Sonali Kolhatkar

07-20-2024 ~ Don’t be distracted by the anti-immigrant rhetoric this election. The real impact on democracy comes from moneyed elites.

When President Joe Biden said in a phone call to MSNBC’s Morning Joe recently, “I’m getting so frustrated with the elites… the elites of the party. I don’t care what the millionaires think,” former Labor Secretary Robert Reich wrote that, “It was the first time any modern president has admitted that the elites of the party are the millionaires (and billionaires) who fund it.”

While Biden’s comments were in reference to the movement to oust him from the 2024 Democratic presidential nomination, it was an important admission about who really wields power in our democracy.

We may think of elections in terms of one person, one vote. But, not only do undemocratic structures such as the electoral college dilute our votes, the money that elites flaunt places a hefty thumb on the scales of who represents us. Yet, we hear more about the threat of, say, immigrants than the threat of billionaires, to our democracy.

Billionaires have tried very hard to buy influence and political power. For example, former New York City Mayor Mike Bloomberg donated $20 million toward efforts to reelect Biden this year alone. Four years ago, Bloomberg spent a whopping $1 billion in just four months in an attempt to be the 2020 Democratic presidential nominee. In a testament to the fact that we have a modicum of democratic accountability left within the system as it stands, he failed spectacularly, as others have often done. Voters seem to have a distaste for electing the ultra-rich but have yet to disavow the de facto proxies that their money helps elect.

While billionaires remain influential within the Democratic Party, the last election for which spending records exist shows that moneyed elites overwhelmingly prefer the Republican Party. The nation’s 465 wealthiest people collectively donated $881 million to influence the 2022 midterm elections, most of it to the GOP.

Now, the richest person in the world—not just in the United States—Elon Musk, has jumped into the 2024 race. His proxy, Donald Trump, in surviving an assassination attempt, earned Musk’s endorsement, as if that was somehow a qualification to run the nation. Musk has vowed to pour $45 million a month into a new Super PAC that’s working to elect Trump. The amount is pocket change for someone currently worth nearly $250 billion. Musk could spend $45 million a day every day this year and it would barely make a dent in his bottom line.

According to a New York Times analysis, Musk went from supporting Democrats to Republicans because he was “[a]ngry at liberals over immigration, transgender rights, and the Biden administration’s perceived treatment of Tesla.” At a meeting earlier this year that embodied the specter of a secret cabal of billionaires seeking to buy an election, Musk reportedly conversed with his fellow wealthy elites about Republican control of the U.S. Senate. At that meeting, he reportedly worried that “if President Biden won, millions of undocumented immigrants would be legalized and democracy would be finished,” as per the Times.

He’s not the only one. The Republican Party as a whole has decided that undocumented people voting in U.S. elections is the single biggest threat facing the country—not billionaires like Musk raining down dollars to drown our democracy.

Undocumented immigrants are human beings, not dollar bills. And yet they hold far less sway over elections than Musk’s money. There is no mass amnesty for undocumented people in the U.S. currently—this isn’t Ronald Reagan’s America after all. And even if there was, there is a long, complicated path from legal status to the voting status that citizenship allows.

I should know, I’ve been there personally, having entered the U.S. as an immigrant on a student visa before obtaining legal residency and then citizenship. My journey was far more straightforward than that of Melania Trump and still, it was 18 years before I could legally vote after first stepping on American soil.

And yet every four years, immigrants become political footballs, flayed at the proverbial whipping posts of democracy for merely existing—usually by both political parties. Right-wing voters waved signs saying “Mass Deportations Now” at the Republican National Convention, while Democrats took a less vulgar approach by appeasing anti-immigrant forces with asylum restrictions, hoping it would garner voter support.

Sean Morales-Doyle, writing for the Brennan Center for Justice, asks us to imagine being an undocumented immigrant in the U.S.: “Would you risk everything—your freedom, your life in the United States, your ability to be near your family—just to cast a single ballot?” Not only are there harsh penalties, including prison time, for illegally casting ballots, but even the rabidly far-right Heritage Foundation has found only 85 cases of supposed undocumented voters out of 2 billion votes cast from 2002 to 2023. That works out to a 0.00000425 percent of the vote.

Let’s compare this to the influence of money on elections. The nonpartisan group Open Secrets, which tracks money in politics, finds that “the candidate who spends the most usually wins.” In 2022, about 94 percent of the candidates for the House of Representatives who spent the most money won their race, while 82 percent of those running for the Senate who spent the most money won their seats. Much of their donations come from Super PACs, which bundle high-dollar amounts from wealthy Americans.

While billionaires such as Bloomberg have had trouble getting themselveselected, they have had little trouble getting others elected—or unelected as the case may be. Already this year, moneyed interests in the form of the pro-Israel lobby group AIPAC, defeated progressive congressional representative Jamaal Bowman of New York in his primary election, and have their sights set on representative Cori Bush of Missouri next.

Should we be concerned about the imagined influence of undocumented immigrants or the actual influence of billionaire dollars on our elections? In a 2020 poll, Pew Research found that most Americans felt billionaires were neither good nor bad for the nation. Only about a third felt they were bad for the nation—roughly the same percentage that fears there is an effort to replace U.S. voters with immigrants for the purposes of electoral power.

USA Today writer Marla Bautista captured Musk’s role succinctly in asking, “Can Elon Musk buy Trump the White House?” It’s a valid question, one that we should be centering as election season heats up.

Think of the U.S. democracy as an old, large, sailing ship attempting to cross a vast ocean with all voters on board working to steer it across to shore. Every hole in its sail, every shark circling it, impacts its ability to succeed. In such a scenario, an undocumented person attempting to vote is akin to a speck of dust on the hull. Every million-dollar donation is a wave buffeting the ship. Enter men like Musk, whose money becomes a veritable tsunami aimed directly at democracy to overwhelm and topple it, destroying everything and everyone on board.

Sure, we may have sailed successful voyages most of the time (with the years 2000 and 2016 being among the worst exceptions). But with billionaire influence becoming larger every election, there’s an ever-increasing chance that democracy may not reach the shore. Will we be distracted by the dust on our hull or the massive wave rising before us?

By Sonali Kolhatkar

Author Bio: Sonali Kolhatkar is an award-winning multimedia journalist. She is the founder, host, and executive producer of “Rising Up With Sonali,” a weekly television and radio show that airs on Free Speech TV and Pacifica stations. Her most recent book is Rising Up: The Power of Narrative in Pursuing Racial Justice (City Lights Books, 2023). She is a writing fellow for the Economy for All project at the Independent Media Institute and the racial justice and civil liberties editor at Yes! Magazine. She serves as the co-director of the nonprofit solidarity organization the Afghan Women’s Mission and is a co-author of Bleeding Afghanistan. She also sits on the board of directors of Justice Action Center, an immigrant rights organization.

