ISSA Proceedings 2014 – Theory Of Argumentation: The Argumentological Twist Is Necessary

Abstract: Today we need some kind of background knowledge of argumentation theory. It is the philosophy of argumentation, or argumentology. Argumentology studies ontological, epistemological etc. fundamentals of argumentation. Argumentological ontology answers the following question: "Does a Homo arguer really exist as a theoretical problem?" Argumentological epistemology deals with the problem of cognitive backgrounds of theory and practice of argumentation. Argumentological methodology comprises logical, rhetorical, and dialectical approaches to argumentation.

1. *Introduction*

Nowadays theory of argumentation (TA) is the field of research and study with vague basic principles and intellectual tools of the domain conceptualization. There are a lot of definitions of the term 'argumentation' ('argument'). Indeed, according to Ch. Perelman "for argumentation to exist, an effective community of minds must be realized at a given moment" (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1971, p. 14). On the contrary, L. Groake stresses that "photographs, drawings, cartoons, logos, symbols, film footage, dramatic performances, etc. may all function as elements of visual arguments. One can find examples of visual arguments which are expressed in entirely visual ways, but most combine visual and verbal cues". (Groake, 2007, p. 535). F. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst and T. Kruiger define argumentation as "social, intellectual, verbal activity serving to justify or refute an opinion, consisting of a constellation of statements and directed towards obtaining the approbation of an audience" (van Eemeren, Grootendorst & Kruiger, 1987, p. 7). In this case one may consider the following problems: Is argumentation rational or not only rational entertainment? Is argumentation a verbal or not only verbal construction? Is argumentation a set of words or both a

set of words and a variety of images? What is more we can add that some other problems exist. What is an argument (ation) layout? What is the aim and the peculiarities of argumentation? All these questions are usually problematic in almost all contemporary theories of argumentation and their academic presentations. So what should we do in this case? We think in order to answer the questions correctly; we need some kind of background knowledge of argumentation or the philosophy of argumentation that is called argumentology.

2. *Argumentology and TA*
In 1993 I used the term '*argumentology*' in my second Ph.D. dissertation: *Theory-historical backgrounds of argumentology* (defended at Saint-Petersburg State University, Russia) (Tchouechov, 1993). I had an idea that argumentology is the philosophy of theory and practice of argumentation. It is not a scientific theory or empirical model of argumentation.

Argumentology studies backgrounds or ultimate presuppositions of theory and practice of argumentation. Being philosophical enterprise argumentology is based on three intellectual pillars. The first one is ordinary experience of argumentation. The second one is scientific experience, or theory of argumentation and the third one is philosophical experience or the history of Western and Orient philosophy of argumentation (Tchouechov, 2003, pp. 34-77).

If we construct argumentology on the basis of ordinary experience, or common sense we should take into account that there are at least four hints about the perspectives of scientific experience, or argumentation theory. From ordinary and etymological point of view we should take into consideration that the English word 'argumentation' derives from Latin '*argumentum*' as well as from Old French '*argument*' and it has four basic Latin meanings:

1. evidence;
2. ground;
3. support;
4. proof (logical argument)
(Merriam-Webster's, 2014).

It is interesting to stress that the Russian word 'argumentation' derives from Latin 'argumentum' as well as Polish 'argument' and it has four basic Latin meanings:

1. persuasion;
2. demonstration (proof);
3. confirmation (substantiation, support);
4. cause (causality) (Dal, 1955, p. 21). It is reasonable to distinguish among ordinary meanings of the word 'argumentation' in various languages.

For example, F. van Eemeren distinguishes three types of differences between the ordinary meaning of the English word 'argumentation' and its counterparts in the Dutch language. The first difference is that in English the process side of argumentation is predominant while the product side remains more passive, uncovered. At the same time in the Dutch language there is a kind of balance between above mentioned sides in ordinary usage. The second difference is that in English the ordinary meaning of the word 'argumentation' is connected to a non-deliberate, skirmishing approach to dispute resolution, whereas non-English ordinary meanings of the word 'argumentation' are immediately associated with reasonableness. The third difference is that in the Dutch language the meaning of the word 'argumentation' deals only with constellation of reasons put forward in defense of a standpoint. While in the case of English the ordinary meaning of the word 'argumentation' covers both a standpoint and arguments advanced (van Eemeren, 2010, 308 pp.). It is clear that such meanings as evidence, ground, support, proof, a logical argument, reasoning, opinion constitute demonstrative, confirmative, explanative etc. approaches to theory of argumentation. At the same time a critical approach is formed by such meanings as 'to argue', 'accusation', and 'charge'. As compared to Russian etymological perspective the English one holds more critical character.

