Who Cares For The People Who Care For Children? Reimagining The Adults Closest To Every Child

10-29-2026 ~ Communities can better protect children by supporting teachers, caregivers, and other trusted adults—and helping them work together.

Children form their understanding of society through the people around them: the person who greets them at the classroom door, the coach who notices when something’s wrong, the nurse who explains a scary procedure gently, the librarian who saves a book, the neighbor who walks them home. Policy, institutions, and cultural norms—the subjects of the first five articles in this series—often reach children through these adults. A well-funded program or a well-written law can change a child’s circumstances. But children often experience its promise through something much simpler: a lunch, a lesson, a kind word, a moment of attention.

Researchers at Harvard University’s Center on the Developing Child describe “serve and return” as the responsive, back-and-forth exchanges between children and the adults who care for them. Because these relationships help shape the developing brain, the adults present in a child’s early years play a foundational role. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) framework on “Preventing Adverse Childhood Experiences” identifies safe, stable, nurturing relationships as critical not only to helping children reach their full potential but also to preventing harm. Trusted adults help child-welfare policy fulfill its promise.

And yet many of these adults—teachers, coaches, childcare workers, librarians, volunteers, and others—work with limited time, resources, autonomy, or institutional support. If society relies on these relationships to protect children and support their development, it has an obligation to strengthen the people who sustain them.

That raises a central question: How can society better recognize, support, and organize the adults who already care for children—and expand what they can offer?

The Adults Children Actually Encounter Every Day
A child’s daily life brings them into contact with a wide range of adults: their third-grade teacher, youth soccer coach, pediatrician, neighborhood librarian, daycare provider, music teacher, crossing guard, or scout leader. The volunteer who runs the after-school program and the neighbor who keeps an eye on the block also matter. Together, these adults form part of the child’s social world.

These adults have different roles and responsibilities, but children do not necessarily see them through their professional roles. A teacher may notice that a child has arrived hungry. A coach may recognize that something is wrong before the child says so. A librarian may become someone a child trusts enough to approach for help. Their importance can extend well beyond the task they were hired or volunteered to perform.

One finding recurs in research on childhood resilience: relationships with supportive adults matter. Harvard’s Center on the Developing Child identifies at least one stable, committed relationship with a supportive parent, caregiver, or other adult as a common protective factor for children who overcome serious hardship. Trusted relationships with adults outside the immediate family also matter. In a 2021 study, Kathryn Ashton of Public Health Wales and her colleagues examined adults’ recollections of the support available to them during childhood, including from trusted adults outside the home. They found that access to trusted adults was associated with greater childhood resilience resources, particularly among those who had experienced substantial adversity.

What matters is not only what these adults do, but whether they know a child well enough to notice a change, recognize a need, or earn their trust. But how much attention an adult can give a child depends in part on how many children that adult is expected to care for.

The Privilege of Adult Attention
That makes adult-to-child ratios consequential. A teacher responsible for 30 students has far less time for each child than a tutor working one-on-one. A coach responsible for an entire team has less time for each player than an instructor working individually with one child. Smaller adult-to-child ratios give adults more opportunities to notice changes, recognize needs, build trust, and respond.

Families with resources can pay for more adult attention. They hire tutors, coaches, therapists, and music teachers. They may choose schools with smaller classes or programs offering more individual attention. What they are buying is more of an adult’s time and attention for fewer children.

What affluent families seek for their own children raises a larger question. Why should close adult attention be treated primarily as a private advantage rather than something every child should have? The goal cannot always be one adult for one child, nor will the ratio be the same in a classroom, sports team, childcare center, or after-school program. But the principle can be universal: every child should have meaningful access to adults who have enough time and capacity to know them.

That would make adult-to-child ratios more than an administrative staffing measure. Those ratios would also tell us something about how much room a community makes for those relationships.

Beyond the Job Description
The adults who matter to children sometimes become important for reasons that have little to do with the duties for which they were hired. A teacher teaches, a pediatrician provides medical care, a librarian helps people find information, a coach develops athletic skills, and a crossing guard gets children safely across the street. But each may notice something that someone farther from the child would miss.