Source: Independent Media Institute

Credit Line: This article was produced by Economy for All, a project of the Independent Media Institute.

Emma Rae Lierley – Rainforest Action Network

07-21-2024 ~ Millions of tons of palm oil are ‘missing’ from Big Food’s deforestation-free claims.

Palm oil is one of the most used vegetable oils in the world and is found in a large variety of packaged products, from shampoos and lipstick to cookies and frozen pizza. Unfortunately, the production of palm oil has been linked to severe environmental and social costs, including significant rainforest destruction and human rights abuses, particularly in countries like Indonesia and Malaysia, which together account for around 85 percent of global exports.

In the United States, out of the seven commodities that were linked to forest destruction, palm oil was the most “significant contributor” to deforestation, according to a March 2024 report. This report by Trase, a “data-driven transparency initiative,” is based on an analysis of figures from October 2021 to November 2023. “[T]he United States’ direct imports of seven forest risk commodities… [are] exposed to at least 122,800 hectares of tropical and subtropical deforestation. This is an area comparable in size to the city of Los Angeles,” states the report.

If any part of the palm oil supply chain is linked to the destruction of rainforests and peatlands or human rights abuses, the product is known as Conflict Palm Oil.

According to a May 2024 report by my organization, Rainforest Action Network (RAN), palm oil is increasingly being used “as an animal feed additive,” however, “much of the international trade in palm oil-based animal feed is obscured for consumers and other stakeholders.”. This lack of transparency raises questions about the actual role of the world’s largest palm oil traders in deforestation and social conflict.

Responding to this crisis and bowing to consumer and stakeholder pressure, many companies have adopted the “No Deforestation, No Peatland, No Exploitation” (NDPE) policy to ensure responsible production. This corporate pledge is meant to prevent further deforestation, safeguard “High Conservation Value” (HCV) areas, eliminate new development on peatlands, and protect Indigenous communities.

Hidden Palm Oil in Animal Feed
Palm oil is found in many foods and household products, but it’s also used in animal feed, especially for dairy cows, and ends up in products like milk, cheese, ice cream, and chocolate. Because it is an indirect ingredient, it is known as “embedded palm oil”—often hidden and not included in companies’ deforestation-free commitments. An analysis of 2022 data by RAN revealed that palm oil-based animal feed was the largest category of palm oil products imported to the United States.

Our research reveals that most companies—15 out of 17—importing palm oil-based animal feed into the U.S. lack NDPE policies, thereby increasing the risk of deforestation and human rights abuses. Companies must include palm oil-based animal feed in their NDPE policies and deforestation-free commitments and be transparent about using palm oil in their supply chains.

Major companies like Nestlé and Ferrero make claims about lessening the impact of deforestation across their product lines. These claims are misleading because vast amounts of palm oil are entering their supply chain as animal feed is not included in their accounting.

Dairy companies like Lactalis, Danone, and Fonterra are not taking enough action to ensure their products, such as milk, cheese, and chocolate, do not contribute to deforestation. Only Unilever provided an estimate to our researchers about how much palm oil-based animal feed forms part of its supply chain. Swedish-Danish company Arla has promised that there will be no palm oil in its milk supply network by 2028, ensuring it is deforestation-free.

Our research estimates that if Nestlé accounted for the embedded palm oil in its supply chain, its claim of being 96 percent deforestation-free could drop to 72 percent (in terms of crude palm oil equivalent).

Increasing Demand for Palm Oil-Based Animal Feed
Initially, animal feed contained palm kernel expeller (PKE), a co-product of crushing palm kernels. Now, new palm oil additives, known as “palm fat,” “palmitic acid,” “rumen-protected fats,” or “calcium salt” (when fortified with calcium), are used in cow diets to boost milk production and quality. These additives have become popular, especially in North America. In Canada, up to 90 percent of farmers use these additives for their dairy cows. (Similar U.S. statistics are unavailable because there is very little industry oversight about its use.)

Palm oil-based animal feed, especially calcium salt, was mainly exported from Indonesia and Malaysia to countries with large dairy industries, including the U.S., the European Union, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and various Middle Eastern and South American countries from 2020 to 2021. Another additive, palm fatty acid distillate (PFAD), is a product of the palm oil refining process and was previously considered a waste product.

High demand for PFAD means it’s now considered an essential part of the palm oil market. Its use is not only limited to animal feed but extends to other products as well, such as biofuels, soaps, and candles. PFAD, therefore, sells for 80 percent more than palm oil. This raises concerns about its production, leading to deforestation and peatland loss, similar to virgin palm oil. Stearin, a triglyceride, is another co-product used in animal feed and foods like margarine and bakery shortening.

Tracking palm oil-based animal feed in global trade is challenging due to a lack of specific trade codes. According to our analysis of more than 30,000 shipments of palm oil products to the U.S. in 2022, feed-grade palm oil was the largest imported category of such products, making up more than a third of U.S. palm oil imports.

Most of these products came from Indonesia, where palm oil production is closely associated with deforestation. This illustrates the significant role of palm oil-based feed in causing environmental degradation.

Embedded Palm Oil Hidden in Global Supply Chains
Many consumer goods companies that adopt NDPE policies claim their supply chains are “deforestation-free,” but they often fall short and fail to meet these expectations. Our research, based on data from 2022 and 2023, indicates that only three of the ten leading consumer goods companies had NDPE policies that they implemented for all their forest-risk commodity supply networks. Additionally, none of these ten companies fully implemented NDPE policies, putting their deforestation-free claims into question.

One of the main issues is that palm oil supply chains, which comprise several co-products and intermediaries, are difficult to track. As a result, palm oil-based animal feed is often unmonitored in company reports. The best practice would be to ensure that all suppliers of palm oil products adopt NDPE policies. Some companies report on the use of soy-based animal feed but not palm oil. The Consumer Goods Forum, an industry-led network of more than 400 companies, includes soy-based feed in its roadmaps, created for various commodities to ensure “forest positive production,” but omits palm oil. If NDPE policies were to cover all parts of the supply chains that use palm oil-based products—including animal feed—companies could avoid sourcing Conflict Palm Oil and making misleading deforestation-free claims.

Major Dairy and Consumer Goods Companies Feeding the Demand
Our researchers analyzed the policies of 14 of the world’s largest dairy and consumer goods companies to see if they ensure that palm oil-based animal feed in their supply chains meets NDPE standards. These companies drive demand for palm oil-based animal feed by producing dairy, chocolate, and other processed foods. The companies analyzed include Arla, Dairy Farmers of America, Danone, Ferrero, Fonterra, FrieslandCampina, Lactalis, Mars, Mengniu, Mondelēz International, Nestlé, Saputo, Unilever, and Yili.

