Workplace Surveillance Is Central To Capitalist Exploitation

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Surveillance of employees in the workplace through the use of advanced technology represents the latest phase in the long history of capitalism to maintain control of workers and to increase productivity through intensified forms of exploitation. Is surveillance capitalism an updated version of Big Brother or something even more sinister? Does it really increase productivity? Are workers accepting of surveillance? And how do we ensure that surveillance capitalism does not completely wipe out privacy and individual rights? In this exclusive *Truthout* interview, Ivan Manokha, a lecturer at Oxford University and a leading scholar in surveillance studies, offers penetrating insights into the above questions.

C.J. Polychroniou: In the age of flexible capitalism, surveillance technologies have become extremely widespread among advanced capitalist societies, with as yet unclear implications. In your view, what is the primary aim and function of the new spying and surveillance technologies?
Ivan Manokha: The key distinguishing feature of capitalism is the existence of a labor market, i.e. in capitalism human labor is commodified — it is bought and sold in a market place. From the point of view of employers, purchasing labor represents a production cost, and their objective is to make sure that it is utilized

to the maximum of its productive potential. This, in turn, requires surveillance and it may be observed that capitalism as a socioeconomic system has always involved workplace surveillance for this reason.

It is actually misleading to use the term “surveillance capitalism” following, in particular, the work of Shoshana Zuboff, now widely employed to refer to the current phase of capitalism with new — digital and biometric — technologies entering the workplace. Capitalism has always been “surveillance capitalism” because in this system the main objective of any business activity is to maximize profits — to make sure that the resources purchased and employed — including labor — are used with the maximum efficiency.

The function of new technologies, as this has always been the case with respect to workplace surveillance, is to seek to maximize worker productivity. This may be achieved in two ways: by extending the amount of time that employees work (e.g. by reducing the duration of breaks, by extending hours of work in the workplace or encouraging employees to work from home after the end of the working day, etc.), or by intensifying the labor process (the speed with which workers move, the number of tasks they complete per unit of times, etc.).

Modern workplace surveillance technologies have the potential to enable employers to do both: to monitor more precisely and continuously the time employees spend to actually work, including the timing of lunch and toilet breaks, as well as to better scrutinize and measure their performance (continuously measuring output, developing performance scoring systems and rankings, etc.).

Here a special mention needs to be made of the so-called “platform labor” — the rise of different digital platforms that bring together clients and “independent contractors,” the euphemism platforms use to refer to their laborers and service providers. They do not know their workers and have to rely on various indicators of performance to measure and compare their productivity, and the central role here is played by customers who perform the role of proxy managers — they evaluate and rank the performance of workers (e.g. of Uber drivers, of cleaners of TaskRabbit, etc.). In short, new workplace surveillance technology is used to improve the capacity of employers to monitor employees, something that they have always done.

How do they differ from past workplace surveillance, and even from surveillance

techniques under authoritarian and former communist regimes?
The main difference resides in the shift from surveillance based on the "gaze" — on the capacity of supervisors, foremen, managers, etc. to visually monitor workers — to surveillance that is digitalized, i.e. that goes beyond the "gaze" and involves the collection of all kinds of data. This shift greatly enhances the capacity of employers to monitor employees. Thus, if in the past workplace surveillance was limited to the time that supervisors were actually looking at workers, today the use of different types of new equipment (RFID badges, handheld devices carried by employees, and even implanted microchips) makes surveillance continuous.

In addition, the data may be processed in real time and managers on their KPI [key performance indicators] screens may see not only the productivity of each employee, but his or her ranking in comparison to others. For employees this means that there is no breathing time and there is no place to hide — everything may be monitored, recorded, processed and analyzed.

Concerning the second part of the question, there is indeed an Orwellian aspect to it in that new means of workplace surveillance make it totalizing — literally every move of an employee may be surveilled and, what is more, transformed into digital data that may be analyzed in ways that workers do not control and do not know of (e.g., what kind of algorithm is used to calculate performance, what is involved in the construction of a historical trajectory of performance, how will the results be used by managers, etc.). Thus, there is indeed a certain similarity with secret services in authoritarian societies, particularly the totalizing nature of surveillance and a high degree of arbitrariness that may be involved in treating and using the information obtained.

At the same time, let us note once again that this in itself is hardly new; it has always been the case that "democracy ended at the factory gate"; what has changed is the means and the degree to which workplace surveillance may be enhanced by new technologies.

Do the new surveillance technologies increase productivity?
No general definitive conclusion may be reached; what is required is a concrete empirical analysis of each particular technology in each particular industry. What we may observe, however, is that in many industries workers are pushed to the limit of their physical and mental capacities. For example, warehouse pickers at

Amazon have only a few seconds to find an item, pick it, and then immediately run to fetch another one, and so one, having to walk over 20 kilometers each day.
Going back to the distinction between extending working hours and intensifying the work as a means of increasing performance, it is clear that new technologies do enhance the ability of employees to do the former, and I would say that may, in many cases, also contribute to the latter. This, however, comes at a price of worker exhaustion, both physical and mental, and may lead to burnouts, depressions or illnesses related to stress.

Is surveillance a value-neutral activity that may be used for good and bad purposes, or is it always problematic?
It is common to cite Melvin Kranzberg's dictum that "technology is neither good nor bad; nor is it neutral" with reference to technological innovations, and to add that it all depends on the context and the use to which they are put. Surveillance technologies are no exception. They may be enabling and liberating (e.g., using wearable technology to locate miners unable to get back to the surface after an accident, monitoring health of patients at a distance, filming police brutality, etc.), but they may also be used to increase subjugation, oppression and exploitation.

What we may say is that, overall, surveillance technology is more likely to serve the interests of the powerful (because they have bigger capacity and means to put it to use that they desire), be it governments, corporate managers or digital platforms. In this respect, what is important is to focus not on surveillance technology in the abstract, but on concrete existing power relations and examine how they are affected by new means of surveillance. Thus, when we speak of workplace surveillance, it is undeniable that they have benefited employers and have greatly increased their relative power over employees.

Some recent data seems to indicate that employees are accepting of surveillance. Why would employees accept surveillance, and shouldn't unions make privacy concerns part of the collective agreements?
To begin with, we do not really know whether employees are really OK with it. The fact that they do not openly oppose its deployment and do not organize protests does not necessarily mean that they are willingly accepting it. There may be other reasons for not challenging the introduction of new workplace surveillance technologies (fear of losing a job, of being not well seen by managers, or of simply compromising one's career, etc.). However, it may be

suggested that in part the lack of protest may be due to a more general spread of surveillance and data collection in our societies.

We are used to banks gathering data on our transactions and giving us a credit score, to online shops storing our details and targeting us with products that we are likely to purchase based on our profile, to our smartphones tracking our movements, to CCTVs in the streets and biometric passport scanners at airports, etc. Now, such technologies are also present in the workplace and perhaps for many it is just something that seems unavoidable, a phenomenon that is uncontrollable. This, however, is not the case and it is important that unions take this issue seriously and attempt to control the spread of new workplace surveillance technologies.

It is crucial to note that it is not just about individual privacy; modern surveillance usually raises privacy concerns but privacy is indispensable to the exercise of a whole range of other rights (freedom of association, the right to vote, freedom of expression, etc.). The violation of workers' privacy may thus have an impact on their right to be free from discrimination and to have equal career opportunities, and to the right to form trade unions. It is thus important that unions do not underestimate the risks of new workplace surveillance and attempt to at least put certain limits on its use by employers.

About C.J. Polychroniou

C.J. Polychroniou is a political economist/political scientist who has taught and worked in universities and research centers in Europe and the United States. His main research interests are in European economic integration, globalization, the political economy of the United States and the deconstruction of neoliberalism's politico-economic project. He is a regular contributor to *Truthout* as well as a member of *Truthout*'s Public Intellectual Project. He has published several books and his articles have appeared in a variety of journals, magazines, newspapers and popular news websites. Many of his publications have been translated into several foreign languages, including Croatian, French, Greek, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish and Turkish. He is the author of *Optimism Over Despair: Noam Chomsky On Capitalism, Empire, and Social Change*, an anthology of interviews with Chomsky originally published at *Truthout* and collected by Haymarket Books.

Previously published: https://truthout.org/

Carl Cederström ~ Ons geluksideaal – Een nieuwe blik op een versleten idee

Carl Cederström – Ills.
Joseph Sassoon Semah

Carl Cederström, auteur van *The Wellness Syndrome* en *'Desperately Seeking Self-Improvement'* onderzoekt in *Ons Geluksideaal – Een nieuwe blik op een versleten idee* onze opvattingen van geluk. Hij omschrijft het geluksideaal als een expressie van wat mensen wensen en verlangen als het gaat om het goede leven.

Het geluksideaal bereikte zijn hoogtepunt in de jaren zestig met de Oostenrijkse psychoanalyticus Wilhelm Reich en zijn onconventionele interpretatie van seksuele driften. Reich combineerde de eis om authentiek te zijn met de voorwaarde van seksueel genot: het ideaal van seksuele en existentiële bevrijding. Het ideaal dat dat het rijke Westen nu al bijna een eeuw beheerst zijn weliswaar geworteld in het begin van de twintigste-eeuwse Europese psychiatrie, en de tegencultuur van de jaren dertig, maar leidt alleen tot de huidige hedonistische consumentencultuur. Authenticiteit, genot, narcisme en

zelfontplooiing vormen het hart van dit geluksideaal, en voor ons geluk zijn we zelf verantwoordelijk.
Multinationals en reclamebureaus dringen ons levens op die steeds meer onbevredigend, onzeker en narcistisch zijn. Zelfontplooiing werd decennia later niet een doel op zich maar een manier om je eigen marktwaarde te vergroten. Trainingscentra leerden grote groepen mensen hoe ze persoonlijke bevrijding konden combineren met financieel succes. Grote ondernemingen ontleenden inspiratie aan de 'human potential movement'. Dit specifieke geluksideaal werd opgenomen en verwerkt in bedrijfsculturen. De grens tussen productie en consumptie aan de ene kant en het streven naar geluk aan de andere kant vervaagden. Geluk kon via werk worden bereikt.

Cederström vraagt zich af of nu, in een tijd van schaarste en onzekerheid, andere alternatieven zijn te bedenken voor een zinvol geluksideaal.
Hij sluit zijn boek optimistisch en ietwat hoogdravend af: "In plaats van geluk te definiëren in individualistische termen en waanvoorstellingen, zullen we het in de toekomst moeten zien als een collectieve strijd van toewijding aan de waarheid."
Tegenover het hedonisme en individualisme van de vorige generaties stelt Cederström een andere visie op het goede leven, gekenmerkt door een grotere betrokkenheid bij de wereld. Als we ons laten leiden door liefde, vriendelijkheid en solidariteit kunnen wij onszelf en onze maatschappij opnieuw uitvinden.

Carl Cederström is verbonden aan de Stockholm Business School.

Carl Cederström – Ons Geluksideaal – Een nieuwe blik op een versleten idee. Ten Have, Amsterdam, 2018. ISBN 9789025906740

Linda Bouws – St. Metropool Internationale Kunstprojecten

Allegories Of Wildness ~ Prologue



"It is singular to come so far and to see so infinitely little" [i].

The above passage is from Robert Louis Stevenson's diary, which he kept during his sea voyage to Polynesia. The principle behind this quote has some general truth that holds for all voyages. Upon seeing the Polynesian islands, Stevenson was enchanted not just by the landscape, but by the inhabitants as well. He treated the Polynesians with respect and kept an open mind despite their strange practices. Although he denounced cannibalism when he visited the altar on which the native Marquesan people sacrificed prisoners for their own consumption, Stevenson claimed to have felt "infinitely distant", as "in the cold perspective and dry light of history." In part because of Western diseases and in part because of the cultural values of European conquerors, the Marquesans gradually abandoned their ceremonies, many of which the colonial government considered repugnant and savage. Stevenson deplored the consequences of contact, a term that the literature uses to describe the interaction between indigenous peoples and outsiders, and went so far as to demonstrate his respect for the imposing cannibal chief. Stevenson even questioned the moral basis for the European rejection of cannibalism; after all, he notes, the slaughter and eating of animals would cause a similar revulsion amongst Buddhists. Stevenson's strong egalitarian views are evident in his suggestion that "(…) *to cut a man's flesh after he is dead is far less hateful than to oppress him while he lives.*"

These observations serve as a reminder of a deplorable and all-to-popular story of the effects of colonialist expansion on all indigenous peoples. Unsurprisingly, the

history of Brazil's Nambikwara is not unique. "History" always engulfs these people and in so doing destroys not only sociocultural and political autonomy, but often much of the population. The name "Nambikwara" evokes such battles, some of which are quite well known. First, there are the 'indomitable warriors' that Rondon succeeded in pacifying, despite their initial rejection of civilization and contact. The model of making contact with wild tribes that Rondon established endures even now. Second, there is Lévi-Strauss' field study as described in Tristes Tropiques, a work that made the Nambikwara one of the most famous tribal peoples in the world. The lasting impact of this book is clear, it continues to be cited in a variety of scientific and non-scientific books and papers. Lastly, there is the prime example of victims of so-called development forcefully promoted by the Brazilian government. Such "progress" typically manifests as road construction and the interference of bureaucratic agencies in a certain region. Many of these projects involve financing from the World Bank. David Price exposes the negative impact of such national and international organizations. He notes a near complete lack of consideration and respect for those "before the bulldozer" suffering the regional consequences of globalization (Price 1977a; 1989). Such peoples, and, in particular, the Nambikwara, were about to be pushed aside in favor of a different civilization. Rondon was a man who believed that he represented this society benevolently. He remarks often on the compassion and kindness of the Nambikwara civilization. Lévi-Strauss, by comparison, wanted to avoid discussing it, even as he treaded through the devastation caused by contact with the Nambikwara. Price (1977) denounced continued contact as being strongly detrimental to the surviving members of what was once a large group of peoples, known for their strength and heartiness.

The goal of this work is to explore relevant aspects of the history and the modern sociocultural situation of three Indian peoples, the Latundê, Sabanê, and Sararé [ii] . The fact that these names are not well known demonstrate the unique fame associated with the Nambikwara. This project involves three case studies of individuals and peoples. Of particular interest are specific historical narrations about contact, the individual pasts of the Indians along with their contemporary situation and their unique modes of interaction with Brazilian society. Note that all three peoples are related not only to one another, but to variety of other peoples and groups. For simplicity, I refer to all these people as members of the Nambikwara language family. A considerable amount of dialects and languages make up this language family.

The plan to study Nambikwara stems from two linguistic considerations: (1) Despite the fact that a number of studies are already published (on the South Nambikwara language group in particular), this family has not been studied in all its variety and in consideration of its descriptive complexity. Preliminary work both by David Price and by members of the Summer Institute of Linguistics (SIL), a self-styled linguistic branch of a Protestant missionary organization, exists but remains incomplete (currently the SIL is working on some studies of a so-called Northern language). (2) Certain interesting phonological and morphological phenomena may be relevant materials in theoretical linguistics. The Nambikwara language family represents a relatively small group at the southernmost point of an area of impressive linguistic variety, which includes a number of small linguistic families and language isolates, in what is now the southern part of the Brazilian state of Rondônia. For many years the Latundê were the only, isolated, local group representing the Nambikwara in Rondônia. Today, however, there is direct contact with two isolated languages in this linguistically and culturally rich region.

While the prime objective of this project largely stems from these linguistic considerations, the choice of the three groups derived from the logic of research in this discipline. Stella Telles completed much Latundê research in her PhD dissertation. Her supervisor, Prof. Leo Wetzels of the Vrije Universiteit van Amsterdam also became the coordinator of this project. Prof. Wetzels conceived of two complementary studies conducted by two other PhD candidates: one about the Sabanê language, previously reported as a separate and unique branch of the family, and the other regarding the Sararé, the most distant member of the Southern cluster, possibly representative of one of its four major dialect groups [iii] . By way of this choice, the two most extreme geographical positions of the two major groups were chosen jointly with the only existing representative of the presumed third branch of the family. The choice of particular groups within the language family consisted of linguistic and not sociocultural criteria, but it stands to reason that cultural variation bears a certain relation to linguistic variability. Language is the medium of culture and humanity and, as such, of the sociocultural order. Linguists are very worried about the lack of attention and visibility of the threat posed by social factors to the permanence of the present diversity of languages. The theme of language diversity is much less evident than that of biodiversity or even ethnodiversity.

For this reason, and without transforming the project into a sociolinguistic study, the inclusion of an anthropologist in the Project expands the objective of language analysis and incorporates an exploratory study of the ethnohistory of the three peoples and some of their notions on their own culture and language in comparison to the Brazilian counterparts. In brief, this relates to the political and social Brazilian conquest which overwhelmed all these native peoples. The political system that allowed interethnic territorial encirclement and subjugation, with the dissolution of the previous sociopolitical autonomy effectively dominates all Nambikwara local groups and peoples and pushes indigenous languages towards extinction.

The general aim of the present study is therefore an introduction to the ethnohistory and to some selected topics on the present sociocultural situation of these indigenous peoples. Note that the idea of ethnohistory refers here to both uses that circulate in the literature. First, it concerns the description of the history of a people from an external vantage point. Also, it relates to the people's own way of describing and portraying their historical contingencies. Both perspectives are, of course, essential to an anthropological approach of history and of what we may subsume under the headings of change and continuity of a people's diachronic passage through time (even if reality itself is actually only change as Lévi-Strauss, the most famous author on the Nambikwara, once wrote; Reesink 1999). Furthermore, the particular history of each people also yields some idea of the conceptualisation of the sociocultural notion of the person and the sociocultural predicates of indigenous human personhood and alterity.

The Nambikwara (by which I mean a foreign conception of "one people"), possess a number of myths and stories about their origins and past events that depict their views on their own history. Ideally, such histories yield significant information on the way the Nambikwara shaped their responses to the intrusion of the outsiders. Generally, the most 'significant others' were various Brazilian agents and agencies. It is thus very important to gauge all types of impacts on the diverse Indian peoples. This includes examining how the diversity between them makes itself apparent and what the parallel extraneous structural constraints to which they were all subjected are. In this way, I intend to make an exploratory initial contribution to the study of one national 'cosmology of contact' opposed to three Indian 'cosmologies of contact' (see Albert and Ramos (2002), especially in Albert's model introduction). As in all these 'cosmologies', the other peoples

constitute ‘wild others’. Accordingly, this effort is related intrinsically to the idea of allegory in that it is an element that reveals something beyond itself and is not just what it initially seems. Literally, an allegory requests one “to say the other” (Kothe 1986: 7)[iv].

The Project, financed by the Netherlands Foundation for the Advancement of Tropical Research and the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research, provided for a two year post-doctoral research position at the Vrije Universiteit (September 2000 – August 2002) of which over six months were spent in Brazil. Therefore, there were definite limits to the extent of fieldwork among each people and the documentation of the results. The fieldwork was projected to be done among all three peoples (two months for each one) but its realization was hampered by a number of unforeseen practical complications [v] . On the other hand, the extension of six months of guest hospitality at the Vrije Universiteit to write this book allowing for the fact that our return to Brazil only took place in the middle of 2003 permitted an expansion of the use of documentary sources and of the literature. However, for a number of reasons the final publication of this book was very much delayed. This means that a number of references published afterwards are only incorporated in this final text in very limited way. Although these obvious limitations must be kept in mind, I hope that the reader will agree the result still is a worthwhile introduction and a relevant first step in an analysis of Nambikwara ethnohistories.

In effect, the information obtained in the field is one important source for the chapters that follow, but the slowly expanding and hardly known literature on the Nambikwara constitutes an additional fund of knowledge from which I will draw heavily in order to supplement its limitations. Rondon himself wanted to be known as a scientist, a naturalist, and an ethnographer and he published on the Indian peoples along with his Commission. When Lévi-Strauss followed the route of the telegraph lines installed by his famous predecessor, he noted that these lines had not fulfilled the promise of the future that Rondon was certain his work would be shaping. Lévi-Strauss was a little recognized ethnographer, and considering the fact that he never had the chance to visit a permanent village and also did not have the opportunity to learn the language except for a very rudimentary frontier pidgin, he managed to write a more scholarly treatise on the Nambikwara. His Tristes Tropiques molded the image of the Nambikwara so strongly that the works of Price are not sufficient to correct opinions in the many quarters where the

popular book was read. Price's own thesis remained unpublished, as were the theses of a score of other Nambikwara students (Aspelin; Figueroa; Serafim; Costa, published in 2002; Fiorini, also to be published soon). Employing these writers' articles and material from the archives of Brazil's Indian affairs bureau, FUNAI, I provide fresh interpretations from the Nambikwara point of view. Hopefully, these efforts succeed in making history a little less dry.

Having embarked on this project with these general ideas summarily outlined, the first local group to be visited was the Latundê. The reasons for this choice are purely practical and had to do with considerations relating to the access to the Indigenous Territories. Such access was extremely difficult, if not impossible, during the rainy season. Correspondingly, I embarked on this visit in the beginning of September, 2000 and I left the group less than three months later. The field research at the Latundê received the wholehearted support of the linguist Stella Telles and we passed some time together at the Latundê and Aikaná villages. The Latundê are the only Northern Nambikwara people still living in their own village in the immense region that was once populated with many peoples and groups. Rondon, the first explorer to create the fame of the Nambikwara, had already contacted all of these other peoples. In fact, Rondon chose their name. For a variety of reasons, the reader will note that names and naming are significant and constitute one of the recurring issues of this work. The Nambikwara names of people and the secrecy of personal names are the theme of Fiorini's (2000) thesis. The publication of this study represents the first extensive modern monograph on Nambikwara culture. Due to time limitations, my research aims at a less comprehensive ethnographic objective of this culture and I will mainly discuss the relation between naming of local groups and the contemporary process of group-formation. For the Latundê I start with the bureaucratic process of the national society's method of naming, classifying and creating the people and the peoples' land within the surrounding framework of the nation-state. Later, I turn to the native viewpoint, although in a restricted way due to language barriers and psychological difficulties which inhibit discussing such a traumatic past with a stranger. Finally, I turn to some considerations about the future of the people and their language. In particular, the endangered status of the language plays a prominent role in the maintenance of culture and sociocultural tradition.

The Sabanê were contacted at the time of Rondon's construction of the telegraph line that penetrated the heart of North Nambikwara territory. At the time,

according to this people, they had migrated from Mato Grosso and participated fully in the fabric of relationships in this vast region that encompassed an uncertain number of peoples, each with at least one village. Some part of their particular history appears in the writings of the Rondon Commission. Here the reader will gain a glimpse of the native conceptions of contact. Rondon, for instance, became a mythological hero in both the national society and among the Nambikwara peoples whom he contacted. The subsequent Sabanê history is full of adaptations, clashes, and contingencies that severely affected their possibility of continuing as an autonomous people and especially the maintenance of their language. I did some collaborative fieldwork on this topic with another linguist, Gabriel Antunes, who was working on a thesis on the Sabanê language. Antunes was also very worried about the future of this language. His census of native speakers revealed that the language is nearly dead and that the number of native speakers was less than ten (and decreasing). As usual, younger generations are generally monolingual Portuguese speakers. As a people, the Sabanê do not suffer the threat of extinction but rather the demise of their unique language, the only one of the third branch of the Nambikwara linguistic family. Here the threat of language death is pre-eminent. The recent founding of a new Sabanê village on the Roosevelt River (in Rondônia) in their own traditional lands alleviates the tensions amongst the Sabanê themselves and their immediate neighbors in the Aroeira Indigenous Territory, Mato Grosso. Sadly, however, this may be a necessary but insufficient condition for language revival and permanence.

As for the last group, the Sararé is the only case where neither the language nor the people run the clear risk of extinction. This does not mean that the history of the various autonomous groups now known as Sararé (or sometimes as Katitauhlu) is less complicated than of the two previous segments of the Nambikwara group. For instance, some peoples of the region have died out. The history of the southernmost peoples of the South Nambikwara language cluster can be traced further back and also raises specific questions as to the length of the occupancy of the region of the upper Guaporé River with the Sararé River in the center. In the eighteenth century, mining operations invaded the region and, after initiating their decline, there was a perpetual war between Indian peoples and the regional society represented by the inhabitants of the first capital of Mato Grosso, the contemporary municipality of Vila Bela. This protracted war resulted in the withdrawal of the intruders and the autonomous occupancy of nearly the entire region by Sararé Nambikwara. Here one wonders whether these peoples

simply reconquered their lands. As usual, historical sources are thoroughly confusing about the names of the peoples who fought the whites, be they the Cabixi, the Paresi, or both. Furthermore, usage of such names is very inconsistent. Only at the end of the nineteenth century did it become clear that Cabixi must have been the most common name for the peoples who later partially merged into the entity now known as the Sararé.

It was Rondon's decision to name all of these people as Nhambiquara. Here I discuss some problems of the mode of occupancy of the Nambikwara and their characteristic form of leadership. Some narratives of the Nambikwara do Campo partly elucidate both aspects of the relationship to the land, the character of the local group and the enormous individual and social suffering provoked by the 'contact situation'. The war in the Sararé region itself ended only in the 1960's. The Sararé maintained a relatively positive self-image but the population decline and subsequent very slow recovery after contact was agitated further by the invasion of many gold miners and lumber companies. Even if the recovery did take place and the population grew again ensuring language and sociocultural survival, the continuing allure of their natural resources for the most perfidious sectors of the local population, who possess their own socioeconomic mythology and interests, causes a persistent disquiet among the Sararé.

Briefly, these are the peoples and their ethnohistories. The first Part of the book is called The Name because issues raised by Latundê history are a good introduction to the process of naming by others. Part II on the Sabanê is titled Fame, by virtue of the prominent role played by Rondon in real life and in the mythology of both parties when for the first time, the Nambikwara really reached national fame. Finally, the last Part is called Fate, because of the long history involved and the way the long term vicissitudes of contact shape a significant part of the destiny of the Nambikwara.

The similarities and differences in the historical processes of these three representatives of the whole group demonstrate a reasonable array of possibilities for antagonistic contact between national society and the component segments of the Nambikwara. Processes of 'deculturation,' 'acculturation' and language maintenance or death of these peoples illustrate the same historical globalizing colonial 'encounter' imbued with the attempt to oppress and construct submission on the one side, and, on the other side, the effort to maintain autonomy, transformation, accommodation and the resilient, recurrent and courageous

expression of a local sociopolitical agency. At various times and in various frameworks, the clash of perspectives and power shaped three different outcomes. One element, however, stands: in all cases, including the peoples not discussed here, the Nambikwara peoples showed an astonishing resilience and capacity. Only in the face of overwhelming odds and forces do they conform to extraneous impositions. Despite the unfortunate contemporary outcomes, their histories still are a tribute to human imaginativeness and inventiveness. If the capabilities could ever be applied to the present situation, perhaps there may be a future that heals some of the ruinous effects of history. If properly managed, the Nambikwara languages and cultures can, through their reiterated recurrent and reflexive practice, transform and persist into the future.

Acknowledgements
When I took unpaid leave of the Federal University of Bahia in order to accompany my wife for her doctorate, I began to keep an eye open for other opportunities to fill in the temporary hiatus. By complete coincidence, the Nambikwara Project of Prof. Wetzels of the Vrije Universiteit van Amsterdam was being presented to the financing institution, the WOTRO (the Dutch organization for scientific research in the tropics) when we were about to leave Brazil. Prof. Adelaar of Leiden University referred the project designer and supervisor to the possibility of my participation. So it is to him that I owe my participation. By then professor Wetzels had collaborated with the anthropologist Prof. Jarich Oosten, also of Leiden University. They accepted the suggestion by Prof. Adelaar and kindly invited me to participate in the Project. As the subject matter lies within my normal research area and I found the issue extremely interesting, I jumped at the possibility. In Brazil they gave me the opportunity to make some suggestions and otherwise contribute to the definitive research design that was approved several months later. I thank them all for the opportunity and, as they are all very dedicated scientists, for the fruitful cooperation that followed. The WOTRO (part of the NWO, the general Dutch institution for the financing of scientific research) henceforth financed the post-doctorate position and the trips to the three areas. I am therefore happy to thank the WOTRO and NWO for the grant (WAG 52-897) that made this research possible.

Research for this monograph was carried out during a stay at the Faculty of Humanities of the Vrije Universiteit van Amsterdam, in The Netherlands. I am very grateful to the Vrije Universiteit for the academic hospitality that was given

to me during the six months I stayed there as guest. I also gratefully acknowledge the financial assistance that I received from the Vrije Universiteit Algemeen Steunfonds for preparing the camera-ready manuscript. I wish to thank Matt Coler for his assistance in giving this book its actual form as far as style and grammar is concerned and also the Van Coevorden Adriani Stichting for its financial assistance, which has allowed me to profit from Matt Coler's expertise.

Of course, while the Vrije Universiteit provided all the bureaucratic support and lodging, my most frequent contact was with the general supervisor and professor of that University, Prof. Wetzels. We also traveled together through nearly the entire Nambikwara region in July and August 2001. Considering the circumstances, it was an especially interesting and rewarding trip. Prof. Wetzels was always available to help. He leads a most promising and interesting study program of the Indigenous Amazonian languages and I thank him this unfailing support. The anthropological research also benefited from the support of Prof. Jarich Oosten to whom I am also very grateful.

Due to the long term of participation, this book is tributary to the research group and tradition of the PINEB. The latter – the Research Program of the Indigenous Peoples in the Northeast of Brazil at the Federal University of Bahia – headed by Drs. Pedro Agostinho and Ma. Rosário Carvalho transformed itself from the pioneering anthropological research effort on the indigenous peoples of Bahia into an enduring anthropological enterprise that extended to the whole of the Northeast. From its birth in 1971, it has produced a substantial amount of novel work and has always sought to foster creativity and intellectual growth. Most importantly, it serves as an uncommon stimulating intellectual climate that promotes discussion and dialogue. All in all, although usually not cited as such, the present effort is tributary to the Brazilian tradition represented by the PINEB and which combines the tradition of studies of interethnic friction (initiated by Cardoso de Oliveira) as well as the tradition of ethnographies of Indian peoples (from Nimuendaju to the growing number of renowned contemporary anthropologists). Cardoso de Oliveira (1978: 189; orig. written in 1972) for example, clearly pointed out that the term "Nambikuara" covered a truly interethnic spectrum.

Despite some problems that will be discussed later, the great majority of the different Nambikwara peoples where I and the members of the Project did research viewed our efforts favorably and I sincerely hope the result will be

helpful to them. Listing each individual would require pages. I am especially grateful for the help of the Latundê, Sabanê and Sararé peoples and am in debt to Terezinha, Mané, Manézinho, Ivone, Tereza, Américo and Saulo. Furthermore I greatly appreciate the hospitality of the Aikaná of the Gleba in Chupinguaia. The prefect of Chupinguaia at the time, Ataíde da Silva, furnished some much-needed transport.

FUNAI granted me the necessary authorization and support. Thus, I am grateful for the assistance of people like Ariovaldo dos Santos, Natal, Ana Maria Costa and the staff in Vilhena, especially Nicodemus. I particularly thank Aldair Algayer for a very instructing time. Last, but not least, I appreciate the time, however brief, I spent with the retired Marcelo Santos.

Employees working for organizations like the PACA (Raquel and Sandro) as well as those from the NGO and the teaching missionaries in the Sararé and the Funasa also supported the research during key moments. OPAN and João dal Poz aided me by graciously permitting access to certain documents in Cuiabá. In The Netherlands, Hein Van der Voort and Willem Adelaar offered critical advice and support. The ambiance and team spirit of the linguist members of the Project, Cristina Borella, Gabriel Antunes and Stella Telles (always complemented by the untiring Marcos Galindo) provided intellectual stimulus. Finally, my family, Mísia and Loïc (later also including Anik), and my late mother Mw. Reesink, unfailingly supported my work.

I am grateful to all these people, each of whom played a key role in this research and without whom none of this would have been possible. Thank you all.

Notes:

[1] These and other quotes in this section are cited in Bell's book retracing the travels of Stevenson in the Pacific (Bell 1995: 31; 58; respectively).

[ii] Italics indicate native terms, whether Indian or, like the word *Indian* itself , having originated in Brazilian national society.

[iii] This is suggested by David Price, the major anthropologist involved with the Nambikwara, mostly with the Nambikwara do Campo dialect group, (See Price 1978 for his overview of the linguistic relations between the diverse Nambikwara local groups).

[iv]The title is also tributary to the title of the stimulating book *Allegories of the Wilderness* by M. Jackson (1982). In a sense, some features about the allegorical

stores and personhood are based on or relate to Jackson's work.
[v] For example, among the Latundê there are no elders to recount history; among the Sabanê many of the small group of elders were not accessible for unexpected political reasons; and among the Sararé the elders do not speak Portuguese and the younger men can be enticed only with great difficulty to aid in translation.

Allegories Of Wildness ~ Documentary Ethnohistory: The Convolutions Of The Right To Territory



Preliminary general framework
This Part is founded on field research completed among the Latundê as well as archived documents available at the headquarters of the Brazilian government's Indian affairs bureau, FUNAI (*Fundação Nacional do Índio*), in Brasília[i]. FUNAI is the nominal institutional caretaker and protector of Indian peoples and their legal rights. It is the successor to the corrupt Indian Protection Service (known as SPI, *Serviço de Proteção ao Índio*). The new institution renewed the *Indian policy*[ii] previously in practice. Despite the good intentions of many of its employees, the official policy towards the Indian peoples has always been profoundly ethnocentric. Essentially, it views the Indians as being early evolutionary remnants and so is justified in *civilizing* them. Thus, aside from similarities in the bureaucratic structure and even the staff, FUNAI maintains significant ideological similarities with SPI. Moreover, in its role as the *legal ward* of the Indians, the organization has always been involved in a structural

quagmire; it must perform its legal duties in favor of the *protected* while diplomatically dealing with the many opposing local and regional interests with strong political influence. Juggling these two rival concerns characterize FUNAI's unique place in the bureaucracy within the Interior Ministry and, even today, after relocation within the Ministry of Justice.

From the beginning FUNAI's general and wide-ranging subordination to government policies is noteworthy. During the 1970s, the legal problems of the crooked SPI and a public image tainted with massacres (such as that suffered by the Cinta Larga, northern neighbors to the Northern Nambikwara) resulted in a new legal precedent, Law 6001, known more generally as the *Estatuto do Índio* (1973). In the zenith of the military dictatorship, the political and civil elite pretended to demonstrate a degree of *civilization* and respect for certain human rights with a relatively advanced law. The government sought to exhibit its pretensions of being the defense to *Western Christian civilization* in a world polarized by the cold war and plagued by various armed leftist movements, contending for what they thought was a historic possibility to *liberate* the Brazilian people. Of course, the 'humanistic' or humane treatment proposed depended largely on this self image that had been particularly debated in regards to the *Indian question* by civil movements in the Western countries. The image projected abroad was fundamental in drawing up the terms of the law that contained the expected principles regarding the relentless course of the *evolution of mankind*, a philosophy supported by a number of culturalist and assimilationist anthro-pological concepts in the 1950s, theories that emphasized culture over domination and accordingly tended to predict that the Indian peoples assimilate. Ironically this movement employed some of the ideas of Darcy Ribeiro, a famous anthropologist persecuted for his political activities by the same military regime. Even so, the law extended some measure of legal protection to Indian peoples and their respective rights to land, culture and language.

In Brazil, as in many other countries, the existence of written legal rights does not guarantee their practice. On paper the law appears as a perfectly reasonable protection for peoples absolutely unequipped to deal with the scale and manner of assault they were about to suffer. In practice, however, the unofficial ideology of the vast majority of military and civil servant elite considered the *Indian problem* a minor and generally insignificant issue when compared to the countries' social and economic problems. Consequently, Indian interests were habitually

completely subordinated to the state, sacrificed to the higher aims of socioeconomic *development*. In addition, there was the *menace* they represented as autonomous peoples, termed *ethnic enclaves* in the military *national security* doctrine prevalent at the time [iii]. In a sense there was a shift in one of the key issues at hand; the *Indian problem* is not the Indian's problem. Actually, in a way it is an issue for the ethnic majority, a *White problem*. This problem was brought to the Indians by the intrusive expansion of Brazilian society, an expansion that claimed their land and bodies as a natural eternal part of the state. This expansion sought to dissolve their ethnic difference with the common nation-state mantra of "one state, one nation, one people and one language". The state symbolically expropriated their autonomy, and consequently, especially their political independence. It is no coincidence that even the progressive 1988 Constitution has no mention of indigenous *peoples* but opts for terms like *indigenous communities*. By means of laws originally totally irrelevant to native peoples, those designated as *Indians* became *Brazilian* via the encompassing state. They were and are subject to state action that would transform them in accordance with the nationalist imagination. In this sense, the conquest that begun in 1500 still continues forcefully in the persistence of the process of symbolic violence, subordination and exploitation of *Indian* peoples and their natural resources.

In this long history, the state *protection* agency started out as the government intermediary whose function was to bring the Indians into the fold of Brazilian nationhood with the humanistic concern of saving their lives but not their culture or identity. In the beginning, this *Service* also dealt with the settlement of national rural laborers and the two areas of concern were very closely related. The aim of *civilizing* the *uncivilized* is the same for both the Brazil's laborers and the agency's Indians, and even more so with the predicted destiny of the Indian's transformation into *civilized national laborers*. As such, not much has changed since its foundation in 1910 and the actions of the Rondon Commission that first penetrated the region of the Nambikwara and its neighbors around the same time. Strategic geopolitics inspired the incorporation of this largely untouched region and Rondon proudly proclaimed his aim to be turning the unused, maybe even unspoiled, and practically untouched savanna and jungle and its innocent inhabitants into productive economic national assets [iv]. A number of Nambikwara peoples and local groups in the northern and northeastern part of their original territory entered into strenuous but relatively untroubled relations

with the telegraph builders and the personnel that operated the various stations, despite some violence and a few deaths. It is clear that the Sabanê entered into these relations sometime after the construction of the telegraph line, as Lévi-Strauss mentioned them in his famous journey along this route in the 1930s. Among the northern local groups, the same author speaks of an alliance of this group with a group of speakers of another northern language, the *Tarundê*, while staying in Vilhena (see Part II). There is no mention by any author of this period that identifies the Latundê as one of the peoples or groups in the northernmost part of the extensive area formerly held by the Northern Nambikwara cluster until their *pacification* in the 1970s. The Sararé, being located in the southernmost tip of the Guaporé Valley have a lengthy historical record but only in the 1960s *civilization* strongly shaped their destiny (see Part III).

The type of Indian relations, the particularities of their subjugation and the historical results of the process for these different peoples depends largely on the sociocultural attitudes of the Indian peoples at the time of *contact* and the historical phase of the socioeconomic dynamics of the Brazilian conquest of *Brazilian territory*. To some degree, the policies of related official governmental agencies effected crucial phases of initial contact and settlement [v]. Hence, it is significant that contact with the Latundê happened in the mid-1970s, after the initial construction of the road from Cuiabá to Porto Velho, known notoriously as the BR364. Despite being merely a dirt road, its official opening in 1960-1961 caused an immediate and steadily increasing influx of settlers with diverse intentions united by the general goal of 'making a new life'. The major policy makers and participant institutions, however, did not reckon that the majority of these people would be poor peasants venturing north to escape the closed agricultural situation in the southern states[vi]. In this sense, a significant part of the influx consisted of socioeconomically undesirable migrants. The government's explicit and implicit aims involved the public goal of what is best described as a magical idea of *development* during the *Brazilian miracle* (the period of strong economic growth). *Growth* and *development* were considered nearly synonymous and beneficial by definition to all society. The internal migration was meant to skim off the *excess population* in northeastern Brazil by funneling people into the *empty spaces* of *unexploited lands* in the Amazon and in so doing avoid the agrarian reform in Northeast Brazil. Simultaneously, there was the strategic military objective of *occupying the frontiers* with real *Brazilians* to achieve nationalistic objectives and validate the popular slogan *Amazonia is ours*. In

reality, aside from these overt and covert aims, numerous federal incentives like fiscal exemption and development subsidies always benefited powerful commercial and industrial interests of large firms, even including transnational enterprises like Volkswagen.

The state elaborated various *development plans*. Firstly, there was the National Integration Plan of 1970 and later other national and regional plans that affected the Nambikwara like the *Polonoroeste* (literally Northwestern Pole). A name, as Price already noted, that marks southeast Brazil as the sociopolitical and economic center that commands the overall perspective. The National Integration Plan was intended as a foundation to implement what was referred to as the *rational* occupation of Amazonia. The purported rationality of the planning board was severely alienated by the actual workings of regional bureaucracy, enmeshed as they were with the private business elite. The latter profited without any scruples from the federal government's economic incentives and from the dynamic situation created by the influx of incoming peasants. The landless poor, small-scale entrepreneurs, and other interested people all set out to make their fortune. Many impoverished and homeless citizens migrated in the hope of eking out a new existence. Although this assorted mixture of social classes occasionally and partially cooperated, they also tended to compete amongst themselves for the natural resources that became increasingly accessible by the state's construction of the infrastructure, and especially roads. In this way, the Plan resulted in a frontier situation full of conflicts and sporadic violence that were often outside the control of the state and its agencies. The government still attempted to discipline some of the actions undertaken by those *occupying* the interior in the name of the magic of *economic progress*. FUNAI mainly played a shameful and subordinate role in the government effort to control events, except for a brief period and a few respectable actions. At this time, the Nambikwara found themselves, in the words of Price (1989b), *Before the bulldozer.* In short, they were shoved aside to make way for the self-proclaimed *miracle* (as Davis emphasized in *Victims of the Miracle*; the *miracle* refers to rapid economic growth). The Nambikwara peoples figure prominently among the principal victims.

The name of the Nambikwara once again reached international fame as the prototypical innocent victims of what some Brazilian oppositional circles referred to as *savage capitalism.* Having first reached fame in Brazil as being the primary subjects of the *humanistic approach of Rondon* (around 1910), they attained

international recognition as the prime example of *primitiveness* in a study by Lévi-Strauss (1955)[vii]. All instances of temporary fame concern the notion of a general encompassing idea of *Nambikwara* with little attention to internal differences between the diverging and converging destinies of the numerous components of the *Nambikwara* ensemble. No one had heard of the independent Latundê until the mid-1970s. Documentation in the FUNAI archives from that period that pertain to the process of the demarcation of the Latundê territory confirms this in how they attached so little importance to some crucial issues. Additionally, compared to the absolutely shameful treatment suffered by certain Nambikwara of the Guaporé Valley, there was little attention given to this case owing to the apparently relatively smooth solution: namely their *pacification* and the demarcation of their lands. To a very important extent ignored by both FUNAI and SPI, the Latundê received almost no recognition and public attention. Yet, this case is representative of some aspects of the general *Indian policy* implemented at the time. A number of pertinent documents probably disappeared and were never archived. Thankfully, the existent documents are sufficient to reconstruct a general overview of what was happening. These bureaucratic remnants follow the demarcation process from the beginning to its end and provide a rare view of the agency's inner workings. To my knowledge, no similar case analysis for this period exists for Amazonia (for the special case of the Xingu, see Menezes 2000).

Furthermore, an exploration of a case like this not only demonstrates the particularities of a specific process but also shows commonalities in the way the bureaucracy generally dealt with the implementation of the legally guaranteed right to demarcation as shown by Almeida and Oliveira (1998) [viii]. A good example of more general implications of the administrative protocol is obvious in the name of the file "Tubarão/Latundê territory"[ix]. According to this title, the Latundê area links directly to that of the Tubarão Indians (now usually known as the Aikaná). In fact, the Latundê are the only members of the Nambikwara people whose land demarcation directly relates to that of another Indian people (excluding the special case of Utiariti where the area originally derives from a Post of the Telegraph Line; that is, this area dates from another era of interethnic relations and the settlement later became a religious mission that attracted several groups of different peoples to this Paresi territory). The combination of these two peoples in one area appears in all of the recent general surveys, the small Sabanê presence is often noted too. The combination of names is found

broadly in a variety of works and surveys. Looking specifically at those from the Instituto Socioambiental, an agency responsible for thorough summaries of each indigenous area, this particular Indigenous Territory is always considered to belong both to the Tubarão and to the Latundê. Such an exceptional situation needs an explanation by means of its bureaucratic history. In other words, the relevant dossier that explains how this irregular situation arose must be explored in the following sections.

The first documents: a sluggish ethnocentric and bureaucratic approach

The official classification and recognition of the people known as an *Indian group*, once unknown to the state bureaucracy, is fairly well documented in the archive. Prior to this, however, the small village must have had a history of contact as they were one of the peoples that originally occupied territory in the region of the upper Pimenta Bueno River. Their history is intertwined with the former frontiers of expansion into Amazonia (here referring to the Amazons as the region drained by the rivers of the Amazon basin). The Nambikwara peoples lived in Amazonia but in a transitional region from the savannas of Central Brazil to the real Amazon forest. Practically all of the peoples of the Nambikwara ensemble preferred to live in the savanna and used the forests for growing food and the production of other goods. Unfortunately for them, wherever there was a sufficient number of rubber trees (as in Rondônia, the northern part of the Guaporé Valley and along the rivers on the Parecis Plateau), their presence encumbered the interests of the intruding national frontiers. The early history of Rondônia involves mainly the expansion in search of rubber and the carving out of *seringais*, the large *properties* used to exploit rubber trees. In this particular case, the *owner* practiced a system of extracting rubber from rubber trees with the help of a subaltern workforce maintained through a particular form of domination. The owner shaped his domination by channeling all *products* and *merchandise* through the notorious *barracão* (the only central trading post dominated by the owner or his foreman) and the *debt* for the worker this control created. Many Indian peoples of this region, where not simply exterminated or expelled from their lands, were forced to work along the rubber *roads*. They *produced* the primary raw material and *bought* industrialized merchandise. When the exploitation reached its peak in a time of high rubber prices, *owners* even imported basic foods. This particular mode of domination and exploitation *civilized* many Indians on their own lands. Among these, the Paresi preceded the Nambikwara do Campo in being forced to accept an alliance with the rubber

tappers penetrating their lands either from the lower rivers north of their territory or from the direction of Cuiabá.

In the 1930s, the *Tubarão* Indians were similarly required to use their own natural resources to benefit the new *owners* and intermediaries in the rubber trade. The self-proclaimed *owners* abused the subjugated Indian peoples as laborers on their own land, territory which was previously autonomous. In spite of the considerable period of *contact* with the regional society and SPI's documented knowledge of the Tubarão's existence in the forties (as reported in the writings of Dequech), the official agency ignored the peoples of the upper Pimento River several decades later. They made their reappearance in the bureaucratic record in a small number of documents sent to Nogueira's[x] Eighth Regional Administration of FUNAI in Porto Velho by Cerqueira, the substitute administrator of the *Aripuanã Indian Park*. Cerqueira explicitly requested that these documents be forwarded to Brasília for consideration by the Agency's president. The first page of the Tubarão-Latundê dossier, dated June 28, 1976, concerns the reports of new Indians. The second document is a copy of a telegram, apparently written by this same person. According to the contents, in April Nogueira already had some crucial information on the subject and requested an employee to visit the area to establish the truth of what remains unsubstantiated information:
226/8a. DR at 13.04.76. to inform. claim existence of civilized Indians. municipality of Pimenta Bueno Tubarões tribes consisting of 12 families totaling 52 people. the Tubarões were born right bank of [who travels upstream the]*... Pimenta River. INCRA reserved* [land] *in the same direction as maloca Indians were born.*[On the] *left bank. soils not apt for agriculture. would like esteemed partner determine trip sertanista Benamour certify veracity fact. as well as quantity area reserved Indians by INCRA. SDS 8a. DR*[xi].

A closer examination of the passage above is informative. The Aripuanã Park was inhabited by Indian peoples only recently *pacified* and was home to what were popularly known as *uncivilized Indians*. The northern neighbors of the Nambikwara ensemble became known as *Cinta Larga* (Large Belt) because of their conspicuous attire. This people is one of the Tupi-Mondé peoples from Rondônia. It is noteworthy that these Indians believe that they established contact and pacified the *Whites* and not the other way around, as is the usually unquestioned assumption of their role as the initiator and conductor of

pacification[xii]. The expression *civilized Indians* typifies the evolutionary and integrationalist ideology in the discourse as well as the predictions of the Indian's future made by the very employees responsible for their *protection* and well-being. Another interesting feature of the telegram concerns the use of the plural to name these *tribes*. This kind of generalization is not uncommon, although admittedly in this instance only one name is given, the pluralized *Tubarões*; that is, literally translated into English, *Sharks*. Still the information itself is precise because the group really lived near the Pimenta Bueno River margin, to the south of their present location, in the interior. These people were transferred to lands with inferior soil quality as mandated by another government agency, INCRA (an acronym for the "National Institute of Colonization and Agrarian Reform"). The mission of this agency was the settlement of peasants and others by means of colonization projects.

From the very start, it was known that the Indians had been relocated away from their original homelands and into a region that was not only unfamiliar, but one that also significantly less fertile. Being noticeably in *contact*, the generic and generalizing qualification *Indian* applies to them with its leveling force of being their first and foremost identifying label, an identifier which they must have learned *to be* by now. Of course, it is as *Indian* that the Brazilian society and state classifies all these peoples, disregarding their profound specificities and differences, subjecting all of them to a simplistic template of what an *Indian* should be, do and appear. It is the characteristic of *Indians* that prompted Cerqueira, the park administrator, to send a letter to INCRA on May 6, 1976 to clarify the information of his superior administration that this agency "(...) *penetrated this area obliging these Indians to move to the left bank of this river where the land is infertile* (...)". On June 4, 1976, the executive officer Silva[xiii] responded not by answering the implicit accusation but by highlighting his own administrative problems:
"*The INCRA selection processed lands with the name of Gleba Corumbiara, gleba* [a unit of land] *which is divided into 12 sectors.*
In sector 11 of this gleba, is an Indian tribe called Tubarão, situated at the immediacies of the Pimenta Bueno river at its right bank, headwaters of the Mutuca and Chupinguaia rivers.
The winners of the selection process of the parcels located in the proximity of the referred tribe, are having difficulties in penetrating this area, because of the existence of the tribe ".

These rather confusing remarks underscore how INCRA planned the parcels of the land on the map and refers to the way the land was allotted to new owners. In one of the sectors of the INCRA project they encountered the Tubarão. Silva attached a map to this prejudiced letter regarding the colonization project Corumbiara and provides a very biased depiction. There is no mention of how the Indians arrived in the first place. Their presence is only relevant in that they are implicitly an obstacle to legal and legitimate *parcel owners*. There is no indication of a solution, nor is there any proposal for action. In a letter also dated June 4, 1976, Cerqueira reacted immediately and correctly. He sent a letter in which he cited law 6001, known as the *Estatuto do Índio*, with the relevant passages underlined to make absolutely clear that he has the law on his side. He noted that sector 11 cannot be exploited by the *civilizados* and requests the other agencies' assistance in order to stop the *penetration* until further elucidation by FUNAI.

Ten days later, interpreting the former request of verification as a brief for designating an auxiliary agent of the *Frente de Atração* (literally an "Attraction Front" to attract the *wild Indians*), Sobrinho, with two Cinta Larga Indian interpreters to investigate the situation on a three day trip[xiv]. Written in a colloquial style, with somewhat truncated Portuguese, the message is comprised of only one page with two large paragraphs[xv]. Sobrinho's document first simplified the situation by accusing the Whites of irregularities and of trying to leave the Indians:
"(…) *abandoned, on the bad lands* [consisting of] *an area totally of sand. The Tubarões Indians whose chief Cuíra asks the authorities to do some things for them, such as obtain an area of better lands for them in order to survive on agriculture and rubber production. Also they can produce on the lands on which they were raised* [region from where they came] *for they find themselves pressed on by those who say they is owner of the best lands in the region, and they have been left with little land* [land that is] *moreover bad".*

The last rather cryptic aside could mean that the Indians petitioned to return to their former lands. Nevertheless, only the necessity of gaining access to better soils is clear. Also note that rubber collecting is one of the reasons for this appeal, the already well-established need of industrialized goods must be satisfied with a clear articulation to the encompassing economic system via a saleable product. Clearly, they already have a constant relation to the embracive capitalist economy and are at least somewhat reliant on an income to buy commodities. After stating

the necessity of some solution, Sobrinho also mentioned that other requests are being made, such as that of a school. He adds, in obvious agreement to what his superiors would want to hear, that such facilities help the Indians in their *development*. Counting 12 families and 49 people in the Indian group, he then proceeded to mention some land owners "(…) *that are occupants of the lands in the indigenous area".* It is remarkable, that without any kind of explanation Sobrinho presumed the existence of a local indigenous territory of known limits that permits him to declare nearby landowners to be invaders on Indian lands. Once again, the prior actual territory of the Indians is not mentioned, though the next paragraph cites the Indians as being well accustomed to *work* and *production*, collecting rubber and cultivating the land at the margins of the Pimenta River. Then, with no clear transition, the author returns to the complaints of bad soils and the consequent lack of certain crops. Mentioning the Indian's high productivity is an implicit praise by Sobrinho, as one of the other aims of his agency is to turn the *Indian* into a well-trained producer who shuns what was understood to be laziness or apathy.

Returning to the document above, the location of Sobrinho's visit, though somewhere on the northern margin of the Pimenta River, certainly is not close to its edges but actually on its tributary, the Chupinguaia. This confusion inhibits a clear notion of were the Indians came from and encourages the notion of reserving land close to where they live and stimulating their *progress* right there. Next, Sobrinho described the other part of his trip:
"*I learned from the Tubarão Tribe chief, that at a distance of 24 km there was a Tribe of unknown Indians who he did not understand the dialect of these Indians, who all walk around naked and sleep on the ground, there are two huts housing 22 Indians, the Tubarões say that they went over there and when they arrived were greeted with bows and arrows drawn, but that afterwards all went well and that at a distant corner they sighted about nine more huts. The next day I traveled with my companions towards the Tribe to learn more; when we were 4 km away from the village, I saw many indications* [of Indians] *but as I did not bring presents nor security and few people I made up my mind to turn back from there. And in this area everything has been demarcated by the civilized people and the Tubarões Indians say that they helped doing the work of demarcation to earn money for their livelihood, during my trip I saw all of the lands of the Tubarões Indians indigenous areas and those of the unknown wild Indians. Here I hope that the competent authorities have a solution in favor of the Indians*."

Sobrinho finished the report in the style of lower class Brazilians with an appeal to the authorities. Clearly, these socially hierarchic superiors operate on a level very distant from his. In that sense, the quality of its labor has always been a problem for FUNAI and the sending of this employee on a relatively significant mission demonstrates one of its permanent limitations. The report contains some important information on the Tubarão and, for the first time, it mentions the *wild Indians* that the *tame Indians* had visited. Today we know that they are the Indians currently known as Latundê. The Tubarão passed on several relevant points that characterize these then unknown Indians. First, they had their own *dialect* (as Indian languages are often classified derogatorily); also they were *naked*. This is an indication that they have not yet been *contacted*, as the first thing the *civilized* want uncontacted Indians to do is to put on clothes. Without clothes the group epitomizes *wildness* (*brabo*, in contrast to the neighbors who are called *manso,* meaning *tame*). This group is reported to *sleep on the ground*, a most remarkable distinguishing habit that diacritically characterizes the Nambikwara ensemble (in fact, the Cinta Larga and the Paresi refer to them as *those who sleep on the ground*[xvi]). The existence of two huts housing 22 people shows that the visit included the village site and a fair notion of the total population. Such information proves that the 'domesticated Indians' really had already made contact, succeeded in establishing a peaceful relationship and, being careful observers, accurately described the group. It was clear that this group was not very friendly to outsiders and harbored some mistrust.

Despite the danger, Sobrinho decided to see for himself. He may have believed that this was a good decision that surpassed the mission of his endeavor, if interpreted in the narrow sense of a reconnaissance of only the *Tubarão*. His initiative to visit the area and ascertain the presence of these *wild Indians* certified their presence and verified the dangerous encroachment of the landowners that INCRA considered to be taking legitimate possession. On the other hand, though contact had been established before, Sobrinho did not exceed his instructions and initiate his own *contact*. The main reason is a complete adherence to the normal model of *attraction* and *pacification* (not coincidentally the work he was accustomed to, namely being an assistant to a sertanista): no *presents*, no *security* and few people. Due to his experience at a similar *front*, he already was socialized towards a paradigm of how the agency should and, ideally, always would approach *isolated* Indian groups. In his report, there is no mention of any gifts given by the Tubarão to the unknown Indians, nor any other type of

exchange of material items. It is safe to assume that a group of men at work at demarcating an unknown area did not encumber themselves with such stuff and certainly were unprepared to give presents. Therefore, the gifts were not always immediately essential to the establishment of a peaceful relation, although, certainly, an exchange of gifts furthers goodwill and is a customary means of initiating and maintaining an alliance in these situations. FUNAI officials, by comparison, believe that without *presents*, *security* (which apparently means being sufficiently armed) and more *people*, they cannot approach the Indians. The template derives from the prior paradigm of Rondon's way of attraction that was the trademark of the SPI. In fact, his *pacification* of the Nambikwara at the time of the penetration of the telegraph line is sometimes considered a classical realization of this model in action, especially as the *primitive* Nambikwara resisted what is known as *easy approaches*[xvii].

On June 25, 1976, the substitute administrator Cerqueira, the superior to whom the visitor reported his findings, summarized the results and added to them by questioning the field agent in an account to his superior in Porto Velho. A visit of the *chief Cuirá* also provides further information that was relayed to regional headquarters. This reveals the substitute administrator's interest in learning some basic parameters about the previously *unknown* Tubarão Indians. First, there was the matter of language identification. As it was unidentified by the Cinta Larga, Cerqueira was uncertain save for some vague indications that the language belongs to a *branch of the Massacá*. They were *already semi-civilized Indians* and the employee's testimony was used to testify to the *dialect* spoken in daily life. The fact that the Tubarão Indians live in wooden houses and consume food bought with money they earn with rubber tapping and clearing lands for Brazilian landowners confirms their *semi-civilized* state. The daily use of the Indian language is used *despite* the intermediate social state they are in. As if by virtue of being semi-civilized, this language should be on the road to extinction. Then, still citing comments by the witness, Cerqueira claimed that they had a *good appearance,* apparently asserting that these people look healthy and physically similar to the image of what phenotipically constitutes an Indian .Language and physical description enter the report as distinctive features that legitimize the classification of *Indian* in spite of certain other factors (such as their clothing and Portuguese ability, and their permanent relation to the surrounding *Whites*). After their discussion comes the subsequent examination of what these characteristics permit FUNAI to conclude about the *type of Indian*

encountered, point *3a*, not coincidentally the longest paragraph of this document.

Next in Cerqueira's report, Cuirá's narration described how the group was removed from their prior area by INCRA's selection of their lands, an imposition that forced them to relocate to the headwaters of the Chupinguaia River. Once more, although the withdrawal is accepted and mentioned as a cause of contemporary hardships, no clear localization of the original lands is provided. This *tuxaua* (the Amazonian equivalent of the cacique, or *chief*) Cuirá, informed that his people suffered from various contagious diseases and their population dropped from 242 to 49 people[xviii]. The next item refers to the other *tribe*, expanding on the previous knowledge of the discernible distinctive features mentioned before: "(...)[there is] *another tribe of which they do not know their origin, these Indians live in huts, sleep on the ground and have dark skin. They already tried an approach to this group by which they were received with arrows in hand. However, lately, an elderly Indian with two boys, is coming to his house and stays a few days before returning again. This tribe is composed of 9 (nine) huts and situated at the headwaters of the Mituca river, as shown on the map annexed*". The Nambikwara in general, and the Latundê in particular, are dark skinned in comparison to the other neighboring Indians. This is evident in the photographs published in Lévi-Strauss' *Tristes Tropiques* (1984; photos appear only in the hardcover edition). Their physical characteristics make them stand out from the usual model expected of the *Indian* and distinguish them from the Tubarão. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that this alliance fostered a friendly alliance such that one probably senior member of the unknown group regularly visited the other Indians. The visits prove that the relation between the two tribes was more intimate than the single visit mentioned in the former report suggested. The groups apparently demonstrated a certain limited trust, considering the few persons involved and the conspicuous absence of women in a relatively steady relationship. The omission of any mention of a counter visit and of a stay of one of the settled Indians with the *wild Indians* probably both reflects the tension inherent in the previous visit and signals the likely superior feelings instilled by their absorption of the White ideology and the dichotomy of *wildness* and *civilization*. Nevertheless, a minimal, albeit fragile, alliance existed before any official action.

The rest of Cerqueira's deals with the Tubarão and the proposals and actions taken to start resolving their most relevant problems. The next item (*d*) raises

again the issue of the abandonment of superior land for land with poor soil. There is no mention of the original *habitat*. This loss obliges the Indians to work for *greedy rubber patrons and landowners* and that leads to the prediction that the coming White advance (item *e*) will reduce them to a landless workforce. Point *4* relates that Cuirá, using the coordinates from INCRA's map, proposes that FUNAI reserve an area for the Indians. INCRA created a map using a quadrangular projection of delineated blocks, circumscribing plots on the map that are totally oblivious of the realities of the terrain[xix]. The claimed area contains some fertile soil and plainly, it is suggested, attends to their needs. This very concrete proposal surfaces as Cuirá's initiative in order to *maintain the survival of his group and in the future of his unknown brothers*. There are several interesting points regarding the short paragraphs dealing with the proposal. One notable feature concerns the apparently complete acceptance of the leadership role exercised by this particular Indian. Not a word arises about his legitimacy as a leader authorized to advance a proposal so vital to his group. Nothing is written about any other sort of wider consultation with the group members. Such conduct is an indication of the general tendency of FUNAI employees to always seek the leader and to rely heavily on this intermediary *chief* as the unquestionably legitimate spokesman for the entire group. No explanation is given on this subject except that the chief had succeeded his father in this role. There is no clarification offered on the justification of this particular area and of the method of delimiting its perimeters.

Secondly, when studying the map and the areas plotted on it that denote the presumed locations of the present and prior territory of both settled and unknown Indians, one observes that the contemporary location of the Aikaná village and part of the huts of the unknown Indians are outside of the fertile area. What is interesting is that the proposal extends to an area on both sides of the Pimenta River; the major part is on the southern bank, contrary to the current Indigenous Territory entirely on the opposite one. Curiously, their former lands also fall outside of what one might call the 'fertile subdivision' (within the Corumbiara Project the lands are classified by soil quality) comprising 60 parcels of 2000 ha (totaling 120,000 ha). The rest of the proposed areas are in the segment classified on INCRA's map as infertile, consisting of 40 plots, totaling 80,000 ha. The grand total amounts to 200,000 ha. By comparison, the entire Gleba Corumbiara extends from Vilhena to the town of Pimenta Bueno encompassing 547 plots of 2,000 ha and six of 1,000 ha. Thus, the total is *1,100,000 ha* that are to be distributed

under state guidance in the name of *development*. In the spirit of many similar government projects in the Amazons, this one too was planned in complete ignorance or with total disregard to Indigenous Territories. As for the proposal of reserving land for Indians within this enormous area, the reference in the previous item to *our unknown brothers* is intriguing, as such a term is very unlikely to have been used by Cuirá. To speak of the unknown people as brothers is something learned only after a prolonged contact with FUNAI or other similar Indian organizations. It therefore seems reasonable to understand this part of the proposal as the result of a dialogue between the FUNAI author, Cerqueira, and Cuirá. In this manner, a leader of the people then called *Tubarão* not only proposed a solution for all of *his Indians* but is supposed to magnanimously embrace his *kin*. In all likelihood, the administrator, someone who never even saw the region and armed with only information provided by Sobrinho who did not really explore the expanse occupied by these unknowns, parleyed with the *Tubarão chief* to include the neighboring *wild tribe*. The enormity of the responsibility of deciding to advance a proposal on such a crucial issue for both peoples (and an unknown third party) established on this fragile agreement is evident.

