Being Human. Chapter 10: Aggression: The Common Thread Of Humanity



Not a day passes without reminders of the violent world in which we live. Pick up a newspaper on any given day and you will see multiple reports of aggression at the interpersonal as well as at group or international levels. Wars continue despite efforts to make the First World War the "war to end all wars". Genocide is committed as we write these lines in Darfur and other regions of the world despite all protestations of "never again". It is not possible to live insulated lives as violence affects individuals, families, communities, the nation, and the international system.

Many people are keenly aware of the misery caused by aggression and are trying to change political systems to ameliorate the consequences. Thousands of Americans and Europeans have moved their protests to the streets angered by the apparent indifference of politicians in bringing the current wars, like in Iraq and the Middle-East, to an end. Today's paper also reports on the racism (see also chapter 9) that still lurks in our societies, on school children being killed in Thailand, on plans to introduce new missile systems in Poland with radar support in the Czech republic. The Palestinians have not yet come together in a unity government and see their efforts dismissed by Israel, another chapter in that ongoing conflict. Elsewhere the police has unraveled a drug smuggling gang and found, along with money and drugs, many guns. As you read this chapter today it is probably but an average day of continued violence in the world.

Aggression stimuli can be found not only in the media, but now also consumes significant space in the ever-growing Internet. The content of violent pornography is related to violence, as we shall see later in this chapter. Video games are often vivid depictions of massive and terrible violence. Some researchers have related these stimuli to real life aggression, facilitated by the ease of obtaining guns,

particularly in the United States. Daily television programming yields numerous violent episodes with nonchalant killing at the center of the action. Violent movies sell, and based on the results of social learning theory, they must have an effect on impressionable audiences.

Unlike in European countries that are less violent tens of thousands of people are murdered each year in United States. However, not only in the U.S. do we observe the phenomena of school killings, or men attacking others at their workplace. In recent years it has also happened in Germany and in The Netherlands, but with less frequency and scale compared to the US. At Columbine High School in 1999 two students turned guns and explosives on fellow students in an attack that costs several innocent lives. Their actions were an example of anger-based aggression as they went to their school with the intent and determination to hurt fellow students and staff. Similar episodes have occurred in other states (Newman, Fox, Harding, Metha, & Roth, 2004). Recently (April 16th, 2007) a 23-year old student in Virginia killed 32 people and wounded 25 others before he took his own life. A similar act of violence happened on November 7th, 2007, in Tuusula (Finland). An 18-year-old shot seven students and the headmistress inside his high school in southern Finland, before turning the gun on himself. He, calling himself Sturmgeist89', published a manifesto online on youtube demanding war on the "weak-minded masses" and pledged to die for his cause.

The difference in violence between Europe and the United States suggests the importance of cultural values. Some societies are more acceptant of violence whereas other countries have built into social inhibitions and control of aggression cues. The stimuli of guns in many homes in America, and their indifferent use in the media, are not independent of the actual violence in society.

Daily news also provides many sad examples of more intimate violence. Child abuse is common, as are other forms of domestic violence often associated with drug and alcohol use. The fact that societies have created centers where women can escape violence speaks volumes about the prevalence of family aggression and intimate violence. Rape centers present everywhere in the Western world, also point to the prevalence of aggression in society.

Since violence is everywhere in human society and in the animal world, is there an evolutionary basis for aggression? Do we still have these biological

components present in our genetic coding? Yet, the behaviors that had a survival function in our common early history are today dysfunctional. Predisposition to aggress may kill us one-by-one, or we may all die in the feared nuclear cataclysm of the future. We should remind ourselves that the carnivorous dinosaurs of the past are all gone.

1. Dimensions of aggression in the world

Although the cold war is over, the nuclear powers still possess tens of thousands of nuclear bombs that can be activated at a moments notice. Although annihilation is a singular experience the warlords of the world have ensured mutual extinction many times over. Social psychological factors play important roles in the development of military technology and strategy (e.g. Larsen, 1987). World War II took 50 million lives, but millions died before that period from other reckless wars or torture. Political leaders have not learned much as they still rely on force to reach political objectives, and millions have died since World War II. The purges of China and Eastern Europe were horrible. So too were the extermination of Native Americans in the United States and the Aboriginals of Australia by European invaders (Brown, 1971).

The death toll yearly from war and other violence is about 1.6 million persons, including at least half a million homicides (Stolberg, 2002). American society makes a significant contribution to these statistics through endless wars and domestic homicide rates. Why is American society so violent? Some explanations point to a lack of social integration. As a country of immigrants the U.S. has little history and few common denominators which taken together diminish empathy toward victims of violence. In addition to the extermination of the native population, the U.S. also engaged in slavery until the civil war, and institutionalized violence toward Blacks afterwards as we saw in chapter 9.

Further, homicides occur in impoverished areas where people have few investments in stable social relations. Violence is often associated with drug cultures where masculine pride and retaliation for any slight or insult is as certain as it is stupid. The U.S., although rich in resources, has one of the highest income disparities in the world. Poverty brings many social ills that directly or indirectly generate aggression and mortality. Finally, the U.S is the only society in the world with an irrational attachment to firearms. Hundreds of millions of firearms exist in private homes, and instead of protecting are often used to kill others in close relationships. Family or other intimate partners commit the large majority of

violent crimes.

2. Two types of aggression

Aggression is defined as intentional behavior aimed at inflicting physical or emotional harm. Aggression should not be confused with assertive behavior. The willingness to stand up for one's rights, to speak out against injustice requires assertiveness. Assertiveness is especially necessary in societies that feed on conformity. Women today are becoming more assertive, are speaking up for fair treatment, and relating to men on a more equal basis. Speaking up is assertiveness, but unless it contains hostility and the desire to injure another, it is not aggression.

It is possible to differentiate between aggression carried out with a legal and good intent on behalf of society. Police officers act in aggressive ways, often to enforce laws that protect the rest of the community. Criminals are also aggressive, and most often at a cost to society. At times police aggression is violence without cause, as in the cases of unarmed people shot for no apparent good reason. In social psychology however, most often two types of aggression are recognized: Hostile and instrumental aggression

2.1 Hostile and instrumental aggression

Berkowitz (1993) made a distinction between instrumental and hostile aggression. Hostile aggression results from feelings of anger that aim at injuring or causing pain to the target person or group. The emotion of anger is the mediating variable in this type of aggression. However, warlords are less emotional and more calculating. Wars are often fought for resources of space, and other tangential rewards. Many wars are initially fought not with hostile intent, (which comes later along with war propaganda), but to reach some goal or end purpose. Hitler's war was for "Living space" according to his book Mein Kampf, but turned into a bitter hostile extermination campaign where dehumanizing propaganda was used to justify the action. The war in Iraq is the current example of endless wars. It was started for the instrumental purpose of removing Saddam Hussein, or perhaps for oil control, or protection of a client state of the U.S. However, the war became a hostile campaign aimed at the utter destruction of perceived enemies. It is probably fair to say that wars for the warlords are primarily instrumental, whereas for soldiers and populations they are hostile events.

So we can see it is difficult in practice to distinguish between instrumental versus

hostile aggression. Most murders are probably impulsive angry acts and a form of hostile aggression. On the other hand murders committed by the mob and gangsters are often purely instrumental. The mob seeks to remove a rival, or induce terror so it can continue with criminal operations (nothing personal sir!). At the level of rationalization many wars are fought initially for instrumental purposes, but take on the nature of hostile aggression as each side seeks to justify inhumanity and denigrate the enemy.

2.2 Torture is instrumental aggression

Whether describing the recent acts of the U.S. military in the now infamous prisons, or the so-called "rendition" program of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), torture is for some end or some purpose. That is also true of the torture practiced by other proto-fascist governments of the past. The burning of witches at the stake was instrumental in that the purpose was to save their souls. The Spanish Inquisition likewise used torture as an instrumental exercise as the perpetrators were engaged in the great "loving labor" of saving souls who were devilishly afflicted. People change when they engage in torture. To rationalize torture the victim must be denigrated, and the acts must be perceived as being for some greater good. Of course some sadists or psychopaths have no need for rationalizations, as the torture chamber is their natural environment.

Even though society holds individuals responsible for behavior, we know that peers and the social context influence behaviors that some individuals would never commit without that powerful encouragement. As we have discussed in chapter 7, Abu Ghraib did not result so much from individual evil as from the predisposing social context (Fiske, Ladsana, & Cuddy, 2004). Iraq was a combat environment that predisposed the prison guards to aggression, and at the same time viewed the inmates as disgusting and unworthy of sympathy.

Other research reported in chapter 7 demonstrated the ease by which inhuman behavior is elicited by obedience to authority (e.g. Milgram, 1963; 1974), and by conformity processes (e.g. Larsen, 1972a). In combat situations conformity pressures are especially high since going along with fellow soldiers is related to individual survival. Prison guards may observe the torture committed by other soldiers, and given the social context think it is all right to behave in similar ways. In other situations, including massacres committed by suicide bombers, war crimes are socialized events resulting from conformity and obedience.

In many cases the provocations leading to genocidal actions is witnessing the killing of fellow soldiers. This experience with hostility generates anger that is transferred to a largely innocent population. Torture is a gradual process starting with apparent legitimate forms of abuse that include “waterboarding” by the U.S. Repeated acts desensitize the perpetrator, and hostility gradually includes the willingness to the kill and mutilate civilians. Contributing to these violent outcomes is the behavior of governments that justify torture of enemy prisoners. Torture is also instrumental aggression since soldiers may sincerely believe they are doing a service by punishing, killing, and otherwise eliminating groups of people that seem so deserving of that treatment.

3. Theories of aggression

Thinkers about human violence have over the years put forward several theories of aggression. Some researchers who observed the near universality of aggressive behavior pointed to biology, genetics or instincts as the primary causes of aggression. Later learning theorists based on rich research evidence suggested that aggression, like other social behaviors, is learned.

3.1 Biological and evolutionary causes

Early thinkers in psychology believed that aggressive impulses were inborn, that all humans had an instinctive aggressive trait that would find expression in behavior if not inhibited by learning (Hobbes, 1651). Much later Freud (1930) was also a proponent of instinct theory. He saw human psychology as interplay between two primary instincts: the Eros (life instinct), and the Thanatos (death instinct). From Freud’s perspective aggression and in general destructive behavior was an expression of the death instinct.

Still later Lorenz (1966) argued that we have inborn mechanisms for both aggression and the inhibition of hostility. In modern times some researchers suggest that aggression is an inherited tendency that we share with other animals, particularly primates (Potegal & Knutson, 1994). Aggression has become part of our genetic inheritance because this behavior had survival functions, including access to mates and protection of defenseless children (Buss & Kenrick, 1998).

Biology must logically play a role. The potential has to be present in biology for any behavior to occur even if biological contributions are modest (Geen, 1998). For example aggression is partly determined by the presence of the so-called

male hormone testosterone (Dabbs, 1998). The neurotransmitter serotonin may also be involved in hostility and aggression is influenced by the reactivity of our sympathic nervous system (Kagan, 1989). Since aggressive behavior is prominent in some families (Miles & Carey, 1997), and remains stable within individuals across the lifespan (Huesmann & Moise, 2000), a genetic contribution can be inferred. Research by Finnish psychologists show that some species can also be bred for aggressive behavior (Lagerspetz, 1979).

Most social psychologists have viewed instinctual sources of aggression with disbelief (see e.g. Larsen, 1973; 1977a). They point to the great variability of violence in different cultures (Hornstein, 1976). Variability can however also be attributed to different cultural inhibitions, and therefore does not disprove an inborn tendency toward aggression. The near universality of aggressive behavior among vertebrates suggests a dominant survival value of at least instrumental aggression (Lore & Schultz, 1993). However, the fact that it varies by culture in humans and can be modified would suggest that it is not rigidly programmed into human nature. Still most social psychologists would emphasize the basic learned nature of human hostility (Berkowitz, 1993; Geen, 1998).

3.2 Learned aggression

From learning theory we know that people learn through reinforcement, as well as by imitation. When a person finds aggressive behavior rewarding he/she is likely to repeat it on future occasions. In the military, reinforcement consists of medals, commendations, and promotions for aggressive behavior. Aggressive behavior is also rewarded in criminal gangs by promotion to leadership, and with a greater share of the spoils.

3.2.1 Reinforcement and aggression

In some societies children, particularly boys, are rewarded for aggressive behavior. Boys are told to fight back, and not to give way to bullies. Other societies make retaliation a cultural requirement, and punish those who do not comply. In one study (Geen & Pigg, 1970) participants were reinforced verbally while participating in a study administering sham “shock” to other participants. Those who were told they were doing a “great job” subsequently shocked at significantly more intense levels. If rewards lead to increased aggression, will punishing aggressive behavior inhibit violence? The answer is no. Other studies have shown that when children are physically punished for aggression parents actually model the behavior being corrected. Therefore aggression training may

produce more violent behavior away from home (Sears, Whiting, Nowlis, & Sears, 1953; Widom, 1989). Since the parents serve as models for imitation it is difficult to separate influences of reinforcement from those of social learning.

People as well as animals respond to rewards. If behavior is rewarded it is likely to be a lasting part of a person's behavior. The bully learns that his behavior brings rewards as it produces more influence on the playground at school, and perhaps he even obtains the lunch money of frightened children. The best hockey players are the most aggressive who spend extra time in the penalty box (Patterson Littman, & Bricker, 1967; McCarthy & Kelley, 1978). The lesson of 9/11 in the U.S. shows that terrorism can be very rewarding. If the goal of 9/11 terrorism was to cause fear and chaos, the perpetrators of air piracy succeeded beyond imagination. If the long-term objective of terrorism was to embroil the U.S. in long-term warfare, create permanent difficulties in air travel, 9/11 was very rewarding to the perpetrators. If the objective also included a torn society, and rejection of the U.S. policies by much of the world, the suicidal sacrifice brought great rewards to those who planned the aggression.

3.2.2 Observational learning

Rewards are only one motivator of learned aggression. Bandura, Ross, & Ross (1961) in a classic experiment demonstrated that children learn by the simple imitation of others. Children in a Stanford University nursery school were placed in a room with an adult. The room contained Tinker Toys and a large inflatable doll. After working with the Tinker Toys for a few minutes the adult concentrated his interest on the inflated doll, and begin to abuse it in a violent fashion. The doll was hit repeatedly, kicked, and thrown about while the adult yelled aggressive encouragements to "knock the doll" down, and "kick it". After the child had observed the adult outburst he was told that other children must now use the current toys, and he was placed in a different room with more toys that included the inflated Bobo doll and a mallet.

Comparative results showed that children who were not exposed to the adult modeling of aggression rarely picked up the mallet or hit the Bobo doll in the subsequent session. Children who were exposed, on the other hand, were more likely to aggressively attack the doll. It was as if the child had learned to be aggressive by observation, and had also learned the actual behavior of how to attack. Later (1979) Bandura identified aggressive models in the family, in gang culture, and in the mass media. Violent teenagers frequently abused as children,

learned aggression by watching their parents. Sadly, many abused children would later become abusive parents themselves demonstrating the power of social learning (Bandura & Walters, 1959; Kaufman & Zigler, 1987).

Today the average child may observe many models of aggression in the movies, on television, and on the Internet. It stands to reason that when children spend many hours watching violence, the consequences may be numbing. Initial violence observed in the media may cause a negative emotional response in the child. However, over time as the child is exposed to repeatedly aggressive events, the accumulation of observed aggression produces little reaction to violence as the child is desensitized.

Also many young people cannot easily distinguish between social reality and the media world. To some degree repeated exposure affects the world-view of the observer, and observing many aggressive acts connote a fearful world of violence. In turn an aggressive worldview may function as support for continued acceptance of aggression in the media. In particular aggression on television or in the movies are often justified if committed by the "good" guy, the one wearing the proverbial white hat. These influences may distort the child's view of the real world.

3.2.3 Violent models in the media

The average child in the U.S. will see approximately 8,000 murders and 100,000 acts of violence by the time he finishes elementary school (Eron, 2001). Other studies have analyzed television for content as well and show that 58 percent of all programs contain violence, most without any critical comments or evaluation. When it comes to prime time television, children and adults in the United States watch 5 or 6 violent episodes for each hour of television, and about 90 percent of children's television menu contains components of violence (Gerbner, Gross, Morgan, & Signorielli, 1986). Often the violence is committed by admired and heroic figures and the aggression depicted therefore has the additional benefit of positive social sanction. On the whole, Eron and his co-workers have demonstrated high correlations between the amount of aggressive television viewed and subsequent hostile behavior (Eron, 1987; Eron, Huesmann, Lefkowitz, & Walder, 1996).

Eron & Huesmann (1984, 1985) found that viewing violence at age 8 predicted violent behavior at age 19. In another study (Huesmann, Moise-Titus, Podolski, &

Eron, 2003) the investigators assessed the television habits of a large group of boys from childhood to adulthood. The researchers controlled for aggressive predisposition by examining separate groups trait aggression as the boys grew older. Holding constant for predisposition to violence at age 8, those who watched violent television were significantly more likely to commit various criminal acts when 30, compared to those who had little or moderate liking for aggressive television viewing (see also Huesmann, 1986)

The correlation between televised aggression and violent behavior can be inferred from the temporal appearance of television in the homes of United States and Canada and subsequent violence rates. The homicide rates doubled in the time period from 1957 to 1974 following the spread of violent programming. The temporal relationship between violent programming and violence in society can also be observed in several studies from South Africa and rural Canada (Centerwall, 1989; Williams, 1986).

However, it is always a problem in correlational studies to determine cause and effect. Could it be that children predisposed to violence also enjoyed watching aggressive television and later displayed aggressive behavior not caused by the television diet, but from the aggressive predisposition? While the Eron & Huesmann (1984, 1985) studies answered that objection and demonstrated cause and effect, it is also necessary to confirm the relationship by studying aggression in the laboratory. In a classic study Liebert and Baron (1972) exposed a group of children to a violent police drama, and then compared their behavior with a control group of children who saw an exciting sporting event with no violence. The violent and sports dramas both produced physiological arousal, but to what were these reactions attributed? Those children who watched the aggressive episode were later observed to be significantly more aggressive than the children exposed to the sporting drama. In another early study, juvenile delinquents who watched violent television diet were more aggressive compared to a control group (Leyens, Camino, Parke, & Berkowitz, 1981). In yet other studies, students who were deliberately angered in a laboratory study behaved more aggressively toward females afterwards (Donnerstein & Berkowitz, 1981).

Perhaps watching media violence in effect gives children as well as adults “permission” to be violent. Television violence seems to have the greatest effect on children who already had some predisposition to violence (Josephson, 1987). Watching a movie about police violence produced significantly more aggressive

acts during a floor hockey game, especially among those already rated high in aggression by their teachers. The educational environment provided permissive cover for aggressive behavior as showing the film in school must have implied approval in the eyes of children. Other studies have examined children with extensive and prolonged violent television diets (Parke, Berkowitz, Leyens, West & Sebastian, 1977). The great majority of these kids had no initial predisposition to violence, but became more violent after an extended period of exposure. In a meta-analysis of 230 studies Hearold (1986) demonstrated the convergent evidence that media violence is associated with antisocial behavior. Today there is little doubt that social learning of aggression occurs in the aftermath of watching aggressive television (Cantor, Bushman, Huesmann, Groebel, Malamuth, Impett, Donnerstein, & Smith, 2001; Geen, 1998; Huesmann & Miller, 1994).

The effect of media violence on aggression has been studied further by Geen & Thomas (1986). Their findings may be summarized as follows. The aggressive media stimuli produce emotional arousal in the viewer that spills over into behavior. Once aroused the individual is motivated and energized for other behaviors. Secondly, the aggressive stimulus disinhibits the viewer. As the individual observes massive gratuitous violence over long periods, a numbing of ethics and reason takes place. In other words sustained violence disinhibits the viewer allowing for more aggression (Bushman & Geen, 1990). Finally, as discussed in section 3.2.2, the violent content of television serves as social learning models for imitation. For example, the children attacking the Bobo doll in the Bandura experiment were simply imitating what they had seen the adult model perform.

Sadly, aggressive viewing habits have lasting effects. The emotional numbing may encourage people to use violence in solving the problems of life. Exposure to constant brutality also desensitizes and distorts the social reality as demonstrated by several investigators (Cline, Croft, Courrier, 1973; Drabman & Thomas, 1976). One consequence of media distortion is excessive fear of violence that does not correspond to real dangers in society (Radicki, 1989). Media distortion causes people to arm themselves with handguns, which are also aggression cues with only one functional purpose, that of killing other human beings.

3.3 Violent video games

Video games constitute an obsessive activity for many children and young people throughout the world. About 85 percent of U.S. teenagers play these games on a

regular basis (Anderson & Bushman, 2001). Significant time is devoted weekly to videos that contain a sickeningly level of violence and destruction (Roberts, Foehr, Rideout, & Brodie, 1999). Anderson & Bushman (2001) reviewed 35 studies on the effect of video violence and concluded that the games contribute to aggressive behaviors. Violent videos also have a negative effect on prosocial behaviors, as the participants in the above studies were less likely to help others or engage in altruistic behavior. The violent games increased the levels of aggressive thoughts and feelings, and produced changes in the body commonly associated with the 'fight or flight" syndrome: increased blood pressure and heart rate.

In a typical violent video experiment, students were asked to either play the game called "Mortal Combat" or another called "PGA tournament Golf". When the participants lost the game they were punished by a blast of white noise. Those respondents who were exposed to the violent video game gave stronger and longer blasts of white noise. As is true in the case of television violence, there is little doubt about the negative effects of violent video games for children and society (Anderson & Bushman, 2001).

3.4 Violent pornography and violence against women

Today adult "book" stores proliferate all over the Western world. In addition the Internet contain millions of images of naked women, and a significant portion of this material shows in various ways how to humiliate and aggress toward females. Learning theory would predict a relationship between viewing this material and aggression toward women including rape. Pornography at such high levels of consumption must also affect men's world-view of women, and the role women play or should play in heterosexual relations. In fact, research shows that pornography endorses the image of sexually submissive women where the man plays the role of overpowering reluctant females (Hansen & Hansen, 1990; St. Lawrence & Joyner, 1991). Pornography also endorses the idea that the use of coercion is pleasurable for women, and thereby indirectly promotes rape. At the very least, violent pornography distorts how women actually feel about coercion.

As pornography has spread throughout the world, attacks on women have also become more frequent (Court, 1985). Even the sale of soft-core magazines like Playboy is correlated with rape rates (Baron & Straus, 1984). The presence of pornography in the background of sexual criminals is well documented (Marshall, 1989; Ressler, Burgess, & Douglas, 1988). A unanimous statement by leading

scientists stated that exposure to violent pornography leads to aggressive behavior toward women (Koop, 1987). In an interview with serial killer Ted Bundy he acknowledged the habitual use of pornography. Perhaps he was also self-serving in blaming pornography and thereby diverting attention away from his own personal responsibility for his crimes. In sum, pornography causes harm to women (Russell, 1997).

But rigid sexual culture is also harmful to women. In the guise of protecting women some cultures prohibit any natural evolution of sexual relationships, and blame the victims of sexual oppression for any infraction. A recent court case (November, 2007) in Saudi Arabia that was reported in the news comes to mind. In that male dominated country, women are prohibited from leaving their houses without a male escort who is also a member of her family. The woman cannot drive in a car for example without violating these rigid taboos. In the court case mentioned above a woman was gang raped by seven men, after which the woman was given a sentence of 200 lashes and six months in prison for being in a car without a male escort of her family. In this case as in many other situations it was the victim who was blamed for the assault.

3.5 Sexual beliefs

Growing up many adolescents come to believe that women are supposed to resist and say no when they really mean yes to sexual advances (White, Donat, & Humphrey, 1995). Nearly half of the high school students in the U.S. believed that when a woman said no, she did not really mean it. These common sexual beliefs set the stage for miscommunications and date rape. Some universities have responded by requiring students to negotiate a contract prior to dating explicitly defining sexual conduct, and the limitations on their behavior. That requirement put a damper on the spontaneity of sexual behavior and was eventually discarded (Roiphe, 1994).

3.6 Violent pornography distorts the victims' reaction

Research shows violent pornography too has a numbing effect and decreases empathy with potential victims just like the effect of watching other types of violence. Typically in erotic violence the victim's response is distorted and out of touch with reality. If a woman is raped, she is shown smiling afterwards, and it is this response of showing sexual satisfaction that is crucial to the incidence of subsequent violence (Donnerstein & Berkowitz, 1981). Repeated exposure to violent pornography produces desensitization in much the same way as exposure

to general violence leads to an acceptance of aggression. More broadly erotic violence leads to an acceptance of violence against women (Donnerstein & Linz, 1994; Weisz & Earls, 1995).

In one important study (Check & Malamuth, 1981), participants were exposed to movies displaying either erotic or nonerotic aggression in a regular theater setting. Males exposed to erotic aggression subsequently displayed more aggression toward females, whereas female participants did not accept violence against their gender. Other research showed that repeated exposure to violent erotic films produced desensitization in several ways. The violent material became more acceptable, the participants showed less sympathy for victims of rape, and displayed less support for sexual equality (Malamuth & Briere, 1986).

Taken together, these and other studies show that exposure to sexually violent material produced greater acceptance of violence against women. It stands to reason that violent erotica is also responsible for aggressive behavior toward women in real life (Dean & Malamuth, 1997). Pornographic violence serves to focus aggressive feelings toward women rather than on other more appropriate targets (Linz, Donnerstein, & Penrod, 1988). A meta-analysis of 30 studies showed conclusively that violent erotica has aggressive consequences (Allen, D'Alessio, & Brezgel, 1995). The weight of the conclusions is that the violent component of erotica had the most serious anti-social effect on subsequent aggressive behavior.

4. Culture

Cultural situations determine whether inborn tendencies are actually expressed. Aggression is therefore a function of the interplay between inborn tendencies, the inhibitions or facilitation of culture, and the particular situation in which the behavior occurs.

As already mentioned American society is among the most violent in the world. Is it in the national character for Americans to be violent, or are there other explanations? Some researchers (Daly, Wilson, & Vasdev, 2001) have provided situational explanations for the high levels of violence in the U.S. They point to the frustrations of income inequality, which is far greater in the U.S. than in comparative countries where murder rates are lower. Others have suggested that a culture sensitive to threat, called a culture of honor, is mainly responsible.

4.1 Herding societies and the culture of honor

The southern part of the United States has historically been more violent than the North. It was here that the vast majority of lynchings took place, and a large amount of other person-to-person violence. Nisbett, (1993), showed that murder rates were significantly higher in the south, a situation he attributes to a culture of pride or "honor". Southern whites are likely to endorse violence when threatened or suffering slights or insults. Later work (Cohen, Nisbett, Bowdle, & Schwarz, 1996; Cohen & Nisbett, 1994; Nisbett & Cohen, 1996) supports the presence of a culture of "honor" preoccupied with a reputation for toughness, and an ability to retaliate swiftly against any insult or threat.

Part of the culture is also the reputed southern politeness in which people recognize that the honor of others serve as a stabilizing force in social relations. Since the politeness norm of the south of the U.S. is well understood, insults are equally salient and leave little doubts as to proper reaction. In one study (Nisbett, Polly, & Lang, 1995) the authors examined archival information for the presence of two types of murders. One type is argument-based murders that involve perceived threat to honor, like the perceived unfaithfulness of women to spouses or boyfriends. The other type of murder occurs in the course of some felony like a bank robbery. The rate for felony murders was about the same in the south and other regions of the U.S. However, argument-based murders occurred at a much higher rate in the south (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996).

Studies in the laboratory supported these regional findings of the effect of honor on aggressive responses (Cohen, Nisbett, Bowdle, & Scwarz, 1996). Confederates of the experimenter insulted the participants deliberately by bumping into the subjects when passing while whispering "asshole". Participants from the south, as expected, reacted more aggressively than those from the north. The researchers did not believe that regional differences in homicide were caused by the cruel history of slavery or the greater humidity in the south. Examining the historical record they noted that homicides were more common in relative cool mountain and rural areas where slavery was relatively uncommon. Nisbett & Cohen (1996) argued that the culture of honor was responsible, and is a variant of similar cultures found elsewhere in the world.

Cohen and his collaborators noted that in cultures, which historically produced a living by herding animals, people were especially sensitive to insults. As is well known from the history of warfare, groups all over the world stole or slaughtered domestic animals in raids on their enemies, and thereby destroyed the wealth of a

family or community in an instant. The culture of honor developed initially as a means of protection and to discourage attack from potential enemies. Central to the culture of honor is the idea that any attack is met with swift counteraction, and insults are not tolerated. Justice delayed is justice denied. When insulted or threatened, the code of survival of people from herding societies demanded a determined and immediate response to potential violence. In these societies children are taught not to back down, to meet each challenge head on, and not allow for bullying.

Gradually over time this herding culture became part of the social fabric of immigrants who came from these societies to United States. Primarily Scottish and Irish immigrants who herded animals from primordial times settled in the southern part of the U.S. Violence in this herding context had initially survival value, but over time a sensitivity to insults became a part of culture and automatic thinking. Today there is greater support for self-defense in the south, for the use of guns, for corporal and for capital punishment than in the North (Cohen, 1996; Podell & Archer, 1994). Violence is seen as appropriate in the protection of self, but indiscriminate aggression is not endorsed (Fischer, 1989). Child training is more likely to include spanking in the south. So, by means of modeling, children also learn from their parents to settle arguments or disputes by violence. These patterns of behavior have lost their survival function in modern society, but are still valued in the social institutions of the South (Cohen, 1996).

4.2 The culture of mobs

The phenomena of imitation crimes are well known by police and other observers. Social learning also plays a role when a criminal observes the violent conduct of another and seeks to commit a similar crime. Imitation crimes were observed early in the 19th century by the sociologist Tarde (1903). He noted that newsworthy crimes often led to similar outrages in other communities. People often commit violence in mobs where they can imitate the aggression of others. The cause of mob violence is deindividuation according to Zimbardo (1970). The individual acting in groups or mobs feels less personal responsibility for his aggressive behavior. Zimbardo noted that deindividuation was partially caused by anonymity since an unknown individual cannot be held to account for his violent behavior. For example executioners and the Ku Klux Klan wore hoods to disguise appearance, and thereby became anonymous to victims and observers of the violence. Deindividuation is also caused by diffusion of responsibility since the

individual feels less personal responsibility when the violence is committed with many others. The more people who are present at decision making meetings the less the sense of individual responsibility. The acts of lynch mobs are thought possible because no single person is held responsible for the murder (Watson, 1973; Mullen, 1986).

The difference between advising participants to aggress and actually "shocking" someone was investigated in an experiment (Gaebelein & Mander (1978). Those subjects whose role was confined to advising on how much shock to administer recommended much higher levels of shock, compared to those who actually did the shocking. A similar diffusion of responsibility occurs in mob lynchings (Mullen, 1986). In examining 60 lynchings in the U.S. the investigator discovered that the larger the mob the more brutal the murder and mutilation of the victim. Being in a large mob decreases personal responsibility, and whatever happens can be blamed on others. This group-produced enhancement of negative behavior was observed in another study employing shock. When a group of respondents were angered and given the opportunity to shock, they as a group administered much higher levels of shock compared to the shock administered by the single respondent (Jaffe & Yinon, 1983). Something happens to the sense of personal responsibility when people act in groups that lead to higher levels of hostility and violent behavior.

The size of the group also matters, as noted the larger the mob the greater the deindividuation. Racial riots in the United States and elsewhere demonstrate how large groups engage in indiscriminate violence and atrocities toward members of other groups with whom they have no personal relationship. The effect of deindividuation can also be observed in violent warfare where individual responsibility is disguised by the wearing of uniforms, and utilizing face or body paint.

Human history shows that it is much easier for old men to command young men to go to war, than to serve themselves in the front lines. Often the leading members of governments who are most bellicose risk no members of their own family. Since none are serving in the armed forces they sustain no personal risks from their aggressive actions and decisions. Groups create problems in risk taking by diffusing the responsibility for any action.

5. Gender and aggression

In all societies studied males have been found to be more aggressive, with only a few exceptions, like the Trobianders (Benedict, 1935). Men commit nearly all violence associated with gangs and criminal activity (Kimmel, 2004). Eighty percent of those arrested in the U.S. for murder are men, as are 87 percent of those confined in prison for aggravated assaults. One has only to watch children at play to observe gender differences in aggression from the very earliest moments of social interaction.

5.1 Evolution and male aggression

The higher level of male aggression is most likely an evolutionary adaptation in the struggle for survival. In the early period of human development women were gatherers of food, and protectors of children. Men on the other hand had the task of killing animals for food, and engaging in combat to protect the family or tribe. Male aggression was often instrumental in obtaining women from enemy tribes, and often included the rape of women and the murder of their male protectors. According to evolutionary theory, rape was expressed historically as an unconscious drive to secure the survival of one's gene pool, and in the domination of others. The rape of women in warfare initially served these biological purposes (Thornhill & Thornhill, 1983). Like all human behaviors, that adaptation was modified and changed by social institutions, although never in warfare.

Women also express aggression in varying circumstances. Females express hostility in relationships through the use of gossip, by forming cliques and alliances, and by excluding the unworthy (Coie, Cillessen, Dodge, Hubbard, Schwartz, Lemerise, & Bateman, 1999; Dodge & Schwartz, 1997). Girls can be emotionally vicious, and put a high price on in-group status. A meta-analysis shows that men are much more physically aggressive than women, but the differences in behavior is narrowed when the behavior is provoked (Bettencourt & Miller, 1996). Men will in ordinary circumstances be more aggressive than females. For example, men are primarily responsible for road rage incidents. However, when women are subject to extraordinary frustration or insults, they also act aggressively. Have the gender role changes that have occurred over the past several decades produced a convergence of male and female aggressive behavior? Males still primarily commit violent crimes, whereas property crime rates have increased for women (Wilson & Hernstein, 1985; Chapple, McQuillan, & Berdahl, 2005).

Aggressive behavior is not consistent with most women's ideal self-concept. When

women commit aggressive acts they feel more guilt and anxiety (Eagly & Steffen, 1986). The gender difference holds in different cultural contexts as males express more aggression than females across different societies (Archer & McDaniel, 1995). Culture made a contribution to levels of hostility however, as women living in either Australia or New Zealand displayed more aggression than female respondents from Sweden or Korea.

5.2 Evolution and violence in close relationships

The pattern of gender related violence has led evolutionary psychologists to offer explanations pointing to the survival functions of violence. As noted in the preceding section they contend that violence is unconsciously motivated by the desire to pass on one's own genes and those of close relations. To observe the power of genes in relationships we have only to observe the outcome of divorce (Daly & Wilson, 1996). Typically after a divorce, the in-law member of the family has no more status. Despite a previous harmonious history of supportive in-law relations, divorce is typically not only between marriage partners, but also between families. Common offspring often become objects in a contest to control childrearing where the child's interest and desire of having two parents come second to each partners selfish wish to be in charge.

