mess that is causing mass suffering and widespread devastation without producing political gains. Yet translating that recognition into a formula that produces an end to the violence has so far proved futile and frustrating as each party sees the conflict from its partisan perspective of gain and loss.

With the two-state solution having ceased long ago being a viable alternative, what are the most likely prospects for the future of Israeli-Palestinian relations?

The safest response is to anticipate a persistence of the present status quo, which involves continuing Israeli expansionism by way of the settlements and the persistence of the Palestinian ordeal, with some resistance in the occupied West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem, and a growing global solidarity movement exerting pressure on Israel in the form of the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) campaign. There may be some attention given to a variety of proposals to end the conflict by revived diplomacy. Trump’s blustery promise of “a deal of the century” has received skeptical attention, but its likely one-sidedness makes it almost certain to be a non-starter, especially as the Israeli government feels insufficient pressure to produce a peaceful solution based on a genuine political compromise and the Palestinian Authority remains unwilling to accept a demilitarized statelet as a token Palestine state, or even to participate in negotiations that are so obviously stacked against it. For public relations reasons, the international consensus clings to the two-state solution even though, as your question suggests, its viability has long been superseded by Israeli expansionist policies intended to fulfill the Zionist goal of making the boundaries of Israel coterminous with the whole of the Jewish biblical conception of the “promised land.”

There are other outcomes that are possible. [Right-wing historian] Daniel Pipes has been promoting what he dubbed “the victory caucus,” which posits Israel as the victor in the struggle to establish a Jewish state and Palestine the loser. Pipes argues that diplomacy has failed to resolve the conflict after years of effort, and hence … the only alternative is for one side to win and the other to lose if peace is to be established. He encourages Israel to escalate pressure on the Palestinians to make them see the light, accept the reality of a Jewish state and move on. Such an initiative is distasteful to those who support the Palestinian struggle, and it seems oblivious to the claims of international law and international morality as these are generally understood in the 21st century when colonialism and ethnic nationalism are illegitimate forms of political control and the right of self-determination has become universally accepted as an inalienable right of an oppressed people in the circumstances of the Palestinians.

In my view, neither the two-state nor a consensual one-state outcome of the struggle is currently within the realm of political feasibility. We are necessarily speculating about future political scenarios within the domain of “political impossibility.” Yet the impossible sometimes happens. Colonialism was successfully challenged, the Soviet Union collapsed, South Africa renounced apartheid, the Arab Spring erupted. In none of these cases did such occurrences seem possible except in retrospect. After the events, as expected, experts appeared who explained why these impossible developments were, if closely considered, inevitable.

In this spirit, I think it useful to acknowledge the limits of rational assessment, and either remain silent, or offer for consideration, a solution that is “impossible,” yet “desirable” from the perspective of humane values, which in this case involves a secure, equitable and sustainable peace for both peoples that is, above all, sensitive to their equality and to their distinct, yet legitimate, claims to self-determination. I find it unimaginable to realize such a peace within the current structure of the Middle East, which consists of a group of artificial and autocratic states held together by varying mixtures of coercion, corruption and external military assistance. An Israel-Palestine peace cannot unfold in a benevolent manner without a structural return to the Ottoman framework of regional unity and ethnic community, and possibly an Islamic caliphate adapted to post-colonial realities. Such a stateless Middle East would reverse the harm inflicted on the region by the imposition of European territorial states through the infamous Sykes-Picot diplomacy.

South Africa’s former apartheid system has been employed analytically by many to describe the current status of the state of Israel with regard to its treatment toward Palestinians. Indeed, it is from such a comparison that the BDS movement was born, but to what extent are the two cases compatible? South Africa was pretty much isolated by the early 1980s, but the same cannot be said about Israel today. In fact, Israel has even managed to expand recently its network of allies with Greece and the Sunni states. So, what are your thoughts on the comparison between the former South African apartheid regime and Israel and the effectiveness of the strategy of BDS?

Your question raises two distinct issues: Is Israel responsibly regarded as an “apartheid state?” If so, is Israeli apartheid similar to South African apartheid?

Prior to responding to these questions, it seems helpful to clarify the status of the international crime of apartheid as it has evolved in international law, taking particular note of the fact that although the name and core idea is based on the specific condemnation of South African racism, the international crime is detached from this precedent. The essence of the international crime is any form of discriminatory domination by one race over another that relies on “inhuman acts” to sustain its purposes. In this important sense, Israeli forms of domination over the Palestinian people may be quite different than the domination of whites over Blacks in South Africa, and yet constitute the international crime of apartheid. Treating apartheid as an international crime is based both on the 1973 International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid and on the 2002 Rome Statute governing the operations of the International Criminal Court that categorizes “apartheid” in Article 7 as one of 11 types of crimes against humanity.

In a study commissioned by the UN Economic and Social Commission, Virginia Tilley and I concluded that the policies and practices of Israel toward the Palestinian people as a whole satisfy the requirements of the international crime of apartheid. Our conclusion is based on the view that Israel, to maintain an expanding Jewish state, has subjected the Palestinian people to structures of subjugation and victimization that are sustained by excessive violence and other inhuman means. It was our judgment that Jews and Palestinians are distinct “races” as the term is understood in international law. The scope of Israeli apartheid is based on coherent strategies designed to subjugate the Palestinian people whether they are living under occupation, the most obvious case, or as a discriminated minority within Israel, or as residents in refugee camps in neighboring countries, or living in a global diaspora as involuntary exiles. Each of these domains is connected with the Israeli efforts to ensure not only the prevalence of a Jewish state, but also a secure Jewish-majority population that could only be achieved by a process of dispossession, dispersion and fragmentation, as well as by the denial of any right of return.

South African apartheid was very different in its operation as compared to Israeli apartheid. For one thing, white South Africa was a minority demographic in the country and critically dependent on Black labor. For another, the South African concept of law, citizenship and democracy was delineated along racial lines, while Israel claims to be an inclusive democracy, although is more accurately understood to be an ethnocracy. Despite these fundamental differences, the core reality of “inhuman acts” and “discriminatory structures of domination” are present, although distinctly enacted, in both national settings.

Finally, it should be understood that such allegations of Israeli apartheid are made on the basis of academic study, and while they may be persuasive morally and politically, it is also true that until a valid tribunal passes judgment on such allegations, the legal status of the allegations remains unresolved and is, of course, feverishly contested by Israel and its supporters.

Overall, what are the prospects for restored stability and a positive future for the countries in the Middle East?

Without the intervention of unanticipated developments, the prospects are poor. On one level, the extreme turmoil in countries such as Syria, Yemen, Iraq and neighboring Libya are likely to continue and could spread to additional states. On a second level, the regional rivalries between Iran and a Saudi-led coalition on the one side and Israel on the other, seem likely to intensify. On a third level, there is no plausible scenario for establishing a sustainable peace between Israel and the Palestinian people. On a fourth level, with the reassertion of Russian engagement and the US pursuit of a strategic agenda related to Israel, oil, political Islam, Iran and nuclear nonproliferation, the region has, as in the Cold War, become a site of dangerous geopolitical maneuver and confrontation. On a fifth level, perhaps less serious than the others, is the sort of intra-regional tensions that have given rise to the Gulf Crisis centered upon the relations of Qatar to other gulf countries, and to the role of Turkey as partner and antagonist, especially in relation to the continuing search of the Kurdish peoples for self-determination. Finally, on a sixth level, there is almost certain to be new expressions of internal strife and various extremisms that strike against the West, inviting retaliation, which will probably be accompanied by further migratory flows that aggravate relations between the Middle East and Europe.

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