INCRA's map also pretends to show the Tubarão's ancestral land. If correct, this land represents part of the preexisting *properties*. This is the mechanism of recognizing previous land claims in the immense Gleba area, certainly not as completely devoid of occupants as commonly supposed. The INCRA map, dated July 10, 1976 that is attached to the FUNAI files reveals the plots in the vicinity of these properties are marked as having entered into the ownership selection process for occupants in 1972. Plots that were later demarcated as lands occupied by both Indian peoples consist of parcels to be distributed in January 1975 and of portions reserved for *forest exploitation*. The first encroachment by earlier properties probably removed the Tubarão from their homelands or expropriated their right to the land they used to live on; from 1975 onwards, after removal from the river, the pressure moved from their previous locations along the river to the new locations in the interior, possibly shortly before Sobrinho's visit to the area. The presence of FUNAI and its supposed intermediations are rather late. Revealing a part of the contradictions of state interference, INCRA's laconic answer demonstrates prior knowledge of the *problem* but the agency did not find it either necessary or convenient to involve its fellow federal bureaucratic institution. Perhaps, if a speculation grounded in currently prevalent stereotypes

may be permitted, the responsible employees believed that some plots could be distributed to the Indians (*civilized* enough to be 'equal' to *Brazilian peasants*), or that their complete removal could be endorsed. The major and large-scale contradiction between state planning of *colonization* and *protection* of Indian lands expresses itself eloquently in this micro-level case. The size of the parcels to be auctioned and allotted to new *owners* highlights a program designed to benefit significant agrarian enterprises over the interests of peasantry. For example, a peasant family colonization project at the Transamazônica distributes plots of 100 ha[xx]. The lack of peasant family landholders at the Corumbiara Project contradicts the image of Rondônia as the region intended for family farm colonization. This was also true further to the north of the state in other similar huge colonization projects. State efforts to encourage the peasant economy later began privileging and financing wealthy landowners. Accordingly, middle-class investors and large capital also entered the sector.

In constantly losing their land, the *Tubarão Indians* suffered various setbacks during this crucial conjuncture. Point five of the document summary shows these social and economic constraints in a poignant example of how the wider reality affected the Indians in their local situation by virtue of the bewildering larger dynamic of unknown logic. First, the author employed a cliché that encodes the merit of the previous land claims:
"*In order to provide some clarification, according to information by the employee Nogueira and area residents, this Indian group is highly disposed to work, as can be seen from the fact that the Indian Cuirá, jointly with his group, recently acquired a 1976 pick-up with the fruits of his labor, destined to transport rubber and get food in Pimenta Bueno*".

This short characterization reveals something quite relevant that remains implicit in the author's descriptions of the Indian group's image: the car provides transportation for rubber produced by *his group*. This property, however, is attributed to the *chief* and not the group. One may argue that this may be a figure of speech but it is likely that the chief actually was a kind of rubber patron to the group who are really also his clients. He seems to exploit the region they occupy as if it were a rubber extraction unit. Characteristically, Cerqueira mentioned the predisposition to hard work but leaves out the mode of articulation between the Indian labor force and the market economy. He also emphasized the merit of this quality but does not question how it arose or what role this Indian actually played.

However, given that his significant role between the production of rubber and its sale on the market was a fact appreciated by FUNAI, the social reality implicitly portrayed does raise the question of the legitimacy of the Indian acting as a rubber patron. This raises many unanswered issues, most prominent among them is weighing the validity of Cuirá's desire to remain in the present area versus his possible interest in returning to his ancestral land. Maybe FUNAI would prefer the Indians to stay where they are and support *useful* economic activities already underway.

Cerqueira's first clear intervention in favor of the Indians is revealing. After the truck crashed, Cerqueira and Cuirá went to the town of Pimenta Bueno to enlist a mechanic's help. The truck was the major part of the payment for the felling of 100,000 alqueires[xxi] of virgin forest made by a landowner from São Paulo called *Doctor Marcelo*. The title *Doctor* in this context is the sure sign of class distinction. As promised, Doctor Marcelo handed over the car, but personal investigation by Cerqueira revealed the papers remained in his hands and registered in his own name. Thus, by implication, the *citizen* Dr. Marcelo became suspected of some form of fraud. Perhaps he did not consider the Indian capable of owning cars and registering this kind of property in his own name. In any case, holding on to the papers denotes a form of social domination. The situation is paradigmatic in another sense: it is well known that the major impediment in the transformation of forest into pasture consists of the labor demands in felling the forest and the subsequent clearing the soil of this vegetation. For such a contract, the *chief* acts as an intermediary who represents the group in a manner analogous of the men who organize work gangs in Amazonia (a particularly notorious labor practice which often involves a kind of slavery by means of debt bondage). Again, Cuirá occupied a fundamental intermediary position in mediating the relationship between the Indians and the surrounding society. The job he offered involved a large area to be cleared and turned into pasture. It represents a single major opportunity for the Indians to participate in the local economic system. That also means their presence is useful when cattle ranches were commonly being created for wealthy landowners. Judging from comments made by Chupinguaia locals to me, the labor force was scarce at the time.

In this sense, the regional Indians helped the landowners outside of the immediate occupied areas[xxii]. After clearing the pastures and beginning the raising of cattle, the ranches' economic activity demanded very little permanent

labor. There was little use for a group of Indians proletarianized due to the lack of fertile land for their own gardens and crops. The Indians must have known these facts, and this might have even been a stimulus for Cuirá to request to stay and plead with FUNAI for access to fertile land. Other related factors, such as local ecological characteristics, may have entered into this equation, too. The region of Rondônia and especially its southern edge, where these Indian peoples lived is a transition forest between the full grown rain forests of central and western Amazonia and the drier savannas of central Brazil. In general, that means the absence of a homogeneous intermediate forest cover and a patchwork of denser forested land intermingled with *cerradão*, a low forest or dense tangle of high shrubs and small trees. Such diversity occurs in the desired area and actually justifies extension of the territory to the south, towards the river, to incorporate more fertile land and a denser forest. Moreover, Indian slash and burn horticultural practices require large areas because of the long periods of fallow between the first use and subsequent re-use and relies on the more fertile, forested areas. Satellite images verify that the landowners prefer to concentrate their pastures in exactly the same patches of dense forest[xxiii]. The ecological competition really existing between landowners and Indians is much more intense than it seems to be at first sight. The Indians again probably were quite aware of this fact. In contrast, the olympic ignorance of official planning went beyond matters concerning the terrain, and included a total lack of understanding of the climatic particularities of the region. In a stark difference from central Amazonia, the climate in Rondônia has a definite dry season and is subject to some comparably cold weather. Research as early as 1989 already showed a 15% loss of the vegetal cover in this state. This caused erosion, and severely affected the soil quality. Other influences on the local environment included concentration of land ownership and invasion of Indian and ecological reserves[xxiv].

Cerqueira probably considered the Indians to have been rather naive about the issue of the truck documents but found it unnecessary to comment clearly on this. At another time, Cerqueira described the Indians as simpleminded. Another regional inhabitant pretended to be Cuirá's friend, he helped him sell rubber in Pimenta Bueno, and drank liberally on his tab. The FUNAI employee believed such behavior classified him as a *useless citizen*, unscrupulously benefiting from the good faith of the Indian. Still worse in Cerqueira's view, the same man convinced the Indians to register births, marriages (already issued and he considered these documents illegal in consideration of Law 6001, which

mandated that an official agency assist Indians in certain bureaucratic acts) and to apply for identity papers. The legally required assistance assigned by FUNAI was conspicuously absent because, as he writes: *This fact was to benefit the pretensions of Incra because of disqualification of the condition of Indian of this group, as the whole of it has been registered with civilized names, Christian names and surnames.* INCRA acted arrogantly in dealing with an enormous amount of land and the people on it just by itself, even if the Indians should legally be treated separately. Also, the general tenor of not qualifying for the juridical state of a real *Indian* signifies being treated merely as members of the largely powerless lower class. This results from the stereotype common among the Brazilian middle class that the Indians should accept being transformed into normal citizens and that any Indian not conforming to the template of the *wild Indian* (naked, innocent, and savage) becomes *less Indian*, and so is on the road to assimilation. In itself, the idea of any *privilege* to these inferior people from the *Stone Age*, like granting land rights, often causes abhorrence among people at the frontier and affronts their belief in a magical notion of *development*. At the same time, the author appears to agree with such a notion of disqualification because he certainly does not seem to dispute the idea in itself but only the consequences.

Naturally, merely having national identification papers does not signify assimilation and, inversely, it should assist in loosening the constraints which those without identity documents experience in a bureaucratic society. In absolutely no way incompatible with being Indian, this is a double bind situation where being a *wild savage* brings about one type of stigma and being too *civilized* causes another. Civilizing oneself does not dissolve prejudice, it merely changes to a related and different constellation of stereotypes[xxv]. It goes without saying that more profound knowledge about the *national society*, as the very same case exemplifies, functions as a precondition for the constitution of the *Indian* as a more active agent and less a passive victim of circumstance. Or, maybe better, the Indian becomes a more informed actor, someone capable of formulating a better strategy to act on the sociocultural constraints of the dominant society. In effect, INCRA's proposal regarding the Indigenous Territory applied the coordinate grid blindly from above. In drafting the proposal in the same logic, the *chief* turns it against the very bureaucracy that invented the application of the geometric topological squares of the *colonization project*. This subverted the use of the coordinates supplied by the state in an enormous *Project* conceived to

support the appropriation of land by higher class landowners and their agrarian capitalist enterprise. This project mostly disregarded the previous occupation by *seringais* and dispersed rubber tappers (as was done at the town that became Chupinguaia), implemented in the period when the state turned away from the publicized *colonization* of family agriculture. In this sense, the Indians' proposal for their own land not only totalizes quite a large area but one easily identifiable, visible on the map and immediately grasped by the same bureaucrats. Regardless of Cuirá's intention or his understanding of his political role and comprehension of regional and national society, the demand does not seem to be made by a naïve or an *innocent Indian*. Both competence and intelligence of the lowly subaltern tend to be underestimated by the *civilized*[xxvi]. Cerqueira's worry regarding INCRA plainly justifies itself when one considers INCRA's role. This agency controlled land distribution for nearly the entire state[xxvii]. This highlights the ironies associated with using its own system of unambiguous land coordinates to visualize the limits of an area otherwise not easily expressible in such clear geographic limits (after all, the Indian and regional names of local places are quite unknown).

The bureaucratic road to recognition of an Indigenous Territory

An analysis of the initial documents, which marked the beginning of FUNAI's knowledge of these Indians, reveals details about how the case was dealt with. The bureaucratic response ranged from a prompt reaction at a higher level to salvage Indian interests, to a hasty method of defining Indian territory with disregard for particulars of the Indian's situation. This paperwork by the Regional Administration in Porto Velho, 8th DR was forwarded along in accordance with a reminder by Cerqueira at the end of his report that the FUNAI president ordered the dossier sent to him. The accompanying note by the Delegado of the 8th DR refers to one of the Indians in the annexed photograph as Massacá. This seems odd considering prior linguistic consideration. Three other men are the chief, his father and a Dr. Salustiano. The picture of these four men on a tractor shows a White man driving with the oldest Indian sitting beside him and serves as definitive proof of their existence and their socioeconomic subordination as laborers clearing land for development by an outsider. This material definitely had an effect on the responsible employee on July 6, 1976. The regional FUNAI delegate, head of the regional office, expressed his impression of the way the civilized "(…) try to maltreat [and] exploit…the Indians that live innocently [and

who are] (…) constantly in need of our help, our massive and sincere support in search of their acculturations". In this letter to the president, the Indians' salvation is dependent on FUNAI's action. Emphasis was given to the helplessness experienced at the hands of the less enlightened Whites and its contrast with the abnegated dedication of FUNAI in favor of the Indians. Consequently, both the same stereotyped images of the Indian seen previously and the essential intermediation by FUNAI, the very reason of its existence, complement each other.

The FUNAI president acted quickly, dispatching the papers to a department for suggestions to be made. Of course, it was not really so simple, the long and winding road of the bureaucratic process had only just begun. This was the moment of creation of the file (*Proc. FUNAI/BSB/03503/78*) which became the destination of a variety of relevant paperwork circulating within the extensive administration. Other subjects, like an inquiry about employee conduct, ended up in another file. In fact, the file was reworked at a certain point, and pages in the first part were renumbered. The sediment of the bureaucratic activities is considerable despite the fact that some relevant papers surely were lost in the labyrinth of the administrative machine. The circuitous meandering through the channels of bureaucracy can be traced partially by the markings on the papers, a phenomenon that merits investigation in itself. It is impossible to tackle all the aspects related to these documents. With attention given to both the administrative intricacies and what the documents show about the Latundê, this part of the book will summarize the paper trail that represents the administrative bureaucratic procedures. Although such procedures do not fully describe the actual events, they do serve as decent foundation for a more comprehensive study. Accordingly, the very first dispatch in Brasília, dated July 21, 1976, is worthy of examination. It manifests the way the central and most important part of the agency handled these cases and shaped the parameters of future actions. After a short summation and a handful of erroneous interpretations of the small dossier, the conclusion and final recommendations are:
– that the denomination of tubarões tribe is a fancy one, and may induce distrusting these Indians, it being expedient to ascertain, with due rigor their origin.
– that the 8th Administrative Region must join INCRA to clarify the alleged by CUIRÁ about the expulsion of his group and procure contact with the indicated 9 huts".

These few phrases yield the suggestion of a prejudice against *semi-accultured* Indians with such an unusual name, as if the oddness of the name is somehow connected to the groups' contemporary situation (as if the name is the content). The Indians, of course, did not even choose this name. Hardly any name given to an Indian group was suggested by the members themselves. Usually the names derive from a classification by the conquerors and not from any label of the people itself. Many names derive from the name of the leader, even someone not of their own people: *Tubarão* was a *Mondê* Indian who dominated several distinct villages at Tanaru, at the upper Pimenta Bueno, in 1953[xxviii]. In fact, even today when many new names are deriving from Indian languages, such names almost always come from enemies of the people and so are often depreciatory. The distrust is based on the ignorance of the naming process and on a prejudice against *tame* Indians. Additionally, the phrasing hints that the search for the relevant background of a group with such an inauthentic name might reveal that it was comprised of false Indians. It suggests that the proposed research into the origin may not be to inform the process of a more profound decision making. In fact, at the time many high FUNAI officials had careers originating in the military and thought that some people might pose as Indians for material benefits. Moreover, the contact with INCRA proposed to the regional agent is couched in odd language, as if to really join forces in an area of FUNAI competence and not just to gain information about the situation. By carefully studying the words and the phrasing, one might interpret the suggestion to join INCRA to include the effort to contact the unknown group, so that INCRA might be included in making contact with those Indians, an extremely unlikely possibility. As said, many of the higher posts within FUNAI were held by men who had continued ties to the military. They, however, did not adhere to the 'Rondonian' style of interaction, they like the colonel substitute director of Department of General Operations who wrote the instructions cited above, operated under what may be called the National Security style, a style devoid of humanitarian interests. The military abided by concepts of enforced assimilation, abhorrence of the term *Indian people*, believed in only rarely granting Indian reserves, economic *development* for everyone, and had no pity for any Indian *obstacle* to the symbolic and socioeconomic conquest of the *savages* within legitimate Brazilian *national territory*. They were impatient and merciless with the Indians who did not have certain distinctive features inherent in their conception of the *real Indian*. Perhaps the appeal of the regional administrator indirectly invoking previous 'Rondonian' ideals was not far of the mark in this context after all.

A further note from the Department of Research marks this case as one among a number of similar instances involving INCRA's land distribution project and the colonization of Indian lands. This conflict arose despite the existence of a joint commission between the two agencies to define Indian areas and avoid identical land claims. One FUNAI geographer suggests that INCRA should consult FUNAI before planning any project, a suggestion endorsed by her superior, the anthropologist Ferrari[xxix], also added a handwritten note mentioning that the Tubarão or Massacá had been known since 1962 (in accordance with a book by a highly-ranked SPI employee, the one time president Malcher). In a later short dispatch, yet another department head recalled the obvious necessity of FUNAI to be present to assist the Tubarão, a need that FUNAI never attended to, just as it has to create an *attraction front* for the *isolated Indians*. After this swift start, the process was inexplicably delayed for two months. At this point, the INCRA connection reappears with their representative in the meeting of the joint committee of the two agencies. Prior to this the FUNAI representative in the Commission visited INCRA. On that occasion an INCRA representative stated that the local FUNAI sent a note to acknowledge the presence of Indians in a number of INCRA plots and later communicated this area to be insufficient (that is, it did not account for the Latundê area). The extension concerns the area of the unknown Indians where the plots have been distributed by INCRA but not yet occupied by the *owners*. The problem for INCRA would then be the unexpected expansion to include the unknown Indians after the previous communications exchanged between the agencies. In order to pursue an expedient solution, the commission of "Work Groups" of the two agencies discussed the matter and agreed on the visit of a "Sub Group" ascertain the area occupied by the Indians. In this view, the problem suddenly resumes itself to the zone of *perambulation* outside of an area already reserved for the Tubarão[xxx]. The FUNAI representative in the commission, Mattar, sent a communication to the FUNAI president (another military colonel, Ismarth de Araújo Oliveira) proposing a letter to the INCRA. A suggestion later adopted and in which the latter requested the INCRA president halt the release of the other plots to new *owners*, and essentially put an end to the illegal occupation of lands. The letter mentioned the previous reservation of land by INCRA to the Tubarão Indians simply in passing, as if a sign of the agency's impeccable conduct in creating a completely satisfactory solution. Apparently, the Indian's proposal disappears, and it is not even mentioned at the meeting. In contrast, the sketched map annexed to the same papers, copied from the INCRA map, shades in the area of the Indian's proposal.

In sum, fast reading and carelessness seem to be a major theme at the FUNAI officials' first approach in Brasília. The substitute head of a very important department, Colonel Joel, author of the lines above, confused at least one important issue and was averse to admitting new Indians of a *fanciful* name. Subsequently, there are frank contradictions and the summary of the Indian situation is completely off the mark in significant aspects. The *sketch map* that accompanied Ismarth's letter to INCRA showed the entire area of the current position of the Tubarão, the other malocas, and the area claimed by the first Indians, to the south of the Pimenta Bueno River. The entire bloc was placed completely erroneously.

Textual contradictions may imply that INCRA engaged in illegal or disallowed activities. Plots *respected* by INCRA *really are indicated as an Indian Reserve* on the map, according to the FUNAI representative Mattar. However, a study of the map reveals that this block of 20 plots bears the legend, *reserved for forest exploitation (Hevea)*. It is unclear why Mattar did not point out the obvious contradiction. Perhaps this had to do with his own cultural stereotypes regarding the ecological Indian. Alternatively, it could be that he believed it politically unwise to comment. The question posed regards why INCRA had *reserved* lands for the Indians without communicating their plans to FUNAI before, and, more pertinently, why they hid this fact on their map with a misleading label to thwart publication of their meddling in FUNAI's domain. Unsurprisingly, in Rondônia, as in Amazonia, in the competitive bureaucratic space of federal agencies INCRA had much greater influence than the comparatively weak FUNAI. After INCRA first communicated the presence of the Indians, it became possible to hypothesize this agency's true intentions. Apparently, INCRA had decided to treat the Indians as an intermediate class of people, not as rubber tappers (a social category that was completely ignored by INCRA whenever possible), nor *real* Indians. Hence, they were ineligible to receive the benefits Indians generally should receive from FUNAI. Evidently, INCRA had its own plan for disposal, a re-settlement onto sixteen parcels of the Project. It is likely that INCRA believed this to be a rather humanitarian solution. The area given to the Indians, roughly 36,000 ha, was no small piece of land. A further study of relevant documentation yields some interesting information, what follows is a memo written by someone involved with a later project called *Polonoroeste* (a large-scale federal development project that encompassed this region).

Since 1972, INCRA's internal documents reference the presence of three Indian groups in the area of extension of the Corumbiara Project. The document notes the necessity of guaranteeing their lands for them while avoiding conflicts. The parcels of the Corumbiara Project were distributed in Brasília, with no other criteria than the affinity of the interested party with personalities of the regime [the military dictatorship]. *Plots of 2,000 or 3,000 hectares were distributed among kin or affiliated associates, that is, in practice stimulating large properties in the few fertile regions.*

The Aikaná-Latundê – who maintained contacts with rubber tappers since the beginning of the century – immediately protested against the donation of their land to large landowners, and the FUNAI demarcated an area but with straight lines oriented by the presence of the neighboring colonization projects"[xxxi].

The author then continued to discuss the genocide practiced against the other isolated group of Indians in the region when INCRA resolved to ignore their presence. Although FUNAI intervened initially, it eventually backed down and condoned the advance of *landowners* with private militia. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that two very small groups did survive in the Omerê area. A third group, not so far away, has one lonely survivor, still there. He became subject to an *attraction front* in a small area. Even now, neither area is totally demarcated due to political pressure[xxxii]. Notwithstanding the erroneous information about the fusion of the Tubarão, under their new name, with the Latundê, the notion that this joint group initiated contact, and that the demarcation by FUNAI involved their original land, the author correctly suggests – by implication of the comparative case of what occurred to neighboring *isolated Indians* – that much worse could have happened. In fact, one can argue that the limited recognition and the provision of land by INCRA furnished the very basis for the initiation of this bureaucratic process. As for the first paragraph in the above quote, INCRA confirms that by 1972 it was already aware of this situation, as this was the year of the first selection process for land distribution. The author found proof in the INCRA archives that the agency knew of the Indians but, as far as the absence of any mention in FUNAI documents permits to conclude, never insisted upon any FUNAI action. If so, it was only through INCRA's political power that a scandal was avoided. To be clear, the accusation of corruption concerns conferring enormous privileges to well connected members of the elite, by allocating large properties exactly on the more fertile land, essentially creating the agrarian

situation supposedly being reformed. Unsurprisingly, the people who benefited most from such allotment were those who least needed an additional income. The poor enjoyed no such advantage.

Unfortunately for the Tubarão, their original lands also happened to have good soil. When they found themselves relocated to poorer lands at the beginning of the INCRA Project, their presence was ignored. When the agency reserved land it looks like it simply uses a reserve area not meant for agricultural use. As if the belief was that the Indians use the *forest reserve* just as some endangered exotic species would. Assuming the accuracy of these facts (minor errors aside), INCRA was, at some level, corrupt. This would explain their reluctance to share information even after FUNAI discovered the Indians. It also signifies that what seems a generous allocation of the *forest reserve* part of the Project to the Indians actively participating in the system was no coincidence. The land given to the Indians happens to be some of the poor soil in the region but they might continue to be tappers. It is all too simple to put the pieces of this puzzle together. Clearly, INCRA was doing it's best to further the conquest of the Indians. The well-intentioned federal laws were cast aside by official agencies with projects worded in the most eloquent terms to justify federal intervention in the name of a society struggling blindly for *development*.

The first anthropological field report

The first order to investigate the case dates April 1976. Dates reveal that the bureaucratic procedures took several months and that long overdue field research done by a qualified employee is finally arranged. The dossier contains an anthropologists' travel report – although here *anthropology* has more to do with chaotic bureaucracy and contextual constraints than science[xxxiii]. Although the trip lasted from November 18 to 26, only the 20 and 21 were spent in Pimenta Bueno. Despite this brief period spent in the city, the anthropologist garnered some information from both resident Indians and visits to FUNAI and INCRA. In what was a typical attitude, the local FUNAI officials did not make available any supplementary information not already in the documentation. They apparently failed to see the case as particularly urgent as at that time there was a significant conflict between the Cinta Larga and the colonists who settled on their lands (owing to another INCRA project). This culminated with the murder of an Indian. Incidentally, other similar urgent cases in Rondônia shed light on the INCRA's methodology in solving the Indian problem. Several cases are mentioned in an

Annex to the anthropological report. Frontiers drawn by INCRA and FUNAI for Cinta Larga do not agree. INCRA technicians requested a rapid *solution* as the entire southern area of this Indigenous Territory had been previously arranged for colonists, who were acting within INCRA's *proposed* limits. At the northern limit of Corumbiara, colonists spotted an isolated group (Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau) and warned INCRA. INCRA, in turn, demanded FUNAI take action. Although INCRA *reserved* an area of 112,000 hectares for these Indians, the public sale and distribution of the area *seemed to have been well underway* or even already concluded. In this way INCRA flaunts its proposals and reserves for isolated Indians in FUNAI's face, unrestrained by the areas of competence of each agency and apparently very assured of its dominance in the institutional field of government[xxxiv].

FUNAI, meanwhile, was very understaffed and overextended, a testament to its political weakness and the general lack of political will to solve the *Indian question*. INCRA's attitude apparently caused little (if any) reaction in the report[xxxv]. This does not mean that INCRA always had its way. The case of the Uru-Eu-Wau-Wau, for example, is one such instance. Yet only the encompassing context explains how the proposal to remove a Suruí group to another reserve, while according to all evidence it was being forcibly removed from its own land by unscrupulous invaders leaving them only about a $100m^2$, sounds comprehensible even when in total disregard of all legal rights[xxxvi]. In that sense, settling the Tubarão in their current area, with the advantages of some cooperation by INCRA and without confrontation with other interests working against their return to their territory, is an easy win for FUNAI. INCRA's contacts in Pimenta Bueno also included the assistance of one employee who claimed to be very familiar with the area of the Corumbiara Project. He aided in locating the villages of both groups in a reconnaissance flight that covered the so-called *Forest Indians* (Tubarão) and the unknown Indians (Latundê). Judging by the flight time, the distance between the two groups must have been around 35 km. Although this would have allowed for a more accurate plotting, there is no mention of map revisions. Several aerial photographs accompany the report, including what may be the first ever of the Latundê village, effectively showing their dwellings and the silhouettes of the members. Five large houses and one smaller construction constitute the center. There was still another structure on the outskirts of the village, but owing to the quality of the photograph, it remains unclear. The image also features six people while seven people were seen.

This view certified the existence of unknown Indians and their approximate location, but it did not render a clear notion of what the total area of occupancy might be. Such work was restricted owing to economic and practical concerns. In fact, the arduous trip to the village was suspended when the *chief* and a companion arrived in town. They planned to sell rubber and planned to stay in town for two days. This happened just as Ferrari, the anthropologist, was about to depart for this area. Their chance arrival saved her time, money and an arduous journey. Once more all information depended on those Indians coming to the town, a handful of their relatives in Porto Velho, and on the information from Isaias, an INCRA employee. Isaias affirmed that he traversed the region of these Indians in 1971 and communicated the fact to the FUNAI in Porto Velho, getting no response. If true, FUNAI was first warned five years prior and took no action. Obviously this would mean grave negligence. Nonetheless, the subsequent behavior of INCRA was also irresponsible, for it could easily have pushed for resolution instead of letting the issue disappear. Rather, as an alternative, INCRA left it to a White rubber patron *to help* the Indians to resettle. This warning then may have come solely from Isaias. As Isaias had already flown above the village sometime around 1975, he definitely knew about the Indians and also could have urged for something to be done. Judging by the results of inaction, events were favorable for whoever was really responsible for the decisions made by INCRA.

Furthermore, the lack of time and informants severely hampered the quantity and quality of a very laudable effort to collect as much information as possible. Informants were limited to merely two Indians and a handful of Whites (all either from INCRA or local landowners). Ferrari tried to reconstruct the previous locations of the Indians, charted their genealogies, and recorded the Indian names, their auto-denominations and the ethnic connections of the various groups involved, their 'original' cultures and the historical trajectories of the peoples. The resultant work was so muddled that the author goes so far as to alert the reader that she did not succeed in adequately organizing the information coherently. A few remarks stand out in this confusing jumble of statements by various agents. First, in town the term *Tubarão* is practically unknown and the Indian informants use a variety of names but, apparently, the two visiting Pimenta used the terms *Inganá* and *Aikanã*. This seems to be the first reference to what became their name, *Aikaná*. Other names surface throughout the report, with references to component parts of this group. Only one of these partialities is now current in the area, the *Guazani* are now known as the *Kwazá*. The Kwazá are the

remnants of a formerly independent people with an isolated language but today they are few, scattered, and partly intermarried among the Aikaná (one of the other peoples mentioned, the *Kanoê*, still live in other areas, including the Omerê area)[xxxvii]. Secondly, the author furnishes some details on cultural practices and relations between these peoples, capturing the spirit of what probably was a closely-knit regional network of alliance and permanent relations. Possibly, owing to this very feature the anthropologist underestimates the linguistic and cultural variety. Currently Aikaná, Kwazá and Kanoê are classified as isolated languages while other groups pertain to Tupian language families. All of these peoples used to live at the margins of the Pimenta Bueno or, less so, Machado Rivers and were victims of the expansion of the rubber front, effectively scattering them from their homelands[xxxviii]. Unable to find a clear name for these peoples, the author opts to refer to the ex-Tubarão as *Forest Indians*, and the unknown ones as *Savanna Indians* (In Portuguese, *Índios do Campo*. A *campo* is a savanna, here referring to a patch of savanna in the middle of the forested regions toward the east of the region).

The *Forest Indians* sometimes were known in town as *Massaká* or as *caboclos* of some river, while the *Campo Indians* unanimously received the designation *Nambikwara* (similar to the *Nambikwara do Campo* of the Paresis Plateau). The practice of *sleeping on the ground like dogs*, in the words of the Aikaná (an indication of their prejudice), directs the attention to exactly the same differentiating *primitive* custom of the Southern Nambikwara. Also, walking around *naked* is taken as an index of their *isolation* from the *civilized*. Thus, although observations clearly point towards a group affiliated to the Nambikwara (judging by the housing and a preference for open land), the author cautiously uses a generic description with a geographic predicate. In a way, this is a sensible precaution, but from another point of view, the necessity of labeling and imposition of the generic classification is needed even when the state has still failed to initiate contact. A rubber extraction proprietor appended these comments with the affirmation that the language and the people are Mamaindê. This is close to the mark, as the Mamaindê pertain to the same cluster of *Northern Nambikwara*, and, as will be discussed soon, even roamed this far north from their village (now located just over the border in Mato Grosso). Strikingly, these observations contrast with the reality that the groups were enemies. The obvious difficulty with the kind of report written by *civilized* people concerns a general unawareness of the distinctions in the generic class of *Indian*. Either the

civilized confounded these forays with the presence of the Latundê or else some sporadic encounter lead to this observation. Only a real *contact* could truly clarify these matters. Still, the first tentative affiliation of Nambikwara was established. Another passage in the report speculates about a Savanna Indian migration. The Forest Indians affirm that the former either came from the south, towards Mamaindê, or from the north towards Vilhena or the Roosevelt River, just like the Sabanê (see Part II). This group was supposedly forced to move on because of the encroachment of White settlements. It is noted that the savanna is not normally desirable land for Whites.

Some confusion remains about the history of contact with the Latundê and other sightings of unknown groups. There were reports of other small villages which *seem to be* of the Savanna Indians close to the highway and outside of sector 11 of the Project. Later in the report, contact between the fifteen Latundê and an owner of two parcels of land at kilometer 624 of the BR (federal highway) is mentioned as having occurred in 1972, with their subsequent withdrawal to the present location. Apparently the location is not thought to be connected to known Indians although the locations would basically match (close to Marcos Rondon, at the time occupied by Sabanê and Northern Nambikwara). Later, two families of unknown affiliation are said to be still residing with the same owner (Ms. Filhinha[xxxix]). This confuses two different Nambikwara groups. These were Tawandê families living near the road in the Seringal do Faustino (see Part II). The regional resident's error leads the author away from the Nambikwara connection because the informant states them to be *Tupi*. His description of dark Indians with long hair and with urucu paint on their bodies contradicts this. This denotes a Nambikwara affiliation and coincides with the anthropologist's aerial view of the Latundê. The resident suggested the possible presence of another group of unknown Indians to the north of the *Savanna Indians* (Nambikwara do Campo), and, if confirmed, proposed *attracting* them into the proposed Forest and Savanna Indian reservation, (again note the casualness of the transfer proposal). Other indications are even more unclear: sightings still attributed to the *Savanna Indians* on two other places at the Pimenta River, one to the south of the Aikaná but slightly to the west, and another one to the west of them, above the mouth of the Chupinguaia on the Pimenta River. The *Savanna Indians* are actually in the east while the sightings are either relatively far to the southwest or even completely on the other side of the Forest Indians, near the river and in the forest. As such, it is quite certain that these are not the Latundê and must be

remnants of older local inhabitants, survivors of the peoples of the area and perhaps a group now known to be Kanoê, who live in the Omerê area[xlv].

Furthermore, a wealthy landowner, flying over the region detected a set of four houses slightly to the south of the attested presence of the Nambikwara, which, according to the INCRA employee Pereira, are the Savanna Indians. This would be a fair conclusion given their proximity and that the Latundê were divided into two villages, were it not for the fact that the landowner also recorded other locations, to the south along the Pimenta River, ranging from the limits of sector 11 into the adjacent sector to the east (towards Vilhena). Pereira also thought that these locations could be the still the same group, despite the distance and the difference in terrain. Therefore, the indications certainly cannot be attributed to the Latundê. It is relevant that Pereira insisted in acknowledging only the Savanna and Forest Indians, whose existence he verified himself. Judging from the report, oddly enough, he asserted his position rather vehemently[xlvi]. Of all of these *references* (in the jargon of *attraction front*) only the Omerê enter into known history, and then only partially so because of the massacre (see footnote 39 and 40) and the attempts at erasing all of the Indian presence that ensued. The region alongside the Pimenta River seems mainly occupied by large landholdings, possibly due to the favorable soil and forest conditions. The disparate and dispersed evidence of uncontacted groups definitely does justify the recommendation of the anthropologist to contact the *Savanna Indians* and the somewhat timid corollary: "*It may be convenient for a sertanista to verify the places mentioned by the regional population as being of Indian presence*". Actually, all of this discussion and confusion in the report still leaves out a group of houses further on to the east (the ones the mentioning in the first report later identified as Sabanê), and possibly some of those places sighted by plane.

When discussing the *history* and *cultural traits* of the *Savanna Indians*, the same sort of confusion reappears. The Forest Indian's story of their own visit is more or less the same as before but with additions: a young man of the unknown Indians hurled arrows at them but an older man took his weapons away, put them on the ground and offered good and rich food (wild pig, roasted sweet manioc, toasted corn and peanuts); they stayed for three hours and left tools and clothing; they noticed three houses and fifteen adults, with only one female adolescent. They feared being killed on their return[xlii]. Actually, they accuse the other Indians of cannibalism and poisoning and, apparently, of trying to steal their women. Hence,

the present tense relations where their own ethnocentric preconceptions are obvious, and a previous history of warlike relations is credible. If the Indians affirmed this belief, than they too probably confused some peoples. When examining what they witnessed, the oral history of the Latundê examined below can serve a measure for confirmation. A comparison of these records is sometimes more easily contextualized when reference can be made to material objects like ceramic pots, and personal affects like breast collars[xliii]. The study of material belongings at other times seems rather arbitrary. If, during the course of some short meeting, no basket weaving is noted, the people are documented as not having such items. Likewise, an initial report states the absence of body adornments, an observation confirmed by a White observer. Then, in the following paragraph, it is written that the women have small wooden piercings in their upper lip and in the tip of the ears. In fact, one of the most curious features about this group is the lack of piercing in the lips and the ears of both men and women. Again, this demonstrates the unreliable and contradictory information given by these different sources. Hence the author admits that there is no real consistency. In this sense the report expounds the weakness of the fieldwork carried out, hampered by an enormous lack of experts for such a massive responsibility. The many demands that the bureaucracy made on the author, who, as an anthropologist, was relatively low on the administrative ladder, probably accounts for the failure of time and energy to complete a more thorough study. The quick-paced methodology of the field work explains the inadequate information. There was a rush to process the entire diverse range of contradictory and confusing source made by often unqualified outsiders. As a last example, the *civilized* informant cited above claims, correctly, that the Indians consume several kinds of insects. He declares the insects to be obnoxious and inconsumable. He uses the correct information about insect consumption to stigmatize the Indians, claiming that such foods cause *indolence.* An equivalent of this sort of transformation of an observation into an accusation for the Aikaná would be that of anthropophagi: the cannibalism they fear they might be subjected to. Both sources demonstrate their own peculiar sociocultural conceptions as to what can be consumed and how the consumption of the wrong food condemns the consuming agent.

Bearing these facts in mind, there is less reliable data regarding the *Savanna Indians* then there is for the *Forest Indians*, even though the latter also is rather lacking. Fundamental questions regarding land are also subject to an aggregate of incorrect and unverifiable statements. First, the Tubarão Indians persisted in

the claim of the same area as before, a block of plots ranging from their present location, where they claim to have arrived only three years earlier, to the south and on to the other bank of the river, 36 plots of land with a total area of 64,000 hectares. This claim is based on the group's link to the Pimenta River, believed to be their *original land*. Although this is *their claim* it must be the result of a dialogue initiated by a FUNAI administrator. It is claimed that only three plots have not yet been auctioned and yet, according to the Indians, no major changes took place. However, INCRA contested this information and asserted that some kind of human conversion of the forest already had begun. Such ambiguity can only be clarified by going to the field, an impossible task. Eventually, the author convinced INCRA to augment the *reserved* area with the inclusion of plots not yet distributed, only one of these being in the block claimed by the Tubarão. Two other blocks are located to the north and the south of the presumed location of the *Savanna Indians*. Despite what may seem a sensible precaution, such delimitation evidently implies the exclusion of the location of the *Savanna Indians* as the proposal extends their reserved area by only one plot. In addition, it is unclear how much of the total area claimed already has suffered from some intervention by the owners; the Indians mention much activity near the river and less further north. Plots with no manmade transformations can be exchanged for others by INCRA; all others would need paid compensations for the funds spent on the *improvements* of the land (*benfeitorias*, loosely translatable as *benefactions* as indeed it carries a connotation of being a charitable act)[xliv]. If INCRA had insisted on exchanging information with FUNAI, acknowledged the presence of an uncertain number of Indian groups and acted accordingly, then the subsequent complexities and disastrous consequences for these peoples could have been avoided.

The Savanna Indians cannot *claim* anything hence the indirect information provided by their uneasy Forest Indian neighbors substantiates the area *to be claimed* for them, following their *suggestion*: the area in red on the map which extends from the northern block cited above until an area south of the river, four plots wide and seven deep, totaling 56,000 hectares. Notably, this claim is one row of four parcels less then their own claim, the substitute claim starts one row up, but ends two rows less to the south. Nevertheless, the major problem is that the data provided, for whatever reason, are incorrect. The area of foraging and of forest agriculture (always in a forest patch as the savanna of low grasses and bushes tends to be less fertile) does not expand unto the southern margin of the

river. Actually, according to information given by the Latundê Indians themselves, even their forays did not habitually prolong as far as their own side of the river. As to the east-west axis, the choice of the width of four plots remains obscure. Nothing is known about the range of activity engaged in by the village to the east (or to the north, for that matter), not to mention the proposal of *attracting* the group suspected to live outside of sector 11 of the Project, to the north, into the claimed area. The same section reserved for the *Indians* does not need the formal *interdiction* of its area because in the village seen on the flight "(…) *we only saw 7 people, even though they say there are 14 Indians. If the other villages contain roughly the same number of people, the area will be sufficient.*" Although this may not be exactly the ideal method of deduction based on very precarious information, it may be the best available at the time. But it must be remembered that the main informant for both peoples still is the *chief* of the *Forest Indians* and some of what is reported differs from, or even contradicts, earlier reporting. From a modern perspective, the proposal is preposterous and presumptuous. Only taking into consideration the political context and FUNAI's practices explains such dauntless behavior.

As for the anthropologist's efforts, it is true that she made some important progress in garnering reliable information, but time and effort constraints hindering direct contact in the area failed to clarify several contested issues, effectively calling the quality of the work into question. The final proposal and recommendation of delimitation and demarcation of 120,000 hectares in one single area, joins lands *claimed* and those *to be claimed*. This results from a very hazardous and risky process of gathering information resulting from the way FUNAI bureaucracy functioned. The author herself clearly admits to the precariousness of the report[xlix]. This is evident in the recommendation to fund a four-month anthropological study of socioeconomic conditions, partly designed to prepare some development project that would assist the *Forest Indians* to better resist the perils of the coming influx of settlers in Rondônia. The argument put forward to secure this land, even when inexplicably contradicting Chief Manoel's unmentioned former proposal, implicitly reveals some of the dominant thinking. Even when the search for the Savanna Indians other then the few actually certified is in vain, the area proposed should be maintained because it is thought that many other *Forest Indians* live dispersed throughout Rondônia and will want to join their relatives. More simply, does that mean that the *Forest Indians* may go on and live on the land of their Indian neighbors if that land is largely

uninhabited? This convoluted reasoning is only understandable if the major argument for restricting land rights invokes the false (and illegal) notion of the notorious and untrue, but widely circulating, declaration, *lots of land for few Indians*[xlv]. This was a familiar stereotype for the large majority of FUNAI officials, many of whom partake in the normal constellation of Brazilian ethnocentric imagery of *Indians*. The veritable boldness shown by the report despite its obvious deficiencies, many recognized by the author, are intelligible only in this larger context.

Two and a half years later

The last note from 1976, dated two days before Christmas, concerns the dispatching of the report to the *Land Commission* by means of FUNAI's General Department of Indigenous Patrimony. However, on the same page is a handwritten note dated two and a half years later (June 12, 1978) lamenting the delay in organizing a *sub-group* of a sertanista and an anthropologist *for the attraction of the Massacá group* (sic). Indeed, such an interval conveys the impression of negligence, regardless of the reason. The note also considers the complications caused by their presence in the INCRA project, suggesting the formal interdiction of the area in order to halt colonization of the allotted plots (with a *memorial* and a *map* annexed). After such an impressive delay, finally the suggestion is immediately taken up by the president of FUNAI who ordered the preparation of the necessary legal document. Next, the dossier does include the papers for the *interdiction* of the area. Interdiction is a formal step taken to put the area defined under the protection of a general prohibition of any entry of third parties, except FUNAI and those authorized by the agency. The document defines the area with a *descriptive memorial* and a *sketch map*, both refer to the *Tubarões and Massacá*, again note confusion and change of names (this document may have been retro-dated). Moreover, documents found in the dossier suggest that the interdiction comprehends the whole of INCRA's *sector 11* (40 kilometers of width on a straight west/east line and 50 kilometers of length along the straight north/south axis). There is no justification for this change in area. Suddenly the area comprehends 200,000 hectares. The publication was also sent to the INCRA president on July 19, 1978. A few days later, the FUNAI of Rondônia solicited the respective dossier and maps while *in principle* also requesting the correction of the municipality named in the document, Pimenta Bueno instead of Guajaramirim. The dossier does not furnish an explanation for these errors and changes. No other explanation is forthcoming other than the supposition of misreading and

explicatory errors by the bureaucrats responsible for the document's preparation. The area's expansion was a common practice then, here it capitalized on the pre-established lattice of geographical coordinates of the project superimposed on the Indian lands[xlvii].

A FUNAI departmental director in Brasília ordered a visit to renew contact with the territory when these legal measures were taken. The visit revealed roughly the same situation as before and offered the same solution. The chief of the office in Porto Velho remarks again on the limited usefulness of the contemporary occupied lands and the Indian's forced removal from the Pimenta River (July 14, 1978; he resumed the report of the employees that made the visit). After such a long absence, the visitors learned the Tubarão thought FUNAI had abandoned them. A number of customary measures were recommended, including the presence of some assistant employees and the construction of a post and an infirmary. There was also the urgent necessity of demarcation to thwart migrants and, it is asserted, because of rapidly rising land prices. Odd as it may seem, the writer pays special attention to the great potential for lumber in the delimited area. This is a time when *development* fever extended to *community development projects* that envisioned the implementation of *projects* that would realize the *economic potential* of Indian resources and make a profit for FUNAI while, in theory, benefiting the Indians with revenue that would compensate for the chronic shortage of federal funding. A significant number of highly-ranked FUNAI employees believed that Indian resources could and should pay for their protection from the assaults launched by the national society. As for the uncontacted Indians, these *Massacá* need an Attraction Front and require relocation towards the river, for basically the same reasons as the others (i.e. no subsistence agriculture possible and no hunting and fishing in the area). That contradicts what is implied by the very presence of the Indian people in this region. However, it does agree economically with the overall appreciation of the lower quality of the land and its resources and takes into account the prospects of profitability from the Brazilian perspective. The report on the ground (in an annex) adds more details because it concerns a *socioeconomic survey* of which the most salient point is the testimony that the area *reserved* by INCRA is insufficient. Moreover, it relays how rubber collecting is fundamental for subsistence and as the most significant gathering area are within the plots *reserved* for colonization, the Indians will be deprived of a important income source. As INCRA once declared this very same area to be *reserved for forestry*

there is little doubt this agency did not have a vested interested in the economic sustainability of the Indians.

In fact, all of this action was stimulated by previous bureaucratic contacts that have not been preserved in this record, although likely to be found in other archives[xlviii]. A telegram (by radio) from Porto Velho to Brasília dated January 1978 mentions the report by the anthropologist and reminds the central administration of the critical situation of the *Tubarões* and the *Massacas or Sabanes*. This may be the origin of the use of *Massaca* over *Nambikwara*, as was current in the town of Pimenta, essentially confusing a name of the other group with the unknown Indians. No normal functionary of FUNAI will continually use a label like *Forest Indians* except when there are no other alternatives. Note that the mention of *Sabanes* appears for the first time in this correspondence, without any apparent justification. Later, a small group of Sabanê actually was found to inhabit the southeastern tip of the current Indigenous Territory, just north of the Pimenta River. In response, a representative from Brasília answered that two measures already were taken. First, the land commission recommended that INCRA not distribute plots considered Indian land (proof of some unregistered administrative activities of unknown efficiency). Also addressed was the lack of manpower to deal with the *Massaca/Sabanes* because the assignment of the *sertanista Fritz* [Tolksdorf] fell through. It suggests a complementary study, if feasible, by the regional office. This study only took place after the definition of the legal act of *delimitation*. By November 1978, the issue of the conflicting federal agencies resulted in a meeting and the indication of a joint *sub-group* to investigate *in loco* what is called the *habitat* (a naturalist term used for animal populations) and propose a *definitive area* (exemplifying the need to negotiate). The previous delimitation of a large area may have been part of a strategy to be used before entering into such, in a sense, illegal negotiation. The *sertanista* Tolksdorf, however, voiced his concern over the reported presence of two uncontacted Indian groups and so pointed to the larger priority of putting into motion a *base de atração*, literally translatable as an *Attraction Base*. That is, this was to be the base camp for *attracting* groups refusing contact. This measure was adopted immediately in early December, nearly one year after the first telegram was sent.

In principle, this action should have been crucial to the Latundê but another gap in the records prevents closer investigation until the end of 1979. Apparently by

initiative of the regional office at Porto Velho, FUNAI proceeded with legal action against the *invaders* of the area previously delimited in 1978 (two documents with identical content, both dated October 24, 1979). In a previous telegram exchange between Porto Velho and Brasília, representatives from Porto Velho claimed to have sent messages about measures to be taken while those from Brasilia report that the lack of local FUNAI presence was brought to the FUNAI presidency's attention by the *Tubarão* tuxaua. Apart from this indication that the Indians commenced to be enterprising enough to go to the center of decision making – a pilgrimage that many Indian groups find necessary to speed up the bureaucratic process – this judiciary petition demonstrates the non-action of the INCRA and dispels any remaining doubt about the evasion and actual non-cooperation of this agency. Five months after the legal document regarding the area's delimitation was emitted, INCRA should have had full knowledge of the Indian occupations. However, when FUNAI contacted the coordinator in charge of the *Special Coordination of the Territory* (i.e. Rondônia), a man who should be aware of all the land problems in his jurisdiction, the FUNAI representative was "(…) *informed that he did not know about the problem, and unjustifiably evaded the issue* (…)." Unjustifiable indeed, but once again, FUNAI's subordinate position impedes progress. The judicial action resulted from the *delimitation*. The issuing of this measure permitted the regional agency to take steps to assure its application and the eviction of area intruders. Once more, unsurprisingly, FUNAI did not succeed in convincing the Rondônia territory's security forces to cooperate. The security forces argued that the titles are legal because INCRA granted them. This, of course, was a rather fictitious argument to justify class and ethnic prejudice. Also, in many cases INCRA simply withheld information though simultaneously stating its disposition to aid further inquiries[xlix]. The local FUNAI office correctly considered this behavior on the part of INCRA to signify a true lack of cooperation, poorly masked behind a semblance of good intentions. Bureaucracy, of course, lends itself very well to just this kind of disguise between the formal written deceptive pretense and the informal real actions and intentions. The local agent certainly would be in a position to ascertain the difference between the semblance of formality and the actual hidden actions or lack there-of.

Conscious of the power structure, the regional official solicits a joint commission between INCRA and FUNAI. While requesting measures from Brasília, it sends the same documents at least twice. In the mid-June 1980 the problem resurfaces, this time regarding the invasion of a rubber collecting area and subsequent

tensions between the intruder and the Indians. Not being priority, two of the documents dated from late 1979 and early 1980 were not sent to the president's office until late June 1980. Only later does a report coming from Rondônia, dated almost a year earlier, become included in the dossier. Thus, several documents circulated but were not always combined into one central reference file. This may be one of the reasons of the sudden appearance of the unknown Indians in the previously mentioned report of a visit in July 1978. As seen, one item suggested the creation of an *Attraction Front* but, with no explanation whatsoever as to the circumstances, an annex shows two photographs taken of the still so-called *Massakás.* The caption read "(…) *at the time of the first visit of the functionary Fonseca to this community*". It shows the men of the expedition walking towards houses in the distance[xlx]. The other captions simply note the presence of houses and some Indians. There appear two houses and three male Indians. The first real photograph of a Latundê, albeit small and in black and White, demonstrates that something more has been going on (just as the expression *first visit* implies a more prolonged contact); indeed, one Indian wears shorts and a shirt. The request for the habitual form of *attraction* comes somewhat too late then, as, somehow, contact has already been established. These papers do not elaborate upon how and why this *auxiliary*, Fonseca, began and carried on in this manner. It is unexplained if or how he conducted the delicate process of approaching an unidentified Indian group. This is the same *auxiliary* that, in a last item of a dispatch, was sent back to the fifth regional agency because of the "(…) *information collected and Terms of Declaration annexed to the Report of the Commission.*" This attachment is also lacking in the file.

Thus, a careful reading reveals that a *rural auxiliary* stationed nearby with the Tubarão Indians contacted the Latundê prior to July 1978. It is interesting that at the end of this year the sertanista Tolksdorf asserted the presence of two unknown groups while this document exposes the fact that some regular relation already existed. Doubtlessly, something unusual was going on. Perhaps the lethargic bureaucracy and administration failed to note the irregularity of the auxiliary's accomplishment. It is very vague in what circumstances this approach was made. In August 1979 (over a year later, and filed later still) the legal activities mentioned above were initiated. These documents clarify who exactly made contact. Apart from documenting the problems arising from the continued incursions made by landowners, it describes a visit to the Indians:

"4. There exists a group recently contacted and living in the savanna. We suppose that this group is Nambikuara, considering that the Nambikuara interpreter that we took could communicate in the same language. The initial contact was made by Fonseca. He counted eighteen people. During our visit we noted the presence of ten people. According to a comment made to us, ten people of this group, mainly women, were enlisted to work at the rubber exploitation of "Dona Filhinha" located at the margin of the BR 364.

5. According to the Tubarões [sic]*, there are other groups in the area that still have not been contacted. Through an interpreter, the Indians revealed that although they were once a large group, they were oppressed by rubber plantations and fazendas* (...) *Their precautions demonstrate that this is true: their fields are cultivated far from where they live. They do not have houses but precarious constructs made of palm or grass-like leaves. All are imbued with a spirit of defense; even the women know well how to use bow and arrow. They seem to live in permanent movement through the savanna locating themselves for short periods at the headwaters of small streams, where the existence of water forms the basis for wooded land"*.

Thus, identification of members of the Nambikwara ensemble confirms the indication of the people of Pimenta during the first trip of an outsider. There are consistent accounts of roughly twenty people, but the contact phases have progressed to the point where nearly half of them are already thought to be exploited in a rubber extraction unit under the control of the *civilized* White Brazilian, Dona Filhinha, daughter of Afonso França. All of this, naturally, unravels without any real assistance by FUNAI. The absence of the women can only be attributed to a blatant lack of care taken by the protective agency. Shortly after an obscure auxiliary *attracts* this small Indian group, they suffered an exodus of half of their population. These Indians very soon became engaged in the economic activities of the national society, undoubtedly providing a very cheap labor source. It seems likely that the spirit of *defense* prevailed within the group – living on the open field obviously permits a much better view around against surprises – as they surely felt the growing pressure of the surrounding society. Still, the idea of continuous movement does not agree with the observations of previous visitors and may result from the increasing precariousness caused by *contact,* as symbolized by the absence of a substantial part of the population. Alternatively, this theory may arise from a different apprehension of the Indian

houses and conditions. Observe that the previous photographs displayed a normal and constant Nambikwara style of house construction. The photographs annexed here, by comparison, show instead a makeshift lean-to. The edge of the photograph reveals a house-post made of two tree trunks in the regional non-traditional style. This attests to the verification of an uncontrolled post-contact change[xlxi]. The typical solution proposed by FUNAI involves the employment of an *Indian Post* with resources to attend to both these peoples and the other uncontacted Indians reported by the *Tubarão.* As usual, weight is given to the area's demarcation and the removal of intruders. There is no doubt that some of these measures should have been taken years ago and that the protection of the uncontacted group or groups should have garnered much more attention.

Contact

There was some progress in 1980. In June, the lawyer in Porto Velho submitted another legal action to impede the deforestation committed by landowners in an area delimited just two years prior. This legal protective order was shown to be either unknown or disrespected many times at the local level. The Indians complained about encroachments on their resources and specifically one *landowner* who was cutting down a piece of forest with rubber trees *a manu militari* (June 23, 1980). Soon after the FUNAI president formed a *Work Group* to proceed with *the identification of the indigenous area Tubarão/Massacá*, (July 8, 1980) designating an anthropologist and an engineer to do the land measurements. In the beginning of September, this president requested information about a road planned that would cut through the area already set apart for the Indians, as outlined in a letter to the regional development agency of the central-west (SUDECO). He stated his firm desire to accomplish the delimitation and demarcation of the Tubarão Indigenous Territory. The designation of the *Work Group* to survey the indigenous territory was by this time part of the regular procedure and the first necessary step towards final legitimating of the land base as official *Indian land*. This procedure of establishing the limits of the land changed many times and, as land was the major source of contention between the Brazilians and the Indians, it is logical that there was significant interference from outside agencies and lobbies (especially the army and, in particular, the *security* agency controlled by the military)[lii]. Possibly in light of this situation, the director of the executive department not only instructed his subordinates as to the schedule of the Work Group participants to establish the Indigenous Territory but also took the initiative to consult the regional office

in Cuiabá, Mato Grosso (where the majority of the Nambikwara ensemble lived by this time). These papers, apparently sent by this office, reveal other features of the *attraction* suffered by the Latundê. As the dispatch by the responsible employee in the neighboring regional office, the Tubarão area, pertains administratively to Porto Velho, technically, he should not be involved in this concern. This demonstrates some significant aspects of the action taken by the *sertanista Fritz Tolksdorf*, a name mentioned previously only in passing.

The correspondence about the *Sabanes* of the *Tubarão reserve* discloses a new perspective that corroborates and strengthens the previous analysis. Only three laconic and colloquial reports (two of which were one page and one of which was two pages) and two sketched maps comprise the total account of the efforts of Tolksdorf responsible for first *contact* (a set dated January 17, 1979). Tolksdorf's earliest dated correspondence recounts to his superior his activities in 1977. Such correspondence stands in contrast to those dispatches above that suggest that FUNAI had not attempted to arrange efforts to contact the unknown Indians (report dated November 17, 1977). Internal communication and the circulation of information is certainly not a strong point within FUNAI during these years (at least in this case study). Tolksdorf actually began his retrospective outline of 1979 with the affirmation that the Indians fired arrows at the plane hired by FUNAI, a documentation that should be referring to Ferrari's notes. Curiously, Ferrari does not affirm anything of the kind in her report. Instead she mentioned what might have been a friendly gesture made by a boy offering food by holding up a bowl. Then he goes on to say that he received a small amount of money to carry out the order to *contact* the two Indian groups, an order that must have emanated from information from the previous flight. Tolksdorf writes: "*On July 2, 1977 we entered into contact with this group that contained, at this occasion, 8 couples, with no children in sight. I communicated the fact immediately to FUNAI and asked for further funding and instructions regarding the continuity of this task*." Here, finally, we find the actual official date of contact with the Latundê, even though the group remains anonymous on the entire page. No details whatsoever are given as to the circumstances of this encounter, nor are the all of the subsequent actions of the author altogether clear.

To clarify, Tolksdorf was the responsible agent for the attraction and here claims to have made *contact*. In the town of Pimenta Bueno he also talked to the local INCRA. The latter promised to stop the demarcation and further distribution of

plots. They could not, they alleged, stop the actions of squatters already *opening up* lands some 20 kilometers away from the Indians. The mentioning of squatters is interesting as it points to irregular and, from the agency's point of view, *illegal* migrants. The sertanista affirms to have notified the president of FUNAI. The latter, as seen above, did take measures. He adds, however, that his intervention with the INCRA proved unfruitful and accuses the agency to have broken its promise. Tolksdorf points out that FUNAI did not produce the desired results with respect to the question of land. As for his own actions, after *contact* he asserts to have left the *auxiliary Fonseca* in charge of the local situation in order to assist the Indians and avoid conflicts. Notwithstanding this initial success, no new funding became available to continue his efforts. At about the same time the situation of the *Nambiquara Project* deteriorated and he wanted to dedicate his attention to this important Project (a project started by Price and which will be discussed further below). In other words, he alleged that without money and with a complicated task at hand he could not continue to be responsible for the attraction. Essentially, all Tolksdorf did was remind FUNAI that the new group and the Tubarão existed[liii]. After the initial attraction was done and the funding exhausted, he asked to be transferred to the regional agency in Porto Velho.

It took nearly a year for the regional office to request information regarding the death of a Latundê Indian. Tolksdorf answered from his institutional position as head of the *Nambiquara Project*. He previously suggested relinquishing control of the attraction operation. Yet, the Project still maintained some relation to the situation of the Latundê although nothing in the papers alludes to the actual nature of the connection (September 8, 1978). In August a Nambikwara Indian visited the "(…) *Massaca (Latundê) group and before arriving at the village encountered a dead Indian* (…) *from the Latundê group, who had a punctured chest and some burn marks, he was decomposing*". The *Tayaté* Indian warned *Marcelo* the *chief of the Mamainde*, who contacted Tolksdorf. They then sent for a tracker from the *Tolori reserve* but only succeeded in verifying that the death was caused by unknown Indians, whose tracks went towards the east[liv]. The *Latundês* also supported this conclusion, and so it came to be implied that there was another unknown group responsible for the homicide. Apart from the case itself, namely the murder of an adult Indian supposedly at the hand of a mysterious unknown group and the associated turmoil[lv], several other issues are relevant. For the first time the name of the Savanna Indians changes from being a *Massaca group*, that is, from being specified as some sort of minor

division within this class of Indians, to simply being called by the unique name of *Latundê.* The persistence with which the former name still frequently reappears in other FUNAI quarters is striking. Old names die hard. The new designation itself must stem from the Project although there is no way to verify this. The introduction of this new name creates a greater difference from the *Tubarão* as these received the name much earlier as one of their prior designations, causing some confusion. The modification serves to differentiate the two groups from each other. A proper name, as one would say, for the group confers the distinctiveness that recognizes the real existing difference. In another way the name creates the people. Having acquired their specific name, FUNAI can deal with the group specifically. The contingencies in the history of naming sometimes dissolve the same people into distinct *Indian peoples*, or, conversely, amalgamate different peoples.

The visit of an Indian from the Northern Nambikwara cluster is a clear reminder that the process of *contact* commenced at least a year before and is more complicated than these short notes suggest. Other *Nambikwara* Indians now emerge on the scene where before *isolation* kept the Latundê apart from other peoples. Tolksdorf, in passing, affirms the existence of yet another uncontacted group at the margin of the Pimenta River (roughly to the south of the *Tubarões*). This may be true, possibly even a rumor of the groups in the Omerê area, but this marks a certain inflation of *references* (observations, in the jargon of sertanistas employed in making *first contact*). There remains a rather great confusion about what happened after the first contact and who conducts the post-contact phase. In the beginning of 1979, when Brasília asked for information, Tolksdorf's testimony provides insight into the slowness of the bureaucracy and FUNAI's negligence. Maybe that is why he marked this communication *topic: confidential*. According to his story, in October 1973 he was called on to participate in the investigation of the death of a *civilized* person in the *Tubarão area* (naturally, such a request is extremely unlikely in the event of an Indian's murder. In such situations, any attempts for an official investigation are routinely thwarted). He asserts to have alerted INCRA at the time and twice more between 1974 and 1976. According to him, this agency was aware of the fact, as plot surveyors had already encountered signs of an Indian's presence, initially causing the intruders to abandon the area (but they later returned). He also states to have warned FUNAI in Brasília, but it was only in 1977 after the reconnaissance flight was *attacked by arrows* that Brasília issued the command to establish *contact*. After

contact (with Fonseca's assistance), lack of funds obstructed continuation. Tolksdorf notes that his request did *not obtain an answer.* Not only had FUNAI reacted very late to its own employee's messages (though it remains unclear if he was part of the regularly employed personnel in this period), but the very process finally initiated was halted and interrupted by lack of support. Apparently, he forgot his former suggestion that there ought to be a transfer of responsibility for *attraction*. He continued in a sometimes cryptic style, revelatory of some of the internal friction within the bureaucracy:
Then there came the request for the transfer of the functionary João Fonseca to the 8th Regional Office, where he is located until today, that I was granted my request and the effort of continuity went to the 8th R.O., answering a complaint of mine, possibly in good faith, thinking there already was a functionary of the 8th R.O. in the area because of the doubtful events in the area of the Tubarões.

We, the personnel from the 5th R.O., affiliated with the Nambikwara Project, continued to supply not only medical but also material assistance to this group as well as the cinta larga Indians that appear on the roads constructed by the Codemat[livi], [these roads are] *in* [an] *awful state, because until now no FUNAI functionary is operating in the region and this state of affairs endures, last week we provided relief for three cinta larga Indians that were transported to Cuiabá, for lack of aid* (…)"

A combination of lack of political and bureaucratic will, patent accusations regarding procedure, and the failure of local representatives' performance combined to create such a high degree of operational incompetence that the formally unrelated Nambiquara Project went out of its way to aid the neglected Indians of Rondônia[lvii]. Any support to the Latundê, who were likely named by them and belong to the Nambikwara ensemble, could reasonably be encompassed in the Project. In fact, the Latundê should be part of any Project concerning the Nambikwara, and the latter should not comprise the Cinta Larga (Tupi Mondé). After this summation of things gone awry, the author solicits Brasília to assume the commitment to *contact* two unknown groups and to guarantee a specified quantity of manpower (including one medical assistant, Indian trackers, and support personnel) and tools, cooking instruments, and a specified number of hours of air reconnaissance flights. This falls into the traditional template of *pacification*, though nothing like customary pacification occurred with the Latundê, as will become clear presently. The *sertanista Fritz* wanted to avoid

future problems by establishing as a precondition the operational requirements to assure continuity after the first contact – in an area where INCRA demanded action for it already sold or distributed the land, thus purporting to eliminate obstacles to the ecological and socioeconomic order of the regional society as desired by both this agency and its clients. Tolksdorf expresses his disposition to agree with engaging in the task only on the condition that the request rests on the bureaucracies' firm support. His short comments confirm the conclusion already obvious in the analysis of other documents, FUNAI failed miserably in its institutional role at the expense of a small and unprepared people. Later documents further substantiate this conclusion.

Anthropological reports and the first post-contact phase

The major report on the situation follows from what is an apparently firmer political will to resolve the issue, and consequently in 1980, the Work Group mentioned previously is founded. The results put forth from this taskforce further uncover inept, inefficient and scandalous negligence. The anthropologist, Jane Galvão, completed research in the library, carried out fieldwork for thirty days in the Tubarão/Massaká area and united all FUNAI documents[lvi]. From the outset, she perceived the confusions of names, after the *apparent discovery* by FUNAI in 1976, when the file and documentation of the case started. The confusion of names of leaders as eponym for the group under their leadership explains the former names of *Massaca* and *Tubarão*. According to the Indians, these names derived from the names of their tuxauas, instead of these extraneous names they proposed the term *Aikaná* as an auto-denomination. The strength of this name affects the outsider's perception of the group's indianess. It is this particular report that led to the adoption of this ethnonym as the definite designation of this people. The name is now in general use. The use of the term *Massacá* to both groups and the one of *Índios do Campo* in the task description of the Work Group and in the legal document of interdiction, adds to the original confusion. Here too, Galvão removes any doubts and again assigns this people their definitive classification, *they are Nambiquara of the Latundê group.* The idea of *Nambiquara* comes from the first anthropological report while the name Latundê, as evident in Tolksdorf's second report, originated from the *Nambikwara Project* Unfortunately, the author does not indicate the sources of her information. So finally, after several years and much confusion, the names of the relevant groups are standardized. In one case, an auto-denomination is used even though it is an idiomatic expression, not some equivalent of 'Us' or 'People'. In the second case,

the origin of the word Nambikwara remains unsolved. Similarly, the emphasis on the report and the bulk of the material treats the history and contemporary situation of the Aikaná while only a very minor portion concerns the Latundê[lvix].