Out of the 14 major companies, only Arla has a strong NDPE policy that covers palm oil in animal feed. However, the company won’t execute the embedded palm oil part of the policy until 2028. This is later than the 2025 deadline set by the EU, where “products that contain palm oil will have to be proven deforestation-free by the beginning of 2025,” according to the RAN report. The other 13 companies either have weak policies or none, which means they might still be linked to deforestation and human rights abuses.

Only seven companies, including Arla, Danone, and Unilever, admit that palm oil-based animal feed is a risk for deforestation. Furthermore, most companies don’t discuss how much embedded palm oil they use. Unilever is an exception, revealing it used 30,000 tonnes of palm oil in its dairy products in 2022, though it didn’t explain how it calculated this figure.

Meanwhile, some companies make misleading claims about being deforestation-free. For instance, Nestlé says 96 percent of its “primary supply chain” of palm oil was deforestation-free in 2023 but doesn’t count the palm oil in animal feed. Without better policies and honest reporting, consumers cannot trust these claims. Companies must include embedded palm oil in their policies and be more transparent to ensure the protection of our forests.

The European Deforestation Regulation and Palm Oil-Based Animal Feed
In June 2023, the EU introduced regulation 2023/115, also called the EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR). This regulation mandates companies trading in products like cattle, cocoa, coffee, palm oil, rubber, soy, and wood to ensure that these products are not linked to deforestation activities.

This policy affects companies that source their milk or dairy products from the region. European companies like Arla, Danone, Ferrero, FrieslandCampina, and Lactalis, as well as Nestlé and Unilever, have significant operations within the EU and are affected by this regulation. Danone claims 91 percent of its supply chain is deforestation-free. But if, for example, 10 percent of its dairy cows were to be given palm oil-based feed, substantial palm oil could enter its supply chain without NDPE guarantees.

Ferrero and Mars make deforestation-free claims for their palm oil supply chains but do not account for embedded palm oil in animal feed, making their claims misleading. Both companies lack transparency in their methodologies and rely on second-party rather than independent third-party verification.

Lack of Proper Regulation for Monitoring Palm Oil-Based Animal Feed Trade
Exporters are crucial in the palm oil supply chain, but it is challenging to identify them and ensure they follow the NDPE policy. RAN’s analysis of customs data from 2022 found that about 25 percent of exporters shipping palm oil-based animal feed from Indonesia and Malaysia to the U.S. were either unknown or listed as logistics companies.

Among the known exporters, around two-thirds of the feed-grade palm oil products entering the U.S. during the same year were not covered by public NDPE policies. The two largest exporters from Indonesia and Malaysia, Jati Perkasa Nusantara and Nutrion International, accounted for nearly one-third of total exports of palm oil products; they both lacked NDPE policies.

While nine exporters had NDPE policies, they were not reporting adequately on their implementation. These policies are only effective with proper monitoring and independent verification. Most exporters rely on self-reported compliance instead of independent checks regarding the execution of the policy guidelines. A lack of policies and traceability means European importers will struggle to ensure their products are deforestation-free, risking non-compliance with the EUDR.

Meanwhile, according to RAN’s report, out of 17 importers of feed-grade palm oil products to the U.S., most were not covered by NDPE policies.

Only two importers had published NDPE policies: Wilmar International and Perdue AgriBusiness, which accounted for just 12 percent of imports. The largest importers, Nutrition Feeds and Global Agri-Trade Corporation, responsible for 57 percent of palm oil products imports, didn’t adhere to NDPE commitments. Overall, 84 percent of the palm oil-based animal feed products imported by known companies to the U.S. in 2022 were not covered by NDPE policies.

The Paradox of Self-Governance
Profit-based corporations that have adopted NDPE policies are often in an uncomfortable position. By taking the pledge, a company would have to bear the financial cost of implementing it. By not taking the pledge, a company would sustain a blow to its public image. In a 2023 paper published in the Journal of Business Ethics, Janina Grabs, associate professor of sustainability research at the University of Basel, Switzerland, and Rachael D. Garrett, a professor of conservation and development at Cambridge University, United Kingdom, call this a “paradox” in “goal-based sustainability governance” while referring to the Indonesian palm oil sector.

“You cannot have both [no deforestation and smallholder inclusion]; you can have one, you can have the other,” a large integrated supply chain company representative told them during the anonymous interviews they conducted as part of their research. “And if you want to have both, you have to put some skin in the game and say, I will support change, and it will cost me. The problem is, if your neighbor doesn’t do it, your marketing team is going to say, ‘Why do we do that? We’re going to get hit, and we’re going to lose market shares.’ It’s an uncomfortable balance to find.”

The Role of the Consumer Goods Forum
The Consumer Goods Forum comprises leaders from 400 big retailers and manufacturers, including Danone, Nestlé, and Unilever. These companies sell products worth euro 4.6 trillion, many containing palm oil. In 2010, the CGF promised to stop deforestation by 2020 but has failed to meet this goal.

In 2020, the CGF started the Forest Positive Coalition to stop deforestation in supply chains. This coalition has a Palm Oil Roadmap to ensure responsible palm oil use by adopting NDPE policies. “However, the CGF’s methodology for calculating ‘Palm Oil Deforestation and Conversion Free’ volumes does not state the need to ensure volumes include the volume of palm oil used in animal feed. This is in contrast to the methodology for soy, which details the types of ‘embedded soy’ products that need to be included,” points out the RAN report. This omission could result in misleading deforestation-free claims by its members and the Forest Positive Coalition.

To stop deforestation, the CGF must enforce NDPE policies for all palm oil products, including animal feed, and ensure transparent reporting.

Policies and Transparency Are Essential
With climate change and biodiversity loss worsening, stopping the production and use of Conflict Palm Oil and preventing environmental and social injustices globally is crucial. Companies need transparent, well-monitored supply chains to ensure adherence to global regulations and sustainability promises. It is no longer acceptable to let millions of tons of palm oil, especially in animal feed, enter the U.S. without proper tracking.

The solution to this problem is simple: All companies must adopt a strict NDPE policy that includes embedded palm oil. The Consumer Goods Forum’s 400 companies and palm oil importers and exporters must also follow this policy. Brands must be honest about the products used in their supply chains and take tangible steps to stop human rights abuses and deforestation.

Transparency and companies taking responsibility for their actions are critical to protecting forests and upholding Indigenous Peoples’ rights.

By Emma Rae Lierley

Author Bio: Emma Rae Lierley is a senior communications manager at Rainforest Action Network. She is a contributor to the Observatory.

Source: Independent Media Institute

Credit Line: This article was produced by Earth | Food | Life, a project of the Independent Media Institute.

07-20-2024 ~ Most royal families continue to face a decline in relevance, yet their ongoing efforts to adapt means they cannot be discounted entirely.