5.2.1 Genes and the treatment of stepchildren

"Blood" matters at the end of the day, as daughters move home to their parents, and most links of affection are broken. Being a blood related or not is also significant to the domestic violence experienced by the child. Typically stepchildren are treated worse than natural offspring. We have in the literature many tales of the wicked stepmother, who feels little or no compassion for the children of her husband. Men likewise treat the offspring of other men with less care, or with violence (Daly & Wilson, 1996; Wilson, Daly, & Weghorst, 1980). It is costly to be a parent, and evolutionary psychologists assert that parental love is unconsciously motivated toward ensuring the survival of one's own genetic pool. Looking after stepchildren makes no contribution to genetic survival. Stepchildren suffer higher frequency of mistreatment and more severe violence from stepparents (Daly & Wilson, 1996).

Relations between stepparents and children are more distant and complicated (Hobart, 1991). One of us had the experience of meeting a group of cousins he had never met before. At the end of an evening of family solidarity someone commented that it is "like we have known you all our lives". Common genetic pool

creates interests in family relations even when people are strangers. On the other hand stepchildren fare poorly. Daly and Wilson (1996) showed that they were 100 times more likely to suffer lethal violence by stepparents than genetic children. You might think this is due to some other factor in families that have stepchildren? However, the studies cited controlled for poverty, the number of children, and the inexperience and youth of the mother.

5.2.2 Males and the culture of honor

Men kill other men much more frequently than women kill women (about 20 times more frequently). Most male homicides occur after relative small disagreements that spin out of control (Mulvihill, Tumin, & Curtis, 1969). Why would men risk their lives for comparative trivial reasons? Remember our discussion of the "culture of honor"? These small arguments are not trivial in an evolutionary sense since they concern prestige and status that in turn are related to access to females (Daly & Wilson, 1988). Women generally don't find it difficult to pass off their genes by attracting partners, but some men are left out, particularly where society approves of polygamous marriages. Is lack of availability of females an evolutionary reason for the greater promiscuity of males, a behavior we also observe among the chimpanzee, our closest animal relatives? Evolutionary psychologists would maintain that part of the aggression equation must include the desire to ensure survival of one's gene pool to which male killing of other males made a contribution in our distant past.

Other factors may contribute, but are not easily separated from evolutionary explanations. A higher level of testosterone in males contributes to aggression, but is that hormone not part of the evolutionary adaptation? A sexist society may also be accepting of male dominance and control of women, which leads to higher levels of violence (Eisenstat & Bancroft, 1999). We have examples of "honor" societies where daughters are murdered by their parents for contemplating unions with a nonapproved male. But is that not also just another expression of the evolutionary demand to control the genetic pool? One conclusion is certain. Evolutionary psychology can explain, but cannot remove individual responsibility for contemptible acts of violence against women. Further, the changing cultural levels of aggression suggest that evolution cannot explain all forms of aggression, and that socialization must play a role. As we shall see other factors are also important in predicting aggressive behavior.

6. Frustration and aggression

Initially social psychologists believed that all frustration led to aggression (Dollard, Doob, Miller, & Sears, 1939). Early experiments showed that the more satisfaction that was anticipated the greater the frustration when thwarted. Also when a person is frequently prevented from realizing goals the frustrations accumulate over time. If frustrations occur when the goal is in sight the frustration is experienced more intensely (Miller, 1941).

A classic experiment (Barker, Dembo, & Lewin, 1941) demonstrated the frustration-aggression process among small children. The children were placed in a room where they were separated from attractive toys by a wire screen. In the control conditions the children were allowed to play with the desirable toys immediately. The children in the frustrated group were required to wait and were subsequently more destructive and aggressive toward the toys.

In another study Harris (1974) examined the frustration experienced as a function of how close to the goal the respondent was before being frustrated. An experimental collaborator was instructed to cut in front of others waiting for tickets to theaters, or entrance to restaurants. More anger was expressed if the cutting in front occurred when those waiting were almost ready to buy tickets or enter the restaurant. When the confederate cut into the second place and the next person was almost ready to purchase, the frustration experienced was more intense compared to when the confederate cut in front further down the line. One of us had a similar experience when being delayed by customs he sought to cut in front of the security lines in order to make the next flight. As it turned out the couple he cut in front of had also been delayed, and were in danger of not making their flight. It took much diplomacy to explain and apologize, and allow them to proceed while securing a place in the front.

The frustration-aggression hypothesis asserts that a person experiencing interference or blocking of goal related behavior reacts with the emotion of anger. Emotion of anger is the mediating variable between frustration and aggression (Geen, 1998). One reason that people resort to aggression is that it reduces negative emotions temporarily (Bushman, Baumeister, & Phillips, 2001). There are many sources of frustration in modern life. Family life is frustrating as people’s expectations rarely match reality. That assertion holds true for emotional satisfaction in families, but also for the economic frustrations derived from the struggle to survive. Many families fight to survive in competitive societies. The lack of meaningful social security in some countries is experienced as stressful,

and leaves many families angry (Strauss, & Gelles, 1980).

Frustrations related to the economy accumulate, and people may vent their anger on innocent targets (Catalano, Novaco, & McConnell, 1997). Some of the displaced targets are personal to the aggressor leading to child abuse or spousal violence. Some acts of aggression are more impersonal and targets people who are not known to the perpetrators. Hovland and Sears (1940) provided a dramatic example when they correlated the price of cotton in the south with the number of lynchings perpetrated on black people. Whenever the price of cotton dropped, the southern economy suffered and the anger was displaced toward totally innocent targets.

Job related frustrations have led to dramatic shootings at various locations in the U.S. in recent years. Many people work in jobs that are much less than satisfying, putting in time just to survive. In the world economy, many students graduate with higher skills, yet the society is unable to provide jobs where these skills can be utilized. Often workers experience pressure from managers to improve performance. Frustrations are produced by the discrepancies between the expectations of workers and the leadership of the economic unit. Together, job related frustrations are related to the anger felt by many people in our modern societies (Houston & Kelly, 1989). In the current era of global capitalism frustrations accumulate as many workers have lost their jobs to cheaper labor from elsewhere. Workers have historically fought back, and recognized the importance of international unions since capitalism knows no border, and is not motivated by patriotism. However, this struggle has become more difficult as unions have lost members, and poor workers from elsewhere are happy for any jobs even those that exploit their labor. In such times of economic crisis national leaders may seek to divert attention by waving the flag and focusing on external enemies.

6.1 Aversive events and frustration

Any aversive event has the capacity to elicit frustration and aggressive responses. Many events fall into this category including prolonged pain, humiliation, perceived insults, fatigue and hunger. Have you noted how easy anger is brought on when you are hungry? Depriving the body of food will bring anger and aggression in some form. Berkowitz & Troccoli (1990) showed that producing pain in a person for as little as six minutes produced aggressive responses. Anything, which the individual perceives as aversive, may trigger hostility in the

form of anger responses, or instrumental behavior seeking to change the situation.

6.2 The influence of heat

People are comfortable within specified ranges of temperatures. Hot temperatures are experienced as frustrating and cause violence (Rotton & Cohn, 2000). Attribution matters since the anger may again be displaced toward innocent targets. Feeling the discomfort of high temperatures, some people will call on well-established aggressive schemas and vent their anger on family or other interpersonal targets (Anderson, Deuser, & DeNeve, 1995).

Are our moods and feelings related to weather changes? We see retired people move south in search of more sun in the winter and more agreeable temperatures. Our language provides examples of beliefs in the relationship between heat and aggression. Anger produces a change in body temperatures that we refer to as being “steamed”, or being “hot under the collar”.

There is something about the discomfort of excessive heat and its effect on aggressive behaviors (Anderson, 1987, 1989). The evidence shows clearly that higher temperatures are correlated with higher violence rates. Examining the crime rates in American cities, Anderson noted that the number of days where temperatures exceeded 32 degrees Celsius was a strong predictor of violent crime. Other studies show that violent crime is more likely to occur during the hot and humid summer months. An ingenious study on heat and aggression looked at the number of times baseball pitchers intentionally hit batters as aggressive acts. As the weather gets hotter the batters are hit with increased frequency (Reifman, Larrick, & Fein, 1991).

Another study examined students who responded to a survey in a room where the thermostat was set at 32 degrees Celsius, compared to another group who completed the survey at normal room temperature. Those who responded in the heated room reported more irritability and aggressive feelings. Other studies have linked heat to retaliation proclivity (Rule et al, 1987).

6.3 Attribution and aggression

Why is heat related to aggression? One explanation is that heat is aversive and therefore frustrating and this leads to the emotion of anger and hostile behavior. Another explanation emerges from attribution theory. Perhaps we feel

physiologically aroused by the heat and look for the best explanation for the bodily changes. One available target for attribution in the above mentioned baseball study was the batter on whom the anger was displaced. Attributions also contribute to the victimization of innocents by lynch mobs. Though innocent, victims are dehumanized and attributed traits that threaten social values and are therefore deserving of the violence. Attribution processes are responsible for the dehumanization that often accompanies mob violence. To facilitate mob violence the victim is attributed subhuman traits as Hitler and his cronies did effectively with the Jews, communists, Gypsy's, and in general with all who opposed the state. However, we do not have to go that far back in history as current affairs show ample examples of the effect of dehumanization. Rwanda, Darfur, the former Yugoslavia all come to mind as arenas of violence justified by dehumanization. Recent research on "infrahumanization" instigated by Belgian social psychologists show that people are less prone to ascribe "higher" emotional qualities to out-groups than they are to in-groups, implying "they" are not as human as "us" (Leyens, Demoulin, Dovido, Fiske, Gaun, et al., 2003).

6.4 Retaliation

When we are attacked, other matters being equal, we will retaliate (Dengerink & Myers, 1977). Many studies on attack have used "shock" experiments to examine aggression in the laboratory. When the respondent perceives attacks as being intentional the result is retaliating behavior. Life teaches us in other ways that retaliation is a common human reaction to aggression. Retaliation is often used as a rationalization for going to war, or justifying attacks on others. Research (Dengerik & Myers, 1977) shows that aggression is frequently retaliatory, an "eye for an eye". Although cautioned by religion to turn the other cheek, most people are more motivated by rage or anger, and seek to give back in kind. Whether retaliation is culturally derived or emerges from basic biological needs to survive, attack brings counteraction where possible.

There are many social situations that discourage direct retaliation. Some attackers, for example, are too powerful, and have a great potential to counteract in return, which discourages retaliation. In other words, retaliation is limited by the power of the other party, and the nature of the relationship.

6.5 Crowding and aggression

Crowding is a psychological concept. It differs from physical density that refers to the number of people living together according to some standard measurement.

Crowding is the subjectively stressful feeling derived from having insufficient space. The same physical density that produces stress in Western countries, will not necessarily be experienced as crowding in Asia or other high physical density areas (Hall, 1966). Culture provides people with compensation for crowding through the use of elaborate norms of courtesy that reduce stress in the higher density areas. Regardless of these cultural differences, tolerance for density has limits and will eventually be experienced as stress.

The loss of control experienced in crowding produces aggressive reactions. Crime rates are much higher in inner city areas with higher population densities (Fleming, Baum, & Weiss, 1987; Kirmeyer, 1978). As biological beings there must be a balance in our space between privacy and interaction with others. When that balance is in doubt, the result is striking out with aggressive behavior or violent crime.

6.6 Economic wealth and frustration

Since we live in a material world perhaps an increase in wealth would reduce frustration and make us happy? Many people think that just an additional 10 to 20 percent in income would improve well-being and happiness (Strumpel, 1976). People in the Western world are raised with the idea that money buys happiness. Observe the jubilation of contestants on television when winning a prize; one would think money bought instant happiness! In the United States in and several other industrial countries, people have experienced growing but inequitable affluence over several decades. Yet the economic wealth is often accompanied by personal or family unhappiness as seen in our divorce statistics. (Knowles, 1977). Our society manifests visible inequalities between the wealthy and those struggling to survive. While poverty is not a great thing, who can say honestly that wealth equates to happiness?

Frustration is not the same as deprivation. Living in a competitive society, rich people are frustrated by those whose wealth is greater. Look at the phenomena of the continuously larger homes built for the wealthy all over the world. When two people live in a house with 20 bedrooms and 5 bathrooms, we know that the size of the home means something more than meeting the housing needs of the occupants. The size of homes reflects the status of the wealthy and is a form of conspicuous consumption. Once wealth becomes a focus in life, nothing is ever enough. But are those who live in the large mansions any happier or less frustrated than those at the lower end of the income distribution (Diener &

Seligman, 2004)?

People are constantly comparing upwards, so it is not absolute deprivation that matters, but the envy derived from those who have and display more wealth (Suls & Tesch, 1978). The feelings of relative deprivation cause frustration and anger (Wood, 1989). Minority groups feel relative deprivation as the media, travel, and simple observation makes the wealth of those who consume conspicuously more salient. Protests calling for social change emerge out of feelings that one's group is relatively deprived compared to others (Walker & Mann, 1987). When television came into use in poor homes and displayed the conspicuous wealth of the rich, crime rates increased dramatically (Hennigan, Del Rosario, Health, Cook, Wharton, & Calder, 1982). Television soaps and other popular programs are not recorded in the homes of average people, but typically those of the wealthy. As a result wealth becomes a standard for comparison, and when people are unable to live like the rich they feel relatively deprived and frustrated.

Global warming and associated problems are produced by the desire for conspicuous accumulation. For the survival of society it is time to adjust downward in standard of living. Consumption is not only conspicuous, but threatens the very survival of the planet. We need comparison levels of wealth that are sustainable over the long run. In other arenas people have learned to adjust downward, and still experience human contentment.

For example people with severe handicaps adapt to the changing circumstances of their lives and still feel life satisfaction (Chwalisz, Diener, & Gallagher, 1988; Schulz & Decker, 1985). When people realize that there are always situations worse than where they find themselves in life, they feel less depressed (Gibbons & Gerrard, 1989). Since relative deprivation exists in the world, we must learn to enhance downward. Unless you live in Darfur or places where AIDs is destroying individual or community life, you are not experiencing the worst frustration possible. Downward enhancement removes frustration for many, while many others look upward to relative deprivation for the motivation to cure social injustice.

6.7 Attribution of intent to harm: How we construe the situation

It is not stimuli that produce aggression, but how we think about the stimuli, and the intent we attribute to others. It is whether the behavior is construed as intentionally harmful that produces aggression (Worchel, 1974).

We have all experienced someone inadvertently frustrating our efforts. If the behavior is construed as not intentional, and the person apologizes, most of us will not take great affront. But let us examine another situation. An attack on a bartender who refused to serve drinks to an inebriated customer was in the news today. The customer took umbrage at the refusal of service, which he perceived as an insult, and attributed to the bartender. For the bar employee, her attribution about the customer's behavior was based on his violation of laws she was required to enforce as part of her employment. Perhaps she was also concerned about the well-being of the customer and the public when she refused service. The drunken customer attributed motives of insult to the bartender that resulted in a vicious attack. As is well known alcohol reduces a person's ability to construe the ramifications of behavior, and often contributes to the attribution of hostile intent. So the motives and the intentions attributed to the other person (in this case the bartender) determine whether a person is angered and retaliates (Reeder, Kumar, Hesson-McInnis, & Trafimov, 2002). In other words anger is more likely if the frustration is perceived as intentional, and not the consequence of some situational factor. If a car does not move when the traffic light turns green, people behind the car will begin to honk their horns. We believe the car is under the control of the driver, and if he does not move, it must be because of intent to stay put. When we believe behavior is under another person's internal control, we attribute responsibility for frustration to that person (Betancourt & Blair, 1992).

Most people do not retaliate if they are convinced that the provocation was not intentional (Kremer & Stephens, 1983). At times we are in situations where we do not know the intent. Once an irate car driver whom a friend of ours had inadvertently cut in front of, jumped out of his car to confront our friend aggressively. The truth was that the driver drove with such speed that our friend had not seen him, and the provocation was not intentional. This driver was not to be consoled by that fact, as he had already construed the provocation as intentional arrogance. So mitigating circumstances must be known before the incident, or it will have little effect. Johnson & Rule (1986) study showed that it mattered if an explanation was offered when a confederate treated students rudely. Some respondents were told the assistant was upset after receiving a low grade, others were offered no reason. Those participants offered this explanation did not attribute hostility to the confederate as the frustration of getting a low grade explained his behavior. Subsequently, the respondents that were offered an

explanation were less angered and aggressive at the confederate's rude behavior.

A car accident that is perceived as nonintentional will produce less aggression. However, if the accident is seen as a result of deliberate carelessness, or hostile intent, or otherwise unjustified, the attribution of intent contributes to aggressive behavior (Averill, 1973). Situations contribute to behavior as they are construed. The thwarting of goal realization may be perceived as intentional or nonintentional. It is the attribution that matters.

Furthermore, expectations matter in the construal of the situation. In one study (Kulik & Brown, 1979) students were hired to work on commission trying to motivate people to give money to a charity. Some participants were led to believe that contributions would be easy to obtain, and that the rate of positive responses would be high. Others were told to expect less success, and more difficulty in getting donations. The group with the high expectations was more aggressive when confronted with people who did not want to donate. They would speak harshly or slam down the phone more frequently than the solicitors whose expectations were low. So frustrations do not provoke aggression, but rather it is the anger that follows the construal of the situation. The situation must be construed in a way that anger and aggression is possible (Berkowitz, 1989; Gustafson, 1989).

People who want to avoid unpleasant reactions avoid provocations. If you are stopped for a traffic infraction, your response to the police officer is likely to be instrumental in order to avoid too large a fine. You could be hostile considering the potential fine, but that would not be smart. Most of us have automatic and intuitive construal of which reactions would be provocative, what behaviors would step over the line and cause an aggressive response. In one experiment (Baron, 1988), the participants were required to prepare an advertisement for a new product. The advertisement was subsequently criticized using either gentle or harsh feedback. When the criticism was gentle, with consideration for the feelings of the respondent, the response was muted. However, when the respondents were treated harshly (this advertisement is the worst I have ever seen) the respondents were far more likely to retaliate.

Some provocations cannot be avoided. The drunken customer to whom we referred in the beginning of this section (who by the way was an off duty police officer) could not be avoided; his attributions were clouded by intoxication. Could

the bartender have offered a more gentle rejection? Would the customer have been less angered if offered a cup of coffee on the house? Perhaps a gentle response would have worked and changed the attributions. On the other hand, maybe attempts at conciliation would have made no difference in the customer's drunken state. In sum, the attribution of intent is what matters in aggression.

6.8 Criticisms of the frustration-aggression hypothesis

Berkowitz (1993) showed that stimuli other than frustration contributed to aggression including pollution, crowding (see section 6.4.1), and pain (Rotton & Frey, 1985). Also, as noted some aggression is not based on anger, but is instrumental in reaching a valued goal. Olweus studied student behavior in Norwegian schools (1979; 1980) and found that bullies sought to dominate weaker opponents primarily in an effort to achieve status.

The assumption of the frustration-aggression hypothesis is that frustrations always lead to aggression. This position has been criticized in several ways. People who live in tyrannical dictatorships learn helplessness and resign themselves to their frustrations. The very poor and oppressed moreover feel helpless in construing another way of living. The concept of learned helplessness (Seligman, 1975) asserts that when animals and people cannot avoid aversive conditions they do not respond to frustration with aggression, but rather with passivity or depression. Like the dogs facing unavoidable shock in Seligman's experiment, the severely oppressed learn they have no control over the outcomes of their lives. Learned helplessness includes the belief that behavior will not change circumstances or frustrations. In other words, people respond to frustrations not only with aggression, but also with resignation.

Whether frustration leads to aggression depends on several factors including the emotion of anger. In turn people's anger depends on attributions of the other party's intent to provoke. Anger is associated with our perceptions of the perpetrators responsibility, and the feelings of being treated unjustly and therefore wanting revenge. Some aversive events contribute to the construal of anger (Berkowitz, 1989, Berkowitz & Troccoli, 1990).

In turn, anger is not the sole condition leading to aggression, as cognitive processes (and attribution is a cognitive process) also intervene. Perhaps you have found yourself in an unpleasant situation at work and felt angry. You feel a lack of appreciation for your efforts, the boss has provided no pay increases for

some time, and has attributed poor work performance to what you consider your best efforts. However, you are fearful of the consequences if you speak up that the boss may retaliate with anger and aggression. The anger you feel might be more safely displaced toward a convenient target. Safer targets less likely to retaliate include spouses or children. They in turn may displace their anger on the dog; the dog goes after the cat, and the cat after the mouse. Many frustrating events do not lead directly to aggression depending on the construal of the power of the other party to retaliate. These intervening variables all point to the importance of construal processes in mediating between frustration and aggression.

6.9 The revolution of rising expectations and the construal of thwarted expectations

Frustration is not the same as deprivation. People living in poverty are extremely deprived, but as we have seen may respond with depression or resignation and not with frustration. The riots in the United States in the 1960's however, were the consequence of rising expectations of a better life, and not absolute deprivation (Frank, 1978). The most serious events did not occur in the areas of greatest poverty, but in areas where the conditions were comparatively better. The cause of the riots was not absolute deprivation, but pervading feelings of maltreatment among the minorities. What mattered in these riots was the construal of injustice by the Black community that is received less than the deserved outcome in life. When riots occurred it was because there were no other acceptable attributions of responsibility for the deprivations felt by most members of the minority community. Living in the age of television, Black people understood that others lived better, and furthermore the Black population did not resign themselves to the unequal treatment. Levi (1989) also noted the role of relative deprivation in the resistance of concentration camp prisoners. The prisoners who were less deprived and who had the time and possibility of opposing the Nazi's, were leaders of the camp resistance. In one rebellion the camp tailors who made clothes for the guards, and were somewhat useful to the Nazi's and therefore privileged, provided the means of rebellion and escape.

7. Violence as consequences of aggression cues

We are bombarded every day with media violence, and aggression related stimuli are everywhere in western society. When aggression cued objects like guns are present in social interaction, does that increase the likelihood of violence? In

Europe and countries that practice gun control, aggression cues are a matter of less concern. In the United States, however, there are hundreds of millions of handguns present in homes, in gangs, as well as among criminals. A classical experiment (Berkowitz & Le Page, 1967) studied handguns as aggression cues. As part of the procedure a confederate angered student participants. In the experimental condition, a handgun was present and left conveniently in sight. In the control condition a neutral object, a badminton racket, was left lying around. After being angered, the participants were asked to participate in a study that involved the application of electric "shock" to other participants. The results showed that those who were angered in the presence of a gun applied more intense shock than participants in the neutral condition (Frodi, 1975; Turner & Leyens, 1992). This study verified the importance of the presence of guns as aggression cues.

Although the gun lobby in the United States has had success with it's slogan "guns don't kill, people do", these experiments show that guns can be the stimulus to violence, and handguns as aggression cues go a long way in explaining the high murder rate in the U.S. Where handguns are banned as they are in Europe, comparative results demonstrate lower rates of violence (Archer & Gartner, 1984). Guns become part of the schemas of children growing up in the U.S., along with a higher expectation of violence (Archer, 1994; Archer & McDaniel, 1995).

If aggression were elicited by aggression cues like handguns, a rational society would seek to limit the availability of these means of destruction. Jamaica in 1974 fought violent crime by enacting strict gun control as well as censoring violent gun scenes from television and movies robberies. As a consequence violent acts dropped by 25 percent, and nonfatal shootings by 37 percent. The presence of guns is a serious liability for American society with tens of thousands of murders each year, and an influential gun lobby that interprets the second amendment in the Constitution to include all guns. Some of the gun supporters would buy tanks or rockets for personal home defense if that were possible.

If black is associated with violence, black clothing can also be an aggression cue. At one point the (American) football team at the Oregon State University changed the colors of uniforms from orange to black. It did not improve their game, but the players became much more aggressive. In fact research shows that black clothing is associated with aggression (Frank & Gilovich, 1988). Teams who wore

black uniforms were consistently more aggressive in the National Football and National Hockey Leagues. In general anything associated with violence has the potential of providing aggression cues.

7.1 Drugs and alcohol intensify perceived insults.

The use of drugs and alcohol contributes to a large proportion of aggressive acts. Mind alternators reduce the inhibition of aggression that is coded in our biological inheritance, and also the inhibition we have learned from family and society. Sixty percent of all murders in the U.S. are committed while the offender is intoxicated. A high proportion of other violent behavior is also committed while under the influence including rape, child abuse, general assaults, and spousal violence (Lisak & Roth, 1988; Steele & Southwick, 1985).

Alcohol also increases sensitivity to perceived slights or insults that typically contribute to aggression (Taylor & Sears, 1988). We already saw that sensitivity manifested (see section 6.7) in the example of the attack on the bartender who refused to serve drinks to an inebriated consumer. The drunken aggressor attributed nonintentional infractions as a threat or as having hostile intent.

Sober people on the other hand are better able to evaluate the intent of any provocation. Since aggression is likely to bring retaliation, people not under the influence can better evaluate that reality. Is the temporary satisfaction that aggression accrues worth the broken bones, loss of life, arrest and prison that are likely consequences of violence? The drunken aggressor loses inhibitions and attends less to these life-altering consequences of aggression (Zeichner & Pihl, 1979).

Furthermore, alcohol also increases the effect of social pressure. Often violence is carried out in gangs where perpetrators commit acts of violence because “it seemed the thing to do’. Reports of groups of young men attacking totally innocent victims occur not infrequently in the media. Most recently U.S. media reported on teenage gangs attacking the homeless, maiming and in some cases killing these defenseless people.

7.2 Schemas for aggression

As for other salient aspects of life, people have constructed schemas (see also chapter 4) related to aggression. Aggression schemas are organized beliefs about when aggression is appropriate, and define the situations that are cues for

hostility. A child that grows up throwing temper tantrums may come to consider that behavior as appropriate. People who are sensitive to status concerns feel that small insults to the self-concept are sufficient justification for retaliation. We recall the "culture of honor" previously described, where seemingly small provocation can result in severe retaliatory responses. Once we develop schemas for aggression they tend to be self-sustaining and we act in ways that maintain justifications (Huesmann, 1998; Huesmann & Guerra, 1997).

Aggression schemas work together with attributions of intent (Zelli, Dodge, Lochman, & Laird, 1999). Children who have stable aggression schemas possess selective attributions that the intent of others is hostile. Culture plays a role for the aggression schemas or the combination of aggression schemas and attributions of intend (Bond, 2004). Middle-east societies dictate revenge as necessary behavior when threatened or in retaliation. The mutually assured destruction in the civil war between Shia and Sunni Muslim sects is largely a consequence of a culture of revenge, where hostility is attributed to all acts of the other side, and the term innocent has lost it's meaning.

Because of schemas aggression tends to be stable across human development (Olweus, 1979). Schemas become stable attitudes when aggression becomes acceptable as a solution for a variety of problems (Larsen, 1971). As a stable personality trait aggression can predict a variety of behaviors related to human adjustment. Aggression predicts dropout rates from school and criminal behavior (Hudley & Graham, 1992). Chronically aggressive children believe that others have hostile intent. This attributional bias affects the construal of all interactions. An attributional bias that anticipates hostility may in fact cause retaliatory responses (Graham, Hudley, & Williams, 1992). Aggressive minority youth have biased attributions, feel more anger, and are more likely to retaliate compared to nonaggresive minority youth. These attributions occur without the need for provocation or anger and are based on stable schemas and attitudes that contribute to ongoing aggression.

7.3 Schemas and school shootings

We began the present chapter pointing to school violence as a serious problem in the U.S., and in other countries. School shootings and resulting fatalities suggest that this is a problem that society cannot afford to overlook. In the U.S. hundreds of thousands of youth are affected by violence each year; many students carry guns to school for protection or for aggressive purposes. Gangs that inculcate

violence as an acceptable norm have enrolled many hundreds of thousands of young people in the U.S. (Egley & Major, 2004). Although not as severe, violent youth culture is also present in Europe and other parts of the world.

The school system has a significant effect on violence among young people. Bullies who are allowed to dominate and isolate their victims contribute to school shootings. Other important contributors include the family context, the presence or absence of aggression in the home, being members of gangs, the abuse the child has suffered in the past, and the use of alcohol and drugs in the social context. Access to lethal weapons is possible nearly everywhere in the U.S., but thankfully less so in other countries. Some neurological disorders may also contribute to violence, including hyperactivity (Sleek, 1998). School shootings are unnerving to parents and society since they seem to be unpredictable. In the aftermath, other students however recognize bullying as a factor, and anger of the shooters at being excluded. Most acts have occurred in rural areas, perhaps because urban areas are more acceptant of kids who are different (Newman, 2004).

The reduction of violence in schools requires the development of novel ideas that combine efforts of inclusion of all children and cooperation in the classroom. The jig saw puzzle classroom previously discussed in chapter 9 is an effort in that direction (Aronson & Gonzales, 1988). Working together in small groups where each student is dependent on others for learning has proven useful in integrating students and improving learning. Aggression in schools remains a serious problem that needs more scholarly attention (Baron & Richardson, 1994).

8. How do we reduce aggression in society?

Social psychologists have, through research, sought to understand how to reduce violence using a variety of strategies. Some strategies for violence prevention have borrowed from relevant theories including learning theories. Other approaches have emerged from an understanding that what causes aggression may also contribute to prevention. Some approaches assert that nonviolence will only become real when we can feel empathy, and learn to communicate, to negotiate and to compromise.

8.1 Punishment and social learning

Is punishment the solution to aggression in schools and society? Criminal law is based on the utility of both punishment and reform. In families parents seek to

effect a change in a child by punishing the aggressive behavior. Typical aggression training involves a parent spanking the child for hitting another child. What does the child learn from that? Remember the parent is also a model for imitation, as we know from social learning theory. Likewise society is a model when it collectively executes people and thereby justifies the very behavior for which the criminal is put to death. Research endorses the effectiveness of social learning modeling. Children of parents employing physical punishment are more accepting of violence (Vissing, Straus, Gelles, & Harrop, 1991). So since punishment models the behavior we are trying to prevent it might not be the solution to aggression for children.

While severe punishment has little utility in changing the child's aggressive behavior, milder forms of child training may make violence less appealing (Aronson & Carlsmith, 1963; Freedman, 1965). Extensive studies in Norway (Olweus, 1991; 1995; 1997) showed the usefulness of mild punishment combined with educational efforts in changing bullying at Norwegian schools. Bullying was considered an important issue by the Norwegian government, and it was believed that parents had little information on the frequency of intimidation and consequences for their children and others in the school system. Successful change occurred after community meetings explaining the issue. Classes discussed ways of how to overcome bullying, and how to reach lonely or excluded kids. Teachers and administrators worked together to stop intimidation. If bullying still occurred, counselors stopped it by means of mild punishment, discussion with the affected parents, and therapy for the bully (Olweus, 1991).

But can punishment prevent adult crime? Some laboratory experiments suggest that violence can be reduced if the punishment is swift and certain to follow aggression (Bower & Hilgard, 1981). However, in most Western societies punishments are neither swift nor certain, and follow lengthy court appeals. Even in countries where punishment is swift and certain, violence executed by the state still advertises the social learning model effect that aggression is approved as long as you wear the white hat. For instance some states justify capital punishment by advocating that it prevents murder and extreme violence. However, countries that abolished capital punishment have no more violent crime than those who practice it. In the U.S. those states that abolished capital punishment did not experience a rise in murders (Archer & Gartner, 1984; Peterson & Bailey, 1988). Neither did they witness a reduction in murders after

the Supreme Court permitted the reinstitution of capital punishment. It would appear that capital punishment has no social utility. In fact, the U.S. with 3,000 men and women on death row, have higher murder rates than comparative Western countries like France or England.

8.2 Will victim reactions to pain reduce violence?

Aggressive responses are partly a biological adaptation that once was useful in early human history for survival purposes. Dogs often reduce aggression by displaying surrender in baring their throat to another more dominant dog. Are humans likely to respond in a similar way when victims of violence display symptoms of pain? If the victim is hurting will the attacker cease the aggression and show empathy for the suffering? Baron (1971a, 1971b, 1974) found evidence that pain display reduces aggression. When respondents in his studies were shown a pain meter, which correlated with the amount of electrical "shock" administered, the pain cue reduced the aggression. Perceived pain in the victim reduced shock in all cases except when the participant was extremely angry when the opposite actually occurred. Unfortunately, as we learn from life anger often inhibits empathetic processes.

It is obviously easier to kill and maim at a distance as it reduces human responsibility by interfering with empathetic processes. A friend who flew B-52's during the Vietnam War described a typical mission as a day in the office. The crew would cook a pie in the cockpit at 30,000 ft or more while unleashing the bombs. The pilots never saw the suffering on the ground unless they became prisoners. The diffusion of responsibility has been taken a step further by the military since that time in the use of robots and computer directed weapons of mass destruction. The physical and psychological distance created between the aggressive act and the victims is so great that empathetic processes are rarely aroused. Also interfering with empathy is the military culture that mandates killing and the dehumanization of the victims as unworthy of sympathy.

8.3 Changing schemas and attributions

Since chronic aggression emerges partially from well-developed schemas and faulty attribution, perhaps aggression can be reduced if we can change thinking. Those who have organized and stable schemas for aggression perceive a variety of stimuli as threatening or insulting and therefore subject to retaliation. We see well developed aggression schemas in youth gangs where sensitivity to insults are particularly high, comparable to those in so-called cultures of honor. Can we

change these attributions so fewer acts are considered insulting or threatening? That approach would require the intervention of society since aggressive behavior is often motivated by economic deprivation or the need for status in deprived communities.

Graham, Hudley, & Williams (1992) sought to change biased attributions in chronically aggressive children. The program was based on a 12-session intervention program designed to train hostile Afro-American boys to infer nonhostile intent after provocative interactions with peers. Among various subjects the boys were taught the meaning of intent, and what constitutes cues for hostile versus nonhostile intentions. If someone bumped into a boy how was that to be interpreted? Was it inadvertent and accidental or was it intended as a hostile act that required retaliation? Learning to discriminate between these events and attribute nonhostile intentions to some provocations led to a reduction of aggressive attributions in the children's perceptions. After the training program was completed, the children were less likely to endorse aggressive behavior. An independent source, the classroom teacher, also considered the boys less aggressive after the intervention.

Aggressive behavior is a complex product of many forces. Would intervention work with youth gangs? If there is a possibility it should be tried of course. Youth gang hostility is however a product of many forces that must be changed too. Among these negative forces are lack of parental guidance, insufficient job opportunities to help youth to perceive positive outcomes in the future, the presence of historical enmity between races and ethnic groups, and the presence of aggressive models that are admired in the gang culture.