A teacher may notice that a student is hungry or unusually withdrawn. A coach may realize that a child is struggling with a problem at home. A librarian may become an adult a teenager trusts enough to approach for help. A pediatrician may recognize signs that a child is unsafe. A crossing guard who sees the same children every morning may notice when one of them suddenly seems frightened or upset. None of these observations necessarily form part of a job description, but noticing them may still call for a response. Standing up for a child in such circumstances need not be heroic. It can be an ordinary part of caring for children: noticing what they need, speaking up for them, and helping when one can. Read more

Ancient DNA In the Neanderthal Mirror

10-27-2026 ~ Why are we so obsessed with a group of prehistoric humans who disappeared some 40,000 years ago? Ever since the discovery of the first named Neanderthal fossils in 1856, scientists have struggled to make sense of them in tens of thousands of books and articles. But the never-ending Neanderthal problem is not just a chapter continuously revisited in the scientific study of human origins, nor is it only about them: the purchase that Neanderthals have in popular culture—in film, fiction, advertising, and political rhetoric—suggests that our fascination has been mostly about us.

In both science and popular culture, Neanderthals have long been a mirror reflecting and refracting who we think we are. In Neanderthals Among Us: The Making of a Prehistoric Human (Harvard University Press, 2027), I suggest how the mirror has tracked our redemption and rehabilitation of Neanderthals in science and popular culture, from brutish ape-men “others” to culturally endowed humans, kindred just like “us.” In that uneven, century-long arc, that mirror has served us in two ways: supporting our claims of exceptionalism and uniqueness (what I’ve called our “Sapiens Superiority Complex”), and exploring our own differences, especially of race and gender. Along the way, we’ve used Neanderthals at different moments in different ways to reflect on our violent proclivities, definitions of the human, and threats to our survival as a species.

For a long time, the Neanderthal mirror was made from fragments of fossilized bone and knapped stones, studied by paleontologists and archaeologists, and then constructed and diffused through museum dioramas, magazine illustrations, documentary films, and prehistoric fiction. But in the last 20 years, molecules have taken precedence, as geneticists, computational biologists, and molecular anthropologists invented and refined ancient DNA analysis in the field of paleogenomics. Their work has cracked the mirror, reshaping long-rehearsed fables about our prehistoric cousins. A recent example is a report in Science (February 26, 2026), “Interbreeding Between Neanderthals and Modern Humans Was Strongly Sex Biased,” which revises our gendered and hierarchical assumptions about the encounter. This claim, like other revelations about the Neanderthal genome, shifts the ground beneath the myth of our dominance and conquest of the planet, inherited from the late 19th century and long rehearsed in scientific works and commercial fiction. And it reshapes the Neanderthal mirror in unexpected ways.

In the traditional prehistoric fairy tale, Homo sapiens began arriving in Europe some 45,000 years ago, smarter and more imaginative than the indigenous Neanderthals, and armed with superior tools and weaponry. A violent, gendered conquest ensued: Male Homo sapiens raped Neanderthal women and slaughtered the natives, as a superior, brainier species “replaced” a lesser and more primitive one. That story, already familiar as a colonial fable, remains embedded in our scientific and literary imagining of prehistory, persisting despite surprising findings from genomic science.

In 2010, Swedish geneticist Svante Pääbo, founding father of paleogenomics and winner of the 2022 Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine, reconstructed genomes from three fossil Neanderthals and found evidence of “introgression,” the movement of genetic material between species—that is, sexual relations. Most of us, at least, are a little bit Neanderthal, sharing a modest genetic heritage with our long-extinct cousins. Novels, films, and documentaries have since registered the molecular evidence, as has the business of personal genomics, reshaping but never quite abandoning the gendered stories of “conquest” and “replacement.” The most recent genomic studies further complicate the picture, providing new materials for the stories we tell about Neanderthals—and about ourselves.