Recently appointed British Prime Minister Keir Starmer pledged his loyalty to British King Charles III on July 6, 2024, continuing a tradition that dates back centuries. However, since the leadership role taken by Prime Minister David Lloyd George in World War I, the monarchy’s political influence has become progressively ceremonial and even more precarious since the death of the late Queen Elizabeth II in 2022.

This trend is not unique to the UK; in recent centuries, the role of royalty in politics has declined considerably worldwide. As political ideals began challenging royal authority in Europe, European colonial powers began to undermine their authority overseas. The strain of World War I helped cause several European monarchies to collapse, and World War II diminished their numbers further. After, the Soviet Union and the U.S. divided Europe along ideological lines and sought to impose their communist and liberal democratic ideals elsewhere, and the remaining monarchs faced accelerating marginalization.

Today, fewer than 30 royal families are politically active on a national scale. Some, like Japan’s and the UK’s, trace their lineages back more than a millennium, while Belgium’s is less than 200 years old. Several have adapted by reducing political power while maintaining cultural and financial relevance, while others have retained their strong political control. Their various methods and circumstances make it difficult to determine where royals may endure, collapse, or return.

Alongside the UK, the royals of Belgium, Spain, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands have all seen their powers become largely ceremonial. Smaller European monarchical states like Andorra and the Vatican City are not hereditary, while Luxembourg, Monaco, and Liechtenstein are—though only the latter two still wield tangible power.

Attempts to exercise remaining royal political power have often highlighted its increasing redundancy. Belgian King Baudouin’s refusal to sign an abortion bill in 1990 saw him declared unfit to rule before being reinstated once it passed. Luxembourg’s Grand Duke Henri meanwhile lost his legislative role in 2008 after refusing to sign a euthanasia bill. Following increasing scrutiny of Queen Beatrix’s influence, the Dutch monarch’s role in forming coalition governments was transferred to parliament in 2012, and she also lost the ability to dissolve parliament.

The British monarch’s decline in political influence is also evident, but it can still prove useful. The royal family’s global popularity is used to project soft power, while royal visits can help seal important agreements, particularly in countries with other royal families. The leaders of 14 other countries also pledge allegiance to King Charles III as their head of state.

Additionally, the monarchy can be used to bypass certain democratic processes. In 1999 the British government advised Queen Elizabeth II to withhold Queen’s Consent, preventing parliamentary debate on the Military Action Against Iraq Bill, which would have restricted the ability to take military action without parliamentary approval.

Royal efforts to cultivate soft power and maintain a positive public image have also been crucial for their survival. Belgium’s royal family is seen as a necessary source of political stability and unity. In Spain, former King Juan Carlos played a leading role in the country’s transition to democracy in the 1970s. Modernizing their image as neutral political guardians with relatable attributes who engage in advocacy and humanitarian work often gives European royal families higher approval ratings than politicians.

Royal families have also downsized in recent years for discretion and to reduce costs. In 2019, Sweden’s king removed royal titles, duties, and some privileges from five of his grandchildren. The Danish queen implemented similar changes in 2022. Norway’s royal family now consists only of the King, Queen, Crown Prince, and Princess, while the British royal family has hinted at further reducing its current number of 10 “working royals.”

Despite these efforts, European royal families continue to face scandals and intense public and media scrutiny. In 2020, Spanish and Swiss authorities began investigating former Spanish King Juan Carlos for allegedly receiving $100 million from a deal with Saudi Arabia. In 2023, Belgium’s Prince Laurent was accused of fraud and extortion by Libya’s sovereign wealth fund. The UK royal family’s recent treatment of Megan Markle and the departure of Prince Harry and Prince Andrew’s association with Jeffrey Epstein have also rocked Britain. The British monarchy’s unprecedented challenges are reinforced by record-low support since the death of Queen Elizabeth II in 2022. The King’s and Princess Kate’s cancer diagnoses have also added to the sense of fragility.

Across Europe, cultural shifts, concern over royal expenses, and increasing political irrelevance have threatened its royal families. Movements like the Alliance of European Republican Movements, created in 2010 to abolish monarchies altogether, reflect the increasing disregard for royal power.

The opaque nature of royal finances, however, has granted some respite. Officially, Grand Duke Henri of Luxembourg’s $4 billion makes him Europe’s richest royal. However, suspicions abound regarding billions more in assets like trusts, jewelry, and art collections that point to larger degrees of wealth.

Extensive efforts go into hiding these fortunes. Liechtenstein’s royal family operates a bank criticized by the U.S. Senate for aiding clients in tax evasion, dodging creditors, and other misconduct. Queen Elizabeth II once used Queen’s Consent to change a draft law so that her wealth remained concealed, while the Panama Papers leaks revealed huge undisclosed European royal assets. Europe’s poorest royal family in Belgium saw King Phillippe declare the monarchy’s wealth at roughly £11 million in 2013, but the European Union Times estimated it at £684 million.

Estimates for King Charles’s worth range from $750 million to more than $2 billion, while the fortunes of the entire British royal family, also known as “the Firm,” can range from $28 billion to almost $90 billion. Britain’s monarchs also enjoy more institutionalized ties to national wealth than other European royals. Through the peerage system that upholds British nobility, a network of support from wealthy Dukes, Marquesses, Earls, Viscounts, and Barons helps the monarchy remain firmly entrenched in the UK’s wealth centers.

Royal families in the Asia-Pacific consist of Thailand, Malaysia, Cambodia, Brunei, Japan, and Tonga. Thailand’s King is the world’s richest, with a net worth of $43 billion, but faces his own controversies relating to personal scandals and the use of political powers that have led to an anti-monarchy movement. Malaysia has a rotational system of nine sultans that rule their own states and serve as head of state every five years. While formal authority is limited, the sultans command influence in cultural and religious matters, and despite their powers being curtailed by constitutional amendments, occasionally intervene in politics. In Cambodia, the monarchy is similarly politically and culturally influential.

Brunei’s absolute monarchy has granted its Sultan, Hassanal Bolkiah, supreme authority over his country for more than 50 years. His $288-billion fortune makes him the second-richest monarch in the world. However, as a microstate, Brunei’s influence in international affairs is limited. The reduced power of Japan’s monarchy since 1945 has meanwhile made it most like European monarchies, though its powers have remained steady since then. In sub-Saharan Africa, partnerships with British colonial authorities have allowed Lesotho’s monarchy to retain largely ceremonial influence, while Eswatini’s King Mswati III exerts strong control over the country.

Nonetheless, alongside Europe, most regions have seen general declines in royal power over decades. Bucking that trend is the Middle East, where monarchies previously had limited authority under the Ottoman Empire. Its collapse after World War I allowed them to increase their power considerably, even those under loose French and British protectorates.