8.4 Can distractions reduce anger?

Some people ruminate about perceived insults and when they do anger increases and motivates aggression. Can the opposite occur? Can we distract ourselves and get some distance between us and the perceived insult, and would that reduce aggression? We are told to count to ten before responding with anger in some situations. That advice is given to prevent us from reacting with rage while in an anger mode. Other distractions include walking away from the source of frustration. Last night at a basketball game a player incurred an unjustified foul from the referee. The audience was in agreement with the player who obviously felt very provoked. However, rather than responding to his anger the player walked away toward the team bench while he got a hold on his feelings. The

walking away distracted him sufficiently and the play continued. Studies have shown that ruminating on insults increases aggression, and distraction sometimes, but not always, reduces aggressive behavior (Bushman, 2002; Rusting & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998).

8.5 Catharsis: Is it useful?

The idea of catharsis came from the psychoanalytic theories of Freud (1930). Freud subscribed to the idea that if aggressive behavior was not sublimated it would increase over time. Some have likened Freud's model to a hydraulic pump where the accumulated hostility must find release in socially sanctioned ways or otherwise be released in violent acts. If aggressive impulses are not released bottled up feelings may cause mental disturbance or illness. When feelings of aggression are repressed long enough, illness may be the outcome (Pennebaker, 1990; Pennebaker & Francis, 1996).

Do these findings imply that aggression is healthy? One problem in venting anger is that doing so does not take into account the need to change the situation that provoked the anger. For example, being in an abusive relationship causes anger to build up over time in the victim. Going to the Gym or finding distractions might sublimate and dissipate some of that anger. However, efforts at catharsis will not solve the problem of abuse that caused the anger in the first place.

Further, we have evidence that expressing anger directly does not have any cathartic effects (Patterson, 1974). If aggressive behavior had cathartic effects, one would expect that the longer a player engages in competitive and aggressive sports the lower the level of hostility. In fact, the reverse occurred in this study, as the players became more hostile the longer the season. The cathartic concept also implies that watching violence may release pent-up aggression and therefore reduce subsequent hostility. One researcher studied a violent hockey game and drew the opposite conclusion (Russell, 1983). As the game progressed, the spectators became increasingly violent, and the state of anger arousal did not return to pre-game levels until several hours passed. Watching aggressive games actually increased feelings of aggression (Arms, Russell, & Sandilands, 1979; Branscombe & Wann, 1992).

If we direct aggression toward the source of our anger does that produce a cathartic response? Apparently not as this tend to increase future acts of violence (Geen, 1998). In one study (Geen, Stonner, & Shope, 1975) participants who were

angered by a confederate and subsequently given the opportunity shocked the confederate at high levels. After administering the shock in this part of the experiment did a cathartic reaction occur? The answer is “no”, the respondent shocked at even higher levels later in the study. Typically these results are consistent with that experienced by most people in real life. An unresolved verbal confrontation is typically followed by more aggression. The cathartic effect must be considered largely mythological.

8.6 Confrontation and apology

If catharsis does not work, should we just bottle everything up? Perhaps there are cases in which we must suppress feelings of anger in the interest of the family or social harmony. However, in the long run this has negative effects on mental health (Pennebaker, 1990). Some research supports the importance of confronting the frustrating party in a nonviolent manner, to share the effect of the frustration and its consequences. Telling the other party in precise details what caused the anger and what mutual steps can be taken so the frustration does not reoccur or how it can be ameliorated, may reduce anger.

The confrontation procedure avoids direct aggression, and therefore does not bring denigration and other rationalizations into the picture. Think what it would mean to relationships if people could calmly discuss differences and frustrations while maintaining the dignity of the opponent or partner? The aim should be exchanging information that might encourage ways of reducing frustration, and improve relationships (Aronson, 1999). If it is not possible to talk directly to the person, it still might help to vent feelings to an empathetic other. Revealing emotions to others helps to reduce stress and is therefore supportive of mental health (Pennebaker, 1990). In the process of venting feelings, the person also often discovers insights into the issue, and an awareness of the contributions he has made himself to the frustrating behaviors.

On the other hand, if you find yourself contributing to the frustration can you do anything to improve the situation? One response to that question is obvious, you might even have practiced it, apologize! Most parties in conflict would take an apology seriously, and if sincerely meant it may disarm the other party and prevent hostility. Nations are often more immature than individuals, and sensitive nations often demand apologies over real or imagined insults. When the frustrating party takes full responsibility, the apologies reduce frustration and anger (Baron, 1988, 1990; Ohbuchi & Sato, 1994).

8.7 Social learning models of nonviolence

We have noted the intensity and prevalence of violent modeling in the media, and its affect on aggression. Every week a new movie makes its appearance and the primary action content is violence. It has been a cause of wonderment why the movie industry cannot find more models of nonviolence and produce excellent movies with themes like “Gandhi” or a current movie “Amazing Grace”. The former depicts the example of the great Indian leader and his nonviolent struggle against British colonialism, the latter the nonviolent struggle of the abolitionists of Great Britain to end the slavery trade.

These movies and others like them inspire and encourage people to participate in the human liberation project. Such noble aspirations are however counteracted by the many more performances in the movies or television of empty distraction or gratuitous violence. Yet, nonviolence is effective. We have only to remember the historical examples of nonviolent struggles that changed countries (e.g. India) or the internal life of nations (e.g. United States). In fact research shows that when children are exposed to nonviolent models they respond in more cautious ways to provocation (Baron, 1972; Vidysagar & Mishra, 1993). Nonviolence has demonstrated its utility in a variety of circumstances and could reduce violence in relationships both between individuals and nations.

8.8 Taking the position of the other side: learning empathy

As we have seen an important element in cruelty is the dehumanization of the victim. Denigration of the other party occurs for example by name calling, either between individuals, between racial or ethnic groups in society, or between nations. Perhaps the fact that the need to denigrate the victim is important to the aggressor, might leave room for a solution. Studies in social psychology on the administration of “shock” to victims show that it is difficult to inflict pain on strangers unless they are denigrated in some way (Feshbach & Feshbach, 1969; Feshbach, 1978). If we truly “felt” the consequences of aggression we would have less desire to participate in the aggressive act (we must exclude from this discussion psychopaths and warlords). Aggression is reduced when people develop empathy as demonstrated in several studies (Richardson, Hammock, Smith, & Gardner, 1994; Ohbuchi, Ohno, & Mukai, 1993). The question is how to create empathy for victims of violence. Taking the side of the opposing party takes not only courage, but also intellectual skills. Students who posses greater empathetic skills also display higher academic achievements (Feshback, 1997).

8.9 Developing communication skills

Finally, to solve conflict between individuals, groups or nations we must develop some method other than revenge or aggression. History has shown that this merely increases retaliatory violence. We all become angry, that is a natural human response. What matters is how we express our feelings. We could reduce the overall violence if people had better communication skills. How can we communicate anger in a way that does not invite retaliation?

In many conflicts there is the possibility to negotiate and reach a consensus. Individuals with poor communication skills more often respond to provocations in violent ways (Toch, 1980). Formal training in communication could potentially benefit the solution of many conflicts. In one study students were frustrated, but those who had the benefit of communication training responded constructively to frustration and showed less aggressive behavior (Davitz, 1952). The educational system is now more aware of the benefits of training pupils in nonviolence (Eargle, Guerra, & Tolan, 1994). It takes communication skills learned by formal training to reduce aggression in many arenas of life (Studer, 1996).

Summary

Violence in the world is as old as the story of Cain and Abel. Today we are more aware of violence all over the world due to the media and the Internet. Aggression is everywhere, between strangers, in families, and between ethnic groups and nations. The dimension of potential aggression can be measured in the availability of tens of thousands of nuclear weapons that can be activated in minutes. Those who read history know that all weapons that have been developed have also been used and the nuclear age may still produce the day of total annihilation. History tells of endless wars and campaigns of extermination. The United States has a violent history for reasons of insufficient integration, socio-economic inequalities, and cultural attachments to firearms.

Research has defined two types of aggression. Hostile Aggression is mediated by anger and aims at causing injury or pain. Most murders are anger based, but the mafia sometimes commits cold calculated killings. The second type is called Instrumental Aggression and its purpose is to remove obstacles like uncooperative crime partners. Since all killing may include both components, they are difficult to separate. The burning of witches during the dark ages had the instrumental purpose of saving their devilishly afflicted souls. For torture to occur, moreover it is necessary to dehumanize the victim. It is a form of

instrumental aggression used to obtain confessions or humiliate the victims. Conformity to social pressure or obedience to authority causes torture to appear normal to the perpetrators.

Research reveals several theoretical approaches aimed at understanding aggression. The biological approach asserts that aggression is part of our genetic inheritance. For Freud, hostility was an expression of the Thanatos or death instincts. Other writers see aggression as a function of a broader biological inheritance that we share with the natural world. From this perspective aggression has a survival function. The presence of biological components related to aggression supports the genetic viewpoint. These components include hormones, neurotransmitters, the presence of the trait aggression in certain families that is stable across life spans, and the fact that animals can be bred for aggression.

Most social psychologists focus on learned aggression. Reinforcement theory suggests that people learn aggressive behavior by being rewarded. Bullies in school are rewarded for their intimidation by an increased status among fellow students. Reinforcement produces lasting aggressive behaviors. Observational learning, on the other hand, points to the effect of powerful models that children and adults learn to imitate. The social learning of hostility is produced by imitation of abusive parents, and by the many aggressive models in television, movies, the Internet, and in videogames. Social psychological research points to the numbing effect of repeated exposure to violence as a primary cause for the loss of empathy for victims and the willingness to accept violence.

The average child watches numerous killings on television while still in elementary school. Studies have shown a high correlation between this kind of exposure and violent or criminal behavior. Aggressive television diets at age eight may have profound lifelong consequences. Wherever violent television programming was introduced it was followed by increased violence in society. The relationship between media violence and aggression has also been supported by experimental studies. Media violence produces emotional arousal, disinhibition, and a numbing of ethics related to aggressive behavior. The evidence also supports the presence of social learning of aggression for video games and violent pornography. As pornography has spread throughout the Western world violence against women has increased. Rapists and serial killers have used pornography as a rationalization for their crimes. The porn industry has contributed to the sexual

beliefs that women really mean yes when they say no, and that they enjoy being abused. Overall violent pornography makes violence more acceptable; encourages less sympathy for victims, and less support for sexual equality.

The culture we live in matters to the prevalence of human aggression. Some societies are more violent than others and the United States is among the most violent countries in the world. Is violence simply controlled by national character or preference? Research points to situational variables including high-income inequality, cultural sensitivity to threat, lack of integration, and history as they all contribute to higher levels of aggression.

In addition, the aggression schemas derived from herding cultures affect the behavior of today. It is believed that the sensitivity to insults derives from herding cultures where livelihood could be destroyed in an instant by enemy raids. Any perceived threat therefore required decisive and determined responses. Violence for example is greater in the southern part of the United States than in other regions. Southern whites are more likely to embrace violence in response to perceived threat or insult. Southern politeness recognizes the honor of others, but also make insults more salient. Rates for murders based on arguments are much higher in the Southern states compared to other locations in the country. Violence in the south endorses the protection of the self, but not indiscriminately.

The culture of a particular social group can also be conducive to violence. Mobs inculcate norms of violence. Mobs can generate violence because of deindividuation. A participant in mob activity carries less personal responsibility for violence due to anonymity, diffusion of responsibility among many, and the polarization effect common to groups. Risk taking derived from group decisions contributes to wars, lynching, and other aggressive conduct. Group polarization is expressed in increasing hostile behavior.

Gender is related to aggression. Males are more aggressive in all cultures where the issue has been studied. Nearly all reported violence associated with gangs or criminal behavior are committed by males. Male aggression is most likely an evolutionary adaptation used for survival but now threatens existence on the planet. Evolutionary psychologists believe that male protection of the gene pool is responsible for a variety of violent behavior, especially against women. Women on the other hand express aggression in relationships through gossip or exclusion of targeted persons.

Genetic relationships are what matters in treatment of in-laws after divorce or in the neglect of stepchildren. Research points furthermore to a higher level of parental maltreatment of children when they are not genetically related. The murder of women by men is also related to protection of the gene pool. Evolutionary psychologists argue that perceived infidelity of women threatens the survival of the genes and research shows that domestic murders are more likely in situations where women are perceived to have more sexual freedom. Contributing to these statistics is the male culture of honor. Men kill each other frequently after apparent small arguments. The disagreements however are not trivial since they involve prestige and therefore access to women.

Research guided by the frustration-aggression hypothesis has made significant contributions to the understanding of aggressive behavior. Many sources of frustration can be identified in family life and in other parts of our modern societies. Anger is the intervening variable between frustration and aggression, and research shows that it can often be displaced toward innocent targets. Aversive events are frustrating and elicit anger-based aggression. Examples of aversive events are pain, humiliations, insults and heat. Heat is as aversive stimulus related to violence as is demonstrated by the rising crime rates during hot months.

Attributing subhuman traits to the targeted person helps justify aggression. Being attacked will also nearly always bring retaliation, the need for which is emphasized in rationales for warfare. Crowding moreover is an aversive psychological condition that differs from the mere measures of physical density. Crowding is experienced as stressful and is associated with violence and higher crime rates.

Being frustrated economically is also thought to bring aggressive responses. However, it is important not to confuse frustration for deprivation. It is not absolute deprivation that is frustrating, but the feeling of injustice that comes from relative frustration. When we compare ourselves to others, as in the case of minority groups comparing their fate in life to the majority, we may experience relative deprivation. So what brings human contentment is not conspicuous consumption. The survival of the world requires us to move downward in material consumption. Nevertheless the construal of thwarted expectations, the relative frustration we experience, contribute to individual’s frustration.

Critics of the frustration-aggression hypothesis have noted that other stimuli may cause aggression as well. Some aggression is not even based on anger, like the instrumental aggression as the status needs of school bullies showed. Further, not all anger producing frustration leads to aggression. The severely oppressed often react to hopelessness with learned helplessness and resignation.

Violence may also be caused by aggression cues like handguns or (in some cultures) dark clothing. Where handguns are not permitted as in European countries, murder rates are significantly lower compared to the United States. Other aggression cues are drugs and alcohol. Drugs and alcohol contribute to violence as statistics show that the majority of murders occur under the influence. Using drugs or alcohol disinhibits aggressive responses, and the user is also more sensitive to insults. Drunken people are incapable of correctly attributing intent to insult, and react emotionally to minimal slights. Alcohol also increases the social pressure in gangs' intent on hurting others.

Schemas that define when aggression is appropriate behavior, are sensitive to aggression cues and hence facilitate aggression. Schemas work together with attributions in deciding whether the intent of the other party is hostile or not. Aggression schemas tend to be stable over the life span of people who are chronically aggressive. School shootings for example occur when schemas define an inhospitable school environment of dominant bullies. Family issues, child abuse, access to lethal weapons also all contribute to school violence.

What can be done to reduce violence in the world? Does punishing the aggressor work? It must be kept in mind that when a parent physically punishes a child, he/she also becomes a model for the aggressive behavior the parent is trying to inhibit. Children that are severely punished become more acceptant of violence and in turn may become abusive parents. Less severe punishment combined with counseling and community involvement has shown promise in reducing violence. Swift punishment may stop adult aggression, but the legal processes in Western countries make that outcome unlikely. The evidence shows that countries that have abolished capital punishment have no higher rates of murder and violence than those that retain the ultimate punishment.

A second way to reduce violence is the utility of empathetic processes. Research has shown that becoming aware of the pain inflicted on a subject reduces aggression. The problem with modern warfare is that aggression using long

distance technology inhibits empathy because of the large physical and psychological distances produced.

A third option is changing schemas? Work with chronically aggressive children supports the utility of intervention programs designed to change faulty attributions.

Fourthly, we can distract ourselves and thereby get a hold of our emotions in the face of frustration and hence prevent aggression. Sometimes we just need to put some distance between the frustration and response by counting to ten before responding to insults. Catharsis has not proven successful. Although it is unhealthy to repress feelings, expressing anger directly actually increases aggression as can be observed in violent hockey games. Further, sublimating aggression does not get at the cause that produced frustration in the first place.

Fifthly, we can confront the frustration in a nonviolent way and share the effect of the frustration with the other party. The effort should aim at encouraging mutual steps to reduce anger. By using nonviolent approaches, the need to denigrate the other party that fuels ongoing hostility is removed. Sincere apologies take the string out of the frustration. We need more positive social learning models of nonviolence in the media to counteract the great imbalance that favors aggression and hostility.

Finally, learning to take the other side by developing empathetic skills could reduce aggression. Along with empathy, formal communication skills may help correctly identify intent. We may also learn to communicate anger that does not invite retaliation, and improve skills of negotiation and compromise.

Being Human. Chapter 11: Altruism And Prosocial Behavior



In 1964 a shocking incident occurred in New York City that caused distress and concern among social psychologists. A young woman, Kitty Genovese, was walking to her home when a stalker attacked her. What was especially distressing was that she was stabbed repeatedly over a 35-minute time span while crying out for help. It was not as if no one heard her cries. According to several news reports in the days that followed she died while 38 of her neighbors saw the attack and did nothing. They watched the attack unfold from windows above the street and the only intervention occurred when someone yelled, "leave that girl alone", at which point the attacker left temporarily. However, after a short interval the attacker returned and stabbed her 8 more times, sexually assaulted her, and left her for dead. When finally police were called, there was nothing that could be done as Kitty had died.

When the neighbors were later interviewed and asked why they did not intervene, some indicated that they felt no personal responsibility to help, whereas others misconstrued the situation as one that did not require intervention. Although recent research indicates that the news reports had not been quite correct about every detail of this incidence (Manning, Levine & Collins, 2007), more importantly social psychologists were motivated by the news stories about this crime to try to understand what caused such indifference to suffering. In a more positive sense it also led to the desire to know why on the other hand some bystanders in other situations do display concern and intervene in order to help (Darley & Latane, 1968). We will come back to this research later in this chapter.

When September 11, 2001 came to New York, we saw this different side of the human nature, a desire to help and intervene. That day close to 3,000 people died in a massive attack on the World Trade Center. However, there were also hundreds of people who died trying to help these victims and in the process sacrificed their own lives (Lee, 2001). Most of the people who displayed extraordinary courage and selfless behavior on that day were ordinary people just like those who decided not to help Kitty Genovese. The helpers were average human beings who found themselves faced with an extraordinary situation that demanded their attention. Most of the workers in the building did the natural

thing and fled to safety. However, there were some who stayed behind and helped the physically handicapped, there were those workers who saw to it that others were led to safety first, and there were hundreds of firefighters who lost their lives trying to save others (Stewart, 2002).

In both of these incidents the possibility of behaving in altruistic and helping ways presented itself. Why did those who watched Kitty Genovese die not help? Why did altruistic heroes arise out of the catastrophe at the World Trade Center? These and other issues dealing with altruistic and prosocial behavior will be addressed in this chapter. Human history shows the selfish and dark side of humanity, but also records people who are willing to sacrifice even their lives to help those in need. For social psychologists these anecdotal examples create questions as to whether willingness to help has a basic genetic component, or whether it is a consequence of learning. Is there such a thing as a pure altruistic motive in helping people or are all such behaviors at least partly motivated by self-interests?

1. What is altruistic and prosocial behavior?

Altruistic behavior occurs when we perform a voluntary act to help someone, and there is no expectation of any reward. The motives of the helper are what matters in any definition of prosocial or altruistic behavior. A major criterion of altruistic behavior is that the same helping behavior is elicited whether performed anonymously or in the public eye. Altruistic motives are inferred from behavior and are not motivated by the desire for medals or other public recognition (Schroeder, Penner, Dovido, & Piliavin, 1995).

On the other hand prosocial behavior is more broadly defined than altruism since it includes all helping behavior regardless of motives. If rich corporations donate money to support AIDS research they are performing a prosocial act, even if the motives include the desire to achieve public recognition as a socially responsible entity. So prosocial behaviors define the whole range of beneficial acts, from those motivated entirely by self-interest to those that are selfless acts of sacrifice (Batson, 1998). Societies offer many forms of recognition for prosocial behavior ranging from community recognition as “young leader of the year” to national honors bestowed by the government. In most societies prosocial behavior is easily identified and related to being considered a “good” person (McGuire, 1994). Many people are willing to help others with low cost behavior like providing telephone change after the recipient reported his wallet stolen (Berkowitz, 1972);

or are willing to mail back a wallet that was “lost” by the researchers (Hornstein, Fisch, & Holmes, 1968). Life provides many opportunities to be helpful. The scout organization promotes “doing a good deed “ every day, and awards merit badges and rank for prosocial behavior. The military thrives on social recognition in the form of rank, and values the symbols of prosocial behavior such as medals for various categories of bravery.

At the end of the day what matters are the intentions of the actor, whether selfless or motivated by some form of self-interest. Altruistic behavior is defined by selfless motivation. When there are some egoistic motives, however remote in consciousness, we are describing prosocial behaviors. For the sake of a better society we should encourage prosocial behaviors, and also admire those people who act with complete selflessness.

2. The motivation to help

Several theories have been developed in social psychology to explain why people help others. Social exchange theory argues that apparent unselfish behavior is really a form of disguised self-help. Evolutionary psychology asserts that altruism emerged out of our ancestral past because such behavior was useful to the survival of individuals and the species. Finally, some social psychologists believe that there are pure motives for altruism as an expression of empathy with the suffering of others.

2.1 Social exchange theory: We help when rewards are greater than costs

Some social psychologists have relied on well-tried theories to explain altruistic behavior. Social exchange theory (see also chapter 3) hypothesizes that people help after weighing benefits and costs of the behavior. In deciding on whether to help or not, we employ in our psychological economy what might be called a minimax strategy. In other words we seek to maximize our rewards at the least cost. The weighing of outcomes is not necessarily done in a conscious way, but subconsciously we weigh the costs versus the benefits from any behavior (Homans, 1961; Lawler & Thye, 1999). In fact, helping behavior can be rewarding as well as costly in several ways. If we help someone perhaps they will help you in the future. A friend confided that she looked after old friends because “perhaps someone would do that for me when I get old”. Also, many people feel disturbed when observing suffering, so helping may be motivated by the desire to relieve distress as well as the wish to help the other person (Dovido, Piliavin, Gaertner, Schroeder, & Clark, 1991; Eisenberg & Fabes, 1991). Keep in mind that not all

rewards for prosocial behavior are external. At times we also feel better about ourselves when we help.

So social exchange theory argues that we help in order to gain some benefit. Are purely unselfish motives at play when rich people give away great amounts of money to ameliorate suffering? Perhaps, but at some level the donor may also be aware of the social approval that follows such acts. Prosocial behavior is supported by socialized norms in most if not all societies. Human motives are complex, and any behavior including prosocial behavior is the outcome of such complexity. Of course prosocial behavior should be lauded regardless of motives since helping is voluntary. Rich people could have chosen some other way to use their money (Dovido et. al. 1991).

Still intuitively many people feel dissatisfied with explanation of behavior as a function of market place ideology. This seems a too cynical explanation for many acts of bravery and other forms of unselfish behavior. As we shall see altruistic behavior is more complex, and some of us believe that people also respond with pure motives. Nevertheless, social approval may partly predict the willingness to intervene to help. In some research when approval followed helping (reinforcement), prosocial behavior increased (Staub, 1978).

2.2 Improving image and other rewards

As suggested above helping others is highly valued behavior in most societies, and altruistic behaviors may be motivated by a desire for social recognition. Captains of industry with questionable reputations may seek to improve their image by volunteering or giving money to charities (Nowak, Page, & Sigmund, 2000). When we help others society takes notes, and the helper may be a candidate for titles and other forms of social recognition. Do some of us help because we like the attention it brings, and are attracted to having a positive image in our community? When Bill Gates gave away 500 billion dollars to a variety of worthwhile causes was that pure altruism? The establishment of his foundation did not occur anonymously, it bears his name, nor did the contributions of other high profile givers. Perhaps these powerful people enjoy being able to transform the life of people and nations, or perhaps they seek to store up credit for the life that follows earthly existence. On the other hand since we have no direct evidence of motivation, these unselfish gifts may have been donated without regard to any social consequences.

Altruistic behavior can be a means of improving one's standing in the community, as it tends to be valued behavior in all cultures (Campbell, 1975). If the motive is to obtain social rewards that too may have an evolutionary advantage. People who are praised for their unselfish behavior often get rewards in terms of influence, higher pay, election to office, and improvement of their image. These advantages give greater possibilities also for their children and other kin. In de U.S., for example, giving a large donation to a university may assist in college applications for descendents of the generous donor. Improvement of image comes from having buildings or stadiums named after the beneficent donator. There are many ways in which social rewards assist natural selection by offering benefits directly to the donor and his offspring.

A number of studies have shown that children are more willing to help if they are rewarded gold stars, or given bubble gum to reinforce helping behavior (Fischer, 1963). Praise is also an effective vehicle to promote generosity in children (Mills & Grusec, 1989). Praise that aims at reinforcing the child's self-conception is very effective in promoting helping behavior. Directing praise to the child's personality "you are helpful, because that is really the nice person you are", is more effective than just general praise that helping "is a good thing to do for others". Dispositional praise helps the child develop a self-concept that includes altruistic behavior, and therefore is more likely to sustain helping behavior in the future.

Children of course also learn by modeling the behavior of others. In one study children watched a popular television show that either depicted helping behavior, or a neutral situation. Children who watched the prosocial modeling were more likely to help even giving up some personal benefits, compared to those children who watched the neutral show (Sprafkin, Liebert, & Poulos, 1975). Adult blood donors are also affected by the actions of models (Rushton & Campbell, 1977). In the aforementioned study potentional donors volunteered at a higher rate when they observed a confederate first volunteer. More than two-thirds (67 %) pledged to give blood in the social learning condition, whereas only 25 percent of the participants were willing when they saw no model. The social learning effect persisted in the actual behavior. None of the participants who pledged to donate blood in the 'no model' condition actually gave blood subsequently, whereas 33 percent of those who observed the confederate model pledge eventually donated. We cannot overestimate the importance of good examples as people look to others to learn how to behave in a given situation.

2.3 Social norms and prosocial or altruistic behavior

Society supports prosocial behavior in a variety of ways. The socialization process where norms are established makes such behavior largely automatic and unconscious. In the process of socialization children learn that it is good to help those who are vulnerable. Boy scouts learn to be helpful, the educational institutions support humanitarian projects, and children receive praise from their parents for helpful behavior. Social norms have developed over time, because they have some adaptive function related to the welfare of society. The norm of social responsibility urges us to look after those who depend on us. Parents should care for their children, and children should look after their parents in old age. The norm of social responsibility urges us to look after the vulnerable in society. Society prescribes social responsibility as a duty that might at times be written into law. The social security systems of many countries, the complete medical assistance in Cuba, or the educational systems of most countries, are all examples of the social responsibility norm.

The norm of reciprocity contains the idea that we help those who help us. Reciprocity obviously has many advantages for the individual as societies cooperate to create better lives for their citizens, and to protect the society from those who would do harm. Regan (1968) showed the effectiveness of the reciprocity norm in an experimental study. Study pairs of university students worked on a judgment task, and after some time had passed were given a short break. During the break the confederate who was working as a member of the couple left the building, and after a while returned and gave the subject a coca cola. In a second condition the experimenters gave all the participants the drink. In the third and final condition no drinks were provided during the break. The participants then returned to the task and continued working. During a second break the confederate approached the subject and asked for his help in selling some raffle tickets for a good purpose (building a new gym). The results showed that the participants were more willing to help the confederate when the confederate had done the favor of providing a drink during the break. The reciprocity norm is strong in many cultures (Gergen, Ellsworth, Maslach, & Seipel, 1975).

The social justice (equity) norm supports the fair treatment of members of society. Equity is a common principle in many societies. For example equal work by men and women should yield equal pay. This is one of the reasons that strong labor

unions emerged in Western Europe and in North America. These unions not only fought for fair standards at work, but also established procedures for equal treatment. In recent years we have seen many efforts to provide equity between the races, ethnic groups, and genders in Europe and the United States. Still the capitalist system creates inequity, and some people like Bill Gates benefit in truly unequal ways.

There is some evidence that those who are over-benefited in society try to restore some equity to those who are losers (Walster, Walster, & Berscheid, 1978). Is that why Bill Gates and other very rich (e.g. Warren Buffett) donate money to worthwhile causes? In a laboratory study (Berscheid and Walster, 1967) one person through no fault of his own lost a great deal. When given the possibility of restoring some equity at the end of the game, the winner (the actual subject) was more likely to give money to the loser whereas when both parties had approximately equal winnings they gave less (see also Schmitt & Marwell, 1972). These norms (social responsibility, reciprocity, equity) and other social prescriptions encourage those who grow up in a given society to help those in need.

2.4 Evolutionary motives to act altruistically

Scientists have long been aware of prosocial behavior among various animal species (Darwin, 1871). Dawkins (1976) noted for example that rabbits try to warn other rabbits of predators and approaching dangers. There is obviously a survival value for rabbits as a species (although not as individuals) if they are hard wired to warn of danger. Evolutionary theory presents a problem for altruism. If the most altruistic members of a species take risks to help others survive and in the process die, how can they pass the altruistic gene on to the next generation? In response evolutionary theory would argue that any gene that contributes to the survival of the species tends to be passed on to the next generation.

When helping others is motivated by our genetic inheritance it must contribute to survival of the gene, although not necessarily the survival of the individual (Bell, 2001; McAndrew, 2002). When the mother storms into a burning house to save her children, she may lose her life in the process, but still thereby contribute to the survival of her genes by saving a child. Costly or self-sacrificing acts may be counterproductive for the individual, but still help children or other kin prosper and survive. The role of genes in contributing to survival is supported by animal

studies (Burnstein, Crandall, & Kitayama, 1994). Human parents have also been shown to be more helpful to healthy offspring rather than children that have less of a chance to survive (Webster, 2003). Further, mothers are commonly more attentive to their children's needs than fathers. The evolutionary argument is that mothers must be more attentive for their genes to survive as they produce only few offspring, whereas males can theoretically produce many children with different females. Many of you may resist this idea that altruism is hardwired selfishness. It is a sure thing that human behavior is not unidimensional, but the product of many factors among which genes may be one component. Genes may contribute to both selfish and altruistic behaviors, and we are far from understanding any gene-path to complex behaviors (Bell, 2001; Kottler, 2000).

2.4.1 Kinship altruism

Natural selection favors acts that increase the likelihood of survival and reproduction. Since altruism requires sacrifice and is costly, it would seem that altruistic people would not survive nor pass on offspring to the next generation. Natural selection however, encourages behaviors that lead to survival of those who are genetically related (Hamilton, 1964). Those who are closest genetically are therefore likely to be the recipients of our most beneficial acts. Children come first in the minds of parents. When we look after our children we are most likely to pass on our genes to the coming generations. Research confirms that the closer the genetic relationship the higher the level of helpful behavior. In studies of identical twins, Segal (1984) found that they were significantly more supportive of each other than fraternal twins.

Throughout history genetic survival value has increased when we identified those with whom we shared common genes. Our genes are responsible for apparent physical similarity, a marker for those we should help. Eye color, skin tone, facial features all help to identify those with whom we have a closer genetic relationship (Rushton, Russell, & Wells, 1984). We are also more likely to mate with neighbors than strangers. Being biologically biased toward neighbors occurs since historically living close to someone meant a genetic relationship. Only in modern times and especially with globalization is the genetic relationship of neighbors uncertain. However, even in these conditions immigrants gather into ethnic communities of mutual support.

In natural disasters people help first close kin, then neighbors, and then strangers (Burnstein, Crandall, & Kitayama, 1994). Is the motive favoring genetic survival

the reason that most people favor their own ethnic group? Evolutionary psychologists would agree that genes determine prosocial behavior toward the closely related, and greater likelihood of violence toward the less genetically related. There are social psychologists that think that kinship preferences are the true enemies of civilization responsible for all the genocides, wars, and indifference to human suffering (Rushton, 1991). The ability to identify kin from smells or visual cues has been demonstrated in animal studies. Human mothers can recognize their newborn babies from photographs even after very little contact (Porter, Cernoch, & Balogh, 1984). Imagine a Dane having the experience of being in the presence of people traveling to York at the train station in London, England, who seemed to resemble the features of the Danish people from whom he descends. York was a center of the Danish Viking kingdom, and it is not surprising that there still exists a pool of shared ancestry and genes in people traveling to York. People with shared genes are probably more sensitive to visual cues that others might not notice.

If the idea that there is a genetic basis in motivating helping behavior holds true it should be demonstrable in different cultures. In a variety of ethnic groups people receive more help from close kin than from those more distant (Essock-Vitale & McGuire, 1985). Identical twins are twice as likely to cooperate than fraternal twins who share only half of their genes with each other (Burnstein, 2005). Survivors of a fire noted that they were more likely to search for family members rather than friends before escaping from the inferno (Sime, 1983). Genes of course do not operate at any level of consciousness, but are thought to be hardwired in our brains as predispositions. The essential argument is that those who follow the biological imperative to help close kin are more likely to have their genes survive across the many thousands of years of human history and evolution.

2.4.2 Reciprocity derives from genetic self-interest

The norm of reciprocity may also be a product of genetic self-interest. We help and in turn expect to be helped (Binham, 1980). Living in groups, human beings learned the advantage of cooperating since it directly contributed to survival. When a person is helped at one point in time there is also the expectation that the favor will be returned at a later time. Evolutionary psychologists call this reciprocal altruism that we also discussed under the topic of social norms. We seemingly help strangers who do not have the benefit of kinship, some believe

because of the expectation that the favor will be returned at some later point (Trivers, 1971). Drinking beer in Australia is a good example of reciprocity. Each person at the table takes his turn to pay, and if anyone tries to skip his turn a long silence will ensue until it becomes clear that there will be no more drinking unless reciprocity is respected. An experiment demonstrated this powerful principle of human conduct. A researcher mailed Christmas cards to complete strangers, and 20 percent mailed back a Christmas card greeting to a name and address they did not know (Gouldner, 1960). On a more serious scale of social behavior reciprocity helps people form alliances for mutual assistance, and counteracts the domination of would-be leaders (Preston & de Waal, 2002). In short reciprocity contributes directly to evolutionary advantages and survival, and evolutionary psychologists believe that the predisposition is hard wired into our brains.

2.4.3 Genetic predisposition to learn social norms

Simon (1990) suggested that learning social norms is also adaptive and helpful to survival. We learn social norms from parents, friends and social institutions in the process of socialization. Those who learn norms best are more likely to survive and leave offspring. This weeding out process over time leaves people in society with a predisposition to learn and follow social norms. Altruism or at least prosocial behavior is a norm in all societies, and evolutionary psychologists believe that people are hardwired to learn these norms because of their relationship to natural selection and survival. Learning how to cooperate and help others has adaptive functions for the individual, but also for society as a whole (Kameda, Takezawa, & Hasite, 2003).