Changing Narratives: From “Replacement” to Hybridity
The conquest narrative, the original “Great Replacement” in which Homo sapiens exterminated the natives, was constructed without fossil or archaeological evidence: there are no mass graves, no blood-stained fossils, no physical evidence supporting the prehistoric fantasy. The myth took shape a half century after the first named Neanderthal fossils emerged in 1856, after the early debates about human antiquity and human participation in the evolutionary struggles of natural selection, which followed the publication of Darwin’s On the Origin of Species in 1859. Why did it take so long to form? Early evolutionary theorists were committed to a unilinear, progressive model, in which Neanderthals were not a separate human species but the brutish, violent ancestors of the human lineage. Irish geologist William King’s 1864 naming of Neanderthals as a distinct species, Homo neanderthalensis, was quickly forgotten for almost four decades. The apish, uncultured but ancestral identity of Neanderthals crystallized after the discovery of the first “Cro-Magnon” skulls in 1868, named for the French site where they were accidentally uncovered, promising an early “race” that resembled our own, artistic and creative selves. Neanderthals were born the ugly, lesser doppelganger of Homo sapiens, even though they were, at first, considered our ancestors.

A shift in thinking took place in the late 19th century. Supported by new discoveries of Neanderthals at Spy, Belgium, in 1887, and by the far older “Java Man” in 1891 (the type specimen of Homo erectus), anatomists and paleontologists insistently pushed “Neanderthal Man” back to ape-like standing. Then in 1901, the German-Jewish anatomist Gustav Schwalbe excluded Neanderthals from the Homo sapiens lineage, reviving King’s taxonomy, which this time became widely accepted. Their new status came bundled with an evolutionary model borrowed from empire: “replacement” was a euphemism for the metaphor of a “race war.” A Neanderthal skeleton found in the Dordogne in 1908 moved French paleontologist Marcellin Boule to produce an exhaustive account of “the Old Man of La Chapelle-aux-Saints,” which, along with František Kupka’s widely reproduced, caricatured drawing, sealed Neanderthals’ fate as hairy, shuffling, apish brutes. Boule’s monograph a few years later advanced a new “paleontological law” in which Homo sapiens and Neanderthals were distinct species on separate branches of the evolutionary tree, one vigorous and fruiting, the other a desiccated twig that did not simply drop off on its own.

For decades, evolutionary theory remained deeply embedded in an imperial and racial grammar, its essential narratives drawing its framework from the colonial conquest of an “inferior” (Neanderthal) species by a “superior” (Cro-Magnon) species, a framework given moral buoyancy in the rising tide of eugenicist thought. British paleoanthropologist and racial theorist Arthur Keith wrote in 1915 that “a more virile form” extinguished Neanderthals, and he compared the Cro-Magnon “conquest” of Europe to the European subjugation and colonization of the Americas.

Across the Atlantic, at the American Museum of Natural History in New York, Henry Fairfield Osborn added a eugenicist script through his writings and oversight of Charles Knight’s 1920 murals. In Chicago, the Field Museum employed Frederick Blaschke to stage a diorama, reproduced for decades in postcards and textbooks, that affirmed the lesser racial standing of our bent-kneed, dark-skinned cousins. Meanwhile, commercial fiction enriched the narrative of the white man’s conquest of his darker inferiors, as in the genocidal fable of a “species war” rehearsed in H.G. Wells’s “The Grisly Folk” (1921). The conquest was gendered: some anthropologists conceded a limited, forceful interbreeding between Homo sapiens men and Neanderthal women; others, following eugenicist guidelines, insisted that super Homo sapiensmen had killed off the women with no interbreeding at all. Read more

Remembering The Great October Revolution 109 Years Later

C.J. Polychroniou

10-26-2026 ~ After all this time, the rise of the Bolsheviks to power continues to divide scholars, the chattering classes, and even the educated public. And while you can easily romanticize about the October Revolution, the cold reality of history smacks you in the face.

One hundred nine years ago, on the evening of October 25, 1917, the Winter Palace in Petrograd (today’s St Petersburg) was stormed. This event marked the beginning of the Great October Revolution, one of the most significant political events of the twentieth century that shaped the course of history for decades ahead.

Leading up to the events of October 25 was another revolution in late February 1917, which brought to power a group of leaders from bourgeois political parties that formed a provisional government headed initially by Georgy Lvov, a liberal reformer, and then by Aleksander Kerensky, a socialist. In early March of that year, Czar Nicholas II, who had ruled imperial Russia since 1894, abdicated. Five months later, Russia was pronounced a republic.

Although the provisional government did introduce some reforms on the political front, prompting even Bolshevik leader Vladimir Lenin to declare Russia in April 1917 “the freest country in the world,” it was the Red October Revolution that turned the old order completely upside down by inaugurating a socialist regime and making Soviet-style communism a global ideological and political force that lasted until the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991.