By exploiting their increasingly valuable resource reserves, Gulf monarchies in particular managed to thrive. Today, absolute monarchies exist in Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and Kuwait with complete control over media, government branches, and law enforcement. No opposition is tolerated, and they are backed by religious lobbies that reinforce their status as custodians of cultural traditions. Despite the heavy-handed approach they largely enjoy strong support, even among the youth—the Saudi Crown Prince has long been popular among younger Saudis in particular.

As in Europe, Middle Eastern royal wealth is often hidden and difficult to discern. Estimates for the combined wealth of the Saudi royal family range from roughly $100 billion to $1.4 trillion. Other estimates put the UAE’s Al Nahyan family of Abu Dhabi as the richest royal family in the world, with more than $300 billion in wealth. The royal families of Kuwait and Qatar also have fortunes often measured in the hundreds of billions.

The other Middle Eastern royal families in Oman, Jordan, and Morocco, have less influence, but still more so than in Europe, and have also withstood democratization pressures by promoting stability. During the Arab Spring, as other Middle Eastern states faced revolutions and civil wars, the monarchies and their political systems survived in place.

However, the downfall of royal families in Egypt, Tunisia, Iraq, North Yemen, Libya, and Iran during the 20th century shows the risks of instability. Today, this often comes from within the royal families themselves. Saudi royal disputes regularly play out in public, including a mass purge in 2017. In 2023, Jordan’s crown prince was placed under house arrest for an attempted coup, only to emerge days later and pledge loyalty to the king. The 2017–21 Qatar-Saudi Crisis meanwhile saw Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt sever diplomatic relations and blockade Qatar following accusations of supporting terrorism and supporting Iran.

While some of their positions may be precarious, royal families maintain some solidarity among them. Marriages between European royals throughout history mean that the current ruling royals in Europe are all related, similar to some Middle Eastern monarchies. Following controversy over corruption allegations, Spain’s Juan Carlos meanwhile lived in exile in the UAE for two years.

Royals have also taken more active roles to support one another. The British royal family played a significant diplomatic role in supporting the Arab monarchs against the Ottoman Empire in World War I. And in 1962, the British monarchy, which had a close relationship with the Brunei monarchy, helped lobby to send British forces to the country and quash an armed rebellion, maintaining British influence in Southeast Asia.

Other royal families could still return to power. More than 20 royal families remain without a country to reign over, with Spain’s monarchy being restored in 1975 and Cambodia’s in 1993 the latest to be reintegrated into politics. In Romania in 1992, an estimated one million people took to the streets to welcome former King Michael, who abdicated in 1947. The daughter of former King Michael, Margareta of Romania, now lives in Elisabeta Palace in Bucharest, and other family members have taken a growing role in politics.

Bulgaria’s former Tsar, Simeon II, lived in Spain after being overthrown in 1946 and returned to Bulgaria after the communist government crumbled, serving as prime minister from 2001 to 2005. Albania’s Prince Leka, grandson of former King Zog I, attempted to reinstate the monarchy in a 1997 referendum but failed. In 2007, family members of former Italian King Umberto II sought damages for their exile and the return of assets, countered by Italy’s government suing for damages due to royal collusion with Mussolini.

The Italian royal family’s case shows how disputes among exiled royals can have geopolitical implications. Greece’s royal family now lives in London, frequently appearing at royal functions. Meanwhile, members of Iran’s former royal family, as well as descendants of Ethiopia’s and Russia’s, live in the U.S. Although there is no current method or desire to launch a political movement to put them back into power, leveraging diaspora communities’ support for royalty can still help host governments wield influence through them.

Having survived fascism and communism, monarchies have largely relinquished political power in the modern liberal world order. Yet, as symbols of state continuity, some monarchs have maintained their relevance by providing long-term stability. While incompatible with communism, royalty’s adaptability to democratic and fascist regimes highlights their resilience. Their ability to reinvent themselves and demonstrate their usefulness to contemporary politics may secure their survival—though their dwindling numbers suggest this will remain challenging.

By John P. Ruehl

Author Bio: John P. Ruehl is an Australian-American journalist living in Washington, D.C., and a world affairs correspondent for the Independent Media Institute. He is a contributing editor to Strategic Policy and a contributor to several other foreign affairs publications. His book, Budget Superpower: How Russia Challenges the West With an Economy Smaller Than Texas’, was published in December 2022.

Source: Independent Media Institute

A little over a year ago, WHO declared the end of the COVID-19 health emergency. The pandemic had disastrous consequences for workers, especially those in the informal sector. According to a World Bank report, the last five years will reflect the lowest figures for economic growth in the last 30 years: 40 percent of low-income countries will remain poorer than they were before the pandemic.

In Chile, 2 million jobs were lost during the pandemic. A report by the Economics Institute of the Catholic University of Chile indicates that the employment rate could only recover to pre-pandemic levels by the end of 2026.

In this context, informal sector workers face an unaccounted crisis: the non-recognition of their work leaves them outside the ambit of adequate public policies for their recovery. As part of this sector, sex workers face the great limbo of the legal status of sex work in Chile: it is not prohibited, but it is not recognized as work either. Persecution is concentrated in the places where it is practiced. Herminda González, president of Fundación Margen, tells me that this option leaves only one option for the workers: the streets. From that place, the Fundación provides the assistance that the State does not provide.

The Solidarity Fund
During the quarantine, Herminda and Nancy Gutierréz (Margen’s spokesperson) took advantage of the early morning darkness to sneak into the Foundation’s headquarters, where they distributed boxes of food for the sex workers. “We did it because we knew the girls were waiting,” says Herminda. “And if it wasn’t us, who was going to do it? Only the people help the people.”

As the pandemic progressed, they decided to design protocols for safe sex. “Along with condoms, we distributed masks and latex gloves,” because, despite the restrictions, the work did not stop. “There were colleagues who earned a lot of money during the pandemic,” because obviously, the risk increased the value of the services. However, in any situation that meant not being able to work, the girls were completely unprotected, as they were not covered by any of the government schemes designed to protect workers recognized as such.

“Many of the sex workers support their families; they are mothers, daughters,” Gonzalez tells me. In the absence of the state—which only donated food to the foundation during the entire pandemic—“the aunts,” as the younger workers affectionately call the foundation’s leaders, decided to create a solidarity fund for sex workers, where allies and close clients made donations that allowed them to survive the pandemic crisis.

The Solidarity Fund is still active and is used to support sex workers during the hardest times of the year, including when it is time to buy school supplies, for example.

The Irruption of the Virtual
One of the strategies to continue working during the pandemic was the leap to virtuality. “As everything evolves, so does sex work,” Herminda tells me. The new generations play a fundamental role in this evolution. The range of women in sex work has expanded to include, for example, university students.

“Here in Chile, there are only the poor and the rich,” says Herminda, the president of Margen “But people disguise themselves as middle class just because they can send their children to school or pay a rent.” So, when in a poor household there are children who study and also someone who starts studying at a high school or university, that someone looks for the job that best suits him or her.