One may discuss which (English, Russian or Dutch) etymological meaning of the word 'argumentation' is better to provide TA machinery. I would like to point out the up-to-date F. van Eemeren's remark on the question. He writes:

it is clear that *conceptually* the lexical meaning of the non-English counterparts of the English word 'argumentation' constitutes a *better basis for a theoretical definition* (all italicized by me.- V.Tch.) of the technical term argumentation than the meaning of the ordinary English word '*argumentation*' (if it is even an ordinary word) (van Eemeren, 2010, 308 p.).

From Russian etymological perspective there are at least *four* approaches to theorizing about the ultimate foundations of argumentation.

Firstly, the approach which deals with persuasion or *persuasive* approach.

Secondly, there is one that is concerned about demonstration or *demonstrative* approach.

Thirdly, there is an approach which covers confirmation or *confirmative* approach.

Fourthly, there is one which is associated with explanation or *explanatory* approach.

Consequently, ordinary experience supposes that there are four ways (directions) of the approaches transformation into theories of argumentation. The demonstrative approach to studying of ultimate foundations of argumentation has been often associated with logic (formal logic); the persuasive one – with rhetoric; the confirmative one – with dialectic. As far as the explanatory approach is concerned, it originally deals with the lost Aristotle's *Methodic* and nowadays this approach is frequently associated by non-philosophers with cognitive science, whereas in argumentological perspective it should be connected to epistemology.

Recently the features of theoretical approaches to argumentation and relations between its inseparable levels have been considered by such scholars as J. Wenzel, A. Blair, R. Johnson, F. van Eemeren, D. Walton, C. Tindale and others. It should be mentioned that studying argumentation requires *a clear demarcation between* its levels and non-discrimination of all approaches. The non-discrimination means that an argumentation theorist shouldn't consider his favorite approach to be discriminatory to other inferior or subordinate levels. Consequently, theoretical and practical realization of these approaches must be based on a clear difference between *logic* and *rhetoric*, *rhetoric* and *dialectic*, *dialectic* and *epistemology* of argumentation and their multi- and interdisciplinary connection.

One of the consequences of clearness violation is the emergence of various and today not yet well studied *argumentological dilemmas*. For example: the dilemma of persuasive demonstrativeness (in accordance with which persuasiveness is a criterion for demonstrativeness) and demonstrative persuasiveness (according to this dilemma, for example, logic is persuasive itself, that is it is something like rigorous, ironclad logic). The dilemma of confirmative explanativeness (according to it a standpoint is supported but this support is not an obvious one) and explanative confirmativeness should also be pointed out. Therefore, one may consider that there are four theoretical perspectives for the argumentological

twist in TA: logical; rhetorical; dialectical, and epistemological.

The possibility of existence of at least four relatively independent approaches to theorizing about argumentation focuses on the problem of their *general justification* or, philosophically speaking, ontology of theory and practice of argumentation. But what is ontology of argumentation? This question is relatively new in contemporary theory and philosophy of argumentation. To answer the question, one may suppose that this ontology should be connected to anthropological turn in ontology that was proposed by M. Heidegger and J. – P. Sartre in the first half of the XX-th century (Heidegger, 1996; Sartre, 1984).

However, general and particular peculiarities of ontology of argumentation should be more reasonably connected with the concept of *Homo arguer*. Moreover, we can make much clearer the *ontological minimum* of argumentation, according to which (as H. Johnstone Jr. indirectly mentioned) man is a "persuading and persuaded animal" (Johnstone Jr., 1965, pp.41-46), or speaking in other words, who has no ability to argue is not yet man in the real sense of the word, or is not a Homo arguer. Following the American philosopher H. W. Johnstone Jr. discourse about persuading and persuaded animal, we may also say that ontology of argumentation should be the ontology of Homo arguer. The status of *Homo arguer* as a concept in contemporary theory of argumentation as well as in ontology of argumentation can hardly be overestimated.