Still, one hundred nine years later, the rise of the Bolsheviks to power continues to divide scholars, the chattering classes, and even the educated public. There are several issues that are particularly divisive, such as whether the October Revolution was a popular insurgency or essentially a coup, and whether Stalinism evolved naturally from the basic principles and political strategies of Lenin or was an unexpected development.

Likewise, there is still a great deal of ambiguity, disagreement and confusion over the nature of the regime that flourished in the Soviet Union after Lenin’s death in 1924. For example, did the Soviet Union represent an “actual socialist society,” a “degenerated workers’ state,” or simply a “totalitarian state economy” in which the communist ideology functioned as a mere instrument of political legitimization and imperial rule?

When it happened, the Great October Revolution produced global hysteria, untamed enthusiasm and hope about the possibility of creating heaven on earth (a new utopia) in equal measure. For the bourgeois classes everywhere, the inauguration of the Soviet regime was anathema to core values of the “western civilization”, while for radicals and communists it signified a natural culmination of the inevitable march of history towards human freedom and a social order devoid of exploitation.

Given how things turned out, an objective evaluation on socialism and the legacy of Soviet communism gives no room for mourning or celebration. The Great October Revolution was essentially the epic story of an impossible dream that turned in due time into a political and historical nightmare because of the interplay of a vast array of factors that included “backward” socioeconomic conditions, outside intervention, an absence of democratic traditions, and misconceived notions about socialism and democracy. Hence, while you can easily romanticize about the October Revolution, the cold reality of history smacks you in the face.

For starters, the Great October Revolution was unlike the February Revolution which erupted as a result of spontaneous action by hundreds of thousands of hungry and angry men and women workers and militant troops. What happened in October 1917 was the outcome of a well-designed strategy on the part of the leader (Lenin) of a minority party (the Bolsheviks) to wrest control from the provisional government because of a strong ideological aversion to “bourgeois democracy” and desire for power. Unsurprisingly Lenin’s call for “all power to the Soviets” ended up being something entirely different: all power went to the party and its politburo. The October Revolution was not a coup in itself, but neither was it a popular uprising that enjoyed the kind of mass support that the February Revolution had. In fact, it was not until the autumn of 1917 that Lenin’s “land, peace, bread” slogan had been embraced by some workers in St Petersburg and Moscow.

Yet even this does not mean that the Bolshevik program and Lenin’s ideas of rule were accepted by the majority of the Russian people: In the November 1917 elections, the first truly free election in Russian history, Lenin’s party received only one quarter of the vote, while the Social Revolutionaries managed to receive over 60 percent. Read more

Puerto Rican Communities Bear The Brunt Of The Water Crisis

10-17-2026 ~ The archipelago’s current water crisis, the product of a colonial system of debt, austerity, and extraction, cannot be solved by community organizing alone.

As a child, visits to my grandmother’s home in the rural area between the municipalities of Humacao and Yabucoa, in eastern Puerto Rico, often began with the same question: “Is there running water?” Decades later, we have stopped asking—not because the problem has been solved, but because we already know the answer. She either has no running water at all or lives with such low water pressure that access remains uncertain.

Community-based organizations across Puerto Rico, particularly in rural areas, have long organized to demand access to running water, but public officials often treat this struggle as a problem of the past. Yet the water-rationing program initiated by the Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority (PRASA) on August 7 in response to an anticipated drought caused by the El Niño phenomenon reveals how persistent the problem remains. Although the program was recently suspended following temporary relief from cloud-seeding efforts, declining reservoir levels recorded on September 21—nearly a week after the intervention—underscore why Puerto Rico’s water crisis cannot be understood as a matter of climate alone.

The water crisis predates the current drought. PRASA has long struggled with deteriorating infrastructure, compounded by two unsuccessful privatization attempts between 1995 and 2004. Many communities have responded by developing their own aqueducts, but these initiatives cannot match the scale of the structural problem on their own.

Amid the drought, there are also growing concerns that El Súper Tubo, Puerto Rico’s main distribution pipeline, has reached the end of its useful life. In response, the government has called on residents and community organizations to prepare for drought conditions that could persist through the end of the year.