Notwithstanding the small part dedicated to the Latundê, the information and suggestions are quite relevant for an understanding of their history. In the first place, the author describes how the Aikaná Indians depended upon the rubber collection and the transformation of two of them into minor *patrons,* each with a number of client Indians, and, perhaps as a concurrent phenomenon, the change from a general pooling of income to individual *accounts*. In 1975 these two men, then brothers-in-law, quarreled and the people separated into two settlements of kin-groups each under the leadership of one of the men. As already hinted above, this entails the attenuated reproduction of the *relations of domination* prevalent in the regional society. This rapid sketch is relevant because of the intermediation exercised by the Aikaná with respect to the Latundê. The role concerns both the bureaucratic relation initiated with FUNAI's presence and the insertion into the dominant economic relations in which they found themselves. The historical contingencies of the lack of care and lack of attentiveness to specificities and the corresponding irresponsibility of FUNAI engendered a process of uncontrolled integration by the neighboring Indians and the resident FUNAI employee. In fact, it is evident from the maps furnished by Tolksdorf that he approached the Latundê directly, penetrating the area by way of the national highway (BR), and not by circumventing their region and entering through the Aikaná village. Documents assembled by the anthropologist show that she concluded that Tolksdorf apparently initiated *contact*, leaving Fonseca to take care of the Indians, but:
"(…) *the Latundê never had on the part of FUNAI a really effective and efficacious support. Fonseca was appointed to stay in the area and take care of these Indians, but rapidly abandoned them, going to live with the Aikaná. The Latundê were left to their devices and with an ever more miserable existence.*

The reports mention that at the time of contact the number of Latundê amounted to 23 people. According to data obtained by us, the Latundê have been reduced to 13 people, 4 of whom presently live in the village of captain Manoel. Today the situation of these Indians is deeply regrettable. The ex-employee Fonseca furnished clothes to the Indians and they walk about the village with their clothes torn and dirty. When we were in the area, two Latundê fell seriously ill,

contracting the flu, but they recovered.

A lamentable fact that is occurring concerns the "civilizing" of the Latundê by the Aikaná. The Aikaná assimilated, in their contacts with the Whites, the scheme of domination/subordination and are reproducing this in relation to the Latundê, considering them "inferior Indians". A young detribalized Sabané (Mané Torto) married a young Latundê (Terezinha) and it is this Indian that establishes the communication between the Latundê and the Aikaná, because Mané Torto understands the Latundê language and speaks Portuguese. In fact, it was Mané Torto who brought the four Latundê Indians to the village.

We did not go to their village where the rest of the Latundê reside. According to information, the Latundê captain is very conservative and does not want to leave his village.
The four Latundê presently residing in the Aikaná village are being compelled to a form of labor totally deleterious to the group's social organization. When we left the area, the Latundê were cleaning up the access road to the Aikaná village. According to Mr. J. Fonseca the Indians would receive a salary for this task and would be able to buy food at the warehouse.
Normally the Latundê would leave very early in the morning and return at dusk. When arriving they would light a fire in the interior of the house, roast some manioc and some small animal they hunted. Often they went fishing and came back late at night when we could hear their laughter or, if not, the noise they made in order to expel the pigs owned by the Aikaná that sometimes invaded their house".

Without any competent agent present to accompany the Latundê, the flow of events took a different course. Fonseca abandoned the Latundê and went to live with the Aikaná, afterwards, in September 1979, he was discharged from service. Before leaving the area, he established a firm relation with the Aikaná, re-oriented the direction of Latundê *contact* through this channel and attracted a significant part of the Indians into the same system of economic exploitation[lviii]. It is significant that the mention of the marriage of the young Latundê woman to another *Nambikwara* man – wrongly referred to as Sabanê, his life story is more complicated than the simple predicate *detribalization* implies – highlights Fonseca's continued presence and his apparent role of manager among the Aikaná. He handles the question of payments and he actively manages more than just the books, going so far as hiring cheap labor. The rewards for the Indians'

labor appear symbolically as the dirty and torn clothing they wear. These are the new *necessities* imposed by the recent colonialist relation, essentially transforming them into *poor* people that, ultimately (as Fonseca explicitly said), have to *work* even to obtain food. The Indians originally did not go around *naked*, they had ornaments and body aesthetics for daily life and ritual performances; assigning the label of *naked* to a people was part of the template or *attraction*. Among many, if not all, Nambikwara peoples full nudity, even without any existing ornaments, used to be considered perfectly acceptable. Clothes are, in a way, symptomatic of the new symbolic domination, of the first step towards *civilization* (in transition from the *savage* to the *domesticated Indian*) and of the creation of new needs that cannot be fulfilled by traditional means. Essentially, this generates a double dependency because they must be acquired by learning new skills inserted in a new conception of *commodities* and time, *labor*, to be *sold* and the corollary objects to be *bought* and *utilized*.

At this point, by virtue of the Indian's enticement of certain commodities and external objects, coupled with the concomitant attempt to impose the standards and values that encourage such interest (along with an entirely new world view of personal agency), it is possible to assume that the Latundê view of autonomy of the body, the world, and agency was already modifying[lxi]. Observations of the most significant Latundê members illustrates the growing breach between the traditional and subordinated lifestyles. The recognized leader of the Latundê, the *captain* continued to lead his own autonomous lifestyle. The label *traditional*, possibly used by Fonseca and the Aikaná and reported in the description above, very likely carries a negative connotation. Fonseca and the Aikaná held the view that the stranger who married into the group is a man already partially disciplined in the new hegemonic order, at least in relation to new economic realities. Unfortunately, Galvão did not visit the Latundê nor did she give the *captain*'s name but she interpreted his refusal to move to the village as resistance to the social construction of a new symbolic and economic domination mediated by the Aikaná, the lowest partiality of the socioeconomic system of the regional society. And the information about the Latundê most likely still issues from the same people that attempted to discipline the family in the Aikaná village in their role as *civilizing agents* of wild and uncivilized Indians.

The rags and the lodgings certainly epitomize the inferior state in which they were held and the symbolic inferiority attributed to them. It would be too hasty to

conclude that this opinion was necessarily accepted by the Latundê themselves, as they did not constitute a real object of the research. Their apparent happiness, for example, challenges the image supposed by other Indians and the *civilized* of a destitute people, suffering in abject poverty in a world without *commodities*. Such misconceptions seem to have influenced Galvão's notion of the conditions of the clothing and housing of this people. After all, it goes without saying that it is impossible to judge or evaluate people based on the type of clothing they wear or its cleanliness: the exterior does not necessarily translate the own interior appraisal. Such concepts vary immensely cross-culturally. Plus the Nambikwara notions of *matter out of place*, in the famous expression by Mary Douglas, are notoriously different. Notwithstanding different conceptions, the Latundê were probably learning the *civilized* notion of cleanliness. Likewise, understanding the notion of *poverty* entails a certain reassessment of their notions of value and worth. Previous contact with neighboring cultures and the very likely adoption of new practices or objects did not diminish their ethnocentrism and self-esteem despite the fact that these neighbors usually possessed more material objects than the Nambikwara. Still, being exploited demands attention and the measures Galvão proposes demonstrate good sense. She suggested immediate assistance be made available separately for the Latundê at their village and that further assistance should be directed by the engagement of a Nambikwara specialist of the *Nambiquara Project*. As for the territory of these peoples, initially she criticizes INCRA for its interference and its *reservation* of the worst possible land for the Aikaná. She criticizes INCRA for acting illegally when the organization improperly assumed this task and even believed it was doing these people *a favor* in offering a larger area (72,000 hectares) in 1977. Inferring from her fieldwork data and the Aikaná pleas, she positions herself in opposition to the popular belief that Indian land is akin to merely a source of economic income, like a fazenda. She applied the principle that land had a deeper significance for these peoples than a mere means of production. Galvão then proposed an area of approximately 110,000 hectares for both peoples or, secondly, if not possible, minimally *63,000 hectares* for the Aikaná and *47,000 hectares* for the Latundê[lxii]. The fact that Latundê were a neglected *group on the verge of extinction* and required immediate action is thought to justify the proposed size of their area. At one point, the author argues explicitly against the transference of the Indians, a further reminder of the facility with which such inappropriate and actually illegal action occurred in these times.

Remarkably, the justification for the proposal is mainly concerned with issues relating to the soil composition, the blatant deficiencies of INCRA's *reservation*, and the ecological conduct of the Indians compared with the irresponsible destruction of the rubber trees by *civilized* tappers. The second proposed solution amounts to the same area proposed in the first. The only difference is that it is to be distributed separately to the two peoples. Thus, the proposals still operate within the historical constraints and contingencies of INCRA's *colonization* scheme and the previous framework of the legal *delimitation*. No further explanation is deemed necessary nor are any details given about the real present occupation of this area. Not even the occupancy of the Aikaná is studied more closely, let alone the Latundê's patterns of land use. Regarding this land, one of the only observations relates that cattle ranchers are usually not very interested in the savanna. In this way the entire chunk of the *delimited* area south of the Pimenta River would be *liberated.* The only exception to this conspicuous reduction is an area of 37,000 hectares proposed for the protection of the uncontacted Indians. This is an Indian presence that Galvão affirms to have been known by many lower FUNAI officials for several years and whom had also called for action for some time[lxiii]. Such reduction still totals 53,000 hectares that are to be subtracted from the previously reserved stock of land and the reduction of the joint Aikaná and Latundê block to some 55% of the formerly *delimited* area. Though it is true they did not occupy these lands, the Aikaná themselves requested an extension on both sides of the margins of the river. Thus, the appeal to the field data and the consultations of the Indians leaves the argument about how much land is sufficient underdeveloped; this reasoning however may be a rhetorical device to sustain a large area for small populations. After all, the Latundê are even considered to be *in extinction.* This may be another political tactic used by federal institutions. Clearly, *liberating* so much land may provide a bargaining chip in negotiating with a powerful agency like INCRA (not to mention the fact that Rondônia was soon after granted statehood, a factor correctly remembered as an argument to encourage rapid demarcation).

Two annexes to the major report further illuminate the issues of contact, land, and neglect: one concerns the special *Case João Fonseca*, the other reproduces a communication by David Price to FUNAI about his trip through Nambikwara country in 1977 (dated August 15, 1977). The two documents are related because the assistant worked for several years at the Nambikwara Post in Mato Grosso before he, as a result of his engagement in the *attraction* of the Latundê,

requested transfer to Rondônia[lxiv]. According to Price, at his former Post Fonseca did not obey his duties and made the *caboclos* (general lower class term for Indian or an acculturated Indian) produce subsistence food for him and his family. The report gathers diverse material to prove the general opinion of inappropriate and irregular behavior, including the findings of a special investigating commission. The treatment of the assistant evinces the problems of the agency with personnel, not only did it take years to discharge the man, as after his dismissal another regional administrator filed a request to review the process and to re-admit him (evidence of internal patronage). Most significantly, however, is the fact that he somehow could be designated to work on the *attraction* of the Latundê and afterwards, by virtue of his monopoly of literacy and mathematical proficiency, he succeeded in gaining a firm stronghold as the veritable Aikaná patron. A project he, in a way, announced to Price: "*Mr. João* [Fonseca] *plans to establish himself at the Aikanã village, from where he would pay attention to the small Nambiquara village and would "pacify", with the aid of the Aikanã, other wild groups, to the south of the Pimenta River. He stated to me that when he started something he went to the end of it; and that now he shall "bring all of these unruly ones together".* The choice of words in the citations quite explicitly unveils the common sense of the rural conception of the *Indian* as an entity to be pacified, domesticated and taught to work by a competent *civilized* person. The latter, naturally, should earn not only the merit of such operation but could also legitimately profit from his service as manager (the reproach of personal benefits from Indian labor are common in the reports). As Fonseca made no attempt to hide or mask his viewpoints and plans, FUNAI must have been aware of them. Nevertheless, he only was relieved of his duties in the beginning of 1980, when another employee went to live in the area. The newcomer could not rival with the sociopolitical power exerted by his ex-colleague who initially simply remained as the manager employed by the Indian patrons.

Overall, the history of *contact and pacification* of the Latundê is full of seeming peculiarities. When Fonseca told Price about this history, he confirmed some of the strange happenings and astounding negligence in his own idiosyncratic style. For example, as Fonseca was somewhat reticent about traveling with Price and other employees to see the Latundê, Price also believed that he withheld information about his activities (Price suspected some unclear fear; they did go, however, on July 27):
"*In June of this year, the Rural Overseer João Fonseca was informally assigned to*

the operation of contact. Accordingly, he entered the forest accompanied by five Aikanã Indians and one rubber tapper; he does not remember the exact date of the expedition, nor did he write a report but knows that he passed the June festivities [Saint John's day] *in the forest. After five days, he found the village he was looking for, the inhabitants of which trembled in fear but formed a frail line of defense to protect their homes. He and his companions slept in the savanna and on the following day succeeded in their approach, a fact corroborated by some badly exposed photographs of Mr. J.Fonseca embracing the Indians. The group never let the strangers enter their village and Mr. J.Fonseca did not remember if the men had nose and lip piercing, but affirmed that the Aikanã did not understand their language, which must be Nambiquara because he recognized "the way they talk". He said to have counted 10 men and 8 women, apart from the likely presence of children that he did not see".*

The precariousness of this attempt and of first *contact* is evident in the complete inappropriateness of the designation of the leader of the expedition. The total lack of bureaucratic compliance with the rules transpires from the moment of an *informal assignment* to the absence of a report of this activity. Actually, Price himself only visited the Indians informally (he was no longer FUNAI staff) when the opportunity arose. At the time, the *coordinator* of the *Nambikwara Project* ordered one of his men, Ariovaldo Santos, to take Fonseca to the Latundê, who then also invited another employee of the *Project*, Marcelo dos Santos, and two Nambikwara. The Indians went in order to confirm the group's linguistic affiliation[lxv]. The *northern Nambiquara* maintained the conversation between the two parties and they were very well received with so many presents that Price felt that they hardly accomplished a satisfactory retribution. That is, the probable second *contact*, although not explicitly stated as such, not only went well, but proved that the Indians were not too *poor* to give many presents. Price also did not say why he asked about the ornaments, but he obviously thought that one of the diacritical features of being *Nambiquara*, irrespective of any dialectal and linguistic differences concerns the use of piercings[lxvi]. Yet the language clearly defines the affiliation of the Latundê. He adds that the only other Indians known to the small group are the Aikaná, "(…) *whom they call mahalohndé, and whom they consider extremely dangerous enemies".* Small wonder the first *contact* appears to have been tense. Both sides thoroughly mistrusted each other. It is worth noting that Price, so soon after first *contact*, carefully avoids naming these *Northern Nambiquara* with any particular denomination, only referring to the

village and the *group*. No outsider name seems to have coined. Some years later, in a discussion of the sociocultural nature of these groups, the people now called Latundê appears unnamed in his argument. Price asked the accompanying Indian "(…) *who served as an interpreter to find out what the people called themselves, and after a bit of conversation he reported that they had no name*" (Price 1987: 14). Nambikwara peoples and groups do not name themselves, they name others.

Price also did not mention who assigned the assistant to the job, perhaps out of diplomacy, just as he does not refer to the coordinator of the Nambiquara Project by name in this part. In a prior section of his account, he called him *Mr. Fritz Tolksdorf*. Price observed, in a diplomatic and ironic fashion, how in the course of a drawn-out and dangerous conflict between Nambikwara do Campo Indians and a sham landowner, Fritz appeared only once in the area of conflict and stayed for exactly ninety minutes. Now, it must be noted that Tolksdorf stated in his correspondence to have made official contact on July 2. At the end of July, during of the expedition in which Price participated, only the assistant, a *civilized* tapper and the Aikaná are confirmed by the people in the area to be participants of the prior trip. Hence the conclusion of Tolksdorf's conspicuous absence on the trip that resulted in the *first contact*. It is unlikely Price left out the name of his political adversary in an event of such importance. His account only allows the conclusion that Tolksdorf did not participate in the efforts in the field, and delegated everything to Fonseca. Doubtlessly something strange happened here, when years later the *sertanista* Tolksdorf claimed to have pacified the Latundê in accordance with the task he temporarily agreed to undertake. All evidence suggests this to be plainly untrue. One might rightfully ask about the stark contrast between the Latundê case and the conditions the sertanista posed to conduct an attraction some time later. Tolksdorf later also disavowed his subordinate collaborator, because the papers of the commission investigating the conduct of Fonseca include his statement that he is a very poor functionary (cited in the annex; unfortunately without the date). Personal and corporate politics may explain the transition from a valued collaborator to a discarded pawn within FUNAI, but without more information, this can be only speculation[lxvii].

In Price's report on the general situation, he describes a situation that flaunts the results of what may be called an informal policy. At least three people were recovering from the flu, a notorious killer of uncontacted Indians, one of whom was still suffering the effects of the illness. Worse, two people died since *Mr.*

J.Fonseca's visit, one of whom was an old woman photographed on the previous visit and the other was a man who died only two days prior to Price's visit. In less than a month, the recently contacted group already suffered the severe loss of two of its senior members. Statistically, this is a very significant number as it comprises 10% of the adult population tallied. Clearly, to such a small group such sudden losses are traumatic[lxviii]. The village consisted of seven houses, one owned by the newly deceased man, and the six others lodged six couples, one of which had three children and another had one. This adds up to fifteen people and does not comprise the total population as at least four adults are missing in this count according to Fonseca's calculations. Price asserts that the Indians told of their long history on that savanna and the worn footpaths in and around the houses and the surroundings testify to the longtime occupation of village. Thus, they were definitely not nomads and inhabited the area for a considerable period. Furthermore, it was discovered that the savanna in which they lived was located at the *Capivara River* and not, as thought before, at the neighboring river, *Mutuca*. Bones of hunted animals seen around the village served as a testament to the group's success in this environment as did their generosity in giving the visitors vegetable foods grown from their own gardens. Obviously, the Indians were more than self-sufficient and they were very familiar with the environment that was clearly their permanent location.

After clarifying these inauspicious and obscure beginnings of a permanent relation between the Indians and national society, Price writes that the *Nambiquara* identification as *Nambiquara* should be determinant in defining the responsible bureaucratic unit for the management of the people's relationship with the national society. Thus, he concludes that the Nambiquara Project, under the aegis of the Mamaindê Post *chief*, should assume responsibility for the Latundê.

This chief already had a plan to create an access route to the Latundê to avoid passing through the Aikaná village. Price also recommended the obvious *interdiction* of the area to protect the Indians. In the following part of the document he discusses the role of the Aikaná and Fonseca. Here too Price expands upon the knowledge available, observing, for example, that FUNAI's predecessor, the SPI, left the Aikaná to their own devices, relinquishing them from its responsibilities and turning control over to rubber patrons who enslaved the various peoples of the region. Tracing its parallel to FUNAI's and INCRA's

development, these Indians surface as the victims of previous forced deculturation and acculturation. Consequently, the appearances of change enabled INCRA to allege that they no longer represented *authentic Indians* and their clothing and Portuguese ability constitutes a significant foundation for this stigmatization[lxix]. Price reminds FUNAI that the abandonment of the Aikaná and the resultant deaths should not be dealt with by appointing an assistant who demonstrated an unprofessional prior performance (as in Aroeira), extending a bad reputation to anyone who works at that Post. In light of this, Price closes his report by writing:

"It was to resolve these problems that the Coordinator of the Project thought to give him work that would keep him far away from the Post. Nonetheless, it is already evident that he is not capacitated to execute the difficult task to maintain first contacts with groups rejecting contact. This being said, the Coordinator plans to restrict his attributions to the rendering of medical services to the Aikaná. However, ever since he requested drugs including cortisone and morphine "to treat insect bites", I do not really trust his medical abilities. Perhaps it would be better to grant his wish for transference, something he has been asking for years.

Certainly the Aikaná deserve something better."

As do the Latundê. Regardless of knowing well whom he was assigning to the job, the coordinator, Tolksdorf, left the real work and responsibility of establishing and maintaining *contact* with an unknown people who were scared and unprepared for this sort of new relation with the dangerous outside, to a representative of the same regional society that discriminates and persecutes them. Afterwards, contrary to what he asserts in his later report, this superior did not plan to leave him taking care of the Latundê, he intended to put him in charge of caring for the Aikaná, still a reckless and hazardous proposition. It is unclear if he was being dishonest with Price or if he changed his mind. Regardless, a large part of the real responsibility for both the Latundê and the Aikaná lies in his hands[lxx]. Regional superior officials were perfectly aware of the general situation and of the characteristics of their subordinate, probably other higher tiers of the administration were too. Price's report does not leave much room for misinterpretation. Despite all of these warnings and owing to internal politics, employee motivations, and the external constraints of the context of the institutional field and national Indian policy (a situation too complex to accurately sketch here), from 1977 to 1979 the same man exercised a fundamental influence

on both peoples. Even after being discharged, he sociopolitically eclipsed the FUNAI representative in 1980, to the point of interfering with the allocation of the funds of a development project. In a position to shape policy, he held on to his strategic managerial position. The two Aikaná *captains*, both apparently small-scale Indian rubber patrons to the other Indians, later petitioned for his stay and his formal return to the FUNAI ranks.

Not content to administer medicine, Fonseca wanted to *civilize* the Indians into the discipline of *work*; the auxiliary and later adjunct administrator of one of the *captains* (but also exercising firm influence over the other and later performing the same task for both), wished to extend the influence of his actions to encompass all regional Indians. "*Some questions about a larger productivity of the Indians or the use of the labor force of the Latundê are clearly put by João Fonseca who gets irritated when an Indian, for whatever motive, abandons his "colocação"* [a house and the rubber collecting tracks attached to it]. *He made the Latundê understand that the only way to earn food is by working for captain Manoel. J.Fonseca uses the Latundê for tasks like cutting firewood for his stove*". Hence the presence of a couple, one older woman and two teenagers of the recently contacted Latundê in the Aikaná village, subject to the discipline of this labor regime. This demonstrates the ease with which such a minor player can affect the victims of contact. This is the direct result of the process of a foolhardy *attraction* as carried out under the formal guidance of FUNAI. The presence in the village impresses Galvão, who, seeing the comparative squalor of the clothes and lodgings, muses that she is meeting a people in decline, even on the verge of *extinction*. The recent population trends did give grounds for such pessimism. The numbers given at first *contact*, refer to around twenty persons, presumably somewhere around eighteen adults and four children (it unclear how she arrived at the number of 23). After the numerous deaths so soon after first contact, the author rightfully concludes that a decline to thirteen people in only three years represents a very severe loss and is a threat to their survival as an ethnic group. A gravely diminished population of a people weakened further by the division of one group staying in their homeland and another residing in the Aikaná village. Perspectives for social and ethnic reproduction could only inspire somber prognostics, unless the so-called *competent authorities* finally took some effective action. The course of such action though maybe does not that appear to be obvious to any such authority. However, Galvão's report makes it abundantly clear that nobody heeded Price's advice.

Final reports and the definitions of areas

The repeated outcry for action did have some effect. Most of it, as far as can be perceived from the dossier, seems to have been administrative. The Work Group did not elaborate on the situation *in locus* of the Latundê, despite some penetrating and relevant remarks on abandonment, irresponsibility, general negligence and the mode of insertion into the Aikaná economic system. The lack of data on the effective occupancy in the savanna occasioned FUNAI in 1981 to constitute another Work Group with a view to *complement prior studies*[lxxi]. In the beginning of February, the presidency issued an administrative act that created the *Tubarão Indian Post.* Even when citing the dossier as the basis of this measure, somehow the *Tubarão* name did not change to the more appropriate name already known. Some months after the latest report, an employee infrastructure, a radio, and a car were finally allocated to this new Post. The presence of an assistant trained in indigenous assistance and another person trained in basic healthcare should bring some permanent relief to minor daily problems, particularly to the Aikaná. Simultaneously this would objectify and introduce the permanence of the encompassing authority of the outside agency to which both peoples are essentially *Indian*, and their myriad differences being of secondary relevance. The newly instated Work Group set out specifically for the Latundê, who, after all, had never been visited by any FUNAI official in a Work Group deciding on their territory. The people assigned to the group started their investigations sometime in June, receiving the support of the Mamaindê Post *chief* and two Nambikwara Indians. Due to the practical difficulties of transport and food, they stayed with the Latundê for only four days. For some reason these difficulties always rise with respect to a visit to the Latundê. Notwithstanding real problems, one suspects the barrier must be additionally composed of a psychological and social component. In spite of the shortness of fieldwork, the conclusions highlight continuity in precise practices. The first conclusion consists of the fundamentally unchanged structural situation of this group, the continued attempt at *attraction and insertion* into the Aikaná system of rubber collection and socioeconomic domination. Other contingencies temporarily worsened the general situation. The small group in the Aikaná village experienced serious setbacks that apparently resulted in a withdrawal from more concentrated contact in the Latundê heartland:

"From the moment of contact, the groups did not receive any assistance from FUNAI and in a four year period suffered a drastic population reduction caused by the infectious and contagious diseases to which they were not resistant. From

the contacted population of 23, only 11 are left, of whom 9 are in the village and 2 are in medical treatment in Cacoal. There is a certain urgency to provide a systematic effort for this group, some sort of an effective support. Without this, this group will become yet another extinct group in the country. Today we only came across one child of about 5 years old, despite the presence of two young couples in the village.

The contact of the group with the surrounding society and even with the Tubarão group is minimal, despite the various occasions when their labor force was recruited for periodic tasks by the Tubarão. This group is trying to "civilize them" by introducing manufactured goods and foods, thereby slowly creating necessities and dependencies with respect to the national society and the Tubarão. After the last epidemic of measles, the Latundê withdrew themselves from the area of their neighbors and contact is realized by way of a sabanê Indian that lives in the Latundê village. The Tubarão group personified by its chief discriminates the latundê with stereotyped images absorbed by the permanent contact with our society."

Some things are immediately noteworthy; the return of the Aikaná's systematic use of *Tubarão*, the erroneous attribution of being *Sabanê* to the inter-married Indian, and the classification of a veritable Indian patron as a *chief*. Such naming and classifying is never harmless and is almost always part of a larger common sociocultural dispute regarding the principles of legitimate classificatory divisions and connected competencies, attribution of capacities, and power allocation (Bourdieu 2000). The Sabanê language is not close to Latundê, the name Aikaná is less arbitrary then Tubarão, and to call the leader a chief amounts to suggesting a political legitimacy not acquired by economic domination alone. One could easily argue that this is a deliberate tool to maintain control, ensuring that everyone is included in the classificatory system and not left outside the sociopolitical order. Indeed, naming *Indians* and designating each *indigenous groups* with a specific name corroborates the very existence of the embracing sociopolitical order, which is one of the main reasons of the immediacy and prominence of naming. Naming independent peoples reduces them, to use a historical term, to a known entity within the dominant sociopolitical order. Further appeals to the *natural* contingencies of history as an evolutionary path illustrates the supposed inevitability of such non-autonomous existence within the nation-state[lxxii]. The objective of the journey falls within this scope. The task to

map the utilization and extension of the Latundê territory discloses how their previously independent occupancy should be verified, ratified, and officially sanctioned by the state. In general, the state abhors the idea of allocating *too much land* to undeserving proto-citizens who practice a mode of non-capitalistic economic production. FUNAI therefore assigned the employees to a Work Group with the task to proceed with a reconnaissance, sending them to explore the land and see how it is used. According to the anthropologist Galvão, even with the interpreters, communication with the Indians was hampered by the monolingual Latundê (the exception being one man from the outside who spoke some Portuguese). Not being able to carry enough supplies, and aggravated by *the scarcity of* (…) [provisions] *among the Indians, because of their recent relocation* (probably as the fields were not yet producing), limited the effort. Furthermore, two members of the Work Group caught the flu gravely threatening the Indians[lxxiii]. During Galvão's visit, neither the planned Post nor its personnel were in place, so any outbreak would be severe as there was no help available.

When the first expedition to carry out the bureaucratic exigencies related to land demarcation necessary to guarantee the Latundê territory finally succeeded in reaching their homeland, several factors severely limited its results. The report resultantly relies heavily on the assumption of a sociocultural similarity among the whole of the Nambikwara ensemble and then attributes these generic characteristics to the Latundê. The collected information is more interesting but occasionally repeats prior reports and contains some inaccuracies[lxxiv]. The most important news is the death of the *Latundê chief* in the measles epidemic. Much attention is given to the prominence of his replacement, the incoming husband. Significantly, the death practically means the end of an entire generation (although an older woman still survives) and deprives the Latundê of a competent leader of their own village. Actually, the presence of a young Latundê man is noted but he remains subdued by the former stranger who came to live with the group, *Mané Torto*. However, it is not noted that the Latundê man is fairly younger and less experienced than Mané, as can be seen on the picture taken in 1980. Moreover, the papers and the picture make clear that the younger man used to live in Mané's house. Thus, he was partially raised by the outsider. Naturally, Mané exercised a strong influence on the younger man. Documentation reveals that *Mané Torto*'s presence was perceived as beneficial to the group's reorganization. In fact, if the eldest available woman of the younger generation (Terezinha) had not married, the group might have dissolved and become socially

extinct. Mané, the report continues, chose a new group locale closer to the rubber collecting areas in the forest and intended to engage in rubber production in order to maintain access to industrial commodities. Mané did not intend to discontinue the group's insertion in the system of socioeconomic dominance in place.

Unfortunately, the population decline accelerated in the year since the last report and signifies another terrible blow for an already weakened people. As it relates that one third of the population died since the release of the previous report: "*A measles epidemic occurred in the region in 1980 resulting in the death of approximately 6 Latundê Indians. At the time, the group sought assistance from the Tubarão but did not receive any.*" In absence of a census, the demographic data presented are somewhat confusing. Only the married couple is mentioned by name. Part of the reason for this incompleteness concerns the fact that an elderly couple and a young child lived away from the two houses of the major village. They apparently attempted to maintain the traditional house and lifestyle in the savanna. The movement towards the rubber trees is a move towards the other Indians, closer to the forest, and building houses in regional style. This recent change, stimulated by the death of the leader, probably Terezinha's father, is evident in some of the photographs showing the traditional houses further away in the savanna, closer to the previous site. The permanence of the former site, already inhabited at *contact*, demonstrates the persistence of the village, and is further evidence against the nomadic character often ascribed to the Nambikwara. Although the place of the new building implies the necessity of the cultivation of a new garden, the older field continues to supply the village with produce. It is said that the harvest must be complemented with collection expeditions by the women. The anthropologist Galvão probably correctly considered this conduct to be a persistence of a customary practice of women foraging both in the savanna and the forest, and that the temporary shortage mentioned results from the post-contact situation. The *opening up* of nearby large landholdings, for example, affected hunting and obliged hunters to amplify the area covered to provide sufficient meat. In spite of the legal action by FUNAI in 1980 prohibiting any action in the delimited area, INCRA confirmed to the author the persistence of opening up of plots south of the area. Also, three rubber tappers and their families began living in the Latundê area, all working for one of the *Tubarão* patrons.

Several matters contributed to the increasing disintegration of the Latundê's territorial integrity and the noticeable encroachment upon their traditional lands. The author suggests that during the dry season the group used to split up in various small bands and then spread out over large territory in order to forage and hunt. The practice is thought to have been abandoned after the increase in illness and death. The suggestion of these treks bases itself more on the literature than the complicated communication with the Indians themselves. The captions of the photographs imply that the village already had moved once before being fixed in the latest location. The Latundê, not surprisingly, took no note of any territorial limits imposed by outside definitions, but no longer posed opposition to intruders or the diverse inroads into their lands. Maybe in the end this was the better alternative. This, together with the relative poverty of their heartland, possibly protected them from the threat suffered by the *wild* Omerê Indians to the south. In the Omerê region with its forest and better soils, the unknown Indians were sighted and: "*It is said that the landowner contracted laborers to exterminate the unknown group if they appear again in his lands*." In effect, this sighting is outside of the area south of the Pimenta River that the previous Work Group suggested remain under prohibition. The current document did not recommend any modification[lxxv]. As to the Latundê area, irrespective of not having visited the eastern part of their territory because of the fear of uncontacted Indians, and after all the arguments about the ecological necessity of a large area, the proposal covers only 27,000 ha. At this time the Indians used the northern part sparingly for fear of the so-called *Bigfoot Indians* (thought to be responsible for the killing). In four days, without participating in any real reconnaissance of the territory, with at most a scant knowledge of ecological adaptation and occupancy, this proposal perpetuates the prior temerarious audacity with respect to Latundê territorial perimeters. The group argued for the maintenance of another 20,000 ha because of the presence of the uncontacted Indians[lxxvi]. The final list of generic recommendations repeats the same remedies as those above. Mentioned is the necessity of a clear division between the areas of the two neighboring peoples, Fonseca's withdrawal, the location of a future Post at a place that enables personnel to assist both peoples (something already agreed to by both Aikaná *chiefs* a year before), and the stationing of a medical health agent at the Latundê village.

The report received a bureaucratic treatment in Brasília that resulted in another documentary evaluation of the known data and the proposal of the Latundê area

(dated December 1981). Sometimes aspects of this document confuse the subject. For instance, in the original report, the Latundê population is given as eleven and the summarizing report suggests the population is fifteen. The official census counts twelve people, accounting for a marriage with an Indian from another people. It is true the referenced text does not make clear whether Mané is included or not in the customarily mentioned number of eleven Indians but the phrasing may be interpreted as such. Sometimes the error derives from certain assumptions such as that that the Latundê are *fundamentally* monogamous and the two young couples are the only ones who may reproduce and that there are four unmarried young women[lxxvii]. Other times errors derive from bad reading. Such sloppiness explains the statement that after the first anthropological report the two groups were labeled on the one hand Tubarão or Aikaná, and on the other one Latundê, *both nambikwara subgroups*. After synthesizing reasonably well other information, the conclusion notes the *immemorial occupation*, a figure of speech essential to the judiciary recognition of existing land rights. The document returns to the figure of *eleven individuals*, remarking upon the precarious existence of an ethnic group that possesses no more than two couples for reproduction, prompting the recommendation of actions to assure the physical and cultural survival of the group. Furthermore, most of the above-mentioned measures are also accepted, along with another list enumerating many well-known measures, namely the *attraction* of the uncontacted Indians by a sertanista, the removal of the intruding non-Indian families from the indigenous area, the liberation of *unused areas* and the protection of the Latundê area. On the other hand, the lack of actual verification of the occupancy and land use is duly noted from observations made on the ground as well as from the air. From this moment on, these numbers and procedures might have gained a certain momentum, by virtue of being proposed in Brasília, the main bureaucratic seat where the real decisions customarily are taken. A memorandum made by the head of the *Division of Identification and Delimitation* of indigenous areas, even though dependent on internal power relations, normally carries a certain weight.

For whatever reason, it was another Department that sent a memorandum to Rondônia requesting clarification *in loco* of several points including the item about the presence of two unknown groups. Most importantly, it also solicits an opinion about the convenience of displacing the Latundê to the Tubarão area. The suggestion is made in light of the documented poor soil quality. This is an odd suggestion; after all, the document clearly mentioned the enmity between these

peoples and the firm attachment of the Latundê to their native land. At the end of December 1980, the response is sent to Brasília. Some issues are solved. The *Bigfoot Indians* do not exist. They are but a group of *Nambiquaras* coming from Mato Grosso living off rubber collecting to the southeast of the Latundê, at Veado Preto. No other unknown Indians exist on the left bank of the Pimenta River, but there is a group of Indians living near the Mequens River (west of the Tubarão), without any assistance at all and at the mercy of rubber patrons. Fonseca furnished this information, with his *profound knowledge* of the region. His continued involvement demonstrates once more the occasional lack of preparation of the investigating *technicians of indigenism* (written in formally incorrect Portuguese). Note that this report does not come from the people in the field but from those not living near the site. This explains why even the two *indigenist experts* had no familiarity with this region:
"(...) *the indigenous community Latundê (Nambiquara Sabanê Indians), find themselves within the interdicted area on behalf of the Tubarão and not outside of it as was assumed. These Indians are approximately 12 in number.*
They were attracted to where they are today by Mister Fonseca. He is working intensely to improve their living conditions, associating them with the rubber [trade]*, just like the Tubarões* [sic]."

These observations reveal the well-known bias of *work and progress* and the indication of dislocation in the direction of the Aikaná villages could have severely impaired the territorial claims of the Latundê, who once more are wrongly referred to as *Sabanê*. In one sense, the agents must be partially exempted from any responsibility, for part of their ignorance is caused by the now well-documented tendency within FUNAI not to circulate the relevant information to all whom it may concern. After all, Price identified the language and affiliation already 1977, yet a potentially damaging number of ethnonyms in various associations surface regularly in the documents. Probably the ingrained habits of bureaucracy of referring to familiar routines and known *facts* prevailed, or else the slow progress of the process hindered change from previous conventions. In fact, the next entry in the dossier is made six months later in July 1982. Another dispatch in Brasília by Pierson (substitute director of the Patrimônio Indígena) noticed the case and briefly mentioned the existing *interdicted areas to be maintained, in view of the vestiges of Indian occupation*. This document specifically deals with the question of the Indians not assisted by FUNAI and proposes an investigation *in loco*[lxxviii].

As incredible as it may seem, this paper provoked the creation of yet another Work Group (the last). This Work Group was sent off to the area with the task to ascertain the presence of these unassisted Indians. The members, however, interpreted their task more expansively and extended their attention to the whole region, now designated *Indian Area Tubarão/Latundê/Sabanê*. They took a census among the *Tubarão* and made observations about the extractive economy and about the presence of an infirmary and a school, both of which had no personnel. Empty buildings without qualified workers denote the persistent FUNAI abandonment. The only reason to prevent the scandalous conclusion of total desertion is the singular visit by a larger medical team. The Latundê group is now said to have only 10 people, including the inmarrying man now called the *captain*. The most significant detail with respect to demographic tendencies is that the report takes note of the birth of a newborn child to the leader and his wife. The composition of the population remains unclear because, as noted above, the prior reports do not give all the names nor do their evaluations include precise ages of the members. They offer only a range of probable ages. Judging from available data, it seems likely that the census count failed to include one boy, so the total population is almost the same as the prior year. The brother of the uncounted boy was listed as Mané Torto's son and was said to be enlisted in rubber collecting. In fact, both of the boys are actually brothers of the leader's wife[lxxix].

Aside from the inaccuracies, the report elucidates how the lack of assistance continues even with the recently constructed infrastructure at a three hours walking distance from the Latundê. Fonseca gave medical attention, although Price thought him unfit to act in such capacity. At this time, the buildings were situated between the Latundê and Aikaná villages. For the first time after the 1980 measles epidemic, a re-composition of the population became feasible. There are two couples, two potential families in two houses, and one had children[lxxx]. Thus, after the pathogenic impact of *contact* and the almost complete abandonment of medical care to protect against this widely known phenomenon sometimes called the *Columbian* Exchange, diseases cut the very small population down to half its original size. After a census demonstrating the presence of twelve Sabanê to the southeast of the Latundê, the authors proposed the ratification of the Tubarão and Latundê areas as proposed earlier, 63,000 ha and 47,000 ha respectively, this time augmenting the total area with an adjacent area for the Sabanê area amounting to 8,000 ha (although I assume that all members endorsed these results, the report was only signed by one member). In

determining the appropriate size of the Latundê area, they took into account the range of land used for the cultivation of maize, manioc and peanuts and that used for the collection of fibers and fish poison, as well as the location of old villages and graveyards[lxxxi]. All three areas were now defined and the final size of the territory was fixed. This final resolution demonstrates how important initial interpretations were. Initial data gained from one reconnaissance flight and short consultations with Aikaná Indians proved to be remarkably ponderous parameters for later proposals. As the three areas are contiguous (from the west to east first the Aikaná then the Latundê and lastly the Sabanê) for the purpose of demarcation the description of the total area was concerned with the outer limits and disregarded inner limits between the three areas. There was a serious attempt to confirm the existence of the uncontacted Indians to the southeast of this indigenous area, but the search yielded no definitive results[lxxxii].

By this point, the necessary data for the official recognition of the three territories were completed and the final phases of the demarcation process could begin. During the years this process has been subjected to different bureaucratic procedures within the agency and to interventions from outside FUNAI attempting to control its crucial legal attribution. First, in September 1982, the Department of Indigenous Patrimony in charge summarized the relevant facts. It reviewed the credentials of the proposal and the previous studies discussed earlier, and then recommended that the presidency formally declare the area an *Indigenous Territory*. The FUNAI president, Paulo Moreira Leal almost immediately accepted this and took the important initial step towards the legal regularization of the area. As the area is made up of distinct parts with a large measure of contiguity, the document names all three *indigenous groups* separately but treats the area as a whole, not even mentioning once the particular sections pertaining to each different group. This, of course, makes good practical sense, just as it makes sense to designate the area for *administrative control* as *Tubarão-Latundê Indigenous Territory* and then allocate its immediately superior bureaucratic level to neighboring Vilhena. In reality, this sort of practical bureaucratic sense creates the same administrative structure to transform an administrative unit into something that can be treated for all practical purposes as a single unit. In other words, all of the recommendations about the particular attributes of the *Forest* and *Savanna Indians* and the necessity of separate approaches to the Aikaná and Latundê (not the least of which concerns the maintenance of a topological and administrative distance between them) are not

expressed in the document. Unsurprisingly, the administrative definition of *one area* naturally shall tend to foster the idea of equal treatment rather than a distinctive approach to each people. Although distinctiveness was recognized as a matter of course imposed by the many obvious differences, the advice and a more profound recognition of such differences should have led to a system of assistance including, for instance, a separate Latundê administrative unit like an *Indian Post*. At the higher bureaucratic levels the local alterities give way to the generic encompassing label *Indian*. Both sheer bureaucratic expediency and cost accounting, combined with the generalized bias and the customary stereotype of the similarities of the *Indian* militate against a differentiated treatment of a group of only a dozen people. The map accompanying the file, a significant feature to the progress of this situation, now does not show the different territories, as if this was irrelevant. The map conflates the territories, compounding the difficulty of discerning the different peoples and thus promotes the future bureaucratic mandate over *one area*.

After this, the FUNAI president, another man with a military background, formally represented the proposal to higher authorities at the Ministry of the Interior. This was a complicated task, as the Ministry advances policies consisting of economic activities that supposedly mean *progress*, and was little disposed to view the *Indians* as much more than obstacles to what until today is called *development*. The *indigenous groups* represent the very antithesis of this ideological construct in a typical Brazilian contradiction between the letter of the law and the realities of both power and in the execution of the laws[lxxxiii]. The official term *grupos indígenas* carries a political connotation. The really appropriate term *povos indígenas* would highlight the ethnic uniqueness of these peoples and would stress their status as autonomous peoples within the state which forcibly incorporates them . The higher tiers of state administration habitually invent bureaucratic proceedings at the level of legal execution to enable other state agencies (in this period predominantly the security branch dominated by the military) to exert direct influence over the final result. Needless to say, this interference always harmed and harms Indian interests. Accordingly, FUNAI president Leal sent a summary of the whole case to the Ministry. The 1977 INCRA proposal continued to be mentioned as if such facts do not imply any illegality. The 1978 FUNAI report is cited to demonstrate INCRA's obedience to laws relating to the Indians. Only later does the summary accuse INCRA of problems associated with the transference of the Aikaná in 1973 and explicitly

exposes the legal abuses committed. One of the other odd features is that in 1976 the Indians were supposed to consider this entirely unfair change as irreversible; just as the Indians were supposed to present a demand excluding the southern bank of the Pimenta River from the delimited area. Actually, there is no evidence whatsoever that either demand was subjected to thorough consultation with any Indians. The collected documents reveal that the Indian's role did not entail more than an auxiliary function. The remarks translate rather certain facilities for FUNAI to exempt itself from any sign of misdemeanor, mismanagement and incompetence that was too obvious and whenever feasible to blame the misconduct on another federal agency.

As for the Latundê area, the actual happenings also differ from my reconstruction and their history is somewhat disguised or even distorted: the Indians are painted as victims of progress before contact and, as part of a larger original group, are said to have been decimated while another part of the group is thought to be still roaming through the region; nothing is said about the lack of FUNAI assistance and the traumatic depopulation[lxxxiv]. The reports of anthropologists are resumed as to perform in the attributed role as *experts* that are capable of *identification*. They furnish the ethnic classification, cultural characterization, and territorial extension of the people and their land, so that the *technical* results authenticate the solidification and anchoring of the flux and contingency of actual history into the atemporal notion of a *justified Indigenous Territory*. This process shows the subordination of anthropological research to state objectives, being shaped and instrumentalized as a *scientific technique* that will merely reveal reality. A major problem here concerns the contradiction of thorough anthropological investigations with the normal social understanding of reality as substantialized and essentialist[lxxxv]. The various flaws, both from an extraneous academic point of view and an interior evaluation that the detailed investigation of the anthropological reports demonstrate and the sociocultural construction of peoples and areas they manifestly imply, are absent from Leal's text. The summary must obey the rhetorical imposition of appearing to result from a technique that, if not impeccable, at least conforms to the *canons of science*. This is the face to be presented in such circumstances where the summation enters an arena of dispute where different interests of different federal agencies and diversified segments of the Brazilian population are represented and where, consequently, interests clash: a technically competent agency that produces a legitimate demand in conformation of the law and the *objectivity* of science. The

bureaucratic constraints exerted upon the anthropological research, in particular the extreme limits on fieldwork, vanish at this point; only the supposed efficiency brought to the task is foregrounded. It is definitely no accident that the summary of previous reports is done by a bureaucrat in Brasília, someone of unknown credentials, but who certainly is not an anthropologist. In a real sense, both as a an *Indian people* and as legitimate occupant of an *Indian area*, the *Latundê*, their name, their land and their fate, are the very product of state intervention in a contingent conjuncture of a much more encompassing structural process. To each his own tradition of inventiveness (Sahlins 1999).

As the total area must be justified by the presence of several groups, Leal duly took note of the Aikaná, Latundê, and Sabanê in some of his correspondences (to the head of INCRA, for example). Also, judging from some remarks made in detached paperwork, it became clear around this time that FUNAI acted to prevent the construction of a regional state road projected to cross the interdicted area (apparently halting the construction of the road). Thus, after the federal government initiated the bureaucratic measures in view of the implementation of land rights some other actions to preserve the integrity of the area occurred too. In one instance FUNAI negated the plea for the issuing of a so-called *negative certificate*[lxxxvi] to the *owner* of a parcel (i.e. a document necessary for validating formal legal *possession* and hence a possible source of corruption; see Part III). On the other hand, larger interests receive much less opposition. In the copy of a dispatch dated the same month as the certificate request, the intention of flooding a sizeable portion of the *Latundê Area* to benefit the construction of a dam provokes hardly any reaction. Only concerns about an compensation for the loss and guarantees of no other land use within the limits of the area are mentioned – affecting *4,000* of *55,000 hectares* (as usual, this figure does not coincide with any previous numbers. In this case, FUNAI represented the Latundê interests. The agency, however, was not going to oppose the building of the dam designed to generate electricity for the region. The only concern related to limiting the degree of damage. Such a dam and the resulting reservoir inevitably cause much more damage then just the loss of the land to be flooded[lxxxvii]. The *protection* of the Latundê of the inevitable nefarious side effects should warrant some attention, especially in terms of disease control and prevention. More generally, the very logic imposed by the agency and by other state influences supposedly confines the Indians within a territory that is not only theirs, but one that is also considered essential and vital to their socioeconomic

and cultural reproduction. Therefore, *the tutelary power* of the state exercised by FUNAI is obviously a question of conquest and the *granting of rights* constitutes in this view a kind of concession by the state. The cession of land, by this example, should not obstruct any usage not directly and totally related to the people for whom the land is reserved whenever it is in the *indispensable* interest of the national society. Especially when the people whose rights are directly affected are not consulted and, therefore, are not actually totally *protected*. The principle and ideology of conquest consisting, among other ideas, of the belief that the Indians should not block progress is particularly apparent in this case[lxxxviii].

It is hence no coincidence that the case for demarcation of the total area continues for a considerable time in the proper bureaucratic channels in Brasília. The size of the land reserved for the Aikaná is disputed. Another field investigation established that the Indians effectively occupied the contested area, essential for the rubber collecting that sustained the Aikaná and their socioeconomic organization as a *rubber enterprise* headed by a *patron* (in this case *the captain of the tribe*) (report dated April 2, 1984)[lxxxvii]. The necessary visit *in loco* prevented the exclusion of the northern part of the Tubarão area from the proposal of demarcation. It will hardly be a surprise that the dispute originated from the INCRA representative in the decision making council (the superior bureaucracy channel that was needed at the time to end the demarcation process). This particular form of interference and tentative control started from a 1983 decree and the council that finally decided about the demarcation was popularly known as *grupão*, literally *large group*. The quarrel was based on an INCRA study sustaining the argument that this part of the territory had no *village* nor served as an area of any *regular visiting*. The document concludes the size of land to be excluded is 20,000 ha.: [INCRA] "*sought to reclaim the best portion of the reserve for distribution to ranchers*" (Carlson 1985: 3). Possibly annoyed by interagency competition and the repeated interference with the competence of FUNAI (both the pertinence of the rationale of the proposal and the impertinence of a study purporting to report on Indian land and settlement), FUNAI president Leal reacted and allowed no final decision until after the inspection by a *competent commission* by his own institution. The INCRA study ended up discredited and the Territory continued on its administrative course, the paperwork in question now was accompanied by exemplary models of the further dispatches required of the ministers and of the official presidential decree to be

issued. This typically meandering paper route has always impeded the quick demarcation of Indian lands. In this case, however, the reserved land is noted in the ministerial dispatch models for being situated in the area of influence of the Polonoroeste Program (the important large scale official *regional development* program that affected the entire Nambikwara region). Hence the means are available to reimburse the indemnities of non-Indians, the so-called *owners* must receive compensation for their *losses* and these costs usually impeded their quick removal. This is also a reminder of the presence of international monitoring in the region and of international attention to the *indigenous question*. This circumstance entailed first of all removal of the customary bottleneck, the lack of funds to pay for the intruder's material *possessions*. The second factor provides an inducement for correct behavior that complies with legal standards. It seems that international pressure from a financing institution (even some possible censure from the World Bank) formed some incentive for the application of the law.

International finance probably explains the presence of an economic study by an institute of São Paulo, FIPE – Fundação Instituto de Pesquisas Econômicas (dated June-December 1983; November 1983 report by Lima), a research also requested by a government agency charged with the *development* of central Brazil (SUDECO)[lxxxx]. One observation in this document refers to the judicial actions taken by FUNAI. Apparently these gained some notoriety in the press, some may have lost momentum, but the definition of the area in 1982 seems to have resolved a litigation in which the FUNAI lost the appeal against an originally favorable sentence. Losing a legal battle, as far as can be reconstructed here, did not damage the Indian's interests. Another observation concerns the process of evaluation of indemnities of *owners*, being in full swing in October 1983. The long and winding administrative road to demarcation entails slowly negotiating the obstacles of a many administrative hurdles. One of the most challenging of these barriers was compensation evaluation and payment of intruders of *good faith* (those supposedly unaware of any legal restriction, many times this is purely a fiction that goes unquestioned because of the interests involved and the large sociopolitical tension engendered by a group of self conceived *owners* forced to leave *their lands*). The author, Lima, strongly recommended accelerating the process, especially because of the dangers related to the increased immigration facilitated by the paving of the BR 364 highway. In fact, the very context of the notorious *development project* of which the road construction forms a part, and

which also includes financing consultant studies (*Polonoroeste*), stimulated resolution of land conflicts by the state. The international context, as cited in the justification of the Latundê area, provides a stimulus to guarantee Indian rights. In conclusion, the state's executive branches initiated far too late the process of attempting to exert control. The diverse interventions of different state agencies (particularly INCRA) generated many social conflicts in their partially or totally contradictory operations within a complex social reality. These represent the same conflicts that these agencies or, more generally, the state is called to mediate afterwards. Such conflicts continued to be produced by these agencies continued as long as the involved agencies still adopted and pursued their partially disharmonic agendas.

As for any useful additional information on the Latundê, the *study* adduces little new knowledge[lxxxxi]. One passing observation suggests that the Tarundê of Lévi-Strauss are the contemporary Latundê, an observation no doubt inspired by the phonetic resemblance. Perhaps, this interesting possibility arises from a report compiled by Lima based on FUNAI documents. As the ethnonym probably came out of the *Nambiquara Project*, he may be echoing a document unavailable to me. If not, the resemblance certainly points in the direction of a name conferred by some other Northern Nambikwara Indian individual or group. By this time the population number of the people stays the same, preserving the precarious recuperation. The infrastructure built in Vilhena was finally starting to function, particularly the health care (there are finally no deaths in 1983 and a health attendant is present in the area). There are no remarks regarding the exploitative nature of the rubber collecting system. The most relevant information consists of the firm indices of the decline of rubber, causing Fonseca's dismissal and withdrawal from the area. Most blame was ascribed to Fonseca. After FUNAI's inability to evict him, his withdrawal resulted from the *deterioration* of the rubber extraction regime. Two factors impacted the economic forecast. Firstly, there was a gradual decline partially motivated by the larger economic conditions of recession and inflation. Secondly, there were worsened terms of exchange between collected natural materials and industrial commodities (in this case the value of rubber steadily dropped while the price of commodities brought in rose). It is not surprising that Lima noticed that these general circumstances meant for FUNAI the *proper space to act in the area*, where the Aikaná were known for their *reserve, independence and distance*. A translation of these euphemistic statements reveals that the group (or more precisely the power

concentrated in the Indian patronage system) rejected a more forceful interference of the tutory power. After the economic crisis, however, both the prestige and power basis of the leading administrators fell quickly, opening up the social space to exercise an economic power (available because of the additional financial resources of the Polonoroeste Project) that converts into political power.

Contrary to what the text asserts, FUNAI's *non-interference* did not simply imply *respect*; rather it connoted FUNAI's lack of control of the more autonomous Indians. State power now effectively installed itself in the Indigenous Territory, as evidenced by the existence of the Indian Post. Its means and resources however meager (except in a temporary situation as the Polonoroeste) were important due to the waning of rubber gathering and the corollary dependence generated on outside means. In a way similar to the exploitative rubber collection regime's monopolizing market access (and the very trees being *owned* by the two *leaders*), the management of the economic flux through this channel signifies the creation of the basis of power manipulation. Resources, as is evident, were almost completely channeled through the Polonoroeste Program, which, in this sense, effectively supported one of its customarily unstated goals: the implementation of state presence in an area very weakly controlled by FUNAI before. Control and development were actually in an intimate binomial relation. As such, Lima judged the opportunity for FUNAI not to be passed over, to be able to withstand the prior competition offered by the power of one of the *leaders* (predicated as *personalist* and *authoritarian*, offending the modernist ethos and Lima's belief in the future). The same modernist faith implicitly views the *improvements* in the rubber collecting systems operated by Fonseca in a quite favorable light. In comparison to what seems to be thought of as a pre-modern patron, the measures combine with the modernist value of rationalization of production. The prior system *remunerated* the leaders (who never did any collecting themselves) and the supervisor (the *manager João Fonseca*). Clearly, the author's economic bias towards efficiency and commodity production for the market shaped his description by the use of an economic idiom to analyze the situation that implies a lack of attention paid to the patron-client relationship as a broad sociocultural mode of paternalistic domination. The concomitant economic exploitation of the rubber tappers also remained in the shadows, except when referring to Fonseca as a mixture of an *adventurer*, *civilizing agent* and *Indian exploiter*. Lima also noted the rumor that Fonseca left the area a poor man. His writing reveals a

mixture of feelings for the manager, whose role also derived from the leeway originally allowed by his FUNAI superiors, and whose *civilizing project* was known and very well portrayed by Price. His positive side stems from the shared ethnocentrism of normal common sense. Shared, of course, by agents of the same sociocultural extraction and, similarly, by almost all FUNAI bureaucrats[xcii].

FUNAI took several actions. It acquired a number of goods and the use of a car for rubber transport. After effectively breaking the monopoly of the two *leaders*, they were rather forced to consent to a new relationship with FUNAI. Understandably curious of what the future will bring with respect to this economic role, Lima wondered about a return to former *relations of production* (although the trick really lies in the relation to the market and less in the production itself) and to a *dependency on the policy of government handouts* (implicitly recognizing its political dimension)[xciii]. For the Latundê, this meant separating from the Aikaná system and an increased difficulty in participating in the new system because of their distance from the other village. This difficulty is compounded since FUNAI *negotiated* a new location for its Post, utilizing an abandoned farm house and building its own warehouse right at the entrance of the area. This location is near the two Aikaná villages and close to the road to Vilhena and the village of Chupinguaia (slowly becoming a small town). Although this move had a some logical basis, the Latundê already had to walk some three hours to receive medical attention when the Post was nearer (and already closer to the Aikaná). The method to *obtain the agreement* of the two leaders, as always, attaches the representation of the entire group onto these two people who, according to the same observer, are losing their capacity for effective leadership with the loss of the rubber regime. If taken at face value, then no other Aikaná participated in the decision, nor was there any Latundê representation at the meeting. Politically speaking, the Latundê did not exist. For the leaders and the Aikaná, the acceptance of a Post and its infrastructure nearby naturally entails a large advantage, as the former location demanded bridging a considerable distance (over two hours of walking). Thus, the relocation attended to the interests of FUNAI, its local agents and the Aikaná.

Once again, FUNAI focused almost entirely on the Aikaná situation and essentially ignored the Latundê. This people also received little attention in Lima's assessment study, as if *nomadic* and *hunter-gatherer* attributes make any special consideration unnecessary. Lima judged that the group must be kept in

"(...) *semi-isolation until the community, recuperating its numbers, and has an interest in participating autonomously in the Aikaná-FUNAI system.*" Keeping the people in splendid isolation was good but insufficient advice. This is obvious in his own testimony of the involvement of the Latundê leader in the rubber-collecting regime and the perceived necessity of certain industrial items. This was further strengthened because of the premise that the Latundê will be integrated into the system, for in these circumstances the very presence of FUNAI at the Aikaná automatically warrants the expectation of some form of continued exploitation. Other sound advice recommended that the issue of health care receive attention, and specifically an increase in health attendant and medical team visits. There was also the first mention of the very necessary reminder of dental care in this type of report. The bureaucratic complications and difficulty of access most likely would result in an irregular and sparse visiting pattern; and emergency cases would entail an even greater effort than before. Despite these remarks, the Latundê receive no real special consideration. The Latundê persisted in being some kind of appendage of the Aikaná as the bureaucratic logic of *one area* affected actual practice. The entirety of the Tubarão-Latundê Territory was conveniently integrated and subordinated to the state bureaucracy. The Latundê's place in this scheme was subsidiary within this larger whole: a subordinate sociopolitical place within a sociopolitically and economically subordinate area. After defining the respective territories as *Indian Territories*, the factual blending into *one area* and the redefinition of economic relations permits the reconfiguration of power relations into the domination of the most prominent and largest group, the Aikaná. This aim took precedence over a policy towards the Latundê. Owing to their relative isolation and marginality, they were viewed as an insignificant population. Order first must be established among the more resistant population, one with an alternative competing power system relating to outer society, consequently demanding priority in attention and allocation of funds.

Furthermore, notwithstanding a few exceptions of a critical stance, the acceptance in this report of FUNAI practice, planning, and spending, can be understood as an approval of the general outlines that orient these actions, essentially serving as a scientific justification of a supposedly rational policy[xciv]. Thus it leaves the implicit replication of the evolutionary postulate in the two-phase subordination unquestioned (i.e. the belief that some Indians have advanced less on the evolutionary road to civilization), especially when paired with the *primitiveness* of the Latundê as justification of *isolation*. Apart from the

contradiction with the supposed necessity already created by a flow of commodities, isolation with only medical assistance may be read by administrators as a *population* which does not require any specific concerns and policy. Previous recommendations by anthropologists did not carry much weight in the bureaucratic report processing. These were apparently biased when invoked for administrative logic. The practical reason of bureaucratic rationality now dictated the flow of events. By this point, the dossier contains a small flurry of telegrams. The earliest was from 1984 and dealt with practical information regarding non-Indians residing within the limits of the Indigenous Territory[xcv]. The dossier also holds documents soliciting information on demarcation and ratification of the area in 1989 in order to substantiate legal action to remove noncompliant plot *owners*. At this time the area had been officially recognized, demarcated and ratified, by this time only the last formal step was required. This was dealt with in a separate dossier (3419/89). Little other information was given in these papers, except an occasional illustration of the importance of the impression implied in the name given to an Indigenous Territory. In 1989 a head of the land division sent the paperwork under the title "*Tubarão Latundê Tribe*" (no one mentioned before and probably unfamiliar with the whole process).

The final pages in the dossier mainly repeated former reports. Also included was extensive material detailing evaluation of the infrastructure constructed within the *Terra Indígena*, determining how much was to be reimbursed to the *owners* who can claim *good faith* at the date of implementation[xcvi]. One dispatch concerns the denial of a road through the Territory, even when the Aikaná *chief* was in favor. The road was to be built by the municipality of Vilhena and would extend to Chupinguaia. FUNAI was being rightly mindful of any such large penetration of 22 kilometers at a time when the energy company contemplated the electricity dam. Other documents include a copy of a 17 July 1983 article in a national newspaper, the *Folha de São Paulo*. The article voiced the complaints of the *fazendeiros* (large landowners) who protest against the abnormality of being processed by one federal agency for possessing land distributed by another federal institution. The journalist unashamedly employs the usual stereotypes about *development* and *so much land for so few Indians*. He even lists other obstacles to *development* like the absurdity of the government of turning a prosperous land into an Indigenous Territory. The fazendeiros accused INCRA of negating the existence of a judicial process and thought no more about. Now they discovered the truth. That is, they claimed that the *intelligent chief* (an

entrepreneur of Indian labor) imported Indians from Mato Grosso and then pleaded with FUNAI to allocate more land, specifically the land the landowners legitimately bought[xcvii]. The accusations apparently prompted FUNAI to respond. The response probably invoked the media which it used to present its side of the truth. Somehow this response seems to have sped up demarcation along with compensation and relocation procedures, in order to avoid the uncertain outcome of the court case (a fear expressed by a FUNAI lawyer)[xcviii].

In 1986, the decision-making council (the *grupão*) finally decided favorably in a short memorandum in which tribute was given to Rondon's presence in the area. This act paved the way for the bureaucratic conclusion of the demarcation process. The dossier also incorporates details of the ratification process mentioned and copies of other documents. The final paper, however, is interesting and clinches the matter. In December 1991 the *Tubarão/Latundê Indigenous Territory* was registered in the appropriate office of land registration, shortly after its official creation by a decree of the president of the republic. This final act closes the long trail of papers needed to, one might say, verily and orderly regularize a portion of the *national territory* as an *Indigenous Area* and guarantee its exclusive use by its *Indian* inhabitants. *Indians* of a specific named *indigenous group* now are reduced from an autonomous and independent people into a named *Indian group* subordinated and incorporated into the state and subject to the agencies to which the state delegates its powers. Thus, the insertion and encompassing subjugation transforms a previously unknown people into a new known categorical unit. Sociocultural inventiveness created a new people circumscribed in its *name*, *land* and *rights*. To each people, as mentioned above, its own creativeness. The colonial conquest was now complete.

Notes

[i]I take the opportunity to thank the institution for access to the archive.

[ii] In interest of concision, note that italicized words imply the specific meanings of native terms (of oral discourse or quotes from documents).

[iii] In Brazil, the elite and its *development agencies* (like the World Bank of this era), could easily be described as *development* cultists. In general, among all classes in Brazil the word *development* conveyed a great potential in what, up until recently, was always optimistically considered as a *country of the future*. Accordingly, some sacrifices were necessary, and the Indians seemed an acceptable loss. For example, the term *quistos étnicos* (*ethnic pockets*, an

expression with very negative connotations) is still used at the national military academy (a fact surfacing only recently). Though there have been changes after the so-called *democratisation*, much ideological and practical notions are still accepted. The scandalous treatment of the Indians in Porto Seguro in April 2000 at the *commemoration* of the inappropriately named event, *500 Years Since the Discovery of Brazil* by the neo-liberal government of Cardoso, an ex-sociologist, is not the exception, but the rule. For example, funds allocated for the demarcation of Amazonian Indian Lands in 2000 were less than the money spent by the army to suppress the protests against the commemoration (Araujo passim Baines 2001: 37). Contrary to what the uninformed observer might think, this government did not make the same unconditional pledges as are found in the law. The ex-minister of Justice, Nelson Jobim, who used to be known as a champion for human rights, was responsible for a legal interpretation that tended to subvert Indian territorial claims.

[iv] For the institutional history of the SPI and the importance of these positivistic and humanistic ideas, see Lima (1995).

[v] The policies also depend upon the particular phase of the eventful political and institutional history of the agencies themselves.