Sex work allows young women to manage their time in a way that other jobs do not, but because of the clandestine situation, it does not allow them access to mortgages, loans, or retirement. The foundation believes that the legalization of sex work would allow all of this and, in addition, would put an end to the guilt that sex workers carry with them.

“Sex work is not like in the old days when it was limited to intercourse and the brothel,” Herminda tells me. Today it is very diverse: it also includes work via webcams and the telephone, as well as selling photos. “All the exchange of your body for money is sex work, but we find it hard to recognize it because of the stigma.”

Sex Exchange for ConvenienceIn the early 1990s, Monsignor Alfonso Baeza, a human rights priest, was a parish priest in downtown Santiago. He would park near the church, and sex workers would come there to be blessed. The priest offered them a room in the parish to meet, urging them to organize. There, sitting at a large table while drinking tea, Herminda González heard for the first time the voices of other sex workers, talking about their children, their problems at home, at work, their happiness, and their sorrows. At that time, she also met Eliana Deltone, the first sex worker union leader in Chile.

In 1995 they held the first national meeting of sex workers and began to hold workshops, to which women came who were not sex workers, but who were interested “even in sexuality advice,” Herminda tells me. Then they organized the first “sex for convenience exchange workshop.” Amid the economic precariousness of the 1990s, “there were women who slept with the greengrocer, the butcher, the bus driver,” but they did not recognize this as sex work. “It took us years to recognize ourselves,” says González, “as dancers, we couldn’t realize that we were doing the same thing as other sex workers. It wasn’t until they began to take workshops and learn about the subject that we realized that we were doing the same thing, that maybe we weren’t trading sex for coitus but we were showing our bodies for others.” Herminda is convinced that this is a process. “It is not easy to say, ‘I am a sex worker’ because discrimination begins [there].” That’s why girls today prefer to say they are “escorts,” as if that were a university degree.

Potential Customers
Herminda says that hypocrisy is one of the main obstacles to the legalization of sex work in Chile. “Everyone is a potential client,” she says. But there is a backlash, “because they speak and decide for us. Who decides that sex workers can’t be sex workers because that’s what a woman who is more educated or has more money thinks?”

The Margen Foundation and the Angela Lina Union made great progress and were even received by the former president of Chile, Michelle Bachelet.

However, this link with the state ended after the pandemic. Herminda comments that the stigma extends to feminism. When sex workers attended the Women’s Day march wearing their dance costumes, they were singled out by other women for “promoting the objectification of the body,” says Herminda. However, she says, when the women gathered to chant “The Violator is You,” and when they did this bare-chested, then they were not accused of objectification. This moral hypocrisy creates its own discrimination.

The “aunts” of the Margen Foundation confront discrimination with actions. In the middle of the cold Santiago winter, they hand out condoms and lubricants as well as hot chocolate and tea to the workers, who are forced to be on the streets by the restrictions of the law. Although the pain and fear of having been so close to death “never goes away,” says Herminda, “the pandemic also left us with good things: the girls’ confidence in us.”

By Taroa Zúñiga Silva

Author Bio: This article was produced by Globetrotter.

Taroa Zúñiga Silva is a writing fellow and the Spanish media coordinator for Globetrotter. She is the co-editor with Giordana García Sojo of Venezuela, Vórtice de la Guerra del Siglo XXI (2020). She is a member of the coordinating committee of Argos: International Observatory on Migration and Human Rights and is a member of the Mecha Cooperativa, a project of the Ejército Comunicacional de Liberación.

Source: Globetrotter

Richard D. Wolff

07-11-2024 ~ Both Trump and Biden imposed high tariffs on imported products made in China and other countries. Those impositions broke with and departed from the previous half century’s policies favoring “free trade” (less or minimal government intervention in international markets). Free trade policies facilitated “globalization,” the euphemism for the post-1970 surge in U.S. corporations’ investing abroad: producing and distributing there, re-locating operations there, and merging with foreign enterprises there. Presidents before Trump had insisted that free trade plus globalization best served U.S. interests. Both Democratic and Republican administrations had enthusiastically endorsed that insistence. Dutifully performing ideological support duties, they stressed how globalization’s benefits to U.S. corporations would “trickle down” to the rest of us. Globalizing U.S. corporations used portions of their profits to reward both parties with donations and other electoral and lobbying supports.

Our last two Presidents reversed that position. Against free trade they favored multiple government interventions in international trade, especially imposing and raising tariffs. Instead of advocating free trade and globalization, they promoted economic nationalism. Like their predecessors, Trump and Biden depended on financial support from corporate America as well as votes from the employee class. Many U.S. corporations and those they enriched had shifted their profit expectations in response to the competition they faced from new, powerful non-U.S. firms. The latter had emerged during the free-trade/globalization conditions after 1970, above all in China. U.S. firms increasingly welcomed or demanded protection from those competitors. Accordingly, they financed changes in the political winds and shifts in “public opinion” toward economic nationalism.

Trump and Biden thus endorsed pro-tariff policies that protected many corporations’ profits. Those policies also appealed to those for whom economic nationalism offered ideological comforts. For example, many in the United States grasped the relative decline of the United States and its G7 allies in the global economy and the relative rise of China and its BRICS allies. They welcomed an aggressive counteraction in the forms of tariff and trade wars. Both corporations (including mass media) and their subservient politicians worked to build popular and voter support. That was needed to pass the tax, budget, subsidy, tariff, and other laws that would realize the shift to economic nationalism. A key argument held that “tariffs protect jobs.” A political struggle pitted the defenders of “free trade” against those demanding “protection.” Over the last decade, those defenders have been losing.

These days, most candidates and parties perform this particular ideological task for capitalism: persuading Americans that tariffs protect jobs. Note, however, that over the 50 years before around 2015, the same parties and their candidates mostly performed the opposite ideological task. Then they denounced tariffs as unnecessary, inefficient, and counterproductive government interferences. “Free international markets” would, they insisted, be much better for workers and capitalists. However, we need not and should not have been fooled then or now. Neither ideological claim is true.

Free trade profits some industries, but not others. Those that profit rely on exporting their outputs to foreign markets, invest there, or rely on importing products from there. Similarly, tariffs profit some industries (those they protect), but not others. As industries evolve and change, so do their relationships with international trade. Correspondingly, their attitudes toward free trade versus tariffs change.

Capitalist economies almost always pit pro-free trade against pro-tariff protection industries. Their battles vary from open, public, and intense to quiet and under-the-table. Their weapons include bribes, donations, and other kinds of deals offered to politicians mostly by the employers in the interested industries. Both sides also compete to enlist the public and especially voter support—“public opinion”—in order to swing politicians their way. Employers on each side spend millions to persuade the employee class to support their side. Politicians usually split according to which side offers more donations threatens more opposition in the next election, or has spent more to shape public opinion. Each side seeks to prevail, to make government policies favor free versus tariff-protected trade. One way to achieve that is endless repetition by politicians, business leaders, journalists, and academics of one side’s perspective in the hope and expectation that it becomes “common sense.”