There is broad consensus in Puerto Rico on the importance of local communities in addressing the water crisis. Yet calls for communities to take the lead raise questions that demand a more nuanced approach. How is the burden of the water crisis distributed? What do calls for autonomous community action demand of local leaders and the everyday work of their organizations? How have the austerity measures imposed amid Puerto Rico’s debt crisis affected PRASA’s capacity to respond?

Who Bears the Burden of Puerto Rico’s Water Crisis? 
The rationing affected an estimated 500,000 residents across San Juan, Trujillo Alto, Loíza, Canóvanas, Juncos, Gurabo, and Carolina, many of whom continue experiencing interruptions and low water pressure. The burden of Puerto Rico’s water crisis falls along lines of race, class, and gender. In Loíza—where 43 percent of the population lives in poverty and 32 percent identifies as Black or African American—residents have endured unreliable access to running water for nearly six months. Similarly, residents of Canóvanas—where 32 percent of the population lives in poverty and 15 percent identify as Black or African American—have faced this crisis for nearly six months. Among the seven municipalities affected by PRASA’s rationing program, Loíza and Canóvanas have both the highest poverty rates and the largest proportions of residents who identify as Black or African American.

PRASA’s rationing program is not the only institutional response to the water crisis. Jennifer González Colón, Puerto Rico’s right-wing governor, declared a state of emergency through Executive Order 2026-035. The order attributes the crisis primarily to insufficient rainfall, prioritizes available water for potable use, and authorizes exemptions from standard procurement procedures. At the same time, communities and social movements have demanded more transparency from PRASA and González Colón over the management of the situation. In response, PRASA has threatened to fine residents for “misuse of water,” and Puerto Rico’s Department of Natural and Environmental Resources has deployed personnel in enforcement operations resembling police raids to identify residential and community wells it considers illegal.

The Double State of Exception
This move by González Colón’s administration recalls the politics of exception that have accompanied other emergencies in Puerto Rico, including hurricanes, earthquakes, and the COVID-19 pandemic. As Sociologist José Atiles Osoria points out, the Puerto Rican government’s growing reliance on executive orders as a form of governance creates a double state of exception: one produced by U.S. colonial rule and the other by Puerto Rico’s executive branch’s routine use of executive orders. In a similar vein, sociologist Naomi Klein, in her work on The Shock Doctrine, reminds us how government institutions capitalize on emergencies to maximize fear and trauma, and expand their powers.

Puerto Ricans remember how these politics of exceptionality created opportunities for private firms to profit after the widespread destruction caused by Hurricane María in 2017. The current crisis has also revived more intimate memories of María.

“This feels like going back to the times after Hurricane María. This activates my PTSD from [Hurricane] María,” one resident told me while collecting water from a tanker truck. We walked together briefly after filling our containers, and she ended our conversation with a clear statement: “This whole situation is not the result of insufficient rainfall. It is the result of the inefficiency of the people in charge.” Read more

How Non-State Alliances Are Reshaping The Global Order

John P. Ruehl – Independent Media Institute

10-15-2026 ~ From the Houthis to Mexican cartels, autonomous non-state groups are reacting to the changing global order by building their own international networks. Efforts to contain them are complicated due to growing cooperation with private-sector interests.

Yemen’s civil war reignited in early October, as Saudi Arabia brought in Turkish and Pakistani military support to fight the Houthi rebels, who have governed much of northern Yemen as a de facto authority and waged a guerrilla war in the country since 2004. Having spent more than a decade fighting Saudi-led forces and enduring US, British, and Israeli strikes, the Houthis have survived as a powerful regional force with close ties to Iran. Their continued ability to threaten Yemen’s neighbors and Red Sea shipping was demonstrated again by retaliatory strikes against Saudi infrastructure in recent days.

Although Iran is its main state ally, the Houthis, also known as Ansar Allah, are far from isolated. A spokesperson for the US military’s Africa Command said in September that the growing cooperation between the Houthis and the Al Qaeda-affiliated Somali Islamist group Al-Shabaab was a “highly concerning, escalatory threat to regional stability,” according to the Financial Times. Contact between the two ideologically opposed groups—Houthis are Zaydi Shiites, and Al-Shabaab has been strongly ideologically opposed to Shiism—has been publicly evident since at least 2024, with the Houthis supplying weapons and technical training to Al-Shabaab, which, in return, has been providing access to piracy smuggling routes along the Somali coast.