2.4.4 Critiques of evolutionary theory

While evolutionary theory has produced provocative ideas about human behavior, it has not convinced everyone (Batson, 1998; Gould, 1997; Wood & Eagly, 2002). Where is the survival value in helping complete strangers, or assisting people whose physical appearances indicate low levels of kinship? Altruism and prosocial behavior can also be explained by psychological constructs. Helping close kin may be the consequence of modeling and rewards in the family for such behavior. Somehow it seems too cynical to attribute life-threatening interventions on behalf of strangers to a genetic predisposition. Perhaps there are also other motives in helping behavior.

3. Distress at observing suffering

When we observe suffering in others we may experience distress. For example it is distressful to see a victim of a traffic accident. The victim may be in great pain so you try to help by holding his hand, talking in soothing voice, and calling for an ambulance. Are these behaviors totally a consequence of your focus on the victim, or is your distress at seeing pain a contributing factor in helping behavior? Empathy obviously plays a role; i.e., we feel the suffering of the victim, and identify with the pain being experienced as we imagine how the other person feels. Perhaps we have experienced pain ourselves in a previous accident, or had a close relative that was injured. Such life experiences may make us more sensitive to suffering, and more likely to act in helpful ways.

We know from research that the ability to empathize is present at the very beginning of life. In one study (Martin & Clark, 1982) infants heard a tape of their own crying, the distress of another one-day old child, and the crying of an eleven-month infant. The infants cried most in response to another one-day old infant. We seem to be hardwired to understand the distress of others and feel it like our own. Gradually over time we learn to take the perspective of the other, which in turn produces altruistic behavior. However, do we respond to alleviate the distress of the other, or reduce our own discomfort? If we act without concern for our own distress perhaps our motives are purely unselfish, but if our motive is to reduce the distress we personally feel, then obviously the motive is at least partly egoistic.

4. Empathy and prosocial behavior

Regardless, empathy has been related to helping behavior in a variety of situations and cultures (Batson 1998; Hoffman, 2000). We feel more empathy when we deal with victims that are similar to ourselves in some meaningful way. In the chapter on relationships and attraction (chapter 3) the importance of similarity in relationships was emphasized.

We are also more likely to feel empathy if we construe the situation as one that is beyond the control of the victim (Miller, Kozu, & Davis, 2001). If a person approaches you with a plea for some pocket change your desire to help may be determined by whether you construe the beggar as an alcoholic trying to wing his next drink, or a person out of luck who lost his job. Finally, we can increase empathy if we direct the attention toward the person in need. In one study (Toi & Batson, 1982) participants were asked whether they would be willing to help a fellow student who had been in a car accident and broken both her legs. In one

condition the participants were asked to take the perspective of the victim and how she felt about her misfortune. In the second condition the participants were asked to be as “objective” as possible, paying attention to the information, but not concerning themselves with the feelings of the victim. In the condition where students were primed with empathy instructions 71 percent of the participants volunteered to help, whereas in the objective condition only 33 percent offered help. So taking the position of the other by being empathetic can result in greater levels of helpful behavior.

4.1 Emphatic or pure altruism

Perhaps you now wonder is there any behavior which can be described as purely selfless, where the motive focuses on the other person, and where the concern is only for the welfare of other people? We can see from the evolutionary as well as from the social exchange perspective that selfish motives cannot be separated from selflessness. There are those researchers however, who would claim a role for altruism in human behavior (Batson & Shaw, 1991). Batson and his colleagues would acknowledge the difficulty of separating motives in complex social interaction, but nevertheless designed a series of experiments to understand motives for unselfish or altruistic behavior (Batson, 2002; Batson & Powell, 2003).

Batson argued that when we feel empathy for another person we help for purely altruistic reasons, regardless of whether we gain something for ourselves in the process. In the Toi & Batson study (1982) the investigators varied both cost and empathy. High cost was manipulated by telling the participants that the student who had the accident would be returning to class, and therefore they would have a daily reminder of whether they helped or not. In the low-cost condition the participants were told that the accident victim would be doing her class work at home, and therefore they would not have to face her sitting in a wheel chair reminding them of their guilt if they did not help.

If purely altruistic motives were at play, helping behavior would be extended regardless of costs once empathy had been manipulated. In fact that was the result. When people were provided with empathy instructions they were about equally likely to volunteer regardless of the costs. However, when told to be objective (low empathy) the participants were more likely to help when it was not costly. Seeing the accident victim in class is psychologically costly since there might be issues related to the disapproval by the victim if the participants did not volunteer. The results for the low empathy condition were interpreted from the

perspective of social exchange theory. When empathy was low people are more likely to be concerned with costs and benefits of helping the victim.

Another study involved the willingness to take electrical shocks in place of a confederate of the experimenter (Batson, O'Quin, Fultz, Vanderplas, & Isen, 1983). The confederate pleaded feeling unwell, and the experimenter turned to the actual subject to see if they were willing to replace the confederate. Based on a self-report measure the researchers divided subjects into those who felt egoistic distress at the potential of watching someone else getting the shocks, and those who felt empathy. In fact those who felt empathy were more likely to volunteer to take the unpleasant shocks.

If empathy is a distinct emotional state can we observe its signature in the respondents physiological responses? Eisenberg, Fabes, Miller, Fultz, Shell, & Mathy, (1989) conducted an experiment with children and college students who watched a video of a woman and her children who had been in an accident. Measures were taken of facial expressions and heart rates. Later the participants were given an opportunity to help by taking homework to the victims during recess thereby also sacrificing playtime. The results showed that those who felt sympathy or empathy had distinct facial responses, heart deceleration, and were more likely to help. This study would suggest that empathy has a discernable physiological concomitant.

4.2 Theories of altruism and prosocial behavior offer different levels of explanation

In the scholarly contest a theory is presented as if it is the one and only true explanation for human behavior. In fact all theories are but windows into reality through which we may perceive some of the landscape, but by no means all of human behavior. Different windows provide different views, and social psychological theories provide different levels of explanation.

Social exchange theory offers explanations at the psychological level with prosocial behavior seen as a function of external rewards. We engage in prosocial behavior to get something in return including praise, promotions, one's name on a building, or medals for achievements. Many people aspire to good works for these external rewards. Social exchange theory also explains what we have called "pure" altruism from still a reward perspective. For example if we feel bad at the suffering of others, removing that distress causes a restoration of tranquility and

provides some inner reward for our unselfish behavior.

The social norm theory suggests we learn prosocial and altruistic behavior through socialization in our society. Norm theory is therefore primarily a sociological theory. Prosocial behavior is initiated and sustained by expected responses as defined by the reciprocity norm. If you help me now I expect to help you at a later point. Help me build my house now and I will help you build your house at a later date, a common practice among the Amish religious communities in the United States.

The reason we engage in helping strangers with whom we have no reciprocal relationship is that we have incorporated norms of social responsibility. Society over the course of history has encouraged us to look after those who are vulnerable, and so we feel a responsibility to help the beggar, to donate money to cancer research, or help with the problems of hunger and the AIDS epidemic. All these activities on behalf of people we will never know and never meet are in response to feelings and thoughts of social responsibility.

The evolutionary perspective discussed in 2.4.2 and 2.4.3 explain prosocial and altruistic behavior from fundamental biological imperatives. Evolutionary psychologists argue that prosocial behavior such as reciprocity in helping has evolutionary advantages, and therefore became hardwired in our brains in the course of evolution. Those who cooperate have a much greater chance to survive and pass on their genes to the next generation. Why is it then that we are more likely to help close kin as compared to strangers? Again the biological imperative ensures in that situation that while we may not survive as individuals, our genes survive if we help our children. That is perhaps why parents are more altruistic toward their children, than children are toward their parents.

Each of these theories explains altruistic and prosocial behavior to some degree after the fact, and therefore is open to the charge of speculative nominalism. However, as we have seen these theories have also proven to be scientific theories by generating hypotheses that test propositions emerging from each theory. Although some experiments may seem contrived and open to experimenter's effects (where good students infer the meaning of the study and try to comply with the expected behavior), the three approaches possess validity emerging from both common sense and every day experience. At the end of the day complex behaviors cannot be understood by looking through one or two

windows, only by taking in the whole panorama. In other words prosocial and altruistic behavior are a function of all these approaches and much else, as we shall see in the coming paragraphs.

5. Personality and other individual differences

One of the important lessons learnt in social psychology is that the power of the situation may overcome individual differences making these irrelevant to the prediction of behavior (Ross & Nisbett, 1991). Remember the Milgram and Larsen experiments in chapter 7. In the Larsen, Coleman, Forbes, & Johnson (1972) experiments no relationships were found between personality measures and laboratory aggression. The work on conformity by Asch (1954) and others (e.g. Larsen, 1974a,b; Larsen, Triplet, Brant, & Langenberg, 1979; Larsen, 1982; Larsen, 1990) also showed that pressures from others overwrite any scruples a person might have in conforming to illogical behavior.

The power of the situation was observed in a classical study on prosocial behavior (Hartshorne & May, 1929). These scholars investigated the prosocial responses of tens of thousands of elementary and high school students in a variety of situations. The results showed that being prosocial in one situation did not necessarily predict helpful behavior in another context. Others (Batson, 1998) have shown that scoring high on personality measures of altruism do not lead to more helpful behavior compared to those scoring low. There are obviously factors other than personality that also matter in prosocial behavior.

Nevertheless, personality matters if we know the connection between the personality and the situation in which the behavior occurs. There are individual differences in prosocial behavior that are stable over long periods (Hampton, 1984). Gradually, researchers have teased out from the data some personality traits that are likely to lead the individual to being more helpful to others. These traits include empathy, self-efficacy (competence), and emotionality (Bierhoff, Klein, & Kramp, 1991; Tice & Baumeister, 1985). Also, we are beginning to understand that particular personality traits are important in particular situations. Therefore it is the particular combination of personality and the context that matters (Romer, Gruder, & Lizzadro, 1986; Wilson & Petruska, 1984). Studies on the social self (see chapter 2) show that those who are self-monitoring and staying in tune with a given situation are more likely to be helpful if prosocial behavior leads to some reward. Those who are more internally guided pay less attention to the situation and opinions of others (White & Gerstein,

1987). In review studies of gender and helping it is also the interaction between personality and context that matters (Eagly & Crowley, 1986). Other studies likewise point to the interaction factor as the critical component (Knight, Johnson, Carlo, & Eisenberg, 1994). For example people who have a high need for approval will donate money when they believe their prosocial behavior is being observed (Satow, 1975).

There are of course many ways to help, ranging from donating blood to the Red Cross to risking life and limb trying to save someone. Social learning is important in the background of blood donors who often had a parent modeling prosocial behavior (Piliavin & Callero, 1991). From these studies they also noted that blood donation reflected personal identity, that often people donated because of their feelings that they were the type of person who would and should engage in prosocial behavior. Self-identity as a prosocial person is important for long time contributions in various areas including working for cancer causes or other volunteer work (Grube & Piliavin, 2000).

Those who intervened on behalf of the victims in the holocaust in Europe during the Second World War have also been investigated (Oliner & Oliner, 1988). What would cause a person to risk everything for complete strangers who in turn were threatened with persecution and death? When later interviewed these altruistic people would refer to the influence of family and community, and the prosocial norms they grew up with encouraging them to be helpful, as critical in deciding to help. Others who intervened noted that they felt compelled to help because they empathized with the suffering of the victims and felt compassion. Feelings about justice and social responsibility also played a role. From these studies we recognize that there are nevertheless individual differences that consistently cause people to be helpful across a variety of situations (Eisenberg, Guthrie, Cumberland, Murphy, Shepard, Zhou, & Carlo, 2002; Penner & Finkelstein, 1998).

5.1 Gender differences

The type of altruistic behavior a person will engage in depends to some extent on gender. Who would be more likely to behave heroically in saving someone's life, like jumping in the water to save a drowning person, or running into a building on fire to rescue victims? On the other hand who would be more likely to help the infirm and provide long term care to those in need? If you answered men to the first example, and women to the second your opinion would be consistent with the

data. It stands to reason that the genders having experienced gender-based socialization, would behave differently in these situations, as they do in so many other fields of life. Men are socialized to take on the role of protector. Since 1904, 8,706 persons have been recipients of the Carnegie Hero Fund Medal, an annual recognition of a US citizen who risked all to save another person. Of these thousands of individuals only 9 percent were women (Becker & Eagly, 2004). Women on the other hand excel in the nurturance and commitment required to help others (George, Carroll, Kersnick, & Calderon, 1998). This pattern of greater willingness to do volunteer work by girls and women is also demonstrated cross-culturally (Flanagan, Bowes, Jonsson, Csapo, & Sheblanova, 1998). The greater upper body strength and athletic training in men and boys contribute to this gender difference, as does the nurturing behavior norms encouraged in females in all cultures.

Does the Carnegie recognition reflect a true difference in heroism between men and women? When it came to risking their lives during the holocaust women were more likely to intervene. Nearly 63 percent of those who rescued the Jews were women (Becker & Eagly, 2004). This outcome reflects perhaps gender differences in empathy and compassion with women feeling more of both traits.

It is not an easy decision to give up an organ to another person. Among those who donated a kidney, 57 percent were women. Other helping challenges including serving in the Peace Corps also produces more women volunteer, as 60 percent of these are also women. Like mentioned before women also outshine men when it comes to nurturing assistance to others. Women are more likely than men to look after children, aging parents, and provide social support for others (Eagly & Crowley, 1986; Shumaker & Hill, 1991; Crawford & Unger, 2000).

5.2 Religious differences

One might expect that religious beliefs would make a difference in people's willingness to intervene and help other. After all, the Golden Rule is common to all religions. "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you," reflects the reciprocity norm that good things follow prosocial behavior. For example the Christians' Bible urges us to "store up things in heaven" since these eternal rewards do not perish with individual life. These prescriptions emphasize the motivation of the social exchange model at least for some religious people. So to be religious may not be so different from other forms of prosocial behavior, only the rewards expected are in the life that follows earthly existence. That is not to

say that religious people are not capable of true altruism, or in making selfless sacrifices for others, but probably not at rates greater than people who utilize a different ethical model for life except as noted below.

When it comes to helping in minor emergency situations, religious people do not help more than others (Batson, Schoenrade, & Pych, 1985). However, when it comes to planned helping, which requires long-term commitment, religious devotion makes a difference. Having a religious outlook would logically impact planning one's life, including a life of service. Those who are religious are more likely to help with AIDS victims, and the homeless (Amato, 1990; Snyder & Omoto, 1991). Students in a university who were religiously committed were also more likely to campaign for social justice, and work among the needy in society (Gallup, 1984; Colasanto, 1989). Religious people are also more willing to share their income and contribute to a variety of charities (Hodgkinson & Weitzman, 1990). We can speculate as to the underlying motives, but that seems less important than the outcome that show that sincerely religious people are more prosocial in planning their life and their activities than those who are not religious.

5.3 Differences in mood

If you are in a good mood you are more likely to let that feeling spill over and engage you in prosocial behavior (Isen & Simmonds, 1978). Another study showed that mood enhancing using soothing music results in prosocial behaviors (Fried & Berkowitz, 1979). Who would have guessed it, even the presence of pleasant odors such as freshly baked cookies also increases the positiveness you feel toward others (Batson, 1998). Some of you may remember the odors of Christmas baking and how that helped put you in a good mood for the holidays. Perhaps organizations would be more harmonious if the participants could listen to music and eat fresh cookies each day, it may even affect work habits?

Of course when in a good mood you would like to maintain the feeling, and helping others promotes the continuation of these positive feelings. Giving a helping hand to someone may simply be a way of maintaining the positive feelings (Carlson, Charlin, & Miller, 1988). Happy people tend to help others, regardless of the origin of the happy thoughts (Salovey, Mayer, & Rosenhan, 1991). Unfortunately moods do not last, so helping behavior derived from moods tends to be short-lived (Isen, Clark, & Schwartz, 1976). Nevertheless, helping others may improve one's bad mood, and therefore lead to more helping behavior (Berkowitz,

1987).

Whether bad moods lead to helping depends on whether the mood is self-focused or focused on the needs of the other person. We are more likely to help if assisting others leads to a more positive mood and therefore gives us relief from our own negative feelings (Cialdini, Schaller, Houlihan, Arps, Fultz, & Beaman, 1987; Schaller & Cialdini, 1988). From this perspective prosocial behavior responds to ego based needs, to relieve bad feelings or discomfort. Is there actually a relationship between helpful behavior and positive moods? Several studies have supported this contention, and have shown that by providing help one develops more elevated feelings about the self (Williamson & Clark, 1992). A good mood helps us see the positive of life, and the good side of others. Helping others prolongs these feelings of good mood, whereas walking away is a sure way to feel bad (Clark & Isen, 1982). Good moods also seem to increase the focus on the self, and on our altruistic ideals. This attention to self-identity in turn increases helping behavior (Berkowitz, 1987).

5.4 Guilt: a long lasting emotion

Probably all people have experienced situations where they violated their conscience, transgressed against their better selves, and subsequently felt guilt. Guilt is typically not a passing mood, but may be long lasting and painful. We observe from the collective history of mankind various ways of dealing with guilt, and efforts we make to reduce negative feelings. The concept of “scapegoat” (where we seek to blame others for our misdeeds) has a historical origin, where an animal was required to bear the burden of a whole society’s guilt (de Vaux, 1965). Throughout the history people have sought to placate the gods by offering various forms of sacrifice, typically something valuable. The sacrifice could include the best of the harvest, but the gods were not easy to placate, and eventually in some societies it included human sacrifice of virgins and children. In modern times people have sought to placate their own conscience by doing good deeds in order to remove guilt and to feel better about themselves. The role of guilt in prosocial behavior has been examined experimentally by inducing guilt in respondents by encouraging them to lie or to commit other moral transgressions, and then afterwards offering opportunities for helpful behavior. In one experiment (McMillen & Austin, 1971) where students were induced to lie, they were subsequently more helpful in a totally unrelated activity.

Confessing guilt is a means by which people may restore their self-image.

Recently in Tromsø (Norway) a young thief wrote a letter to the editor of the local paper apologizing for his criminal behavior. Others have shown that publicly confessing to misdeeds elicits sympathy and forgiveness of transgressions. The Catholic Church recognizes the importance of confessions in restoring self-image and self-esteem. In one experiment (Weiner, Graham, Peter, & Zmuidinas, 1991) women in a store were led to think they had broken a valuable camera. Subsequently when given the opportunity these women were much more likely to help in a different situation when compared to those who did not experience guilt. Long lasting guilt is not a healthy emotion, but helping others is positive behavior and may benefit both the person in need and also relieve guilt at the same time.

5.5 Cultural differences

Is culture a factor affecting prosocial behavior? Some research would answer in the affirmative. Perhaps because of the kinship selection all cultures are more likely to help members of the in-group than those who belong to out-groups (Brewer & Brown, 1998). Yet we observe in groups like Save the Children, or Aid programs for Africa, efforts to reach outside cultural barriers and assist those in need who are not related. As might be expected this stream of assistance comes from those who are relatively well off in material goods.

Culture plays an important role in societies described as interdependent versus independent. In interdependent cultures the needs of people belonging to the in-group are considered more important than helping people from the out-group. Members of more independent cultures in the Western countries are more likely to help out-groups (Miller, Bersoff, & Harwood, 1990; Moghaddam, Taylor, & Wright, 1993; Triandis, 1994). However, as we have seen elsewhere there is also a positive bias toward members of one's own group in competitive Western societies, even when based on nonsensical categories (Doise, Csepeli, Dann, Gouge, Larsen, & Ostell, 1972). Helping behavior is more likely when people can see you as part of their own society and thus empathize with your plight (Ting & Piliavin, 2000).

One major study investigated the cultural value called "simpatia" in Spanish speaking countries that include traits like being polite, friendly, and helpful toward others. The investigators staged incidents in major cities of 23 countries and observed how frequently people were helpful. The Spanish speaking countries that valued simpatia all ranked relatively high in helpfulness. However, so did other countries that did not posses that unique social value, but perhaps

possessed other cultural attributes requiring people to be helpful. For example Denmark ranked number 7 out of the 23 countries, and higher than 2 of the Spanish speaking countries. Cultural norms that support prosocial behavior are likely to encourage people to intervene and help when they see a need (Levine, Norenzayan, & Philbrick, 2001; Janoff-Bulman, & Leggatt, 2002).

6. The power of the situational context in determining prosocial behavior

We have seen in other studies on conformity and aggression discussed above that the situation is often more powerful than personality, or may overcome a person's best intentions. Prosocial behavior is determined not solely by altruistic personal characteristics, but even more by the situational context a person finds himself in, and to which he is compelled to take note and respond. Among these situational contexts are the effects of rural versus urban environments, the number of people observing the event also called the bystander effect, environmental conditions, time pressures, and the nature of the relationships.

6.1 The culture of rural versus urban communities

You will recall from our discussion of aggression (see chapter 10) that geographical regions made a difference in the U.S. Southern regions with their culture of politeness and honor were much more likely to be aggressive in response to perceived insults or slights. Does it also make a difference to helping behavior if you live in different locations? The answer appears to be yes, as the difference between urban and rural life has an effect on prosocial behavior. Steblay (1987) examined 35 studies that investigated helping behavior in rural and urban environments and found that strangers were more likely to be helped in rural or small communities. A direct relationship existed between size of town and helping until the community got larger than 50,000, after which size did not matter.

Is it the socialization in the rural versus urban contexts that matter? Do children receive training that leads to more concern for others that lasts over the lifespan? Or is it the location that matters whether one is born and raised in this or another context? Some people are raised in big cities, but then move to small communities. Yet others were raised in small communities, but found a niche in the big city. As it turns out, it is not where you are born and socialized that matters, but where you live currently. The current social context is what contributes to helping behavior. As we shall see these situational determinants are powerful factors in prosocial behavior.

Milgram (1970) attributed lack of helping behavior in the urban context to stimulus overload. There are so many pressures in the urban environment that it is impossible to attend to all the stimuli. People living in cities learn to attend to the happenings that are most personally relevant, and respond to situations important for their individual survival. When we live in cities we narrow our focus and attend to the most personally relevant situations. Another plausible explanation focuses on the diversity that exists in modern cities. We know from other research that people help those who are similar in some significant way. In cities we find much more diversity in race, religion, education, and other significant variables, variables on which people are not similar. In the rural areas people are more likely to encounter similar people in educational achievement, income, and ethnic identity. In small communities people know each other, and may experience less diffusion of responsibility. You will recall that diffusion of responsibility occurs when there are more people present. In the diffusion of responsibility each individual feels less personally involved. In smaller communities it is not easy to avoid the call for help as one might encounter the needy person on a regular basis and feel guilt if not helping when needed.

Population density is even more important than size of population (Levine, Martinez, Brase, Sorenson, 1994). The more densely packed the population the less likely people are to help one another. Population density may also contribute to stimulus overload and the stress experienced in densely packed communities. All people need private space. When the situation does not provide that essential living condition we experience stress. We also know that criminality increases in high-density areas, a factor that interacts with stress, alienation, and hostile behavior. Remember when people do not feel good they are less likely to help. Stress by definition is an adverse experience, and therefore help explain the lower levels of help offered where the population density is higher. Population density also contributes to the bystander effect, the more people present the lower the sense of personal responsibility to intervene and help.

6.2 Intimate versus social exchange relationships

Most of the aforementioned research on prosocial behavior investigated the likelihood of people helping strangers. As we all know however, most helping occurs within family or friendship circles. Although social exchange theory suggests we help only those who provide benefits to us, when people are in intimate relationships there is a greater concern about long-term beneficial

outcomes (Salovey et al, 1991). Close friends and parents know how to delay personal satisfaction in favor of helping someone who is close and intimate. Helping children succeed does not bring immediate benefits except internal satisfaction, and often at a great cost psychologically and financially. What parents look for is children's long-term development, and the satisfaction of seeing the child succeed. In fact parents may be unconcerned about the benefits children bring since the focus is on the child and his welfare, and not personal outcomes.

Where there are some rewards in intimate relationships they tend to be long-term benefits in exchange for short-term costs (Batson, 1993). Some researchers believe that people in intimate relationships are not concerned at all with outcomes, but more with satisfying the needs of the other person (Clark & Grote, 1998; Mills & Clark, 2001). We tend to self-identify through intimate relationships, and it stands to reason that we are more likely to help those who are close to us in kinship or friendship.

In relationships based on social exchange people keep a close tally, you scratch my back and I will scratch yours. In social exchange relationships if I did you a favor by donating money to your campaign, I expect you to pursue my welfare by passing the law I want enacted.

6.3 The bystander effect: People who observe the event

Recall the case of Kitty Genovese who was murdered while some 38 neighbors observed and did nothing? Her case is sadly just one of many examples of the bystander effect. The murder was shocking to many, since it would have taken only a phone to call to police and get help for Kitty. Why did none of the neighbors step forward and take responsibility? Two young psychologists were touched by the crime and began to investigate the effect of the number of bystanders observing an event requiring assistance on helping behavior. They designed experiments in both naturalistic and laboratory settings to examine the bystander effect, i.e. the number of observers in situations requiring assistance (Latane & Darley, 1970; Latane & Dabs, 1975; Latane & Nida, 1981).).

In one study the experimenters staged a robbery in front of a salesclerk and two confederates acting as criminals. The criminals would come into the store while the clerk was in the back, pick up a case of beer or other merchandise, and then leave without paying. As expected when the customer was alone in the store they

reported the crime to the clerk more frequently, than when several other customers were present. In another study reported by Latane and Darley the participants sat in individual cubicles when suddenly they heard a confederate calling out for help as if he was having a seizure. The confederate kept calling out for help while choking, and eventually fell silent. In fact the "other" participants were recorded voices kept standard for all the real subjects. In one condition the real participant was led to believe that he or she was alone with the other "participant", in another condition that he/she was one of several others. When the participants thought they were alone in confronting the emergency 85 percent tried to help within 60 seconds, and 100 percent within 2 1/2 minutes. That number that assisted dropped to 62 percent when the participant believed one other person was present, and to 31 percent (within the first minute) when the participant thought that four other individuals were present in the experiment.

The bystander effect occurs the more people who witness an event requiring assistance are present and results in a lower likelihood that anyone will intervene. Latane and Darley concluded that when a large number of bystanders were present, the bystanders were less likely to notice the event requiring assistance, were less likely to assess the event as an emergency requiring intervention, and finally were less likely to assume personal responsibility for helping. Overall, across several studies investigating the bystander effect, 75 percent helped when alone, and only 53 percent when in the presence of other participants (Latane & Nida, 1981).

6.3.1 Noticing that something is happening

One of the reasons that people help less in urban environments is the sheer number of event requiring their attention, and therefore the need to focus on the most pertinent. Perhaps multidimensional demands for attention have the effect of habituation where a person learns to attend only to that which is narrowly and personally relevant, and to disregard anything else. In modern life people are in a hurry to make a buck and get ahead.

Some of you may remember the biblical parable of the Good Samaritan who stopped to help a wounded man when others were too busy to notice. Darley & Batson (1973) observed that even trivial factors like being in a hurry had an effect on helping behavior. The irony of this experiment was that it was conducted with students at Princeton University who were studying for the ministry and a life of service to others. One would think that these students were more altruistic than

average, and had certainly studied the parable of the Good Samaritan. From that religious background one might draw the conclusion that the students would be likely to intervene and help a man slumped in a doorway and groaning with pain.

The students were told to go to an adjoining building to make a short speech. In one condition the students were advised that there was no rush as others were running late in performing the task in the other building. In the second condition the participants were told that they were late and should hurry to the assignment. As they walked to the nearby building they encountered the man in the doorway who obviously needed help. Whether they stopped to help however depended on the situation. When told that there was no rush 63 percent stopped to assist, whereas only 10 percent did when told they were in a hurry.

The investigators produced further irony in the experiment by varying the topic of the supposed speech that the students were required to give. Some participants were asked to discuss the type of work they would prefer, others were asked to discuss the parable of the Good Samaritan. As it turned out the topic made little difference as the students in a hurry were no more likely to help if the speech was to address the parable of the Good Samaritan or if the speech was on work preferences.

Noticing that something is happening is obviously a function of the ambiguity of the situation. When the emergency is clear cut, a man has fallen off a ladder and injured himself, most people would act and call the emergency services. In one study it was the verbalization of the injury that got assistance. When the victim did not ask for help or otherwise did not react to his injuries assistance was only provided 30 percent of the time (Clark & Wood, 1972). Clear cues of the emergency helps the bystander decide whether to help or not (Shotland & Huston, 1979). Cues that lead to intervention include the suddenness of the event, the clear threat to the victim, the likelihood that more harm would result from lack of intervention, and whether the victim is helpless. Of course it is also critical that you know how to help. If someone is drowning in your presence you may want to intervene, but can do little if you do not know how to swim or cannot call for other assistance. Other emergencies however require just a phone call as in the case of Kitty Genovese

6.3.2 Interpretation of the event as an emergency and pluralistic ignorance
How can we know an event is an emergency that requires us to intervene? The

man slumped in the doorway could have been a habitual drunk whom we could not help, or on the other hand he might be really ill and we should call for emergency medical assistance. Remember we often look to others for assistance in interpreting what is happening. However, what if everyone is looking to others and seeing no one responding, assume that there is no emergency? When people observe an apparent lack of concern on the part of other bystanders, many assume that the event does not constitute an emergency.

In another experiment by Darley & Latane (1970) the participants completed a survey on attitudes toward problems of urban life. As they begin filling out the questionnaire the participants noticed white smoke coming into the room through a vent in the wall. Eventually the room was completely filled with smoke. You would think everyone participating would jump up and inquire of the experimenters or others what is happening? Perhaps the building was on fire and should be evacuated? What would you do in this situation? Well if you were alone chances are that you would respond in some way, 50 percent did within two minutes, and 75 percent within six minutes. However, in the other condition when there were three participants (including two confederates) the results were starkly different. Only 12 percent intervened within two minutes, and only 38 percent within the six-minute limit when at that time the room was filled with smoke. The investigators attributed these findings to pluralistic ignorance. When the smoke began to fill the room the participants looked to each other to interpret the event. When the confederates appeared to be untroubled by the smoke the actual participant assumed that nothing was wrong and stayed in the room (Solomon, Solomon, & Stone, 1978).

6.3.3 Assuming responsibility for helping

A major problem for the bystander is noticing that a real emergency exists requiring intervention. In the case of Kitty Genovese the emergency was obvious, since killing her took considerable time, and was watched intently by all (Rosenthal, 1964). Evidently the neighbors however did not see the emergency as a personal responsibility to intervene. In the case of the man slumped in the doorway there was some ambiguity, as the participants could not be sure of the cause of the man's distress. Solomon, Solomon, & Stone (1978) investigated the ambiguity of the situational context in helping others among New York participants. When the situation was ambiguous the bystanders who were among others were less likely to help than when alone. Another experiment examined the

effect of confederate responses as a source of ambiguity (Darley, Teger, & Lewis, 1973). The investigators required participants to either sit back to back or facing each other when an event was staged. Suddenly they heard a crash in the adjoining room as metal frames fell on the person working. When the participant noted the reaction or startle of another person they interpreted the crash as an emergency and interceded to help. The back-to-back condition allowed for more ambiguity since it was not possible to see the other person's response.

Responsibility for assisting is also more likely when people feel competent to help (Cramer, McMaster, Bartell, & Dragna, 1988). We are not all trained in emergency procedures, but perhaps we should be as the evidence shows that the competent person intervenes more often to help others. A person is also more likely to help if he/she has some responsibility as a leader in the group (Baumeister, Chesner, Senders, & Tice, 1988). So anything that contributes to feelings of personal responsibility is likely to contribute to prosocial behavior (Markey, 2000). Of course diffusion of responsibility remains an important factor even when people are acting alone. When participants in one experiment were asked to think about the possibility of going to dinner with ten intimate friends, they were less likely to volunteer help or donate money, than when they were asked to think about going out with just one friend (Garcia, Weaver, Moskowitz, & Darley, 2002).

In a naturalistic study at the beach, the confederate neighbor of the actual subject goes for a swim while leaving behind her radio. After a short interval a thief comes by and takes the radio away. Would you intervene at that point? You could confront the thief and ask him about the radio, and ask him to put it back until the swimmer returns. In this study however only 20 percent felt it their personal responsibility to intervene (Moriarity, 1975). However, in the second condition when the owner of the radio asked the person to look after her things 95 percent intervened, so just asking someone to help increases feelings of personal responsibility. The greater care we show for intimate partners has to do with the personal responsibility we feel, and is an expression of the norm of social responsibility (Maruyama, Fraser, & Miller, 1982).

7. Weighing whether to help

As we saw above, different rules apply when we are helping a child or close friend as compared to a stranger or acquaintance. In helping non-intimate persons we are likely to weigh carefully the costs and benefits of intervening (Dovido, Piliavin,

Gaertner, Schroeder, & Clark, 1991). Social exchange theory would predict that the greater the costs of helping the less likely you are in assisting someone. Practically anyone will give you the time, or directions to some location. These forms of assistance are low in cost. Trying to rescue someone from a burning building, or from drowning are high-risk situations where the helper may be putting his life in play.

Of course there are also benefits in helping other. The gratefulness of the person being helped, an award from the city or state, your name in the newspapers, all are recognitions experienced as rewards. This is not an argument for cold social exchange calculation by the numbers, but rather evidence of an intuitive and automatic calculation that occurs prior to any interaction with others. However, we have also argued for pure altruism. The act of saving someone does not allow time for reflection, and may occur impulsively. When a soldier jumps on top of a grenade about to explode to save his fellow soldiers there is no time to calculate. Such an act must be considered motivated by pure altruism.

7.1 Construal of the situation: The victim's responses

The victim's responses to an emergency are also vital to whether people will be motivated to help. Many situations are ambiguous and the emergency is not clear-cut. A Dutchman witnessing a street argument in Vietnam may not lead to any conclusion about any impending emergency. The language barrier of course is the most critical factor. Did someone who needed help cause the commotion? Facial features associated with emotion are universal, but was it possible to mistake the feeling communicated? In another well-traveled country, Cuba, people habitually speak loudly and even yell to each other in the street, yet without anger. Was it just two neighbors angry at each other for some imagined or real cause? There was no apparent victim who could be assisted so the experience remained ambiguous.