Each side’s arguments are driven by their respective industries’ financial self-interest, not any shared commitment to the “truth” about tariffs versus free trade. As we show below, the truth is precisely that neither tariffs nor their opposite, free trade, necessarily protect jobs. At best, both protect some jobs at the cost of losing others. The truth is that we cannot know—and thus cannot measure—all the effects on profits or jobs caused by either free trade or protectionism. So politicians cannot know what the net effect on jobs will be of either free or protected trade policies of governments.

A simple example can clarify the basic points. Chinese auto-makers currently sell high-quality electric vehicles (EVs), cars, and trucks, globally, at very competitive prices. Those EVs can be found on roadways around the world, but not in the United States. That is because, until recently, a 27.5 percent tariff was applied in the United States. For example, if a Chinese EV’s port-of-entry price was, say, $30,000, it would cost a U.S. buyer $30,000 plus the 27.5 percent tariff (an additional $8,250) for a total U.S. price of $38,250. Recently, President Biden raised that tariff from 27.5 percent to 100 percent, thereby raising the Chinese EV’s price for potential U.S. buyers to $60,000. The EU plans similarly to raise its tariff against Chinese EVs from 10 percent to 48 percent, thereby raising the price to potential EU buyers to $44,400.

Those tariffs protect makers of electric vehicles inside the U.S. and EU precisely because those EV makers need not add any tariff to the prices they charge. Thus, for example, if EVs made in the U.S. and EU had cost $40,000, they would have been uncompetitive with the Chinese EVs priced at $30,000. Prospects of profit for them would have been grim. With the tariffs now imposed by the U.S. and proposed by the EU, their EV makers see profit bonanzas. Makers in the EU can raise their EV price from $40,000 to, say, $43,000, and still be cheaper than Chinese EV imports suffering the planned EU tariff and thus priced at $44,400. EV makers in the U.S. can raise their prices to, say, $50,000, sharply improving their profits while still outcompeting Chinese EVs priced at $60,000 (including the 100 percent tariff).

Barring interference from other factors (possible automation, changing tastes for cars, and so forth), we may assume that the raised tariffs increased the profits of EV makers inside the U.S. and EU. We may also assume that those tariffs also saved jobs at those U.S. EV makers. But that is never the end of the story. EV jobs are not the only jobs affected by raised tariffs on EVs.

For example, many corporations in the United States buy fleets of EVs as inputs. Many compete with corporations outside the United States who likewise buy such fleets as their inputs. The raised U.S. tariff seriously disadvantages EV fleet-buying firms inside the United States. Firms inside the United States cannot buy Chinese electric vehicles for $30,000 each. They have to pay much more for the tariff-protected U.S.-made EVs. In stark contrast, their competitors outside the United States can buy Chinese EVs at the far cheaper $30,000 price. It follows that those outside competitors can offer lower prices for whatever products they sell because they enjoy lower (because free of tariffs) input costs. Those firms will gain buyers for their products around the world at the expense of their inside-the-U.S. competitors.

Jobs will likely be lost in such competitively disadvantaged firms inside the United States. While raising tariffs on Chinese EVs may have protected U.S. workers at EV producers inside the United States, it also deprived other U.S. workers of jobs in other U.S. industries competitively disadvantaged by the EV tariff.

In our examples above, U.S. and EU makers of EVs can and likely will raise their prices because of tariff protection. In this way, tariffs tend to worsen inflations. Inflations in turn tend to hurt exports as rising prices lead customers to buy elsewhere. Reduced exports usually mean reduced jobs making such exports.

Still more factors shape tariffs’ job effects. Often “forgotten” by tariff boosters are possible retaliations by affected other countries. Evidence already suggests retaliatory Chinese tariffs coming on imports of U.S.-made large-engine vehicles. If that happens, U.S. exports of such engines to China will shrink or end. Jobs entailed in those exports will also end, offsetting job gains from the U.S. tariffs imposed on Chinese EVs.

Since China is the chief target of U.S. and EU tariff policies it is important to see how China can retaliate in ways that threaten large U.S. and EU job losses. China has now successfully surrounded itself with allies in the BRICS (a total of 11 countries). The economic damage inflicted upon China by U.S. tariffs incentivizes China to offset much or all of that damage by shifting to sell output instead to the world outside of the United States and the EU and especially to its BRICS partners. As China redirects its exports, that will also impact where its imports will be sourced. All those changes will affect many U.S. and EU industries and the jobs they sustain.

Honest economists shrug and plead irreducible uncertainty when asked whether tariffs will “protect” jobs. No matter how hard-pressed or bribed to give a definitive answer, honesty precludes it. Nonetheless, politicians eager to get votes by promising that a tariff they impose will protect jobs can rest easy. They will easily find economists who will give or sell them the answers they want to hear. Trump and Biden did and do.

The implications of this analysis for the U.S. working class are significant. The struggle between free traders and protectionists pits shifting alliances of capitalist employers against one another. One alliance of capitalist employers fights another to win the working class’s votes. Each side promotes its false narrative about what is the best policy for jobs.

The working class should not be fooled or distracted by these free trade versus protectionism struggles among capitalists. Whoever wins them remains profit-driven first and foremost. The ultimate impact on jobs is not a priority for any of them. It never was. The working class’s interest in shaping the quantity and quality of jobs can only be genuinely prioritized if society progresses beyond capitalism. That happens when employees (running democratic worker coops) replace employers (dominating hierarchical capitalist enterprises) in the driver seats of factories, offices, and stores. When employees have become their own employers, they will make the quantities and qualities of a society’s jobs a key policy objective rather than a side-effect of policies focused elsewhere.

By Richard D. Wolff

Author Bio: Richard D. Wolff is professor of economics emeritus at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, and a visiting professor in the Graduate Program in International Affairs of the New School University, in New York. Wolff’s weekly show, “Economic Update,” is syndicated by more than 100 radio stations and goes to 55 million TV receivers via Free Speech TV. His three recent books with Democracy at Work are The Sickness Is the System: When Capitalism Fails to Save Us From Pandemics or Itself, Understanding Socialism, and Understanding Marxism, the latter of which is now available in a newly released 2021 hardcover edition with a new introduction by the author. Wolff’s new book, Understanding Capitalism, will be published and released this summer (2024) by Democracy at Work.

Source: Independent Media Institute

Credit Line: This article was produced by Economy for All, a project of the Independent Media Institute.

C.J. Polychroniou

07-11-204 ~ A united left is a formidable opponent that cannot only halt the surge of neo-fascism, but can also offer a positive and inspiring vision for the future.