In recent years, similar ties have emerged between the Houthis and other non-state groups in Somalia. The Islamic State in Somalia (ISS) has received Houthi weapons and drones while helping them monitor ships in the Gulf of Aden. The Houthis, Al-Shabaab, and ISS have also coordinated with Somali pirates to transport goods and target vessels in the Red Sea. “During the Gaza conflict, Ansar Allah persuaded Al-Shabaab, ISS, and Somali pirates to attack vessels and block their passage into the Red Sea in solidarity with the Palestinians,” stated a 2025 article in the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Since 2022, the Houthis have meanwhile paused fighting with Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) amid the Yemeni civil war. According to the think tank Jamestown, this collaboration is transactional and focused on short-term arrangements: the Houthis can acquire funds and smuggling routes, and Al Qaeda affiliates can procure weapons and manufacturing capabilities.

Along with the Houthis’ decades-long relationship with the Lebanese-based force Hezbollah, which also has the backing of Iran, the group has more partners than its isolated diplomatic standing suggests.

Foreign state support remains crucial to non-state groups. Much has been made of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance,” but British support for the Arab Revolt during World War I demonstrated how Western powers could use local armed groups to shape Middle Eastern affairs. The US and Soviet Union refined proxy warfare during the Cold War, covertly financing, training, and arming foreign militant movements, from the US-backed Nicaraguan Contras to Soviet support for the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). This helped push militant groups into the drug trade, with the superpowers willing to turn a blind eye when criminal profits helped keep their allies fighting.

Supporting non-state groups also provided smaller states with means to strike at more powerful adversaries. Between the 1970s and 1980s, Libya supplied the Irish Republican Army with weapons, explosives, and funding to attack British targets.

The partial decline in state support immediately after the Cold War forced many non-state militant groups to become self-reliant. Globalization, along with improved communications and financial networks, brought them into increasing contact with organized criminal organizations, even as state support rebounded.

Together, the “crime-terror nexus” has built a global black market of smuggling routes, safe houses, arms dealers, financiers, money launderers, and shared technology. Distinguishing lines have faded—militant groups like the Houthis have turned to drug smuggling to fund their operations, Yemeni authorities alleged, according to reporting by the nonprofit Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project. Somali pirates have also become more militarized due to their cooperation with the Houthis. Alliances between non-state groups are mostly loose and temporary partnerships, and even groups like Al Qaeda have become decentralized, giving local affiliates greater freedom to pursue their own interests.

From Al Qaeda’s role in 9/11 to the Red Sea crisis involving the Houthis and their allies, these non-state groups have shown they can reshape global affairs independent of state sponsors. The global illicit economy generated around $6 trillion in 2025, according to the International Coalition Against Illicit Economies, giving criminal and militant networks growing reach across international trade and finance. Governments and businesses also have to contend with these groups moving through the formal economy; in 2023, Gulf-based traders were sanctioned for brokering charcoal exports from Al-Shabaab-controlled territory.

As the global order grows more unstable due to ongoing wars, cooperation among non-state groups makes it harder for governments to control them and for the private sector to avoid them. Read more

How Gen Z Protests Are Reshaping Politics In Asia

Ruhi Bhasin – Photo: LinkedIn

10-13-2026 ~ Youth-led protests have forced concessions in India and changed governments in Nepal and Bangladesh. Can those victories produce lasting political reform?

Asia has seen a surge of “Gen Z protests,” led by a generation tired of accepting the status quo and increasingly using social media to drive change in deeply entrenched political systems. In India, protests over the education system helped force the education minister’s resignation in 2026. Protests in Bangladesh and Nepal in 2024 and 2025, respectively, led to government changes. These protests have helped expose fractured political structures in these countries.

Governments in several South and Southeast Asian countries have done little to address the economic distress and corruption plaguing them. The Gen Z citizens, who are facing the brunt of these crumbling systems, are increasingly demanding accountability and justice, using social media to fight back, organize, document events, and press their demands. Despite efforts to suppress them, these protests have brought political change. Whether these movements can sustain solidarity and organize beyond immediate demands to pursue lasting reforms remains to be seen.