[vi] This pioneering spirit is especially strong in Rondônia where the vast majority of the population in certain regions, like Vilhena and the southern part of Rondônia, where the Latundê are located, consists of immigrants from almost all of Brazil, though mainly from the South. Note that this part of the population is largely descendant from earlier European migration (the Germans are conspicuously present) and were originally completely unaware of tropical ecology and local living conditions.

[vii] This is the image circulated after *Tristes Tropiques*, even though Lévi-Strauss definitely is more subtle. He wrote about them as being part of a "*society reduced to its most simple expression*" (1984: 377). Doubtlessly Levi-Strauss appreciated the humanity of the people involved and noted, for example, "*the most moving and true expression of human tenderness*" between married couples (ib: 345-6). That is, *a society of human beings* with their own individualities.

[viii] Almeida and Oliveira (1998) came to very similar conclusions in their work (1984-5). They adopted a more polemic style to engender discussion and purposefully did not explore thoroughly any specific case. Not all points of their discussions can be examined here, but in general, our conclusions tend to coincide.

[ix] The land terminology has changed over time; at one time such land was

referred to as an *Indigenous Reserve*, later an *Indigenous Area*. Currently *Terra Indígena* (Indigenous Land) is used. It should be Indigenous Territory in order to convey the more encompassing and symbolic relation of a people to its land and I will use this designation.

[x] Many names have been changed to insure the privacy of those involved.

[xi] I translated all the notes, memos, and quotes used in this work. Incomplete sentences and spelling errors here reflect my attempt to convey the original flavor as much as possible although corrections have been made.

[xii] See Dal Poz (1998) for this history of how this people sought an alliance on their own terms.

[xiii] Interestingly, both these employees are substituting for the official occupant of the important local bureaucratic employee in their respective districts. Substitutes sometimes perform important roles for considerable periods in this kind of bureaucracy where bureaucrats may live in conditions not considered civilized and far away from the conveniences of urban facilities.

[xiv] This *service order* was dated the same day as the agent set out on his trip. This is usual in this sort of outpost. Paperwork is adapted to the rhythm of daily work, not the other way around.

[xv] The writer frequently mixed up plural subjects and verbs in the singular tense. This is a common feature of lower class sociolect and thus indicative of the level of preparation and education of this employee who is on a particularly important mission.

[xvi] For references regarding the Cinta Larga, see Dal Poz 1998: 169; for the Paresi see Price's 1981a article. This issue is dealt with in detail in Parts II and III.

[xvii] Dal Poz 1998: 188. This was, in fact, the first real test because some of the Paresi already were in contact and, in general, not very *wild*. Rondon, his actions and their consequences are analyzed in Part II.

[xviii] The accuracy of these numbers is uncertain. Population estimates and familiarity with such high numbers is not part of the Indian's culture. Although already familiar with the mathematics of rubber exploitation, at this stage it is uncertain if the Indians had these counting skills. Their apparent *partly civilized* state may have persuaded the author to accept these numbers. On the other hand, they compare well with the Latundê population reported later.

[xix] Not surprisingly, this type of planning caused many problems for the owners using the land. The realities of lowlands, hillsides, swamps, rivers, small streams, and the like impeded easy agricultural use. This occurred, for example, at the

notorious Transamazônica Road which was planned to settle peasants from the Northeast, one of the other Amazonian regions that suffered under state colonization in the early seventies. Only after these difficulties appeared were attempts made to remedy this situation and to plan the division of the land according to geographic features. Even an exemplar for family farm exploitation, like Altamira I, one of the first projects in these times, was launched without adequate prior knowledge of the region and even still issued directives to the settlers as the settlement was already underway (Hamelin 1991).

[xx] A 400m x 2.5 km rectangle (Hamelin 1991: 167).

[xxi] An alqueire is a unit of measurement that varies regionally in Brazil. The measurement that applies in the Guaporé Valley is around 2.4 ha (Price, 1989b: 110). Documents show that the salary given was 60,000 cruzeiros. Although it is difficult to say now if this was a fair salary without a complicated way to calculate current value, the likely difficulty of sufficient labour force in the region may have guaranteed a reasonable payment. No comment is made in the document.

[xxii]Also, even those later implicated in the process of demarcating land for the Indians probably saw the Indian presence as a potential asset because these owners, backed by INCRA, may not have envisioned and anticipated any possibility of the Indians garnering political support to stay. The usual expectation, by the way, of the powerful in this sort of situation.

[xxiii] See Fearnside (1991) for these considerations and explanations concerning the reasons cattle raising, despite serious ecological and economic drawbacks, remains a major factor in deforestation.

[xxiv] See Miranda (1991), for a study concerning the creation of family agriculture colonization projects.

[xxv] Interestingly, a Brazilian wearing blue jeans is not an *American* but an Indian wearing clothing forced on him after contact is less of an *Indian* (for further elaboration, see Reesink 1983).

[xxvi] The front presented by subordinates to their ethnic superiors, as the Indians to the powerful landowners, can be carefully crafted to protect against retaliation by acting stereotypically stupid or simple.

[xxvii] For a short history of Rondônia and the role played by the federal government and INCRA in particular, see Becker (1990). Note that from 1970 up to 1974-5, when the colonization projects contemplated family agriculture, these were implemented north of the area of *Corumbiara* (distributed in 100 ha parcels). In this sense, this *Gleba* prefigures the later preference for capitalist agrarian enterprise and much larger land holdings. *Doctor Marcelo* represents a

clear paradigm of the contemporary major landowners in the region, being from the south, of a higher class, not residing on the property and raising cattle. Observe that the map (o.c.: 151) erroneously shows the contours of the Tubarão/Latundê Indian land as "traditional occupation" and not as subject to state directed land distribution (except further south outside of the 1975 INCRA map), as if wholly unaffected by the interference of this enormous project. On the other hand, the author notes in passing (o.c.: 159) the process of land distribution in parcels of the projects' size to private enterprise, apparently by public auctioning, in 1972 and 1975, just as in the project in question (o.c.: 151). Moreover, the administrator ends his letter by stating that several plots in the 'fertile subdivision' have already been paid for.

[xxviii] Someone from the town of Pimenta Bueno went to prospect for gold on the upper part of the river and visited the village of Tubarão. It is clear that he dominated the other villages by force. The Aikaná were very likely among the latter and became known by the stranger's name. Maybe the people mentioned as living in two small groups on both sides of the river in 1964 are the Aikaná: forty people in a seringal; one independent village (Spadari 1964).

[xxix] FUNAI and INCRA did consult one another for many years. Research on the period between 1982 and 1985 shows how FUNAI always responded late and that INCRA practically ignored procedure. Real cooperation did not exist even then. INCRA tended to *identify* unclaimed land as public federal lands, i.e. a stock of lands at their disposal and the foundation of their power (Linhares 1998). Later, some of the specific details of the problems caused by INCRA intervention with the Corumbiara Project are explored.

[xxx] Perambulation signifies an area that is traversed and inspected for resources but is not used to build a village.

[xxxi] My translation: Leonel 1991: 327.

[xxxii] Note that the heinous act of temporarily lifting the ban of one of the areas and allowing the landowners to return *legally* was taken by a civilian and not a military representative. Romero Jucá, who later started a political career in one of the most anti-indigenous states in Brazil, Roraima. Obviously, such former actions earned him certain political support. Rumors of corruption in acts such as lifting FUNAI's prohibition of access to specific areas circulate in the region. This particular act seems quite equivocal, suspiciously so, but any claim in a case like this is very hard to substantiate.

[xxxiv] Ferrari 17/12/1976, *Relatório de viagem à Pimenta Bueno* (proc. 3503/76, pp.34-82).

[xxxv] INCRA employees demanded instant consultation and expedience from the FUNAI employee, probably because of the usual difficulty to get a response. It is no surprise that an evaluation of the joint commission and the Work Groups on both sides concluded its failure to resolve the conflicts created by the projects of INCRA that were elaborated in complete disregard of indigenous areas in all of Amazonia (Almeida 1991: 266).

[xxxvi]FUNAI generally adapted to the reality of power relations in the state sponsored conquest of Amazonia and many cases during this decade prove "(…) *the subordination of agencies responsible for the preservation of the human and natural environments to other agencies charged with the promotion of rapid industrialization and capitalist expansion* (Bunker 1984: 116-7; for a general overview of FUNAI's obliging of superior agencies, see pp.117-122).

[xxxvi] The proposal comes from a medical doctor attending the Indians and is said to have the support of the Indians. An eye-witness account of part of the terrible misfortunes of the mismanagement and sufferings of the Indian peoples in the Aripuanã Park can be found in Chiappino (1975).

[xxxvii] H. van der Voort's thesis examines the Kwazá language. He described the term as derived from the name with an Aikaná suffix (2000: 518). Some ethnographic information is given in the thesis and continued separately in the encyclopedia of the Instituto Socioambiental (Van der Voort 1998).

[xxxviii] Indians provide information that makes clear that the rubber boss who *helped* resettle them did so because his *property* at the Pimenta River was to be transformed into large landholdings with pastures, and thus incompatible with the Indian presence. Thus, actually, he sold Indian land.

[xxxix] The daughter of Afonso França, an SPI employee introduced in Part II.

[xl] These people were victims of a tragic history. The men of their autonomous village of about fifty people on the Omerê one day found another Indian village and set out to procure wives. They never returned. The women left the village and tried in vain to find the men. Many got lost. Or, in a later version, they found the men dead and decided to commit suicide. At the last moment one older woman vomited and convinced her sister and their children to stay alive. The sister went mad and disappeared. Eventually five people were contacted in 1995. In 2000 only four people were alive (Algayer 2001, personal communication). In 2003 another two people died and only a sister and a brother remained behind, deeply depressed (Bacelar 2004: 41-2).

[xli] This is odd because of the subsequent history of the Omerê where in the mid-1980s, a Tupian village was razed and the inhabitants massacred (now

Akunsun). Plainly this entailed an attempt at complete genocide. The *landowners* perfidiously negated any Indian presence and only with great difficulties did FUNAI eventually act (Algayer 2001, personal communication; the case of the lone survivor seems to be the massacre reported in van der Voort (1996: 383) as perpetrated by H. Dalafini of the Modelo ranch in January 1996). Naturally, it does not yet imply that this man was really involved in any deliberate concealment of further Indian presence in his Project. After all, the same employee claimed to have alerted FUNAI and readily admitted to the existence of the other two groups.

[xli] That they took the initiative and left an indeterminate amount of gifts at their own costs does not contradict what was said before about making contact but can be considered as the introduction of the reciprocity necessary for a minimal alliance. The observation that they did not enter into contact again contradicts the mention of the visits of the Latundê to the Tubarão (perhaps the same one who intervened before?). The explanation for the contradiction varies. The Indians simply may not have mentioned it.

[xlii] It is not well known that certain groups of the Nambikwara did, in fact, produce ceramics. Comparatively, poisoning is a notorious Nambikwara ability. Accordingly, it is easy to see why the visitors were not keen on continuing their visits in the savanna.

[xliv] "*Benefactions*" is the literal translation of the Portuguese word and is iconic of the underlying paradigm that untouched nature is useless, wild and brutal. Nature awaits man to charitably domesticate it. Ecologists note that pastures are classified as an *improvement* to nature, while ultimately it may be destructive, unproductive and not *sustainable development* (Fearnside 1991).

[xlv] Some of this is discernable in the structure of the report, resuming the most relevant information for action and final recommendations in the first part of six pages. Afterwards comes the history and cultural traits of the Forest Indians, and after that the collected information on the same topics for the unknown group. Then, of course, the annexes, some of which were already mentioned. This is a strategy of the author to facilitate bureaucratic attention.

[xlvi] *Muita terra para pouco índio*. Even now, this is a widely circulated proposition by anti-indigenous interests, sometimes to deliberately confuse the public. The obvious trick is to reduce the ethnic specificity of an Indian *territory* to the relation of a rural landowner to his particular piece of land within the Brazilian territory, a kind of *fazenda* or smallholding. In other words, the Indian as the poor peasant he is supposed to become. A self-fulfilling prophecy if such

image guides the official policies and not some kind of *natural law* of evolution.
[xlvii] Personal communication by Jurandir Leite (2000).
[xlviii] For example, in the archives with information about personnel, there is mention of the problem of a man whose title was *rural auxiliary.* He worked with the *Tubarão* but was transferred away. This is the first time his name, João Fonseca, appears. His role is important, as will be discussed shortly.
[xlix] Note that this time the principal executive of the regional branch changed again. Such employees often change, usually coinciding with the changing of the FUNAI president, depending on the external and internal political situation (as well as administrators of the *Indian Posts* in the territories themselves). In this case, this particular agent, who pursued a full time professional career within FUNAI, would one day become its president.
[l] This village very probably is the same as seen and photographed from the air before, though the photographs do not permit a definite conclusion. There are six other photographs before these two, all in color and probably taken with a different camera, an indication that they were taken by different people, but most likely obtained from Fonseca.
[lx] One woman wears a dress but the other few people visible wear only the usual ornaments on the upper arm, collars and one older woman wears a sort of collar around her waist. On the face of one adult man, though unclear in these black and White photographs, one does not note any traces of the habitual Nambikwara pierced nose or lip ornaments. The same man had a *civilized* haircut. Previous photos showed all men with shoulder-length hair, probably the pre-contact style.
[lii] For an account of the influence of the military and their alliance with mining interests in the sensitive Yanomami area, see Albert 1990. Albert shows that the disreputable influence was still prevalent even after the formal *democratization* of the country and until today. Note also that Ismarth was no longer the FUNAI president, the position was held by yet another military man, Nobre da Veiga.
[liii] Definite proof of not having read the existing report comes from his short observation, which he apparently believed novel, that there existed *another Indian group* in the region known as the *Tubarões*.
[liv] This reserve usually is called *Aroeira*, the name of its major village but officially goes by the name of Pyreneus de Souza (situated near Vilhena but on the Mato Grosso side of the border). Tolori is the name of a river and a region within this area, not the name of the *reserve*. Another odd feature is the classification of the visiting Indian as *Tatayé*, as no such name is in use. It is likely a

transformation of the word *Tawandê*, a Northern Nambikwara group with a closely related language.

[lv] The body was found some twenty kilometers north of the Latundê village. Many of these incidents are examined more closely in the following chapter.

[livi] Codemat is one of those *developing agencies* that opened up entire *new* regions for colonization, usually with very little regard for the previous existing occupants.

[lvii] Price conceived the Nambikwara Project in the mid-seventies to cushion the impact of the brutal advance of the frontier. This took place during an interval when the FUNAI administration admitted the relevance of anthropology and employed anthropologists to implement certain programs on a more solid and less prejudiced basis (Agostinho 1991). By virtue of the inherent contradictions with former practice, other conceptions, and political realities within FUNAI, it is no surprise that these experiences did not last. Thus, Tolksdorf's note of the *problems* faced at the end of 1977.

[lviii] There is one more rapid visit of another FUNAI anthropologist named Lange in 1979, but her report is in another file that is not included in this one. I do not have a copy.

[lix] The work on the Aikaná is competent and very interesting, worthy of publication especially as this group is practically ignored in the ethnographic literature.

[lx] According to dispatch by regional administrator dated September 4, 1979 João Fonseca was "*dispensed*" by *portaria no.* 560/P at 27.08.79. At the same time, he suggests the allocation of a certain employee to the area as his local replacement.

[lxi] The concept of agency sometimes remains ill defined; here I adopt the simple 'bare bones' definition provisionally proposed by Ahearn (2001: 112): "*Agency refers to the socioculturally mediated capacity to act*".

[lxii] It is unclear why the first proposal could be rejected except, perhaps, owing to the belief that two dissimilar populations ought to be treated separately. In hindsight, it would have been best to recognize the necessity of establishing a separate relation with the Latundê and refer only to the second proposal.

[lxiii] This block, the southwestern part of the southern margin of the river, includes the upper part of the Omerê River and thus possibly may include these previously *isolated* Indians. Another *liberated* part is located at the opposite point, a block of plots in the northeastern corner, north of the location of the Latundê, an area actually not occupied by them, although this is not mentioned and

probably unknown. The principal motive for this proposal refers to the fact that these plots included a part of the BR 363 highway and the previous occupation alongside it.

[lxiv] Price mentions the delicate labor of the transference of different Northern Nambikwara groups into the *Reserve* (from Rondônia to what is now Aroeira). That is, from the area north of the Latundê and more or less within (or very close to) the corner slated for liberation. All Indians moved, except the Indian Mussolini and his wife (more on them in Part II) who stayed at the *Seringal do Faustino* (by the margin of the national highway). No other Nambikwara member remained in Rondônia. The precedent probably fuelled Galvão's insistence not to remove the Latundê.

[lxv] Which he did by comparing a list of words to the Mamaindê language in an attachment to the report; the other employee was *chief* of the Mamaindê Post.

[lxvi] See Price (1972), his PhD thesis, where he considers how the Nambikwara recognize the family resemblance of the many different groups by the pierced nose and lip ornament.

[lxvii] In the next chapter, I examine Fonseca's version.

[lxviii] The participants of the expedition thought the fact of such rapid transmission was odd. They apparently were unaware of previous rapid contacts with representatives of the regional society or the Aikaná. It is unclear if any preventative measures were taken to avoid the spread of contagious diseases during the *first contact*. Nothing is mentioned and given the account it seems unlikely.

[lxix] This is a double bind involved with being the *savage*, and an unworthy *Indian*, and also with the *unwild, domesticated Indian* (or *caboclo*) forced not to be not *wild* but then not truly an *Indian* (especially legally). Even when no longer *wild*, the *former* or partial Indian is never considered a full member of society and discrimination persists (see Reesink 1983 for the extreme case of Northeast Brazil).

[lxx] It is unclear why he alleges to have advised to allocate the Latundê to Rondônia when all logic points to the continued inclusion in the *Nambiquara Project*, even going so far as to complain that they extended assistance to these Indians. This seems like a covert ploy to cover the tracks of the events of 1977. Obviously, this reaches the limits of what can be reconstructed in this complicated process.

[lxxi] In June, 1981 another participant of the group accidentally came across the coordinator of the *Nambiquara Project* who reminded him of the uncontacted

Indians so he, in his turn, reminded a Department in Brasília of this fact. Once again, this relevant information was not dealt with and failed to prompt expedient action.

[lxxii] This is one of the symbolic reasons why the autonomy of independent Indians is so much denigrated and feared by bureaucratic institutions like the military, nobody should live an existence free from the aegis of the all-encompassing state, the idea is intolerable, especially within its *own frontiers*.

[lxxiii] It remains unclear if any later precaution was taken. The presence of two Indians in Cacoal means that some assistance finally did reach the Latundê by this time.

[lxxiv] The Latundê, for example, did not live near the Pimenta River, but the interpretation is understandable because the author probably listened to a story by the Portuguese speaker about other Nambikwara groups in this region. The corrections on this *Nambikwara model* by Aspelin, then recently published, had not reached FUNAI yet, coloring this image in a definite way. For example, the Nambikwara are not typical *hunters and gatherers*.

[lxxv] A location in the direction of the Omerê area; after the massacre, this area eventually entered in the process of demarcation (but at the time of our visit not demarcated).

[lxxvi] Making a total of 90,000 hectares, the *description* of the area included both areas of both peoples, even when the WG only was engaged to deal with the *Latundê Indigenous Area* – and demarcation would be executed this way.

[lxxvii] This sort of conjecture follows from the application of received ideas from the literature that Nambikwara are monogamous except for headmen, a proposition by Lévi-Strauss not corroborated by later research by Price (whose work, surprisingly but comprehensible with respect to FUNAI's bureaucratic chaos, is never cited). All discussions about the adaptation patterns of the Nambikwara, particularly the nomadic tendencies in the dry season famously postulated by Lévi-Strauss, do not receive any notice. I will turn to such issues in Part II and III.

[lxxviii] It is remarkable how much paperwork is dated near the middle and end of this year. It is unclear why this may be, but such concerns can only be resolved by a different kind of research.

[lxxix] Though not explicitly stated, the Work Group members apparently visited the village. Among the participants was the head of the Mamaindê Indian Post, Marcelo dos Santos, so some of this inaccuracy is somewhat odd. It was not the only visit by this dedicated and highly reputed man to the Latundê but then he,

contrary to the early proposal by Price, never became responsible for the Latundê (and did not speak the language). Alternatively, perhaps this reflected suboptimal cooperation between Work Group members in the area and those in Brasília.

[lxxx] The third domestic unit contains a potential couple, one younger adolescent girl and one older woman. The authors do not discuss these arrangements any further or the potential for recouping some of the population losses.

[lxxxi] An interesting observation is the acceptance of the previous proposal when, as noted previously, the Work Group actually divided the Latundê land into two parts, one meant for the people itself, the other part protected only because of rumors of uncontacted Indians. As those uncontacted Indians turned out to be Sabanê, this confusion may have ultimately benefited the Latundê.

[lxxxii] For practical purposes the report lists all of the non-Indian occupants of the area and explains the manner in which the survey was realized.

[lxxxiii] For an interpretation of the rigidity of the law disregarded regularly by local Amazonian elites, who use the circumvention of the law as a structural resource of power for a paternalist mode of domination, see Geffray (1995). Bureaucratic discontinuity also is manifest in that this summary is the first to remark on the prior efforts of SPI deployed in the region of the Pimenta River in the 1930s and 1940s.

[lxxxiv] One piece of information helps exemplify the bias about the Latundê house style (shelters with roof and walls made of vegetable material are not real houses) but the note is completely contradicted by several reports. The existence of a larger group that separated into minor ones does not confer with any report in the dossier. On the other hand, the summary seems to be incomplete and pages are lacking. The Sabanê, for example, were unmentioned.

[lxxxv] Common sense presupposes that reality is simply out there as pre-existing things to be discovered. The substance and essence of objects — people and things – are givens and not the collective sociocultural construction of reality it actually involves. As seen, neither the *Indians* and the *Latundê* nor their *land* existed as such before the whole process of contact and state intervention.

[lxxxvi] This certificate declared that the land in question was uninhabited by Indians.

[lxxxvii] For reasons not available in the dossier, the dam was not built. In later years a similar case concerned Aroeira, where consultations with the Indians did occur and maybe objections killed the idea as the dam was not built.

[lxxxviii] For more on the notion of conquest and the exercise of tutelary power as being fundamental for the operating of SPI and consequent scandals and

corruption, see Lima (1995). He noted that the positivist action of Rondon, much of it regarding the Nambikwara, implies 'tutoring' the Indians in *civilization*. This is examined in Part II.

[lxxxix] A linguist visitor who stayed for around ten weeks in the Gleba in 1984 confirmed that Luis had taken over as "*patron of the rubber business*". He added, however: "*my strong impression is that everything is unusually fair and above-board*" (Carlson 1985: 3). He also noted the strong integration into the market economy of the Aikaná and how this situation both favored and disfavored cultural and linguistic continuance (ib.: 3-7).

[lc] The exact nature of this *consultancy* remains unclear, as the study constitutes a part of a larger report about several areas and peoples. Obviously, this type of consultant always runs the risk of being subject to certain direct and indirect restraints by the agency evaluated.

[lci] The economic information copies the FUNAI report from 1981, emphasizing seasonal hunting and gathering and mentions nomadism and rudimentary agriculture, typical inaccuracies. For a general picture and more profound analysis of nomadism and other stereotypes in the national society, see Ramos (1995).

[xcii] In this dossier nobody ever remarks upon the contradiction between the report by Price and the allegation of the sertanista about the initial *contact* phase.

[xciii] After commenting on available resources and planned purchases, the phrase that (…) FUNAI *maneuvers to avoid the disarticulation of the current economic system based on the rubber exploitation and carefully avoids interfering in questions regarding Indian-leaders*", is a contradiction in its own terms.

[xciv] As for the distinct modes of appropriation of anthropological knowledge, aside from the previously mentioned instrumentalization, there is legitimation (although probably not by an anthropologist but by a specialist). See the discussion by De L'Estoile, Neiburg and Sigaud (2000).

[xcv] It is noteworthy that several of the plot owners were resettled by Incra in an area that was to become the Mequens Indigenous Territory. This may represent another example of Incra defiance of official legal competence, or perhaps lack of effective communication.

[xcvi] The issue of *good* or *bad faith* is not so easy to determine in practice. Generally, the organization tended not to pursue bad faith and to indemnify simply everyone and everything within a system of given rules.

[xcvii] The major criticism, maybe the only one possible at this time of the military dictatorship, thus points to the lack of rationality of the state when it attempts to

project the image as a legitimate modern power moved by the principle of rational direction of society (see De L'Estoile 2000).
[xcviii] A visit by a local FUNAI functionary from Aripuanã Park disclaimed major tensions in the area and noted only few producing plots – but even those were being phased out.

Allegories Of Wildness ~ Latundê Ethnohistory And Their Contemporary Situation



First times: another view of Latundê history

The prior history reconstitutes the trajectory of observations, research and intervention materialized in the paperwork of a file generated to constitute a bureaucratic dossier that documents the way to the final legal act of creating an *Indigenous Territory* in accordance with presidential decree. It becomes obvious that it concerns a legal, bureaucratic, and social fiction that presupposed the recognition of concepts and objects – of people and materials – postulated pre-existing. In effect, the history examined so far grounds and socioculturally fabricates the people and their land as a reified object. This corresponds to a dialectal process of what evidence really exists and what was thought to exist or

should exist. From this examination of the file, two major points are especially salient. Historical contingencies of context play an important role in the specific structure of conjuncture (in the words of Sahlins) where local time and place are relevant and national and international factors prevail. In current fashion, the local and the global, and between (unsurprisingly this is not always very well represented in the case itself and a point not fully dealt with in this chapter). A small and hardly known group of people, even in specialist circles, suffers immensely from the process of internal conquest. The result is the formally named and grounded *Latundê*, a distant appendage in the bureaucratic dominant and dominating structure put into place to exert state control over a land and people previously uncontrolled. The state delegates to FUNAI the function of the authorized mentor of land and population management of previously uncontrolled people. In turn, FUNAI occupies a subordinated place within the state when conceived of as an arena of competition between different federal agencies. It is noteworthy that the process so far had very little to do with consultation of the group directly concerned, even the anthropological reports rarely succeed in gaining some insight in the conceptions and opinions of the *Indians*. As said, this derives from the restriction and subordination of anthropological work within the bureaucracy[i]. Overall, the dossier reflects bureaucratic inconsequential attention, inefficiency, negligence, and sometimes criminal collective and individual behavior and responsibilities.

The Indians were more object than subject of these constitutive processes. They are not just victims, but are the foremost interpreters and, in their own way, agents of their history. What is apparent from the reports aligned before is that the impact of the euphemistically labeled *contact* was devastating in its population effects. From 1977 to 1981, the absolute lack of medical assistance caused the death of nearly 60% of the entire group, diminishing it from about 23 Indians to 9 at the lowest point, not counting Mané. It was only with marriage and new children that the population began to approach a number closer to pre-contact times. The damage done was tremendous in these first years of *pacified* relations as most of the older generation perished, particularly after the measles epidemic. I emphasized the example of the Latundê *captain's* death and the Mané's ascent to command. Doubtlessly, the measles epidemic was avoidable, especially so long after *contact* and considering that the effects of contagious diseases on indigenous populations are notorious. The havoc caused by this small scale genocidal tendency of non interference after primary *contact* left a strong

imprint on the survivors. The only anthropologist to pass four days in the village commented on the distinct difficulty among members to speak about the dead and to take stock of the ravages of population decimation. This difficulty persists even today. Stella Telles, the linguist working with the Latundê language started her visits in 1997 and established a firm rapport and empathy with the group and some of its members in particular (Telles 2002). Impressed by the plight suffered by this people she tried to gather some data about their history. One of these efforts concerned the reconstruction of the group's history at the time of *contact*. The result was a painstaking, but especially painful, exercise with the most senior woman, Terezinha, of one of two households, a woman who is still the most senior Latundê[ii]:

Telles describes the living situation as follows:
House 1: Terezinha, the oldest sister in her sibling set, an adolescent man José and his younger sister Madalena;
House 2: Terezinha's father Davi, her mother Madalena, and her siblings Fatima, Sebastião, João and Francisco;
House 3: Terezinha's older brother Cinzeiro, husband of José's and Madalena's mother (as José is the major surviving Latundê man, he is the reference point for children);
House 4: Chico, José's older brother;
House 5: the father of José and his siblings;
House 6: Batatá's mother;
House 7: Sebastião, José's brother, and his wife, Terezinha's aunt;
House 8: Batatá and her husband (older adults) and Terezinha's younger sister Lourdes, living in a place somewhat detached from the other houses;

This only amounts to 19 people. First, it must be noted that for official purpose the date of *contact* concerns the first time FUNAI established an encounter with the Indians that lead to initiating a permanent relation. Put differently, as if the moment of constitution of this relation depends on the state's recognition, as if to emphasize the veritable genesis of the people involved and their inclusion into the state apparatus. In a sense, this is true. The official version, however, often does not reflect factual situations. Indeed, previous contact might have been made by a large variety of agents and representatives of the *national society*. In this case, the Latundê report that a helicopter once threw down objects and that, when on a foray, an older man had an encounter with a Brazilian who gave a machete to the

Indian. Hence, at least one friendly encounter already had occurred and new tools were known. Clearly, the supposed *isolation* of the group was not absolute. Furthermore, it is possible that there were previous contacts but that they are either not remembered or reported. The idea of isolation perpetuated by the FUNAI notion of *isolated Indians* contrasts with the fact that these groups usually felt the presence of the encroaching *national society* before official *contact* and frequently underwent important sociocultural changes. There was some contact and encounters before INCRA and FUNAI officially took notice. Doubtlessly, these situations must have made the people that came to be known as *Latundê* to speculate about these strangers, but unfortunately very little is known of this impact and the related views. Generally, the Latundê apparently considered outsiders a threat to their lives and well-being. Judging from Nambikwara group relationships patterns, the isolation from other groups must be at least partially due to geographic considerations – the Latundê were located on the far edge of the Nambikwara area. Any relations with neighboring allied groups would have been cut off long ago due to the changed *contact* situation, all of whom suffered strongly themselves. Isolation here connotes an historical contingency, probably sought after because of the circumstances, and is certainly not representative of any previous indigenous history or pristine state.

Terezinha's testimony conveys a stressful and traumatic series of events. In itself the need to rely on her story as the most senior Latundê is significant. In the years following the contact in 1977 diseases killed most of the older generation. Thus, the husband of Batatá died having never received a Portuguese name. A few other adults also did not live long enough to receive such a name, thereby complicating the reconstruction because of the absence of Latundê names. Several attempts to reconstruct the pre-contact Latundê population by asking for their names were to no avail. People claimed that the dead and even some of the living did not have names in Latundê. Very likely this assertion is related to a common feature in the Nambikwara ensemble: the interdiction to speak the name of close kin and of the names of the dead. Speaking of the deceased (in particular the recent dead as reported for Southern Nambikwara) may encourage the deceased to take away the living. Obviously establishing pre-official contact population numbers and demographic trends is very difficult, if not impossible. Criminal post-contact negligence left the group consisting of only two older adults, one being Batatá, who continued living in her Latundê-style house until an illness shortly before my visit and Terezinha's older brother, nicknamed Cinzeiro

(ashtray) because of the burns sustained when sleeping near the fire. Batatá does not speak Portuguese and is somewhat difficult to approach with an interpreter. Cinzeiro does not speak Portuguese and is considered rather feeble-minded by the others (although he is very friendly)[iii]. It is believed that, according to Latundê theory of causality, he came to be so by touching meat which a vulture had eaten from. This leaves Terezinha, who, being the oldest daughter, at the time of contact already had completed the first menstruation seclusion ritual. As her sisters were both children then, she is the major source of information.

One major feature in the organization of the Latundê at the time of *contact* is the proliferation of houses. Not only did every couple possess a house but also bachelors and single divorced people tended to live alone, except for the little group in Terezinha's house. Photographs taken by Price reveal that the village had a small *macaw house* (*casa das araras* in Portuguese). This place was a home for the many representatives of various species of parakeets, small macaws (*ararinhas*), parrots and possibly macaws[iv]. Until very recently this traditional house was maintained by Terezinha. The two sites of current occupation (as of 1999-2000) both had their own macaw house. Although Terezinha let her house disintegrate, leaving only the scattered remains and part of the frame, she dug a hole in the ground for the birds to stay in. The passion for all these different types of birds continues. In a way, the very presence of the macaw house not only indicates the prevalence of the domesticated birds who, in comparison with other animals, receive a preferential treatment and constitute the main stock of domestic animals, but also the pre-eminence of the house epitomizing individual autonomy. This tendency prevailed until recently. Batatá built and lived in the last Latundê style house until she moved into a partially open and independent room in José's house (regional style). Later illness forced her to move to the Aikaná village where the Aikaná husband of Terezinha's younger sister later built her a small house. She still lives there and continues her role with the macaws by lodging them in her house. At the same site where Batatá used to live, Cinzeiro also own a regional-style house. This place commonly functions as the kitchen for the other family in residence, José, Lourdes and their children, who occupy a separate house, directly in front.

At the time of contact, the social relations among the Latundê explain the distance of Batatá's husbands' house to the others. Thus, all members of the group demonstrated their relative autonomy in house-building patterns, a fact

apparent today in the distance from Mané's and Terezinha's house to the site of José's, a twenty minute walk. Though the same pattern continued to prevail, one exception is Terezinha's younger brother who stayed in their house and still lives there. However, this young man was in a fashion raised by the older couple, and is markedly shy. The costs associated with a modern house are much greater than a traditional house. As José is strengthening the already strong ties with Mané's household, he started to build a new house at the other man's site and prepared a large garden jointly with the men of the same house (except Mané). This house is being built with the assistance of the sons and the younger brother living at Terezinha's house, also men who are his partners in the preparation of the gardens, at the time of Telles and my major stay ay the Latundê house (September to October 2000, the main ethnographic present in these chapters). Nearly a year later, in August 2000, on occasion of a very rapid visit, everyone was already living together at the same site (and Cinzeiro had, at least for the moment, not built a separate house). The houses made by the elders denote a strong tendency of individual autonomy which is unlikely to carry on to the next generation. For the younger people, constructing their own house implies more work, as they prefer Brazilian style homes. The other younger brother of Terezinha's siblings who lives with and works for other Indians, after some sort of misunderstanding with his *patron*, decided to live in an abandoned house constructed at the *fazenda* not far away from the Latundê main site (a house and pastures resulting from an INCRA-authorized land invasion).

In some respect, the Latundê settlement pattern persists even with the adoption of the regional house style. Terezinha was a young woman when she married Batatá's husband (one of the men who remains nameless because of early post-contact death). This man was married to Batatá, Terezinha, and her younger sister Lourdes. She, however, had a fight with the husband and left him to live in a house with the adolescents, one a marriageable boy, José. This seems to be in accord with a notion of easy divorce for young married people. The importance of autonomy is also evident in the Nambikwara ensemble custom that permits young women to try out more than one husbands until settling down, the end of this period habitually being heralded by the birth of a child (Price 1972). Lourdes, was the next youngest sibling (assuming the usual Nambikwara practice of birth spacing, she should be between two to four years younger), had not yet completed the coming of age ritual and consequently could not yet be a wife. She probably entered the house while still being raised to be a future wife by her husband,

another practice also quite common among neighboring peoples. In the Nambikwara ensemble even very young children have marriages arranged by their parents. Their other four younger siblings lived with their parents, the only united and not divorced parents with children inhabiting a single family house. It is interesting that the couple made up of the oldest sibling of Terezinha and the other one constituted by José's older brother were both still childless. Another of José's brother also lived alone but could have been a choice for the girls from the first sibling set. Even though some partners were available possibly political choices were made such as marrying the sisters to Batatá's husband and not to the young adults. Later Terezinha did marry one of the younger men but this husband died of illness in the contact phase.

All of this provides clues about organization and reproduction, admittedly in a probabilistic fashion and in comparison with numerous patterns abstracted from other Nambikwara sources. This is basically speculation and not without pitfalls. For example, the customary pattern for Northern Nambikwara village displayed two larger houses and not small-individualized houses. This demonstrates that the Latundê may have changed certain social arrangements and practices as this new set-up differs from neighboring Northern Nambikwara peoples. For the moment, this rearrangement lacks any plausible explanation. It may be the effect of long isolation from other villages. One hypothesis would be that the shelters normally set up for temporary lodgings were, in a way, transformed into small individual and familial houses (I discuss the village pattern further in Part II and III). Be that as it may, it is safe to say that only two couples were producing children, siring the sibling set of Terezinha and that of José. Batatá's mother was the only other child-bearing person alive, while her daughter, though apparently older than the sibling sets, did not have any children. According to one comment by a Latundê, she did not want any children. Given the general Nambikwara practice of wishing to have children, this may be the reason for the polygamous marriages of her husband[v]. If the judgments from post-contact reports hold true that the major leader of the group was either Terezinha's father or José's father, then the only polygamous man was not the group leader (a fact also evident by the dissension of a separate house site). Not only did Batatá's husband not have descendants but he also does not seem to have been the groups' leader, contrary to the Nambikwara pattern postulated by Lévi-Strauss but conforming to the much ampler later sample discussed by Price[vi]. In a way, the partitioning of the group and keeping apart of one house turns the major part of the group essentially into

the fusion of two older couples and their descendants. Later one of these couples divorced, possibly reinforcing Davi's authority, the father of Terezinha and the major set of siblings (as well as the marriage of the ex-wife to his son too). A remark likely made by Price in 1977 on the photograph of José's father accredited him as being the leader. This comment aside, both of the elder men should be the senior persons in the small group as the men of the two principal couples that already have adult male and female children. In sum, it is uncertain whether leadership involved either one or the other, but both were in a position of influence and must have had significant authority.

The situation, particularly at *contact*, almost mirrors the basic *reduced model* (in the words of Lévi-Strauss) implicit in Dravidian kinship: two couples exchange their children (like cross-cousins) and ensure reproduction of the group (whose children would be cross-cousins and could thus ensure population growth). In effect, both Cinzeiro's marriage at the time and the later, still existing marriage of José and Lourdes express a relation of potential affinity and not any impeditive consanguinity between these couples[vii]. It is important to stress that it is impossible to confirm this conjecture due to the absence of the full kinship relationship system. Several attempts by the linguist Stella Telles to elicit anything more than the kin-term for brother, sister, father and mother did not succeed. It is unclear whether the Latundê really have a Dravidian system and the cross-cousin preference that other Nambikwara possess. This seem partially due to language problems, as well as something possibly more profound; either a refusal similar to reluctance to pronounce personal names and to map people on this social chart, or else to discuss real relations even with sympathetic outsiders. In fact, Telles could not establish some important kin relations within the group at the time of this house arrangement. For example, that Batatá's husband is unrelated to anyone is extremely improbable in such a small isolated group[viii]. Yet the presence of this relationship system is extremely likely. Material available from the last native speaker of Lakondê and her own knowledge about the Latundê (though second-hand) confirms an extreme linguistic closeness among the two dialects. This person, Dona Tereza hence advances the hypothesis that the two groups derive from a common ancestral group and were separated by historical accident in the not too distant past. After becoming acquainted with Dona Tereza, Telles expanded her fieldwork with the last Lakondê speaker and her thesis treats both languages as *Latundê* and *Lakondê* (2002)[ix]. Among the Lakondê, kin terminology follows the general Dravidian pattern of the

Nambikwara cultural ensemble (as far as Telles and myself have been able to establish; compare Price 1972; Fiorini 2000).

Also without entering into many details, Terezinha mentioned that the group passed through some serious difficulties; for example, Mamaindê attacks to kidnap their children, an event that caused casualties (at least one of these attempts succeeded and later the kidnapped person was found among them). She seems to imply that her father and José's father reconstituted the group to ensure its persistence. Though the group lived in the savanna for a considerable time, it suffered pressure from the Mato Grosso side and may have been pushed up into Rondônia, through other savanna areas, to escape these assaults. If indeed this group is a remnant of the originally northern Lakondê (Telles 2002: 12-3), their original impulse would derive from fleeing illness, *Whites*, or both, to the south-southeast. Then, after an unknown and undocumented period, the two couples constituted the basic core of the group that could exchange their children and assure the general sociocultural reproduction. This is especially important because the third couple did not have any children but the marrying out of the sisters could create a valuable alliance to the group and amplify marriage choices of future generations[x]. In this sense, the pre-contact situation in the *Campo do Barroso* appears to have been a relatively stabilized group with a core the two older couples in a position of affinity (the men probably treated each other as brothers-in-law) and of potential affinity by the future exchange of children with some other aggregated inhabitants. Thus, the group managed to grow and live traditionally (probably after some serious problems). It seems likely that the Latundê might have persisted in this mode if the encroachment of national society had not imposed *contact*. It seems safe to assume that the somewhat precarious mode of sociocultural reproduction, however possibly unstable in some aspects, was sufficient to guarantee the group's permanence as a distinct social unit.

Difficulties before *contact* also transpire in several observations about the personality and behavior of certain people within the group. First, the distance between the main body and Batatá's husband is sometimes translated in the affirmation of the existence of *two malocas*. Batatá's husband may have been an important man as one of the three older pivotal leading men but preferred to maintain some distance between his household and the other ones. The physical distance indicates a demonstration of his wish for some autonomy within the larger group and probably signals at least some latent tension. In effect, there

may be an ethnic and historical explanation for this division. According to Dona Tereza, her brother Joaquim told her that the Latundê local group consisted of descendants of two different local groups still extant in the beginning of the fifties. The Tawandê attacked, dissolved and incorporated all of the small villages of three Northern Nambikwara speaking peoples of that time, including the last independent village of the Lakondê. Despite having been a real and intimate brother to Dona Tereza, Joaquim actually pertained to one of the other two peoples whose members also either were forcefully incorporated into the Tawandê or fled and went to live at José Bonifácio. That is, the current Latundê would be made up of people originally from the Yelelihrê and another closely related people, possibly Sowaintê (the first name as transcribed by Telles 1992: 12). Although these peoples were very close in language and culture, they still considered themselves as distinct from one another and for this reason the local groups may be called 'peoples'.

Hence it is possible that Batatá's husband belonged to a different people than the majority of the group and that such a fact added to the potential tensions of the small group. He allegedly beat his new wife, who had recently completed the seclusion ritual, and that induced her to move out and set up another household with a pair of siblings. Tensions between husband and wife (or wives) existed at least in some cases. Moreover, other tensions between people happened as a function of individual behavior. Some persons were known for their antisocial characteristics, and were referred to with the Portuguese expression, *brabo* (wild, untamed). This is the same word used to describe the uncontacted and hence *untamed* and undomesticated Indians. That is, the expression points to asocial and uncivilized conduct and the accusations against some of the women of the group include thievery and there are charges against one or two men of unruly violence. Once, Terezinha's father *nearly killed* one of the female thieves. Formerly, such conflicts were resolved by changing groups or locations, and the very absence of alternatives likely caused a profound change in the former pre-contact patterns of group and individual relations. Now the regional society deprived the Latundê of participating in the usual mesh of alliances, animosities, and the concurrent circulation of visitors and spouses. Apparently no relations remained with other Nambikwara groups, only the hostility and the threat of the Mamaindê. Thus, isolation possibly condemned the group to live together as one unit in spite of significant tensions.

Living in the savanna was advantageous in some ways. The usefulness of the savanna does not issue from any particular ecological adaptation, although it certainly did have its uses. The open spaces are remembered as an imperative of defense. The high visibility made possible on the open savanna contrasts with the forest. Also, the Indians used to burn the low vegetation of the savanna. The benefits of this activity included killing game. Terezinha still very occasionally burns to *clean* the plain and kill some meat in the process. Additionally, the burning clears the vegetal cover and leaves no possibility for anyone to sneak close up and surreptitiously attack the *maloca*. Terezinha remembered the savanna as the original and preferable habitat of the group for its safety. Today, however, she also adduces a pragmatic reason for preferring to live in the forest, the fact that mosquitoes and other insects infest the savanna and make life difficult. The sandy soil of the savanna provides the White sand the Nambikwara Indians normally preferred as their bedding on the ground near a fire[xi]. In this respect, of course, her people exhibited one of the primary distinguishing features within the Nambikwara group, along with the preference for open spaces. However, it is quite clear from the photographs taken by Price and the statements that they differed in another salient feature[xii]. Even though the people did not go about naked in the sense that they wore few ornaments – a collar on the waist or across the upper part of the body for the women and armbands on the upper arm for the men, other more general Nambikwara features – they did not pierce noses or lips. For some Nambikwara this feature normally consigns unknown people immediately to the category of belonging to the Nambikwara ensemble, as one Nambikwara do Campo asserted to Price (1972). In my sense, the hypothesis must be that the exception to the rule entails that the people have lost this practice for, as far as I know, all other peoples in the ensemble always wore those ornaments. Even other local groups, apparently unknown to the Latundê, reported to have been previously living near the Pimenta River before contact and now extinct, did so. The complexities of their history may explain this remarkable absence, shaping a situation in which the group found itself on the edge of the Northern Nambikwara cluster's area in the physical sense, simultaneously being on the edge in a larger sociocultural sense. Again, recall the possibility of prolonged but not so splendid isolation.

That is, this people was very likely not just on the edge but also was on edge with the outside. This isolation represented the flight from enemies and the absence of outside allies, internal strife and internal tensions that may have caused fissioning

the group in other circumstances. The fact that they were on their own and had only themselves for sociocultural and economic reproduction was feasible until *contac*t[xiii]. Thus the recollections of the surviving generation features *many people* living in the savanna, suggesting a group sufficiently numerous to allow for an endogamous cross-cousin marriage system and continued population maintenance or growth. The image further brings to mind the positive side and a largely positive evaluation of the complete autonomy of the time. Reports confirm that the horticulture practiced in the nearby forest in conjunction with hunting and gathering activities provided more than enough food. The receptions with abundant food depict a people well accustomed to permanent habitation at the *Campo do Barroso*. Though in political terms seemingly a refugee area, ecologically and economically speaking, the adequate adaptation to the savanna probably followed the usual historical patterns. The village built sustained a permanent and not just seasonal occupation, even when it is likely that hunting and gathering expeditions of variable duration were mounted[xiv]. Again, these people were not *nomads*, as some reports discussed above claimed, nor was there a poverty in adaptation that *forced even the to women hunt*, as one of these observers noticed with surprise[xv]. The fact that at least some women hunted with bow and arrow (as did Batatá and the two mothers of the sibling sets) does not necessarily imply group disorganization. Nor it is not proof of any insufficiency of the male hunters. It might very well be an expansion of the women's role as gatherers, a task that always included capturing small animals. In fact, women hunted smaller prey and only killed game from the savanna or forest floor, not including animals living in the trees except when they passed by on the ground (Terezinha recalls only one such instance when her mother killed some monkeys).

Overall the people apparently succeeded well enough in providing for their sustenance. The group used its own repertoire of food crops (like maize, *cará* (yam), and manioc) and complemented them with gathering other vegetable foods (and tobacco). Some of these plants, like maize, probably were distinct varieties lost in the contact phase. This was a loss of genetic diversity that affected not only this small group, but the global community too. Such losses have only recently been recognized in ethno-ecological studies[xvi]. The gathering of plants nowadays has diminished; a *cará do mato* (literally a forest yam) collected by Cinzeiro was shown to us as being part of this older repertoire of edible plants. The youngest generation had not yet eaten this food and some took the

opportunity for their first taste. Even before *contact*, one notices the experimental attitude of José's father when he collected sugarcane at a distant *fazenda* to bring it home to plant. An expedition in which, naturally, he took care in attempting not to be noticed by the owners of the plantation, apparently taking the plants out of the field in the dark. In this event both curiosity and willingness to improve on the stock of available plants to cultivate are manifest, a sharp contrast to the stereotype of alleged conservatism. Scouting in the region and some knowledge of the regional society also show curiosity about the outside. On the whole, horticulture was a prominent part of the economic activities of sustenance, but gathering provided a fundamental component. Hunting of larger animals like deer and tapir also contributed to the group's nutrition and general sustenance (exploiting different ecological zones). Terezinha remembered living in a fixed village with much daily activity. Water, for instance, had to be fetched from a far-away source. There was a distinctly active life of food production and procurement, and sustenance with the presence of many people that Terezinha recalls fondly. She recollects a satisfactory, even happy life. Even if her memories may be biased towards the better reminiscences because of subsequent disasters, her judgment should be basically sound. As a whole, the group regarded their specific way of life as a viable and valuable mode of living.

Contact from other perspectives

After offering a tentative picture of the history and situation at *contact*, I attempt to examine some characteristics of the prior situation. The fact of living in what is normally called *isolation* might give the erroneous notion that the pre-contact history had not been influenced by the encroaching regional society. However, the turbulent history before official contact directly caused changes in the mode of living of the village and the inhabitants had less overt contacts. These encounters and the normal avoidance of regional inhabitants must have shaped the notions entertained by the Latundê of this kind of stranger. Only a few such events are known to us. The theft of cane has already been mentioned. Another case concerns the encounter of the same Indian with a fazenda employee who was working not far from the village. Somehow, the two men met in the middle of the savanna and conducted a peaceful encounter from which José's father came away with the gift of machete. Such a tool must have been enormously beneficial. The practical Indians doubtlessly found much use for such an advantageous tool. In this way, some of the advantages of a peaceful exchange relation with the intruders preceded the first tentative openings towards the group. By the

seventies, the Tubarão settled to the east, relocated by the inaction of a government agency that shamelessly approved their removal from the fertile lands along the river to the south (a map of the soils in Rondônia shows that this area is one of the very few patches of *red soil* (*terra roxa*), the best available and in total contrast to the dry savanna or the mostly sandy soils supporting forms of a low bushy forest[xvii]). One of their occupations at the time was to engage in wage work or to contract work for the *fazendas* whose land was yet to be delineated. As mentioned above, this temporary demand of labor provided many much-needed jobs, compared to the small number of employees necessary to care for cattle. Thus, the ranchers employed the Tubarão to scout the area and literally clear the straight property lines through the forest as they appear on INCRA's map, effectively recreating the map on the ground[xviii]. On one of these missions, some Aikaná came across signs indicating the presence of *wild Indians* in the area and their first reaction was to retreat, afraid to enter a region inhabited by unknown peoples. The Aikaná belong to another ethnographic area and participated in a distinct interethnic multidimensional exchange system, centered along the axis of the Pimenta River. They knew peoples like the Kwazá, Kanoê and Tupi speaking groups which had evolved an interesting complex of relations between themselves[xix]. The Latundê (or any other group of the congeries of Northern Nambikwara), however, are believed not to have participated.

So their unexpected presence posed a practical and interpretative problem to the Tubarão. In 1974, according to one participant in these events, *nobody knew they were there* when the land surveyor engaged by the fazendeiro (large landowner) employed them to open the *picadas* (path lines) cleared to constitute the property borders. Then, after fifteen kilometers along *line 120*, they noticed some signs: one of the Indians' paths; a place of collection of honey and grubs[xx]. Significantly, they *did not know* about FUNAI at the time. This clean path came out of the forest and entered into the savanna and then the Indians returned with the knowledge of Indians on the savanna. Returning without further investigation left them still unaware of whether these were *tame* (manso) or *wild* (brabo), the first question on their minds. That is, having assimilated the idiom of the *branco* (Whites in these contexts is always an ethnic and not a 'racial' term), the first relevant classification concerns the condition of domesticated (in effect, dominated) or unruly (autonomous and not subjugated by the system). This idiom is widely used, for example, by peasants and farmers to contrast land and animals

not under human control with those that are brought under human mastery by means of human labor. Wildness is not viewed as a positive attribute, nature is seen as a force to be conquered, transformed by human capacity, put *to use* and gain value (in both senses). The basic opposition also classifies people with respect to their capacity to work and be *useful*. This can be thought of as the ability to be self-domesticated. People should labor to transform savage nature into humanly ordered cultivated space. Thus, this classification immediately refers to a larger cosmological scheme which may be applied to both the southern migrants coming into Rondônia as well as the natives. This is unmistakable when Fonseca told Price of his wish to *teach the Indians to work*. In this system, hunting, gathering and nomadism fail to constitute *work*, neither are they the predicates that found real people nor classify as a normal and satisfactory human relationship with nature.

The Aikaná finished their task afraid to encounter these unknown Indians but completed their work without incidents. Later, talking to *the chief*, they decided to go out and look for them. The chief asserted that if they were *wild*, they would make them throw down their arrows and be domesticated (*amansar*), if they be already *tame*, he planned to converse with them. The *chief* in this case is actually a man from Ceará who engaged the Indians in rubber extraction. Fifteen men went on the trip, all armed, taking little chances in case of an incident and trying to make an impression based on numbers and force (according to the statements of an Aikaná participant). When they arrived near the open savanna they heard the pounding of maize kernels to powder and afterwards saw two malocas. The sound was one of the older principal men pounding maize and the Tubarão cried out to make their presence known. The man went into a house and came out with four other people, three women and an elderly man, all armed. They waited outside, equipped with bow and arrows and a club while the group approached them, gesturing and requesting that lay down their arms[xxi]. Batatá was ready to shoot arrows at the strangers but the older man intervened to make his people drop their weapons and establish a peaceful connection. Another participant remembered that at this point the Aikaná maneuvered the White man from Ceará to be up ahead of the row of men, *with a revolver in his hand*, right at the front where any violence would break out first[xxii]. It is probable that the older man was the father of José (as told by another participant) and that his prior contacts prepared him to risk the approach. Bear in mind that the group consisted of most of the Aikaná male population and that the future Latundê were likely familiar

with firearms. Fear dictated these precautions and caused the display of armaments and manpower on both sides:
[We believed that] *they are wild,* [that] *they would fire arrows. I told my people, if he wounds someone, one of our companions, you may fire at him too; but if he does not wound anyone and misses his shot, hold your fire. If he hits one of ours, if we see that he* [a member of our group] *really is going to die, then we would have reacted and shot them. But thank God they did not do that. I think, maybe they were frightened too, who knows. I know they put all their weapons down and they greeted us without harm. We confirmed they were not wild, but we were afraid. They wanted us to stay the night but I said that we were not going to sleep there. We left.*

Evidently, violence was a real possibility and the whole expedition might have led to a bloody encounter in which doubtlessly the Latundê would be the primary victims. Such an accident would deeply unsettle the Indians' way of life and leave them with nowhere to flee[xxiii]. Violence is well known to the Aikaná and their neighbors, in pre-contact times, during contact, and obviously after *contact* with their subjugation and incorporation in the rubber collecting enterprises that often relied on weapons to subdue *wild Indians*. Luckily, the intervention of the older man carried enough influence to stop the outbreak of violence to these unexpected visitors appearing all of a sudden in his own village. This visit is even more terrifying when the native people have no allies in the world[xxiv]. This moment of courage was crucial to the group's very existence. By preempting a violent encounter, the older man, certainly one of the leading figures, avoided a situation that may have resulted in the demise of his people. His conduct was interpreted to signify that the group could be approached by people employing signs of peaceful intentions.

Even though it was clear that these people could be *domesticated*, prejudice and preconceptions still played a significant role. In this particular *pacification* effort lead by Indians and Whites, the Aikaná understood the *nakedness*, and their choice of habitat as indicative of a strange and wild people (note that the Aikaná lived on the river and in the forest). Moreover, before their actual approach, the Aikaná were already afraid because the older Indians of their group described the unknown people in frightful terms: *because these people kills us, eat us, and drink our blood*. One leading Aikaná told the others that *they kill and suck blood* and *roast* the flesh for consumption with manioc cakes. They attributed to these

others a very dangerous quality and the initiative of the expedition actually may have resulted from the persuading of the White *chief*, their patron in the rubber business. In effect, the Aikaná admit having practiced a form of cannibalism, as did other peoples in the interethnic complex of the Pimenta River. They accuse the Kwazá of indiscriminately eating the whole body – possibly denoting the view that they hunted humans as they did any other animal prey instead of a mode of consumption demanded by this distinction. The suction of blood appears to be an accusation of another thing not done although the reason for this taboo is obscure[xxv]. Some Indians refused to participate in the expedition to the Latundê. These ideas infused the whole expedition with an atmosphere of fear of violence because among the Aikaná the unknown also inspired the trepidation and dread of the uncivilized and unpredictable. Preconceptions on both sides shaped the actual encounter with a large amount of fear and potential for hostilities.

Attempting to speak different languages did not resolve the problem of oral communication but after the strangers *took his hand* and *greeted* the leading man, the Indians gave them *chicha* (a drink made from maize or manioc), smoked meat and manioc cakes (*beiju*). The main narrator I consulted attributed a prominent role to himself (he became one of the formerly mentioned *chiefs* who actually appear to have functioned as patrons) and reported that he insisted that his companions eat this food and did not throw any of it away. His perseverance illustrates the tension and lack of confidence prevailing in this first encounter. Although the food was said to be good – proof of the sustenance provided by the diverse productive activities – many were concerned about poisoning. In order to normalize relations one had to eat the food, overcoming a fear certainly not unfounded as the Nambikwara are notorious for their knowledge of natural poisons. Even if the Aikaná did not want to, they ate the food. After all, refusing the commensality of eating together implies the insult of refusing a token of amity. One Latundê Indian sneaked away to warn the others, at the other village, and some time later another seven people arrived at the gathering, threatening to use their weapons. The older man intervened again, took their weapons away and stored them elsewhere. These newcomers also brought food and they offered these to the strangers who ate even more.

Afterwards, according to one version, the visitors made their hosts understand that they were asking them to dance. Another narrator with a better memory affirms that the idea came from José's father. The Latundê then carried out their

dancing and singing, without playing any instruments. One Aikaná wanted to reciprocate with a song but the flu had made him too hoarse. This casual remark reveals that he likely functioned as the vector that transmitted the virus to a previously unexposed population. Thus, the Tubarão[xxvi] seem to reproduce a template of initiating cordial alliances (similar to the customary proceedings before contact), somehow also reminiscent of their inter-ethnic relations with *Whites*. A short look at this history displays some features of this learning process. At a prior point in their history the various peoples of the Pimenta region lived together in one big village, but in separate malocas, because of the White mans' domination and want to gather them in one centralized area to collect rubber. During this period, the White dictated his will because of fear and factors related to real and symbolic violence (Bourdieu's notion) to the Indians. Among other things, the present-day Aikaná recall that the Indians thought the White man *killed Indians to mix with rubber and make tools*. This belief of fabricating the tools from Indian bodies possibly conceived of as conferring a superiority to the tyrannizing Whites is full of implications. One concerns the salience of bodily idiom and substance, a familiar feature in the ethnological literature of Lowland South America, to construct similitude and difference (more on this in Part II). In a way, it is quite true that the rubber and the subsequent tools were fashioned from their bodies; the coveted commodities served to assist in the subduing and extracting labor from the victims in a closed circle of substances. The circle, in turn, raises the hypothesis that it is modeled after previous notions about the circularity of predation in the universe. Without knowledge of the Aikaná these conceptions cannot be explored and confirmed. Regardless, violence, subjugation and the fear of this figurative cannibalism by the White man is an integral part of a historical experience that may have predisposed them to conceive and treat the Latundê this way.

After leaving the village, the party spent the night on the road and one participant remembers how they, despite the exchange, did not dare to sleep out for fear of a surprise attack. Nothing happened though, and three days later the Latundê took the initiative to seek out a rubber tapper that lived in the adjacent forest (perhaps at a two hours walking distance). They wanted industrial commodities, mostly metal objects like machetes, axes and pans. The tapper offered them some older goods and they returned home. The visit shows that the Indians knew the general direction their visitors came from and demonstrates the enticement of these commodities (a desire generally one the major causes for *pre-contact* contacts

and the acceptance of *contact*). Afterwards the Aikaná made contact with FUNAI in Vilhena and the agency brought a lot of material as presents for them. The auxiliary Fonseca appeared in the history of both peoples at this moment. The chronology of events is to some extent resumed in this particular narrative, for the Aikaná claims that this must have happened in 1977. That, according to him, was the moment when FUNAI established itself in town and Fonseca was in charge of Aroeira (people of the Nambiquara Project were also present)[xxvii]. The Aikaná man and Fonseca jointly took the presents to the Latundê and that *domesticated them somewhat further*. The Aikaná remembers tools, hammocks, shoes, clothes, blankets, matches and tobacco as gifts. The Indians did not have any salt, rice or any foodstuffs. The clear memory of this distribution relates to the quantity involved and especially to the fact of receiving so many things the Aikaná themselves habitually worked so hard to get. Fonseca took Mané Torto with him as a translator on his second visit. Fonseca later left Mané with the group, claiming that as he did not have a wife, it would be best for him to stay. *He married Tereza and stayed there. And so they were domesticated*. And when, in 1979, the FUNAI agents from the base in Riozinho (in the direction of the town of Pimenta Bueno) sent more presents and, with Mané already living there, in his mind this signaled the end of the process: *they ended domestication*[xxviii]. The flow of gifts, the usual template of *pacification*, in his sense too correlates with taming wildness.

In the reports cited so far, the special role of Fonseca in this process and his relevance for both peoples is apparent. For one thing, he openly announced to Price what his project for the transformation of the Latundê implied. In fact, his proposition only resumes the essence of the colonial project of conquest. Nowadays the state does not directly order or condone murder of *Indians* and does not forcibly take away all of their territory (as in the *just wars* of the past). The slowly increasing recognition of prior rights to life and land does not dispense the states' general intention to transform both, and the society's individual and collective projects of appropriation of these *resources*. It has been unusual to recognize all of their lands as Indian Territory. A major contradiction experienced as a result of the *pacification* template always concerns the barrier all the *contacted* peoples run against: after the more or less liberal flow of free industrial goods in the *pacification* period, the flow inexplicably dries up. A new regime of trade terms is introduced where their values of industrial goods must be compensated for by values produced. A major problem, naturally, constitutes the

fact that the appreciation of *value* is completely dictated by the economic logic of the national society. This generally has little, if anything, to do with the economic logic of domestic mode of sustenance with the sharing of produce and with the modality of direct equivalent trade prevalent between similar groups (as described, for instance, by Lévi-Strauss, 1984). The terms of trade are then translated into the *necessity* to produce within the framework set up by the dominant society, this entails the transformation of the, so to speak, valueless domestic economy into an integrated subordinate part of the *economy* with the production of valued products and the corollary modification of the independent worthless producers into *useful laborers* (and, less significantly, consumers). Naturally, the *resources* of an Indigenous Territory, the *labor force* of the inhabitants, and the consequent economic autonomous production of sustenance when still an independent circuit of particular ecological adaptation and socioeconomic organization really is useless and *valueless* to the capitalist world economy. These areas are mainly viewed as *unexploited resources* and are thought of in terms of their exchange value instead of the uncomplicated objects with a use value to the immediate producer and consumer. More relevant are the variegated regional and national interests that now apprehend the entire independent Indian system as *valuable resources* to be incorporated. Such a perspective is only valid in the capitalist economy in which the Brazilian agents themselves are inserted, generally in a subordinate position, within Brazilian society. A perspective of a cosmology of *labor* that extracts *products* from *natural resources* represented, reified and objectified as the only natural and obvious reality of the world, especially in regards to its workings, the position and ranking of people, and the notion of personhood (on these points, of course, I am inspired by the work of Sahlins).

In his own way, Fonseca shares this perspective from the stance of his *humble* origin in a rubber collecting region of Rondônia. His own account solves one previous mystery and, from his own way of representing the course of events, demonstrates the negligence of FUNAI agents[xxix]. It is worthwhile to resume his own narrative and add yet another point of view. His career begins as a poor rubber collector where he earned valuable experience in the wilderness. Later he worked as assistant to a traveling boat trader, and learned about trade. Basically expelled from the interior by the economic crisis, he settled in the town of Porto Velho, with a quick passage through São Paulo. Later on during his stay in town he became a widower with children, with an experience more suitable to moving

through the forest and a positive appreciation of rubber collecting and selling rather than being qualified for a job in town. One day he encountered a higher-class *friend* who immediately set out *to help* him and *arranged*, in the typical paternalistic fashion, a job with FUNAI (after another attempt that did not suit him). Francisco Meirelles, then in the FUNAI agency of Porto Velho, accepted him on account of his degree of excellence in forest experience (in 1970). First he went to live with three *qualities of Indians* up the Guaporé River, he *sent for the Indians of the Mequens River* (not so far away from the Pimenta River) because the Jaboti Indians at the post were *all lazy*[xxx]. *They did not have manioc, they did not have maize because they were too lazy to work*. Two Indian *captains* and *their people* came down river and *we* constructed a *row of houses* and *large fields* with lots of produce. Quoting an Indian he calls simply *chief*: *Here I like to work, Mr. Fonseca, here they are people*. Producing palm oil to sell at the market resolved the necessity to buy the lacking commodities from the outside[xxxi]. After a period of *pacification* with the Paaka-Nova (Wari) that did not go very well (being so wild as *not to obey* and who left him with a few arrow wounds), he was transferred to Cuiabá and the Aroeira Post. There he lived quite well and was pleased with himself. Once and a while he conducted explorations with *good Indians* (by implication, obedient ones) along the famous Telegraph Line. The land at the Aroeira Post permitted horticulture, and was said to be *good to work*. He urged the Indians to get manioc to plant, because before his arrival the Indians *hardly planted*. Equating work with ample and diversified horticulture and large amounts of produce, he condemned anyone who did not share these ideas as *lazy*. He, a man who claims to abhor the idea of being subordinate to someone in his own work, did not shy away from strong measures to enforce compliance.