Far-right forces have gained ground across Europe, particularly in Austria, France, Germany, and the Netherlands. In fact, the Netherlands has a new government, a coalition between far right and right, and the far right came first in the first-round of France’s snap election. But fearful of the prospect of a neo-fascist and xenophobic party in government, French voters came out in record numbers and rallied not behind Ensemble—the centrist coalition led by President Emmanuel Macron—but behind the coalition of left forces calling themselves the New Popular Front (NFP), delivering in the end a blow to Marine Le Pen’s National Rally (RN) which had made historic gains in the first round and topped the poll with 33.15 percent of the votes cast. NFP came in first in the run-off election, with 188 seats, but falling short of majority.

France’s snap parliamentary election results help us to make sense of the surge of the far right and offer valuable lessons for the left all over the world, including the U.S. where a centrist democrat and a wannabe dictator face off in November.

First, it is crystal clear that the main reason for the rise of Europe’s far right, authoritarian, and ethnonationalist forces is the status quo of neoliberal capitalism. The neoliberal counterrevolution that begun in the early 1980s and undermined every aspect of the social democracy model that had characterized European political economy since the end of the Second World War has unleashed utterly dangerous political forces that envision a return to a golden era of traditional values built around the idea of the nation by fomenting incessant and socially destructive change.

True to its actual aims and intent, neoliberalism has exacerbated capitalism’s tendency to concentrate wealth in the hands of fewer and fewer, reduced the well-being of the population through mass privatization and commercialization of public services, hijacked democracy, decreased the overall functionality of state agencies, and created a condition of permanent insecurity. Moreover, powerful global economic governance institutions—namely, the unholy trinity of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization—took control of the world economy and became instrumental in the spreading of neoliberalism by shaping and influencing the policies of national governments. It is under these conditions that ethnonationalism, racism, and neofascism resurfaced in Europe, and in fact all over the world.

In France, the rise of the far right coincided with President François Mitterand’s turn to austerity in the 1980s as his government fell prey to the monetarist-neoliberal ideology of the Anglo-Saxon world. Once Mitterand made his infamous neoliberal turn, the rest of the social democratic regimes in southern Europe (Greece under Andreas Papandreou, Italy under Bettino Craxi, Spain under Felipe Gonzalez, and Portugal under Mario Soares) tagged along, and the eclipse of progressivism was underway.

Less than two decades later, reactionary political forces had emerged throughout Europe as extreme neoliberal economic policies had paved the way for the emergence of political tendencies with an eye to exploiting the catastrophic social and economic impacts of neoliberalism by tapping into a huge reservoir of public anger and discontent with the establishment. Indeed, as neoliberalism tightened its grip on domestic society, far right forces gained more ground. The surge of Marine Le Pen’s RN occurs against the backdrop of Macron’s obsession with converting France into a full-fledged neoliberal society.

A crucial lesson offered by the results of France’s snap election (as well as by Labour’s victory in UK) is that economics remains the rule of the day. Political forces that seek to promote multiculturalism and social rights while pushing at the same time the neoliberal economic agenda will, in the end, get the short end of the stick.

Initially, Macronism was a strategy of trying to appeal to a wide range of center-left and center-right voters by defending secular social rights and even making gestures to LGBTQ people but always with an eye to transforming the social contract and freeing up the “energy of the workforce.” Macron’s “progressive liberalism” philosophy worked up to a point. It backfired in a big way along the way when workers, farmers, and minority groups realized that their economic future was at stake by Macron’s pro-market policies—and that was clearly far more important to them than concerns over social issues and even the environment itself. The “yellow vest” movement that rocked Macron’s presidency in 2018 and left an “indelible mark” on French politics was the first indication that any set of government reforms that carried a disproportionate impact on the working and middle classes was going to be severely challenged.

In the end, Macronism even lost the support it initially had from women’s and LGBTQ organizations, and not simply because Macron’s stance on social policies hardened along the way as part of an opportunistic and desperate attempt on his part to stir conservative voters away from the arms of the far right. It is worth pointing out here that, unlike most social movements which are male-dominated, the “yellow vest” movement was distinguished by the “high proportion of women” that took part in the protests. It was economics that drove French women out into the streets, demonstrating against Macron government’s unjust tax reform measures.

Again, the lesson here is that voters are unlikely to be deceived by the sort of political rhetoric that emphasizes diversity, multiculturalism, and environmental concerns while policies are being pursued in favor of a brutal neoliberal economic setting. Social rights under neoliberalism is a mirage. This is a critical lesson for all left forces in an age in which multiculturalism and the politics of identity play such a prominent ideological role. We see the counter effects of this ultimately “pro-capitalist-stratagem” in the U.S. where voters without college degrees, which amount to over 60 percent of the population, are overwhelmingly on Trump’s camp. A similar tendency can be seen in the Latino community as a growing segment of Hispanic voters are joining Trump’s GOP party.

For the benefit of political expediency and ideological integrity alike, the left should stick to its universalist traditions while remaining of course sensitive to diversity and particularism. But it has no business playing the game of identity politics that has become the hallmark of corporate capitalism and of the liberal political establishment. Last thing we need is a cultural and post-material left morphed into a movement vying for space in a capitalist dominated universe.

More important, as the unique experience of the formation of a coalition of leftist parties in France for the snap parliamentary election attests, the left’s best hope for making major inroads in today’s western societies, which are unquestionably highly complex and diversified, is by introducing and promoting an attractive yet realistic economic agenda that addresses the immediate concerns of average people but without losing sight of the broader objective of the leftist vision which is none other than social transformation.

The “shocking” success of the New Popular Front in the run-off election in France did not materialize simply because French voters wanted to halt the rise of the far right to power, which is the mainstream interpretation. French voters backed NFP for two key reasons: first, because they finally saw the left leaving behind factionalism and, second, because they were lured by its radical manifesto.

For the first time since the 1930s, not only has an anti-fascist alliance been revived in France but there is now hope for the future of the left because of its economic vision, assuming of course that the left can stay united beyond the election. And this is perhaps the greatest lesson leftist forces should draw from the French snap elections: a united left is a formidable opponent that cannot only halt the surge of neo-fascism but can also offer real hope for a humane and sustainable future.

Source: https://www.commondreams.org/opinion/french-elections-lessons
Our work is licensed under Creative Commons (CC BY-NC-ND 3.0). Feel free to republish and share widely.

C.J. Polychroniou is a political economist/political scientist who has taught and worked in numerous universities and research centers in Europe and the United States. His latest books are The Precipice: Neoliberalism, the Pandemic and the Urgent Need for Social Change (A collection of interviews with Noam Chomsky; Haymarket Books, 2021), and Economics and the Left: Interviews with Progressive Economists (Verso, 2021).