India
In India, the Bharatiya Janata Party-led government has been in power for more than 12 years, having first been elected in 2014. Press freedom and other democratic safeguards have come under pressure during its tenure; Sweden’s V-Dem Institute has classified India as an “electoral autocracy.” As stated by an August 2026 Time report, “Modi has consolidated his grip on all manner of national institutions in recent years: from the media, where pliant owners have repeatedly bent the knee to the administration, to election authorities, which in a recent state poll erased millions of names from voter rolls in a move widely seen as benefiting Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).”

India has been facing increasing unemployment among its educated youth, even though the government has consistently maintained these claims to be false. The country’s youth have also been contending with an education system marked by repeated paper leaks. In May 2026, the National Eligibility cum Entrance Test for undergraduate medical admissions was canceled over paper-leak allegations, fueling anger over the examination system.

Meanwhile, during the same month, the Supreme Court Chief Justice’s comparison of unemployed youth to “parasites” and “cockroaches” led to the formation of the Cockroach Janta Party (CJP) by Abhijeet Dipke, an Indian student from Boston University who graduated in 2025 with a master’s in public relations. The CJP’s Instagram account amassed 20 million followers within days, according to Time. Dipke eventually returned to India on June 6. Anger over the government’s mismanagement of the education system soon moved from social media to the streets as thousands of Gen Z showed up at Jantar Mantar, a popular protest site in India’s capital, New Delhi, with their main demand being the resignation of Education Minister Dharmendra Pradhan.

As the protest gained momentum and spread, authorities resorted to force against demonstrators. Young protesters used social media to document events on the ground and responded with “humor and grit.” For them, the protest wasn’t about any political party but rather about ensuring accountability for a broken education system. They finally succeeded in forcing Pradhan to resign on July 25, 2026.

“In the end, the young cockroaches proved so resilient because Modi’s regime of control had no punishment or humiliation to threaten them with beyond what the system already inflicts on them every day. These young men and women had reached a point where they felt they had no voice in the existing order—and nothing left to lose,” explains the Time report. Allegations of links to foreign funding were also made against the movement, but the Ministry of External Affairs said it had “no information” to confirm these allegations.

In July 2026, after the protest ended, the government introduced a bill to amend the public examinations law, and Modi announced an examination reform task force. Whether these actions succeed in reforming the education system and whether the CJP can keep pushing for their proper implementation remains to be seen.

The CJP announced another campaign in September 2026 demanding chief election commissioner Gyanesh Kumar’s resignation over alleged manipulation of voter rolls. Street protests followed in October, with opposition parties and civil society groups participating. The Election Commission denies the allegations. These protests will test the CJP’s ability to sustain pressure and the authorities’ response to demands for electoral reform.

The CJP has already split internally, resulting in the formation of the Cockroach Janta Party—Democratic.

Nepal
In September 2025, Gen Z protests erupted in Nepal after the government banned social media platforms that had not met its registration requirements, according to a Harvard T.H. Chan School of Public Health article. Gen Z saw this move to ban social media as an attempt to trample their freedom of expression, while the politicians were hoping to use their traditional tactics to also stop hashtags like #NepoKids or #YouthAgainstCorruption targeted against their children and the privileged life they led, in sharp contrast to the hardships being faced by ordinary youths daily. The government further shut down the internet, thinking that would muzzle the protests. However, they drastically underestimated the youth’s power and frustration.

While the ban triggered the protests, several larger unresolved issues had been simmering for years, including unemployment, corruption, and nepotism, which strengthened the agitation. “In a country where 56 percent of the population is below the age of thirty, a geriatric leadership whose average age was seventy was woefully out of touch. In the last decade, internet connectivity had rapidly expanded to cover more than half the population. Young Nepalis were online—on Instagram, TikTok, Reddit, Discord—but offline, they saw none of the better future promised by the 2006 revolution against the monarchy. Instead, they saw widening inequality and corruption, and on their social media feeds, they saw the children of elites flaunting their privilege,” writes author Amish Raj Mulmi for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

The protesters demanded Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli’s resignation. He finally heeded their demands on September 9, 2025. Read more


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