Then an opportunity arose: *They sent me, FUNAI sent me*. He set out alone and later organizing a team of Aikaná, the first contact was not an immediate success. Once the expedition got on its way, it took a lot of effort to find them. After three days of searching, one of his companions, the tuxaua and guide, already wanted to return as the food was running out and they had not seen traces of Indians. Insisting in trying another direction as a last effort, he was worrying about what to say to FUNAI about this failure. Then, finally, they encountered a *caboclo* (Indian). Whispering, the Indians told him to lie down, just as the armed Indian they spotted had done. So he decided to encircle the other Indian, as he was accompanied by six Tubarão (one being *Arara*, Kwazá[xxxii]). When the Indian noted their approach, he stood up, trembling in fear. Both tried to communicate

but the Indians of the party said they *did not listen* (i.e. understand). They managed to ask for the maloca, the *chief*, and the Indian, with a grunt, indicated the direction. The large house occupied the top of small hill in the savanna and was visible from a distance. Before arriving there, circumventing a lake (of the Barroso savanna), two girls were roasting yams. These people are still alive and when they see Fonseca embrace him exclaiming they owe their life to him[xxxiii]. He already had given some knives and mirrors to the man, Cinzeiro, when the other Latundê descended the hill, armed and with the *captain* in front[xxxiv]. He was so furious for some reason that he was foaming from the corners of his mouth. Talking did not establish communication but after leaving all the presents which were not touched at all by the intended recipients, the captain of the Tubarão succeeded in gaining permission to leave and they left. So, apparently contacts had been interrupted for some time, possibly even some incidents occurred to raise the wrath of the leader and turn the whole encounter into a tense affair. Also, conspicuously absent and leaving no doubt whatsoever as to this point, no other FUNAI agent participated in this attempt to apply the classical *pacification* template.

At this point, Fonseca went to see a White man in Marco Rondon who *employed* a number of *Nambikwara* to produce foodstuffs like manioc flour. These are part of the Indians Price mentioned in the same report of 1977 as having accepted, with one exception, relocation within the reserved lands of Aroeira (see Part II). The solution was proposed to all the dispersed Northern Indians who customarily were integrated into a situation of subordination and exploitation, and who already had been alienated from their homelands. He then invited the leader of one of these peoples, a socially and historically important man named Joaquim, and mounted a new attempt with the assistance of these Nambikwara, in particular with this *Sabanê* who prized his capacities to speak languages[xxxv]. Fonseca alleged that the unknown others were actually not that *wild*, rather it was only that nobody succeeded in speaking with them. This, he argued, the Indian should be able to do. Fonseca not only paid him but also appealed to him to participate *as a favor* (presumably because he would be in dire straits without his help). At the time no road existed between the main highway and the interior. After passing through the Aikaná village, they reached the savanna and set up their approach, at about four o'clock in the afternoon. *Everyone carried a gun, to inspire some fear*. From then on the initiative rested with Joaquim, the Indian leader Fonseca appointed. He instructed Fonseca to stay behind him while the

other Indians remained in the background. Then the *wild* Indians descended the hill, yelling, as riotously as the first time with their *captain* in front. Joaquim and the *captain* talked for such a long time that it made the expedition's nominal leader anxious. In effect, according to Dona Tereza Lakondê this was her *brother* Joaquim and not a Sabanê at all, hence his fluency and competence in the dialogue. To assuage his fears, the Indian said to Fonseca, *let him grow tired, let him blow off some steam*. The two leading Indians pursued their dialogue and even Fonseca's presence cropped up and, stamping his feet, Joaquin presented the auxiliary to the Latundê leader as a *captain*, a *chief*. After sending most of the accompanying wild Indians away, food arrived for the visitors, *honey*, *roasted maize and yam*, *meat*, *everything*. The Indian leader told him that they would stay the night, as it would be much more comfortable then staying in the forest. Notably, no one saw any women, only men, the classic sign of distrust. At night the local Latundê leader authorized the outsiders to arrange themselves for their staying the night, to improvise beds and to sleep.

Here it is clear that the actual process of *contact* was conducted by the Indian leader and that the choice of this man proved to be providential to the whole effort. From then on the encounter followed Nambikwara conventions of confrontations with unknown others, firstly because effective communication proved possible and then ensued a tirade and dialogue which brings to mind the kind of encounter described by Lévi-Strauss (1984). At this instance, a meeting between two opposing groups with mutual complaints, the leaders voiced these grudges loudly in a reciprocal harangue. It does not seem far-fetched to presume these new ingredients are the essential novel features that guaranteed success. In other words, bringing in a knowledgeable leader that conducted the interaction in terms of a sociocultural Nambikwara template (as opposed to relying solely on other designs of interaction), was probably the only way to begin disarming the fear, anger, and distrust. It is clear that venting such strong feelings, short of complete and utter defeat, must be channeled through mutually comprehensible discourse and means. The show of arms, incidentally, is a normal part of *pacification* (a term that is military jargon for bringing peace) with the connotation of gaining control over the *legitimate use* of violence[xxxvi]. At night the functionary resumed the command of negotiating the *peace*, promising that *I and captain Joaquim will send blankets from over there*. The Latundê leader *did not know what a blanket was*. The same leader sent one young *naked girl* each, *the poor child*, to provide a small fire for both visiting *chiefs* and they stayed on

sitting there on the visitor's side. Then, later at night, all the men sang, but not the women, singing *eh eh e e eh*, brandishing their clubs (bow and arrow were used *more by the women than the men*). They passed close by his bedding, what did stir him into a little anxiety. Nothing happened, the singing stopped after some time and the Indians went away. Only the girls stayed to tend to the *blanket* of the Indians and a small fire (he believed the fire was very small, although it was likely the standard kind for sleeping next to). From then on he *obtained permission* to return whenever he wanted. Feeling *authorized* he did so and one time even took a priest to visit the Latundê.

It is remarkable that the previous and still ruling autonomy is recognized because Fonseca emphasized that he was *authorized* by the local leader. He proudly reports on these visits despite the fact the official rules clearly prohibit them. He mentions with pride the episode of *a priest from Porto Velho who had heard about my pacification* [of the Indians]. Naturally, the whole description confirms that the enterprise shows signs of practices that are in stark contrast to the rules. Most strikingly at odds with the rules is the original *order* that sent this man on a mission for which he was totally unprepared as an *Indian agent*, a sertanista. This remark is not intended as a personal criticism, as his inventiveness and persistence shows, rather it must be observed that his action was shaped by a regionally accepted common sense that FUNAI should do its utmost to expunge. The preparedness for the especially delicate task of approaching an autonomous people draws only from his own resources and has nothing to do with any FUNAI training. The *pacification* template contains its own very questionable premises but it usually functions to establish a relation. What really motivated Fonseca to assume the task was the promise by Tolksdorf, the man who was officially charged with *pacification*. As noted above, the same sertanista who claimed in his later report to have succeeded in *contact* and who later in the same year abandoned the official command of the process of dealing with the Latundê people. This was the same *sertanista* who had experience in conducting the delicate operation and who, on paper, refused to initiate such an operation without sufficient funds and medical support. Nowhere in this narrative is there any indication of special measures and precautions taken. For example, the basic safeguard of avoiding bringing in people infected with influenza or to bring in a medical team for consultations and vaccinations. No precautions seem to have been taken and Fritz Tolksdorf delegated his task to his subordinate in a completely irresponsible manner. Fonseca claimed he *was sent by FUNAI*, by

Fritz, who promised that *if I went he would compensate me with the post of sertanista*! Or, *It was ah …Fritz, you go, if you pacify this village, I guarantee that I, jointly with the personnel here, will give you the post of* (…) *indigenista, and you will earn well for the rest of your life*. From his perspective, the previously mentioned opinion of the Aikaná corroborate that he carried out his activities as a solitary agent: *I pacified them*.

Fonseca believed that he was not promoted for two reasons. First, there was Tolksdorf's death shortly after the effort[xxxvii]. He further attributes being relieved of duty after pacification to the personnel of the Nambiquara Project, particularly to the agent of the Post at the Negarotê (at the time, of the Mamaindê, Marcelo Santos who Price suggested to replace him). Afterwards, receiving another task, he continued to maintain a presence in the area. While living in the Aikaná village, he concurred with the Latundê leader to go to the Tubarão village and get the goods over there. Then, after *giving* commodities like tools and ornaments, he gave *shorts to the women, as they could not walk around* [naked] *they must be clothed, I clothed them*". Then *everything was beautiful*. Until this point, the Latundê tore up and threw away the gifted clothes, blankets and hammocks in the forest, in a place separate from normal refuse in the savanna. Nakedness was an offense that must be *remedied* as fast as possible and the fact that *now they do not want to know any more about that* (that they once went *naked*), implicitly recognizes the evident superiority of clothing. These culturally insensitive beliefs ignore the subjectivity of such judgments. The aesthetic pattern of *beauty* does not inhere in the clothing itself, it acceptation rather epitomizes dominance. Like many others, Fonseca believed that ethnocentric patterns are cross-culturally valid. For instance, an old woman threatened the strangers during their visit. Joaquin advised him to leave her alone, and let her vent her fury. He agreed and found that the strategy worked, *because it was a woman*. Perhaps the same woman was renowned for her hunting and later she insisted with him that she did *kill, kill*, *roast* (imitating their Portuguese, limited to a few words). Aside from his remarks about female hunters, Fonseca attested to a sufficient food production. Even though their *field was small* in comparison to his standards, it contained *many yams* (called *batata* in Portuguese, a generic term referring to potatoes and in general to similar tubers) and a specific variety of *soft maize, good maize*. Complementing this life style, the village was *full of birds, parakeets,* [and]*macaws*". In other words, his testimony of savanna life indirectly confirms its resilience and apparent viability,

at least around the time of *contact*.

He was also proud of constructing the road from the Aikaná to the Latundê village and of establishing a mule train to make the monthly delivery of the *goods bought* and to collect the rubber produce, saving the Indians the trouble of carrying everything on their backs. Indeed, a number of feats were worded in the typical Brazilian construct of what *I have done and accomplished* (a phrase especially prominent in politics when someone claims credit for a collective or state enterprise[xxxviii]). In his opinion, his merits are obvious, as he oriented the Indians in their productive activities and kept the records of all transactions with rubber and the commodities bought with them. Again the mode employed to depict the years with the Aikaná is couched in the amity idiom that subsumes the paternalistic attitude of *teaching what is good for them*. He employs the same style to assert he was *helping* them *to grow* (economically) and points to the signs of mutual assistance and care (receiving meat and manioc and treating the ill). He even includes joking relationships. Such amity does not exclude command. At one point he mentions that he called the Indians together and *I appointed* the captain, who was the son of the former captain, and as there was another group, indicated another man, expecting *to be respected* by both leaders. If this is how this happened, then he appointed the leaders through which he relayed orders for the organization of rubber production and commerce[xxxix]. With his management, the Aikaná apparently did conform to reasonably productive standards that permitted a surplus large enough to buy a light generator for the village, as noted by Fonseca. It is noteworthy, in this respect, that he ascribes the incorporation of the Latundê into this system to the insistence of the Aikaná, who accused them of stealing. This *stealing* is still mentioned by the Aikaná today, especially by those who used to live in the forest closer to the Latundê village. Even in the present, the accusation recurs with respect to certain individuals during their visits to the Aikaná village. For a while this caused such visits to be stopped. Here occurs the same problem of the formerly free flow of goods, at times abundant and apparently easily replenished, a contradiction to *teachings* about the notions of property and scarcity, and of the concept that goods are to be exchanged for products in accordance with supply and demand. The latter scheme functions quite differently from former notions of reciprocity and is not universal, as Fonseca knew very well when expressing the idea that *he* was going to teach them to work. What he did, however, was not so much teach the *wild Indians*, as set up a system of rubber exploitation with the more experienced Aikaná

neighbors.

Conflicts of competence and conflicts of the truth

The interruption of Fonseca's activities with respect to the Savanna Indians partly sprang from Tolksdorf's withdrawal of support. Fonseca believed that in consideration of the degree to which advancement depends on one's personal connections and how much FUNAI is riddled with factional strife, the motive of his being dismissed from *his pacification* can only be personal; he missed his reward because of a *persecution* essentially representing Santos' jealousy or discrimination for something similarly unconnected to objective operational reasons (enumerated by Price). On the contrary, his version of an inquiry to determine if he was misappropriating funds only served to confirm to him his efficacy in rubber collecting and commerce. Once the rubber collecting system had been set up and Fonseca was working among the Aikaná, some wealth accumulated and rumors about unfair distribution began. According to him, the rumor that he was getting rich at the cost of the Indians motivated the FUNAI commission to investigate his financial operations. The complete records of all transactions and the transparency of both the records and the registration of all labor and produce earned him an easy acquittal. Moreover, the commission expressed their praise for the total system put in place, even remarking that this was the best organized Indian village they knew and that the model should be copied in other areas: *beautiful* (in the Brazilian colloquial). In effect, given the circumstances of the time, it is quite possible some member praised his efforts. Purporting to live off his own salary, supplemented with meat and manioc furnished by the Indians, he said to have led an easy enough life and did not in any way embezzle funds. This was a period when FUNAI pushed *community development projects*. Such projects were designed to put Indian labor and resources under the auspices of national economic logic so as to make the Indians produce a surplus to pay for their *needs* and, preferably, for the costs of their *protection* too. In this sense, the efficient system of exploiting rubber and the market integration really proved to be a windfall for FUNAI. The changes in Indian society and the aspects of domination and coercion implicit were either not seen, or considered the unavoidable concomitant of *progress* and *integration*. The same goes for the Latundê, where the engagement of Mané Torto and others into the system resolved the particular problem of the demand imposed and created by *contact*. Customarily the FUNAI more readily paid for *attraction* then for the resultant situation created by the permanent relation.

The introduction of Mané among the Latundê is a disputed issue and there are several versions. The former Aikaná tuxaua asserts without a shred of doubt that his former collaborator Fonseca took Mané with him on his second visit to the savanna to translate. Then, arguing that Mané did not have a wife, Fonseca later left him with the group. *He married Teresa and stayed there. And so they were domesticated*. The presence of a man accustomed to the regional society, trained to *work* (in the gardens, he learned rubber gathering skills later), speaking a variant of the language and a smattering of regional Portuguese certainly makes sense as a mediator in a *civilizing* project. As he is Tawandê or Tawaindê (both names appear in early writings on the Northern Nambikwara), the Aikaná narrator actually thought that the name of the group should have been *Tawandê*, but *they put Latundê*. He claimed the FUNAI employee that registered the name did not know how to say it correctly; she pronounced the name *Tawandê* as *Latundê*[xl]! Whatever the case, the mystery of his arrival persists, because Fonseca himself insists Mané's arrival had nothing to do with him. "*Mané used to work with Crusoë in Marco Rondon. But the thing is that this guy, the one I am calling, oh* [Santos]*, got it in his head that he should go there that there I don't know what. He fetched him and took him there. He, being still very young* [and should be interested in the] (...) *girls, they arrange one for you, you stay here, in no time you are the chief, they all died* (...) *It was he who took Mané Torto*". Crusoë produced manioc employing Indian labor and in his memory Mané lived with them, a mistaken belief[xli]. Fonseca began to hear of Mané's presence from a rumor about an Indian *with no shame*, one who would teach the others to drink *cachaça* (sugarcane alcohol). As it no longer really was his concern, he did not attempt to intervene. Fonseca later concluded his deal with Mané and drew him into his productive orbit, as was probably the intention of the overseer, the White boss, who led the Aikaná to make first contact. On the other hand, the agent, Marcelo Santos (then stationed at the Mamaindê Post), denies all of this. On the contrary, he avouches that, unknown to him, someone took the Indian to the Latundê during his absence from the region while on vacation[xlii].

To the main interested parties, Mané, his wife Terezinha and their family, the answer is quite clear. After the *pacification* and the visit of Price with his former assistants from the Nambiquara Project, the latter pursued the intentions mentioned by Price to take charge of the new group. The Latundê belong to the Nambikwara ensemble, and thus the claim that they should be included in the Nambiquara Project is valid because of the linguistic and sociocultural affinities.

The marked difference with their immediate neighbors and the danger of their incipient domination by neighbors tied into a rubber exploitation system fully justified a differential treatment by Nambikwara experts. If it is true that the Project in some way influenced naming the Latundê, at least some of the people of the Project possessed the most intimate knowledge of the Nambikwara ensemble. The Project originally conjoined personal dedication and novel indigenist practice. In a way, this conception ended up clashing with the older constellation of ideas common among sertanista factions within the agency and the commonsensical definitions of progress and backwardness held close by higher echelons of bureaucracy and politics. The prevalence of endemic factional strife about the power distribution and the material and symbolic spoils at stake within the agency itself, engendered the permanent antagonism which shaped a difficult context for the innovation inherent in the Project's practices and for its far less ethnocentric ideas of indigenist intervention. The result was Price's dismissal as Project head. The ironies in his report about his successor, a clear representative of an affiliation to another more romantic and prejudiced generation, speak for themselves[xliii]. In another ironic twist, the Latundê invoke a part of the general *pacification* template, the taming of the wilderness, as the reason for the introduction of Mané Torto: his entire household concurred in attributing his mission as their own *domestication* – exactly as the auxiliary formulates his role – mentioning, for example, buying clothes and teaching them to wear them.

In effect, the agent who was proposed to deal with the post-contact situation did take charge for a while, although the dossier discussed above does not contain any material about these actions. For instance, he took the Indians to visit both Aroeira and their traditional enemies, the Mamaindê. No doubt he aimed to diminish the fear of the outside world and achieve some alliance with other similar groups (already after Mané's arrival). Later on, pressed by the bureaucratic decision to change the formal responsibility for the group (as noted in the above report of his one-time boss Tolksdorf), he halted direct action with this group. From the Indians' point of view, it was he who proposed that Mané marry into the group and they hold him in high esteem[xliv]. That is, it is a double contradiction that a member of indigenists faction with an alternative view of what should be Indian policy should have introduced this non-member outsider with some criticized credentials. That is, at the time, the death toll had not narrowed or eliminated marriage possibilities within the group. Accordingly, on the contrary, his entry was logical to Fonseca who had little reason to deny his

role except for the antisocial behavior that rumor attributed to Mané. The same accusations lead Fonseca to accuse his supposed rival Marcelo Santos of mismanagement. On the whole the migration does not make sense within the kind of Indian policy Santos adheres to, except as a mistake or the unintended consequence of some other action. I may conjure up some ways to reconcile the conflicting versions but the truth remains difficult to envisage without some deception on some part[xlvi]. For the present purpose, on the other hand, it is enough that the conflicting versions demonstrate the strife within the agency and the way in which these affected the course of events of the treatment of a people who were thrown into a realm of interaction completely foreign to their usual appraisal and conceptions. One wonders how this ended up legitimated in the eyes of the Indian protagonists, essentially putting the latter on a route of sociocultural and linguistic change.

The reports discussed so far document the negligence of FUNAI's responsibility and the way the higher ranks left room for the reservation functionary João Fonseca to realize his plan for economic integration of the Indians. Jointly with the Aikaná, as seen, who in this respect were heavily constrained by dependency and lack of alternatives because of dearth of FUNAI action, to some degree are not just impassive victims but partially implicated in the constitution of the paternalist regime implanted. The drawing of the Latundê into the rubber collecting system was at least partially due to pressures from the Aikaná neighbors fearing for their own meager means and objects; implicitly (or perhaps explicitly), they partake in the ideology of work and progress. The reports obviously simplify their plight and present their abandonment as the sole cause of their sorrows and the lack of official assistance as a sufficient cause for the adoption of a passive attitude. Given the commentaries in all the reports there is a surprise: the land on which the contemporary village of Gleba is situated is not very appropriate for horticulture or agriculture (the situation is somewhat better at the other settlement Rio do Ouro). Until today, no effort has been made to relocate the village or even to furnish greater access to the more fertile lands bordering the Pimenta River. At the risk of the anachronism of projecting the present into the past, this may have occurred because of the rubber regime that downplayed the importance of self-sufficient horticultural practices. Today most of the Indians participate little in horticultural production and consequently depend largely on buying their food in town. This is perhaps no surprise in light of the situation during the rubber period coupled with the prevailing FUNAI-

managed infrastructure. Comparatively, the contemporary implementation of some *community gardens* largely depends on the initiative of the local FUNAI agent[xlvi]. In 1979 or 1980, when all these Indians engaged in rubber collecting it was necessary to produce provisions for the collectors and Fonseca arranged for Mané to come and live at Gleba (the main village).

According to the former Aikaná captain Luis, in 1979 Mané came to work the gardens at the Gleba owned by the other captain, Manoel, planting rice, beans, and manioc for flour. Two men and a woman worked with him before they died from measles. He was *presented with clothes for himself and the women,* [as well as] *hammocks*. After the deaths, Mané and the remaining Latundê went away and Mané never returned, even though the Aikaná continued visiting very occasionally. The epidemics also reached the others who had remained in the savanna. Mané learned to extract rubber and after 1980 he worked fully integrated in the system. Then the *goods bought* (*rice, sugar, whatever you need, clothing, we will furnish*) used to be taken to the Latundê in exchange for rubber gathered by workers. He went to work his own crops and continued collecting rubber. Until 1990 the Latundê participated in this trade, others like José, also entered this system until the prices fell and the whole system collapsed[xlvii]. After this, the other *captain*, Manoel, now also called *cacique* in an effort to be modern, left the area because his wife separated from him. The other former Aikaná captain, Luis, remained *cacique* for ten years, selling Mané's rubber and taking the goods to his house. To both men's minds, things like hammocks and shotguns were necessities. As an Indian patron, he did everything he could to help Mané and the Latundê: [I gave him] *everything he wanted, really helping him*. After his retirement from the post, he asserted that the new village leaders never *aided* Mané or his people. The latter being largely true, his own former *help* consisted mostly of taking care of the delivery of the goods at or near the Latundê village, i.e. ensuring that nothing was stolen when these were first delivered at the house of other Indians living near the Latundê and who were more easily reached through the existing road. Thus, this delivery was liable to theft before the Latundê received the goods. Notable are his repeated paternalist idiom of *helping* in selling his rubber for Mané and delivering his commodities – and the general supportive attitude as if the system put in place is a neutral exchange, even some sort of favor rather than a relation of exploitation. The same evaluation applies to the period in which Mané and others worked for his colleague Manoel, as well as for the time when Luis was directly involved as the intermediary

situated one place up in a chain of commerce. This formed a relay system that reflected more than just the economic dimension but shaped the sociopolitical matrix of dominance. Although it is left unsaid, his standard of evaluation probably accepts this relation as just.

It was not just the deaths that caused Mané Torto to return to the interior. At least today, in his judgment the exchange did not satisfy his criteria for a fair trade and he still holds a grudge against Luis. Previous observations make it very likely that the Latundê were treated as *savages*, or at best, as primitives, and were consequently not entitled to the same treatment as the Aikaná Indians. Certainly it is unwarranted to claim Mané and his group had *everything they wanted*, all signs indicate the probability that Latundê were being exploited more than the others. On the one hand, the sharing of this point of view between Fonseca and one of his *ex-bosses*, who actually were being patronized, shows what FUNAI could and should have avoided. In particular, the establishment of a strong connection between the Latundê and the Tubarão part of the Indigenous Territory and the conduit of the Indian Post in this system should have been examined with care and rejected. There was never any FUNAI action to remove the Latundê from the influence of the Aikaná. In reality, the Latundê's retreat to their own lands only occurred because of the deaths of the mother and a brother of Terezinha at Gleba (and one other unidentified man, possibly José's father). Fonseca buried them in the graveyard he *made*. According to the Aikaná, their people also suffered deaths in this period. According to Fonseca, the ex-manager, his actions and those of his wife (a *nurse*) succeeded in limiting the number of deaths[xlviii]. In the savanna, Terezinha's father had held out to the force of attraction and the attempts to turn his people into a cheap workforce at the service of the Aikaná rubber collecting system. The leader persisted in living traditionally and kept his two small boys, the youngest members of the group, with him. Nevertheless, the epidemics reached the interior, possibly transmitted by frightened Indians fleeing to the woods because of this very illness. He died at the savanna, and, just as the documents discussed above confirm, all these deaths virtually deprived the group of the majority of the older generation and thus of its sociocultural memory and lifestyle. Terezinha commented that *he was not old*, indeed, her last sibling was born during the time of the initial *contact*. Worse still, the death of the leader left the group without the only person with shamanic capabilities and hence without a *curer*[xlix]. She also emphasized that her mother engaged in rubber collecting and thus was a productive and capable person; she

even learned to speak some Aikaná. For obvious reasons, these traumatic events impressed her so much that even today she hesitates to talk about them and, on one occasion when we attempted to elucidate some events, her grief rendered her unable to speak. Examining this period entails traumatic and painful memories of suffering and loss. According to some others on the Indigenous Territory, after the outbreak, the Latundê collectively decided not have any more children and to terminate their ethnic existence (Van der Voort 1996: 380).

Thus, the absence of vaccination and the attempt to socialize the Latundê in the ideology of *work* caused the partitioning of the group and exposed them to devastating viruses. At first sight, this could be thought of as unintentional genocide or genocide by negligence. Yet, this blame rests with the state, whose obligation to know the deleterious effects in advance transforms disregard into genocide (Palmer 1998: 89-90); the definition of genocide implies intent and centuries of experience characterizes negligence as intent and the UN convention mentions as one of its reasons to qualify for genocide: "(…) *2. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group*" (Hinton 2002: 2-3; and that such harm could lead to death should aggravate the charge). Take the following example. A similar situation occurred in Paraguay in April 1978 when contact was established with a Northern Ache group of 22 people of whom only two children, already ill before contact, died as a result. This low number is because of the immediate permanent medical assistance. In 1979 in another group of 37 people only one child died (in both cases the death rate is measured for the first five years after contact and hence represents precisely the most difficult period for the Latundê; Hurtado et. al. 2001)[l]. Of course, the accusation does not hold for all of the individuals involved, some of whom were not in a position to judge the risks and effects of their policy and did not intend to cause harm to the Latundê. Those who should have known for some reason either withdrew or hardly paid attention. The bureaucratic confusion of responsibilities after *contact* probably generated an administrative gray zone where particular people in command did not feel responsible, or felt that they could not be held accountable for non-action. Their conduct contributed to the general malaise[li]. For Fonseca inspired as he was by the charitable aim to put the Indians to *useful work*, the condescending attitude towards this group came naturally. For instance, Indians without Brazilian names themselves chose Christian names freely. When Fonseca later spoke of the naming, he added that if nobody did so, he *could have* assigned them new names. Reminiscing about the time of his visits, he affirmed that when he

would like to eat bacaba [a palm fruit] *and they would fetch it in the savanna*; *I could go there today*, [and] *take Cinzeiro to dig and see what is there*. The implication about authority and *respect* already mentioned is present in these examples; to him they illustrate the naturalization of command with which he condescendingly gives orders.

The commentaries about the nature of the relationship with the Latundê occur in unusual contexts, as when Fonseca confirmed the story of the helicopter *discovery* of the Latundê. Some time later, the pilot of the aircraft turned up at his home. The pilot wanted to examine the possibility of some kind of mineral present in Latundê territory and offered to engage Fonseca as his guide into the area (FUNAI's presence inhibited his attempt to go in alone). The pilot confirmed one of the versions of the discovery of the Latundê Indians, the one that attributes the first sighting to people likely involved with the RADAM Project, a federal research project that intended to take stock of the inventory of *resources* in Amazonia (land, soils, minerals, etc.) using radar and satellite pictures to support research on the ground. During a reconnaissance flight, a team supposedly detected some resource but did not verify this on the ground as the Indians shot arrows at them[lii]. Much later, the pilot tried to penetrate the area on foot, but after he failed to locate it, he resolved to employ an experienced guide. After all, he was formally prohibited from entering the former heartland of the Latundê. Meeting Fonseca at his house, the pilot explained the case and offered money. Fonseca accepted with the assurance that *I can take you there, through Gleba*, [because] *I am authorized to pass through everywhere*. So, despite leaving FUNAI, at that time of the visit and actually until today, his sentiment of being "*authorized*" (and in that sense being an authority himself) is strong enough to make him feel free to enter the area. He acted as if no restriction applied to him and as if to look for some mineral deposit is a normal, legal activity. Note that the pilot's belief refers indirectly to the older regional story that some sort of gold vein is waiting to be discovered in the area (see Dequech's writings on his search for the legendary mines of Urucumacuan[liii]). Only a few years ago unknown men penetrated the Latundê region and were seen from a Latundê house. At that moment only the women were present but the strangers went away after Batatá threw things and made a commotion at the forest's edge (Telles witnessed this). The pilot never returned and news reached Fonseca informing him of the pilot's accidental death. Once again, the opportunity to earn a fortune vanished with the death of a superior high-class person.

On politics and economics

After the deaths and the integration into the rubber collecting system, the Latundê, now headed by Mané Torto, moved to the forest, closer to the rubber trees and the adequate plots to grow food. Despite moving from the savanna, they were, a Fonseca observed, *still on their land*. After the collapse of the rubber market and the group's leaving of their manager, the Indians of both groups searched for alternative income sources and fell easily into the trappings of the demand of regional and national society. The small town of Chupinguaia grew in the eighties and nineties due to the forest *resources* and in a significant part of that growth was sawmills. The opening up of *fazendas*, which made necessary the felling of forests for pastures, supplied these mills with timber. After the *fazendas* were developed, the pace of this so-called development slackened and the lack of new clearings later made the sawmills look out for alternate sources[liv]. The Indian forest resources naturally caught their eye, as in light of the rubber crash and the few assets at the Aikaná village, there was little opportunity to earn money. The Indian reserve was an easy target. According to Fonseca, the Indians did not know how to manage the land and resources and simply sold the timber. In reality, it is more complicated to assess how the newly renamed roles of *cacique* and *leader* performed the mediating role with outsiders[lv]. The persistent problem persists that even though the Indians chose their own leadership who *represent the community*, the profit redistribution almost always caused dissatisfaction and accusations of preferential treatment or excessive personal gain. Allegations of bribes paid to FUNAI agents in this process are also very common in the entire region. In part, by the way, these rumors are further augmented because they issue from the intra-agency strife where such charges form a key part of internal politics in order to disqualify opponents[lvi].

Thus, after the rubber market dried up in the early nineties, some important economic and ecological changes occurred. Looking for alternative sources of income to pay for industrial goods, the timber in the Indigenous Territory often served as the substitute for rubber[lvii]. The traces of these logging operations are easily noticed when going through the reserve to the Latundê village and particularly in its vicinity. One especially notes the existence of some now abandoned roads, and even some felled trees. These trees could not be removed because a few days prior, there was one of the rare official actions against illegal logging. As a result, in parts of the total area these operations impoverished the forest and diminished the availability of game. Although this wasteful and

ecologically harmful practice disturbs the forest, the immediate Latundê area did not suffer major environmental changes. Though it is difficult to assess the real destruction inflicted in this study, the environmental damages in terms of forest and game seem relatively contained. Latundê damages, however, are evident in other aspects of exchange with the loggers. They *earned* (*ganharam* is the original Portuguese verb) food like rice or biscuits *given* by the loggers who also cut wooden planks for their houses and provided them with industrialized plates for roofs. Thus, they provided them with the kinds of building materials commonly used in the region for the construction of the simple, basic houses of the poor. The Latundê, as far as could be established, considered this to have been a fair trade and Mané still waits for their return to collect the cut trunks in the forest in expectation of some such rewards.

This type of house is present in the majority of the Nambikwara villages, signaling earlier trading with loggers and the distribution of spoils. With the notable exception of Aroeira, almost all villages in the Guaporé valley engaged in this trade at some time. As expected, the Indians usually profit very little from this in comparison to the lumber mills. The mahogany trade was officially prohibited somewhere in the middle of the nineties but at a time when most reserves already had been exhausted, including the ones in Indigenous Territories. One mill owner in the Guaporé Valley was asked by a missionary why he paid so little to the Indians, the original owners. He responded that he could only pay them from the money left over after he paid off federal officials (notably those from IBAMA, the agency most concerned with forestry and preservation, local FUNAI agents, and even the Federal Police). Of course, such admission is rare and made off the record. The speaker made clear that he would deny everything if ever questioned officially. But in truth, it is common knowledge in the whole region and in Amazonia that the timber trade is fraught with corruption and Indigenous Territories within the Guaporé Valley are said to be exhausted in the highest valued timber, particularly mahogany[lviii]. The Latundê do not posses the slightest notion about the workings of the capitalist economy in general and the export values of wood in particular. Even Mané, raised in a post-contact situation of labor exploitation and engaged in wage labor as a young man, does not have the necessary skills to deal satisfactorily with money or to correctly evaluate the values of extracted forestry products. The group only began using money a few years ago. Today some of the adults are starting to learn to count money, and to distinguish between different denominations of paper currency. Many are starting

to appreciate the monetary value of goods and services. Contrary to the presumption of complete and equal access to market information of the economist's model of the capitalist system, the reality of ignorance more easily allows for continued realization of profit for the local entrepreneur and the *de facto* transfer of value of exported products like mahogany to the so-called developed countries. There, such products are significantly marked-up thereby grossly minimizing return to the original providers insuring a vested interest by these different actors in keeping the Indians in ignorance[lix].

The Latundê's circumstances are complicated because of the peculiar political arrangements in which their land is considered one shared area. Instead of a clear 'one people in one area' concept, the bureaucracy created a single area named after both groups, as if this was a totally reasonable solution. The single unit approach applied to the one *Indigenous Post*, located near the main eastern entrances of the Territory and at the Aikaná village, while the Latundê occupy a village reputed to be roughly thirty kilometers away. Currently the road that runs from the east to the west has fallen into disuse, although there is an Aikaná-Kwazá Indian who owns horses and mules and is repairing the major part of the road so that he can use his mule-drawn buggy[lx]. He lives and exploits lands to the south of this road, using the thicker forest soils towards the Pimenta River. Also, he is one of the very few Indians who own cattle. The animals graze on the pastures of the abandoned *fazenda* near the Latundê, which technically must fall within the boundaries of the Latundê area. His house is likely the best made amongst the other Indian houses at the Latundê and Gleba villages. Such patterns of land use seem to indicate the lack of firm notion regarding the boundary separating the Aikaná and Latundê. Although there is a definite conception that the land around the Latundê site is theirs, this is not the true size. The actual locally recognized territory is smaller, particularly the southern part which does not seem to have been especially occupied by the Latundê. This territory is called *Barroso* and when the Indians obeyed the necessity of implementing the general political indigenist template of choosing a *cacique* and selecting representatives, they instated only one *representative*. Accordingly, the representational system condensed the *Barroso area* into the single unit construed in accordance with models that echoed FUNAI's bureaucratic vision of simplistic convenience.

The net effect of this mold of representation has been to the detriment of the Latundê and their visibility from FUNAI's point of view as well as the actual

happenings within the Territory. Owing to the Post location and the obvious practical difficulty of reaching the Latundê, the group receives at best minimal attention from FUNAI agents. Some regular routine assistance was furnished and occasionally some commodities reached the Indians. For example, the agent then delegated to the Post visited the Latundê roughly twice in 1999 but, impressed by the large clearings for horticulture in comparison to the lack of similar activities among the Aikaná, resolved to support these efforts and distribute an ample measure of tools. Such favorable comparison is rare and partial to this particular point, because largely the agents and the Aikaná mutually recognize the primitiveness of the Latundê. To aggravate further this unfair comparison, the Aikaná also have a demographic superiority that helps them maintain disproportionate political control over the territory underrating the representativeness of the small Latundê. Thus, until October 2000 the Latundê did not have their own representative in the general council. Adopting the geographic criterion of constituting a representative for the whole of *Barroso*, mixing the Latundê with other Aikaná households (one or two), the mentioned Aikaná-Kwazá (married to an Aikaná), one pure Kwazá, and one headed by a couple of Northern Nambikwara and of Aikaná-Kwazá origins, the representation until this date had been solely by one of the other area inhabitants. In effect, the representative all but left his house and gardens to live in town. Here this man kept a broken down Toyota jeep as if it was his own. Actually, this jeep was the result of the timber trade and the return for *wood* taken out of the Barroso territory. The Latundê complain the vehicle very rarely has had any use for them and do not think of it as theirs. The *owner* was bankrupt after the trade came to a halt, and the car remained in town awaiting repairs, leaving the others deprived of a means of transportation. The Latundê hardly benefited from this spoil of their own area and although Mané thought about investing in the necessary repair, the owner hardly seemed disposed to accept sharing the car.

The proposal of the Nambiquara Project to open and maintain a separate entry road connecting the Latundê directly to the BR 364 highway or in the direction of Vilhena never materialized. The whole of the FUNAI operation after initial contact utilized the Aikaná entry and always oriented the Latundê towards the Tubarão villages (especially after the relocation of the Post at Gleba). The presence of FUNAI thus privileged drawing the recently contacted Indians into a pattern where they occupy the last and most distant tier of the relay chain of bureaucracy and state control. This model of subsuming the Latundê people in a geographical

unit is very unfair to the Latundê as they have hardly any autonomy to represent themselves. While I and Stella Telles stayed in the Latundê village, the local Aikaná-Kwazá man spearheaded a political change. The Latundê felt that they were not being adequately represented and wanted to oust a representative who mainly lived in town and put his own interests first. We discussed the subject with the oldest son of Terezinha and Mané who is groomed to be the group's future leader and representative[lxi]. Of course, we emphasized the necessity for the Latundê to select their own leader, as they were a quite distinct ethnic unit. In the subsequent community meeting the young man did speak up to talk about his fathers' position and in fact was elected to be the representative of *Barroso*. However, though this signifies a small step in strengthening the socially shy Latundê, the political situation is still dominated by the Aikaná. This is primarily because of the election in itself. The choice of the Latundê is not independently made but later sanctioned by the Latundê and Aikaná together who could have chosen a different person. Previous comments by the ex-captain of the Aikaná, Luis, now an affine to the Latundê are revealing: *We put Luis as a leader* [of *Barroso*] *at the meeting.* He knows a little writing, and he added *next year I am going to put him in school*[lxii]. From the perspective of Gleba, the recognition of the Latundê plea did not endanger political hegemony and structurally the relations between the Latundê within the territory remain essentially the same.

The period after the Latundê deaths at Gleba motivated Mané to enter into isolation with few intermittent contacts with the people of Gleba. The relations with the neighbors in the Barroso area were always somewhat strained and alternated between cordial alliances and avoidance. For example, some neighboring people asked for seedlings at various times in recent years but only one returned the gift with a counterprestation. Due to such happenings, Mané's opinion of his neighbors fluctuates, but in general he adopts a suspicious attitude likely similar to the pre-contact Latundê opinion (and with grievances we do not know about). Post-contact reality is unlikely to have improved relations between the two groups. Note that for the Nambikwara, death is rarely caused by natural reasons and is often attributed to supernatural interference by others. Only in recent years with the coming of age of the post-contact generation, the Latundê are seeking closer contact with Gleba and are making a few trips to nearby towns (mostly for medical services). Mané, the group's leader, had not left his area for several years because he suspects the neighbors, especially at Gleba, of unfair treatments. This tension accumulated in his one-time suspicion of a plot to

assassinate him. The younger generation, not having passed through the traumas of their parents and grown up in a context of contact, are becoming less shy even when influenced by the fears of their elders. They are becoming better accepted by the Aikaná, as the indication of the young leader evinces. Acceptance mostly comes from a compliance with standards like the one expressed by Luis that the young man is liked because *he is not lazy*. Observations imply this activity to be helping others at certain activities and participating in the newly initiated *community projects*. The social shyness at least partly stems from the evident low regard in which group members are held by the majority. The Aikaná appear to have changed their minds about Latundê cannibalism but not about the basic backwardness of the Latundê. When asked whether they are still like before, Luis (then recently married to a Latundê) answered: they are still *meio brabo*, still somewhat wild and unruly, *all of a sudden they may want to do anything*; *they cannot be trusted*. Even without the cannibalism rumors, the Latundê still are considered unequal, prone to unpredictable conduct. The presumption of primitiveness, a kind of refracted premise by others who themselves are already placed in the position of the primitive, perseveres.

In this context the sociopolitical emergence of the Latundê can only be slow. They are thoroughly distrustful of the outside world and at considerable distance from the main site of the majority ethnic group and the employee at the FUNAI Post who marks them as primitive and volatile. Resultantly, they gradually conform to Aikaná social norms in dress and custom, as a sort of compensation for their ethnicity. This is obvious in differences in clothes worn in the Latundê village and the clean and proper clothing carefully chosen to wear when visiting the Aikaná village. Here they customarily wish to present themselves in their best clothing. The second oldest son, for example, did not feel up to visit the Aikaná village because he did not have a pair of jeans. In becoming aware of money and local standards, some Latundê (and particularly the oldest member of the post-contact generation) are gradually learning to find his way around at Gleba and acquiring familiarity with the nearby town and its inhabitants. The same younger brother is following suit. After succeeding in obtaining proper clothes he went to stay at Gleba to study at the local school, with very little success, until August 2001. When the young new representative of the Latundê (the oldest of the younger generation) attempted to create an independent household and also to wander about, he followed a pattern of young bachelorhood similar to other Indigenous peoples, like the Sararé. A year after our stay he remodeled his parents' house in

order to close one room and constructed a single independent entry that he locks when he is away at the Aikaná village. This happened after a short period where he and Terezinha's youngest brother joined her other younger brother at a house at the *fazenda*. This change did not last, probably by virtue of the difficult personality of Terezinha's brother and the lack of a sufficient cash income to provide food and industrial commodities[lxiii].

The notion of *food* highlights the political and economic dimensions of interethnic relations. By the presence of Mané, raised in the context of the Tawandê who were exploited by a local *patron* and therefore became accustomed to the regional Brazilian food staples rice and beans, these foods entered into the village. When the Brazilian foods were introduced, it seems to have received a certain preference to their fare. In contrast to the general Brazilian preference for balanced proportions of the two products, however, these Indians tend to prefer less beans and more rice[lxiv]. Interestingly, when the processed imported food is consumed, they say that *the food is finished*, as if the potential abundance provided by their gardens would be irrelevant. Of course, practicing shifting cultivation and field rotation within an ecologically ideal area (as evident by the tree height) and raising various crops, ranging from maize to fruits and manioc, the dearth of the food bought is more then compensated for when the women revert to consuming locally cultivated foods. Considering the group's *work* ethic which was already further motivated with the equipment provided by the FUNAI agent, cultivated produce certainly exceeds the necessities of daily sustenance (so much so that resources can be used to raise domestic animals. Note that this probably entails an increase of horticultural activity since 1977). The continuation of the Nambikwara style horticulture supplies enough food. This is evident in the comparatively little clearing of the felled vegetation used for planting in opposition to the mainstream regional practice of *cleaning the field* by burning this mass as much as possible. Typical food includes manioc cakes dried and roasted over the fire for days before eating the flour as *beiju*, a kind of pancake, epitomizing a common Nambikwara practice. Interesting is a tendency to copy the Brazilian timetable when eating Brazilian food, and a dispersal of eating activities throughout the day when consuming traditional produce. The latter type of foods and the mode of preparation and consumption are sometimes clearly presented by themselves as being traditional, as *Indian*, in opposition to the outside food and their cooking methods.

As with the clothing apparently worn at home even when no stranger is around, cooking rice and beans are known to be imported habits from the outside incorporated into the customs and tastes of the small group. These habits prevail among the outside ethnic groups, both Aikaná and regional Brazilians, and were adopted mainly through Mané's influence and under the pressure of the conscience of discrimination on both scores from the adverse ethnic outside. One may conclude that there is a relative effectiveness of these acculturating constraints to conform to certain key sociocultural practices. The Latundê's increasing visits (with exception to Mané and Cinzeiro) signify a type of *glebalization* (excuse the pun). On a miniature scale, the Latundê are drawn into the orbit of other Indian groups and the regional local society within the framework of Brazilian society. It is also clear that the relative isolation that prevailed since the return to the Latundê Territory preserved them from the brunt of outside coercion and from being forced into incorporating external sociocultural practices. As such, the question of food evokes this precarious balance between their own economic and sociocultural autonomy and the felt necessity and desire to import certain commodities from the exterior[lxv]. Industrialized foods constitute a prominent part of a shopping list that every month goes to the FUNAI agent. This small but steady flow of commodities ensures a permanent but limited channel to provide for some of the prized material objects, presently, for all practical purposes, considered necessities, to a certain degree. Apart from fabrication of the occasional artifacts like necklaces, the participation as a workforce (rare and only by the few younger male adults), or the sale of something gathered from the forest, this shopping represents the most constant relation with the encompassing economic system. The surplus production of the contemporary gardens, inspired by the FUNAI agent who believed that this might afford them an alternative source of monetary income is actually very likely valueless as it seems impossible to bring the goods to market without adequate transportation[lxvi].

With the decline of the rubber trade and the group's subsequent withdrawal from the market (Mané being the first), it would have been difficult for the Latundê to earn an income and a saleable produce had it not been for an arguably fortunate coincidence. Without any *product* to offer in an extraneous *market* – with the incomprehensible sociocultural construction of a totalizing exotic economic system – no easy avenue of access to *commodities* exist. After much delay, in the mid seventies the Brazilian government implemented a law that grants a small

pension to rural laborers above a certain age. Some time later FUNAI started to *pension off* the oldest Indians in the entire Nambikwara region. Price wrote about the possible political repercussions of the pensions among the Southern Nambikwara as it may affect the traditional way of constituting the authority of a leader (1977). In the case of the Latundê, on the contrary, the regular influx of goods of the *compra* (purchase) that has been established by the pensioning of Mané, Cinzeiro and Batatá actually benefits the whole family. Mané's purchases are shared with his household; Cinzeiro's benefits the family of José and his wife. Batatá's goods used to go to her house and were pooled with the neighbors, but now that she stays at the Aikaná village, resources may be shared with her *granddaughter* and her Aikaná husband[lxvii]. The FUNAI profits very much from this arrangement because it alleviates the demands upon this agency and it is certainly no coincidence that it organized the necessary identity cards and subsequent registration. It is this source that enables the FUNAI agent to buy the monthly provisions mentioned above. The pensions guarantee a small but steady trickle of goods that contributes to minimalizing the necessity to find permanent solutions to the acute problem of economic articulation within the wider economic system (compare Kearney (1996) for articulation theory and peasantries) . This is epitomized by the major problem of navigating between autonomy and dependent subordinate integration, of the 'balance of payments' between the local, usually low valued produce and the costly (by local standards) import of commodities[lxviii].

The shopping list of sought-after goods, as dictated to Telles and me in Mané's house, resembles more the enumeration of perceived necessities and consumption desires than a valid notion of purchasing ability. With little concept of the monetary value of the pension and the price of the commodities, the list of items requested inevitably exceeds the meager funds available. On the other hand, as the pension is always expressed in the same monthly delivery, it provides a tangible measure of the deterioration of real buying power readily assessed and certified by the Indians in recent years. The fact is, it is impossible for one such pension to furnish a household as large as Mané's and Terezinha's with food that lasts the whole month along with other necessities like sandals, clothes, shotgun ammunition and shotguns for hunting. There was also the issue of paying off installments for expensive repairs for the gun. The perceived needs, therefore, exceed the value of the pension and enlarge the temptation to sell timber and palm hearts[lxix]. The new scarce means entering into the reservation by way of

the official appointments of the positions of local *Indian health agent* or the newly introduced *bilingual educational agent* is coveted for being low salary but steady income. As the Latundê are politically subordinated within the reserve all these jobs go to other Indians; in the case of *the Barroso* the post *health agent* is occupied by a young Aikaná living at Gleba. He rarely visits the area[lxx]. The current building of a school in the Barroso Area expresses the same reality; the building is farthest from the Latundê village, much farther than from the other houses. Also, the already nominated schoolmaster is the brother of the informal Aikaná/Kwazá leader of the whole area who designated another brother as general *cacique*. To be fair, as the Latundê are only relatively dependent on this extraneous flux of commodities, they do not seem to feel the need as acutely as the Aikaná who, from an overall perspective, do not appear to have a sufficient harvest and depend much more upon the buying of even basic foodstuffs for their survival. In conclusion, the economic articulation remains quite precarious but does not yet seem to be a decisive factor of destabilization of the group's material reproduction.

Language, society and reproduction

Bearing in mind observations made so far it is clear that the future of this group and the survival of its unique culture and language is dependant on a variety of external and internal factors. Of obvious primary importance is maintaining a sustainable population. This is largely influenced by individual capacities, proclivities and trajectories, the sociocultural dynamics of the group within the encompassing framework of their territory and interethnic relations. The Latundê are keen and curious observers of sociocultural differences and are aware of the respective particularities of the other groups. For instance, in the case of the food mentioned above, they are aware of the specificity of their former varieties of domesticated plants and their own way of food preparation; particularly the method of roasting meat, either in or under the ashes of the fireplace, or on a rack above it (for both meat and manioc). This is perceived as representative of their practice and is the kind of food occasionally rejected by strangers. The food and its modes of preparation materialize the dissimilarity of the opposing cultures and societies. Among these distinctive features perceived by the Aikaná, Latundê, and the Brazilians are their respective languages. The deculturation brought to bear on the Aikaná has not hindered their use of the native language, even among children. Many of the oldest group members speak very little Portuguese. All of the younger generations apparently grew up with Aikaná as their first language

while the learning of Portuguese is, in the contemporary younger generations, simultaneous, resulting in bilingual speakers (apparently perfect speakers). Even when the pressures and historical contingencies of the Aikaná made them suffer and, in general, their culture lost some important features (like shamanism and certain rituals), they showed a strong adherence to their language. Normally everyone speaks and small children continue to learn the language. Nowadays, contrary to the deculturation pressures from the past that used to consider the Indian languages as inferior and useless in the *modern* world, such languages officially receive an encouragement from government institutions like FUNAI and the Ministry of Education. Thus, beginning in the nineties, the new appreciation of Indian languages is a positive feature for the Aikaná and actually aids them in *being Indian* as the *lack* of *original culture* militates against their supposed purity and generates specific prejudices against them among Brazilians and the FUNAI agents stationed at the Gleba[lxxi].

The Latundê do not easily suffer from a deficit of symbolic *indianidade* (Indianness), the general conception of their *backwardness* grants them the undisputed right to be *Indian*. Their relative autonomy and isolation shielded them from the major deculturating forces and sustained exposure to prejudice and discrimination notwithstanding the other Indians and temporary invaders. This might have helped preserve the linguistic and cultural patrimony. However, the arrival and integration of the outsider Mané changed the biological, sociocultural and linguistic reproduction among the small group of Latundê. After the extremely unfortunate and traumatic disappearance of the leading part of the older generation, Mané Torto became the group leader. First, he married all of the three sisters but the presence of José without a wife obliged him to cede one of them to this Latundê. José suddenly had been made into the oldest normal man present (Cinzeiro is older but thought mentally deficient). Being a young man at the time of the upheavals of contact, he did not possess the knowledge of Portuguese and of the outside that enabled Mané to deal with the socioeconomic agencies meddling with a people in search of the gestation of a new lived world (Gow 2001: 29). For some time, Cinzeiro was married to José's deaf-mute sister, until an Indian from Central Brazil came along and, when working on a nearby ranch, took her away to live in Vilhena as his wife. This reduced the group to one Latundê couple, one mixed polygamous household with the addition of two young brothers and the two older survivors of the formerly leading generation. In this respect, Mané seems to have been transformed into the focal point of the social

and biological reproduction and social renewal of the village and the birth of his oldest son with Terezinha marked the return of natural fertility and a renewed capacity for survival. The sister who left with José also is said to show signs of incomplete personhood, for example even her Latundê language phonology is criticized by other Latundê. Thus, it may be said that the major vital capacity for economic and sociocultural reproduction rested in the hands of Mané and his household.

During the years after the debacle of staying at Gleba, the population slowly increased and almost doubled. Terezinha (as seen the oldest sister of the surviving siblings and Mané's first wife) had children roughly every two or three years. She had many children, at present there are two young adult sons, one pre-adolescent daughter and three younger sons one of whom is about three years old. This household also raised the two younger brothers of her own sibling set. Terezinha's younger brother is only slightly older than their two nephews; hence the youngest uncle seems almost thought of as an older sibling. Mané's younger wife and Terezinha's younger sister, only a child at contact, has a very different reproductive pattern then her older sister. Her daughter, her only living child, had just entered adolescence. She had another child but he died young, the cause of death is in dispute between the mother and her former co-wife and household members. In fact, the mother is accused by her elder sister of purposeful negligence, an accusation that reveals the tensions between the former co-wives. Having brought up the younger sister after her parents death, the older sibling considers herself as the first and rightful wife. On the other hand, the usual Nambikwara pattern shows a preference in certain kinds of domestic and sexual activity of the husband towards the younger wife and thus, usually, the woman less affected by age and childcare responsibilities. This pattern was not evident in this household. The older wife jealously attempted to maintain dominance. For instance, she normally shared the bed with her husband in their house while habitually a husband favors the younger wife for sexual relations and a certain companionship (Lévi-Strauss 1984). This permanent tension may have been a factor in the much lower birth rate of this ex-wife. It also accounts for her recent fleeing to the Gleba and subsequent marriage to the Aikaná Indian Luis. Her former husband was displeased and imposed the condition that their daughter would remain living in his household.

Though this crisis ended up in the gradual return of more amiable relations, the

older sister also saw her own plans for a possible separation preempted by her younger rival and some tension remains. Furthermore, the newly allied brother-in-law although apparently quite satisfied with the marriage, still holds his affines in an offhand manner as not totally reliable and somewhat backward. Some friction arises, mostly implicitly, when Terezinha and her children spend a few days at the Aikaná village. Their other sister, on the other hand, hardly seems to play any prominent role, for the reason mentioned above. Worse than just mere mispronunciation of Latundê, she suffers from a culturally attributed inability to act as a normal adult. In fact, contrary to her older sister, when it was her time to participate in the female seclusion ritual after her first menstruation, the turmoil caused by contact prevented her participation. This used to be one of the major Northern Nambikwara rituals. The seclusion of the young woman is thought to be necessary in the formation and shaping of the adult body, particularly by means of a special diet. The new adult tends, at least among other peoples, to marry immediately after the final ceremony when she comes out of seclusion. This is congruent to a more general Amazonian indigenous belief that the body needs to be culturally constituted a conviction supported by the tenet that the food intake literally constructs the body. Accordingly, the Latundê seem to conceive her body as incompletely transformed into an normal adult. In the local interpretation, this explains not just her flawed social capacity but also the passing on of these attributes to her children. Most of them seem somehow affected genetically and display some sort of physical or behavioral disorder. The two oldest boys, one almost an adolescent, usually appear normal, but there are some anomalies that may indicate handicaps. Their younger brother of approximately four or five years old suffers from epilepsy, for which he has been irregularly treated, and clearly shows to be mentally retarded. The youngest boy is still an nurturing infant and it is unclear if he is affected in any way. The Latundê believe that these evident bodily defects arise from the mother's deficiency and it is not irrelevant in their opinion that they consider one child to be sired by her own less capable brother, and one or two of the others to have been born out of liaisons with outsiders (one being a harvester of palm hearts). An imperfectly constituted body shelters, in principle, an imperfectly socialized human being[lxxii]. That, incidentally, may be the reason why they admit to the incest while not being very forthcoming to discuss some other tensions within the group.

The population growth must be evaluated as less promising than their numbers alone suggest. The complicating factor stems from the fact that there is no

offspring fathered by Terezinha's older brother owing to the dissolution of his marriage with José's sister. All of the new generation came from the three sisters, making them either half-siblings or parallel cousins, which in the Latundê framework is equivalent to being siblings. Thus, all of the new post-contact generation belongs to one set of siblings or parallel cousins, all share consanguinity[lxxiii]. This implies an incest prohibition inherent in the preferential marriage with a cross cousin I hypothesized above that they believed this conduct to must be obeyed by normally constituted human beings who, as one of the Latundê said, are *not beasts*. It ensues that the whole generation cannot reproduce within the group. Endogamy foreclosed, this raises the acute problem of finding exogamous marriage partners for all of them. Additionally, their two slightly older uncles are also without any marriageable partner. Their other uncle, José, is dissatisfied with his marriage, possibly for the reason of his wife's problems. It is for obvious reasons that at least two men of the older generation expressed a strong interest in their niece, the sole young woman coming of age. They attempted to establish a relationship in contradiction to the wish of the parents and her other *mother* (her older aunt), all of whom intend to see her married to a younger man. Thus, of necessity, they prefer an outsider, and discourage an incestuous endogamous relation. If the Latundê resemble their very close kin of the Lakondê and general Nambikwara practice, they disapprove of avuncular marriage. Of course, necessity may cause them to break the law (some Nambikwara broke the rules in Price's time but did feel quite uncomfortable about it and tended to hide the fact; the same holds for a Wasusu case reported by Fiorini (2000), personal communication). José is some kind of cross kin[lxxiv]. In other words, he does not stand a direct prohibited consanguineous relation, but is a potential affine and hence marriageable.

In reality then, the social field of the small group is strewn with potential and actual tensions between the constituent composing people, aggravated by the lack of possibility of endogamous reproduction and the imperative to search for alternatives outside the group. In part this procurement started at the Aikaná village, where there are a few eligible young women. However, the betrothal with some girl or woman from another people obviously creates a range of problems, including different life expectations, sociocultural background and language barriers. Mixed marriages are notorious for the implications on the language spoken by descendants. Depending on the context, the potential effects include an array of possibilities, ranging from adopting the use of a third language spoken by

both partners up until the child learning both parental languages as a fully bilingual speaker. One family at the Gleba demonstrates instances of this continuum. The older couple (Aikaná-Kwazá) still experienced some of the life of the independent Indian peoples and villages before their subjugation to the rubber extracting regime. The Kwazá suffered more from the ravages caused by conquest and resultant the dispersal and population decline. They allied themselves with the Aikaná and this resulting marriage produced the sibling set of the current cacique and the informal leader, all of whom, by influence of their mother are bilingual (up to the point that the leader served as the primary informant of Van der Voort that recently studied this isolated language; Van der Voort 2000). All but one of these siblings married Aikaná women. The older children of the leader and informant also speak Kwazá because their grandparents used to live with them in the forest. Their grandmother taught them the language in daily life. When the living situation changed, the younger children lost the opportunity and hence the ability to speak this language. Research shows that children become true bilingual speakers if they learn the languages before they turn seven (Dalgalian 2000: 25). Slowly, therefore, the use of Kwazá is declining and is not passed on to all of the potential bilingual (or often potentially trilingual) speakers. Some of the brothers, stimulated by their patrilineal inheritance, want to adhere to the Aikaná ethnic identify, the dominant ethnic group in the area[lxxv]. Their father did not learn the language of his Aikaná-speaking wife.

As the example of this older couple shows, the Aikaná language prevails over any other existing language. This represents one of the unfortunate dangers of a further *glebalization* of the Latundê. The youngest sister's presence in the Gleba weakens the group's reproductive potential (it still would not solve the exogamy problem). In terms of her language, she is improving the Portuguese that she uses to communicate with her husband and is learning Aikaná too. At the same time, Batatá's presence maintains her Latundê ability. The bilingualism of the Aikaná could be a stimulus for the Latundê to copy the same model and improve on their Portuguese without abandoning their own language. The permanence of Aikaná seems further assured by the teaching of the language to all infants and the newly introduced *bilingual education*. Notwithstanding the positive value that accrues to the native practice of language maintenance by virtue of the institutional support, locally maintenance may be complicated. The daughter of the same Aikaná-Kwazá couple mentioned above is a speaker of both languages. Her husband's surname

is *Sabané,* but his father actually was a prominent Lakondê. He is only a passive speaker of his ancestral language, and so tends to speak Portuguese[lxxvi]. As a result, his children (at least the oldest sons) favor Portuguese and are not well disposed to speaking Aikaná. The most dominant language in the regional context begins to make some inroads in the Territory and the teacher complained that, after the recent introduction of the Indian language at the school, their negative attitude towards the utility of Aikaná began to influence the other children. Subsequently, some of the grandchildren of the same Kwazá woman who took pains to maintain her language with her children and her grandchildren she lived with, now has a some grandchildren only interested in the major dominant language and averse to the diverse Indian languages spoken around them by own their family. A rapid and probably common pattern of language shift is evident. The last Lakondê generation to experience some semblance of Indian village life speaks at least one or two Indian languages and are even reputed to have had traditional knowledge and to be traditional minded, but one of the few people of the next generation became a passive bilingual when the Lakondê dispersed and lived and worked among Brazilians; finally, with his mixed marriage, it are his older children who are choosing the hegemonic regional and national language.

School language is predominantly Portuguese. The introduction of an officially sponsored language program, although a clear and much needed sign of progress and respect, still does not extend further than the appointment of a *bilingual Indian educator* and limited usage of the language as a teaching tool in class. It is treated as if it was a foreign language, and receives attention only a few hours a week. The limited use does not compare to the total immersion method, when the Indian language would actually be the dominant language, without the exclusion of Portuguese (its use should be gradually expanded)[lxxvii]. The school represents a powerful means of acculturation if the contemporary national reviews of school curriculum do not take certain specificities into account. As for the Latundê, just like the Indian health agent, their future school teacher is one of the younger brothers of the informal leader and who is also one of the main beneficiaries of the school construction in *the Barroso* area (because his children can stay at their home in the forest instead of having to live at the village and pay the additional costs such a change implies). In such a small school, an Aikaná teacher and bilingual education seem unlikely. Furthermore, that still leaves open the question of which language is to be encouraged. It remains to be seen whether in the future the Latundê children or young adults shall visit the school

regularly and, even if so, whether their language will feature in the curriculum. They do demonstrate interest in the school and the older ones also show interest in further mastering their traditional language. This is apparent in the two young adults and their younger siblings when they attend the school in the Aikaná village during their irregular visits[lxxviii]. The newly appointed Latundê representative had an affair with one of daughters of his Aikaná affine who is much older than his wife, and who also happens to be one of the new teachers in the Territory (both called Luis). Apparently, he plans to marry the slightly older woman with a child and trade her position with the assigned teacher for *the Barroso*. Then they could live in Barroso, enjoy a regular salary and support the schooling of their children. Maybe he even contemplates studying himself in order to qualify to be the indigenous health agent. Such a situation would be an ingenious solution for a variety of the problems, but essentially depends on a precarious personal arrangement that in 2001 shows signs of turbulence. Tactically the situation is even more complicated; both moves require uncertain political maneuvers. The future hinges on many uncertainties.

The prospect of relevant schooling, bilingual education and their supportive assets for language maintenance leaves much to be desired. The necessary institutional patronizing may not be forthcoming for a group of approximately ten children and so an uncertain ethnic future awaits them. Luis Latundê believes that one belongs to the group of the language that one speaks. His belief entails that if he marries the Aikaná teacher he should teach any child his own language for him to be a Latundê and foster the persistence of his own people and language. This too does not appear to be an easy task although arguably should be easier if he lives closer to the Latundê village and ensures their children's school attendance. If his perspective is shared by his kin in the village (a likely fact, but it could not be verified), than two other components of this complex situation come into play. First, there are the linguistic capabilities of his father. Mané Torto lost his parents through assassination when still an infant during a raid by other Northern Nambikwara Indians, perhaps the same people that raised him as their own. Like the accusations of the Latundê against the Mamaindê, these raids entailed a mechanism to steal women and children to demographically strengthen the group. This apparently occurred very frequently after the problems associated with contact, various epidemics, and Cinta Larga attacks. Internecine demographic predation, so to speak, among the Northern Nambikwara in this situation generated more deaths and thus aggravated the

general demographic reservoir for the Northern cluster. In this sense, the sociocultural mechanism to react against the nefarious effects of *contact* only reinforced the very cause. Mané asserts the action extinguished his people[lxxix]. Raised afterwards as a Tawandê, he probably did not acquire a bilingual fluency in his native language but reached only a passive level of competence. Accordingly, when incorporated within the small Latundê group, he insisted that his wives learned to speak Portuguese, even when Terezinha strongly opposed this for some time. She finally gave in. This language is a very insufficient medium for her. Her husband actually does not display a great competence either, yet, given his dominant position, he assured that their children were spoken to in Portuguese. If it is valid to extrapolate from the contemporary way of socializing and enculturing the children, then the post-contact generation grew up being addressed in the outsider's language and learned to speak this language as their primary language.