When a victim vocalizes his/her distress by cries of agony, and direct request for assistance to a specific person among the bystanders, they are more likely to get help (Schroeder, Penner, Dovido, & Piliavin, 1995). Often we are bystanders to only a part of the unfolding drama and see only part of the picture. In one study (Piliavin, Piliavin, & Broll, 1976) the bystander observed a confederate slowly faint and regain consciousness, whereas in the second less clear-cut situation the bystander observed the aftermath of an accident where the confederate was regaining consciousness. When the participants observed the entire drama of first

fainting and then regaining consciousness they were much more likely to provide aid (89 percent of the time) compared to only 13 percent in the ambiguous situation. So help is more likely for the victim, if he/she can reduce ambiguity and make the need for help very clear, for instance by directing the request to a specific individual. A direct request such as “Hey you with the red hair, can you give me a hand I am having a heart attack” might get some response. If possible we need to make it clear to bystanders that the emergency is real, and be specific in asking for help from one bystander to counteract diffusion of responsibility.

7.2 Attribution of need and worthiness

Since charity is at times sought by unworthy people, bystanders seek to attribute the reasons that people ask for help. If the request is one that stimulates our sense of social responsibility, then the victim is attributed as worthy of assistance. For example people are more willing to help someone who appears sick and falls to the ground on a New York subway, than someone who also fell but appeared to be drunk (Piliavin, Rodin, & Piliavin, 1969). To be worthy of help the emergency situation must be attributed to forces outside the individual’s personal control and responsibility. For example students are more likely to help classmates with their lecture notes if the reason for the need is that the professor is a poor lecturer rather than if the student is a poor note taker (Meyer & Mulherin, 1980; Weiner, 1980). In general we have more sympathy for those people who are unfortunate victims of circumstance rather than for those who are perceived as responsible for their own problems (George, 1992).

Often people do not know what to do when confronted with a situation requiring helping behavior. To reduce ambiguity the victim, when possible, must directly address the spectators with words like “I don’t know this person”, “he is attacking me, help”, and these words should be directed personally to someone in the crowd. Intervention is more likely if you address your need for help to a specific person. In studies on shop lifting bystanders were more likely to intervene if the ambiguity of the situation was reduced (Bickman, 1979). Keep in mind that help just requires one person to act; once that happens others are likely to follow. People are looking to others present to interpret what is going on, and decisive action by one person may lead to support from others.

7.3 The social modeling of prosocial behavior

We have already observed that modeling or social learning produces more aggression. Could social learning have the same effect on prosocial behavior? In a

classic study (Bryan & Test, 1967) the investigators placed a male confederate on the highway seemingly in the process of helping a stranded woman change the tire on her car, and then observed whether that exposure had an effect on helping behavior for another woman stranded a quarter mile down the road. In the control condition only the second stranded car was present. Would drivers who observed a helping model try to help the second woman more frequently than those who had not observed the model? The answer is yes, modeling prosocial behavior works. In another study people were more likely to donate blood if they had observed another (confederate) give consent to also donate blood (Rushton & Campbell, 1977).

We have so much evidence from the literature on social learning that there is little doubt that positive modeling of helping behavior encourages more prosocial intervention. Why cannot television or the movies provide more modeling of altruistic behavior rather than frequently presenting the dark side of human nature? When positive models are presented like in the current movie Spiderman, it is in the context of cartoon like characters and gratuitous violence that offer little hope for prosocial influence. If we worry about the state of society we have only to look at the modeling that occurs in the visual and printed media, and the culture of egoism it promotes.

7.4 Time pressures: When we are in a hurry

Keeping in mind the study by Darley and Batson (1973) we can see that being in a hurry prevents us from seeing an emergency and from taking personal responsibility. The seminarians that were late for the appointment seldom stopped to help much like the busy people in the parable of the Good Samaritan. Time pressure keeps many people from being involved in the life of others as such pressures are directed toward feelings of personal survival. When in a hurry we tend to be more narrowly focused, and unable to appreciate the gravity of other people's emergencies.

Once personal motivation takes over, and the focus is on the self, other problems have lower priority. We live in a busy world where speed and efficiency is highly valued. Every year computers increase their power and speed, and economic growth is a function of such efficiencies. Independent societies with a focus on individual achievement do not encourage attention to the plights of others. Perhaps that is why money donations are popular in Western countries. Such donations do alleviate some of the guilt from not being more personally involved

in the lives of our neighbors, or the suffering that occurs in other countries.

7.5 Reading or hearing about bystander effects lead to more helping
In one study participants heard a lecture or saw a movie that discussed how bystander effect inhibits helping behavior (Beaman, Barnes, Klentz, & McQuirk, 1978). After an interval of two weeks the participants were faced with a situation that required their intervention. A fellow student was found lying on the floor obviously in need of help. The experiment contained two conditions. In one situation the participants were with a confederate who did nothing to help. In the other experimental condition the participant was alone. Regardless of the condition, the students who had learned about bystander effects were more likely to intervene. This suggests the important practical utility of social psychological knowledge also found in the Milgram/Larsen experiments on laboratory aggression. When people learn the meaning of these aggression experiments, they were inoculated somehow, and therefore less likely to be manipulated in the future.

Likewise discussing the bystander effect in the classroom or in the larger society may increase concern for others and reduce the bystander effect. Recently, the U.S. news television CNN had a report (CNN, June 4, 2007) during the "Anderson hour" discussing the bystander effect. The case involved the hijacking of the car of a 94-year old man. As in the Kitty Genovese case a group of people observed the attack by the 22-year-old thug, and did nothing to intervene. To the credit of CNN, social psychologists were interviewed and given an opportunity to review the research on the bystander effect to the public. There is hope that such society wide education may have some impact and reduce the bystander effect. We will have more to say about this in section 8.1.

7.6 The stranger we help
The characteristics of the stranger in crisis and in need of help are also significant to whether help is offered. We are more likely to give change for a euro or dollar than intervene in a violent crime so the cost of helping matters. For example, in one study (Piliavin & Piliavin, 1972) a victim staggers out of a subway train and collapses on the ground. In one condition the victim has a small amount of blood on his chin, in the other condition there is no blood. What condition is more likely to receive help do you think? The victim with blood could possible need more help since at least there is a sign of some injury. However, the opposite is what happened, the person who did not show blood was helped 95

percent of the time, whereas the victim with blood was helped only 65 percent of the time. How do we explain this discrepancy? The researchers suggested that the presence of blood indicated to the bystander that it might be more costly to assist, perhaps an ambulance had to be called, or first aid of some kind provided for which some of the bystanders had no preparation.

7.6.1 Similarity to the victim

Other studies show that we are also more likely to help those who are similar to ourselves, from the same ethnic or national group (Latane & Nida, 1981). Bystanders are more likely to help similar others in a variety of studies (Dovido, 1984) perhaps for reasons of kinship, or empathy with those of the same background. Only few people intervene as Good Samaritans and help the true stranger. Other species show similar behavior, being willing to help members of their own species. Some studies have shown that primates will even be willing to starve if it prevents electrical shock from being administered to other members of their group (Preston & De Waal, 2002).

How we dress conveys our values, so similarity also works in how we overtly manifest our beliefs. The large majority of those approached by similarly dressed others asking for a dime to make a telephone call were helped (Emswiller et al, 1971). However, if someone dropped a political opponent's posters or leaflets in front of you would you help pick them up from the ground? In one study conducted during the Nixon versus McGovern presidential contest in the U.S., the majority would stoop to help the person who campaigned for the favorite candidate, but only a minority would help the campaigner for the opposition candidate (Karabenick, Lerner, & Beecher, 1973).

7.6.2 Gender and the vulnerable

The perception of need also interacts with the desire to help. Those who are vulnerable in our society are more likely to receive help. Eagly & Crowley (1986) summarized the results of 35 studies of strangers receiving help. Their results showed that female victims were more likely to receive help from male bystanders than males needing assistance. Again that outcome must be based on the protector norms that exist in most societies in prescribing proper male behavior toward females. As we saw previously, if a female has a flat tire, men are more likely stop and help, than if the victim needing help is male (Penner, Dertke, & Achenbach, 1973; West, Whitney, & Schnedler, 1975). In most societies men are expected to know how to change car or motorcycle tires, so perhaps that is the

major motivation for not helping other males.

Likewise female hitchhikers are more likely to get a ride (Snyder, Grether, & Keller, 1974). That might be explained by the lower threat presented by female riders since attacks on drivers are not unknown these days. On the other hand men may also be attracted to the woman, and perhaps hope for an opportunity to get to know her better. In general attractive females are more likely to get help than those less attractive (Stroufe, Chaikin, Cook, & Freeman, 1977; West and Brown, 1975).

One of the reasons that women get more help is that they are willing to ask for assistance. In our society we have the stereotype of the male driver who is lost in the city and drives for hours without asking for assistance. He can manage to find it by himself, he reasons, and he does not need or want any help. Women by contrast will if lost behave in a more sensible manner, and stop at the first safe opportunity to ask for directions (Addis & Mahalik, 2003). These gender differences seem to reflect the general difference in independence in males versus interdependence in females (Nadler, 1991). Men worry that they might appear incompetent, and often will rather suffer than seek help (Schneider, Major, Luhtanen, & Crocker, 1996).

Men are more likely to suffer from drug or alcohol abuse problems, but are less likely to seek help. Likewise men are less likely to seek help for medical or psychiatric problems. Typically men in our society try to live up to a veneer of toughness, and rely on their own resources to solve problems. Sadly, some men wait too long with medical issues, which may explain partly the longer lifespan of women. Men want to be independent, whereas women's interdependence promotes her willingness to seek help.

7.6.3 Attributions of the victim and helper

Being willing to help depends on the attribution of a person needing assistance. We may want to help those in need, but are wary of helping those we attribute unworthy motives for wanting help. Many charity scams have been revealed in the media, so wealthy people find a readymade excuse for not helping by attributing selfish motives to those requesting assistance. Many people find it easy to refuse help by insisting that there is no real emergency, or the situation is blown all out of proportion to any "real" need. Only when we are convinced that the victim is not responsible for his/her plight, that the emergency is a

consequence of forces the victim could not control, do most people feel sympathy and are willing help the individual (Schmidt & Weiner, 1988).

There may also be psychological barriers present that prevent a needy person from seeking help (Vogel & Wester, 2003). Here the outcome depends on the attributions by the victim. If he can attribute his misfortune to forces beyond his control he is more likely to feel good in asking for help. None of us like to feel that our difficulties or problems are a result of personal inadequacy or poor decision-making. It helps our self-esteem if we can attribute our unemployment for example to the economy or heartless companies rather than to the lack of personal preparation (Fisher, Nadler, & Whitcher-Alagna, 1982).

7.6.4 Culture and the acceptance of help

Since self-esteem is important people will also want to assess the motives of those who want to help. If others genuinely care about us we are likely to accept help (Ames, Flyn, & Weber, 2004). However, if we perceive condescension in the prosocial behavior of others, we may feel that accepting help reflects poorly on our person and that undermines our self-identity. In independent societies many people will not seek needed help because they believe it reflects inadequacy on their part and produces poor self-esteem.

Since the norm of reciprocity is strong in our society, accepting help is more acceptable if it involves some exchange. The need for reciprocity might be observed in the free meal provided at Salvation Army, exchanged by the needy person in listening to a religious message. In another, typical American, example, a needy person might accept a welfare check from society, and feel better if in turn he can perform some service or labor for the community. People are more likely to seek help if they can provide some compensation. Nearly all help between intimate people involves some form of exchange. At Christmas time in the Western world we exchange gifts, and if we help a friend we feel better about asking for his help in the future (Wills, 1992). In our independent societies we do not like to be dependent on others.

Reactance theory (Brehm, 1966) suggests that when we perceive a threat to our sense of personal freedom we react with annoyance and anger. However, the nature of our existence shows that all people need help sometime in their lives. As we age we need help in a variety of ways, getting dressed or simply being fed, are small but necessary ways of helping the aging population. Few people manage to

go through life without assistance at some point. We have accidents that require surgery, or may be otherwise disabled. In recent years researchers have studied the reactions of older people needing help (Newsom, 1999). Unfortunately, as predicted by reactance theory older people often feel that the help attributes weakness and dependency to them, without being able to give anything in return. Helplessness in old age negatively impact on self-esteem.

It would seem reasonable to believe that people in interdependent and collectivist societies do not feel the same way about receiving help as those living in Western countries. The difficulty of men in Western societies in seeking assistance emerges from strong social norms of independence and self-sufficiency. In independent societies needing help may be seen as a weakness, whereas in other cultural environments it may be a natural request that makes it incumbent on other members of society to provide the needed help.

8. How to increase helping behavior in society and the world

In this chapter we have learned something about the altruistic personality, the type of person who might help a stranger in need. Anything we can do to raise people with these characteristics would also increase helping behavior in the world (Snyder, 1993). We also know from social psychology that powerful situational forces can overrule even the best intentions of people. We know that people are more likely to overcome these situational effects if they know about them in advance, and have been educated as to the likely behavior of people watching an emergency.

8.1. Education and the bystander effect

Examples that learning about social psychology does matter in people's behavior are emerging from a number of parallel studies. In one case a student led an effort to prevent another student from committing suicide. Later she said that what caused her to intervene was having heard in class a discussion on bystander intervention a few days earlier, and the sure knowledge that it was up to her to take action (Savitsky, 1998). In another incident a student was being mugged in front of other students. One of the bystanders however decided to call the police as she saw the similarity between that current situation and what happens in other bystander cases like the Kitty Genovese (Coats, 1998). If discussion on the bystander effect was universally required in elementary and high schools, might it change people's willingness to help?

In one study (Beaman, Barnes, Klentz, & McQuirk, 1978) the effect of education was addressed experimentally. Among the participants who had heard the bystander lecture 43 percent stopped to help in the experiment, whereas only 25 percent of those who had not previously listened to the information on bystander intervention, did it. It would appear that the world would be a better place with more education on intervening to help victims occurring at all levels of education. Consider the problem of bullying discussed in an earlier chapter. With information on bystander inaction, would more students be likely to intervene or to help the victim? Only an experimental study on the direct effect of education on bullying would answer that important question.

8.2 The personal approach and helping behavior

Anything we can do to make helping personal (see 7.1) will activate the sense of social responsibility that most of us experience as normative requirements. For example, if we ask someone personally to donate blood they are more likely to help (Jason, Rose, Ferrari & Barone, 1984). Hitchhikers have long known the effectiveness of the personal appeal. The successful hitchhiker often looks the driver directly in the eyes as a way of establishing contact (Solomon & Solomon, 1978). Anything we do to make ourselves known to others by way of personal introduction, or recognition is likely to increase helping behavior at a later point. If we anticipate meeting the person needing help again at a later time, that too increases our sense of responsibility and our willingness to help (Gottlieb & Carver, 1980). In general anything that reduces anonymity and increases self-awareness is likely to contribute to prosocial behavior (Duval, Duval, & Neely, 1979).

Sometimes feelings of guilt at not helping in one situation can be induced with the consequence of increasing willingness to help at another time. When students were asked to chaperon delinquent children on an excursion to the zoo, only 32 percent agreed. However, when they were first asked to help with a very large request such as committing to help delinquent youth for two years (which got universal refusal), and then were asked to chaperone for the zoo trip, 56 percent agreed. The initial refusal produced guilt that in turn was reduced by agreeing to the smaller request. The reverse of that also works. If you ask for a contribution that no one can refuse, chances are that many more will contribute, and when they do they will contribute at least the average (Weyant & Smith, 1987).

8.3 Helping others on a long-term basis

The above discussion refers primarily to helping others in an emergency. However, there are many situations that require the steadiness of helping over the long run. For example the hospice movement in the U.S. and in Europe helping dying people is built upon volunteer assistance. Many other organizations like the Salvation Army, Red Cross, Cancer Prevention organizations, Heart Associations, Humane Societies for protection of Animals, Organizations for the Protection of the Environment, all rely greatly on people's willingness to contribute over the long haul (Penner, 2002). It is curious that in the most independent of all countries, the United States, one also finds the largest number of volunteers (Ting & Paliavin, 2000). Perhaps it is because other advanced countries have social safety networks built into their societies so less volunteer labor is required? In developing countries so much effort is required to survive that few people have time or energy to volunteer for others.

8.4 Making prosocial behavior more central to our culture

We know that bigotry derives at least in part from the desire to exclude certain categories from human fellowship (Opotow, 1990; Tyler & Lind, 1990). The Ku Klux Klan does not consider those of different races, religions, or political convictions to be fully human. They seek a society that would only include whites, Protestants, with a bias toward conservatism in their political outlook. Those who are willing to kill or maim others solely on the basis of such differences practice social exclusion and we can see their handiwork from Darfur to Iraq. Think how often very minor differences in religion (Shite versus Sunni, Catholic versus Protestants), or politics (Stalinists versus Trotskyites), or race (White versus Black) have caused immense injury to humankind. There is a lesson from that, to practice moral inclusion, to express the willingness to see all people as part of the same human race. People who are inclusive view all humanity as derived from a common heritage. From the biological perspective of course, it cannot be any other way. We all derive from common ancestors, and ethnic or racial differences have emerged over time from environmental conditions and relative geographical isolation.

Again people can learn something from social psychology, keeping in mind the research on ingroup favoritism, even when the group categorization is nonsensical (Doise, Csepeli, Dann, Gouge, Larsen, & Ostell, 1972). We are seeing good examples of inclusiveness from people known in the entertainment industry helping greatly with the AIDS crisis in Africa. More people today have a concern

for the well-being of strangers living far away. Many religions teach the universal brotherhood and sisterhood of humankind, but alas also define narrowly that salvation comes from inclusion among the select. Likewise Marxism took the red flag as a symbol of the universal kinship of humanity, but we still saw societies evolving in Eastern Europe that had little concern for others beyond narrow national and political camp interests. Yet, any world worth living in must inculcate prosocial behavior and inclusion must become a universal value in the cultures of the future.

8.5 Shifting from social to selfless motivation

From previous studies on the jigsaw puzzle we know that the overjustification effect undermines intrinsic motivation. This is also true for altruistic behavior. Whereas people may be flattered by praise over the short run, only when the person feels genuinely selfless will he have the motivation to sustain helping behavior. Although some companies more or less require their employees to volunteer, research shows that such external incentives are counterproductive. The more we require people to "volunteer", the less they are likely to do it when away from external constraints (Stukas, Snyder, & Clary, 1999). Making long term contributions are best sustained when they derive from a genuine desire to make a difference, and to contribute to the betterment of the world. In the jig saw puzzle studies we saw that some encouragement may be useful, but if reward continues it leads to lower motivation, the student will be less interested in solving math problems.

Batson, Cochran, Biederman, Blosser, Ryan, & Vogt (1978) and Batson, Coke, Jasnoski, & Hanson (1978) investigated the effect of compliance or compassion on subsequent altruistic feelings. They found initially that students felt most altruistic when they performed services without implied or real reward or social pressure. In a second experiment attributions were manipulated so some participants attributed their helpfulness to compliance, and others to compassion. Subsequently when asked to volunteer for a local service organization, 25 percent did so if they thought they had complied, whereas 60 percent volunteered if they attributed their previous helpfulness to compassion. These studies show that what we think about our helpful behavior and ourselves has behavioral consequences.

To sustain prosocial behavior in the long run it is most effective to shift motives from social bases to internal self-motivation. In one study Batson, Fultz, Schoenrade, & Paduano (1987) asked students to think of some act that they did

for others at great cost to themselves. When the participants began to reflect on the complex reasons for helping it decreased the feelings of altruism. Although many people engage in prosocial behavior because of social encouragement, these behaviors will only be sustained if the helper shifts away from these initial rewards. For example American Churches often encourage their members to donate blood, and most people can do that once or twice with little encouragement. But what causes people to donate again and again over the course of many years? Only those who develop an altruistic self-image will continue to contribute, when they come to believe "that I am the kind of person that helps" (Callero & Piliavin, 1983; Goleman, 1985).

8.6 The social learning of inclusion

Prosocial behavior is learned in the course of socialization. Parents have the most power in developing the self-image of their children. It is therefore not surprising that those willing to risk all to save victims of persecution, or fight for civil rights of Black people, have at least one parent with whom they had a close and warm relationship and who became a moral model for behavior (London, 1970; Oliner & Oliner, 1988). In certain families socialization includes the social responsibility norm that we have a responsibility to be inclusive and care for others. Having altruism modeled by parents is a powerful contribution to the next generation and to what must be hoped an increasingly kind world.

What caused relatively wealthy white students in the US to join the Peace Corps? One important factor is that they had internalized these altruistic behaviors by watching someone they admired engaging in helping behavior. At the same time exclusion of others on the basis of arbitrary criterion justifies a whole range of inhuman behaviors from discriminating in the work place to annihilation of entire peoples (Opotow, 1990; Staub, 1990). The prisoners at Quantanamo are not given the normal rights of the Geneva Convention, because they do not belong to the category of enemy combatants, but to an arbitrarily selected category of "unlawful combatants". That exclusion by the U.S. government in turn allows for torture, secret trials, and disregarding rules of evidence.

8.7 Helping self, helping others

In recent years we have observed the growth of self-help groups in a variety of areas. Many of these groups were modeled on Alcoholics Anonymous, and base their organizations on similar ideas of confronting the self with the dysfunctional behavior, and providing the social support necessary to change. Today self-help

groups combat drug addictions, help people reduce weight to healthy proportions, support coping with gambling addictions, help patients deal with terminal illness, and much more (Medvene, 1992). Self-help groups are successful because they are conducted by people who have empathy, who have themselves been victims of addictions, or are going through the crisis of illness. When you have walked part of the journey of addictions you also create credibility in helping other victims, and the message conveyed is more likely to be convincing resulting in needed attitude and behavioral change. Self-help groups are also cost efficient since volunteers run many of these programs. Some of the volunteers have also become professionals who make a living from helping others. In fact it is an important aspect of staying away from drugs and from abusing alcohol to continue to be involved in helping others. Alcoholics Anonymous urges those in recovery to seek social support and give support by sponsoring others and attending sobriety meetings over the life span.

Today we can also observe the Internet being used to offer help via chat rooms. The Internet is becoming an important source for information and self-help. Victims of disease can now go on the Internet to learn about causes as well as treatments offered. In 2003 there were already more than 100,000 websites that provide patient information (Kalichman, Benotsh, Austin, Luke, & Chauncey, 2003) and that number has increased exponentially. It is easier to get advise from the computer than asking doctors or other people. The information is readily available in seconds on a variety of topics. Asking a computer for help is less costly and does not involve any norms of reciprocity for helping. In one study (Karabenick & Knapp, 1988) participants were required to complete a very difficult and complex computer task. Half of the participants were told they could get help from a human assistant, the other half that they could find the answers on the computer. The results showed that only 36 percent asked for help from the assistant, whereas 86 percent requested help from the computer and more than once. One interpretation is that it is less psychologically costly to obtain information from the computer than asking a person for help. This is of course just the beginning of the computer age. What developments we may see in the future are only limited by our imagination.

9. The focus on positive behavior

Seligman (2002) noted the obvious when he said that much of psychology has focused on the dark side of humankind. Clinical psychology has concentrated its

efforts on understanding mental disorders, but has paid little attention to how we can promote psychological health. Social psychology's major efforts have concentrated on the dark human attributes of prejudice, discrimination, hostility and aggression, and less on the positive aspects of life. It can of course be argued that the dark topics are those that demand attention because of the damage to individuals, families, and society. However, not all social psychology has focused on the dark areas of human existence. For example in this book we have also discussed the importance of high self-esteem, how to develop lasting and joyful relationships with others, and how intrinsic motivation provides for sustained helpful behavior. This chapter has had a focus on how to make the world a more helpful place. The bystander effect research, that shows peoples' indifference to the suffering of strangers when in the presence of others, has a silver lining. As we have shown learning about the bystander effect has caused participants to take action to help that they may not have done so without that information. Likewise those who participated in laboratory studies on aggression may have been inoculated against harmful manipulations in the future. So even if the focus of the research has been on the dark aspects of behavior, the outcome may provide encouragement for more compassionate and helpful behavior.

Although many psychologists believe that all behavior is motivated by selfish motives, there are social psychologists who believe otherwise. Batson, Ahmad, Lishner, & Tsang, (2002) have argued for the presence of pure altruism in human behavior. At least some people are willing to help others even when it entails great personal costs, and some are willing to give their all to help the persecuted. Feeling empathy toward others seems a critical variable in whether such pure altruism occurs to support helping behavior.

Having empathy not only promotes more positive attitudes toward the victim, but also more broadly toward the group to which she or he belongs (Batson et al, 1997). Participants listened to tapes of a woman who had been infected with the AIDS virus, or they listened to a homeless man. Half of the participants were asked to take an empathic perspective trying to imagine the feelings and the situation of the person they listened to on the tape. The other half was told to be objective, to remain detached and not to be involved in the emotions of the victim. The important issue in this study was not whether they would be more likely to help the victim being part of the empathic condition, but rather did they change their attitude toward the group of people (AIDS victims and the homeless) being

depicted in the interviews. In fact the results showed that participants in the emphatic condition developed more positive attitudes toward all people with AIDS as well as homeless people.

The important lesson is to promote activities that produce empathy beyond just helping the individual. What does it feel like to be an AIDS victim, or a discriminated person, or being someone suffering with cancer or serious illness? When we create empathy for these people as a group, we socialize others who are willing to volunteer over the long run, and who vote for policies that are humanitarian. In an ultimate sense we need to create empathy for all people who suffer in the world, to create sufficient motivation to move governments to end policies creating war, genocide, or large scale suffering in remote parts of the world. We all come from common ancestors; we all face the same human conditions of mortality. People love their children in all societies, and culture has evolved to help people survive and cope with the challenges of both life and dying. With that common empathetic base should come not only the recognition of our relatedness, but also a desire to help.

Summary

The Kitty Genovese case and the September 11 attacks showed different aspects of bystander intervention and altruistic behavior. In the first case apparent indifference to the suffering of a neighbor, in the second crisis people moved beyond prosocial behavior, and intervened at great cost even giving their lives to help others. To understand these events we must first understand the definition of altruistic and prosocial behavior. We can determine the nature of helping behaviors by examining the motives for helping. Altruistic behavior focuses on the other person, and is engaged in for selfless motives. On the other hand prosocial behavior is more broadly defined as helping behavior that may include ego-based motives like social recognition, or the expectation of social exchange.

The question of why we help others points to several theories. Social exchange theory proposes that before we help someone we weigh the cost and benefits of intervening. We help others because we believe we gain some benefit from doing so. Social norms point to the socialization process during which norms of social responsibility, reciprocity and social justice are inculcated and internalized. Evolutionary motives derive from the role played by helping behavior in survival of the relevant gene pool. From an evolutionary perspective internalized behavior derives from the predisposition to engage in behavior that has utility for survival

of kinship and closely related others. The evolutionary perspective does not require that genes make a contribution to individual survival, but rather to those closely related who carry the genes to the next generation. Research shows that we have visual cues of kinship, and that altruistic behaviors have distinct physiological concomitants. From the evolutionary perspective even social motives like social exchange and reciprocity exist because they too contribute to cooperation and survival. Those who learn the norms best are likely to be among those who pass their genes onward. Critiques of evolutionary theory point out that there is no survival value in helping complete strangers (except we do share 99 plus percent in genetic inheritance with all humanity), and at any rate helping behavior can be understood from the perspective of psychological constructs.

The cases for pure altruism come from studies manipulating empathy for victims. Some research suggests that empathy is related to similarity between the needy person and the helper. Batson and his colleagues have however shown that empathy produces pure selfless behavior. These theories of altruism can be understood as offering explanation at different levels of constructs. Social exchange theory understands helping at the psychological level as the individual weighting outcomes. Social norms explain helping behavior at the sociological level where it is seen as a consequence of the internalization of social norms. Evolutionary theory offers an explanation at the biological level as the individual responds to genetic predisposition to help kinfolk. Eventually social psychology must creatively combine these viewpoints in an overall eclectic theory of altruism.

While the power of the situation has been demonstrated in many social psychological studies there is research pointing to lasting altruistic personality traits. Some relevant individual differences that are stable over time include empathy, self-efficacy, and emotionality. These traits interact with powerful situational factors in producing altruistic behavior. Self-identification as a helping person is important. Likewise social learning from altruistic models is also crucial to the development of individuals willing to sacrifice all to save the persecuted. Gender differences have an impact on all social behavior including altruism. Men’s roles as protectors, greater athletic training, and upper body strength make it more likely that they will engage in heroic acts to save someone. On the other hand women excel in nurturing and long-term commitment, and in displaying the moral courage to save the persecuted. Religious persuasion makes little difference in small case emergencies, but does contribute to long-term

commitment as part of the religious person's ethical outlook. A religious person is likely to volunteer to help the poor, AIDS victims, or help alleviate suffering in various parts of the world.

Mood differences may also contribute to prosocial behavior. Good moods lead to more helping. Social psychologists have enhanced moods by means of music and pleasant odors and observed the increase in consequent helping behavior. Guilt is a lasting emotion experienced as psychological pain. The place of guilt in human history can be observed from the use of scapegoats on which the guilt of the people was placed. Mankind may also escape the burden of guilt by engaging in prosocial behavior. Our cultural upbringing also makes a contribution to our individual differences. Kinship selection may be responsible for why people help close kin in all cultures. However, as we have seen throughout this book the socialization in interdependent and independent cultures makes for behavioral differences. In interdependent cultures the needs of the people in the ingroup are of foremost importance. In independent cultures people are more likely to donate time and money to help people in outgroups. Some societies also cultivate helping norms and behavior.

However, we cannot underestimate the power of the situational context. The research points for example to reliable differences between rural and urban communities. Rural people are likely to experience less diffusion of responsibility, less stimulus overload, more kinship and less diversity, and more personal relationships, all characteristics that sustain helping behavior. It is important to note that it is not where you are socialized that matters most, but rather the current context, rural or urban, that determines helping behavior.

Although most research in prosocial behavior has focused on helping strangers, in fact most helping behavior occurs within intimate circles of family and friends. Parents typically put their children first, and in any event are willing to wait for any return of their investment for the long run.

The bystander effect is the most frequently studied situational factor. These studies have reliably shown that help is less likely in the presence of others and suggests some specific steps need to occur before helping becomes likely. Intervention depends firstly on noting that something is happening that requires intervention. In urban areas people suffer from stimulus overload that leads to a narrow focus on personally relevant events. Other factors in urban life, like being

in a hurry, or the ambiguity of the situation make it less likely that intervention will occur. Further the event has to be construed to be an emergency. Since we look to others for clues on how to behave, pluralistic ignorance may prevent intervention. If other people react as if the event is of little importance you may decide it is not an emergency that requires help. Finally, someone has to assume responsibility and lead by example. That in turn depends on feelings of self-efficacy, internalized social responsibility, and diffusion of responsibility.

In weighing whether to help strangers we are more concerned about the costs and benefits. However, the construal of the situation also matters. How does the victim respond may be an important clue as to whether help is required. Likewise attribution of need and the worthiness of the victim to receive aid determine intervention. We help when we see that the misfortune is not a consequence of individual responsibility and is outside the victim's control. Social modeling also contributes to prosocial behavior. Those who have positive contributing models are more likely to help in donating or other prosocial activities. Time pressures matter as they relate to motives of enhancement and survival. We can observe inoculation effects, as those who hear or read about bystander effects are more likely to help in subsequent situations. Characteristics of the person we are helping also play a role including similarity, gender, and vulnerability. Attributions of the victim by the helper, and of the helper on the part of the victim also matter. In independent societies people guard their sense of self-esteem, and will often not seek help unless it comes from a genuine desire to help. On the other hand in interdependent societies the social self is more broadly defined as inclusive of others, and people are therefore more likely to accept help from others.

How can we improve on helping behavior in the world? Research supports the idea of educating people on such issues as the bystander effect. Likewise where the victim can reduce ambiguity, and the helper is aware of pluralistic ignorance, more help can be expected. A personal approach in asking for help is a most powerful variable. On the other hand long-term helping is most likely when the potential helper has internalized prosocial behavior as part of self-identification. Other suggestions point to the need to make prosocial behavior more central to the culture in which we live, and promote more inclusiveness in how we define those who need our help. Such a society would also require us to move from selfish to more selfless motivation. Important to altruistic behavior is the

presence of at least one significant and admired other who models inclusion and with whom the helper has a warm and close relationship. Self-help groups such as alcoholics anonymous are part of most Western societies, as are other organizations now responding to the needs to control other addictions. The Internet also offers services for example in understanding illnesses, and chat rooms for social support.

Social psychology has invested many resources in understanding the dark aspects of human existence. In recent years we have seen more an emphasis on positive psychology focusing on the health of the individual and society. In this book we have highlighted some important aspects of a positive psychology including promotion of high self-esteem, joyful relationships, and intrinsic motivation. A positive psychology must help make people aware to move from a focus on individual suffering to the entire category of sufferers. That is a difficult leap for some people.

Being Human. Chapter 12: Morality: Competition, Justice And Cooperation



As we watch the news each day, and interact with others in society, our sense of right and wrong may often be aroused. There is a great deal of evidence in social psychology pointing to the negative effects of selfish and unbridled competition. People at times express extreme egoism in their behavior to the detriment of others, and the remedy may require legal sanctions. Fortunately, as we saw in the last chapter there are also people who seek to act in cooperative ways, and try to reconcile people in conflict. Conflict situations often call for moral

judgment. What is right and wrong in the dispute and where is the common ground? Do you approve of murder as long as it is your enemy? How about killing in a just war as you have defined it? What about infanticide where illness or lack of resources makes the future seem impossible for the child? How about assisted suicide for the hopelessly ill? These issues and many other challenges all require moral judgment.

Perhaps you have taken note of how people live in other countries and cultures. Some behaviors like polygamy or polyandry may strike you as odd, but do they also require moral judgment? In that case we can see that moral judgment is not universally similar as social conventions vary on marriage and other social practices in different cultures. How about a situation where parents deliberatively starve their children to death? Is that universally rejected, do you think people find that acceptable in any culture? Deliberate killing of children is probably not acceptable in modern societies, so there is also evidence for some universality of moral judgment.

1. Moral judgment and culture

How we define morality is of primary concern in moral judgment. What do we use to guide our thinking as we make judgment about right or wrong, good or bad? People rely on guides to live a life that is ethically acceptable. Some people use religious or humanistic scripture to make moral choices. Others believe they hear a little internal voice that warns them of moral compromise. Ethical principles determine a great deal of social behavior, from the paying of money owed to the election of government leaders and political parties. Moral judgment is central in the so-called war on terrorism. It has influenced both sides in the war on their attitudes toward killing and who might be considered innocent parties to the conflict. One side thinks that there are no innocent “infidels”; the other side defines all military opposition as terrorism. Nevertheless both positions are moral judgments based on ethics, which are derived from custom, religion, and social categorization.