This may come as a surprise as the group maintained a certain isolation after the hazardous and disastrous first four or five post-contact years. The tragedy of these years caused a profound impact on the survivors, some of whom barely survived the epidemics[lxxx]. Other calamities were manmade. The Yelelihrê man who was in reality the one brought in by Fonseca to *assist* him at the *pacification* but who confronted the angry Latundê by talking to them and letting them vent their ire and hostility, thought up his own scheme of dealing with this group. The newly discovered Indians spoke a dialect so close to his own that his sister asserts that he claimed that the language is the same as his own (like mentioned above, he affirmed them to be partially of his own people). His designs, according to his younger sister, referred to dislocating the Latundê and providing them with the ability and example to improve their original living conditions. Again an Indian with some experience with regional society and its project of acculturation – who apparently considered this people as his brethren – apparently deemed them as backward and in need of instruction in some of the Brazilian sociocultural practices and beliefs[lxxxi]. He believed that he pursued a course of policy that should benefit the group very recently coming out of isolation. Without the knowledge of the FUNAI officials and in the absence of the Indian agent from the Nambiquara Project, he convinced a large part of the group to visit Aroeira, hitching a lift on a truck, with little or no clothing or other amenities. Aroeira is the site of the relocated remainders of other Northern peoples and the local Southern local group all very much affected by their very difficult and stressing

contact history. When the Latundê arrived there, they were in a precarious and vulnerable position in a foreign territory. Whatever the real purpose of the man, a *strong man* (a 'natural' leader), the Indians at Aroeira abused the fragility of the Latundê, using, for example, the women for sexual intercourse. All peoples being small and shattered by contact, the Indians general policy actually pursued the goal of incorporating the new group especially envisioning espousing the women, adopting the children and, perhaps, exploiting the workforce of the men. The Latundê did not appreciate this abuse and succeeded, at great cost, to return to their homeland.

This traumatic experience must have contributed to the general weakening of the Latundê resistance. As mentioned, slightly after contact, one of the few adult men was found dead in the savanna. The cause of death was likely a fatal arrow shot, but the investigation never concluded. The assassination undoubtedly generated more tension. These unfortunate events were followed by a transient period when a part of the people lived at the Aikaná village and their patron/manager and the other two languages, Portuguese and Aikaná were dominant. This traumatic era with the almost total failure of the official *protection* agency ended with the death of the older generation and the retreat into the *Barroso* area occurred under Mané's leadership. The imprint of the outsider and his precarious Portuguese ability becomes understandable. This is another result of the historical contingencies that caused so much mayhem among this formerly independent, autonomous and ethnocentric group suffered. Despite a number of serious problems, these people accomplished fairly well their sociocultural and linguistic reproduction. Both the resistance and final giving-in of the Latundê wives and the rest of the group stems from post-contact fragility. Although they were seriously weakened, they seem to have resisted to the best of their ability. The post-contact generation thus grew up learning first of all a variant of Portuguese and only passively became bilingual in their own Latundê language. This biased bilingual ability represents the balance of political prominence of the ethnic outsider and should not have happened if any effective *protection* had been given[lxxxii]. This attitude is even more impressive considering that the entire older generation speaks the language very badly and the oldest members of the senior generation (Batatá and Cinzeiro) do not speak it at all[lxxxiii]. Terezinha demonstrates a very basic command of Portuguese but manages to communicate fairly easily with her children. The only other family shows an extremely limited competence that makes one wonder how the mother communicates complex matters to her

children. Only the closeness and daily mixing of the new generations of the two families explains how these other offspring succeeded in learning some Portuguese. Their aunt Terezinha confirms the interaction gave the two older nephews a passive knowledge of Latundê (Telles 2002: 23). As the boys learned an inadequate Portuguese from their mother, they display deficiencies in both languages. These children represent a kind of worst-case scenario as far as language acquisition goes.

This acculturation process that mainly resulted from turning an outsider into a group member is a two way process. The destructurization of the Latundê cleared the way for the imposition of an outside model of *work* and *language* via the incorporation of the outsider socialized in circumstances basically dominated by the exploitation and forced acculturation by Brazilian patrons. On the other hand, the group incorporated Mané and transformed his language and possibly some sociocultural attitudes. For instance, the most influential couple and caretakers of the adolescent girl agree on the necessity of the seclusion period (the father and her aunt she calls mother). When the girl had her first menstruation and nothing was done, the proper moment for enclosure passed. At the time they believed that the situation was too unfavorable to practice this rite of passage. The couple of the older generation both agreed about the maintenance of an important particular ritual. Researchers consider the seclusion to be a characteristic Northern Nambikwara rite that used to be present among all of its peoples and thus this practice probably is seen as traditional by both partners. Given the argument above, the ritual's performance implies both securing the health of the girl and guaranteeing a healthy future generation. The aunt alleged several reasons for postponement and affirmed the wish to hold the seclusion ritual later. Whether this will happen is uncertain, as the general context of the Territory does not appear very encouraging for cultural revival. In this sense, the wish may indicate a more general desire to continue to adhere to their sociocultural practices and conceptions. Despite Mané's presence as a Tawandê among the Latundê, their two cultures overlap often and so both have a mutual longing for the maintenance of certain rituals and customs. As to other ceremonies, however, Mané sometimes imposes his version upon the entire group. Included is a Tawandê variant of a feast where the men play *flutes*, both a variety of secret ones and another of public access[lxxxiv]. During our first visit, the Indians decided to demonstrate some of their culture and the feast held included these *flutes* – which actually constitute a kind of trumpets – an instrument unknown to

the Latundê. Terezinha reluctantly confided to us that they used to sing and circle around the patio without any accompaniment and she and the Latundê, significantly restricted to the women and their brother Cinzeiro, decided to demonstrate their own version of the ritual after. In this manner both the Latundê and the Tawandê culture are currently present in some aspects to various degrees.

The cultural information and training transmitted by Mané's *uncle*, a Tawandê leader and shaman, prevail in Mané's conception of what their Indian cultural heritage should be. Sometimes this inheritance coincides with Latundê practices and sometimes it does not, and this creates a tension within the group. On the other hand, as his linguistic competence did not extend to a full bilingualism, the same tension did not exist in regards to the original Indian language. Not being qualified to vie in this respect with the fully developed skills of the Latundê, Mané actually has been acculturated in the Latundê language. According to his oldest son, he did not speak very well at first but now he speaks the language suitably. In fact, once and a while his father holds long speeches within the kitchen construction (partially open house beside the main house and the usual place to stay during the day), while the other present members of the household and neighbors go about their business apparently without giving his monologue too much attention (his wife, older sons and even the neighbors). He appears comfortable expressing himself at these moments and, despite appearances, the people minding their own activities sometimes show signs of paying attention[lxxxv]. This important aspect of the household communication indicates that the Latundê language is adopted by all of the older people and remains a significant means of expression that confronts the younger generation not divided by ethnic cleavages and some of the tensions of their seniors. As is always the case, the people are quite aware of some of the major differences in culture and language with their neighbors and the older people take a reflexive position of preserving their own distinctive sociocultural and linguistic patrimony. This is evident in the maintenance of the rituals, like the attempt to actualize the seclusion of adolescent girls, the playing of trumpets, and the acknowledgement of the uniqueness of the Latundê language. All adults who commented on their language and its permanence expressed the desire for language competence to be upheld as a means for comprehensive and daily use among group members. Mané even remarked that the recognition of *indianidade* is strongly related to the presence of language and so he favors its use. In spite of the teaching of

Portuguese under his own inspiration, the solution implemented has been to teach the younger generation to assume fluency in the Indian language when reaching adolescence or young adulthood. This is what happened for his two oldest sons who effectively mastered the language, appreciate its value and use it daily. Their newly maturing sister Maria is being taught the language by the older people and particularly by her mother. The mother commented that she really is improving her proficiency, albeit on more than one occasion she denied knowing the language to us, apparently feeling some shame imposed by outsiders. It is remarkable how this pattern replicates the process of linguistic socialization of their father. He had limited Portuguese as primary language, and a passive ability of the native language and as an adult became proficient.

This desire and will to maintain their own language is noticeable in the praise or criticism directed to the minor boys who possess a greater or lesser passive command of Latundê. One of the oldest sons observed the lesser language command of the next-oldest brother and prodded him to improve his language while his mother approvingly commented that her youngest son *spoke the language*. The adults normally tend to speak Latundê among themselves. They usually do so when discussing history or Indian affairs but habitually use Portuguese if the subject refers to outside business. Latundê still is probably the more frequently used language in daily life (Telles 2002: 23). Notwithstanding the positive attitude and these expressions of the adherence to the value and continuity of their own language, the adults consistently converse in Portuguese with the children and the latter systematically reciprocate in that language. Moreover, we noticed that in daily life the children used Portuguese amongst themselves. They switched to Latundê once in order to discuss something privately about the linguist Telles in her presence, as a kind of secret language. This kind of usage seems to be one of the major reasons for talking among themselves at the Aikaná village and one stimulus for language maintenance. The incident shows that most or all children can adopt an active competence even when hardly using this language in normal daily life. Still, the Portuguese spoken is their primary language, the major one of socialization and enculturation in detriment of the native language, although in a manner encompassing their daily life, the latter tends to be reduced to passive capacity and active competence is only occasionally present during childhood. Either out of modesty stemming from the conscience of her limitations or because of the virtual shame attached by outsiders to their native language, Maria claimed not to know this language at all,

even when her elders pointed out that she did.

The Portuguese spoken shows many particularities in lexical, syntactical and, especially, intonational aspects. The variety spoken derives heavily from a regional, pre-migration form of the language. The multitude of variants of the contemporary situation in Eastern Rondônia has not yet been consolidated into a new regional accent. Isolation and the presence of a native language lent it a specific quality that renders the current speech form almost into a pidgin or possibly a creolizing language (Telles 2002: 22-3). The lexical and syntactical elements are mainly an impoverished regional variant. The most distinctive feature is its musicality that owes its rhythm to the native language. Overall, these characteristics impede an easy understanding for the outside Brazilian speaker who sometimes, especially at first, loses himself in the nominally identical language. At the Aikaná village, older speakers tend to harmonize their Portuguese with the other Indians and even the children seem to be cowed into curbing their melodious speech. A quite peculiar version of Portuguese must be the result of the same initial traumatic conditions of the low point in Latundê history that shaped the acceptance of this language. A variant transformed by the particular proficiency of the only speaker also bound to engage in a reciprocal learning process that forged something new, a Latundê Portuguese dialect. Under Mané's influence, the Latundê language adopted (or perhaps more accurately, was imposed with) a variety of lexical elements of Tawandê (in itself a sign of his passive command of a native language). Terezinha identifies these lexical changes if requested to comment on such loanword, (which may be more accurately considered an imposed word), she still can produce a Latundê synonym. However, for both cases of learning another language linguistic research holds that: "*It is commonplace in second-language learning, for example, that learning to* put in *elements of the target language which have no counterpart in the native language is much harder than learning to* leave out" (Wilkens apud Dorian 1981: 92-3). For instance, most striking to outside speakers, even in proper names the gender suffixation in Portuguese can be used as if equivalent, producing variants of Lurdes like Lurda and of Luis like Luiza. Moreover, it is possible that when the language is really learned at adolescence (the sons) or adulthood (from the basis of a previously latent close dialect), it may undergo morphological and phonological simplification of the original richness. Certain simplifying phenomena have been noted, amongst the newest native speakers, especially with the respect to loss of phonemes least similar with Portuguese (Telles 2002). It is

also quite likely that the younger generation analyzes these imposed lexical items as Latundê words. The language may undergo a reduction of the more complex structural features. Typically, such changes commence in the phonology (Telles 2001, personal communication).

In other similar circumstances in which parents spoke one language amongst themselves and a dominant one with their children, children are known to have acquired fluency by adulthood (Dorian 1981). Still, even early passive speakers may demonstrate a limit to proficiency and complete linguistic mastery if active speech acquisition occurred after the age of seven. There is also the likelihood that the differing conditions of social life result in an impoverishment of the cultural conceptions and practices. For example, the possibility of the loss or impoverishment of a sociocultural system and idiom like the kinship relationship terms that we have not been able to solicit may have serious cultural repercussions. Such a change can even occur when the community is bilingual and the native language still prospers and constitutes the sole vehicle of other rituals still performed enthusiastically[lxxxvi]. The vicissitudes of the reintroduction of the seclusion ritual, where both sociocultural Northern Nambikwara Indian traditions coincide, not held at the proper time or even when the situation seems to be permit its viability, shows the troublesome state of affairs of active and reflexive sociocultural and linguistic maintenance. With these epitomes of language and cultural change the situation probably approximates that in which occur other contexts of language shift during which the community usually is unaware that young fluent speakers may simplify their language performance and that the sociolinguistic factors account for a high degree of change "(...) *even among fully fluent, language-loyal speakers of a threatened language*" (Dorian 1981: 154)[lxxxvii].

The interdependency of the sociocultural domain and the linguistic means of expression correlate the impoverishments of both domains to each other, sometimes serving as each other's mirror images, and sometimes one precedes the other. This, even when the deeper structural features of language drift do not directly correlate with culture change (Sapir n.d.: 218-9); it should hardly be surprising that it brings about the loss of one the "*treasures of humanity*" and "*a storehouse of the power of expression and profound comprehension of the universe*" (linguists Zepeda and Hill 1991: 49). A general tendency to impoverishment can be anticipated in this case, which by the loss of what might

be called ‘distinguishing complex features’, might lead to a “*pseudo death*” (Wurm 1991: 15). Some indications of this process have been noted, like the loss of shamanic capabilities, a very serious privation in a universe populated by dangerous supernatural entities. Just like among the Yanomami, this fact causes not just a strong anxiety regarding the lack of protection to body and soul, but, in all likelihood, includes the loss of creative and reproductive sociocultural characteristics of shamans. When the Yanomami shamans specialize in curing they also learn the complex intellectual form of culture with myths, cosmological concepts, ceremonial discourse and conceptual fundaments. With the deprival of shamanic learning “(...) *el universo pierde su coherencia y su significacion. La vida intelectual se retrae, la lengua empobrece*” (Lizot 1999: 43; also Tierney 2000). Our fieldwork does not permit any definite conclusions but the indications available justify the hypothesis for the case of the Latundê. In this sense, the particular blending historically created inflects towards the unexpected renewal and probable maintenance of a part of the Tawandê culture, strongly promoted by Mané who also recounted the history of his adopted family and their myths and conceptions. He regards this as an important task and his wife apparently accepts a certain male predominance in this respect. She only recounted to us a myth her father had told her after our insistence and corollary valorization of her own transmitted sociocultural patrimony. In contrast, Mané recorded various myths and historical stories of his own choosing as a reflection and demonstration of both his authority and his special knowledge. This may result in the paradoxical situation that these Tawandê myths are preserved by the Latundê while being lost in the original language among the group of Tawandê in Aroeira (where, significantly, the oldest fluent generation strongly adheres to shamanism)[lxxxviii].

In conclusion, the sociocultural and linguistic patrimony of the Latundê changed in the post-contact catastrophe and the incorporation of Mané and his different ethnic origin . In my sense, the contemporary sociocultural and linguistic situation represents a new configuration with a large component of dispossession and persistence of the original Latundê, the introduction of Tawandê elements, the Portuguese language, and of industrial commodities where one observes an amalgamation of loss, resilience and re-creation of these diverse traditions into a new mélange. Of course, to the Latundê their own particular transformed blend will, in the ethnic sense of being conceptualized by themselves and others as a distinct patrimony still be peculiarly *Latundê* – even when impoverished from an

extraneous diachronic perspective. As I noticed above, the introduction of Mané very probably assured the continuity of the people, while transforming Latundê culture and language with advantages and disadvantages. As to the language, only a real proficiency test can verify the proposition of language simplification, yet the contemporary speech behavior strongly indicates the probability of decline in performance and complexity. The tendencies in both principal domains (language and culture) represent a clear outcome of the contingencies of the historical process the Latundê suffered as victims and as reflexive agents. A certain quality of being and speaking Latundê is not immediately threatened by their doubly subordinate position originating in the forceful integration into the wider system, the problems of socioeconomic articulation, and especially the necessity of construing a new world view and constructing marriage alliances. Yet these issues do pose enormous problems of reproduction as a people in the near future, of how to attain the social, cultural, economic and demographic viability required to continue to be a self-conceived distinctive ethnic, sociocultural and linguistic group.

A short review of the future of the people's language maintenance manifests how opposing current tendencies make the scenario contingent on a number of relevant factors. The preservation of their language depends on a particularly diverse range of issues. In favor there are a significant number of factors. First, the disposition of adults to teach the language, stimulate its use, the general intent to maintain it, the group's loyalty and the decision not to abandon the language. This appears to resolve the issues of the status of the group's relation to their language and they demand to make a conscious decision and effort to maintain it, especially with respect to the post-contact generation. Regaining their own autonomous village, at a distance from other peoples and the demographic recuperation in the past prepared the minimal conditions for the existence of a post-contact generation that, at least so far, has demonstrated to learn and value the language. The durable possession of an exclusive home territory is essential to maintain a separate sociocultural sphere where one can be Latundê without recriminations. Latundê functioning as a secret language in other villages may help convince the younger generation. The conceived relation by the elders to ethnicity and the essence of distinctiveness also may play an important role. Today official pushes to respect and cherish native languages should be creating a more favorable atmosphere. Also worthy of consideration is the inverse, the negative image and disapproval of official agencies of people not

speaking their language. In a similar way, elder people critique the younger generations of Tawandê and Sabanê for being less than bilingual and this count as a more diffuse general support. The example of the Aikaná, their most immediate relevant Indian neighbors, and their pragmatical full bilingualism (despite some initial difficulties), fully demonstrates this possibility. Lastly, when people like Telles and me expressed interest in the language, prestige and value is conferred to it[lxxxix]. These sociocultural vectors are cited in works on language shift as contributing to language maintenance. Maybe they do not exhaust the total number of possible positive components. The complete set does point to the possibility of maintenance as the Latundê conceive of it as the ethnic language of a distinct people.

On the other hand, an equal or perhaps even larger set of factors militate against the continuance of the language as an operational and fully functional tool. There is the small size of the community and the dubious likelihood of continuous demographic recovery, as evident in the genetic problems, a continued dispersal of members, and the possibility of renewed outward migration that leaves certain members permanently in a different linguistic environment. Furthermore, the bilingualism of the young adults relies increasingly heavily on Portuguese as contacts with the Aikaná and the outside increase. The domestic domain is conceived of as the usual bastion of resistance to change, and it is here that especially the older children are regularly encouraged to speak Latundê and acquire the language. Yet, the children are socialized in Portuguese and, by the Indians' own appraisal, this negatively affects some of the younger children's competence in Latundê. There is the distinct possibility that the younger generation feels *shame* for speaking their native language. This phenomenon was noted above in Maria's refusal to admit speaking ability. Educational issues include the very uncertain teaching of the language in school, the unlikely introduction of Latundê bilingual education, and the bad example of a younger generation's resistance to indigenous languages and bilingual education of one family of mixed ethnicity in the Gleba. Culturally, there is the general label of primitiveness ascribed to this language and politically the domination by other ethnic groups that may affect the indispensable self-esteem of the people. The problem of demographic reproduction if solved by mixed marriages, will transform the indispensable alliances into obstacles for easy language transmission. The general utility of Portuguese in the post-contact phase where the younger generation observes its necessity and social dominance, including the

habitual negative image of *Indians* and their languages in the overwhelming surrounding national society (many of these preconceptions are present among almost all members of the agencies responsible for *protection* and health care). The collection of possible adverse vectors seems to offset the set of positive factors. The question of which will prevail awaits a firmer answer.

In a way the very continuance of this small group of people is at stake. *Survival* will demand a social creativity and engineering of the Latundê and, preferably (but highly problematically), a more efficient and efficacious action by FUNAI appropriate for these constraints and contingencies. As far as any sociological exercise of foresight of the future is valid, there is an array of virtualities in the summation of factors of continuity and change but in general they convey the notion of a threatened people. This danger is compounded as the culture and language are already impoverished from a combination of sociocultural conditions. All of the constituents of the sociocultural situation in the preceding paragraph may be vectors of a language shift away from the native language. Perhaps this will not be an immediate change, but the constraints definitely shape a slow process of erosion. The younger generation may reduce the Latundê language away from the complex richness so much so that it may eventually be reduced to a vocabulary or even disappear altogether. Language survival depends on native language maintenance. In this regard, the foremost element may be Latundê adults' loyalty to the language. The major favorable component here concerns the inclusion of the new generation already grown up in a fundamentally different situation of adverse relations of dominance. Their historical experience tends to direct them to be impressed by the outside world and the limited values of the Latundê language (as a medium and the low esteem of other peoples). From these assumptions, resulting from the historical contingencies, hypothesizing about the future cannot be very constructive. At the most, the scenarios forecasts an array of possibilities, with at the extremes both language death and full maintenance, the only certainty is a difficult period for the native language to avoid language death and ensure maintenance.

Perhaps then, among the specific heritages of the Latundê tradition, their language is, due to the contingencies and the structural components of their particular history, the foremost candidate for extinction. No threatened language is automatically condemned though (Dorian 1981: 110). Change is, of course, always the real nature of culture and language and no merely mechanical process

of maintenance and reproduction exists. As Lévi-Strauss once said, permanence and sociocultural continuity is in need of explanation, not just sociocultural change or language drift. The problem here is, evidently, that the *life or death* of the language (as maintenance or language shift are often called) depends only partially on the speakers themselves. Thus, while the Latundê constitute the essential core of the language maintenance as fully capable and reflexive intentional agents, when they find themselves surrounded by several adverse social forces, the outlook looks gloomy. Then again, as the Latundê demonstrated a surprising resilience in the past, having recuperated against major odds during a terrible time in their history, perhaps they will creatively resolve this ordeal of the future being as they are armed with the intent and the desire. Time will tell. Let the steady flow of time enable the musical flow of Latundê.

Notes

[i] It must be noted that as 1975-1980 featured comparatively more anthropologists in the bureaucracy, relatively well-qualified anthropologists conducted the research. Many times FUNAI also employed people in the created bureaucratic post called *anthropologist* who were utterly without any qualifications. Additionally, such posts demand expert knowledge that the academic anthropologists rarely possess.

[ii] For several reasons the following account cannot be anonymous so personal names are used to give the situation a more personal feel. In a community as small as this one, personalities and personal characteristic take on a great importance for the constitution of social life and its reproduction.

[iii] Much later it was also suggested that Batatá too is somewhat simpleminded but not in the same way as Cinzeiro. In that case, whatever the exact nature of her disability, the general loss would be still worse.

[iv] Real macaws were absent in 1999, but there were several varieties of parakeets (differentiated by habitat) and small macaws. Later on a young parrot was caught and given to Terezinha. In August 2000, she caught macaws; they nested in the savanna near the village at the time of contact (an area that came to be known as *Campo do Barroso*).

[v] It is unclear why she would want to remain childless. It is tempting to speculate that the tense pre-contact situation has something to do with it. It is also unclear how she avoided getting pregnant, perhaps she consumed certain plants to prevent fertilization or induce abortion.

[vi] For the revision and discussion of some of Lévi-Strauss's original ideas, see

Price (1981b) and Part III.
[vii] The marriage of Cinzeiro and José's mother implies that the two older couples probably did not result from an exchange between two pairs of brother-sisters for that would mean marrying his aunt (FZ), in an improbable inversion of oblique marriage. Oblique marriage was postulated by Lévi-Strauss but Price and Fiorini found no supporting evidence.
[viii] According to one of the three sisters, Batatá is the sister of her maternal grandmother. The age difference between the mother and the great aunt was not that large, however.
[ix] She visited Dona Tereza after a suggestion made by myself and the linguist Gabriel Antunes, see Part II. For political and ethnic reasons she considers the two as *languages*, despite the closeness. I agree with this judgment, the difference between dialect and language depends on sociopolitical context.
[x] The Lakondê, in the person of the already quoted speaker of the language and her brother who actually made contact with the Latundê in the contact period, did not retain any memories about the moment or size of the group that she now supposes to have split away from the main group because of the language.
[xi] Recall that this whole area consists of largely rather infertile soils except near the Pimenta River. Much of the forest near the savanna is made up of varying degrees of lower levels of vegetation and much of the soil is sandy.
[xii] Another courtesy of Stella Telles; she, in turn, received the small number of photographs from Santos, Price's former collaborator.
[xiii] Caution is necessary as it is disputed how many people are required for a viable self sustaining endogamous group.
[xiv] Both curiosity and care for defence also induced ranging through the region to learn about resources and possible enemies. On one of these occasions one man reached the Pimenta River but Terezinha herself never went there. Living in a hostile world possibly also makes one reliant on familiar settings and does not encourage ventures too far.
[xv] The stereotypes of poverty and nomadism were among the most tenacious. They and others circulate in many forms as *facts* (especially because corrections do not achieve the same publicity as a work like *Tristes Tropiques* has).
[xvi] According to Marcelo Santos (in a personal communication to Telles), all Nambikwara groups once had their own variety of maize. For many years Santos served as the agent at the Mamaindê or Negarotê Post and he is well acquainted with the Nambikwara, especially those of the northern region. For more on ecological adaptations of a people from the Chapada dos Parecis savanna and the

Guaporé Valley, see Setz (1983).
[xvii] This map, and others prepared by a geography study can found on Internet.
[xviii] At a later stage these 'path lines' are often transformed into fences.
[xix] As suggested by João del Poz (2001; personal communication) this complex now totally destroyed by the conquest, reminds one of the Alto Xingu. Some older Aikaná still carry the memories of, for example, the head-ball game contest between hosts and visiting groups, which included exchanging arrows, and betting. Generally speaking, the relations between these peoples of unrelated languages probably involved a series of exchanges (see also the works of Van der Voort). One notable feature is that most or all practiced different forms of cannibalism. The Aikaná probably lived up farther north and came south because of conflicts with unallied peoples and rubber collectors.
[xx] Such insect larvae grow in rotting trees and are a prized food and a source of protein. The Latundê adore this food and know which larva belong to which species of tree and whether it is edible.
[xxi] The club seems to be like the ceremonial weapon used in ritual dances and might be used to lance or hit someone. Nowadays these are called *swords* in Portuguese and only appear in rituals. Real clubs are not currently made by the Latundê so it remains unclear what is actually meant here.
[xxii] He delivered this remark with a smile, if the man wanted to lead the expedition, let him bear the brunt.
[xxiii] In time the Latundê were hemmed in by pressure from the Mamaindê (east), the road from Vilhena to Porto Velho (north), the road from the Porto Velho to Chupinguaia (west) and the Pimenta River (south). This territory was later subject to INCRA *colonization*.
[xxiv] The same Aikaná narrator reported that a Mamaindê told him that the Latundê *were many when living near* [the town of] *Colorado*, near the frontier with Mato Grosso and the attacks of the Indians caused depopulation and the flight into Rondônia. This supports the sketch of a migration route outlined earlier.
[xxv] Although I collected a little data on the subject (that is not always considered taboo), it is remarkable that the very high age reached by a recently deceased wandering Kwazá woman is generally attributed to her consumption of human flesh, particularly of the head (eating the brain with roasted maize). In many other Indian cultures, by the way, obtains a general aversion to consuming meat with blood. Ironically, the source quoted for the knowledge about the suction of the blood is himself renowned for having eaten another Aikaná. The

man later married into the victim's family and all of them now live on the Tubarão/Latundê Territory.

[xxvi] The Latundê usually refer to the Aikaná as Tubarão (though they pronounce it Tabarão). Similarly, I too use Tubarão and Aikaná interchangeably in this text.

[xxvii] It remains unclear exactly how much time elapsed between the expeditions but it must have been at least one or two years, again indicative of Aikaná reluctance. Apparently hardly any or no other contacts occurred in this time.

[xxviii] In a sense analogical to *amansar* an animal, breaking and taming an animal to live in the company of man and to be utilized by an owner. Price (1983b) already mentioned the importance and implication of terms like *taming Indians.* He writes that in the past, some Whites spoke of *domar*, to break, the Indians in the same way that one breaks in a wild horse. This is not always just a figure of speech. When the police repressed what they thought was a revolt of the Pataxó of southern Bahia, some of the prisoners were subjected to a bridle and ridden as if animals (Florent Kohler 2003, personal communication).

[xxix] His credibility is difficult to establish. I met and interviewed the man in his home in a town of Rondônia with a credential of a friend of his living in Chupinguaia (the interview lasted about two hours). He evidently exercised some caution and restraint because he is aware of his bad reputation in some circles. Still, seemingly convinced of the correctness of his acts, the following appears to be reasonably faithful to his vantage point.

[xxx] It must be noted that this edited reproduction mostly follows the narrators sequence and the very points he himself came up with are stressed in the flow of the dialogue. That is, concepts like *work* and *laziness* figure immediately in his own presentation of himself and his life history.

[xxxi] He also mentions buying things with his own money when needed. In fact, as his current house and other testimony of his period at the Aikaná attest, he did not make a fortune out of these managerial and intermediating activities. The major motivation seems to be ideational and have nothing to do with corrupt intentions, contrary to many similar cases.

[xxxii] The name Arara, Macaw, was regionally used for the Kwazá. In the FUNAI's registration one encounters the surname Arara for the Kwazá. Other peoples also received this denomination. The name "Macaw People" might have been applicable to the Latundê because of their domestic habit of earlier times of keeping these birds in a specially built house.

[xxxiii] The narrator stresses his later firm relations with the Indians. In his view he established an amity with most Indians, both Aikaná and Latundê. Of course,

as is common in Brazil, this can be an asymmetrical, paternalistic *amity.* Remember he entered the Service as *a favor to a friend*.

[xxxiv] The man died from measles, although *wild* caused admiration too because of his demonstrated *valour* (*valente*) and the narrator laments this unnecessary early death.

[xxxv] At this point the narrator mentioned he did take a Sabanê with him before but he also did not establish oral communication. The captain, on the other hand, was not impressed with the linguistic capabilities of these prior participants.

[xxxvi] Rondon's famous mandate not to kill but, if need be, be killed, does not mean walking about unarmed or not using a show of arms but enjoins, if necessary to save lives, shooting over the heads of any assailant to shy him away. It is unclear if Fonseca was aware of this rule or if he had the authority to restrain his companions if necessary. Perhaps the Indian captain had more authority.

[xxxvii] He offered this fact with absolute tranquility, but recall that the paperwork discussed includes documents in Tolkdorf's hand dating from 1979 and the *pacification* occurred in 1977. He withdrew himself and the Project from offering Latundê assistance that same year but did not die then. This contradiction is inexplicable even when the withdrawal and subsequent lack of communication may have been mistaken for death.

[xxxviii] Other assertions range from *the graveyard I made for them* to *the Indians did not have anything*, especially no land, and *I gave them the land* (this is because of his census and reflects how he went to Brasília with others to ask for land; this was registered in reports of the dossier as visits of the *cacique*).

[xxix] Even though these men probably already had some qualification for the job.

[xl] This fits into a larger pattern of naming a group after an important figure within it. After all, this is exactly what happened with the Tubarão (actually a Tupari Indian of an extinct group living with the Aikaná) and Massacá (an Aikaná). In this case the name of the tuxaua becomes a synecdoche the ethnonym of the group who adopted him

[xli] According to himself, Mané was raised in the Seringal do Faustino, partly by the owners and partly by the older Indians. In 1970 members of a foreign medical survey of the Red Cross considered the conditions there to be near slavery and a disgrace for Brazil and the world. In 1971, Hanbury-Tenison (1973) did not notice any real improvements. Finally, in 1972, another international commission still found the place in bad shape but the Indians commented that things had improved (Brooks et. al. 1973: 39-40). It is in this ambience that Mané grew up and in that sense has suffered from one of the worst social experiences of the

process of *integration* into the national society.
[xlii] Working, as stated, in close collaboration with Stella Telles, this information is a personal communication of the agent to the linguist.
[xliii] For an evaluation of the Project, see Agostinho (1995). He makes it clear that the later developments of small reserves and the transfer of peoples and *Nambikwara* populations derived form the logic of the *obstacle of progress* ideology, in sharp contrast with the Project aims (this issue is examined more closely in Parts II and III).
[xliv] As Mané said: [the agent] *left me here to take care of the people*.
[xlv] Apart from what someone like James Clifford, in a somewhat anxious exaggeration, might call the allegory of the detective story, truth in these cases is an elusive concept, yet its search is relevant. Perhaps the complexity of the *truth* is larger than the simplified positions rendered afterwards. The fallibility of memory, hindsight, and political motives harden points of view and fix them into more rigid affirmations. In a situation of sociocultural diversity, there is also ample room for misunderstanding.
[xlvi] This contrasts with the accepted and documented concept of the Aikaná as hard workers and producers of foodstuffs. Their former manager Fonseca mentioned how he obtained some manioc and monkey meat to supplement his income and live well enough without embezzling from the rubber production. Thus, he too apparently appreciated their efforts contrary to later FUNAI evaluations.
[xlvii] The Latundê speak of Terezinha's younger brother participating too and Mané himself downplays his personal activities in the system. The breakdown occurred so fast that the Aikaná asked whether José still possessed that ball of rubber he had not sold.
[xlviii] The couple had an enormous difficulty in making the Indians stop bathing. The Indians suffering from fever wanted to bathe in the small river along the village but as such conduct tends to worsen the treatment of their illness, much vigilance was necessary. This is a recurrent feature in this kind of situations.
[lix] In Portuguese the regional name for shaman adopted is *curador* or *doutor*, not the more general *pajé*.
[l] In the absence of any government agency like FUNAI in the case above, an anthropologist and missionaries provided the assistance. The absence of mortality does not mean that in general health did not decline.
[li] This seems a typical case in which the dilution of responsibility causes no one to assume major responsibility. Even if someone felt a personal liability, he was

probably thwarted by lack of support from colleagues of the agency where he worked.

[lii] Possibly this is the source of confusion mentioned before about Ferrari's plane being attacked. One might also affirm, by the various examples, that exactness in some of the documents is not necessary for the bureaucratic uses of information and sometimes maybe not even be welcome in presenting the case within the agency and to other agencies.

[liii] This is an old story, in the early forties an expedition explored the upper Pimenta in search of this gold, but apparently only encountered Indians like the Aikaná and their neighbors. They proposed to install a Post but little action followed and the Indians were left in the hands of White exploitation. Rondon endorsed the search and funds were allotted to SPI (Lima 1995: 288-9; Dequech). This episode was missed by almost everyone who was involved with the Aikaná and the region in the production of the documents cited in the dossier. This illustrates the lack of continuity of the protective state action in those days as well as the weak memory of this bureaucracy in the course of time.

[liv] The selling of the *standing wood* by the fazendeiro either substituted the capital he spent to acquire the plot or generated the capital to maintain operations. So, as one indigenist commented about the Corumbiara Area to the south of the Pimenta River, the creation of the *fazendas* requires very little real investment from the owner (Algayer 2001, personal communication). That is, it entails an enormous transference of capital and a perverse concentration of land and income benefiting those who need it least.

[lv] The change in vocabulary results from an increment in contacts with the outside and the growth of the Indian movement in Brazil. The term *captain* stems from an analogous military patent deriving from the days of Rondon, cacique even when an imported word from the Caribbean at least has an Indian etymology.

[lvi] The suspicion of being an accomplice is natural when a former local FUNAI agent is said by the Latundê not at all to have opposed the exploitation of timber a few years ago. These agents are presently one of the weakest chains in the FUNAI bureaucratic structure because they usually are not trained for the job, are mostly employed on a temporary basis, and earn a relatively low salary.

[lvii] Another exploited product that is practically exhausted is palm hearts, the inner parts of palm trees.

[lviii] Some valuable timber still exists in a few areas; for this reason the Sararé area is still in danger of invasion.

[lix] Geffray's proposition (1995) that the law often seems a front to be

circumvented in a profitable manner by some of the local actors in the illegal circuit applies. Still, the idea of creating a law to impose illegal circuit and its attractions must not be exaggerated. Many politicians who accrued wealth from the lumber business before going into politics (a very common phenomenon in the region) lobby for the abolishment of the stricter ecological legislation or its alleviation. Still, in a perverse way, some people such as lower FUNAI employees involved in the control of illegal logging have interest in the continuing appearance of the necessity of the local inspection of repeated invasions. In this case, their salary can regularly receive a very significant supplementation from extra pay received for each day in the *field*.

[lx] There is still about 7 km where the road is impassable. At the beginning of the impassable section, the road diverts to the south, to Mario's household in this neighborhood. He also owns a house at Gleba for his children to frequent school and where he can stay during his regular visits.

[lxi] This is not to say that Telles and I somehow pushed the issue but, as far as we can tell, only stimulated the airing of an old complaint and a more assertive attitude.

[lxii] Already mentioned and quoted before, after being *captain*, this man's personal history involved divorce because of alcoholism and a long period outside the territory. Now others claim that he wanted to return to a leadership role for which they do not see him fit because of his previous record. It was rumored that he wanted to become the *Barroso* representative. His contemporary position as affine to the Latundê enables him to perform a mediating role, for example by providing lodgings when they visit Gleba, and as is clear from his second quote, he claimed to exercise a tutoring role to the young man but actually seemed to want to exercise influence.

[lxiii] This man must not be easy to live with as he has a peculiar understanding of the contemporary world. He was the oldest boy mentioned as still living at the savanna with his father when the latter died. These two boys are the last two Latundê being initially raised in the previous lifestyle and later adopted into the household of Terezinha and Mané. Maybe this background accounts for the difficulty of the oldest man to understand the new situation and find a place in this world after he left the household, lived and worked for other neighbors, and attempted to take care of himself by living in the *fazenda* house.

[lxiv] This predominance of rice may have to do with the filling effect of the grains and the facility of rice cooking in comparison with the difficulty of cooking beans (and the laboriousness of manioc). There may also be the symbolic reason too that

Whites are known as *Bean People* by the Southern Nambikwara. Too many beans would substantiate too much Whiteness (see Part II for a more extended argument about a similar case of a physiology of contact).
[lxv] An exterior that remains foreign and extraneous to their group, as they have not really learned yet from the same outside that they are considered *Brazilian* too.
[lxvi] The size of the fields and Mané's gardening activities must be viewed as more than just an ethics of work, as the FUNAI agent inclines to do. Probably the indigenous model of leadership plays a part as this role prescribes the leader as the most active producer and example of the village (see Part III). Many current features may be considered as simultaneously sociocultural maintenance, renewal and innovation.
[lxvii] It must be added that in these micro-politics the original excuse of "*weakness*" for not returning to the Latundê after her illness certainly was valid, being too weak to make the long walk. Notwithstanding her gradual increase in well-being, however, the permanence of Batatá, with the building of her small house by the Aikaná affine, may also have to do with this circumstance as both this man and his Latundê wife do not posses any regular source of income.
[lxviii] And, I may add, if one looks at the photographs of the pensioners in the dossier and at their bodily form, it is clear to both Telles and me that they may be a bit young.
[lxix] The oldest sons lived with and worked for the Barroso representative. They even picked up some Kwazá but eventually became dissatisfied when perceiving the material exchange as unequal; there was no hard currency involved and the workers were compensated with material goods.
[lxx] Although the selection of the agent proceeds from a *community choice*, there is often a preference by outsiders for someone with some formal education and Portuguese ability. The real choice in these cases is made almost purely in terms of local politics and that may circumvent the concerns of the most interested party, here the Latundê.
[lxxi] As mentioned previously, these FUNAI agents usually are unprepared men from the lower middle class and are instilled with the dominant ethnic ideology from the surrounding population. They learn the idiom of *acculturation* with the negative connotation attributed to Indians *who are already acculturated* (citation from one agent), reified, for example, in the very fluency in Portuguese. Many believe the Indian languages to be a *dialect* or even *slang* (very common in colonial situations; Wurm 1991: 5); very rarely are they interested to the point of

learning some of the language save for a few key words. Only one of the dedicated agents of the Nambiquara Project succeeded in acquiring fluency in Southern Nambikwara.

[lxxii] We have not obtained an explanation that accounts for the normal children of the youngest sister, unless, perhaps, her lesser fertility could be attributed to the fact that she too did not go through the seclusion rite. Her daughter apparently does not suffer from any kind of physical or mental defect.

[lxxiii] José's sister did not have any children with her new husband either and so this is a dead end for the presence of any kind of cross cousin.

[lxxiv] Once more, it proved impossible to establish a genealogy to clarify these relationships but, as seen, it seems fair to conclude that José pertains to a cross affinal relationship. Additionally, the uncle interested is the same one who tried to find a life between the old traditional way of life and the outside in his own peculiar way. He is considered somewhat odd by the other Indians in the Territory (lessening his chance to an interethnic match).

[lxxv] According to some comments from pure Aikaná, they are not really considered as full members of this people and though they speak fluently, their slightly different accent demonstrates their different origin. One brother is married to a *White* woman that does not speak Aikaná and his son seems to be bilingual in Portuguese and Aikaná. The two other brothers married Aikaná sisters and did not have any children. One of them divorced and married a Sabanê. Kwazá is on the road to extinction because of the dispersal of the last speakers. While the recent formation of an Indigenous Territory in Pimenta Bueno for the Kwazá should aid in avoiding this, actually, it is said, that the people living there do not use Kwazá anymore and are intermingled with Aikaná.

[lxxvi] He claims to be a passive speaker of his father's language and asserts that he understands Latundê. He affirms that the two languages are actually the same. This concurs with the Lakondê speaker cited, his paternal aunt, to whom the two languages are very close (but there are differences, see the comparison in Telles 2002).

[lxxvii] This is the method now in use in a part of French Brittany where the results of teaching in Breton as the first language show promising results that do not harm the academic performance of the students nor their acquisition of French (an irrational fear strong among nationalist *Republican* opponents; see Libération 11 Nov. 2001; also Dalgalian 2000: 92).

[lxxviii] Their father expressed to me the wish to send only the older children and young adults. He may not consent to let the young children go to school. The

school was being built a two-hour walk away from the Latundê village. This does little to encourage a permanent and regular school routine.
[lxxix] Telles (2002: 18). Dona Tereza describes that during the last Tawandê attack on the Lakondê, around 1950, only four of the last nine Lakondê survived. She herself was taken but later handed back to her maternal aunt. The people of Mané were named Yelelihrê by the Lakondê (Telles 2002: 12-3). As seen above, his people were close neighbors of the Lakondê at the time of the attacks, which happened around the same time. Note that, in this roundabout way, a stolen child of the Yelelihrê, a close ally of the Lakondê, brings a Tawandê influence to a village partially consisting of descendants of his very own original people.
[lxxx] Fonseca claims to have saved several people like Cinzeiro with great personal effort and the help of his wife (an assistant nurse, a position popularly known as *nurse* but in fact she was a trained auxiliary with limited skills).
[lxxxi] Just like the Aikaná and the new Latundê affine who thinks them backward. This is partially because of the lack of the road to the village and the lack of real FUNAI assistance. There is a condescending attitude that *they* are blessed with an infrastructure and are more modern. These Indians form the core of the recently created *Massaká Association of the Indian Peoples Aikaná, Latundê and Kwazá* and entered in the so-called project culture created in the 1990s. They attempt to fund some economic development projects (note the name and sequence of peoples). These concentrate on the Aikaná villages and, not surprisingly, only one project included the repair of the road to the Latundê. Such a road also entails an improvement for the other area inhabitants (and facilitate general penetration of *the Barroso* area too in that it would expand their range of possible locations for horticulture). In this project, they typically aggregate the *Latundê* with the other inhabitants of the *Barroso* totaling 41 people. The Latundê are the largest of the handful of groups in the region, and the only one originally based there.
[lxxxii] The World Bank's official and largely symbolic policy created token projects of protection for the vulnerable indigenous peoples assaulted by the *development* that affected the region. Even these the government only reluctantly implanted for these *primitive obstacles* of development and then with a minimal regard to Indian rights. The menace of physical extinction hovered over other peoples too when epidemics decimated the populations. A 1987 World Bank internal report on Rondônia mentions epidemics of several diseases (including malaria and tuberculosis), systemic pillaging of Indian lands and corruption and fraud in FUNAI (Rich 1994: 28). For more on the dismal historical record of the

World Bank with regard to local and indigenous populations, see Rich 1994.
[lxxxiii] It is noteworthy that Batatá apparently did not teach her language to her grandchildren, as was custom for Kwazá speakers in the case of the family cited; possibly this is a confirmation of a lesser intellectual capacity.
[lxxxiv] Another Tawandê trait in a similar ceremony includes the use of adorned *swords* in a dance, a ritual absent among the Latundê. The latter assure that did possess the variant of secret flutes. It is safe to say that not all rituals are identical, even among the Northern Nambikwara, but the extent of variation is, naturally, impossible to establish at this moment.
[lxxxv] He seems to be discussing past events that befell him and explaining certain opinions of the present situation. Apparently he is transmitting some historical knowledge to the younger generation, possibly a part relevant to contemporary affairs. It must be noted that to an outsider these monologues appear to be without an interested audience. However, this kind of soliloquy format is common among the Nambikwara of the Plateau (Price 1997: 21), and so the analogy makes this interpretation seem acceptable.
[lxxxvi] This example comes from Northeast Brazil where the Fulniô speak their own language (*Yathê*). It is difficult to obtain the original kinship terminology as in this domain apparently the Portuguese terms substitute the *Yathê* terms (possibly accompanied by the gradual dissolution of original marriage rules).
[lxxxvii] The SIL linguist David Eberhard (2001, personal communication) found significant changes between his current work and that of his predecessor Kingston on Mamaindê, a related Northern Nambikwara language. The direction of change also entails a simplification process. The Mamaindê suffered greatly from contact but their community is more populous and much less influenced by incoming Indians from other related peoples and always maintained a certain independent social unity. They probably lived in better conditions and yet the same phenomena occur.
[lxxxviii] The Latundê have visited Aroeira to procure cures for the ails attributed to supernatural causes. However, the cost of traveling and paying the shaman impedes an easy access to the curing ritual. The people of Aroeira related to Mané continue their attempt to interfere with his life and create additional tensions among the Latundê.
[lxxxix] The simple consultation of a Negarotê speaker living at the Aikaná village (herself a strong proponent of language maintenance, recounting the difficulty of the father of her Negarotê children to make the *ashamed* child speak his Northern Nambikwara language) provoked an immediate negative reaction even

with the clear provision that this was not the kind of *work* as in progress with the Latundê. Strong jealousy made the linguist abandon any conversation that might recall any *linguistic work*. This should be a strong inducement to additive and not replacive bilingualism.

Allegories Of Wildness ~ The String Of Events



Before and after Rondon

The common impression of Rondon is of an intrepid man who explored the pristine wilderness and made contact with unknown wild Indians. An image, that is, of someone with a penchant and talent to subdue wildness in its diverse modes. The reality though may not be so simple, the Nambikwara congeries and other indigenous peoples inhabiting the southern fringe of the Amazon basin had a long history of previous contacts. The Latundê played a role in the fabric of the Northern Nambikwara cluster before retreating into *isolation*, living on the edge of a region of rapidly changing peoples and places. At some time they separated from the main body of the Northern Nambikwara peoples, and more specifically from the Lakondê, most likely a consequence of the construction of the Telegraph Line lead by Rondon. It is unclear whether they or Indians from another related component of the Northern cluster ever had peaceful contact with the Whites before Rondon. The occupation of areas in Rondônia and the documented rubber gatherers' penetration from rivers throughout the region north of the Nambikwara do Campo, preceding and coinciding with the Mission, certainly do indicate the possibility that the Northern Nambikwara and the Sabanê were affected by the movements of the rubber frontier. In contrast with previous possible historical relations, Rondon and his Mission accomplished two major feats. They crossed the heartland of the Northern Nambikwara peoples, established a fixed occupation

and made contact with numerous Nambikwara villages. In this sense, Rondon's efforts represent the first real *contact*. He constructed base camps and extended the Telegraph Line right through the middle of the northern territory. This represented the materialization of the Brazilian state's claim to the land. It would not be for several more years that the Sabanê, Lakondê and other members of the cluster would learn about the State, the *nation* and its claims that Rondon and his *achievements* exemplified. The Indians reinterpreted their understanding of Rondon in light of the newly created social space of intersocietal interaction and interethnic situations. In this manner Rondon assumes an importance from the external point of view of Nambikwara history and a salient significance in the Sabanê and Nambikwara interpretation of the *Whites* and their own conception of the same history. As a central figure in these chronicles, it is worthwhile to examine Rondon carefully.

Rondon's heroic image relates to his famous mission to construct the Telegraph Line from Cuiabá into the Amazon in order to *integrate* Amazonia into the national framework envisioned by the recently constituted Republic of Brazil. Rondon seems to have fully adhered to the military ideology and the justification of their intervention. The aim of the republic and the military was to extend the authority of the nation, in effect seen as the *benign and civilizing* power of the state, to all its borders and to include all major regions of the country within the reach of the central government. Several efforts were made. During the previous successful construction of a Telegraph Line within the state of Mato Grosso, Rondon participated and made friends with some of the employees, a group of Bororo Indians. Here Rondon learned his way around and later proved perfectly suited for the task of leading this major project of geopolitical state building. Rondon, then a major, was a native of Mato Grosso. He came from a rural background, and was a qualified engineer. Ideologically a firm positivist, Rondon was dedicated to the country's *progress*. His abilities and skills made him the most suitable candidate to lead what became known as *The Rondon Commission*. Although the characteristically lengthy and cumbersome official title did not feature his name, it was also commonly referred to as *The Rondon Mission*. The use of the word *mission* in this name may have given participants a religious analogy to their project and helped put this political mission on par with those of religious missionaries, who were usually in the front lines of the conquest and sociopolitical domination of Indian peoples. As if they too found themselves on a kind of sacred mission.

It is not coincidental that Rondon was a member of an offshoot of the Positivist Church founded by August Comte, a man who claimed that this church represented the highest form of the religion. When away on the mission in the wilderness of the Northern Nambikwara region Rondon did not forget the festivities on the anniversary of the death of Comte, a man who Rondon regarded as "*humanity's greatest philosopher*". He recommended that his wife and family be his representatives at the commemoration that took place at Brazil's previous capital, Rio de Janeiro (n.d.: 247). Known widely as a frontiersman, Rondon adhered wholeheartedly to a prominent group in the army that embraced the western ideology concerning progress and what can only be described as a totalizing reductionist evolutionary scheme of the history and future of mankind. In this philosophy, the idea of *backward tribes* occupied a legitimate but inferior place. Rondon is remembered for his *humane treatment* and a certain respect for the Indians he encountered. By examining the available literature, this seems a fair judgement and one that is perpetuated in the Brazilian hero cult dedicated to the great explorer and protector of *our Indians*[i]. In one famed incident, Rondon was hit by an Indian's arrow and had to restrain his companions from taking immediate revenge. As he surely would have died had it not been for the bandoleer that he wore across his chest, it is clear that he lived by the belief that made him legendary, *die if necessary, but never kill*[ii]. In this respect, he belonged to a strand of the historical European intellectual tradition that recognized the *Indians* as human beings in a country where only a small minority agreed. For example, in the beginning of the nineteenth century the traveler Auguste Saint-Hilaire attempted in vain to convert local Brazilian hosts in the interior of Espírito Santo to accept this point of view. He did not meet with any success because the local population considered these *savage Indians* as *heathens*, and as worthless, ferocious beasts, unfit for any attempt to be *civilized*. They believed that to be a real human being, one must be baptized (a view prevalent even today among Catholics in Recife[iii]). Hypocritically, this understanding contradicts the Catholic idea that the Indians have human souls and should be treated accordingly (Hemming 1995: 136). Saint-Hilaire was a naturalist and Rondon himself was very much inspired by the ideal of being a naturalist. He patronized the scientific aspects of his expeditions, employed scientists and he himself lectured in public and wrote, among other topics, about geography. Both Saint-Hilaire and Rondon shared the *scientific* notion that the Indians are essentially *children* (Saint-Hilaire), that is, perfectible, and so must be capable of being educated in the *higher* forms of an *advanced* society.

Therefore Rondon seems to have held the Indians and their *tribes* – this word itself a by-product of the evolutionary conception of history – in a relatively high regard and certainly felt sincere affection for them. Despite this admiration and respect for the societies and cultures of these peoples and their special competence in various activities inherent in their lived world, the intrinsic superiority of Western *civilization* is not a topic open for discussion. Yet, in light of Rondon's humble background in the interior and his restraint even when hit by Nambikwara arrows demonstrate that Rondon is indeed both a courageous and just figure firm in his resolve. It can be said that he recognized the humanity of the Indians more than the vast majority of his compatriots, no small feat for someone of his background. But he also believed strongly in the evolutionary scheme of mankind and felt that as human beings are perfectible, the Indians ought to educated by a disinterested tutelage to reach a *higher level of civilization*. Such education involves first and foremost the teaching of *work* as understood to be the disciplined activity of the body engaged in *producing* for others and being involved with the *market*. The idea was to change the basically short-term production and consumption strategies of the Indians into something more similar to the capitalist mode of production[iv]. Indeed, the foreign nature of Indian *economics* (or lack thereof) caused observers to regard what the perceived as idleness, laziness, improvidence or carelessness to be completely askance to a *real work* ethic. Within the Indian peoples, the socially set levels of needs normally were easily met by the existing production levels. Indian villages and peoples remained, consequently, in a state of *unproductive* autonomy with what many outsiders perceived as an "*infuriating indifference to material possessions*" (ib.: 137)[v].

The real issue is what the Indians considered normal productive activities was not the same as what the outsiders thought of as *work*. This underscored the necessity of *education* for a people considered less evolved and justified intervention. This usually forceful interference was sometimes done with the sincere intention of *being for their own good* and hence this was seen as an act of helping these *childlike* peoples who were still in the *infancy of mankind*. This concept of backwardness is still current in Western societies and is almost universally characterized as the *Stone Age*, an expression current in writings relating to the Telegraph Commission. The human beings left in the wake of history need the assistance of those *who know better*. This fundamental and obviously ethnocentric and tempo-centric assumption appears as the undisputed

common sense in Rondon's time and, as already evident, remains a constant certitude in even the temporary conceptions of *Indians*. Especially so when seen as *savages* and *uncivilized*. The well-intentioned disposition of granting a human status to "*our Indians*" (Rondon), is evident the Republic's possessive tone. Brazil's positivist national slogan written on the flag, *order and progress*, also implies the *duty* of transforming these *citizens*. *Indians*, currently considered the *first Brazilians* – note that such an understanding of history inherently involves the idea of eternal or pre-existing nation-state – must become genuinely useful citizens that participate in the *national life*. For this goal to be reached, the Indians must be *taught* this view. Despite the silence about the arbitrary nature of this symbolic dispossession of political autonomy, it should be obvious that no native people ever realized that the national state considers their territory as part of the *national territory* and its peoples as *national citizens*. This literal and symbolic violence derived from the conception of the nation-state is always passed over under silence and the *right* of political and territorial possession usually is conceived of as an undisputed *naturally* existing *right*. To all compatriots like Rondon the *order* must be imposed in the whole country and then the state must lead the way to *progress*. Although, of course, in this scheme, order is progress and, so as to bring about the new order, the opposite is also true.

In fact, the entire Telegraph Line project can be thought of as a manifestation of the domination and domestication of wild spaces and indigenous peoples. Here, under the auspices of science, the positivist inspiration of the Mission correlated not only with development interests but also with scientific advancement. This is clear in the language used during the expeditions, and the explorers' mention of *new lands* that qualified observers had not yet penetrated. The Mission discussed these issues, especially about the *discovery* of rivers and the delineation of the watersheds and river basins. They effectively turned the penetration of *virgin lands* into an exercise of naming *new rivers* and outlining the network of watercourses which permeate the country. Such geographical questions raised debates among the participant officers and were discussed in detail in Rondon's lectures in the then-capital Rio de Janeiro, where his talks aroused a very interested public. Rondon gave new names to nearly all rivers and streams in the region of Nambikwara occupancy. Rondon even renamed some stagnant small towns and villages to encourage *development*. For example, Rondon is responsible for naming what is currently a large town in the Sararé region,

located at the upper Guaporé River – Pontes e Lacerda (Rondon 1922: 26). Rondon usually chose names in honor of significant dates, national republican events, and personal associates. Many of these new names are still in use. Other examples include Rio da Bandeira (Flag), Rio Comemoração (Commemoration), Rio Tenente Marques (formerly the Rio Ananaz – Pineapple River – renamed to honor the sudden death of a participant of the Mission) and Rio da Dúvida (River of Doubt). The latter is a reference to the doubt concerning into which basin this river drains. This doubt created a sort of geographical controversy cumulating during discussions at the capital and ended up calling the attention of the former U.S. president Theodore Roosevelt with whom Rondon led a joint expedition to clear up the issue[vi]. They mounted the expedition, travelled to the region and descended the river, initially through Northern Nambikwara lands. When they arrived at the lower reaches they discovered that the river was inhabited by rubber tappers who used to come up from the Madeira River. Men there were sure that the river's name was *Castanha*. Characteristically, despite the fact that the regional people already had christened the river, it was renamed and now is known as the Rio Roosevelt.

The history of the incorporation of unknown lands

Under Rondon's guidance and within the premisses of his thought, the Telegraph Line first penetrated into a section of the Paresi territory that was inhabited by a people that spoke an Aruak language and who had long-standing relations with the Nambikwara that populated the eastern border. For a long time these Indians had suffered various national intrusions of diverse nature. Interestingly, this people was considered to be more *civilized* than many of their neighbours because their means of sustenance stressed their horticultural techniques and due to their peaceful reputation. In this sense, they constituted a forceful counterbalance to the Nambikwara, whom many thought to be *uncivilized*, warlike, nomadic and brutish cannibals. This benevolent image turned the Paresi into preferred junior partners in the planned civilizing process. They became major junior collaborators in the civilizing mission to bring *progress* to *less advanced tribes*, the *most primitive* being, of course, their neighbours. It should be noted that the Paresi nicknamed the Nambikwara "*those who sleep on the ground*" and here White and Paresi prejudice and stereotype coincided to condemn Nambikwara backwardness. An Indian people that did not even make or use hammocks, the only exception in the region, surely are the most primitive of all the Indians. Rondon cites this Paresi name with a certain approval[vii]. Lévi-

Strauss also reminds his readers that the *Indians*, in general, disregard anyone who is so poor as to not even to possess a hammock. He stresses a kind of material austerity for the Nambikwara. In fact, although a common stereotype regards all Indians as poor and lacking in material culture, all peoples do possess their proper notions about the socially established normal level of material possessions and that what represents wealth. It is probably not arbitrary that, by a coincidence, both of these men were familiar with the Bororo, an indigenous people of Mato Grosso who placed great importance on ownership of a enormous variety of material culture and for whom the wealth of the corporate matrilineal group consists in the ownership of a diverse array of objects, including myths and rituals[viii].

Rondon published a volume on "*Ethnography*" in the series of publications edited by the *Telegraph Commission* somewhere around 1910[ix]. The volume opens with a description of the Paresi according to the usual evolutionist scheme. Rondon noted the high degree of development of their agriculture and in an attempt to improve the limited cultivation capability of their land, he proposed that they move to richer soil. The Paresi leader Toilori refused the offer. He clearly stated his attachment to his land and indicated the limits of what his people considered their territory, "*where their grandfathers were born, died, hunted, and cultivated crops*" (Rondon 1947: 34). Interestingly, aside from a strong attachment to an ancestral territory, there was the necessity of periodically moving villages owing to poor soil. Nonetheless, Rondon did not take this to be a *nomadic* tendency. Not even when the Paresi relocate for cultural reasons like a number of deaths, and hence for what Rondon would call an irrational reason. Greatly suffering from the encroachment of rubber tappers from the Amazon basin and the forceful recruitment inherent in the rubber exploitation system, this same leader explicitly refused the offer, mentioning that he had no desire to be a rubber collector[x]. Living at the headwaters along the watershed of the Amazonian river basin and at the higher parts of its rivers, the Paresi only partially escaped from the pressure of the rubber system expanding upward from the lower parts of the river that are located in the forests where rubber trees are much more abundant. Many villages suffered from the pressure to give up their lands and join the system, than at its zenith. Another such group of people were the neighboring Nambikwara do Campo who, despite the same scarcity of rubber trees of the Parecis plateau, also suffered attacks by rubber tappers. Fortunately, their resistance to compromise and a greater mobility earned them a brutal

reputation that may have protected them (at least in part) from further encroachment. Ferociousness was, in this constellation of images mediated by the notion of undomesticated wildness, equated with cannibalism; and so the Nambikwara were thought of as a particularly wild people close to untamed nature.

Rondon, naturally, did not abandon his plans to help the Paresi come closer to civilization. According to Machado, an expert on the Paresi's relation with Rondon, the Paresi are prominent in the Rondon's conception of the Indian and his decision to act in their favor (Machado 1998:253). Rondon represented the *Federal Government* to the Paresi and he called them to his aid in his *discoveries* in order to carry out the state's firm demand *to populate this immense hinterland* and regain the *primitive splendour* of the Paresi from before the enormous decline of this *populous and wealthy great nation*. Accordingly, he created great scenes demonstrating both the generosity of the government and of himself as its representative. Once during a sort of inter-village potlatch, Rondon made a great show of the distribution of the usual commodities to people from various localities and of different group affiliations. To stamp the most vivid impression upon their *naive spirits* with the *power and greatness* of the government, this military man dressed in his most regal uniform. This impression management (as called by Goffman) thus established him as the embodiment of the abstract and distant government from Rio de Janeiro, the very city that was his home base where his family lived. Personifying the state with an elaborate external signs entails a conscious construction that coincides with the image he projected towards national society. This personal trajectory successfully transformed his personage into a national hero. By promising easy access to outside commodities, either by the redistribution that he employed to gain the Indian's confidence and cooperation, or as rewards for labor engagements, the Commission unquestionably needed to succeed, Rondon achieved the same effect among the Paresi. Consequently, the Indians assigned him the role of a exalted and generous chief, as it was through him that goods were redistributed. This sentiment arose amongst a people who were already dependent on outside goods, and either subjected to the exploitative rubber regime or to the collecting of ipecac; accordingly relations with Rondon entailed a great relief from the direct and sometimes violent domination imposed on them (see Machado 1998: 253-60). Thus, Rondon managed to fabricate being a hero among the Indians as well.

Rondon despised the violence inflicted on the Indians and considered the total system of the rubber market, from the low price fetched by produce to the high cost of commodities, to be unjust and exploitative. In fact, he claimed that he paid his laborers the same as he did the *national laborers*. The employment of the *docile Paresi* demonstrates both the use of *education* and the transformation of the Indian into a manual laborer. This docility is obviously another stereotype, although overall, it may contain a kernel of truth. Mainly, it may have arisen out of this paternalistic hero image and the concomitant generous favors granted, and the fairer treatment they received compared to the disparaging and unfair *contact* to which most of the Paresi were subjected[xi]. Docility apparently is equated with domestication and acceptance of domination. The Mission consequently gained a reliable labor force, Indians were responsible for various aspects of the construction of the Telegraph Line and they were indispensable guides through the *unexplored* Nambikwara lands. The Commission built a boarding school for regional Indian students. Initially this was based in the Paresi heartland, later it was moved to Utiarity, closer to the Nambikwara. Some students (including six orphans from Vilhena) learned the morse alphabet and worked on the telegraph, while others were soldiers and even trumpet players who knew how to play the military commands and the national anthem. Consequently, an Indian could sound the command to stand at attention and play the national hymn when Rondon arrived at his station during one of his later tours of excursion through the region. This purpose of education was to inspire a firm national sentiment jointly with new capabilities and social customs. Being a positivist, Rondon did not support the religious missions. He competed with them directly for control over the role of mediator and *fraternal protection*. The Paresi hence actualized this project of *protection without direction* (in the words of Roquette-Pinto [1919]), letting progress take its *natural* course. They became Rondon's *dedicated, submissive* [sic] *and very loyal friends,* ideal laborers for the conquest of the wilderness along with its *savage* inhabitants (apud Machado 1998: 247; 265). They were an ideal example for the 1910 political campaign to make the Indians wards of the state under the auspices of the new agency *Serviço de Proteção aos Índios e Localização de Trabalhadores Nacionais (*"Service for the Protection of the Indians and the Localization of National Laborers"). Interestingly, the task of this agency differs from pure *protection* to Indians as it also supported colonization in favor of the settlement of national agricultural workers. The latter idea was abandoned eight years later[xii].