1.1 Defining moral behavior

Morality is defined as the principles that guides our lives and which we use in making judgments about the behavior of others (Haidt, 2001). In a broader sense morality is what we consider ideal the utopian society that we hope for in the future. Moral principles incur obligations on us, and to a large extent determine our behavior toward self and others. Moral principles in society generally apply to

all people. We would consider it hypocritical to tell our children to behave in a certain moral way, if we ourselves do not practice the same ethical principle. Likewise for a country if the morality of a society calls for peaceful relations with others it is hypocritical to carry unprovoked war to the shore of other nations. Moral principles are inclusive applying to everyone within the group, be it religious, nation, or other society. Human behavior is far from perfect, and we all violate moral obligations at times. Society, for instance, imposes a requirement not to steal from others in the community. If a member of the community violates this obligation society imposes sanctions. Sanctions vary widely in various cultures from a figuratively slap on the wrist to actually cutting off the offending hand in some Middle Eastern societies. Like in China, many states in the U.S. still have capital punishment for some crimes.

1.2 Culture and morality

Cross-cultural research points to support the universality of moral principles. For example children in various countries consider the idea of doing harm to others as immoral by age ten (Turiel, 2002). From evolutionary development humans have developed horror responses to the maiming and destruction of other humans, emotions that we share with other primates. Humans everywhere deal with similar conditions of life that provide a universal basis for ethics and morality. Universal moral principles develop from common issues of our mortality, the issues around childrearing and maintaining the integrity of family life. These communalities, the universal experiences that we all have in common, are the basis of moral judgments in all cultures. Not harming others and promoting the sanctity of basic human rights appears to be universal. At the same time culture molds and rationalizes moral obligations creating cultural differences. The Taliban's harsh punishment regime versus how similar offenses are treated in the West shows an extreme example of the cultural variations in both moral obligations and sanctions. Within society religious communities vary widely in the moral evaluations of different behaviors. For some societies sexual purity is of supreme importance, whereas others view human sexuality primarily as a social convention of choice.

Cultures differ in whether the behavior in question is considered a matter of absolute moral obligation or whether it is a social convention demanding conformity (Kohlberg, 1976; Turiel, 2002). Certain socio-political concepts are presented as matters of absolute moral judgment including values such as

freedom of the individual, individual rights, and equality before the law. Other societies because of their cultural history including the influence of religion have a broader definition of morality that includes personal sexual purity **(**Rozin, Lowery, Imada, & Haidt, 1999; Vasquez, Keltner, Ebenbach, & Banaszynski, 2001). Religions have purification rites in many cultures, which are incumbent on all members of society including baptism in Christian churches.

In all societies it is possible to distinguish between moral transgressions referring to the violation of the rights of others, and the violation of social convention referring to rules governing acceptable behavior. Social convention determines how we dress, how we wear our hair, and how we decorate our bodies. Social conventions also circumscribe how to address and salute others, the basic rules of courtesy that maintain social distance and privacy. The main difference between cultures is that in some societies moral transgressions are viewed as violations of social conventions to be sanctioned with a raised eyebrow whereas in other societies similar transgressions are considered morally wrong. Comparing Indian and American participants in a study many behaviors that Americans saw as violation of convention were considered moral transgressions among Indian respondents (Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997).

Schweder et al (1997) suggested that morality could be understood as based on three types of ethics. The ethic of autonomy emphasizes the rights and equality of the individual. An ethic of community defines the duties, status, social hierarchies, and the interdependence of members of groups. Individual members learn about social roles and sense of identity from this ethic. The ethic of divinity refers to personal purity guarding the individual from sinful behavior that degrade and contaminate life. Most people in the West would not pay much attention to personal purity seeing behavior as a personal choice. Yet, we can note from the use of language that people are often condemned even in the West when they appear as impure. The homeless and drug addicts are often chastised for being dirty and in need of physical and perhaps spiritual purification. The Salvation Army tries to meet the needs of both (bath and food).

2.3 Social cognition and morality

Some moral judgments are based on emotional intuition and without evaluative social cognition. All cultures condemn incest in moral terms that is often accompanied by expressions of disgust. Reaction to incestuous behavior tends to be immediate, nearly universal, and without complex rationalizations. However,

culture may modify what type of relationship is considered incestuous, but once that is defined the reaction is immediate. Greene & Haidt (2002) and Haidt (2003) also showed that harm-related emotions and self-critical emotions brought immediate reactions, including increased prosocial behavior (Batson & Shaw, 1991), and moral behavior (Higgins, 1987; Keltner & Anderson, 2000). Feelings of awe are felt in the praising of the noble behavior of others (Haidt, 2003; Keltner & Haidt, 2003). Disgust and contempt, on the other hand, underlie what is considered immoral behavior of others. These moral reactions are intuitive and seem to occur automatically without any cognitive rationalizations.

Moral thinking parallels results from studies in social cognition (see chapter 4). As you might remember some cognitive responses are automatic whereas others require complex cognition. For most people stem cell research requires conscious deliberation of the issues before coming to a moral judgment. Kohlberg (1976) demonstrated the stages of the moral development over time from the very ego-centeredness in young children to the broader moral perspective of parents that might focus on values like freedom and equality. The highest stage of moral development in Kohlberg's theory take on a perspective independent of the morality of society. For example slavery was always wrong regardless of social convention since it proscribed individual choice and did harm.

Today moral judgments are made in the context of a changing modern society. We live in a world of increasing scientific progress and technology. It could be an ideal world where for the first time in history we are able to meet human needs for health and justice. How are we doing? The 21st century appears to be no improvement on the 20th as wars are riveting the planet, genocide remains, the AIDS epidemic continues unchecked, and human desperation accumulates. How is it that this state of affairs is possible when we have the means and knowledge to solve many of these problems? The remainder of this chapter will seek to outline the problems that emanate from competition, from issues arising from injustice, and what we have learned about cooperative solutions.

2. Competition and conflict morality

Envy and competition have roots in early human history, just read the story of Cain and Abel in the Bible. The struggle for survival touches on the fundamental conflict over power, status, and perceived scarce resources. Competition is responsible for the ingroup-outgroup distinction that comes so easy to humanity.

At times competition becomes magnified because there are real differences in resources that separate people, and these limitations lead to prejudice and conflict (Dollard, 1938; Jackson, 1993; Sherif, 1966). The capitalist system has from time to time experienced cycles of expansion and contractions, thus creating dislocations in the economy for many people and greater competition over limited resources. The classic study mentioned earlier (see chapter 10) demonstrated scapegoating (Hovland and Sears, 1940), when they correlated the price of cotton in the southern Unites States with the number of lynchings of Blacks. Cotton was so basic to the Southern economy that whenever the price of cotton dropped, poor whites were laid off and many found easy scapegoats among poor blacks to blame for their misfortune. This historical study demonstrated the link between prejudice, discrimination, perceived competition, and violence. The later study by Sherif et al (1961) on competition in a boys' camp emphasized the effect of ingroup cohesiveness and competition on behavior toward outgroups. Fortunately, by establishing superordinate goals for the competitors, the investigators were able to turn things around and create more inclusive attitudes and behavior. Competition can create conflict that turns totally innocent targets into scapegoats (Allport, 1954; Gemmill, 1989). The essence of scapegoating is the misdirection of anger toward powerless groups of people who are disliked, and visible in significant ways. The new reality in Eastern Europe after the collapse of Euro-communism did not produce more cooperation in the quest for superordinate goals of integration, but unleashed conflict as ethnic and national groups turned feelings of frustration and anger toward minority groups. We saw ethnic conflicts and hostility in the wars that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. These misplaced feelings of anger continue to dominate current thinking, and create scapegoats throughout the continent.

A new study (Fidler, 2007) ranked 121 countries according to their level of peace. Russia was ranked in the bottom five, and the United States ranked in the bottom 30 between Yemen and Iran. The study supported the contention that the number of armed conflicts has increased since the 1990s laying to rest any discussion of a peace dividend emerging from the changing circumstances in Eastern Europe. The U.S. ranking (number 96) was attributed to high military spending and the continued engagements in conflicts far beyond its border. The high prison population in the United States (that is the highest per capita in the world) also contributed to its poor showing. The countries ranked highest for peacefulness were Norway, New Zealand, Denmark, and Ireland. The Middle East not

surprisingly produced the least peaceful rankings with Iraq followed by Sudan and Israel. The main variables contributing to peace within a nation were identified as the level of education, and the degree of regional integration. This study identified competition as the dominant morality in conflicts. The study however could not distinguish any common factor that could account for peacefulness toward other countries.

Competition and conflict occur at the interpersonal, intergroup, as well as at the international level. Adolescents commonly report several conflicts each day (Jensen-Campbell, & Graziano, 2000). Among married couples conflict is more likely than among people who know each other causally. Interdependence is an essential quality of conflict (McGonagle, Kessler, & Schilling, 1992). For married couples the fight is often about the use of resources, as well as a fair distribution of work and money (Fincham, 2003). Stress is likely to contribute to scapegoating activities in conflict situations (Bradbury, Rogge, & Lawrence, 2001). Since people are interdependent at several levels conflict may occur over a variety of issues. At the interpersonal level frustrating behaviors, violations of norms, and our beliefs about the personal intentions of the competitor are causes of conflict. At the intergroup level conflict is the result of real and imagined competition over resources, also an incentive for conflict at the international level. At the latter level, conflict may also be promoted by competing ideologies (communism versus capitalism; Muslim versus Christian), and differing histories and cultures. However, all these potential conflicts are centered on competition over perceived scarce resources (material or ideological), and a desire to be in control of the outcome.

2.1 Pursuing selfish versus the common interests

At the center of many conflicts is the contradiction between egoistic advantage and the interests of society. Most of the grievous problems afflicting the world today are a consequence of individual selfish short-term interests prevailing over long-term common welfare. Global warming for example is the result of small incremental individual actions over a long-term period of history. For too long we have disregarded the cumulative effects of the use of the automobile and electricity (the most shameless use of which is in the gambling capitol of the U.S.: Las Vegas, and similar venues), and the accumulating effects of other forms of pollution. The pursuance of our individual selfish interests comes at a great cost to our neighbors, our society, and, in time, the welfare of the world. More and

more people recognize the truth that through globalization no country is an island and global warming will affect all.

We are more and more interconnected and developments in one part of the world inevitably affect outcomes far away (Wright, 2000). Despite globalization the international community remains a world of tension and conflict both between countries and within them (Hunter, 1991). Although birthrates have fallen in many countries they continue to remain stable or increase in countries that can least afford to feed additional mouths. China is the exception with their one-child policy even though they now have a population exceeding 1.3 billion. In many poor countries having additional children is seen as essential to survival in old age, but individual survival makes the collective life more burdensome. The Earth can only produce so much, yet we live in a finite world as if the resources are infinite. People's behavior are dominated by the thinking that individual acts are separate from the collective welfare. Some people reason that taking the car instead of walking to the grocery store nearby, or using air conditioning in excess of comfort does not impact much on pollution. Meanwhile these small individual selfish acts are killing the Earth.

2.1.1 The prisoner's dilemma, tit for tat, and commons games

The prisoners' dilemma game is the most frequently used laboratory analogy used to research and understand the effects of competitive behavior (Dawes, 1991). The participant arrives at the laboratory and is shown into a cubicle and informed that another participant is close by in another cubicle. Each of the participants is required to make a basic decision either to cooperate, a decision from which both will benefit, or to "defect" (to compete). Choosing competition will benefit the participant if the second player decides to cooperate. However, if both players decide to "defect" then the payoff will be significantly smaller.

The name of the game comes from a story about two prisoners (Luce & Raiffa, 1957) who are jointly guilty of a crime. There is only enough evidence to convict both of a less significant offense. The prosecutor interviews each man individually explaining that if one man confesses to the crime the information will be used to convict the other prisoner who will be given the maximum sentence and he, the interviewee will be set free. If both confess they will each receive a moderate sentence. So there is an advantage to be gained for one side if one prisoner confesses, but the other does not. The confessing prisoner will go free; the other gets the maximum penalty. The problem becomes one of trying to figure out what

the other prisoner will do. If he does not confess, but you do you will go free, definitely a desirable outcome. However, if you both decide to cooperate you will each get only a moderate sentence. Would you cooperate under these conditions, or would you hope the other prisoner will not talk to the prosecutor while you plan to nail him for the offense? Can you trust your fellow prisoner to do the right thing and not confess? If you both cooperate the strategy would produce a moderate sentence, and this may be the best payoff to be expected.

Decisions in dyads, small groups, and international relations seem to follow a similar pattern of prisoner's dilemma games. Nobody wants to be taken advantage of, and therefore fall victim to the fundamental attribution error in ascribing the worst motives to the other side. There may be some advantage in keeping the world in a state of terror since we have at least not seen nuclear conflict since the end of World War 2. Nevertheless think of all the wealth utterly wasted, and the talents of scientists that could have been put to productive use. Think of the vicarious wars and hostility that continue because nations are trapped in prisoners' dilemmas unable to trust the opponent. While deterrence may have worked with the threat of nuclear extermination, it had not worked for conventional warfare as more wars have been fought precisely during the times the world was most heavily armed (Sivard, 1991).

The "ideology" of a competitive society primes us to act selfishly. Prior to playing a prisoner's dilemma game the experimenter flashed subliminally 22 words with a hostile connotation (hostile, unfriendly), and to another group a similar list of neutral words (looked, house). Did the game participants exposed to hostile words act differently from those with the neutral word exposure? The answer is yes, even though the exposure was subliminally and not registered consciously, 84 percent of the participants in the subliminally hostile condition "defected" and did not cooperate, compared to only 55 percent in the neutral condition (Neuberg, 1988). The attributions we make of the other party's intent are what matter in the prisoners' dilemma game. When we believe other people will act competitively we adopt a similar strategy right from the start.

Defining the situation as either competitive or not may determine game behavior prior to any interaction. Lieberman, Samuels, & Ross, (2002) told their participants that they were either playing a "Wall Street game" or a "community game". The investigators wanted to know if merely labeling (framing) the game would be sufficient in producing differences in behavior. It did. Those playing the

community game cooperated twice as much as did those playing “Wall Street”, and these initial differences persisted over the remaining rounds of the game. Evidently labeling the game “Wall Street” set in motion competitive schemas and expectations that contributed to competitiveness. The problem with the dilemma is that when a participant first gets locked into a competitive mode it is difficult to change to cooperation during the interaction. In other words competition begets competition, and once started continues for its duration (Kelley & Stahelski, 1970). Escalating competition in any arena is an irrational response since the competition lowers the outcome for all the participants.

Do these games have relevance to the international community and the arms race? The cold war required tremendous expenditures in the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. These expenditures could have been used for clothing, food and medicines that would have improved the standard of living of all people in each camp. However, the arms race was all about attributions of the intentions of the other side. Each step in the arms race required a matching response (Dawes, 1980).

As we know the real world involves more than two players. The Nuts game (Edney, 1979) was developed to see how people would behave when more than two players participated. Some have called the social dilemmas involving many players the “Commons” or “Social traps” (Hardin, 1968; Platt, 1973). There are many social dilemmas that require cooperation of multiple actors for maximal utility including migration, reduction of pollution, and reduction of greenhouse gasses. In all these crises millions of people seemingly contribute only an infinite small part to the problem that nevertheless accumulate and threatens the future of human kind. In the Nuts game several participants sit around a bowl containing ten metal nuts. The goal of the game is to accumulate as many nuts as possible. Each participant is free to take as many nuts as he wants. However, the catch is that every 10 seconds whatever nuts are left in the bowl are doubled. Would you leave nuts in the bowl and hope the other players do the same for the collective much larger long-term return? Apparently most people would not as 65 percent of the groups never got to the second round replacement having taken all the nuts on the first trial.

The so-called tit-for-tat game strategy was developed by Axelrod (1984). In a tournament that utilized 14 different strategies for the prisoner’s dilemma game the winning strategy was an effective tit-for-tat strategy. The strategy is simple in

requiring the player to cooperate on the first round, and subsequently matching the decision of the other player on each following round. The opponent's cooperation is rewarded immediately, while "defection" leads to an immediate competitive response. The Tit-for-tat strategy did not win every round of the game, but did produce the overall best results. Why? Because it invited cooperation and was not envious, as it produced the best long-term result even if in the short term the maximum was not obtained. Also, the player was not likely to be exploited since if the opponent chose a competitive response it would be met in kind. At the same time, the strategy immediately forgave the transgressor by rewarding the next cooperative move. As you can imagine the strategy was not difficult to learn as the players figured it out after playing the game for just a short time. After a few rounds the consequences of every move were clear, and the players would understand that individual as well group outcome would be maximal when choosing cooperative moves in the prisoners dilemma type game.

Could you apply this strategy to your interpersonal relationships, with siblings or friends? Could nations utilize a similar strategy with regard to disarmament? What about the placement of the so-called missile defense system the United States wanted initially to place in Poland and the Czech republic in 2007? It was interesting to observe that Russia tested a new ICBM with multiple warheads capable of defeating the missile defense system almost immediately. In the convoluted world of the arms race the nonzero sum games have usually been played out to exhaustion, but every so often we also see a tit-for-tat strategy. A cooperative response (in the eyes of the opponent) is met with a cooperative response, and a competitive response (such as missiles on the door-steps of Russia) results in escalation.

2.1.2 The fundamental attribution error and the world of ideological competition

We have observed how initial competition leads to more competitive responses in the laboratory. Do people behave in similar ways in the world today? If we examine the news of any given day we observe a world torn apart by ideological conflict, with opponents labeling each other as evil in absolute moralist terms. We have seen in other research how people possess ingroup bias, but the extremity of that bias in the real world cannot be underestimated. On the whole we perceive of our own group as good and virtuous, the reservoir of all that is morally right whereas the opponent is seen as evil or as possessing incomprehensible ideologies. The fundamental attribution error is in full play when opponents

perceive each other as having hostile intent and as a threat to survival (Plous, 1985).

In applying the fundamental attribution error to opponents people overlook all that human beings have in common. Despite cultural differences human beings not only share nearly all of their genetic inheritance, but also many cultural values. The tiny differences exiting in genetic inheritance primarily concern physical appearance of little importance. The areas of ideological agreement are also vastly larger than those of disagreement if we examine issues objectively (Robinson, Keltner, & Ross, 1991). In a study on abortion the participants opposing each other were asked to indicate their abortion related beliefs. They also estimated the beliefs of members of the opposing side. This allowed participants to compare their perceptions with the actual beliefs of the opposing supporters. The fundamental attribution error was clearly displayed since opponents exaggerated differences, and overestimated the gap between each position. The two sides were more likely to see their opponents as extremists rather than to look for common ground. Faulty and misguided construal in social conflict makes it difficult or impossible to find common values and interests. Being raised in competitive societies we assume, prior to interaction, that opponents will automatically take a competitive strategy with long-term loss being certain, and catastrophe possible. We also employ the fundamental attribution error that makes it almost certain that we do not intend to find common ground (Robinson, Keltner, Ward, & Ross, 1995).

2.1.3 Solving the problems generated by individual selfishness against the common good

The problems of communication discovered in game theory and in research on the fundamental attribution error where opponents assume the worst possible motives, appear to be universal and not easily solved. Since these problems are ingrained in our psychological constructs we cannot rely on individual free will to solve problems with terrible destructive consequences. Societies have developed regulations and laws to counteract the selfish inclinations of human nature in order to ensure the common welfare. There are international regulations governing whale hunts, test ban treaties controlling weapons testing in space, and litter laws in the cities. All regulations and laws seek to counteract the perceived egoistic advantage gained at the expense of the collective. Are we doing enough? We would not have the crisis in global warming if previous efforts

to control emissions had been successful. The insidious nature of these dilemmas is that the damage is done in such small incremental steps that few people notice it. Furthermore, there is a significant time lapse between the warnings of scientists and the response by politicians and still later by the general population. There are many ways that we could individually help promote the common good. For example we could each take small steps to help solve global warming by changing normal light bulbs for more efficient types. Still relative few have taken these obvious steps, and most people still behave to their individual advantage, even though they along with everyone else will suffer the consequences if global warming continues.

In chapter 11 we argued that the survival of the world depends on us making altruism more central to our culture. Most people adhere to the norm of social responsibility if they understand that a crisis is occurring. Reciprocity and equity in sharing the burdens of life are norms that could also be utilized in order to gain the public support for the necessary steps needed to put the planet back in balance. Most people will adhere to these norms when they see proper applications (Kerr, 1992). Even in non-zero sum games altruistic appeals to give up individual advantage for the common good have worked (Dawes (1980).

One area of research of interest to the common good is the complexity of thinking. Being able to see a problem from several perspectives is related to conflict resolution (Suedfeld & Tetlock, 1977; Tetlock, 1981, 1984). The research showed that complex social issues require the ability to assess the problem through what the investigators called integrative complexity. The ability to differentiate a problem in arriving at a judgment is fundamental to complex thinking. For example, abortion is not a simple issue except to those who hold extreme positions. When does life begin, when has a fetus developed consciousness, when is pain felt? Is it better to abort a child condemned to a lifetime of suffering or is all life sacred? What should be the role of the mother and the father in any abortion decision? You can probably think of many other related questions with regard to abortion. The second aspect of integrative complexity is the ability to integrate varying cognition. Integrative complexity refers to an individual's ability to connect different facets of the issue.

Tetlock found that people who hold extreme opinions are less complex compared to those with more moderate opinions. Integrative complexity is also related to tolerance, and the ability to consider the opponent's argument on issues. In

examining the cold war Tetlock found evidence that complex rhetoric used during crises in international relations led to solutions or at least the aversion of nuclear catastrophe.

3. Competition morality: Stress and health psychology

Although health is a result of many complex factors there are important psychological components, especially the presence of stress that contribute to illness. An individualistic, narcissistic and competitive society creates stress for people in a variety of ways. People seek escape in a society that is nonrewarding in meeting the human need for solidarity. Victims of stress often find refuge in health endangering practices. Tobacco and drug abuse throughout the Western world are a manifestation of stress and alienation. In the United States as in other countries, these health-destroying practices have been complemented with an overeating crisis. The obesity epidemic is "gaining ground" on tobacco as a major source of ill health. People eat more and larger portions of frequently unhealthy food, which in turn contribute to heart disease, diabetes and other chronic disorders (Los Angeles Times, 2004). Obesity related deaths in the U.S. are now estimated at 400,000 a year, a significant increase over the past decades.

Few doubt today the link between stressful lives and illness (Taylor, 2003). Stress is experienced both physiologically and psychologically. The arousal caused by stress puts the body in a fight or flight mode, where the heart is working overtime and blood pressure increases. Psychologically, when stressed, your attention tends to be focused on the event causing the stress and to disregard all else in life. Such obsessive thinking keeps the stress constantly present (Holman & Silver, 1998). Over time stress wears the body down. It stands to reason that a body constantly armored for action will eventually bear the physiological consequences. Stress has been related to a variety of diseases including cancer and heart disease (Friedman & Rosenman, 1974; Selye, 1976).

Stress is a psychological construct because it starts at the level of perception. It is psychological because not all people react the same way to stressful events. For some people divorce is the end of the world as they know it, for others it is but a new beginning. We all interpret events in different ways depending on our psychological background and personal hardiness. Events are primarily stressful, because they are perceived as such (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). Still when stress related diseases reach epidemic proportions we must assume that society contributes as well. In competitive societies there is much that threatens people

or is perceived harmful while there are few effective coping strategies.

In the portfolio list of stressful events the most unpleasant are those that have no immediate solution. These events are often unpredictable, and are not easily solvable (Bandura, Cioffi, Taylor, & Broullard, 1988). When some situation is uncontrollable or unpredictable it is difficult to develop adequate coping strategies. How do we deal with a spouse that "flies off the handle' at the slightest of provocations? How can the international community effectively cope with the threat of "rogue" nations when their responses are often unpredictable? At times a situation is not only unpredictable, but also ambiguous (Billings & Moos, 1984). You may find yourself wondering about the message conveyed in the aftermath of a conversation with your boss. Was he approving of your work, or were his comments meant as a warning to step up the pace. Any situation that leads to a lower sense of control is experienced as stressful. European and American workers have faced many difficult changes as a result of globalization. Entire industries are no more, and workers have had to train for new, lower paying and insecure jobs. But there is still a McDonalds around the corner in the Western world with cheap, calorie rich food to divert attention for a short time.

3.1 Stress and culture

We respond to stress in the context of social relationships and culture. Therefore, to counteract stress, relationships and society must be involved (Tucker & Mueller, 2000). We have repeatedly referred to the differences between interdependent and independent societies in this book. In independent societies appeals to adopt better health habits frequently focus the individual changes that are needed. However, more and more we are learning that social support is important in coping with stress related health harming habits even in Western countries. The various self-help groups discussed in the previous chapter 11 are all based on the efficacy of social support. Weight loss is more successful in a group situation than when tried individually for many complex reasons (Brownell, Stunkard, & McKeon, 1985). Involving spouses and children in coping with stress related health-habits is useful. People are more likely to engage in healthy behaviors when they feel they have support from intimate others (Catania, Coates, Stall, Bye, Kegeles, & Capell, 1991).

In interdependent cultures the social network is of even greater importance in establishing healthy lifestyle habits. For example smoking cessation depends greatly on supportive social networks among Hispanic smokers (Marin, Marin,

Otero-Sabogal, Sabogal, & Perez-Stable, 1989). Moreover, the fear of losing social support may lead HIV victims to withhold crucial information about their infection, and as a result ironically they will not get the support they need (Mason, Marks, Simoni, Ruiz, & Richardson, 1995). In interdependent cultures successful appeals for healthier lifestyles are more effectively directed toward the social network. In individualistic cultures appeals might be effective if based on already accepted norms of social responsibility to live healthy lifestyles.

3.2 Health and lifestyles

Health is the outcome of the complex interactions of many factors including genetic predispositions to various illnesses, environmental exposures, social support for a healthy life style, and stress. Good health is at least partly determined by the life styles we chose and actively pursue (Kaplan, 2000). If taken seriously healthy lifestyles can save a great deal of misery and expenses that come with chronic illness. A detrimental lifestyle is thought to contribute to all major categories of ill health in the United States and probably in most of the world. Cancer could be reduced significantly, probably by 25-30 percent, if people would quit smoking (American Cancer Society, 1989). Diet is clearly related to heart disease and diabetes, while drunk driving causes highway fatalities. Overeating and drunk driving are life style choices with short and long-term consequences. In a classic study on health behaviors the investigators identified seven important health habits including sleeping proper hours, not smoking, eating breakfast, no more than one or two alcoholic drinks per day, and keeping the weight within 10 percent of the ideal weight. The study was based on interviews with 6,000 people living in California. The participants were asked how many of these health behaviors they practiced, the illnesses they suffered from, and their energy levels. The results showed that the more health habits the respondents practiced the better their health, and the higher their experienced energy levels. We have a choice in our lifestyles, and these in turn have significant effects on our health and well-being.

3.3 Attitudes toward health and consequences

Do beliefs and attitudes about health matter in the pursuit of good health? Researchers have identified several beliefs effective in moderating health related behaviors (Bandura, 1986; Weinstein, 1993). General health values such as an interest in well-being, and the belief that the individual is personally vulnerable to illness are among important beliefs. Also significant are ideas of self-efficacy; i.e.,

that the individual can respond effectively to the health risk believing that the response will remove the threat. These beliefs are related to a variety of health related behaviors including the reduction or elimination of smoking, risky sexual behavior, and obesity (Taylor, 2003). People are constantly reminded of their failure in reducing obesity. Each new reduction program promotes the idea that the product will enable the client to become more effective. If a person does not possess self-efficacy and believe it possible to respond effectively to health threats he/she has in effect learned helplessness. Self-efficacy is also important in quitting smoking (Borland, Owen, Hill, & Schofield, 1991; Sheeran, Conner, & Norman, 2001). When people believe they can modify a particular behavior half the battle is won.

Impulsiveness plays a role in some health threatening behaviors. Many risky behaviors occur spontaneously as a result of particular circumstances. Unprotected sex is typically unplanned behavior, and drug or alcohol abuse usually starts with peer seduction, and only gradually turns into a problem (MacDonald, Zanna, & Fong, 1996). Young people often do not see the relevance of health related behaviors since youth foster illusions of invulnerability. Another problem related to health is relative economic affluence or poverty. A woman might believe a mammogram is helpful in detecting breast cancer. In most European countries access to this procedure is free, but not in the U.S. If a woman there does not have the means she will not have access to this life saving procedure. Generally speaking low-income minorities typically have poorer health, and are likely to experience more stress. Since income disparity is widening in many parts of the world economic differences may contribute even more to poor health in the future (McCloud & Kessler, 1990).

Health education is an important vehicle to inform and empower people to change health related attitudes and behaviors. The average viewer of television is often confronted with public service messages on health related practices. Research indicates that some of these messages are effective in changing attitudes and behavior (Atkin, 1979). At the same time products that encourage ill health including tobacco and alcohol advertisements that still dominate billboards and media in many parts of the world. Although now controlled in the United States to some degree, the use of these products by popular media personalities in movies or on television undo much of the education on the risks of these products.

3.4 Stress, Social support and illness

Competition and the struggle for survival produce stress with negative consequences for health. Typically the outcomes are not immediate, but stress provides the platform from which illness eventually emerges (Taylor, 2003). Once the body is armored in response to stress the bodily reactions often become chronic. Environmental conditions such as overcrowding contribute to feelings of stress, and inhibit prosocial behaviors (Taylor, Repetti, & Seeman, 1997). Many other situations are considered stressful including major life events like changing jobs or majors in University, or the loss of loved ones. Some of these events are existential to life, meaning that all people in the world have similar experiences. However, cultures differ in the amount of social support extended. The same event may be experienced as more stressful in a competitive independent culture when compared to an interdependent culture where individuals have extensive networks of social support. In modern competitive life people fight for space everywhere. Traffic is a daily stressor for many people in the world, as are continuous conflict with others (Bolger, DeLongis, Kessler, & Schilling, 1989). These daily problems have accumulating effects over time that contribute to illness (Kohn, Lafreniere, & Gurevich, 1991).

The competitive nature of many societies not only produces income disparity, but also has diverging health consequences. The relationship between lower economic class and health is well documented (Taylor et al, 1997). Our social environment including the presence or lack of resources determine the levels of stress experienced, and the general state of a person's health. People living deprived lives have less knowledge about health, and fewer economic and social resources to help produce long and healthy lives. In competitive societies it is hard to escape the conclusion that the higher standard of living of some is bought at the expense of poorer health for the many. The social support experienced in more cooperative societies can be crucial to well being (Sarason, Sarason, & Gurung, 1997). Expressions of emotional concern can be life affirming, and reduce the effect of stress. The expression of feelings of liking and love may be crucial in dealing with the effects of an unrewarding society or life. Supportive relatives and friends provide the resources and information that reduce stress in difficult times (Broman, 1993).

The efficacy of social support has been demonstrated in numerous studies (Turner-Cob, Sephton, Koopman, Blake-Mortimer, & Spiegel, 2000). The beneficial effects include the speed by which people recover from illness, the

reduction of physiological reactions to stress, and a more effective functioning in the face of chronic diseases (Taylor & Aspinwall, 1990). To trade the social support of a cooperative society for higher standards of material living is a high price to pay in the developing world (Bolger, Zuckerman, & Kessler, 2000).

3.5 Managing and coping with the effects of stress

Individual differences determine to a large extent success in coping with stress. Coping with stress includes efforts to reduce physiological arousal produced by stress using relaxation exercises such as muscle relaxation, meditation and deep breathing (English & Baker, 1983). It is interesting that many cultures have developed different methods for reducing the physiological consequences of stress including various forms of massage practiced today in many parts of the world. Taking a break from the daily grind can be very helpful in reducing physiological stress responses and might prevent these reactions from becoming chronic (Scheufele, 2000).

Coping strategies are made up from many sources in the life of the individual. Personal attributes and external resources including having sufficient money and social support determine the effectiveness of an individual's coping style. Coping styles vary along several dimensions. Some individuals cope with stress by expressing hostility. A hostile coping style is harmful to the health of the individual and is related to coronary heart disease. People who express suspiciousness, anger, and resentment toward others often develop life threatening coronary complaints (Williams & Barefoot, 1988; Helmers, Krantz, Merz, Klein, Kop, & Gottdiener, 1995). Hostile individuals develop high blood pressure, and rapid heart rates that contribute to the disease over the long run, and lengthen the recovery time the body experiences from stressful events. Since coronary heart disease is a major cause of death in developed nations the relationship of hostility to this disease is important knowledge for the individual and his support system.

Some people seek to avoid situations that cause stress, and others will confront any stressor directly and take action. Different coping styles suggest complex outcomes. Those who avoid stress may cope better in the short run, but are not effective in dealing with persistent stress or threat. People who seek to avoid stress do not develop coping strategies dealing with future problems, since their current response is to not think about it. Eventually, those who cope by avoidance may live in a poor state of health (Smith, Ruiz, & Uchino, 2000). Those who face

up to stress on the other hand may be affected negatively in the short run, since coping by confrontation involves some anxiety, but in the long run confrontation is more beneficial (Holahan & Moos, 1987).

We all have different personalities that relate to coping efficacy. Some people posses a high degree of internal optimism, and believe that life will essentially have good outcomes. This dispositional optimism affects the construal of stressful situations that is probably inculcated by comforting mother's advice that "all is right". People who are optimistic are also more likely to take direct action when faced with a stressor, and have fewer negative effects from stressful events (Chang, 1998; Segerstrom, Taylor, Kemeny, & Fahey, 1998). In recent years investigators have examined the relationship between stress and attitudes that are described as "hardiness" (Kobasa, 1997). Hardiness is associated with attitudes such as an internal sense of control, positive feelings of commitment, and a willingness to respond to challenges. When these attitudes are internalized they provide some protection from stress, making it more likely that the individual will cope successfully (Soderstrom, Dolbier, Leiferman, & Steinhardt, 2000). As we might guess a personality trait opposite to hardiness is neuroticism. Individuals who are neurotic are more likely to construe events as stressful, and react in ways that produce more symptoms. Lower levels of social support may account for some of the stress experienced by neurotics since most people find it unrewarding to be in the presence of defensive personalities (Gunthert, Armeli, & Cohen, 1999).

4. Justice morality

The disparity between the wages of workers and salaried employees and the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of companies is increasing. The average CEO now makes a thousand times the salary of the worker. In general three types of justice are discussed in the literature. If the very rich would pay back the money they had unfairly accumulated we are describing restorative justice. Distributive justice refers to whether the employees have received their fair share of the goods distributed. Finally, procedural justice occurs when the reward system is considered trustworthy and produces outcomes in a legitimate fashion. Procedural justice include much research on legal processes involved in correctly identifying the guilty party in court proceedings, and creating unbiased judgments that encourage confidence in the law.