The labor force participated in a variety of activities undertaken by the Mission. The Indians' own participation in the Mission ranged from their determination to move villages or groups to telegraph stations, to individual or family movements along the route of the Telegraph Line. The Commission itself cared for orphans of epidemics and, in time, was involved with not only arranging but even determining marriages for Indians directly under its influence (Machado 1998: 287). The type of commitment from the dominated Indians themselves stemmed from more than an alleviation of oppression. These Indians developed a sense of being *Rondon's Indians* and being *civilized Indians*. On one occasion Rondon participated in an inter-village feast meant to promote harmony between close and distant kin. It was during this time that the image of Rondon was firmly established as a chief of the Whites who supported traditional leaders and genuinely appreciated the native culture and the Paresi language. The Paresi recognized the builder of the first house of a village as the *owner of the place*, the natural local leadership, but also acknowledged a few major leaders with authority over more than one village. Rondon reinforced this authority by means of the redistribution of goods through these headmen. Perhaps after using his power to resettle whole villages to the Posts he had founded, Rondon already came to be seen as a chief of chiefs[xiii]. In separating Indian territory from White lands and renaming all rivers and various places, he acted as the mythological hero of the Paresi that named the whole region and allocated the different segments to their respective territories. Hence, by renaming and in a way resettling the lands Rondon replicated the original process of occupation by the Indian peoples and he, probably unknowingly, played the role of master of renewal of the placement of the Paresi in the cosmos (cf. Machado 1998). One of the Indians who served Rondon (self-proclaimed *Indian of Rondon*) was reported to have said: "*That one is our chief* (…) *He is correcting the world!*" (Machado 1998: 272). Apparently, these Indians believed that one who imposes order on the land and the people reinstates the world. Perhaps one could say, master of a way of worldmaking (Goodman 1978).

When the Paresi chief, Toloiri, unexpectedly died, Rondon lamented the lost opportunity to propel *progress* through this collaborator. The death was a serious setback to Rondon's grand plans and to the *"speed and profoundness of the desired transformation*" of the Paresi people (Rondon 1922: 48). Toloiri belonged to the Paresi group sometimes referred to as *Cabixi*. This group was generally regarded by the other Paresi segments as uncivilized. They may have been

confused with the *savage* Southern Nambikwara groups believed to be responsible for the persistent long term attacks on the former capital of Mato Grosso, Vila Bela (a city on the Guaporé River, near the Bolivian frontier). Hence the name *Kabixí* both in and out of the Paresi group refered to the least civilized and most savage group. The man whom Rondon called a *chief* was the only one of this southern Paresi group to be incorporated as a guide in Rondon's Mission[xiv]. Ironically, only after Toloiri's death did Rondon honor him by giving his name to one the smaller streams deep within the Nambikwara territories. The Tolori river currently marks the border of the Pyrineus de Souza Indian Territory, near the city of Vilhena (Rondon n.d.: 195; today the name is pronounced Tolori). As a result, one of the only Paresi geographical names is an homage to a dead chief engaged by the Mission and is nowhere near his home territory: Rondon usually knew the Paresi names of geographical occurrences but never adopted them for national usage, always choosing a Brazilian name. The Northern Nambikwara region even includes features with his daughter's names. In naming these lands, Rondon was essentially claiming them for his country. The nation-state required *undiscovered lands* to receive *proper names* as part of the nationalization process. On one occasion Rondon received explicit orders in naming locales. Owing to the sensitive international character of the expedition with Roosevelt, and in compliance with the government resolution, as communicated by the minister of Foreign Affairs, Rondon was told "(...) *to perpetuate on the map of Brazil the memory of the voyage of geographical discoveries*" (Rondon 1916: 75-6). The renaming of the River of Doubt as Roosevelt River could be said to represent the official government policy of imprinting the national mark on the land and transforming geographical landmarks into the distinguishing features of the Republic.

The less contacted Southern Paresi maintained relations with the Nambikwara of the Guaporé valley. Some Southern Paresi even learned the language of this Nambikwara cluster. A *brother* of Toloiri spoke the Nambikwara language (Rondon 1922: 43). At this time, the other Paresi also used the term *Cabixi* pejoratively for both these Paresi and Nambikwara, placing their kin on the same low level as their despicable neighbors. However, Rondon and Roquette-Pinto (see, for example, 1913: 382) preferred to restrict the name *Cabixi* to the Nambikwara. This name identified them as the assailants of the Vila Bela inhabitants (the locally called Cabixi). This is presumably because this leaves only notorious *savages* as the culprits and saves face for the Paresi[xv]. Both authors

presented a possible redefinition of the reference implied by the name of an *Indian tribe* as the mere finding out of the truth, again playing down the political and social consequences of naming. Rondon knew very well that the names of Indian peoples represent labels assigned by the Brazilians who came into contact with them. Rondon wrote that the name *Nambikwara* has its source in backlanders and has been in circulation for a long time. As for the name Paresi, he explains that it is what the explorers understood to be the proper name of the Paresi for themselves. Rondon also remarks that almost all peoples have their own auto-denomination. He relates, however, that the contacts with what he called *Nhambiquara* have not been successful in discovering what this name for themselves might be.

With the fundamental aid of Paresi guides and laborers, the Mission first penetrated the Paresi heartlands and later the territory of the Nambikwara do Campo. The glamour of penetrating *new lands* and ensuing encounters with indigenous peoples enlivened this monotonous advance. In stark contrast with the *peaceful* Paresi, the penetration of Nambikwara territories caused anxiety and tension. But there was also the thrill of *serving the Republic* and extending the State's authority over *untamed* populations, expanding the economic potential of the nation. During this historical time, national curiosity stimulated Rondon to publish ethnographic details about the Nambikwara. He started the chapter emphasizing the fame of this people in the beginning of the century: "*Among the savage populations of Brazil none have recently aroused more attention than the Nhambiquára or Nambiquara tribe that lives in the extreme north of the state of Mato Grosso*" (Rondon 1947: 45). This is the first time the Nambikwara gained a fame they did not procure. It is unclear why Rondon decided to adopt the spelling with an "h" instead of the simpler Nambiquara (Price 1989b: 195). Apparently, he wanted to maintain the previous century's spelling as cited in the work of the German Karl Von den Steinen. Von den Steinen based his information on the reports of the state agency then dealing with the Indians. In this publication, Rondon demonstrated a penchant for ethnography. He copied the model of both current scientists and predecessors like Von den Steinen. This project, however, was not to be done in the same way that foreign investigators proceeded but carried out in the service of the republic, like the hagiographic articles in a journal of the capital in 1915 clearly show. Instead of collecting *exotic objects* there was to be "(…) *an attempt to construct an image of the nhambiquara people detailed enough to permit one to know how, when, and in what sense one would*

have to act to be agreeable to them, to obtain a mode of expression more suitable to their mentality, to the state of their soul, and to the intentions that their discoverer and protector held towards them" (Missão Rondon 1916: 134; the book is based on a series of articles in the journal that seems to copy parts of the Mission's reports; no author is cited but the writer is thought to be Buena Horta Barbosa, the brother of participants in the Mission, Lima 1990: 19). The investigation of what the *discoverer* also describes as the unknown *ethnic conditions* of the Nambikwara clearly aims at the loftier purpose of ethnographic knowledge subordinated to the *discoverer's* exalted intentions of *pacification* (under his *protection*) and subsequent *improvement* of this people (his *intentions*). The quest was for useful knowledge that could further serve the nation, not just the sterile collection of material objects[xvi].

It is probably not arbitrary that the ethnographic style after the initial conclusion regarding the absence of any real historic information begins with giving the coordinates where the expedition first encountered Nambikwara, where Rondon was first attacked and then relates the making of contact by the worker in charge of the Campos Novos Station (the Nambikwara do Campo; Rondon 1947: 46-8). This contact proceeded quite slowly in 1910, and the information obtained is rather restricted to directly observable phenomena like ornaments, sleeping on the ground, and bodily features. The employee in charge and an army officer succeeded in annotating a very small vocabulary in two different places with two different dialects. This is exactly the information presented by Roquette-Pinto (1913) at the Congress of Americanists in London in 1912. Notably, the ethnography on the Paresi contains more information than the one regarding the Nambikwara. Rondon himself reminds the reader of the severe limitations of his notes. Contrary to what is asserted in *Missão Rondon*, a version of the same work that was specifically geared towards the general populace, his ethnography remains rather subordinated to his practical objectives of the efficient construction of the telegraphic line. What Rondon did accomplish, in contrast to this otherwise meager knowledge, relates to the Nambikwara's reputation. Previously, a people thought of as the wildest savages could only be feared as cannibals (Missão Rondon 1916: 136). In Brazilian imagery, the primitive savage fierceness is associated with this practice, iconic of the basest level of civilization or, more aptly, barbarity. Consequently, Rondon searched through the remainders of food refuse in *many villages* in order to examine the bones. This inquiry found no evidence of cannibalism (ib.: 145). The verdict of, one might say, *primitive but*

not anthropophagic, raised the Nambikwara to a higher level of civilization and they gained a slightly higher regard for their lifestyle.

Rondon's account of the adventures during the Mission gives the impression that he felt both respect and admiration for the Nambikwara's valiant resistance to the invasion of their lands, although he never abandons the predicate of primitiveness. In one incident on the savanna "*a cabocla*" – a polysemic Tupi word meaning a copper-colored person of at least some Indian ascendancy, but it can also refer to an Amazonian Indian, or even a *civilized* Indian – shot an arrow which hurt someone on the expedition. This astonished the members of the Mission. Embarrassingly for the wounded man Brazilian's masculine pride, he was struck by a woman (Missão Rondon 1916: 141). Incidentally, this shows that there have been other groups aside from the Latundê, where women used a bow and arrow prior to contact. Apparently then, this phenomenon is not necessarily an act of desperation on the part of a group. Another incident (mentioned earlier) had a strong initial affect on the Brazilian image of Rondon. Despite nearly being shot in the neck, Rondon refused to retaliate or permit any action against the Indians (see Rondon 1922: 26). This attitude denotes what is known as the *peaceful embrace* that was used in the conquest of Brazil's interior. An embrace that actually rather denotes the pressure of a relentless envelopment, containment and encapsulation that the encircled Indians must have felt (that is, not unlike the more general enclosure movement of lands in the interior). The event certainly aided in the fabrication of the image of a *hero*. It is no surprise that this event is always cited as the prime example of Rondon's compliance with his own dictum and a major noble feat responsible for his legendary status (see the short biography of Rondon by Bigio, 2000: 45)[xvii]. This story and similar variants appear even in international summaries of Rondon's life. It is well known that arrows actually hit him and some of the equipment that he wore bore the impact mark made by the most perilous one (Hemming 1995: 445)[xviii].

In the first years of the Mission, the Telegraph Line penetrated further into Nambikwara territories each dry season. Finally, they reached the Serra do Norte (the northern mountain range). Despite the name, the Serra do Norte is not actually a mountain range. It was optimistically labeled this way in the hope that it could be the legendary gold-rich mines (known as *the lost mines of Urucumacuan*) mentioned in historical texts. They were rumored to be located somewhere in eastern Rondônia, anywhere from Vilhena onwards into the current

state, and other rumors about finding appeared once and while in reports and publications. Coincidentally, this area comprises the Northern Nambikwara's region and includes several of the rivers and streams of their homeland. In 1913, impressed by the rumors, Roosevelt suggested that gold mining could be a major incentive that might spur the occupation and development of the whole Nambikwara region. He went on to declare that the entire region awaited a great future in agriculture and cattle raising (Roosevelt 1914: 203); see Rondon (1922: 66) for the Commission report). The change in landscape, vegetation and climate from the savanna highlands of the Parecis Plateau made a strong impression on the members of the Mission. Each journey had its difficulties. Rondon told Roosevelt that he named the Ananaz (pineapple) River after the deserted Indian pineapple field that fed the famished explorers when they reached the river (ib.: 175). In effect, as the exploration crossed the Nambikwara do Campo territory, there were frequent accounts of the size, quality and variety of their fields (raising food crops like the staples maize and manioc, and even various types of potatoes)[xix]. Apparently, these fields had a relatively abundant yield. In 1908, the Mission encountered a village sighted before and abandoned before the explorers entered: a *vast clean plaza*, around which were built one big house and three smaller ones; an area planted with two fruit trees was nearby; one field in fallow a little farther and beyond that quite a large field *testified to the tenacity of these people*. Rondon noted that the original vegetation was cleared better than that of the civilized neighbors. It was *very well done*, well cleared, effectively burnt and trimmed afterwards (Rondon 1922: 33)[xx].

Rondon follows the Paresi in distinguishing two different groups of Nambikwara, one of them being more *warlike* and intractable, the other less so. Thus, Rondon recognized some differences between the *groups* or *tribes* of the great *Nambikwara Nation*. When penetrating the north one of the officers met, by chance, a woman carrying foodstuffs and a child. He established the first contact, which was reported to be very friendly. Thus, Rondon postulates the second group has *lighter customs* and is more peaceful then the Plateau groups. Rondon attributes this difference to the state of war between rubber gatherers and Indians (to which he also attributes the presence of some metal tools, like axes and machetes among the latter). Past the savanna, around Vilhena (already outside of the Tapajos basin), the region is made of a denser forest with a number of small brooks that constitute the headwaters of several rivers that ultimately run into the Madeira River. It is probable that because of the smallish rivers and

the presence of rapids the Northern Nambikwara had avoided serious invasions previous to the occupation occasioned by the Commission. To the north, there lives a number of warlike Tupi Mondé peoples. These peoples also helped deter access from adventurers traveling upriver. In this forested region, the Commission was glad to find several open grassy areas where the mules and oxen found something to eat. According to Rondon and other members, these open, savanna-like areas are the result of the continual Indian practice of occasionally putting fire to the land in order to *clean* it of the vegetation, resulting in permanent *campos* (savanna). This corresponds with the general Nambikwara preference for villages built in open areas and their inclination to inhabit savannas. Owing to these open lands, Rondon decided to change the itinerary of the Telegraph Line to use these pastures as ideal places both line itself and for the telegraph stations and the government cattle farm of Três Buritis. The latter constructions could offer support for mule trains and personnel movements along the Telegraph Line. If so, the Telegraph Line competed with the ecological spaces created by the Northern Nambikwara themselves and hence appropriated a most appreciated part of their ecosystem.

Within this region the expedition found diverse remains that the people left behind in their hasty departure. These objects represent a cross section of the culture of these people. Items found include fire sticks, stone axes, a gourd with a fermented drink, a dead wild pig, head covers made of monkey pelts and tucum strings, a roasted wild potato, urucu seeds, pieces of manioc cakes, several types of arrows, two parakeets under a woven basket, a small pestle, and a ceramic cooking vessel. Overall an interesting and *very rich ethnographic collection* that was left untouched out of respect to the Indians. To assure that no one meddled with any of these objects, Rondon posted a guard while the expedition's main body (the civil labourers) passed the spot[xxi]. The objects catalogued clearly demonstrated the village's impressive ability as cultivators and hunters. Later, the expedition came across another uninhabited village. This one had several conic houses that formed a triangle around a plaza. The occupants had planted banana, pineapple, *araruta* (a type of potato), cotton and the remains of the maize already collected from the stalks. Note the indigenous presence of cotton and ceramics. Interestingly Rondon does not point out the fact that the banana trees imply either some kind of direct contact with the Brazilians or long distance trading between Indian groups that passed this imported crop to this remote area. So although this place was indeed very distant, *history* already had caught up with

these *isolated* Indians. The unique conic form of the houses fascinated Rondon. He attributed this distinctive shape to the influence of runaway slaves who founded a maroon village to the south in Guaporé Valley (these slaves were fleeing from Vila Bela and mining villages; see Part III). This was a relatively popular theory and reappears in his later writings (Rondon 1922: 64). In this sense, he did propose to keep open the possibility of an incomplete isolation even though this contrasted with the key propaganda about the expedition and its explicit goal, namely, the exploration of the *unknown* – unknown *wilderness* and unknown *wildness*.

It is noteworthy that, after this speculation about the origin of the distinctive houses, there follows a description regarding the refuse of the bones of many fish, wild pigs, and tapir. This was yet more proof of the sound ecological adaptation and a tribute to the quality of the hunters and to the variety of the game. Rondon, however, asserted this find to be perhaps the most original *from the viewpoint of indigenous archaeology* of the whole expedition, and possibly of the last few years in general (ib.: 64). Archaeology places these objects in the past when he actually discusses a village given as uninhabited but not abandoned (as the nearby fields prove). It may well have been evacuated soon before the invader's advance, out of fear. However, by using this classification Rondon demotes the inhabitants to the past and so conceives ethnography as the potential archaeology of the future. The fact remains that the region was populated enough to afford these chance encounters. A richer habitat and a relatively dense population challenged the Mission to elaborate a notion of the future for this region within the premises set by the ideology of progress. The report highlights the value of the *incalculable richness* of the land. The supposed economic advantages of the region range from the rich alluvial layers full of gold and diamonds to the *inexhaustible* forest products and the *very fertile soil*, ideal for agriculture. Simply put, the symbolic value of being a part of the Republic appeals to economic values and the sentiment of belonging. Both of these dimensions, of course, imply no change in the tendency to expropriate land and wealth from the indigenous inhabitants as a naturalized and unreasoned practice. The symbolic value motivated an elaborate Independence Day ceremony; the national anthem was played on the expedition's phonograph, the flag was raised, compliments were paid to the leader at his barrack and the order of day discussed the great services of José Bonifácio to the country and its independence. José Bonifácio entertained notions about the education of the apathetic savages and their perfectibility as human beings whom

could be incorporated within *civilization* as wards of the state, a line of thinking strikingly similar to that of the positivists. Rondon named the future telegraph station in the region after this *patron*. Furthermore, this same statesman thought the lazy Indians needed little in life and could get along without strong desires for private property, the vanity of social distinction, or the desire for commodities of civilized man. Thus, he believed, that the Indians should be given presents that both encourage these social motives and impress them with the technological might of civilization (see Erthal apud Machado 1998:266-8). It is no coincidence that Rondon published a picture of his phonograph playing in a Nambikwara hut[xxii].

The story of the hardships involved with crossing the Northern Nambikwara region and going on to the Madeira River are preceded by the heroic example of Columbus and the reference to "(...) *our beautiful pavilion* [with the flag] *fluctuating serenely in Brazilian lands, to remind us that our beloved fatherland would never abandon us, and from all sides she extended to us her loving motherly arms*" [fatherland is feminine in Portuguese] (Rondon 1922: 67). The patriotic rhetoric couched in a familial and paternalistic idiom may have influenced Rondon's fellow officers and some of the civilian recruited men. The Republic was seen as the superior and caring parent of dependent children. Those civilians, however, did not always share Rondon's enthusiasm. An enlisted Paresi Indian recounted that the workers of the civilian camp, separated at a considerable distance from the officer's tents, schemed to kill Rondon. Thankfully for Rondon, the rumor reached the military and a rebellion was prevented. Note that the set up and infrastructure of the camps and the tents thoroughly maintained class and social distinctions (Machado 1998: 283-5). At the end of a particularly difficult expedition, Rondon praised the men he journeyed with as admirable backwoodsmen with muscles stronger than steel without whom the expedition would have failed (Rondon 1922: 68). Other comments asserted that these men were in desperate need of a civilizing education. Clearly, the same kind of condescending attitude prevailed towards the common *sertanejos*, people very good at physical labor in service of the enlightened superior officers, but simultaneously in need of a cultural enrichment to escape their primitive customs. Admiration of physical body and strength was associated with the rejection of the same men's sociocultural background. This brings to mind the famous positivist intellectual and fellow military Euclides da Cunha whose book was a model to Rondon, as is evident in his description of the landscape and nature. Euclides da

Cunha writes that the *race* which populates the country's interior in the Northeast was mixed and yet in some respects outstanding: "*before anything else, the sertanejo is a strong man*." [xxiii]

The bodies of both sertanejos and Indians needed the guiding hand of the superior civilized minds; the same Service (SPI) could thus take care of them. In this way, resuming the major results of the three years of expedition in his public lectures, Rondon confirmed the notions of the superiority of the coastal cities on the Atlantic seaboard over the deep interior, though such a notion was already accepted in the capital. Rondon asserted that: "*We, the descendants of the conquerors of these lands, really can do very much to benefit the inhabitants of these interiors; however in that environment they are better prepared than all of us as they already adapted their organism, and are of inestimable service to us. It is a simple question of the combination of efforts without any evident preoccupation of transforming civilizations, habits, or customs* [like the services rendered by the Bororo and the Paresi at the service of the Telegraph Line s]. *The inhabitants of the Campos Novos of the Serra do Norte, a docile and intelligent people, probably closely related to the Uaicoarcorês or Nhambiquaras (of the large group of Gé) also already provide us with valuable assistance at the construction of huts, and the opening up of fields and camps*" (Rondon 1922: 80). At least in the heart of this city and its capital public Rondon identified himself completely with the listening elite, the conquest and the *conquerors*, and not at all with the conquered, contrary to what one might suspect given his renowned partial Indian ancestry so focal in his hagiography. A partial Indian ancestry is still a minor share of a predominantly *White* make up. The quality of a remote Indian ancestry by this time was an even fashionable higher-class feature[xxiv]. In his text, after exempting the savages from the charge of anthropophagy and reminding them of the long list of violent incidents during the penetration of their lands, Rondon commemorated on the success of the visits of the Indians to the camps. Describing the current fraternizing he finished his thoughts on the racial future: "*And as they belong to an intrepid and tenacious race, the men being robust, tall and handsome, their incorporation into the Brazilian population can only be advantageous to the physical improvement of the latter*" (Rondon 1922: 81). Quite in accordance with the intellectual agenda of the day and its worry about the future of the mixed Brazilian people, the future of the Nambikwara *race* is to dissolve and improve the general stock. Under superior guidance and with formal education they may contribute to the *evolution* of Brazil. Remarkably, this

future resembles closely the ancestry and personal trajectory of Rondon himself.

Expeditions in Northern Nambikwara territory

A few years later, when the Indian Service was institutionalized and under his command, Rondon organized the famous expedition with Roosevelt (in accordance with the allure of the unknown and the fame of exotic *exploration*). A year after the *scientific expedition*, he gave another series of lectures, again in the capital Rio de Janeiro. Both men held a lot of discussions and Rondon did not pass the opportunity to point out some of their convergent views. Thus both agreed on the necessity of the Indians to be allotted to the state as "(…) *pupils of the nation during the time they do not attain the level of civilization that permits them to amalgamate themselves with the rest of the population and be absorbed by it"*. The ex-president also approved of the republican model of action put into practice in the intervening years "(…) *to resolve, amongst us, the great problem, sharply formulated by José Bonifacio, of the establishment of the ethnic unity of the Brazilian people*" (both citations Rondon 1916: 44). The ethnic unity, in this idiom, means the assimilation of the Indians and their racial and cultural disappearance as distinct peoples into a Brazilian melting pot. In another aspect though, the situation between the two countries differed. According to the very magnanimous picture painted by Roosevelt, his nation reserved lands as the right to property of the *Indian tribes* and indemnified them with compensations in case of loss or removal *in the public interest*. In Brazil, Rondon notes indignantly that the question of land allocation to Indians differs considerably. The land registers in the towns are already full of land deeds and property rights claiming lands where no civilized man ever even set foot. On paper the territories of Indian peoples are carved up by these *titles* long before any *owner* ever visited or could present a claim based on real presence on *his land*. If the so-called proprietors following their personal interests should claim these *rights* and take actual possession of the land, by a *monstrous inversion of the facts* the Indians would be treated as if they were *invaders* and *thieves* (Rondon 1916: 44-5). True enough, although the counterpoint with the Northern hemisphere is a distorted picture and in actuality both situations reveal strong analogies in conceptions and actions[xxv].

Land was a real, continuous and conscientious preoccupation of Rondon that found its way into the policy of the Service to create Indian reservations when the legal opportunity arose. Before such action, the Commission applied for land

grants for its own benefit and use around its telegraph stations. That is, to benefit Posts like those at Utiarity and José Bonifácio to the north, right in the heart of the Northern Nambikwara territory. The Service's record for the formalization of Indian land possessions and the associated realization of a land-base for the various Indian peoples themselves is a relatively poor one (Lima 1995). In conformity with his ideas of respectful but, in effect, subordinated humane integration within the *Brazilian territory*, Rondon succeeded in making contact with the Northern Nambikwara when visiting the ranch already established at Três Buritis. He stayed during one of these efforts by the Commission to support the Telegraph Line with locally produced food and work animals, a subsistence base to decrease the demand for goods and diminish the need for long supply lines. Between the first expedition in 1909 and the passage at the end of 1912, the Rondon Commission set up a ranch at this place, near José Bonifácio. The local people engaged in the establishment and production turned the enterprise into a relatively large business in the middle of Northern Nambikwara lands. If the Commission petitioned for land around the Posts and included this sort of own managerial productive activities, no apparent concern over land rights of the traditional inhabitants occured at this point. At least in the beginning of the establishment of the Telegraph Line and its concomitant supporting activities these took precedence over any other concern Rondon might have had about land rights. He conceived the inhabitants as *Brazilians* also to be beneficiaries of the *improvements* implemented and the very example of the success of the ranch as the future for the *Indians* (as employees or peasant-like occupants). Sovereignty could never lie with the uncivilized subalterns to be incorporated into the benevolent civilized state, and in the process the proletarianized or 'peasantified' *Indians* would supposedly require much less land.

When Rondon reported on the *Roosevelt-Rondon Scientific Expedition*, he did not elaborate on the previous expedition through the Southern Nambikwara lands. He does remark on the feature of the enormous success of several local groups of different peoples visiting his expedition, receiving presents and reciprocating likewise. If during this trip he gave a fair stock of presents, his resources may have exceeded the means later dedicated to the people employed in the service of the Line. The year before his trip, the Brazilian anthropologist Roquette-Pinto traveled along the Line to the northern area. He described how the Indians did not frequent the various Posts because the people in charge of the Posts had not been given provisions and so lacked metal instruments and other utensils to

distribute to the Indians. Doubtlessly this was at least partially the result of the long transport lines necessary for replenishment. It was also a token of the financial difficulties often associated with long-term government projects[xxvi]. Two of the employees at Três Buritis, the telegraph operator and the cattle caretaker, are said to be very good friends of the Indians and pointed out to him that one of the "*large Nambikuára*" villages was nearby. Later while searching for Indians for his investigation, the employees brought Roquette-Pinto to a group of "*over 200, with their women and children*" who had resolved to make camp nearby a hut for a few days. The author documents the symbolic and economic conquest of part of the Northern lands and the subsequent flourishing of the ranch in his account. He testifies that the establishment of peaceful relations through the exchange of commodities at a time when the Indian population was also present in considerable size. He forfeited a cow to keep the Indian group in close and to commence some research (Roquette-Pinto 1919).

Roquette-Pinto wrote *Rondônia* (1917; republished several times), a famous book in homage to Rondon. It was he who first suggested naming this Brazilian state after the man who had done much of the renaming in the region. Incidentally, this honorous name encompassing the grid of names he himself imposed could never be suggested by him in good taste. The virtue of modesty and the notion of serving the country impeded such vanity. Roquette-Pinto profited from the aid of the Commission chief on his trip, as in the example of the cow used to feed the Indians and retain them nearby. The retribution inherent in the book title later extended to the proposal that eventually created the state of Rondônia. In the book itself his data consist mainly of the measures he took of them for their *racial* characterization, in accordance with the scientific mores of the day. Although he projected a less anthropometrical and more cultural future for anthropology and spent considerable effort gathering sociocultural information, he confessed to learning little cultural information[xxvii]. Yet, what he learned from observing the Indians contains some interesting glimpses of contact and native life. The size of the group around the civilized base is in itself surprising and it might have been composed of the temporary joining of several local groups. Even if this was the case, the overall testimony points to a dense occupancy of the land. Around the *fazenda* of Campos Novos various groups of Indians gravitate in order to procure the metal tools they prize above anything else (they trade anything for a large ax head), and where they seek medical aid as well. One can safely assume that Três Buritis, where the Line ended at that time, initially transformed into a similar

center of attraction and production. On the other hand, the author observes that he did not gain insight into the relations between the Northern groups which he assumed consisted of a few secondary nuclei within the major ensemble. He mentions the *Tagnani*, *Tauitês* (the only ones he made some notes on) the *Tarutês*, *Taschuitês* and *Salumá*. On some of the pictures in the book the visitors appear, sometimes lying around on the ground in typical Nambikwara fashion as a sign of their being at ease. He situates the main group of the Northern area between the eastern *Doze de Outubro* River (towards the east of the Tenente Marques) and the western Roosevelt River, extending north towards the junction of the Tenente Marques with the Roosevelt. All in all the Northern territory encompasses quite a large region spilling over in the direction of Pimenta Bueno to the south (locating the *Tagnani* in the center on the map; see Roquette-Pinto 1919)[xxviii].

Roquette-Pinto, the first Brazilian anthropologist to visit the Nambikwara made some direct observations about the villages of these groups. He noted that the village plan centres around a large, clean, circular plaza approximately fifty meters in diameter. The villages are located at small hills of savanna vegetation in the forested region envisaging to *dominate* the surrounding landscape and, because of this reason, at some distance from the stream that serves as water supply. The village buildings are in a star-like form, a circle with outgoing paths where two houses oppose each other "*at the extremities of one of the diameters of the plaza*" (ib.: 229). At the Festa da Bandeira River (given as the Nambikwara name *Karumí* in the text), he described the plaza as measuring twenty meters and the circumference of the two houses add up to 28 and 30 meters, respectively. In the largest house he found three smoking racks and two *enormous black pots* that could not have fit through the small door openings. As mentioned earlier, the presence of this ceramics among a *tribe* mostly reputed to be either without this technique or only able to produce coarse rudimentary pots might astound some but he does not comment on his find nor does it seems to be noticed or accounted for by later anthropologists[xxix]. What really aroused his astonishment, however, concerns the state of agriculture verified by the fields and the crops grown: "*They feed themselves principally on agricultural products; it is one of the paradoxical features that this population shows such a development of their agriculture in their retarded stage*" (Roquette-Pinto 1919: 238). He then goes on to describe several kinds of foods, one of them being the manioc cakes toasted in the ashes of the fire, and adds that the manioc is a staple food always present in the house as an indispensable component for any meal (ib.: 240; 245). Meat, of course, as

proven by Rondon's examinations of the house waste as well, furnishes a necessary and amply present complement to the food consumed, but Roquette-Pinto adduces that the special taste for hunted monkeys might have arisen from previous cannibalistic practices (ib.: 241). From his Western vantage point, monkeys call to mind children, or, more generally, human bodies. His scientific writing geared towards a more scientific audience (as opposed to the political writings of Rondon) was not restrained in offering the hypothesis that the primitiveness of the Nambikwara warrants the notion of their being only one step away from cannibal stage.

It is for this reason that the sophisticated horticulture astounded the anthropologist. According to the customary evolutionary stages of mankind, their state of primitiveness (and the shocking lack of the hammock in particular), should combine with a hunting and gathering economy. He therefore returns to the same point to stress that the size of a large population like the one he met here in the north could not depend only on hunting. So *the seed of agriculture* permitted their ample numbers yet he emphasized "(…) *their preservation in the 'stone age' until now*" (Roquette-Pinto: 254). He attributes the cultivation of the *very fertile lands* also to their isolation from the White man and his domestic animals (even the dog). The obligation to survive under these circumstances caused them to "*perfect themselves in this industry*" and "*turn into distinguished agriculturalists even when remaining in a very elementary state of civilization*" (ib. 1919: 254). In other words, the observer recorded a remarkable horticultural activity that furnished a permanent supply of manioc and other crops (both food crops and non-food ones, like tobacco) as attested by the size of the fields, the quantity produced and the variety of cultivated plants. As a counterpoint to the deftness and skill of horticulture, he claims that according to his observations, the Indians collected the maize still green from the fields or the manioc prematurely before full growth. However, the green maize is edible when prepared correctly and may be appreciated as such. The early harvest of manioc may have been due to a specific harvest, tiding them over between two normal harvests. Therefore, these observations do not indicate hunger or malnutrition. The overall picture impressed Roquette-Pinto just as it did Rondon. Indeed, his previous remarks on the abundant produce and horticulture attest to this. Roquette-Pinto noticed these fields to be of a regular circular form and he thought that the abandoned fields may be transformed into open spaces of *campos* (savannas) within the forested region.

The string of telegraph posts and the trail blazed by Rondon not only opened the way for Roquette-Pinto as the first Brazilian anthropologist to visit and do research among the Nambikwara, but also paved the road for the mentioned joint North American–Brazilian venture to clear up the ambiguity of the Rio da Duvída. The description of the journey in a book published soon afterwards is written as a report of events but it also serves as an important medium of promotion of ideas in the intellectual and political arena of the age. Here Rondon explains the circumstances of his first contact with the Northern Nambikwara that occurred after his initial penetration described in his lectures of 1910 when, at the end of 1911, he searched for the best route to construct the Line. Just like Roquette-Pinto, the Mission members attributed the presence of savannas, called *campos*, in the wooded region to the action of slash and burn horticulture practiced by the Nambikwara[xxx]. Rondon remarks that, from the Juruena onwards, the area is inhabited by groups such as the "(…) *Nenês, Iáias, Navaitês, Tagananis, Tauitê and others, each of which occupies his own proper territory in the valleys of the various rivers and streams*" (Rondon 1916: 137). This relatively dense population furnished the string of islands in the woods through which Rondon resolved to create the trail of posts for his precious wire. First he headed to the northeast of Vilhena between the headwaters of the Roosevelt and Ique Rivers to a place where a subordinate officer discovered "(…) *a large village and many fields of Nhambiquaras, of a group we later learned to be called Mamãindê; I, however, did not encounter anything: the Indians had abandoned the spot and incinerated the village*" (ib.: 138). It is worth noting how this shows both the extension of the Mamaindê territory and their proximity to the other Northern groups. This reinforces the likelihood that this group was at one time a semi-unified population. The only village today is located in the Guaporé valley to the south of Vilhena.

Rondon makes contact

The way Rondon noted the existence of basically demarcated territories for each different people did not distract him from his broader aim of incorporating these peoples as Brazilians and the lands as Brazil. After developing the new trail (occasionally with the help of the "*Tauitês*"), Rondon arrived at Três Buritis. The ranch served as a place to rest and feed the cattle necessary to the construction and maintenance of the line, Rondon met with his maternal uncle and the man's nephew, and he decided to explore the area to the north and northwest of the main fazenda with them (Roosevelt (1914: 227) took this uncle to be the farm

manager). Unexpectedly meeting five unarmed Nambikwara men in the forest, Rondon correctly guessed that the small group did not harbor any violent intentions. He established a form of contact. One of the men spoke animatedly before Rondon dismounted from his horse and circulated amongst the group. He succeeded in communicating an interest in visiting their village and they gladly invited him to follow. During most of this trip, Rondon had to restrain his deeply suspicious uncle who, as his nephew pointed out, represented the thoroughly prejudiced regional population that rated the Indians (in an obvious line of long-standing tradition) as hardly better than animals, treacherous, and totally untrustworthy. The description of the way the Indians walked by their weapons without picking them up, serves to underpin Rondon's own counterpoint "(…) *the trait of true nobility, of courage, and of tact by these men*" (Rondon 1916: 142). Rondon, of course, wanted to counter the negative stereotypes about Indians and especially the fame of the *primitive* and *savage* Nambikwara[xxxi]. Therefore he amply recounts their very good welcome and the bountiful food and drink offered to them as guests: *an interminable procession* of manioc, manioc cakes, toasted maize, potatoes and a kind of sweet potatoes, monkey meat, fish and toasted larva.

He found some thirty men from two different groups in the village, with no women and children. Later he discovered the women and children gathered in the only large house of the village. Initially this house protected them from prying eyes. The house contrasted to the *many others*, constructions which more closely resembled lean-tos and allowed no privacy[xxxii]. On arrival, two men, one of the incoming party and one from the village, each gave a loud speech. Afterwards the headman sent messengers to a neighboring village of *Tagananis* and about ten Indians came over from the north and the same man energetically asked them to lay down their weapons. Other people kept arriving because word was sent to other nearby villages of the *Tauitês, Minis and Tachiuvítês* (ib.: 147). Even at night, a large number of Indians, a *crowd*, collected at the village around the campfires and lively discussions ensued. As the night advanced, the women left the large house but fled when the stranger stood up to look at them, much to the amusement of the men. Rondon rested his head on the leg of one of the Indians. This seemed to please the choosen Indian. Rondon even dozed (his uncle, on the other hand, did not as much as blink). In the end, a multitude of no less than two hundred people assembled. The Indians did not sleep because, he conjectured, they were very excited about the stirring prospect of the metal axes they desired

ardently. In the morning they invited him to visit the neighbouring villages on the same savanna and in an undefined but relatively short time he saw four other villages the total population of which the visitors calculated to be *over three hundred individuals*.

It is worth resuming that within an easy walking distance lived three or four different groups, some of which were very likely distinct peoples with dialectical differences, in five villages and numbering at least over three hundred fifty people. This was a dense multi-ethnic network of villages and peoples in one small pocket of the much vaster Northern Nambikwara territories. Through long-distance trading a new metal ax already had found its way to the village, presumably from the Campos Novos fazenda. A large delegation accompanied Rondon back to the main base and he gave each presents like axes, machetes and beads. From this time on, contact was not only firmly established but also expanded throughout a much larger region, including the Sabanê. No doubt the already present multi-ethnic network of relations facilitated this effect, proving to be bigger than the small pocket within the larger region visited by Rondon. "*From this date on the visits of the Indians to our camps never ceased and there were occasions at which they arrived in groups of 200 or more. The word about such an extraordinary success spread very rapidly in the sertão* [hinterland] *and soon caused other tribes than to join in, situated to the North at a distance of over twenty leagues. Thus, we got to know the Sabanês, the Iaiás, the Xaodês and the Teiobês, who are the most beautiful men of the whole region*" (Rondon 1916: 150). Note that the name *Sabanê* was already in circulation. The other names designate now unknown groups or peoples because of either extinction or renaming (in ignorance of previous naming). Sabanê is one of the few names to endure.

This information places the Sabanê to the north of Três Buritis, rather then to the east. The mixture of group names does not assure much certainty that the Sabanê referenced are the current Sabanê. As will be discussed in a future section, oral tradition claims the group originally came from the forests to the east – northeast of this location, and a later entry into the Northern Nambikwara region. The reference to a northerly origin could indicate a direction to the northeast, suggesting a migration from the direction of Mato Grosso. This group's original Amazonian territory may have been what is now the Aripuanã Indian Park (most of it in the northwestern corner of Mato Grosso). This Sabanê may have left

because of pressures from the Cinta Larga or other Tupi Mondé. In any case one may assume that the Sabanê already lived either in the Northern Nambikwara region or in an immediately adjacent area north or northeast, participating in its intricate pattern of relations in this congeries of villages and peoples. The region occupied to the north of Três Buritis and José Bonifacio extended for a large distance that must have passed the confluence of the Tenente Marques River with the Roosevelt River if the mentioned measure is correct. It remains unclear how the Indians communicated across such a distance. It is certain that Rondon's presence created a stir in the whole region. As another indication of the curiosity aroused, the military man added that even the elders came over to his camps to look "(...) *at the men that suddenly appeared in their lands and had the power to produce such a profound and radical modification in their secular customs like the one that results from the substitution of stone instruments by steel tools*" (Rondon 1916: 150). In itself, the causality postulated that the mere presence of metal tools shapes a radical sociocultural transformation denotes the common belief in the efficacy of extraneous objects as agents of change that naturalizes and validates the exercise of domination to produce social change.

So, in the name of civilization and in consideration of the protection and advancement of the contacted Indians, Rondon decided to name the new telegraph station José Bonifacio. In his opinion no one could better express "(...) *the moral and civic exigencies of the emotions and hopes that had been born and that we wished to flourish than this great statesman of Independence*" (ib.: id.). The author of the benign proposal of bringing the independent Indians up to civilization under the aegis of the enlightened Brazilians could be the iconic patron of the telegraph station, the metaphoric reference of the whole project of the recently initiated grandiose enterprise of the protection and civilization. In this respect, Rondon pretended to infuse a patriotic and symbolic significance to the inauguration of the telegraph station named after the hero of independence. He not only timed the inauguration ceremony to be on the birthday of the illustrious patriot but, "*by another happy coincidence*", "(...) *not only with the presence, but also the contribution of a group of Nhambiquaras, the "Tauitês", who selected one of their daughters to raise the sacred symbol of Brazilian nationality upon the hallowed ground of the sertão*" (Rondon 1916: 150). Without being so direct, such words (given at a formal address) probably evoked the classical image of claiming possession of a *virgin* territory, and the primary act of affirming the state's right to these lands to Rondon's audience. Of course, for

someone like Rondon who esteemed the heroism of Columbus, the same act must have reminded him and the audience of the original claiming of Brazil. Note the similarities to the so-called *first mass* during the *discovery of Brazil*. Naturally, the raising of the wooden cross would interfere with his positivist religion. Hence the republican symbols substituted the original religious elements of Cabral's well-known founding act. Earlier sacred acts and objects are now replaced by another *sacred symbol*, imbuing the flag with similar extraordinary content. Evolution and the nation-state replace the conversion of the inhabitants of the *new lands* to the sacred religion implied in the first exemplary act. The intensity of the belief in evolution, and faith in the future development of society against all possible negative evidence, adds a religious character to such system of convictions (Brody 2001: 336).

Thus the replication imitates the so called *birth of Brazil* of nationalist imaginary, with the finishing touch being the active participation of the very people being expropriated by the act, as if they gave their consent and were already present as a kind of proto-Brazilian[xxxiii]. In fact, just like his predecessor, Rondon must have been aware that the Indians could not have the slightest idea of the symbolic significance in the ceremony[xxxiv]. In the interest of historical myth making, he ignores any aspect of the Indian's view. From another perspective of the same event, the assistance of the symbolically inferior in the subordinate role of raising the sacred symbol by a child represents the future as the still pliable Indian. The child is more easily *educated* to acquire the level of a new *superior stage* is more symbolic than Rondon intended. Put differently, this was a silent reproduction of an old ceremony of establishing subordination and legitimizing expropriation. The ritualized pattern only changes the major objective and justification from the salvation of the *soul* by participation in the *true religion* to the incorporation of the native's bodies in the *nation* and *civilization*. The Indian's subordinate prospective role remained unchanged, this was the path to assimilation. Perhaps Roosevelt's mention that Rondon descended paternally from the Paulistas, a people who stand out as the colonial raiders of Indians and searchers for riches in the interior and considered by popularized history as the conquerors of the hinterland, is not irrelevant (Roosevelt 1914: 204). It seems no coincidence that the hagiographic descriptions of Rondon always foreground his Indian descent. In a way, Rondon followed in the footsteps of these conquerors in a novel manner of conquest, as if uniting in his own person common representations of the past and future of Brazil.

Along the wire: "one of the most attractive indigenous cultures in Brazil"

The dense network of associations between related but different peoples within the Northern Nambikwara territory was officially incorporated into *Brazilian boundaries*, a fact that should be recognized by the constellation of other similar entities, the other nation states. Formerly, these peoples and their villages were outside of the reach of the republic or the preceding empire. The journey of Roosevelt and Rondon thus traversed the *unknown wilds* already symbolically appropriated but actually outside of official *civilization*. Roosevelt proudly recounted his penetration and traveling through the area in the company of Rondon. The ex-president had his own reasons for participating in a similar expedition to the wild unknown uncharted lands, emulating great explorers of other continents in order to *put on the map* rivers and *undiscovered* territories (cited in Enders 1998: 15). This personal desire coincided with a vision about the occupation of these savage lands being the exclusive duty and right of the American countries. Such a notion appealed to Brazilian diplomacy and in effect engendered the invitation from the Brazilian ministry of foreign affairs to Roosevelt. Roosevelt's expression of the principle that the *savage expanses* in the Americas should be the civilizing task of the countries within which bounds such regions officially lay was directed against any European power tempted to consider some void as a legitimate area of colonization. Such beliefs were felt to be justified when looking at what was happening in Africa at the time. Brazilian diplomacy pursued a policy of guaranteeing the *right* to Amazonia by settling the border problems with all neighbours, including the European ones to the north. An alliance with the United States and its strengthening by means of the expedition would serve the country as well as the concomitant publicized demonstration of how Brazil was engaged in *charting* and *civilizing* its interior (thus justifying its *right* in the international arena; Enders 1998)[xxxv]. Today, a hundred years later, the same ally is ironically conceived by nationalists as the very threat to sovereignty in Amazonia. This supposed threat is manipulated by false rumors and maps (usually on internet) in order to reject all *outside* interference within the region; in effect it is ordinarily an argument against Indian rights and in favour of an unrestricted pillage of natural resources.

The positivists also perceived a chance to boost their own internal prestige and their influence in shaping the political agenda of *civilizing* the interior and the way to proceed with the *formation of the nation* (Enders 1998: 11). It is impressive to note a number of similarities of presuppositions about the nature of

man in society, his past and future between the group of Rondon and Roosevelt. One such point issues from the general premise of the design of the natural evolution of mankind. It concerns the translation of the presumed technological distance into the supposed superiority of the entirety of Western culture, and that this advantage inevitably generates the desire of the retarded *tribes* stranded in a primitive stage. Stressing the more negative aspects of such parameters of evaluation, Roosevelt saw *ephemeral villages* and a tilling of the soil *with the rude and destructive cultivation of savages* in the several abandoned fields of the Navaitê (Northern Nambikwara) down the Roosevelt River (Roosevelt 1914: 242). Just as the Pareci they should be *raised by degrees* in order to procure to a *permanent rise* induced by their valued *friend* and *leader* Rondon (to be *followed* and *obeyed*) and the *virgin land* opened up for progress to industrious settlers (ib.: 183; 203). The slight contradiction with the *rather extensive maize and manioc cultivation* encountered before on the Chapada does not deter him from emphasizing the implicit comparison with modern *white settlers* and predicting a future of a large pastoral and agricultural population in the very same region. Roosevelt adopts the point of view of the savage that must struggle for survival, "(...) *the immense labor entailed by many of their industries, and the really extraordinary amount of work they accomplish with the skillful use of their primitive and ineffective tools*" (ib.: 196). More than that, when visiting a village and observing the presence of some commodities like some knives "(...) *which they sorely needed, for they are not even in the stone age*" (ib.: 229). The Stone Age was as low as any people can sink in this paradigm, and being below this level was a condition very rarely invoked. The degree of attributed *primitiveness* confers his expedition a special distinction in the set of *expeditions into the unknown*. His vision of the future seems remarkably similar to what already happened in the U.S. *West*. There, the Indians were conquered and dealt with. There were no more expeditions into the unknown. The conquest and assimilation of primitive peoples was seen as the natural, desirable, irrevocable and unquestionable outcome of history. An analogous process was well underway in Mato Grosso.

On the other hand, Rondon, while sharing the same general premises also emphasized the positive qualities of the primitiveness. He worries about the manner in which this people can be transformed as they are by definition his *countrymen* within the same nation-state. Hence the kind of view of the popularizing account of the *Missão Rondon* exposed in the book published only a

year later, when the same naturalness of superiority is thought to be the cause for the gradual absorption of White technology and culture all by itself. That is, no abrupt imposition of cultural change is necessary: All inducement needed concerns what may be called 'the push of poverty and the pull of commodity'. "*These modifications shall be produced as the result of an evolution, the march of which is accelerated by the new instruments of labor with which we provide them, as well as the firearms, salt, matches, sugar, clothing and other utilities that rapidly enter into their customs, turning them ever so much dependent upon the relations with us and increasingly determining more intimate approximations. It is these voluntary, spontaneous approximations that will integrally change them, without neither leaps nor perturbations. And it has been noted that these modifications occur much more quickly than one could imagine*" (Missão Rondon 1916: 258-9). Reality proved otherwise and belied this optimism. The ranch at Três Buritis did flourish around this time. Roosevelt, for example, claimed he saw over a hundred head of cattle. The region was considered the most densely populated area of all of *Nambikwara land* (in the expression of the ex-president). The valleys of the Ananaz, Roosevelt and Bandeira Rivers contained the largest population the authors considered as one group, although they were subdivided into numerous sub-groups like the "(...) *Mamá-indês, Tamá-indês, Malondês, Sabanês, Iaiás and Nava-itês*" (ib.: 298). Rondon estimated the total population at *20,000 souls*, the density of villages varying according to ecological conditions. In other words, if Rondon conceived of the *Nhambiquara nation* to consist of five major sets of groups, the richer northern region should be settled by over a fifth share of this figure (over a 4000 persons; ib.: 302). He recognized these segments as sufficiently distinct to merit the notion of *tribe* within the encompassing *Nation*.

The destiny of the long line of telegraph poles, stations and ranches (*stations of civilization*; Rondon quoted in Enders 1998: 13) was not as anticipated. Contrary to expectations, decline set in when technological change transformed the Line into obsolete technology. Although the telegraph was used once during the 1930 uprising in São Paulo against the federal government, it already was considered obsolete. The telegraph gave way to radio communication. Slowly, technical progress doomed the string of stations and its personnel to an ever increasing governmental neglect and disregard. Largely becoming dependent on their own resources, the people manning the stations and farms fended for themselves as best as they could, just as when Lévi-Strauss undertook his famous expedition

through the Mato Grosso and into current Rondônia. By the time of his expedition in the 1930s, the contact phase had transformed the scene into a demographic disaster, especially as the even more isolated Northern Nambikwara were the primary victims of the so-called Columbian exchange, the arrival of unknown contagious diseases. The results of the White penetration from the setting up of the Line, the presence and passage of a mixture of officers, soldiers, and lower class workers touched off a series of epidemics worsened by the reactions of the Indians to flee the sources of infectious dissipation and the meager, if existent, medical assistance available. Simultaneously, the sporadic entry of the servicing personnel and the absence of a large wave of settlers occupying Indian territory, left the Indian peoples with a very large measure of autonomy. Consequently, the first years of the conquest operated under the auspices of Rondon actually brought in the occupational forces for the Line that wreaked havoc with the epidemics naturally carried by the incoming new people – the decimation and demographic devastation of contagious diseases – without, as yet, the effects of large scale land restrictions introduced by *settlers*. In the years between the initial time of Rondon's approach and conquest and the adventure of the Lévi-Strauss expedition the Indian population greatly decreased, ruining the viability of a number of villages and even peoples to sustain an independent life. Lévi-Strauss followed the Telegraph Line and ventured beyond the straight line itself where he met some surviving groups, among them a group of Sabanê. While at the Vilhena station he described the very severe effects suffered by the Indians after Rondon's passage:
"I encountered two new bands, one of which consisted of eighteen people who spoke a dialect close to that of the people who I began to be acquainted with, while the other, thirty-four members strong, used an unknown language; later I have not been able to identify it. Each was led by a chief, with, it would seem, in the first case purely profane attributions; but the chief of the other more important one was soon to reveal himself as a kind of sorcerer. His group was designated by the name of Sabanê; the others were called Tarundê."(Lévi-Strauss 1984: 360; my translation from French).

The Sabanê language is incomprehensible to any Northern Nambikwara speaker and it is safe to assume that the group mentioned above is indeed the *Sabanê*, His earlier, more academic, monograph of 1949 confers with the comparison with current speakers scrutinized by current linguistic research (with Antunes (2004), fieldwork in 2001). The 34 Sabanê in Vilhena are the survivors of the previous

epoch when Rondon estimated the total number of the whole Nambikwara nation at about twenty thousand. Lévi-Strauss, who cites this number, probably affected by the impressive decline in population, held this to be most likely an inflated number, and no more than an educated guess. Nevertheless, when considering the descriptions of the population before the ravages caused by the contagious diseases, the total may not be very much off the mark. Well aware of this, Lévi-Strauss remarks that the bands previously comprised several hundreds of members and that all evidence pointed to a rapid decline: "(…) *thirty years ago the fragment known as Sabané consisted of over a thousand individuals; when the group visited the telegraph station of Campos Novos, a count amounted to a hundred and twenty seven men, plus their women and children. However, an epidemic of the flu broke out when the group camped at a place called* Espirro[xxxvi]*. The disease developed into a kind of pulmonary edema and three hundred natives died in forty eight hours. The entire group fled, leaving behind the ill and the dying. Of the thousand Sabané known in the past, only nineteen men and their women and children survived in 1938. Perhaps, in order to explain these numbers, one must add that, since a few years ago, the Sabané were engaged in a war against some of their eastern neighbours. But a large group located not far from Tres Buritis was annihilated by the flu in 1927, except for six or seven persons of whom only three were still alive in 1938. The Tarundé group, one of the most important ones in the past, had twelve men (plus their women and children) in 1936; of these twelve men, only four survived in 1938*" (ib.: 347).

Only recently the Brazilian anthropologist Luiz de Castro Faria, who accompanied the expedition as the officially appointed Brazilian representative and inspector, published some of his notes and pictures. His numbers and dates in his diary differ slightly with the above but confirm the sudden and significant population decline:
"(…) *there were over a thousand Sabanese in 1929. In November of the same year, an influenza epidemic hit a group of forty-eight men accompanied by their families – a total of three hundred people – who were waiting for the general's arrival at Espirro. Of these only seven escaped, but is suspected that they had carried the illness to the maloca, causing an even higher number of deaths. In 1931, a group visiting Campos Novos, along with the Manduco* [Manduka] *was once more struck by the disease, although only one woman perished. On returning to the maloca, they carried the influenza, and so there were more deaths. Finding out the situation in which the Sabanese were the Manduco*

attacked their maloca, killing many.

In 1932, the Sabanese came under pressure from the Manduco and appeared at the Vilhena post: they numbered only ninety-seven. They resided at the post for three years. In 1935 they went to José Bonifácio, after being summoned by the telegraphist to work in a swidden; there they once more contracted the flu, which claimed more victims. Today only twenty-one men and twenty women remain" (Faria 2001:133).

The terrible effects of the epidemics on the Sabanê serve as the major example to Lévi-Strauss on the enormous losses of the Nambikwara and if the whole group totaled thirty-four people at the time of 1938, then these accounts indicate between 959 and 966 people died. A population drop of 96% or 97%. Lévi-Strauss and Castro Faria relate some figures that probably were gathered by witnesses. Such data are derived either from the Commission reports (not easily consulted today), or else from the testimony of employees they met along the Telegraph Line . This confers considerable reliability to the numbers cited even if the original base line of a thousand seems to be more of a reasonably informed guess than the result of a census. Such a decline may seem to be exaggerated but comparative cases examined in the recent years confirm impacts similar to the one suffered by the Sabanê (see Dobyns 1993). The contrast with previous reports can hardly be more striking: the Taúitê that visited the Roosevelt expedition and the members of the same group in the village visited by the expedition's doctor did not show any kind of disease. "*Every one appeared to be in perfect health*" (Cajazeira 1916: 32-3). It will hardly be surprising that the people at trade centres in North America were submitted to higher mortality than people in non-trading areas and it stands to reason that the telegraph stations functioned as nodes on the web of contagion (cf. Dobyns 1993: 276). Espirro, a settlement along the Line constructed to gather diverse groups is a prime example. Roquette-Pinto, for example, commented that the fazenda of Campos Novos attracted all groups into which the *great tribe* is subdivided, even enemies fraternize at this exchange centre (1919: 171; the classification of *fazenda* is his, and indexical to the scale of the economic operation).

Fleeing the Line may create a safer distance but also would put one beyond the reach of any medical assistance, and may spread the disease to other villages. The temptation of the useful metal tools occasionally encourages the Indians to trade or receive *presents*. This proved a deadly transaction because it facilitated the

transmission of the full range of unknown diseases along all posts of the Line and spread into the entire region. The metal utensils effectively created one dependency that the Missão Rondon presupposed to be a sufficient motive for total acculturation. However, the lack of any further influx of immigration into the region and the relaxed state power left the Indians autonomous, completely following their old ways. In fact, no such obvious causal relation exists between the want for metal instruments and the adoption of culturally *superior* behavior. Without an actual system of domination that brings about this supposedly natural result and the various languages and cultural variants of the Nambikwara ensemble were reproduced by the different peoples despite the power bestowed upon the *civilized* of the Line by the control of access to these commodities. In effect, the gradual abandonment of the personnel by its employer allowed the Indians to counteract this power because of their numbers and physical force, and, in a way, actually more or less turned the tables[xxxvii]. The impact created by contact, conjoined with the war on eastern neighbors waged simultaneously, must have thoroughly disorganized the sociocultural and political organization of the Sabanê, similarly to the Tarundê. Very little is known about the Sabanê previous to contact, but the disastrous decline in numbers undoubtedly disorganized this people, almost obliterating their existence. When Lévi-Strauss stayed at Vilhena, as cited, the two local groups (villages) entertained friendly relations differently from the animosity verified between other local groups in Campos Novos. Both were fragments of very much larger peoples. The author remarks on the existence of several such groups or peoples who were so reduced that they could no longer pursue an independent way of life. By this time, most peoples had been forced to constitute one village out of the formerly autonomous villages of their own people or else had been compelled to cohabitate and negotiate with a similar fraction of another people to restore the conditions of a socially viable group. In Lévi-Strauss' judgment:

"*In Vilhena, on the other hand, I witnessed an attempt at reconstruction. For there was little doubt that the natives with whom I made my camp elaborated a plan. All of the adult men of one band called the women in the other one "sisters", and the latter called the men in a symmetrical position "brothers". As for the men of the two bands, they designated one another with the term that, in their respective languages, signifies cross cousin and corresponds to the relation that we would translate with "brother-in-law". Given the rules of Nambikwara marriage, this nomenclature results in granting all of the children of one band in the situation of "potential spouse" of the children in the other one and vice versa.*

In this way, by the play of intermarriages, the two bands would be fused in the next generation" (Lévi-Strauss 1984: 326).

Lévi-Strauss, perforce constrained by a very limited vocabulary – a sort of Telegraph Line pidgin –, considered the two groups in question as culturally identical but diverse by the mutually unintelligible languages (a gulf mediated by one or two individuals of each group). This is a view rather common among the students of Nambikwara although later anthropologists do not fail to emphasize a diversity within the whole set. There is a tendency to use the ethnonym as an encompassing catch word for all the different peoples and segments in any way affiliated to the linguistic family. A trend to feel justified about such homogeneity in sociocultural organization even when dialects or languages are barely or completely incomprehensible leads a sensitive author like Lévi-Strauss to include the Sabanê within the ensemble called *Nambikwara*. From the time of Rondon this usage has been followed mostly because a few visible distinguishing features, in particular sleeping on sand, a practice that set all of them so much apart to outsiders that the invisible cultural differences were overlooked. In effect, as Lévi-Strauss observed, the Indians looked very much alike in their near or complete *nudity*. Considering the circumstances, Lévi-Strauss did a remarkable job in ethnography, but failed to confirm or deny the classification of the Sabanê language within the Nambikwara language family. He also perceived quite well the social chiasm between the two *bands* which camped close to each other yet clearly maintained a social distance marked by the separation of their campfires[xxxviii]. He recounts episodes about the Sabanê leader that left the Tarundê one with a certain misgiving about the honesty of his colleague's intentions and the outcome of the whole joint project to aggregate the different fractions and regain a larger and more viable sociopolitical unit. The Sabané were engaged in a war against the most northern group of the Nambikwara on the savanna, one that occupied the land extending from the Ique River in the north to the headwaters of the Doze de Outubro and adjacent Camararé, with the center more or less where current reserve of Aroeira is (Lévi-Strauss 1948: 3; 9; 11). Waging war must have enhanced the pressure on the Sabanê to realize a significant addition to their potential of diminished demographic resources and to augment their chances of permanence as a people. Lévi-Strauss, without explicitly saying so, justifies their inclusion in the encompassing *Nambikwara* (my ensemble) yet he documents the conceived ethnic differences reporting on the tensions between the groups. Social difference plays a significant role in the

project to merge of these two distinct peoples, in particular the distinctiveness of the languages, and the author perceives the precariousness of the convergence and the uncertainty about the outcome of the fusion of the two *bands*.

Lévi-Strauss could not forecast the ultimate result and when he wrote his popular book of the middle of the fifties he did not know it either. Lévi-Strauss believed that he earned an unexpected fame with the publication of his book on journeys into the unknown lands and encounters with exotic peoples. Discounting the book by Roosevelt of lesser distribution and fame, the *Tristes Tropiques*, the sad tropics, marks the introduction of the *Nambikwara* to the international scene of Western literature and the general public. To each party its proper fame. The reception of the idea of the *Nambikwara* among this public probably involves an image of one of the most primitive and backward peoples that the author encountered in his philosophical voyage in search of the meaning of his own life and of the significance of human sociality in human society. Although it is not easy to assess the impact of this book on the circulation of stereotypes in Western countries, it is remarkable how some ideas and *facts* expressed about the Nambikwara entered into a wider circulation. Such appearances arise in surprising contexts. For example, a Columbian Catholic bishop quoted Lévi Strauss during a course on homosexuality and the Catholic attitude towards human sexual nature: "*Yet, there are some signs that certain criteria are not absent in primitive tribes in contrast to the emptiness of a "culture" that turns its back on nature and ethics. And here we have a truth that involves an underlying anthropology. If C. Levi-Strauss recorded homosexual practices in some tribes, he also pointed out that in others, like the Nambikwara, this sort of conduct was given the name, "Tamindige Kihandige", which means "False-love", for which, as one moralist commented, it shows that they are more mature than certain ethnologists (Margaret Mead)* [xxxix]. Sometimes, ironically, the *primitive tribe* appears to concur in the moral judgement pronounced by the authority for whom the condemning attitude attributed to the Nambikwara rhetorically underscores how even these *primitives* already reject a practice that the *immature* anthropologist only catalogued as an example of the malleability of human conduct. As if the exegesis of the native term by Lévi-Strauss somehow contradicts the position of Mead in favor of cultural relativism and against ethnocentrism. This is an unexpected usage of the savage (though just one instance in a long line of Western tradition) actually against Lévi-Strauss' intention in more than one way, because he also clearly states that the same

Indians do not morally object to the behavior described.

Apart from entering into more ample circulation of certain attributes in the wider social context, within anthropology the name of the Nambikwara also is associated with the intellectual activity of Lévi-Strauss. The name of the Nambikwara as a anthropological case also derives from some articles where his observations are framed more abstractly. These publications highlight the specific way this *people* come into existence within the specialized literature as a typical case for a specific example in a thematic field. Added to the case of homosexual behavior appearing in both circuits of dissemination of knowledge, there are a variety of themes: the gender-based division of labor; the question of powerless leadership; the polygamy of chiefs as a retribution for the service of leading the local group; the origin and function of power and its relation to literacy. Furthermore, there is the dualism between the wet season and sedentary horticulture versus the nomadism of hunting and gathering in the dry season; trade exchange and war; cross cousin marriage (the traces of the possible fusion of groups and the implicit duality in Dravidian kinship terminology can be noted in his own first major work, *The elementary structures of kinship* and also in lesser-known earlier publications: Lévi-Strauss 1943; 1944; 1946; 1948a and b); and the astonishing simplicity of the social organization (family life), material culture and dearth of clothing and ornaments. Sometimes for the writer, the Nambikwara represent the *simplest expression* of human society. For example, he discusses the implications of *the elementary social structure* of the Nambikwara band for the origin and function of political power (Lévi-Strauss 1984: 373). However, such simplicity is tempered with his keen eye to individual personalities and characteristics. In no way did he translate the supposed absence of social complexity into a reduction of the varied and typically human qualities of the natives, as if these human beings also are depreciated into a lower life form. A type of humanity in its most *elementary condition*, a typical *modéle réduit*, is a proposition used at other times to gain insight in the laws of social life, observed as the *sociological experience* of a human experiment in sociocultural living. Here it leads him to conclude that the Nambikwara are *the most simple expression* of a reduced society made him *find only human beings*[xl]. In closing the chapters on the Nambikwara in *Tristes Tropiques* with this statement, he may sometimes confuse readers. Even if he thought he found only the smallest amount of social complexity, the minimal sociocultural condition of man still is profoundly and uniquely human and leaves space for an ample specter of personalities and

expressions of individuality.

One of the paradoxes of the writings of Lévi-Strauss is the large public reception of this work amongst diverse audiences beyond his fellow anthropologists. This resulted in the propagation of a number of ideas generated by the Nambikwara experience into mainstream anthropology (reprinting articles on the family, trade and war and political leadership in general readers). Simultaneously, very few of these readers ever set an eye on the academic companion thesis to "The Elementary Structures of Kinship" that predated the popular version (at the time the main doctoral thesis always was accompanied by a smaller supplementary one). Of course, its publication in the periodical of the Society of Americanists (Lévi-Strauss 1948), with its limited editions, contributes to this fact. More importantly, for the same reason the posterior correction of any of these views on the Nambikwara hardly ever penetrates into the same non-specialist circles reached by the popular book. In effect, the views expounded by Lévi-Strauss, admirable as his fieldwork may be when the extreme constraints in which he operated are taken into account, have been proved by later researchers to be incomplete, limited, and to have lead to generalizations not supported by later data. The characteristics of Nambikwara society mentioned above all have been subjected to more or less substantial changes, critiques and amendments. One clear example is the homosexual relation between cross cousins, a relation never witnessed by Lévi-Strauss, as he carefully cautions the reader, yet he still felt justified in suggesting it as a reasonably fair assumption. In this instance, the same conduct was interpreted by his companion anthropologist on the expedition, the Brazilian government representative, Luiz Castro Faria, as indicative of playful behavior devoid of real erotic content[xli]. This kind of joking relationship was corroborated by the findings of Price in the behavior between brothers-in-law among the Nambikwara do Campo (in his 1971 thesis). As far my own few observations permit me to generalize, similar behavior obtains among the Sararé.