4.1 A just world and restorative justice

We know from chapter 9 that beliefs in a just world justify prejudice. However, the just world concept is a very significant belief and motivator in many societies, the belief the life produces expressed a match between people's behavior and their outcomes. As noted, this desire for justice can and has been misused to keep the poor in their place, since the just world ideology proclaims that we get what we deserve. Injustice and the randomness by which fortune is handed out to people challenges these deeply held beliefs (Furnham, 1993; Lerner, 1980). However, the belief in a just world remains a motivator. When people become aware of injustice in treatment they seek to restore the imbalance (Hafer & Olson, 1993; Walster, Walster, & Berscheid, 1978). For example if people feel they are paid too much they respond by working harder trying to restore justice in compensation (Tyler & Smith, 1998). The simple lesson for companies worried about worker productivity is to pay the workers more than they deserve, then the workers then will respond by producing more, or is that a naïve thought? After all there exists a Dutch saying "as long as my boss claims that I earn much, I pretend to work hard".

We can also restore justice by changing our minds about the victims of injustice. Victims of misfortune such as rape victims are often accused of being responsible for their own victimization. Likewise mentally sick people are perceived by many to be responsible for their illness, even though many mentally ill categories can be attributed to problems in brain function or the environment over which the patients have no control (Hinshaw & Cicchetti, 2000). Likewise many wealthy people defend the status quo by justifying existing differences in wealth as deserved by family inheritance, or as determined by the naturally determined evolution of talent (Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004). Society through fashion magazines, and the yellow press attribute social status to those who are rich, famous or infamous. The gossip magazines are endlessly obsessed about the lives of movie stars or other guru's, describing their lives in lurid detail and in ways that are supposed to convince the reader that these personalities are to be admired. If a person is wealthy it is common to believe that he/she is hardworking and intelligent. Ordinary members of society are often influenced by status ideology that favors the rich and famous and in the process accepting personal wealth as natural outcome of a just world. Sadly, people who work for a living have least cause to accept status ideology since admiration of the rich and famous justifies exploitation (Glick & Fiske, 2001; Jost, Pelham, Carvallo, 2002). Meritocracy under capitalism is the modern form of aristocracy that assumes that

people get what they deserve, when in fact a host of factors unrelated to individual merit (e.g. inheritance) is responsible for good fortune.

From the perspective of restorative justice we can also set the situation right by punishing the offender. The Bible and other ancient texts offer examples of "an eye for an eye" retribution that still is with us today. Retribution justice calls for the same treatment to be applied to the offender as that suffered by the victim. So the arrogant rich should have the opportunity to live like the poor just to make life fair! Punishment is also used to deter future crimes. Isolating the offender in prison, or to effect the rehabilitation of criminals, serve the goal of protecting society. In society there is much debate today about whether criminal behavior should be punished in the search for retribution justice, or if the criminal should be rehabilitated to prevent offenses in the future (Carlsmith, Darley, Robinson, 2002). When people feel the emotions of fear or anger from the criminal behavior of others they are more likely to favor retribution. In retribution the responsibility for the criminal act is attributed to the offender. However, when the attribution is situational, people are more likely to call for punishment that leads to rehabilitation (Harmon-Jones, Sigelman, Bohlig, & Harmon-Jones, 2003).

4.2 Equity theory and distributive justice

Do we get what we deserve, is there a balance between what we give and get, in other words do our inputs match our outcomes? These questions are discussed by equity theory (Walster, Walster, & Berscheid, 1978). For many people justice require a balance between what we get and what we give. If one person is giving all to a relationship and our partner is not, the inequity will eventually produce feelings of unfairness, and efforts will be made to restore balance by demanding more from our partner or by ending the relationship. In loving relationships we expect to get as we give, in other words we expect distributive justice.

As mentioned above employees in capitalist economies have many reasons for feeling that distributive justice is violated. In 1998 the average salary of a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) was one thousand times higher than the average employee in the United States. The disparity is increasing with the result that in 1999 the 13,000 richest families in the U.S. exceeded the wealth of the 20 million poorest families (Krugman, 2002; Phillips, 2002). The disparity in wealth is increasing all over the developed and developing world, and is a cause of resentment, feelings of unfairness, and conflicts.

The unfairness in access to resources has many significant health and social consequences. Those in the lower end of the socioeconomic scale are exposed to more toxic hazards, do not get adequate health care, and have a poor start in life as manifested by low birth weight. Not surprisingly the poor are not only robbed of the quality of life, but also have shorter life spans (Adler, Boyce, Chesney, Cohen, Folkman, & Kahn, 1994; Yu & Williams, 1999). In a perceived scarce resource world it should not surprise us that people who are well of look after themselves, and their kinship relations. For people who are aware of distributive injustice the unfairness strikes deep, and fuels wars and regional conflicts. In Africa people are often robbed of the resources from the land on which they live as for example oil or diamonds are removed by foreign companies or central governments with little or no benefit to the local people who should by right own these resources.

4.3 Slave mentality and distributive justice

People often feel that their contributions are inadequately compensated. In laboratory studies, self-interests prevail. Generally people feel that their own behavior is governed by fairness, and participants in studies often feel they were fairer toward others when compared to the other participants. For example married partners in one study felt that they each contributed more than their fair share to the functioning of the household (Ross & Sicoly, 1979). Other studies have produced similar results. Other people are seen as unfair, whereas people see themselves as fair and balanced. The construal of what is fair seems to proceed from ego centered cognition and self-interests (Messick, Bloom, Boldizar, & Samuelson, 1985). However, these studies generally focus on middle class respondents who are not deprived in any absolute sense. In other words, the comparison process for fairness is between relative equals in resources, and not between different socioeconomic classes.

How do deprived people compare themselves when evaluating distributive justice? Some researchers have found that those who live in low socio-economic environments express similar life satisfaction as those who live in wealthy circumstances (Myers, 2000). Absolute wealth discrepancies do not appear a cause for life dissatisfaction. One reason is that people compare for fairness of outcomes within their own socioeconomic group. It is when people fall behind within their own group that distributive justice motivates behavior to restore justice. This fact also makes it easier to obfuscate the real injustice that occurs

between socioeconomic classes.

Relative deprivation is the key to distributive injustice. How deprived a person feels when comparing himself to others from his neighborhood, in his profession, or socioeconomic class is the key to understanding the motivation of distributive injustice (Walker & Pettigrew, 1984). Individuals who display wealth conspicuously are not used for comparisons, as they are not seen as relevant to the outcomes of those who are struggling. For many people conspicuous display of wealth is justified since we live in a "just world". God or other just causes must be responsible for these wealth discrepancies. Those who do not adapt this slave mentality often come from the more advantaged members of the deprived group. The relative better of members of deprived groups are the ones who come in contact with wealthier people and can engage in cross-class social comparison (Guerin & Epps, 1975). When social reality allows people to aspire to a better life, the more advantaged in society are used for comparison, and distributive justice takes on higher standards.

Distributive justice is based on self-interests. Within the relevant comparison group there is always a bias toward self-interest and self-presentation. We feel that we contribute more than others in the work place. Most of us feel also that we are pulling more than our fair share in family life, or among friends. In choosing a fair payout for our efforts we typically pay ourselves more than other participants (Messick & Sentis, 1979). So whether at the top of the socioeconomic pyramid or at the bottom distributive justice is not easily found and is constantly revised.

Equity justice requires that rewards correspond directly to the contributions made in a relationship. Equal pay for equal work has long been the demand of women in various countries of the world. There may be differences between contributions made so equity demands correspondence between the work performed and the compensation received. For example, if you are creating 75 percent of the inventions for the company then equity demands that you receive 75 percent of the profits.

The equity principle favors people who are already winners in society since it would allow them to retain more of their wealth. The flat tax proposal where everyone pays the same percentage is based on the equity principle. If the rich and poor both pay 10 percent of their income in tax obviously the rich will retain

more of their wealth, since 10 percent will be a relatively small share for those who have plenty, but a real sacrifice for those already deprived. In fact from the perspective of self-interests rich people prefer equity, as do the more materialistic and conservative people (Cook & Hegtvedt, 1986; Rasinski, 1987).

Socialism noted the essential unfairness of the equity principle and promoted a new society based on equality. To give according to ability and to receive an equal share of the social resources is the basic theme of socialist thinking. Socialist ideology projected a future vision where selfishness would not be a motivator in a society of plenty. Socialism means that each person contributes what he can and receives from society what he needs. The present world is far from equal in the sharing of resources, a characteristic of exchanges more likely found in friendships. Among friends resources are often shared equally. If a partner finds gold in a mutually owned mine equality demands that the find is shared in equal parts. The United States and many other countries are further away from the principle of equality than in any previous period in history (Phillips, 2000).

In families the principle of need determines distribution of resources (Tyler & Smith, 1998). Children are of course still egoistic and would demand a disproportionate share as "fair", but adults set the tone and make decisions based on what children need to develop and grow to their full potential. If a child is ill he is likely to receive a larger share of resources in defense of his life and health. Many developing societies promote having many children with equity in mind, so when children grow up they could give back and take care of their parents. In the parents' relationship with their children need predominates, and there is always some inequality in need. The need imperative in families can also be thought of as an equality principle as parents seek to compensate for the misfortune and unequal environments of their children. If a child is ill he may receive a disproportionate share of the parents income, which is an attempt by parents to compensate for the unfairness of illness. In intimate relationships we often put our own welfare second to the beloved child or spouse. In more distant relations such as the workplace, we expect equity.

4.4 Fair and transparent procedure

The term "teacher's pet" is used to describe children who are liked by their teachers and gain unfair advantage in grades and promotion not based on merit. Likewise in the workplace the boss may be favorably biased toward a fellow worker who is unfairly given larger pay raises and early promotions. If procedures

for rewards or punishment are not transparent the distribution outcome will be perceived by many to be unfair and unacceptable. According to Tyler (1994) procedural justice is a function of the manifest neutrality of the judge. At sporting events we expect judges to be neutral and to have no ego invested in the outcome. That is why judges are often chosen from neutral countries at international sporting events.

The judging system must be seen as having integrity, so participants can trust the system. The election of president Bush in the first round in 2000 was determined by a handful of disputed votes in Florida, eventually settled by the supreme court in a split partisan vote that left the election illegal in the minds of many if not most Americans. Today the average American has little respect for the integrity of the legislative or executive branches of government.

Another component of procedural justice is the feeling of the participant that he has been treated with respect. Did Gore, the loser in the election, feel that those who decided the outcome treated him with respect? Actual criminals are more likely to accept the punishment received in the courtroom if they are treated with respect. For example, in sentencing serial killer Bundy to death – the death penalty is still carried out in many states in the USA – the judge said he had no personal animosity, and given different circumstances could have seen Bundy being an effective lawyer, and finally wished him "good luck". It is of course a characteristic of psychopaths that they are often likeable, but the judge still manifested the respect that is essential in accepting judgments. In studies about promotions in the workplace, and criminals being judged by the justice system, the results showed that the actual workplace reward (promotions or pay increases), or prison sentence meted out did not correlate with the individuals' sense of procedural justice. What was of greatest importance was whether the authority figure was seen as neutral, had integrity, and treated the individual with respect (Brockner & Weisenfeld, 1994). Admittedly that can cause a problem for justice since a slick judge who expresses a liking for the defendant or boss for a worker can get away with more injustice than the leader who is actually fair, but does not respect the individual.

4.5 Procedural justice and the law

The desire to obey the law is stronger when the procedure is seen as fair and just. If the procedures are considered fair people are also more likely to comply with the law (Tyler, 1990). It is not the fear of punishment that determines compliance,

but the transparency and fairness of the procedures (Blader & Tyler, 2003; Wenzel, 2000). People place importance on procedural justice as can be observed in the study by Tyler (1990). Imagine you have been given a ticket for ignoring a traffic sign and go to court. You feel the fine is unfair since your view of the traffic sign was obscured. Two possibilities now occur. The first is a dismissal of the fine by the judge, who agrees with your objection. The second possibility is that the judge carefully listens to your complaint, examines all the pertinent facts, and then rules against you on account of the fact that the traffic sign although obscured was still visible and should have been obeyed. What outcome do you think people prefer? Hands down you would think dismissal of the fine would be most appealing? However, in this study participants preferred the second option because they felt that they had had their say in court, and had been treated with respect. The ideal society would require no coercion, as people would obey the law because it is fair and just and it is the right thing to do. Since we do not live in an ideal society, coercion must be part of the picture. Nevertheless the law should at least not make any mistakes when it comes to judgment of innocence or guilt. Perhaps the most revolting feelings of unfairness occur when an innocent man is convicted of a crime that he did not commit or when a law is enforced that did not arise from social consensus.

5. Finding the truth: Eyewitness testimony and jury group processes

Juries are selected to decide the guilt or innocence of the accused and have been part of, among others, the British and American justice systems for hundreds of years. The legal system places great value on eyewitness testimony. After all what is better evidence than someone present when the crime was committed? This would be true if eyewitnesses could accurately recall the events, and had no other motives for their testimony. Unfortunately, as we shall see, disinterested and accurate recall is infrequent, and justice often illusive.

5.1 Influence of eyewitness testimony

Law enforcement and jurors rely heavily on eyewitness testimony to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. The evidence shows that jurors tend to overestimate the accuracy of eyewitnesses. Social psychological research has demonstrated many sources of eyewitness error and subsequent miscarriage of justice (Ellsworth & Mauro, 1998; Wells & Olson, 2003). In one experiment the investigators asked participants to rate their confidence in eyewitnesses who had been videotaped identifying a confederate thief. The participants consistently

overestimated the accuracy of the eyewitness testimonies even when conditions were too poor for identification (Lindsay, Wells, & Rumple, 1981; Lindsay, & Wells, 1985).

The confidence in eyewitness testimony is misplaced. The most frequent reason for miscarriage of justice is misleading eyewitness testimony (Brandon, & Davies, 1973; Wells, Wright, & Bradfield, 1999). Wells and Bradfield (1998) reviewed 40 cases in which DNA evidence was obtained after the conviction. The results indicated that the accused were innocent in 36 of the cases. In these miscarriages of justice an eyewitness had mistakenly identified the accused as responsible for the crime. From this set of cases five convicts were subsequently sentenced to death and placed on death row before they were later found innocent. The situation was so critical that eventually the Illinois governor pardoned all prisoners on death row in his state, since he was no longer confident in the evidence that placed them there. One may wonder how many innocent prisoners have been executed throughout history.

5.1.1 Memory and false identification

Memory plays a central role in identifying a criminal offender. An accurate memory of events depends on our ability to acquire, store, and retrieve the appropriate information. We now know that this is not a simple process but one fraught with many opportunities for error and hence injustice. Typically criminal acts occur unexpectedly, and research supports the contention that most people do not acquire reliable memories from sudden and unexpected events. The classical study by Munsterberg (1908) demonstrated the inability of most participants to accurately observe a staged event at a scientific meeting. A confederate acting in a clown costume suddenly appeared in the room followed by a man with a revolver. They created a commotion grappling with each other, falling to the ground, and firing one shot. The participants were later asked to write down exactly what had happened. The majority of those present omitted significant parts, half of them wrote mistakenly about the events, or made other errors. Even among a group of educated and intelligent scientists eyewitness observation was not reliable.

In another study (Tolestrup, Turtle, Yuille, 1994) the investigators examined police records of criminal acts to which an accused had confessed. They compared the physical descriptions of the eyewitnesses to the actual physical features of the criminal who had confessed. The victims of the crime remembered

the suspect's hair color 38 percent of the time, and only 48 percent of the bystanders remembered it correctly. Combining the bystander and victims identification the suspect was identified correctly 48 percent of the time. Not a statistic that should put confidence in the accuracy of crime related memory.

There are many factors that inhibit correct identification. In preventing proper identification the following factors play a role: the speed with which the event often occurs, the fright created in the victim that motivates a narrowing of focus, and poor viewing conditions when for example crimes occur at night time, all obfuscate accurate memory. Furthermore, if the criminal is carrying a weapon the victim is focusing on that and not on his facial features as is demonstrated in various studies (Loftus, Loftus, & Messo, 1987; Shaw & Skolnick, 1999). There are many stereotypes in society related to criminal behavior, and people's expectations may also create false identification. Research shows that observers able to better identify individual characteristics within their own race, but employ stereotypes in identifying individuals of other races (Levin, 2000; Meisnner & Brigham, 2001b). We pay more attention to those with whom we interact with on a daily basis, and are therefore more likely to observe individual features in same race persons. This stereotypic effect can also be demonstrated for age, as college students and middle age respondents are better able to distinguish faces within their own age range. So we see there are memory problems right at the beginning of acquisition.

If there is a time interval between the event and identification the memory of the event must be stored in some form. This creates additional problems. Most people do not possess photographic memories, and memories fade or are otherwise altered over time. What happens in the interval between the event and the testimony matters greatly. Research on reconstructive memory shows that subsequent information may distort and change the memory (Loftus & Hoffman, 1989; McDonald & Hirt, 1997; Schacter, 1996). In a classic study (Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978) the investigators showed 30 slides depicting an automobile accident. One slide varied in the two conditions. Some participants saw the car in front of a stop sign whereas others respondents saw the same vehicle stopped at a yield sign. After observing the slides of the accident the participants were asked a series of questions. The significant question was about their observation of the traffic sign. In one condition the participants were asked if they had observed another car pass while the car was in front of the stop sign. In the second version

the participants were asked if the other car passed while the subject car had stopped at the yield sign. For half of the sample the sign was correctly identified, the other half was provided with incorrect information. Subsequently all the participants were shown two pictures, one with the stop sign the other with the yield sign and were asked which picture they had originally viewed among the thirty slides. Remember for half of the subjects the sign was misidentified. For those who were given correct information 25 percent still misidentified the slide. However, for participants given the misleading question 59 percent misidentified. This study showed that even subtle information can alter the memory of what had recently occurred.

In a court of law prosecutors can ask misleading questions altering what is stored in memory. Misleading questions create a problem in source monitoring; i.e. the misleading inquiry may intervene with the memories (Mitchell, Johnson, Mather, 2003). People get mixed up as to what they saw or heard. They have seen yield and stop signs before, and mistakenly attribute these previous memories to what they observed in the experiment. Eyewitnesses in criminal court may have observed some event and truthfully report what they have seen, while the source of the memory is in fact not the criminal happening. Competing memories are stored, and some may be tagged to the wrong event, yet the witness can most sincerely believe he/she is telling the truth.

The most common cause of judicial error and wrongful convictions is derived from misidentification during lineups of the suspect. The victim or observer is required to identify the criminal from a lineup of similar looking individuals. Often people choose not the actual offender, but someone who looks similar, and we have already seen that identifying individual features is difficult across races since members of another race look similar to the observer (Ellsworth & Mauro, 1998; Wells, Small, Penrod, Malpass, Fulero, & Brimacombe, 1998). There are of course practical steps to minimize misidentification. The witness should be told that the suspect may or may not be in the lineup, and the person presenting the lineup should not know the identity of the suspect to avoid giving subtle, but powerful identifying hints to the witness. The participants in the lineup should look similar to the suspect to minimize identification based on similarity. When photographs are used they should be presented sequentially to avoid the comparison process where the witness again uses similarity to falsely identity. Finally, the more information presented to the eyewitness the more accurate the identification, so

the witness should be presented with both photographs and voice recordings of the suspect (Steblay, Dysart, Fulero, & Lindsay, 2001; Melara, De Witt-Rickards, & O'Brien, 1989). Unfortunately, the media often confound memory further by introducing new material that is now assumed by the eyewitness to be part of the original memory leading to identification.

5.1.2 DNA and eyewitness accuracy

The new science of DNA identification has assisted law enforcement in overcoming misidentifications. Eyewitnesses of murder and rape have often wrongly identified suspects resulting in unjust penalties including lifelong imprisonment and death. Ancient societies knew about the unreliability of eyewitness testimony, and some countries therefore required more than one witness for conviction. The seductive effect of eyewitness testimony for both judge and jury lies in the utterly sincere testimony of the eyewitness who truly believes they are identifying the right person, when in fact they are not. In many cases eyewitnesses are convinced of the correctness of their identification, and refuse to believe otherwise even when presented with scientific evidence to the contrary (Thompson, 2000). Fortunately, the science of DNA identification has now progressed to a point where if the perpetrator leaves any DNA sample the identification can be accurately decided. However, in many criminal cases the suspect leaves no scientific evidence and the courts still rely on eyewitness testimony for most convictions.

It is wise to remember that the certainty by which the eyewitness identifies the suspect is not a good indicator of reliability (Lindsay, Read, & Sharma, 1998; Wells, Olson, & Charman, 2002). There is only a weak relationship between certainty and accuracy in identification. What happens between identification and court testimony may influence the confidence of the witness. If the witness learns that others have identified the suspect confidence increases (Penrod & Cutler, 1999).

Intuition seems to be the best guide to accurate and honest identification. It is when the observer works on his memory that perception is confounded. The more thinking and comparison activities carried out by the witness, the less likely the testimony will prove accurate. Accurate eyewitnesses identify spontaneously, often when the picture of the perpetrator is suddenly visualized, and do not know how they recognized the defendant (Dunning & Stern, 1994). There is also some research that indicates that when we actually try to put the offenders' image into

words that this verbalization process interferes with accuracy (Meissner & Brigham, 2001; Schooler & Engstler-Schooler, 1990). The process of putting an image into words is difficult, and can interfere with and change the memory. Since criminals do usually not stand still for photographs police often have had to rely on sketches of the suspect based on eyewitness descriptions. This identification process is less than accurate given the evidence from these studies.

Some eyewitnesses have motives to wrongly identify a suspect. Perhaps it is a case of revenge for some previous slight or injury, or the eyewitness is motivated by bigotry and hatred. There may be many motives in criminal cases and they are not easily discerned. Research also shows that it not easy to determine when a person is lying. The ability to tell when a person is telling the truth is only slightly better than chance guessing (DePaulo, Stone, & Lassiter, 1985). Recent research has not increased confidence in our ability to detect lying (Bond & Atoum, 2000; Ekman, 2002). The ability to discern the truth is related to job experience in detecting when people lie in a given situation. Thus CIA agents are somewhat better at detecting lying, as are clinical psychologists. Law enforcement officers, who were not identified in the study as outstanding interrogators, on the other hand only correctly detected lying at chance level (Ekman, O'Sullivan, & Frank, 1999).

The guilty have an interest in deception, in convincing others that they are telling the truth when denying knowledge of the crime. Lie detectors have been employed in law enforcement for a long time and used to assess whether a person of interest is telling the truth. The lie detectors are based on the supposedly involuntary responses of the sympathic nervous system in response to stress or anxiety fed by guilty knowledge. Also called the polygraph the lie detector measures changes in breathing and heart rates in response to carefully crafted questions. One type uses a control question where law enforcement officers ask questions relevant to the offense. How many times did you murder the victim? The assumptions are that a directly relevant question will create anxiety and changes in the physiological measures. The second approach employs multiple-choice questions and relies on the idea that only the guilty party knows about the event, and should therefore respond with anxiety to the relevant truthful answer. Did you commit the murder by hanging, gun, drowning, or strangulation? Presumably the murderer would know which way he dispatched his victim and would therefore show greater reactions to the truthful response.

Polygraphs have been found wanting and are of limited utility. If they were accurate tools for detecting deceit, independent analysts looking at the same case should come to the same conclusion about the guilt or innocence of the accused. However, the administrators of lie detection machines often disagree among themselves in interpreting the results (Ellsworth & Mauro, 1998). Under the best conditions the polygraph will predict somewhat better than chance, but it is not perfect (Ben-Shakkar & Elaad, 2003). Ekman (2002) noted that the polygraph misidentifies some 10 to 15 percent of those who lie as truth tellers, and a like number of truth tellers are misidentified a liars. 20 to 30 percent misidentification is too high a number to decide capital or any criminal cases. In less serious cases misidentifying a person as a liar has also repercussions. Some companies now hire based on polygraph results, and we must recognize that those companies treat some 20 to 30 percent of applicants unjustly.

There is no simple measure that can reveal with a high degree of certainty whether a person is responding truthfully or not (Kleiner, 2002). Even though many investigators believed that the reliability of polygraphs could be improved via hypnosis the results do not lend support to this thinking. Rather, hypnosis increases the chance that people come to falsely believe they made observations when in fact they had no such experience. Although hypnosis may increase the confidence that people have in their memory, it is a confidence not justified by increased accuracy. Focusing on the detail of the event by means of cognitive interviewing has in some research resulted in more accuracy in detection (Holliday, 2003). However, others have found that it also increases invention, especially in younger children (Fisher, Brennan, & McCauley, 2001). In sum, there is no way to ensure justice by means of eyewitness testimony; there are just too many ways that errors can occur.

5.1.3 The false memory syndrome

Imagine you are a totally devoted father who has treated his children with care and respect. One day you find yourself arrested for child sexual abuse. Your daughter has used the services of a psychologist and in the process of counseling and with the support of the psychologist she suddenly remembered childhood sexual abuse long repressed and forgotten. This is naturally a traumatic event for your daughter, and for you as well since the violation is reported to the police. What if teachers in a nursery school were all accused of sexual abuse in the form of a conspiracy that included satanic worship? Initially the children did not

remember these events, but the psychologists were helpful, and over time the children recovered their memories. The above cases of accusation have actually happened despite the total innocence of the parents and teachers. These innocent parties were forced to go through the torture of false accusation from their own children and students (Wright, 1994). The accuracy of recovered memories remains a divisive concept in psychology (McNally, 2003; Schooler & Eich, 2000).

The zeitgeist in psychology was influenced by sexual abuse in the 1980s, and some researchers claimed that it was common for women who were sexually abused as children to repress this anxiety producing memory, only to recover it at a safer and more remote time (Bass & Davis, 1994; Alpert, Brown, & Cutois, 1998). However, much research has now cast doubt on the accuracy of these claims (Loftus, 2003; Ornstein, Ceci, & Loftus, 1998; Schacter, 1996; Schooler, 1999). It should surprise no one who understands how human memory works that people can recall an event that never happened. If powerful authorities suggest in subtle or direct ways that something happened the victim might come to believe the event even though it never happened. Today this is called the false memory syndrome, and the real victims are the innocently accused parents and teachers (Kihlstrom, 1996; Loftus, 1993; Schooler & Eich, 2000). These false accusation cases from real life have been supported by the results of numerous laboratory studies that demonstrate that memories may be false, that sincere individuals may be manipulated into believing in their own victimization. There may be memories that have been repressed in the past and suddenly recovered, but these are rare, and cannot be the sole basis for judicial intervention.

5.2 Arriving at the truth: The jury process

The jury system where one is judged by a group of fellow citizens has a long history in English and American jurisprudence. Typically juries consist of a group of six to twelve citizens. They meet after hearing the evidence to render a judgment favoring either the defense or the prosecution. Since the jury is a group of people all the research that we have on group processes and social interaction is relevant to jury decisions. Juries consist of average human beings who are subject to the same cognitive limitations and prejudices found in the rest of society. Therefore arriving at the truth and rendering a just decision is a precarious process.

Can judges who are trained in law, and have experience in legal trials do a better job in deciding what is right? The judge is also a product of society and limited by

his social cognition, his stereotypes, and motivations. Any legal system that wants justice must have checks and balances to overcome biased judgments by jury or judge. It is however, disquieting to know that judges disagree with juries 25 percent of the time (Kalven & Zeisel, 1966). So those who hear the same evidence can come to very different opinions of what is right and fair (Borgida & Fiske, 2008).

5.2.1 Pretrial publicity

Many legal cases are tried in the court of public opinion long before the actual trial. The media often report on the crimes committed and the defendants arrested prior to jury selection. Due to these press reports many potential jurors have made up their minds about the innocence or guilt of the defendants long before they hear any testimony at trial. Typically the information in the media about the defendants comes from law enforcement, not precisely unbiased sources. Research shows that the more people hear about the case from the media the more they tend to be biased against the defendant (Fulero, 2002; Kerr, 1995). Emotional publicity providing lurid details of criminal cases increases the likelihood the jurors will render guilty verdicts, as it arouses people's emotions.

Some white color crimes in the United States have adversely affected tens of thousands of retirees, or those who were going to retire, and left the companies bankrupt. Most people can identify with the plight of the victims, as threats to economic security are very emotional in nature. Although jurors are warned not to be influenced by pretrial publicity it is doubtful that these admonitions can overcome negative pretrial information (Kramer, Kerr, & Carroll, 1990; Ogloff & Vidmar, 1994). We know from research that when jurors are told to disregard what they have heard before the trial such admonitions may in fact increase the possibility that the biased information will be used in the jury room (Fein, McCloskey, & Tomlinson, 1997). Information is often registered in the unconscious portions of the mind, but may nevertheless affect outcomes significantly. Even linking a person superficially to a criminal act in the media produces biased perceptions of that individual. We call this guilt by association, and even denial of such association may by itself produce negative biases (Wegner, Wenzlaff, Kerker, & Beattie, 1981). The best solution for rendering a fair judgment is to find jurors who have heard nothing about the case, but in today's world of television, the Internet, and other media, that may prove impossible.

5.2.2 Group processes and jury deliberations

Jurors utilize the same cognitive processes as people making other types of decisions. They try to decide which account makes most sense, the defendant's or the prosecutor's case (Hastie & Pennington, 2000). Lawyers have two approaches in presenting their cases. They can present the case as a story where the evidence is presented in the sequence in which the criminal events occurred, trying to provide the jurors with the whole picture from the prosecutor's or defendant's perspective. In, the second approach, lawyers can present the case in witness order, using the sequence of witnesses in a way that is most convincing. Here we may remember the so-called primacy and recency effects. Is the information presented first most persuasive, or is it the information presented last (see chapter 8)?

These two strategies have been experimentally employed in simulated jury trials. The results strongly support the effectiveness of the story approach in persuading jurors of the case (Pennington & Hastie, 1988). When the prosecution used the story order of presentation and the defense employed the witness order 78 percent of the experimental jurors voted to convict the defendant. On the other hand if the prosecutor used the witness order and the defense the story approach, only 31 percent voted to convict. So the manner in which the prosecution and defense present their information makes a difference in whether a person is judged guilty or not. Does that strike you as being in conformity with justice morality? It would seem that the manner of presentation determines the verdict regardless of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

The most significant factor in predicting whether a jury will convict is the majority opinion on the initial vote in deliberation. This can easily be understood from studies on conformity. Most people in the minority do not have the fortitude to stand against a majority, and majority opinion usually carries the day as it convinces or wears down the minority with arguments. In a study on actual criminal trials the investigators found that in 97 percent of the cases the final outcome was identical to the initial majority opinion. Still other research suggests that having an initial minority sometimes convinces the majority to change their minds in the direction of the minority at least toward acceptance of a lower criminal charge. When a person is accused of first-degree murder but the minority believes it is a case of manslaughter juries will often find room for compromise. The first-degree murder charge may be downgraded by negotiation

to guilty of second-degree murder, a charge with less severe penalties (Pennington & Hastie, 1990). The ability of minorities to sway the majority is why a jury of 12 persons is better than six, since the larger jury is more likely to have minority opinion present (Horowitz & Bordens, 2002).

6. Cooperation morality and reconciliation

Cooperation is a fundamental morality in all communities. From an evolutionary perspective people developed cooperative modes of interaction because these contributed to survival. People who learned to cooperate together also went hunting together, and shared harvests when times were tough. Treating others with compassion is part of our evolutionary heritage, and is also shared with various other species, particularly among the primates (de Wall, 1996). Chimpanzees in leadership roles share food with their group members, and seek to reduce conflict among lower status individuals. In scarce resource communities conflict is a constant factor of life. Primates have learned to avoid conflict, and to defuse aggression when it does occur. Grooming behavior and offering food among primates are all attempts to bring about more cooperation and avoid conflict (Keltner & Potegal, 1997).

The most basic norm of moral reasoning in humans is the reciprocity norm. Reciprocity supports both cooperative and competitive behavior. When you offer help to someone you expect the favor to be returned (Miller & Bersoff, 1994). Reciprocity is a basic moral obligation found in all societies, although it may have higher priority in interdependent cultures (Miller & Bersoff, 1994). Members of interdependent cultures are more likely to see reciprocity as a moral obligation, whereas those living in more independent cultures think of reciprocity as a choice.

6.1 Intergroup cooperation and contact

In chapter 9 we discussed from research on prejudice that showed that the mere contact between races and ethnic groups does not lead to improved cooperation. In the United States and in several European countries people of different ethnic background still live segregated lives often with hostility brewing under the surface of daily co-existence (Fasenfest, Booza, & Metzger, 2004). People with high levels prejudice avoid contact with target groups as it may confront their cherished prejudicial opinions (Herek & Capitanio, 1996). Interracial cooperation improved however, when the races had to cooperate in the military service during the Second World War (Stouffer, Suchman, DeVinney, Star, & Williams, 1949).

Pettigrew (1997) found that those with more egalitarian contact among minorities in Europe also had less prejudice. It could on the other hand, also be argued that southern whites who displayed prejudice during slave times had the most contact and at the same time the highest degree of bigotry. Why? It is obviously not contact alone that matters, but the nature of the contact.

The improved attitudes that developed between black and white soldiers in integrated units during the Second World War occurred because they came to see themselves as part of a larger group that was inclusive of all races facing a common enemy. In order to develop cooperative interdependence between members of varying groups they must share common goals (Gaertner, Mann, Murrell, & Dovido, 1989; Sherif et al, 1961). When people depend on each other to reach superordinate and overriding goals they develop mutual dependence and cooperative attitudes. As Allport (1954) argued members of competitive groups must interact on the basis of equal status. Aronson and Gonzales (1988) also advanced the importance of the equal status idea in their study on cooperation using the jigsaw method in the classroom. When each student had equal responsibility in learning the material and teaching it to other group members the result was more cooperation across a variety of ethnic groups, improved self-esteem, and better academic performance (Johnson & Johnson, 2000). It is the nature of the contact that improves cooperation. Working together allows members of competing groups to form a new group identity derived from the common superordinate goal (Dovido, Gaertner, & Valilidzic, 1998; Gaertner et al, 1989).

The United Nations was founded with the hope that it would be all-inclusive and would lead to cooperation and lasting peace. It is for sure that the world would not have been a better place without the United Nations. However, the founding hopes have not been attained, and much work remains. The modern world is a constant struggle between the obvious importance of cooperation in building nations, and the desire of sub national groups for recognition and a larger share of the pie. Identification with sub national groups emerges from the belief that it is doing poorly in the sharing of resources compared to the majority (Huo, Smith, Tyler, & Lind, 1996). Migration increases tensions in many parts of the world, particularly in Europe and the United States. New arenas for competition have opened up as some minorities climb their way up the economic ladder. Although societies try in various ways to accommodate new groups, whether legal or illegal

immigrants, there is little doubt that these arrivals test the old structures of cooperation and contribute to intergroup antagonism. How to develop more inclusive categories in the future so these become paramount in social interaction is the key challenge in developing more cooperative societies.

6.2 Perceived injustice and cooperation

Conflict occurs when one or more of the basic norms of equity, equality or needs are violated. We have seen that those who benefit from exploitation find ways of justifying inequity and inequality. People who find themselves as disenfranchised can respond with slave mentality and accept the unfair conditions of life. They can also demand compensation, or refuse to cooperate. We can observe these varying responses in modern revolutionary struggles, in the fight for racial equality and in women's struggles to be treated fairly (Lowe & Wittig, 1989).

6.3 The pressing superordinate goals requiring our cooperation

We live in complex and difficult times. Each day we are reminded of what divides us rather than of the goals we have in common. Yet there are many superordinate goals that must be met for the human race to survive. These goals include overcoming ethnic conflict, pollution, the AIDS epidemic, the effects of globalization, the warming of the planet, and the continued threat of annihilation by nuclear weapons. These are the superordinate goals of humankind that can only be solved if we cooperate and work together for increasing harmony in the world (see also Galtung, 2005). Research has shown that when people become aware of a common threat they are more likely to cooperate and develop a more cohesive outlook. Those who have experienced a common enemy, and faced death together have been known to develop very close ties. We see that among the Veterans of the War on Vietnam today in the United States (Elder & Clipp, 1988), and likewise among the veterans of the colonial war fought by the Netherlands against the Indonesians fighting for their independence halfway through the twentieth century. What can be more threatening than the aforementioned issues that endanger not only individual survival, but also the well being of society and the world.

The effect of external threats on group cohesiveness is well understood by the leaders of nations. The effort to demonize the enemy, to increase his potential threat in the mind of the population, is used in order to motivate national morale (Larsen, 1976). Hitler used the technique in unleashing war in Europe, and other leaders are using similar threats and fears today. Nevertheless we must come to a

consciousness that no nation can face the aforementioned real threats alone, that it is not possible to find security by increasing armaments, and that at the end of the day cooperative morality must find its place as the most effective means of dealing with external threat.

6.4 Trust and misperceptions

The world is still dominated by the belief that coercion is the only way to solve conflict. Yet all past wars refute this contention. Hitler thought that bombing Great Britain would bring the people to their collective knees, but it made the British even more determined to resist the enemy. The French and Americans thought coercion would lead to lasting peace in Vietnam to which end they bombed, tortured, and repressed the country without a peaceful outcome. History has proved the failure of these coercive methods. It is bewildering why national leaders still hang on to the idea that they can get their way by employing force and repression.

The key factor missing in moving the world toward more cooperation is the lack of trust in the opposing side. Leaders do not believe in the good intentions of the other side. At times those feelings are justified, but then again sometimes they are not and how can we tell the difference? Would a major conflict like the Cold war have short-circuited if trust had been employed in the early days of the Soviet Republic? Instead the hostile military intervention of the Western powers at the onset of the Soviet Union laid the basis for the mistrust that lasted for generations. What would have happened to the internal terror in the Soviet Union if Stalin had not have had the external threat of the West to justify his actions? We do not know, but the lack of trust was certainly used by both sides to keep the world on the brink of destruction.

The lack of trust was at least partly based on misperceptions. Of course the world is complex, and there are always many competing motives to take into account. However, keeping in mind the overriding superordinate goals the incompatibility between social systems should not have been allowed to interrupt cooperation during the Cold war, nor should it delay action today. As we have seen in an earlier chapter stereotyping is a response to reduce complexity. This form of absolute thinking leads to moral simplifications expressed in terms such as “evil empire”, and other negative categorizations. National leaders have in the past promoted these stereotypic responses and this has resulted in misperceptions. The behavior that emerges out of these misperceptions plays out as self-fulfilling

prophecies as each side behaves appropriate to the stereotype. It is worth keeping in mind that when two sides have widely varying views of each other and themselves, they cannot both be right and that solutions to conflict require complex thinking (Deutsch, 1986). The end of the cold war was possible when the Soviet Union developed leadership capable of more complex evaluations, and accepted the superordinate goal of avoiding nuclear catastrophe (Tetlock, 1988). Unfortunately the complex thinking in the Soviet Union did not prevent internal social collapse and the rise of new hatreds.

6.5. Cooperation: The overriding morality of an interdependent world

We cannot but accept that we are becoming increasingly interdependent. Those promoting (economic) globalization base their thinking on an increasingly interdependent world. They pay however little attention to the increasing disparity in income, or other costs of globalization including pollution and the warming of the planet. Large industries have been destroyed in developed nations as capital is moved to more profitable parts of the globe. The shortsightedness of this development will come on display in future conflicts between those who have and those who have not. People who lose out in this new world of competition experience injustice, and this inequity contributes to disharmony and despair. It is also not just about money anymore, globalization and changing climate threaten basic needs such as access to water. And while many parts of the world go hungry we turn agricultural products into ethanol!

Where this process will end is not clear. Ordinary people often understand and experience the threats earlier than leaders can accept or find solutions. Once certain benchmarks in the process of global warming have been passed make restoring the damage extremely difficult. Cooperation on this and other superordinate goals is imperative for our future.

Summary

This final chapter of the book addresses issues of morality. Morality refers to principles that guide human behavior and our lives. When applying the measuring stick of morality we ask questions about the ideal, how it would be to live in a more perfect world. Typically moral principles are inclusive and apply to all members of a society or culture. There is some evidence for the universality of some moral principles including the idea that we should not harm others, and that basic human rights possess sanctity. Cultures, however, vary in whether the principle is defined as a moral obligation or a social convention. Some behaviors

defined as social convention in one society are considered moral obligations in others. Socio-political concepts of freedom and individual rights are common to many societies. Some cultures also emphasize personal purity as a moral obligation.

There are three types of ethics governing moral behavior. These include autonomy that is expressed in the rights of the individual. The second ethic refers to community defining status and social hierarchy. A third ethic is divinity that expresses the obligations of personal purity. Some moral judgments are automatic and intuitive and more or less reflexive in response. Other judgments require complex cognition for instance in the abortion debate.

Our competitive society confronts us with moral issues and questions. Competition for scarce resources contributes to conflict as we saw in the study on the price of cotton and lynching in southern United States. Competition also contributes to ingroup cohesiveness while increasing conflict and scapegoating toward outgroups. The ethnic conflicts that occurred in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union and other socialist states are manifestations of competition, and feelings of injustice by sub national groups. Countries that are highly peaceful usually welcome diversity and show tolerance toward outgroups. A major source of conflict derives from the contradiction between selfish individual advantage and the common interest. Many of the important crises in the world like global warming are a consequence of small individual acts of selfishness that conflict with the common good.

Social psychology has developed a number of laboratory games to study competition and cooperation in the laboratory. The prisoner's dilemma game is a laboratory analogy of competitive behavior. The basic idea is whether the participant either cooperates or competes with another participant. Over the long run competition produces the lowest payoff, but players still persist in competition. The arms race is similar since it is all about defining the intent of the opponent. The competitive ideology in society primes people to act competitively in social interaction. Simply labeling a laboratory game as "Wall Street" is sufficient to elicit competitive responses. In the "Nuts" game the investigators showed that groups of people act in the same selfish way. The tit for tat game where each play receives the matching response is easy to read and players soon understand that cooperation is the best payoff in the long run.

Ideological competition is dominated by the fundamental attribution error. The world is torn apart in ideological conflict where opponents are labeled in absolute terms. The fundamental attribution error overlooks the common interests of all parties and exaggerates differences. When we assume the worst of others we feed competition and the desire to win. Competition and the fundamental attribution error are ingrained constructs, and the damage caused comes about in small incremental steps. We cannot rely on free will to solve these problems but require regulations and laws to counteract. The norms of social responsibility should be made more salient within society and between nations for the sake of the health of the Earth. Research supports the importance of complexity of thinking and the ability to empathize with opponents in order to find the common ground.

Competition is a moral issue because it has negative social consequences including increased stress and poor health. In individualistic competitive societies many people are so stressed that they seek to escape by overeating, by the use of tobacco, and the abuse of drugs. Stress produces a mode of constant physiological armament that is related to many diseases. As a concept stress is psychological because we observe individual differences to stress. Still when stress related responses reach epidemic proportion we must acknowledge that there is something fundamentally wrong in society.

Responses to stress occur within the context of relationships and culture. In independent societies appeals for healthy behavior is most efficacious when directed toward the individual and his social responsibility. In interdependent cultures social networks of support are crucial in changing unhealthy behaviors. Research has established a strong link between lifestyles and health. Cancer rates would be significantly reduced if people would stop smoking. Overeating and drunk driving are also lifestyle choices. Attitude toward health is a significant factor in maintaining health and avoiding unhealthy lifestyles. Values including an interest in health, personal vulnerability, and self-efficacy are central to health choices. Impulsiveness also plays a role in health threatening behaviors including unprotected sex, and drug or alcohol abuse. Poverty produces learned helplessness and prevents people from having the necessary resources critical to good health. Cultures differ in the amount of social support rendered to those facing stress and illness. Competitive societies produce income disparity where victims feel the effects of accumulated injustice with subsequent health consequences. The beneficial effects of social support can be demonstrated in the

speed of recovery by patients, and overall effectiveness in functioning.

Stress is always with us in some form, and societies have developed different ways to cope. Sometimes the aim is to reduce physiological arousal that accompanies stress through relaxation therapies including meditation and massage. Individual coping styles vary from hostility, to avoidance, to confronting stress directly. Personality plays a role as some people are optimistic, possess hardiness, and self-efficacy, all traits related to health functioning. One could say that the morality of a competitive society is measured in ill health.

Injustice produces poor health for the many as seen in lower birth weight at the start of existence, and shorter life spans. Justice morality refers to all the issues derived from unfairness in society, and people's responses to injustice and the ideology of a just world. When people become aware of injustice they take measures to restore the imbalance. Frequently that happens by blaming the victim of injustice for his or her own misfortune. Those who possess wealth often justify disparities in resources by referring to rights of inheritance or natural talent, and by status ideology that justifies exploitation. Equity theory and distributive justice address issues of disparity in wealth and resources that seem to be increasing all over the world. People are ego-centered and believe they contribute more than their fair share to any interaction, so what is considered fair is determined by their self-interests. When comparing for status people compare within their own social group, overlooking the larger injustice of disparities between social classes.

Three types of distributive ideologies describe distributive justice. Equity demands that rewards correspond directly to contributions made. This ideology favors the winners in society, the materialistic and the wealthy, who retain more of their resources given equity in distribution. Equality is the ideological underpinnings of socialism that requires that all receive an equal share of the resources. The world is far from fulfilling any approximation of equality, and it is increasingly unequal within and between societies. Need is distribution justice practiced in many families. The need justifies unequal distribution, or may be the family's way of approximating equality given unequal health and individual misfortune of their children.

Since we live in an imperfect world, law must decide disputes of distributory rewards. Authority decisions must be perceived as transparent when distributing

punishments and rewards or they will be seen as unfair. Procedural justice is a function of the neutrality of the decision maker. For an authority to be seen as legitimate it must be perceived to have integrity, and treat any offender of the law with respect. Since we do not live in ideal societies coercion is still a part in all forms of justice. However, we should at least make certain that the legal procedures do not judge the innocent guilty.

In some Western legal systems eyewitness testimonies and jury processes are central to the search for the truth in legal cases. The legal system places great value on eyewitness testimonies, a confidence that is misplaced. Juries tend to overestimate the accuracy of eyewitness to crimes, and misleading testimony is the most frequent cause for miscarriage of justice.

Social perception and memory play a role in identification of the offender. Accurate memory in turn depends on our ability to acquire, store, and retrieve material relevant to a case. Unfortunately, evidence shows many possibilities for error and misjudgment. Crime related events often occur suddenly, and under poor visual conditions, when victims and bystanders are emotionally upset, not ideal conditions for accurate identification. Also stereotypic effects involving minorities obscure identification in some cases. Memory is not photographic, but an active process. So what happens between the event and the time of recall may influence what is remembered. Misleading questions by police and lawyers can lead to problems of source identification of the memory, so what occurred elsewhere becomes part of a different memory. Misidentification occurs frequently during lineups because the eyewitness looks for similarity in features to the offender rather than identifying the actual offender.

Intuition seems the most reliable indicator for correct identification like when the face of the offender suddenly appears in the mind. Thinking about the face or other comparison processes may confound memory. Furthermore, some eyewitnesses have motives to lie and wrongly identify. Unfortunately it is not easy to tell when a person is telling the truth. Lie detectors and hypnosis are imperfect instruments in the search for the truth. In the false memory syndrome we have the tragic instance of innocent people being accused of events that never happened. Some people have for example remembered child sexual abuse with the help of a therapist, but research has strongly debunked the reliability of such memories. DNA has now provided a more solid scientific basis for offender identification, unfortunately DNA material is not always present at crime scenes

and identification still depends on unreliable eyewitness testimony.

The jury is the arbiter of the truth in legal cases. It is important to remember that juries are composed of average human beings with the same cognitive limitations and prejudices as other members of society. Pretrial testimony may prejudice the outcome against the defendant. The prosecution and the defense can either use the story approach or the witness sequence approach in presenting their cases to the jury. The story approach is stronger in persuasion and therefore injustice may be created by the manner in which testimony is presented. The most important factor in jury decisions is the majority opinion at the beginning of deliberation. At times the minority may have an effect on the level of guilt decided upon thus lowering the penalty for the accused.

The world needs more cooperation morality and reconciliation. From an evolutionary perspective people learned early in human history to cooperate because it contributed to survival. The most basic norm of moral reasoning is the reciprocity norm as described in the Golden Rule. Intergroup cooperation is partly a consequence of the type of contact between groups. The contact between slaves and master did not improve attitudes as the contact was based on inequality and exploitation. The literature points to the importance of equal status and common goals in contact situations that lead to more cooperative attitudes. The nature of the contact is critical as is the development of more inclusive group categories.

Conflict occurs when the basic norms of equity, equality, or needs are violated. Cooperative ideology therefore depends on our ability to develop fair access to resources, and to remove the varying forms of injustice from our social life. The world today has pressing superordinate goals the solution to which will determine the survival of the human race. Research has shown that when people become aware of common threats they cooperate and develop more cohesive and inclusive perspectives. Misleaders have also used external threat to demonize opponents in order to build group morale and resolve. However, cooperative morality is the most effective means of removing the significant threats we face now and in the future. History shows plainly that coercion does not solve conflicts. Mistrust and misperception of the opponent feed conflict.

We are living in an increasingly interdependent world. That reality requires that we find global solutions to the major problems of our times. It is ironic that those who advocate globalization ignore the most obvious contribution to conflict, the

increasing disparities in income and resources. Cooperation is imperative in order to find solutions to the problems defined by our common superordinate goals. Our future depends on our ability to use all our knowledge and resources in finding these solutions. Social psychology will provide important information in that quest.

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

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Oil Companies Spent Millions To Defeat Green New Deal In Washington State

Climate change appeared on the ballot in numerous states during the 2018 midterm elections, an indication of the growing concern among average citizens about the catastrophic effects of fossil fuel burning. But the struggle for regulations on emissions was repeatedly blocked by the money machinery of the oil industry. Record amounts of money were spent trying to derail the efforts of activists and labor unions fighting to save the environment. One such instance was over Initiative 1631 in Washington State where the oil industry spent more than $30 million trying to sabotage the struggle for a better world. In this exclusive Truthout interview, *Jeff Johnson* — who led the fight for the passing of *Initiative 1631* — reflects on the lessons activists nationwide can draw for the future from the climate change struggle in Washington State.

C.J. Polychroniou: Jeff, share with me the background of the movement you led in Washington State for climate change and Initiative 1631.

Jeff Johnson: For the record, I am one of seven leaders representing communities of color, the environmental community, tribes and labor that came together to form the Alliance for Jobs and Clean Energy. The Alliance spent three years building a climate justice movement based on principles of equity and giving assistance and voice to those most disproportionately impacted by climate disaster. Initiative 1631 was a product of this work.

I-1631 created a carbon fee of $15 a metric ton on carbon pollution and would have used the resulting $2.3 billion generated over five years to invest in clean energy, clean water and healthy forests – creating tens of thousands of family wage jobs and pulling 20 million tons of CO2 out of the air every year.

I-1631 would have codified a "Just Transition" for our communities in the following ways:

– Giving heating and electric assistance to low income families.
– Investing 35 percent of carbon revenue into disproportionately impacted communities.
– To qualify, grantees would have had to meet high-quality labor standards:

prevailing wages, apprenticeship utilization, community workforce agreements with local hire, clean provisions, clean record on employment [and] health and safety.
– Exempt Energy Intensive Trade exposed industries from fee but not requirements to lessen carbon emissions. This provision would have prevented the leakage of pollution and jobs out of state. It would have also protected our base manufacturing industry for helping produce the infrastructure we need for the clean energy economy.
– Income, health benefits, and pension support for dislocated fossil fuel workers along with two years of retraining benefits, peer counseling, and relocation expenses. These benefits were intended to make workers, their families and their communities whole.
– Fifteen-member oversight committee made up of a majority of individuals representing communities of color, tribes, environment, public health and labor. Those most impacted by climate disaster were put in the role of making the decisions about where clean energy investments were made.

Unions were divided over Initiative 1631, and generally speaking, the labor movement in the US hasn't been so far supportive of policies geared toward combating climate change. What led at least certain unions in Washington State to support your struggles, and do you see the rest of unions catching up with the menace of climate change any time soon?

Unions representing 60.2 percent of the 450,000 members of the Washington State Labor Council, AFL-CIO supported I-1631 and care passionately about addressing climate change. To a varying degree they understand the existential nature of the crisis we face and understand that working people are disproportionately impacted by climate disaster. Some of our unions, mostly building trades, were opposed to the initiative on the grounds that it would cost their members more money and/or crowd out dollars for investing in transportation projects. While I understand their arguments, I think they are both wrong and short-sighted.

As more and more jobs, income, property, lives and public resources are lost to climate disasters the understanding that we need to deal with the issue systemically will grow. Unfortunately, it is a moral race that we are currently losing.

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What is even more obscene is the fossil fuel industry is a major funder of the "Right to Work" movement and voter suppression laws aimed at quashing the voices of working people and communities of color.

Without all this oil money, I-1631 would have stood a much better chance of passage (polling numbers and field work had been consistently positive prior to the onslaught of TV, radio and social media ads). Nonetheless, it is difficult to get people to vote for increased costs during a time of outrageous income and wealth inequality. It is also hard to pass game-changing measures when progressive funders are slow to ante up resources and too many politicians and respected community leaders remain silent on the issue. Building a climate justice movement, a people's movement, takes time.

What are the lessons that we can draw from the Washington State climate change struggle?

We can't give up. I-1631 was not only game-changing but fell down on the right side of history. We now have an infrastructure of climate justice stewards that we created around our state over the past 18 months and we need to keep them working and organizing around clean energy issues, e.g., deep dive energy retrofits, 100 percent clean efforts, building out the EV, electrical vehicle[s], infrastructure, community solar, wind and geothermal projects, etc.

The Alliance for Jobs and Clean Energy will continue educating and organizing

until we create an equitable transition away from fossil fuels. And one in which community and labor voices determine what our economic future looks like.

What's next on your agenda with regards to climate change?

I have begun lobbying our Governor [Jay Inslee] on including the equity and "Just transition" language from the initiative into legislative efforts that he is forwarding for January 2019.

Given the existential nature of the climate crisis and the urgency before us, I will continue to speak out and organize on climate justice issues. To do anything less would be inexcusable.

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C.J. Polychroniou is a political economist/political scientist who has taught and worked in universities and research centers in Europe and the United States. His main research interests are in European economic integration, globalization, the political economy of the United States and the deconstruction of neoliberalism's politico-economic project. He is a regular contributor to Truthout as well as a member of Truthout's Public Intellectual Project. He has published several books and his articles have appeared in a variety of journals, magazines, newspapers and popular news websites. Many of his publications have been translated into several foreign languages, including Croatian, French, Greek, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish and Turkish. He is the author of *Optimism Over Despair: Noam Chomsky On Capitalism, Empire, and Social Change*, an anthology of interviews with Chomsky originally published at Truthout and collected by Haymarket Books.

A Complex World: My Interview

With Noam Chomsky

Noam Chomsky has revolutionized multiple fields of study from psychology to linguistics to political science. Chomsky changed the way human beings even think about language through such concepts as the universal grammar theory. In the field of psychology, Chomsky was instrumental in debunking Skinner's theory of behaviorism. In the field of political science, with books such as *Manufacturing Consent* to *Fateful Triangle* to *Hegemony or Survival*, and many others, Chomsky enlightened people all over the world, from individual citizens to revolutionary political leaders. It is for these reasons, and more, why it is no surprise that Chomsky is regarded as one of the most influential thinkers of our time.

Shortly after the 2016 U.S. elections, I had the privilege of being able to sit down with Professor Chomsky at his office for a chat on an array of different topics, such as what is the fate of an honest intellectual, the concept of pre-modern societies, ethnic conflict, the religious nation-state, federalism, the political vulgarization of genocide, what is power, the value of truth and reconciliation commissions, and anarchism.

What is the Fate of An Honest Intellectual?

Noam Chomsky There's a history, goes back 2500 years, back to the origins of recorded history, classical Greece, and the biblical records. Go back to Greece; there was a man [Socrates] who was accused of corrupting the youth of Athens by asking searching questions. His fate was to be killed with poison—given the hemlock. In the biblical record, which is partly accurate, partly not, there were critical intellectuals—the word that is used for them is prophets. That is a dubious translation of an obscure Hebrew phrase. What they were, if you look at what they were actually saying, were critics. They criticized the acts of the evil kings, they gave geopolitical analysis, warned that the policies were going to lead to disaster; they called for helping widows and orphans and so on. That is what today we call dissident intellectuals. What happened to them? They were imprisoned, driven into the desert, maligned; the worst of the Kings, King Ahab,

condemned the Prophet Elijah as a hater of Israel because he was condemning the acts of the evil Kings—it is probably the origin of the notion of anti-American and anti-Israel, and so on. And it goes the same way throughout history.

Going up to modern times, the term intellectual, in the current sense, is really not used before the late 19th century. It came into use at the time of the Dreyfus trial in France, and Emile Zola and others who supported Dreyfus and condemned the state and the military. They were critical intellectuals [who] were bitterly condemned by the mainstream of the intellectual classes. Zola himself had to flee France for his life. That is the treatment of dissidents.

Shortly after that came the First World War, which was very striking, a lot of commentary on it now since it is the centenary. One of the most interesting things is the reaction of intellectuals. On every side, the intellectual classes lined up passionately in support of their own state. In Germany, there was a manifesto of 93 leading intellectuals instructing the civilized world that Germany is defending the great cultural legacy of Beethoven, Immanuel Kant, and so on, and the world should join them—on the Western side, the same. There were critics, [such as] Bertrand Russell in England, Rosa Luxembourg, Karl Liebknecht in Germany, Eugene Debs in the United States; they were put in jail. That is intellectuals.

What is the price that you have personally paid as an intellectual for criticizing the actions of your own community?

The United States is a pretty free society these days—and people with a degree of privilege are not subject to—it is not like Turkey today where you are thrown in jail if you say something the President doesn't like—so it is vilification, marginalization, denunciation. Actually, there were penalties, but they were self-induced. I was involved extensively in civil disobedience, resistance, came pretty close to a long jail sentence, but I can't call that repression—it was things I was doing consciously.

I know people like Norman Finkelstein, he faced certain consequences; he was not able to get tenure at his university.

It is a special case. It is a very rotten one, but it is a special case. Norman Finkelstein exposed the dishonest criminality of a Harvard Law Professor Alan Dershowitz, who went berserk, and tried in any way he could think of to destroy

Finkelstein to the point of—I can go through the details—but it was Dershowitz's jihad to try to protect himself. He knew that he could not answer Finkelstein's criticisms. So the way he picked was to try vilification, denunciation, massive efforts to prevent him from getting tenure, and yes, so that happened. It is a rotten case, but it is a special case.

Pre-Modern Society

Pre-modern society—pre-modern means not having assimilated and accepted the basic values of the enlightenment and since—and that's a large part of the Western world. Take the United States, leader of the free world, most powerful state in human history, supposedly a beacon of freedom and enlightenment. Take, say, global warming, one of the major problems humans have ever faced, it is hard to convince people in the United States it is a real problem. The reason—40 percent of the population thinks it can't be a problem because Jesus is coming in a few decades. Is that pre-modern? Yeah, it is pre-modern. It is a culturally conservative society—pre-modern in many respects.

Take Europe—Austria and Germany—two countries which evoke some memories from the 1930s. In Austria, a neo-Nazi party is likely to take the Presidency. In Germany, ultra-right nationalist party with neofascist tendencies is defeating the mainstream Merkel party in local elections. Is that pre-modern? Was Nazism pre-modern? Depends what you mean by modern. If you mean by that not having assimilated the fundamental values that were brought forth during the enlightenment and since, yes, much of the world is pre-modern.

In fact, take a phenomenon that is taking place right at this moment. There is a conference in Morocco, as you know, the COP22 conference. It is an international effort to put some teeth in the global warming agreements. What is happening at COP22 is that the values and hopes of civilization are being upheld by China—a harsh authoritarian state is in the lead in trying to mobilize support to deal with this massive problem. The United States, the leader of the free world, is at the end of the line trying to draw the train backwards. It is an astonishing phenomenon, and it is not commented on.

Ethnic Conflict

Until not so long ago, liberal, socialists, and Marxist theoreticians assumed that conflicts involving ethnicity were a phenomenon of pre-modern society and that

such conflicts would progressively fade away. Why haven't we as a society been able to overcome the futility of engaging in ethnic conflict—the uselessness. Why haven't we been able to overcome that?

To some extent, we have. Not totally. There has been progress. Take Europe; for centuries, Europe was the most savage place in the world. The Europeans were just slaughtering one another. The Thirty Years War of the 17th century, maybe a third of the population in Germany was wiped out. There was another 30 years war in the 20th century—from 1914 to 1945—a total horror story. I don't have to tell you what happened in Europe, the rest of the world. Since 1945, there have not been any major wars in Europe. Is that because we are more civilized? No. It is because it was understood that the next time you have a war, you are finished. Humans have created the capacity to destroy themselves and everything else, and we have come very close to blowing everything up. There have been many cases where terminal nuclear war was extremely close and the threat is in fact increasing now.

Religious-Nation State

Why is it dangerous to recognize a country as a Muslim state or a Buddhist state or a Jewish state or a Christian state? Why is that—why is that dangerous?

It depends what your values are. If you believe in democracy, states are states of their citizens—not of some privilege sector of the citizens. So if the United States were called a "white state" that would be outrageous, similarly, if it were called a Christian state and similarly if Pakistan is called an Islamic state or if Israel is called a Jewish state. That is saying that our society recognizes two categories of citizens, "the privileged categories" and the "others", and that violates the most elementary principles of democratic freedom. I should say if these designations are just symbolic, maybe it does not matter. So, for example, with the United States if the official day of rest is Sunday instead of Thursday, okay, it is not a big deal. It is symbolic.

Federalism

With rebel conflicts and separatist conflicts being waged in various parts of the globe, what role do you believe federalism can play in de-stabilizing these conflicts?

Well, take, say, Europe again. One of the greatest achievements of post-war Europe—now under threat incidentally—is a slow move towards a kind of federalism. The Schengen agreement, which permits free passage among the countries of Europe, is a step towards a more tolerant and civilized society; it is a kind of federalism. It has positive and negative aspects because of the way it is implemented. Because of the way it was integrated into the Eurozone—which is something separate from the EU—it has led to a situation where sovereignty has passed from populations to the bureaucracy in Brussels with the German banks hanging over their shoulders. That is where basic decisions are made. It does not matter who people elect for their own government, the major decisions are out of their hands. That has led to extreme resentment—justified resentment—taking self-destructive paths, but the resentment is understandable. That is part of the background for the rise of the ultra-right parties which appeal to the population on the grounds that they no longer control their own destiny. If [Marine] Le Pen wins in France, as she might, she might very well implement what they call "Frexit"— a referendum to pull France out of the European Union, which might destroy it. Now we are back to Europe of competing nationalities, which [has] a pretty ugly past.

Political Vulgarization of Genocide

How has the concept of genocide become, as you state, politically vulgarized and why is it dangerous to politicize the concept of genocide?

Well, genocide had a meaning in the early stages. I mean, it is not a matter of the definition but the way it was understood. Genocide meant what the Nazis did to the Jews, for example. That was genocide. By now the term is used so broadly that people even talk about committing genocide against five people, or a massacre somewhere with a couple hundred people is called genocide. And in fact, it is used in a very restrictive way. We use the term genocide to refer to the atrocities committed by someone else, not our own. Let us take a real case—the Clinton and Blair sanctions on Iraq—that actually was called genocide by the distinguished international diplomats who administered the oil for food program, the so-called "humanitarian" aspect of the sanctions. Denis Halliday, who resigned in protest, because he said they are genocidal, and Hans von Sponeck, who followed him, resigned on the grounds that the [sanctions] amounted to genocide. Hans von Sponeck, in fact, published a detailed book about it called *A Different Kind of War*. They did condemn the sanctions as genocidal. What was the result? Try to

find a copy of von Sponeck's book. Try to find a reference to it. Try to find a review. Try to find anything. This is wiped out of western commentary. The last time I looked, there was not a single review in the United States. The only review in England I think was in the communist party newspaper.

So what needs to be done to reverse the political vulgarization of the concept of the genocide, can it still be used?

It can be used if we are willing to become civilized to recognize that crimes are crimes whether they commit them or we commit them. We could, for example, listen to Justice Robert Jackson—the Chief Prosecutor of Nuremberg—his injunction to the tribunal. He spoke to the tribunal and said: we have to recognize that crimes are crimes whether they commit them or we commit them. We are handing these defendants, he said, a poisoned chalice, and if we sip from it, we must be subject to the same conditions. If not, the whole trial is a farce. Is that applied on and when Britain and the United States invaded Iraq? It is a textbook example of aggression with absolutely no justification, textbook example of what the Nuremberg tribunal called the "supreme international crime" which differs from other war crimes in that it includes all of the evil that follows. For example, the rise of ISIS, and the death of millions of people, includes all of that. Can you find any commentary in the United States even calling [the US-UK invasion] a crime?

Obama is greatly admired on the left because he said it was a blunder. It is just like German generals after Stalingrad who said that the two front war was a blunder—which it was—we should have knocked out England first. That is as far as you can go. The head of Human Rights Watch, Kenneth Roth, when this was specifically brought to his attention can only go as far as saying that [Iraq] was a mistake. Was it a mistake when the Nazis committed aggression? Was it a mistake when Russians invaded Afghanistan? If you are a loyal communist, it was a mistake. We do not call it that. We cannot rise to the level of civilization—even the head of Human Rights Watch, in the leading left liberal journal of intellectuals in the West, the New York Review, [and] Obama, any of them can't say that we committed a crime. At most, we made mistakes.

Go back to Justice Jackson. Anybody listen to his words? Then take Vietnam. The worst crime of the post-war era, worst crime, millions of people killed, three countries destroyed, people still dying from the chemical warfare that was

initiated by John F. Kennedy and expanded. Is it a mistake? Is it a crime? Is anybody guilty, responsible?

Right now, the Obama administration is sponsoring a big memorial of the Vietnam War, and Obama made a, you know, passionate speech with his elevated rhetoric about what happened. He even did talk about crimes; he talked about the crimes that were committed against the American veterans who were not treated properly. What about the Vietnamese? Let's take Jimmy Carter, the human rights President, right after the war, [in] 1977 he was asked in a press conference, "do we owe any debt to Vietnam?" He said we owe them no debt because the destruction was mutual. 1977 human rights President, was there a comment? A few commented on it. I commented on it, and a couple of other people. Until we rise to a minimal level of civilization, we can't use the term genocide.

What is power?

Individuals like John Mearsheimer, Kenneth Waltz, and Joseph Nye have each defined what they consider to be "power" in international relations. You have criticized power structures and power systems. But I would like to know what you consider to be power in the field of international relations.

That is pretty straight forward. Power is the ability to issue orders which others have to follow; to the extent that you can do that, you have power. The orders do not have to be verbal. It can be actions, so if you can invade Iraq, worst crime of the 21st century, and you get no censure or no reaction for it—that is power.

Truth and Reconciliation Commissions

In the aftermath of conflicts, to what extent are truth and reconciliation commissions a viable form of achieving justice and accountability?

I think they make sense in many situations. For example, take South Africa, there were horrible crimes committed under apartheid. But to try to punish people for those crimes would have torn the society to shreds and undermined any hope of progress and development, so a decision was made by the ANC—which I think is understandable—to avoid direct punishment and to settle for a truth and reconciliation commission to expose the nature of what happened, so at least it is kind of understood. Same was done in Central America, Brazil, and East Timor. Take East Timor, which was, if the term genocide has any meaning, what

Indonesia did in East Timor, with the backing of the United States, Britain, other western countries, even Sweden, that comes about as close to genocide as anything since the Second World War. East Timor, finally, won its independence. Should they carry out war crimes trials against Indonesia, Australia, United States, and others? Or should they try to mend the fences with Indonesia and maybe settle for a truth and reconciliation commission? I think the latter, which is what they are doing. They have to live in the world, right?

Let us take where we happen to be sitting right now. The native population suffered a migrant crisis of an incredible kind, not the kind that we talked about, a migrant crisis where the immigrants come in with the intention of exterminating and expelling the population. That is not what we call a crisis, but that is what happened here. There are remnants of the people that used to live here. They have a reservation in Cape Cod and naturally, should they institute war crime trials against the people who live in their homes? It would not make a lot of sense. It would make a lot of sense to bring out understanding of what happened to call for reparations and so on, but not war crimes trials. It just means nothing in these circumstances. Is it genocide? The population of this territorial United States, the time the colonists arrived, nobody knows for sure, maybe 10 million or something like that. By 1900, when there was census, there were about 200,000. The Western hemisphere had about 80 million people when Columbus arrived, and pretty soon about 90 percent of them were gone.

Anarchism

I think as an anarchist, in the long term, you believe that centralized political power ought to be eliminated and turned down to the local level, so what role (if any) would federalism play in your long term vision of anarchism?

The general anarchist pictures—at least within the tradition I associate myself with—are highly federalist, but they assume that they are based on the notion of voluntary association. So there should be self-determination in all institutional structures of life. But voluntary associations could extent to regions and countries, internationally, that is a kind of federalism supported from below. I think it makes good sense in a complex world.

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