Lévi-Strauss read the reports on the Nambikwara of the Rondon Commission and studied the book of Roquette-Pinto. In his academic ethnography he affirms the total lack of attention given to the Nambikwara after Roquette-Pinto, clearly considering his work as its continuation. Hence his major aim was to fill in some gaps in the previous research and especially to study familial and social organization. It is also *superfluous* to state that he did not pretend to exhaust the subject, if only because he spent time with them *during the nomadic period* and

did not hide the fact that visiting during the sedentary season would have rectified the perspective of the whole. Conscious of his limitations, he cited Roquette-Pinto in claiming that the scientific constructions in this terrain will always be slow. As a sharp observer and anthropologist, the author is quite explicit about some injunctions on his work among "*one of the most attractive cultures of indigenous Brazil*" and he expresses the wish to renew his research to include sedentary life (Lévi-Strauss 1948: 3). Apparently, Lévi-Strauss never explained why he did not pursue his study. His propositions and generalizations have only been subjected to revision by later Nambikwara scholars. The most debated case concerns the dual organization of the yearly cycle of activities. The very assertion that he only witnessed the nomadic dry season is a relevant rejoinder, as are his warnings about the limitations of his fieldwork. Yet, the notion of a season of nomadic hunting and gathering and the shorter period of sedentary horticultural villages is recurrent and pre-eminent in his description. Years of intensive research on *economic subsistence* among the Mamaindê (by P. Aspelin) demonstrated both the profound mastery of horticulture, its integration in the general culture and the overall sedentary disposition of this people. The Northern Nambikwara are definitely not nomadic in the sense that the prior research averred[xlii]. In the response following the original article questioning his results, Lévi-Strauss simply complied to the dictum of the temporary nature of knowledge he himself cited about a predecessor. Thus he mostly adhered to the straightforward belief that better and more elaborate research must be accepted as the normal way of progress of anthropological knowledge. He did make a few relevant criticisms about the difference in the respective periods of research. For example, the tremendous encroachment and invasions suffered by the Nambikwara provides, in his view, a plausible compelling force to sedentarization. Also, the Nambikwara are *a far from homogeneous lot*, a pertinent observation but something in the Sabané case not readily noticeable in his own prior writings. Lévi-Strauss further claims to have reported mostly about the *more northern bands*. This is interesting because these peoples are underrepresented in recent ethnographic research. But, on the other hand, it is remarkable argument as the Mamaindê are in fact part of the Northern Nambikwara. Maybe their current geographic position in the Guaporé Valley induced the author to this statement.

Lévi-Strauss (1976) warned against a simplistic invalidation of his observations and that the available data really could support his conclusion. There is no reason to discuss and compare the distinct ethnographic results in all its complexity,

although it is relevant to remember the differentiating contextual set of social conditions in distinct moments of history. With hindsight, however, it seems reasonable that the kind of possibilities of research and the constraints imposed on the time and space of his observation and communication allow for the conclusion that the Nambikwara could have perfectly well been predominantly sedentary. In fact, the reading of the prior reports consistently and constantly highlights the unequivocal mastery and presence of horticulture and permanent houses in villages, especially the emphasis posited by Roquette-Pinto. Nevertheless, sometimes an early observer like Roosevelt classified the villages as *ephemeral*, even when he himself passed through a northern village with *two large huts* of *closely woven thatch, circular in outline, with a rounded dome, and two doors* at opposite ends; there were *fifteen or twenty people to each hut* with a large assortment of material objects described as *implements and utensils* (Roosevelt 1914: 229). Notice that this particular expedition was delayed. They entered the region after the beginning of the rainy season; Rondon's pioneering efforts, on the other hand, usually took place during the dry seasons. Thus, it was likely during the dry period that he first made the described contact and completed his tour of the northern villages. He mentioned the same conical houses (although only one in the initial village; Rondon 1916: 145)[xliii]. Yet, the popularized version from roughly the same time, in the book *Missão Rondon*, he proposes to guide the evolution of the Indians slowly and without abrupt changes, including their *sedentarization* and the construction of villages (1916: 258). According to this view, the notion of *sedentary life* opposes *nomadism*. In itself, nomadism is pejorative, a stigmatizing label denoting the idea of wandering around with no permanent residence. It connotes a suspicious restlessness and unworthiness. Rondon designated a large village in the northern region with a great number of constructions around a major house and ample plantations as representing "*a regular and semi-nomadic life*" (s.d.1: 231). It is noteworthy that even with these qualifications he still considered the epithet *semi-nomadic* justified.

The issue of nomadism is academic to the debate among anthropologists but was hardly innocent in the beginning of the twentieth century when evolutionary schemes based on general common sense stereotypes were prevalent in Western societies. At the time when evolutionism functioned as a descriptive tool shaping *scientific* social interpretation, it was the commonly shared belief of the scientist, the positivist and the general public that the Nambikwara were uncivilized and

backward. Compared to other Indian peoples their savageness and wildness justified the application of more violent means for defense or domination. A German geologist who accompanied Rondon in 1908 described a partially *sedentary tribe* with nomadic inclinations. He recognized *a certain degree of civilization* because of the presence of well-made houses in villages and the sizable horticulture while the Indians at the same time traversed *large tracts of land on hunting trips*. As Price comments, all this concerns their position on the evolutionary scale of value. This type of value assignment applies to Rondon's attempt vigorously seeking to disprove accusations of cannibalism. In sum, divested of the value judgments, Price regarded these reports as evidence that the Nambikwara mode of economic adaptation did not change significantly between Rondon's time, his own, and Aspelin's research some sixty years later A few years after the debate Aspelin (1979a) reexamined the historical evidence I drew on above to confirm the highly probable scenario that the Nambikwara were not originally nomadic. Instead, these judgments may stem from too limited a theoretical paradigm (as in Rondon's case), or a fieldwork too limited in time (as with Lévi-Strauss). Viewed in this light, the Nambikwara proved far less primitive than the allegations claimed and this was important to some narrators to raise their status. On the other hand, such partially raised prestige remained incomplete and a practice like moving a village after some years still counts as unstable, perhaps *semi-nomadic*, behaviour. Maybe not barbarians but still savages, the Nambikwara still qualified for the pedagogical tutelage of the state for *improvement*. Worse, the idea of nomadism continued in full force among the personnel of the Line, people whom, understandably, hardly ever ventured beyond their posts and rarely visited villages but were instead visited by the various peoples (Aspelin 1976: 8)[xliv]. In stark contrast to all of this debate, as far I know, all components of the Nambikwara ensemble consider themselves sedentary and distrust people who wander about too much (Fiorini 2000).

From 1907 to the 1940s, the notion of sedentarization the errant or semi-errant Indians like the *nomadic Nambikwara* served as a cliché in the Service (SPI, Serviço de Proteção aos Índios) to implant a policy of attracting Indians, settling them, and constructing *modern* permanent villages. In such villages, the *responsible* functionary would unite a maximum of separate groups and then these are *administered* by an employee of the Service. In effect, imposing a *benign protection* to teach *modern* methods of subsistence and *raising the cultural level* of the Indians while augmenting their production level. The

byproduct of such an endeavor was the liberation of the now *superfluous* lands to worthy settlers while the *nomadic condition* justifies the exercise of a strong mode of domination. Nomadism carries a remarkable number of stereotypes like being marginal, autarchic, and being socially frozen from immemorial times. Significantly they are viewed as societies without real occupancy, as very loosely related to the land they inhabit. Sedentary villagers tend to regard nomads as menaces, brigands, and overall archaic reprehensible autonomous people. The state apparatus usually adheres to the opinion that such people should be compelled to settle as soon as feasible, without regard to any specificities (see Digard (2000) for a general discussion). Therefore, when the Service policy makers and statements stress nomadism and the need for action such appeal is, politically and administratively speaking, far from an innocent statement of a supposedly ontological state. In fact, when one of the major goals concerns the fixation of nomadic or errant peoples and groups the intervention proposed consists of the total subordination and transformation of economic and sociocultural ways of life in accordance with absolutely distinct notions of economic activity and social organization (cf. the analysis of Lima 1995; for example, chapter 8)[xlv]

Another view of history

The Service made an effort to establish a foothold in the Nambikwara region in the twenties, without much success (Price 1978:150). Getulio Vargas' ascent as dictator in the thirties and the personal vicissitudes of Rondon's political life in this context always made itself felt in the rise and fall of the funds and power of the Service. The Service was crucially linked to its founder and major protector, Rondon, whether as its direct patron or under his indirect direction (Lima 1995). In the forties some of the prestige and influence of Rondon was recovered when the so-called *New State* (an authoritarian state) also proposed *a march to the west* and such undertaking brought Rondon closer to the president. The Service patronized a renewed search for the mines of Urucumacuan, a mystical place who many believed in, Rondon included. The search mainly went along the upper Pimenta Bueno River (also known by its prior name as Apidiá). The mines were never found, but contact was made with the diverse Indian nations that peopled the riverbanks. By this time, the rubber patrons had subjugated most or all the peoples of the region and forced them to work in the rubber gathering enterprise. Here the representative of the Service encountered Indians like the Massacá (future Aikaná) and Kwazá and promised to found a Indian Post to come to their

assistance. This proposal failed and the Post never materialized to replace the rubber trading posts. As noted in the previous Part regarding the Latundê, this episode practically disappeared from the memory of the agency and the resurgence of the Aikaná took considerable time[xlvi]. It is not coincidental that the journey and the planning of this effort happened in the Second World War when the rubber collecting in Amazonia regained some of its drive because of the necessity of the product in war machinery. With North American demand and finance, the rubber gathering revitalized interest in the region and a wave of *rubber soldiers* migrating from the poor Northeast Brazil were employed to furnish the cheap labor essential in the rubber extraction economy. The wide distribution of the individual trees in the forest required manpower and resulted in a pattern of extensive occupation of very large areas.

The renewed interest also brought the state to renovate its own interests in the region. The Indian peoples suffered because of the renewed pressure to cede their territories to the invaders. Usually by violent means or at the very least backed up by the potential of force, the invaders expelled or killed them. In addition, in some cases, they suffered because of the attempts at subjugation and to press the men and their families into the tapper mold as regimented cheap labor. The state as the formal holder of the monopoly of power and violence at this time did not really possess the necessary independence of local power structures to impose itself as the sole legitimate executive branch of the official regime of law and order. Thus, the Service expanded its network in the usually very difficult attempt to set itself up as the legitimate agency to deal with the Indians, as the sole lawful institution of state intervention and unsubordinated to the local interest groups. The region of the Nambikwara, of course, as Lévi-Strauss's travels make clear, featured a tense relation between the decadent pretentiously dominant Line and the effectually autonomous Indians. As Lévi-Strauss was mainly interested in the sociocultural dynamics of the Indian society, his remarks about the *political unrest* (Lévi-Strauss 1976) appear mostly in Tristes Tropiques and he does not really analyze the interethnic relations and the fact that the tenseness emanates from the clash between the Indian autonomy versus the false superiority of the *civilized*. This was not as much a clash of civilizations as a conflict of distinct visions of the same fact and the opposing naturalness of the right to power. Consequently, in order to achieve a greater grip of the situation, in 1942 the Service installed itself in Espirro and initiated an important part of its operations in the area of the Nambikwara. It founded a new

Indian Post between Campos Novos (on the Plateau) and Vilhena (the Post lies within the current *Indian Area Pyrineus de Souza* and was already designated by this name in the time of Lévi-Strauss; Aspelin 1976: 21). The founding of the Post along the Line corresponds to the temporarily increased interest raised and the attempt of the state to implant a semblance of its *right* of disposal of people, the introduction of its goals and discipline, and *right* of the management of its *own territory*. To Rondon, it may have represented a belated sign of the worth of his Line. Noteworthy in this respect is that he may have been a strong proponent of modernity but he stubbornly insisted in communicating with the engineer in Porto Velho by means of the Telegraph Line even when the much more modern and rapid means of radio was already available (Dequech 1988).

The employee responsible for the Post set it up in a strategic area. Located in the territory of the northernmost group that belongs to the Southern language cluster it is simultaneously relatively near the limits of major groups of the Northern language set. Near, for example, the Mamaindê, some of whose villages were first located by Rondon's lieutenant north of Vilhena and which were abandoned a little later. Still later, more or less at the time of the establishment of a port on the Cabixi River in 1921, most of their villages apparently were settled near or on this river to the south of Vilhena. Here they suffered immense losses from epidemics. Subsequently they lived in a village, or villages, away from the river at some twenty kilometers south of the new Post. Essentially, they withdrew into the interior, away from the Line and other lines of penetration, but not so far away as to be unable to visit the nodes of civilized presence. As for the Sabanê, Rondon's prior reports put them far to the north but later they too apparently moved southwards. By the time of Lévi-Strauss they visited as far south as Vilhena, where he found a group in the company of the Tarundê. The Rondon Commission furnished a map of the whole area north of Vilhena, revised before its publication in 1915. The map shows an impressive number of *malocas* (the large houses) along both sides of the Tenente Marques River, a string of longhouses adding up to over ten units; they extended from the source going down river far beyond the settlement of Três Buritis. Unfortunately the map does not indicate which peoples lived in these houses. In the same region, however, the *Taganani* do merit a specific mention, and the symbols on the map that signal *houses* are specifically designated as *village*. Near José Bonifácio some three other *villages* appear on the map, one labeled as *village of the fishing Indians*. The large area not located near the Line or the paths that already crossed the region is left blank. In this way, the

middle of the map shows a large White central area demonstrating the complete ignorance of the Indian settlement of the major part of the Northern region. Clearly the map proves the presence of a dense Indian population of those parts visited by the explorers, while a very large part of the region remained relatively unknown. Although the map is not explicit on the issue, it still stands to reason that the Sabanê inhabited some or most of the indicated malocas in the area north-northeast of Três Buritis.

Lévi-Strauss drew a map where the Sabanê occupy an area above the strip of the Mamaindê territory (he still indicates a part as north of Vilhena) and extending to the north in the direction of the upper and middle Tenente Marques (spreading in the direction of the Roosevelt) and to the northeast to areas adjacent to the upper Aripuanã and along the upper Juruena Mirim (affluent of the Juruena). Probably about one year after the founding of the Post, a Sabanê was born on the Tenente Marques River. The man, known by his Portuguese name Manézinho Sabanê is one of the few elder Indians still alive today who was born and raised in an independent village. He narrates a slightly different but not necessarily contradictory history. From the point of view of the stories told by his own elders, the history of the Sabanê begins in the northeast part of the Northern cluster, in the direction of the town of Diamantino, Mato Grosso. Of course, historically the oldest towns elevated to the status of municipality included immense areas within their boundaries, in this case roughly the whole upper northwestern corner of the state[xlvii]. Although it is hard to ascertain exactly, it is likely that the site of origin must have been to the north of the Nambikwara do Campo of the Parecis Plateau and in the direction of the Aripuanã headwaters. It is uncertain how far to the north the territory of the early *Sabanê* extended as, possibly, the most northern component of the Nambikwara ensemble. It is certain that these lands shared one or more frontiers with enemy peoples, possibly the Cinta Larga or other segments of the Tupi Mondé configuration that may have occupied territories along the middle Aripuanã River at the time[xlviii]. The diverse peoples of the Tupi Mondé thus from this time on probably were the major enemy of the Sabanê (although, as seen above, others like the Manduka also made serious inroads). At the time of the Lévi-Strauss' expedition it was known that Indians from the Aripuanã attacked and killed the Sabanê (Faria 2001: 119). The local rubber-tappers called the Indians who killed the wife and a chief's son *Suruí* (Faria 2001: 131). Today the Suruí are located the northwest of Três Buritis but Tupi Mondé names at this point are unlikely to be clearly fixed.

One can be reasonably certain that the Sabanê used to live in an area in some way to the northeast of the major cluster of Northern Nambikwara which comprised a number of smaller peoples centering in the area from the Tenente Marques to the Comemoração. This places the former territory on the edge of the total region of the Nambikwara Nation (to use Rondon's term) and the people in a habitat that is much more forest than savanna. The language and the information of the few available elements of Sabanê culture bear out this relative distance and approximation to peoples of other languages and cultures. As noted, the Sabanê language differs considerably from the two major clusters of the Nambikwara language family and it constitutes a separate branch. The degree of distinctiveness caused by language drift from the moment of linguistic separation from the major blocs of the linguistic family reveals the considerable duration of the division. Although definitely affiliated with the other languages, Sabanê is unique in that it is incomprehensible to speakers of the other languages and it features a number of distinctive characteristics. In much the same way, contrary to what Lévi-Strauss thought, the Sabanê so-called original culture also includes a series of traits or institutions that demonstrate a differentiation from the main body of the Nambikwara ensemble. For example, the Sabanê had a bachelors house that lodged the unmarried youths and adult men and which they left when they married into the house of their father-in-law. The source of this information, Manézinho, himself slept in this men's house. When his father remarried, the new wife went to live in his father's house, and, therefore, he felt that he could not stay at the house. Such a men's lodge does not exist among the other peoples of the Nambikwara family but is a familiar phenomenon among other peoples. In fact, the Rikbaktsa (Macro-Jê) who used to live north of the Nambikwara cluster, at the Juruena more or less at the same latitude as the Aripuanã Park do have a similar house for single male adults in their villages (Arruda 1998; in the fifties the Cinta Larga also expelled the Rikbaktsa from the western bank of the Juruena, see Dornstauder (1975); so its is possible the Sabanê at one time were neighbors of the latter, a connection suggested by the men's house; this accords with the map in Price and Cook (1969) where the Sabanê are *kolimisi*). In this case, perhaps, the hut may have been mostly a sleeping place for bachelors rather then a true men's house although it is said that Sabanê fathers did not allow their daughters to enter this hut. Furthermore, although my knowledge is unfortunately fragmentary, there are strong affinities with the Nambikwara ensemble in the architecture of the cosmos and its inhabitants. The cosmology shows relevant variations in the distribution of the layers in the sky and the

localization of the habitation of the important supernatural figure of Thunder (the same powerful supernatural being invoked in the adventure of the headman recounted by Lévi-Strauss)[xlix].

In other words, in social organisation and cosmology the Sabanê vary significantly from the Northern Nambikwara, but on some essential features, like the seclusion ritual for girls experiencing their menarche and the basic components of shamanism, the similarities and analogies permit fruitful interaction and a basic mutual understanding. The narrator lived in some of the villages that were founded after the Sabanê arrived in the area around and between the Roosevelt (named *Yatalánma*, a kind of bee) and Tenente Marques (named *Kókia*, hawk) Rivers. He was born on the latter river and subsequently his kin moved to banks of the Roosevelt. The distance between the two locations implied in a two or three day trip that crossed the Três Buritis River (named *Waykía*, wood). In fact, Manézinho is one of the few people alive that grew up in the autonomous villages and can recount some of the flavor of the indigenous lived worlds in free villages in the forties and fifties. He recalls that the villages generally had a relatively large number of houses. According to his recollection, at least six, but on the avarage ten people inhabited each house. The Tenente Marques village was abandoned under pressure from the Cinta Larga, who descended upon the Sabanê and attacked all of the Northern Nambikwara branch from the north-northeast. He claims that this village had about twenty relatively small houses. The other village at the Roosevelt was called *Yatali* (dry wood) where he estimates that roughly the same number of houses each hosted around ten people, thus this village was larger than the previous. The numbers of houses and inhabitants are uncertain as the narrator must refer to the distant past and only learned to express exact quantities in Portuguese numbers in his adulthood. Still, they represent a secure indication of a number of houses and a total population that is not unusual compared with other forest peoples. It does not, however, agree with Roquette-Pinto's description of the smaller villages of the Northern Nambikwara[l].

Other villages existed and sometimes resulted from the fusion of smaller ones for defensive purposes. One village to the northeast at the Tenente Marques named *Titotá* (the larger species of peccary) was under permanent risk of attack by the Tupi, who were thought to live some twelve days away. A small village called *Ulúmatití* (tapir), localized to the southeast of the former suffered at least one

battle with the raiders. Manézinho's village always attempted to exact retribution of its enemies and sometimes united with one and up to four other villages to make a counter-raid. The Sabanê accuse the enemy, usually called Cinta Larga, of taking parts of their victim's body as trophy and consuming it later. Manézinho adds that they were selective enough to prefer *Whites* or Indians and rejected those of black people[li]. The Sabanê made arrows with eagle feathers for their raids. In their own engagements they intended to pursue and to kill the men and capture the girls to take them back to be incorporated into the village. Clearly the pressure from the north was heavily felt and caused dislocations and fusions but at several times a number of villages seem to have existed simultaneously. The population probably was greater than the small group encountered by Lévi-Strauss. This discrepancy may have arisen from either miscommunication about the existence of other groups in the more remote areas or perhaps because of a population surge. In general, the elder remarks that all of the Sabanê spoke the same language and were one people: *dërëbitimuli* (my people, my kin). The different villages, on the other hand, did not always enjoy friendly relations and often *fought* each other. Therefore, it is quite possible that the people on the Line and Lévi-Strauss did not know about Sabanê higher up north. However, most groups entertained personal relations with the stations because of the goods to be obtained, especially steel instruments. Such an inducement to contact should motivate visits of possible other villages. Note that Rondon's and the commission's reports mention a group called *Iaiá.* This word is probably is derived from a Sabanê kin term (elder brother and parallel cousin) and hence this may have been another Sabanê village. The name of the Sabanê themselves might very well stem from *sapáne* (younger sister); Lévi-Strauss (1948b: 31) gives *sabáni* as younger sibling and *iáia* as elder sibling. The name Tawaindê resembles the Sabanê word for hunter, *tawánte* (for both terms G.Antunes 2001: personal communication; also Antunes 2004). This shows that the Sabanê language apparently influenced the group naming. The profusion of names and the temporal changes, of course, depend on who conferred what name, to whom and at what time, but by this derivation the label could be a referral of one Sabanê group to another. In that case different Sabanê villages may have been named as if different groups. It is also possible that some Sabanê village was unknown or differently named in Lévi-Strauss's time.

Thus, Manézinho claims that the Sabanê left the region to the northeast under pressure from other peoples. Fighting with these neighbors – at one time he

named the *Cinta Larga*, *Nambikwara*[lii] (in regional parlance restricted to the Campo group, for example the Halotesu), *Salumã* (now officially renamed Enawenê Nawê; an Aruak speaking people close to Paresi), as the peoples *whom were killing us* – they fled until they thought to be out of reach and settled down again. In fact, recently the same elder saw the photos of a poor Brazilian family that invaded the Enawenê Nawê area in the eighties and paid for their audacity with their lives. The mutilated corpses pierced with arrows reminded the Sabanê very strongly of the victims of his own war and he identifies this people as one of their old enemies[liii]. In the region existed a large village called *Kulimansi*, a place name, which is thought to have lodged all of the Sabanê at one time[liv]. Although this may be a more mythical reference to emphasize the common ancestry, it certainly coincides with the notion of the existence of large villages before and after arriving in the Roosevelt region. It is thought that the fragmentation into smaller villages only happened later. One striking point in this history of gradual migration is the constant reference to a withdrawal from villages and adjacent fields that was accompanied by the return to pick up plants, roots, stems and seeds from their old cultivated lands. They appear to have always gone back to collect the produce of their fields and gather the means to recreate the gardens in the new territory.

According to this account, the Sabanê were a thoroughly sedentary people that under normal circumstances changed their village sites every few years (Manézinho once mentioned ten years). They lived in settled villages and highly valued their horticultural activities. After felling the new fields sometime in the beginning of the dry season, the village dispersed for some time into the forest for hunting and gathering but they returned for the burning and planting in August, to live in the village afterwards[lv]. They buried the dead in a particular tree bark with all of their possessions *for the spirit* within the house without abandoning the construction. The house was fortified with a wooden infrastructure of about a meter high from the ground, circling around the perimeter. Burial in the house and the wooden construction are not usual Nambikwara practices, although Roquette-Pinto suggests some wooden underpinning for a house of the Northern Nambikwara and the latter (Lakondê) use the same technique for the enveloping the dead within a tree bark to serve as the coffin. The most remarkable distinctive feature of the Sabanê concerns Mané's assertion that the married men used to sleep on the ground, the young men sometimes did the same, but the bachelors also used to sleep in hammocks. Moreover, and particularly revealing, his own

father knew how to weave and actually fabricated hammocks. Whether or not was taken over from allies or enemies in the high north-east is unknown. This practice distinguishes them from other members of the linguistic family which categorically refused the use of the hammock and the adoption of the corresponding weaving technique. Also, contrary to the entire major bloc of the Nambikwara ensemble, the Sabanê preferred to live in the forest, near a savanna and running water, but not in the open savanna[lvi]. In these aspects the Sabanê differ from the normal attributes that most saliently characterize the so-called *Nambikwara* (as if a nominal group that implies a basic similarity and identifiable as one *Nation*).

The mention of the *Nambikwara* as an original enemy may have been an involuntary admission but the two groups certainly did not maintain any previous friendly relations. During a later interview, Manézinho described how contact was made. When the Sabanê encountered unknown or previously unfriendly peoples, they followed a mode of establishing alliances that seems to have been generalized among all the neighboring peoples and of which the Nambikwara case was one particular instantiation. Unfamiliar groups were approached with the utmost care, in order to test their willingness to forge a friendly relation and avoid enmities. This friendship had to be created as the other Indians rarely *liked us* initially. Some peoples immediately waged a war after the discovery of the presence of the intruding Sabanê was discovered and peace was not reached. All of the other peoples always feared or distrusted the Sabanê. Each of the newly encountered groups always had to be gradually convinced of their good intentions. Therefore, entering the area of the unknown Northern Nambikwara and, apparently, part of the Southern Nambikwara signified a potentially dangerous enterprise. In fact, the premise of the world outside of the own local group as a very menacing place appears prevalent among other elders of all peoples living in Aroeira. Probably the same conceptualization of the outside still holds for the younger generation as they still believe that illness and death result from sorcery of angry or envious Indians (even from their own people; this could be a reason for the internal disagreements and fragmentation within the Sabanê)[lvii]. A means of conveying good intentions was to "*talk to them*", even if no common language could be found. First from a distance they called out that they were friends and did not harbor any violent designs. One day a courageous Sabanê tuxauá of around forty or fifty, an *urikapari* (a strong leader, translated as *boss* in Antunes 2004: 251), mustered the courage to approach the Nambikwara

and came face to face with them. After this contact that *familiarized* the unknown Indians to their presence, they initiated the trading of all sorts of objects – things like feathers, arrows, bows, necklaces, threads and cotton. This may be similar to the silent trade witnessed by Lévi-Strauss (1976a; orig 1942) where the participants exchange objects without bargaining or conversation. This may be a delicate phase because the same author notes that the silentness potentially generates grudges about the varying appraisals of the values inherent in the objects exchanged. Manézinho said, they did not know that we are good, that we do not harbor bad intentions and *are not like animals*. This sort of exchange should therefore not be understood as simply trade of objects not produced by oneself. Although not absent, in its multifarious aspects it is rather more a representation of something closer to diplomacy, the social enactment of a new friendly tie and strongly of a political character.

After a process of becoming accustomed to each other and gradually being convinced of genuine intentions, the two groups began to learn each other's languages, and participate in each other's feasts and rituals. They showed their respective singing and dancing skills. Lévi-Strauss's description (1984: 357-9) of singing and trading confers with Manézinho's short observations which do not, however, mention altercations between the men of the two groups that clear the air by venting their griefs. But then again, such interaction normally would require the understanding between incomprehensible languages and thus only can come about in time. In this way the Sabanê founded their new relation to the *Nambikwara* (in the restricted regional sense) in a template of interaction that, judging from the case of Rondon and the Latundê, was and is shared by all groups, irrespective of language and cultural distinctions[lviii]. In the first phase, after some measure of friendship, the parties listen to each other's musical and festive performances and invite the other group to attend their rituals. In time some people starts to learn the other's language and after a while they can communicate and provide the link to a better communication and comprehension between villages. The Sabanê engaged in a regional web of relations in this manner that also included the Kithaulu (northwestern neighbours of the *Nambikwara*). The whole set of allies were on bad terms with the Manduka (the most northwestern of the Savanna Nambikwara) and with the Mamaindê. In this way, before reaching the Northern Nambikwara region and familiarize with the (as yet unknown) Tawaindê, the Sabanê are said to have inhabited the area north of the *Nambikwara*. That is, in all likelihood, in a region to the north of, or even

part of, the northern tip of the Nambikwara reserve, or to the north of the lands immediately adjacent Enawanê Nawê (and, as seen, close to the Rikbaksta). Being friends (*dërërëbiti*), means being invited to feasts and bringing food for the occasion, observing and participating in dancing and singing rituals, and exchanging objects to foster a mutual understanding.

This mode of alliance assures part of the necessary peace with important peoples in the vicinity. However, this amity does not include the exchange of women until *we are very well acquainted*, the Sabanê failed to achieve this level of social integration with the *Nambikwara* and the Kithaulu. In a reconstruction pieced together from what Manézinho told Antunes and I, the pressure of other peoples again drove them on and they ventured in the direction of the Tenente Marques. Looking for another place to live in peace, the Sabanê moved on. Initially, they saw few indications of other people but eventually they spotted human tracks during hunting, fishing and scouting expeditions. Alerted by the traces of human occupancy, careful observation from a certain distance revealed that the other's language was incomprehensible. After discovering the village and ascertaining the language difference, the Sabanê discussed the strange peoples' dispositions. They guessed that the others were peaceful (here Manézinho used the Brazilian vernacular, *manso*, *tame*, as opposed to *brabo*, *wild*). Some Indians of the group reconnoitered the terrain with an intent to initiate hostile activities, but the public opinion of a peaceful attitude prevailed. Three or four men then bravely attempted a direct face-to-face contact. The group contacted spoke a dialect the elder considers to be close to Tawaindê, a language and people that the Sabanê called *Sowaintê*. Lévi-Strauss (1948b: 12) mentioned the *sováinte* as the Sabanê name of part of Northern Nambikwara that live on the right bank of the Roosevelt River. They ended up living close by and further strengthened their ties learning the respective languages, taking the relationship further then the previous alliances. It is fairly certain that Lévi-Strauss witnessed such a process in a precarious stage, and it will be remembered that he stressed the enormous demographic decline suffered before. Lévi-Strauss did not know the outcome of this social engineering. In the case of the Sabanê and Sowaintê they drew so close as to exchange women. The Sabanê elder, however, recalls that the peoples were still populous. This opinion is furthered by his belief that living in the forest away from cities and civilization is much healthier than living near Whites[lix]. In this view, due to the mutual appreciation of each other's women as *beautiful*, a part the men of one people married women of the allies and vice versa. In the forest

people died much less and generally enjoyed good health and, according to these recollections, from the exchange between both groups ensued a significant population increase. In this respect, the co-operation proved fruitful and new villages settled at the Tenente Marques and in the remainder of the region.

This still leaves with the question whether the Sowaintê are the Tarundê of Vilhena. The Sowaintê are Northern Nambikwara but Lévi-Strauss (1948: 53) already noted that their language is closely affiliated to Lakondê: a dialect group he called *b2*. Tarundê, on the contrary, pertains to the group *b1*, joining *tarúnde, maimãde* (ib.: 50). They would be survivors from two distinct local groups that used to live on the eastern bank of the upper Roosevelt. At the time the Tarundê wandered around Vilhena and received a visit from the *Kabixi*, coming from the south. This probably means this group was Mamaindê. During this visit the author treats the two local groups as if one group from dialect *b1*. The linguistic ability shown by Lévi-Strauss makes this close identification very likely. Hence the strong possibility that the Tarundê are a distinct local group of the Roosevelt River but, in regional terms, affiliated with the Mamaindê. On his map the *b2* area extends from the Guaporé Valley – the current Mamaindê territory – to the north of Vilhena towards the Roosevelt. As Price concluded that usually there existed a very close linkage between rivers, river basin and peoples or regional sets of local groups, this is either an exception of one regional set straddling the water sheds or the Mamaindê and the Tarundê actually considered one another very close, but different, regional sets. No one ever heard again of the Tarundê (no one Price knew, nor did he find a mention in the literature; Price 1978: 150). Of course, they may have renamed but it would be quite unclear as to under what name they would be known at other times. What is known is that the current Mamaindê are composed of remnants of local groups from the Valley (of the eastern side of the Cabixi River). And the only male survivor of the Northern Mamaindê from around Vilhena lives at Aroeira, and, it is commented, accuses the southern branch of having killed his relatives[lx]. Hence the strong possibility that the Tarundê were Northern Mamaindê or very close to them; and now they would be either extinct, or consisting of only one single person (possibly two, there are some unsubstantiated references about another woman). It is notable, incidentally, that of 68 quotations of words and phrases in *La vie familiale* only two are not from a Tarundê source. Really, Lévi-Strauss was right in pointing out the influence of the northern cluster in his ethnography even if his ecological description of Nambikwara land is definitely more appropriate to the Plateau.

Thus, in contradiction to the assertion of totally disastrous decline by Lévi-Strauss, the recollection also affirms that the populational strength of both groups did not really falter until after a period of some growth. Manézinho suggested that there was a population decline around the time of Lévi-Strauss but he does not report a precipitous decline that engendered a reciprocal design to join forces with different peoples or villages. In reality, both local groups exchanged women but did not fuse. That is, not until the final dispersal of the Sowaintê the latter cease to exist as an independent people (a point I will return to below). Calling each other by terms of affinity and exchanging partners is actually not a project of fusion but the pattern of a normal more elaborated alliance. Here the primary contradiction revolves around the period before the personal memories of Manézinho and, partially, his experience of the later situation. On the one hand, as observed, the anthropologist did not really call attention to the total population of either people. On the other hand, a possible partial explanation concerns the fact that among most Amazonian indigenous peoples personal experience is much richer in detail than the reports on historical events before the narrator's life. The latter tend to be more stereotyped and less informative, reducing the content to a higher level of abstraction (Gow 2001). In discussing the years encompassing his childhood until adulthood, Manézinho envisions a number of roughly ten villages all with the same language and culture before the fusion. There was much inter-village participation in rituals and activities in a mesh of intense social relations. Each village in the web of villages constituted their own lived worlds of a free and viable specific mode of sociocultural life. For Manézinho, the major assault on the viability of the independent and autonomous Sabanê occurs gradually over his lifetime, culminating at the time when he was a young adult and the autonomous village life had to be abandoned.

Part of the Sabanê was drawn to or was coerced to go and live at the Post at Espirro (another point I will return to below). Another part of this group remained in the forest and maintained exchange relations with the José Bonifácio station. This station had been transformed into the centre and hub of access to external commodities of all Northern groups. In the forties and fifties, the Lakondê (probably originating in an area near the Melgaço River to the west), the Tawaindê (apparently living to the northwest of the station), and the Sabanê (in between the Roosevelt and Tenente Marques with at least once a village as far west as an affluent of the Comemoração River), still enjoyed independence and practiced intensive exchange relations amongst one another. As noted, the

Sabanê entered this mesh of alliances even before Rondon's arrival. The project of allying with one of these Northern groups seems to have succeeded in replenishing group numbers. Simultaneously, the Sabanê reached a level of alliance relationships with the other Northern Nambikwara groups that perpetuated the feelings of distinctiveness and a certain distance[lxi]. In the fifties, however, the Cinta Larga raised the intensity of their inroads in the region of the autonomous villages and all Northern groups began to suffer more severely. At the end of this decade and in the beginning of the sixties, despite the withdrawal in the independent villages away from White populations, the epidemics broke out again. The existence of José Bonifácio and the Indian Service Post with the Indian people forcefully contained in Espirro – although both cases represent only a precarious link and channel of external commodities and personnel from outside the region – must have functioned as a conduit for a continual flux of dangerous potential contamination. It is known that in similar situations epidemics struck early and lingered for a long time before erupting again in the same region (Dobyns 1993: 275).

The telegraph station allowed young male Indians to work periodically and to earn some wages to obtain steel tools. Sometimes entire villages camped near the small interethnic station although no people, village, or group seems ever to have moved to the immediate vicinity and give up its independence. The station, by the way, created it own complex interethnic micro-cosmos – with a few *Whites*, some Paresi Indians and local Indians married to the personnel comprising a small permanently resident village[lxii]. Different groups did not make camp jointly in the vicinity but, as clear sign of distinctiveness, raised temporary shelters on their own near the compound. It did create an environment of meeting all other groups of the large region and several or, maybe, many people learned other languages in this linguistically diverse environment. Manézinho was at this time a young adult and acquired some knowledge of Lakondê, Tawaindê, and Portuguese while working. In addition to her mother tongue, Lakondê, Teresa learned Sabanê very well as she was exposed to it at a young age when playing with the visiting children. From her Paresi foster father she also learned Portuguese. Her rapid acquisition of these languages stems, at least in part, from the fact that she was exposed to them when she was only three, an opportune time for language learning. Her case confirms that small children with the innate potential to acquiring native competence can do so in more than one language (here aged about three). Manézinho, a native speaker of Sabanê and a stern critic of the

abilities of second-language learners, affirms that Teresa is a very good speaker (although she has had little opportunity to speak this language for most her life). From the previous transcript of the template of action from contact to alliance, a strongly positive attitude towards multilingualism transpires. The mould of practice thus probably partakes of a favorable pan-Nambikwara disposition towards competence in various languages. In the multi-ethnic meeting-ground of José Bonifácio, this disposition favored the acquisition of various foreign languages. Observe that these peoples were not only interested in the so-called *national language* as the primary *lingua franca*. In this historic period, all Indian languages and dialects prospered as long as the native speakers did, and even spread to members of other language groups.

One segment of the Northern Nambikwara, the Sowaintê, in a way merged with the Sabanê although not, it seems, as conscious project. No traces are known of some of the other groups and peoples due to the fact they either died out completely or the few surviving individuals integrated into other more fortunate groups or peoples. This is a complicated process of which little is known. For example, the *Navaitê* known to Rondon and whose territory was encountered by Rondon on his descent of the River of Doubt, after whom he named a tract of river rapids, later on disappear from the literature. This seems to have been the most northern group but Teresa believes that the Lakondê originally used to occupy a region situated much lower on the Roosevelt River. In that case this people would have been neighbors to the *Navaitê* or they could simply be the same people, having been renamed after the Line became decadent. As for the Sowaintê, I did not come across their name in the limited number of published reports from Rondon's epoch that I have been able to consult. This people experienced a process of gradual decline and diminishing numbers affecting their capacity to live as an independent group. According to Manézinho, whose wife is a Sowaintê, roughly three women and one or two men are the only remnants of this group now that they have submerged in the Sabanê and the scattered descendants do not appear to assume any collective identity. There are a few other parallel instances of this process. As seen, one elder Mamaindê now living in Aroeira belongs to a group of Northern Mamaindê originally inhabiting the Vilhena area and the Southern Mamaindê are accused of murdering their northern brethren (in the south originating from the Guaporé and Cabixi valleys). Only one other woman is said to be from the same people. This man does not live among the Mamaindê in the Guaporé the Southern Mamaindê Valley Indigenous Territory

because he hates the *killers* of his close kin. This man's Mamaindê identity persists even when, in similar cases of disintegrated peoples, they usually are subsumed within a larger people.

Another example is the *Yakoloré*[lxiii], formerly neighbors of the Lakondê after they had moved to the south closer to José Bonifácio, a few descendants also may be living in Aroeira. Most of these fragments of former local groups and peoples nowadays are classified by outsiders as belonging to the predominant enduring groups, the Sabanê among them. Manézinho's wife, Ivone is normally known and registered as Sabanê. She herself affirms that she does not understand how the disappearance of her people came about. She recalls that her people died more because of internecine warfare with other Northern Nambikwara than of diseases, although she recognizes that both contributed to the mortality rate out when they lived in a patch of savanna in the Roosevelt region (the *Campo do Susto*). Her father left the region and lived among the regional Brazilians where she grew up. Despite this, as a young girl she maintained her original language, the *same as Lakondê and Tawaindê* (all close dialects of the Northern Nambikwara cluster). Curiosity even stimulated her to learn Sabanê from a Sabanê foster mother. She was taught this quite different language when she was an adolescent and now speaks fluently. Observe that people born in an autonomous setting show a strong favorable disposition to learn various languages. Of course, the necessity of isolated individuals to attach themselves to a viable local group and the customary interethnic marriages lead to very unfavorable circumstances for language maintenance. The language can normally only be spoken with the few other surviving kin (or those who learned the language when it was socially relevant). Consequently, their offspring tend to be assimilated into the larger ethnic group and their origin forgotten. This is the case for the children of Dona Ivone, all identified as Sabanê, and the same appears to hold for the other Sowaintê women. The Sowaintê amalgamated with the Sabanê and the result is assimilation and concomitant disappearance of ethnic and linguistic uniqueness.

Notes

[i] See, for example, the words of Darcy Ribeiro (1959) at the third Brazilian Anthropology Meeting (1958), shortly after Rodon's death. Ribeiro suggests that the Indians' humanity and right to existence and land did signify a considerable advance (an advance that sadly usually existed mainly only in theory). The

principal right, however, was the freedom to *evolve* without constraint, the privilege to *naturally* adopt the superior Brazilian culture (see Abreu (1996: 108-135) for the development of hero-cults in Brazil with reference to Rondon).

[ii] Marcos Galindo claims that the phrase originates from a ghostwriter who helped prepare Rondon's speeches and books (2002, personal communication). Rondon, in fact, cared very much about his public image. Marc Piault notes that Rondon always appears impeccably dressed even when filmed or photographed during expeditions, deep in the wilderness (2001, personal communication). He has examined the context of Rondon and images in detail (Piault 2001).

[iii] Mísia Lins Reesink 2002, personal communication.

[iv] Today several studies demonstrate that the management of the environment, for example the planting of palm trees, do imply in long-term strategies.

[v] Sometimes the literature employs the idea of a *subsistence economy* to this kind of situation. This notion carries some unfortunate connotations. The Indians did not live in a state of poverty nor were they at the limit of their production capacity without any *surplus*. The most important point here refers to a negative evaluation of this sociocultural mode of production, which is never considered sufficient as a method of integrating economic production and consumption, or as the conversion of means into socially acceptable sustenance. These issues are present in various debates concerning the anthropological economics of non-western or non-capitalist societies that demonstrate the difficulty of discarding the ethnocentric centrality of what, mostly uncritically, are *western* and *capitalist* characteristics (this includes the debate on equality and hierarchy in so-called *simple* societies; Flanagan 1989).

[vi] The Brazilian part of the expedition was known as the "*Roosevelt-Rondon scientific expedition*" to stress national participation. Such an expedition could have potentially hurt national feelings if not for Roosevelt's diplomatic behavior, sometimes described as *respect* by Brazilian contemporaries. The upper reaches of the Roosevelt river received a number of names. A small upper river was named after the son of the former US president and participant in the expedition, Kermit Roosevelt. It's noteworthy that this stretch of river has many rapids and waterfalls that probably had protected the Northern Nambikwara from the full impact of earlier intrusions.

[vii] Rondon remarks that the Paresi did not even sit on the ground. This contrasts to the Nambikwara who sit on the ground in a peculiar and culturally specific way. The Paresi stereotype probably implies a more general perspective than merely ways of sleeping (Machado 1998 : 234).

[viii] When Rondon compares the Northern Nambikwara with their Tupian neighbours (of the Pimenta Bueno), the trait of sleeping on the ground is explicitly mentioned as, among other things, a trait that classifies the latter as being *more advanced* than the former (Rondon 1916: 154).
[ix] This is the year Machado and others place the reference in their bibliography but the original has no publication date (it was republished in 1947).
[x] Already accustomed to *contact*, they even hunted with firearms. The leader Toilori expressed the wish to act as a collector of a certain medicinal root gathered only with expeditions during one season of the year (translated by Hemming (1995: 202) as the "*ipecac root*", this is *poaia*, in Tupi *ipecacuanha* according to Machado [1995: 259]). This collecting could be mounted in much more independent manner and participants would be free from the harsh exploitative regime of the *seringal*.
[xi] Note that Rondon's own observations may contradict the peaceful image of the Paresi. Rondon relates how twice the Nambikwara attacked the Paresi, who defended themselves with firearms, inflicting heavy losses. The Paresi even pursued them to a large village on another river far into Nambikwara territory (Rondon 1947:38-9). The assassination of over 40 Nambikwara contradicts the prevalent view. The nature of the relations between these two groups is a matter under discussion (the Paresi are subdivided into a few endogamous named groups). Fiorini (2001, personal communication) is elaborating the idea that their neighboring groups had developed some symbiotic relation between warriors and horticulturalists before outside encroachment (this is examined in more detail in Part III). Max Schmidt, who travelled through the area at the same time, believed the Paresi presented this pacific image purposefully while simultaneously using bows and arrows to assault Whites and blame the *savages* (apud Machado 1998: 301).
[xii] That is, the agency was also charged with colonizing any newly opened regions with agricultural laborers (see the extensive social analysis of its inception and origin that includes discussion regarding the construction of Rondon's hero image in Lima 1995).
[xiii] One such major chief went to Rio de Janeiro with Rondon after the expedition of 1910 and came back with many commodities, like cattle and a gramophone which, according to Schmidt, he used to consolidate a firm domination over his subjects (apud Machado 1998: 301). This reinforcement of inequality most likely derives from the economic development assistance sent by Rondon (see the similar disastrous effects of unequal access among the

Yanomami, Tierney 2000). In other words, unintended or unforeseen consequences of *development aid* goes back at least as far as Rondon. It seems likely that this aid was intended for the community as a whole, not as private property.

[xiv] Price (1983b) discussed the changes of this name and the question of to whom it was applied. By the time of Rondon it was usually referring to Nambikwara of the Guaporé Valley (see Part III). For more information about Toloiri's role as the only collaborator, see Machado (1995: 254-5).

[xv] This hierarchy may have extended to a social hierarchy within each village where leadership may have had some hereditary aspect. Thus, the society would have been less egalitarian than usually presumed. According to Schmidt, the inter-village chief who returned from Rio with many presents changed the social conditions of his community. I take this to mean that the chief exploited the commodities to establish himself in a way analogous to the rubber debt peonage and position himself as an owner with real power instead of the superior, but relatively powerless, person he previously was. This was meant to reinforce older ideas about inequality and to transform into power differences.

[xvi] Actually, the expedition and Rondon collected many indigenous objects which he greatly valued according to the standards of the day, as the wealth and the pride of an ethnographic collection of the *unknown*. Many if not all of these objects were in the first collection of the National Museum in Rio de Janeiro, helping the institution establish itself as an important museum. The museum corresponded with its firm *scientific* support in the political struggle of Rondon and the positivists to justify the intervention of the state in interethnic relations, and aided in creating the Indian Protection Service, headed by Rondon himself. This mutually productive alliance encouraged Roquette-Pinto to propose the name of Rondônia for the northwestern part of Mato Grosso (see Lima 1995). Thus, the region that was once barely acknowledged, began to be effectively incorporated into the nation.

[xvii] This author takes a slightly more critical stance than some other biographers but he hardly contributes to the understanding of the making of the hero. In all likelihood the author felt somewhat restrained because the national oil company financed this edition with the explicit purpose to furnish the public a series of portraits of "*personalities that contributed to the formation of the national identity*" (opening page, Bigio 2000: 3). Image building continues and occasionally resurges in the Rondônia papers in respect to the great civilizing hero who gave his name to the state. The Indian Protection Service (SPI) had less

qualms about using euphemisms and appealed to the argument that the protection and salvation of the Indians by the government assured the indispensable means to the "*conquest*" of the closed interior of the country (ib.: 35).

[xviii] Rondon mentions the saddle and carbine preserved in Brazilian museums but nothing about the chest protection that is supposed to have saved his life in other versions of this accident. There may be several versions of this famous encounter.

[xix] Supposing that the exploration arrived on the Ananaz River exactly from the Parecis Plateau, these other reports reveal the savanna to be different from the somewhat extreme poverty attributed to this ecosystem.

[xx] In the interest of pacification and science, no reservations about this kind of invasion and expulsion appear in the text, as if this complete invasion of the village is a normal act. The expedition's participants did plant maize in the field among the manioc to demonstrate their good intentions and, explicitly, to show the utility of their metal instruments (Rondon 1922: 34).

[xxi] Observations like these tend to show Rondon a natural leader who dispenses with stern discipline and force in favour of earning allegiance and devotion through example and natural authority. The guard shows the limits of this picture, substantiated by other examples (Zarur 2003: 269).

[xxii] The picture was taken on a 1908 expedition. It featured a large hut *ornamented* with various presents and the phonograph playing prominently. Note that despite the fact that this picture appeared in a work on *ethnography,* it features a clothed expeditionary beside the phonograph. The house itself seems to be more the scene of self exhibition than a picture of ethnographic value (Rondon 1947: n.p.). The presence of the phonograph demonstrates that Western music was seen as civilizing. The school at Utiarity used music to inculcate new civilized body discipline and set of dispositions, a very effective way to alienate the children from their own sociocultural background (Lima 1995: 308-9).

[xxiii] This is a rough translation of what may be the most quoted phrase of *Os Sertões*. The gulf between the elite conception of the Republic and that of the common soldier is also evident in the Canudos war described by the same author. This famous work is considered as a *classic* and has a special status in some circles. This work, assimilating the European scientific theories of the times, stressed the geographical and racial determinations of the people and their culture in the interior.

[xxiv] On *race*, its relation to ethnicity, and the notion of blood as a vector of

physical and moral qualities and rapid historical overview of its history and persisting current relevance, see Reesink (2001).

[xxv] In the beginning of conquest the aim was to convert the Indians and strove for assimilation but small areas were sometimes declared reserved for Indian occupancy. Much later this came to resemble North America: "*The expropriation of North American Indian lands eventually secured by the reserve system: Indians were given title to enclaves of land which were for the most part of only marginal use, along with token compensation for the loss of millions of acres of other land*" (Brody 1975: 225). As for Rondon, his were prophetic words; even in the nineties the former showcase of official indigenist action, the Xingu National Park, has been subjected to a long and difficult lawsuit brought on by land owners with falsified titles. For a history of the genesis of this particular and in many senses exceptional Indian Park, see Menezes (1999).

[xxvi] It is interesting to note here that the problem of the overextended supply lines also occurred at the time when the prestige and allotted funds of the Commission were at its peak, before the later decline set in. Rondon himself, apparently, did not lack the means when he himself travelled through the region.

[xxvii] What he did do was to follow the usage of Rondon and the Commission to apply the name of the Serra do Norte for the entire region from Campos Novos up to the limits of the Northern Nambikwara constellation of peoples, effectively mixing up the northernmost of the Southern Nambikwara ensemble with the former. In this way it is sometimes difficult to know which of the clusters certain information applies to.

[xxviii] He also speculated about the significance of the names of these groups. Sometimes he surmised a connection with a name in older documentation, sometimes he attributes the name to a kin term like *Uncles* and hypothesizes that might be because they are the *most primitive* group of the *tribe*. In this reasoning the Nambikwara themselves are seen as evolutionists, but sometimes the naming proceeds clearly through the alter-classification customary among the entire ensemble of peoples although not an expression like uncles or children, which in all likelihood derived from a misunderstanding or mistranslation. The respondent may have answered a question about the name of a group with who in the other group he knows (see Price 1972 and later publications for an exhaustive treatment of such names, this is examined in the next Part).

[xxix] He remarked on a large stone outside the house that was being used for cracking palm nuts. He casually noted that were it not for the enormous weight of the object he would take it to the museum ignoring the necessity of discussion

with the owners. As mentioned, Rondon restrained himself when visiting an abandoned village in spite of the enormous ethnographic worth. His honesty was motivated by the obligation to foster goodwill. Visiting in the name of science apparently allowed for some special liberty. As seen, Rondon posted a guard and the practice of just taking Indian things in this sort of situation was normal for those of the interior. Regardless, although ordinary thievery was socially intolerable and a very despicable action in the interior, taking Indian objects was not judged so harshly.

[xxx] The geologist of the Roosevelt-Rondon expedition concurred. He described the savanna around Vilhena as the last natural one and comprised of a red clay and sand mixture. This could have been an additional reason for its growth into a town. From here on the savannas are the result of the action of man while the forest and vegetation attains increasing heights and Três Buritis is surrounded by high forest full of valuable timber (*madeira de lei*). Both Três Buritis and José Bonifácio are built on what were known as *Indian savannas* (Oliveira 1915: 33;47).

[xxxi] On this issue, he differs with Roosevelt. Although Roosevelt did agree with Rondon on a number of issues, for example he too considered the *nakedness* of the Indians to be *entirely modest*, yet they still were, to him, the wildest and most primitive savages he ever came across in his travels, even when compared to what he called the African tribes at the same stage of culture (Roosevelt 1914: 208; 210).

[xxxii] Rondon does not say so but it would make sense if these were destined to one of the groups as visitors and the main house is that of the hosts.

[xxxiii] The popular book, *Missão Rondon* (1916: 242) also reports the same solemn occasion in very similar words. It is mentioned how many Indians of the *Taú-i-tês* participated and how one girl was assigned to raise the flag, in commemoration of the newly achieved *peace* with Rondon.

[xxxiv] From the recent experience of the festivities around the so-called *500 years of Brazil* event, I conclude that the audience and public generally accepts unquestioningly the never explicit notion that the Indians at the *first mass* actually acted out of some kind of natural respect for the religious event, not simply out of mimetic politeness for the Portuguese.

[xxxv] It has even been argued that Rondon was well suited for the task to enhance this alliance on the personal level with Roosevelt because of his experience with the *attraction* and *pacification* of *savages*. That is, to pacify Roosevelt, as it were, and gain his respect for Rondon and his country (Zarur

2003: 262-3). In this he apparently succeeded, it seems Roosevelt came to admire Rondon and, by extension, his work and country.

[xxxvi] Forebodingly, the name "Espirro" means "sneeze".

[xxxvii] As Lévi-Strauss commented, he knew them already decimated by epidemics but still, after Rondon's humanitarian efforts, *no one had attempted to subjugate them*. Put differently, enjoying the autonomy of following their own way of life unencumbered by outside interference and domination (ib.: 345-6).

[xxxviii] He drew the conclusion about homogeneity on the basis of the material available most of which he collected in the course of this extremely arduous research. He did, at a certain point warn that the because of the lack of clear communication with the Sabanê: "*Il ne m'appertient donc pas de présenter son point de vue*" (1984: 362).

[xxxix] This quote comes from *For Authentic Sexual Education* by Cardinal Lopez Trujillo, President of the Pontifical Council for the Family. This talk was given at the seminar on Parental responsibility for sex education, London, September 1999 (Text available on Internet, accessed 2000). This example of cultural relativism is only one example among many but has the advantage of showing how cultural relativism is always contested by those high-ranking professionals in the religious hierarchy in pursuit of maintenance and increase of their religious capital. Needless to say the instance cited is not purported to be any condemnation by Lévi-Strauss.

[xl] [Une societé réduite] "*Celle des Nambikwara l'était au point que j'y trouvai seulement des hommes*" (ib.:377). What I interpret to mean they are still normal and complete human beings in the fullness of a specific mode of social life.

[xli] At least as far as concerns a picture in *Tristes Tropiques* which shows the play between two Indian girls; he already claimed to understand the situation differently (*O Globo* Nov. 28, 1998). Modern linguistic research cannot yet confirm or deny the meaning of the phrase in the bishop's quote (Telles 2002, personal communication; she does not recognize the phrase).

[xlii] Debate in the *Bijdragen tot de Taal, Land en Volkenkunde*, 1976, nr. 132 with the article by Aspelin and comments by Lévi-Strauss and Price. The latter wrote a *Final Note* citing early evidence of another observer participating in Rondon's expedition in support of the predominantly sedentary life style (a German ethnographer; Price 1991). However a recent general investigation into the living conditions of the Amazonian rainforest peoples (among other rainforest areas), still found it necessary to explain that *their previous reputation as nomads has been disproved* (website: lucy.ukc.ac.uk/Sonja/RF/Ukpr/Report49.htm;

accessed 2000).

[xliii] He calculated over three hundred people for five villages and that would amount to over sixty people per village. He speaks about a number of make-shift shelters put up around the inner circle but also mentions the presence of visitors from another village, so that might very well be the reason for this precarious arrangement. The *Missão Rondon* ventures the assertion that the shelters are family dwellings and the house serves as storage of the crops but this may be due to the same circumstance. Additionally, people such as the Sararé prefer to sleep outside, but otherwise live in houses.

[xliv] In his comment, Lévi-Strauss does not acknowledge this probable influence but cites the missionaries as witnesses to *the common knowledge* that the northern bands were far less sedentary than the southern. However, the mission can only be the one at Utiarity, which was established shortly before his arrival. Thus, the common knowledge could still very well derive from the people on the Line. It is notable that Lévi-Strauss paints a clear picture of the fears of the employees and the generally tense and always problematical relations entertained with the Nambikwara. Abandoned, hardly trained and of regional origin, their common sense must have been close to the normal stereotypes about Indians and hardly representative of Rondon's earlier attempts to elevate these views. Rondon actually had a harder time to impose his humanist conceptions and discipline than is generally assumed. Roosevelt (1914: 216) even mentions that twice soldiers had deserted their little lonely stations and fled to the Nambikwara. He suggests that the soldiers went to live permanently with the Indians, an unsubstantiated and unlikely conclusion.

[xlv] The discussion on Nambikwara nomadism also has an important place in the contributions of all three protagonists after a polemic article by Price, in the same journal reviewing the former discussion. This debate took a somewhat more problematic turn and need not be reviewed again for the present purpose. Suffice to say that Price adduces further support and that the two recent ethnographers agree on the rejection of nomadism; Lévi-Strauss contends to have already abided by the empirical evidence mustered in the first place, only raising some questions as to possible sources of discrepancy (see Price 1978;Lévi-Strauss 1978; Aspelin 1978). As said, Aspelin (1979) re-affirms the picture as does Aytai (1981) in a very little known contribution. Aytai only suggests that a particularly heavy drought may have fostered an abnormal situation witnessed by Lévi-Strauss.

[xlvi] Even though the travels of Duquech were mentioned in a book by the Service in 1944 and various pictures of these peoples were published (Magelhães

1944).
[xlvii] In 1728 gold was discovered in Diamantino by Gabriel Antunes Maciel and the region began to be regularly visited and conquered (Dornstauder 1975: 2).
[xlviii] In 1941 the mining engineer Victor Dequech (1943) visited the upper Apidiá, now usually called the Pimenta Bueno River prospecting for gold and minerals. He did meet the Indians on the river, who had regained much of their autonomy with the decline of rubber tapping. He situates a mysterious Nambikwara group between the Apediá and Vilhena, adjacent to the current Latundê Area but locates the Sabanê, Xolandê and Mamaindê west of the upper Comemoração river, west of the Roosevelt river. Although he was a very astute observer of his own travels, he did not visit this region and based this possibility on hearsay. Regardless, it is interesting to note as an index of the extension of the occupation of the Northern Nambikwara cluster at the time.
[xlix] The comparison made here refers to narratives about the levels in the sky and their characteristics for the Lakondê and Sabanê as told by Tereza Lakondê and Manézinho Sabanê.
[l] This ideally consisted of two opposing houses, even if this plan did not confer with the single-house village visited by Rondon. One wonders why this dualistic picture is not mentioned by Lévi-Strauss when he definitely proposed dualism for the village plan in other cases; however, he did not visit any real village and his tendency to note and point to all forms of social dualism finds an outlet in the seasonal differentiation and his notion of the merging of the Sabanê – Tarundê.
[li] Keep in mind that in studying the Cinta Larga, João del Poz claims in these earlier days the distinctions between the different Tupi Mondé groups are blurred and the name in question seems to be used indistinctively for all of them. It seems likely that these attackers were indeed Cinta Larga. The mother of the narrator was a victim and the enemy took body parts but not the head, as was Cinta Larga custom (Del Poz 2001, personal communication).
[lii] The Nambikwara in question refer to the regionally designated *Nambikwara* do Campo cluster living on the Parecis Plateau. These peoples are given as extending up to latitudes as high as Três Buritis which would make this possibility plausible and the Sabanê might have been in the middle of these enemies (the Nambikwara and Enawenê to the east or south and the Tupian groups to the north).
[liii] This information was gathered with Antunes (2002, personal communication) at the Funai administration in Vilhena. Antunes also generously supplied the data on the history of the Sabanê villages.

[liv] It is noteworthy that the Enawenê live in one large village of some 250 persons (Valadão 1998). In the diary of Castro Faria cited above it remains unclear but at times he seems to imply that the Sabanê lived in one maloca or at least with many people within the same village.
[lv] The same sort of temporary period of foraging is known among other forest peoples, like the Arawetê (Viveiros de Castro 1992). Here this conduct regards a social event, a trek, and is not so much any kind of nomadism or caused by any insufficiency of sustenance (actually Southern Nambikwara do the same, see Part III). I suspect the same may have been true in this case as the aim also consists of stocking up meat to eat in the village. As said, the Sabanê are probably more like a forest people and, due to fear of another flood that killed many people in the mythical past, do not live near the larger rivers.
[lvi] In this description of similarities and differences, one important distinctive feature coincides: piercing the upper lip and the nose (see Price 1972). This practice was abandoned a long time ago.
[lvii] Shamanism continues to be very important even after the language shift of this generation and appears to be a very relevant practice even in the face of other sociocultural changes. It seems to adapt to knowledge of the new world created by the White man. The shaman consults the spirits to establish if some illness is *Indian* or *White*, and is to be treated accordingly.
[lviii] Lévi-Straus mentioned that the exchanges can be based on a real need of objects not locally produced, probably either raw resources or handicraft. However, except perhaps an item like suitable stone for tools, the exchange of women and people certainly enables learning other methods of fabrication. So, just like the hypothesis about the exchange of items at the Alto Xingu by Pedro Agostinho (1999, personal communication) this may in fact entail a renunciation to a skill exercised by another in order to maintain a kind of social group division of labor, each group had their ability. Lévi-Strauss noted that some Nambikwara peoples did not produce ceramics and so participated in exchange. The Sabanê, in fact, did know to fabricate cooking pots and exchanged them with some of their Northern Nambikwara neighbors for things like feathers and necklaces. Trade is for social relations rather than scarce goods. As Price (1989b: 36) said: "*People who trade are people who intermarry; and people who trade do not make war on each other*".
[lix] In a way this possibility reinforces the possibility of other Sabanê living in the area at the time. Although this does not become clear in Tristes Tropiques, in the academic thesis there is a clear reference that the group at Vilhena was only a

fraction of the Sabanê. They were at odds with the old allies of their own people. Relations of *antagonism* (ib.: 50; 103) would explain the search for other allies, even of another people.

[lx] Vilhena is far away from the source of the Cabixi River, although it small creeks run to the north. In Vilhena the denser vegetation along the same streams used to be cultivated by Mamaindê. That is, my collaborators asserted that 'Vilhena belongs to the Mamaindê'. Note that is about the only place where the high lands separating river basins permit very easy passage from set of rivers running south to the other running north. Hence the possibility that the Mamaindê regional set extended into another basin. Near Vilhena lies the high ground from which several rivers start running in various directions. Among them the Pimenta Bueno River and this shows how the Mamaindê used to be close to the current position of the Latundê. Finally, Stella Telles (2006, personal communication) points out that the Mamaindê dialect group differs in certain syntactic features from the Lakondê dialect group Hence, if the Tarundê and Cabixi easily mixed and conversed freely, then they very likely did belong to the same dialect group. This is why other regional sets may be calling them by the same name.

[lxi] Lévi-Strauss claims that *a proper distance* permits friendly relations and all sorts of exchange – Mané even mentioned that his Sabanê village readily gave food to needy allies. Such a distance does not threaten to erase ethnic differences and attendant sentiments of some permanent distrust.

[lxii] This is the place where Teresa Lakondé was raised when her *mother* (maternal aunt) became remarried to a Paresi Indian employee. Other Indians sometimes hold not being a *village Indian* against her today. However, her knowledge of Lakondê culture is large and, with the death of her brother, the last strong leader, unique.

[lxiii] Perhaps the name comes from the "*village Ialaquiauru of the Tauitê*" mentioned by Rondon (1947: 34). But the Lakondê people called themselves Yalakolori, also close to this name Yalakiaoro, so any identification is conjecture.