It is ontology of argumentation that defines perspectives of its epistemology, dialectic, rhetoric, and logic. Homo arguer is a person who would argue and has knowledge of logical laws and their rhetorical imitation as well as dialectical rules of argumentation and so would rebut logical, rhetorical, dialectical, and epistemological fallacies that contest basic ontological principle of argumentation.

Ontological minimum of argumentation is realized in *logical maximum* of argumentation. This maximum is concretized in three fundamental principles of formal logic: the law of identity, the law of non-contradiction, the law of excluded middle. As it was shown by G. Leibniz,

our reasoning is grounded upon two great principles, that of contradiction, in virtue of which we judge false that which involves a contradiction, and true that which is opposed or contradictory to the false; (Theod. 44, 169.)...and that of sufficient reason, in virtue of which we hold that there can be no fact real or

existing, no statement true, unless there be a sufficient reason, why it should be so and not otherwise, although these reasons usually cannot be known by us. (*Theod. 44,* 196.) (Leibniz, 2014).

It seems to me that the principle of sufficient reason is a kind of 'bridge' from logic to rhetoric and may be even dialectic of argumentation.

Logical maximum of argumentation represented in three basic logical laws is imitated and extended in its rhetorical minimum. One may suppose that rhetorical minimum of argumentation is founded on the rule of justice. According to Ch. Perelman, this rule "requires giving identical treatment to beings or situations of the same kind" (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1971, p. 218).

On the contrary, rhetorical maximum of argumentation consists of schemes of argumentation which were clearly elucidated by Ch. Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca in *The new rhetoric*. Ch. Perelman has also shown that logic of argumentation

is identified, both by Schopenhauer and by J. S. Mill, with the rules applied in the conduct of the one's own thought" and "this individualistic outlook has done much to discredit, not only rhetoric, but, in general, any theory of argumentation (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1971, p. 41).

In this perspective, logic of argumentation is self-evident and its audience is universal audience. On the contrary, rhetoric of argumentation is evident to other people, or directed to a concrete audience in Ch. Perelman's sense of this word. Therefore, there is logic of argumentation and its rhetorical *imitation* (Tchouechov, 2008, pp. 37-41).

The concept of '*imitation*', or speaking in retro manner, *mimesis* (Auerbauch, 1953) plays a crucial methodological role in elucidations of inner connections not only between logic and rhetoric, but between other levels of argumentation theory building. For example, Ch. Perelman correctly distinguishes logical and rhetorical, or quasi-logical arguments (imitating the law of identity and the law of non-contradiction) and argumentative relations based on the structure of reality and only establishing the structure of reality (imitating the principle of sufficient reason) etc. (Perelman, Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1971, pp. 193-260; 350-410).

As it was suggested above, Ch. Perelman himself considered that the bridge from

logic to rhetoric of argumentation is connected with the rule of justice. The inner connection between the Perelman's rule of justice and the Leibniz's principle of sufficient reason needs, of course, more special attention. One may consider these principles are both or separately the bridges between not only logic and rhetoric, but also logic, rhetoric, and dialectic of argumentation. However in the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation the bridge between rhetoric and dialectic of argumentation is based on the concept of *strategic maneuvering.*

It is known that pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation has five constituents: philosophical, theoretical, analytical, empirical, and practical (van Eemeren, 2004, p. 38-39). The philosophical estate is based on the critical-rationalistic view of reasonableness, which in its part stems from the ideas of Karl Popper (van Eemeren, 2004, p. 17). The other element of the pragma-dialectical philosophical ground of theory of argumentation is utilitarianism. But due to the high influence of the Popperian concept of falsification the main utilitarian principle is changed and understood as minimization of disagreement (not as maximization of agreement) (van Eemeren, 2010, p. 34).

At the end of the 20th century two Dutch scholars F. van Eemeren and P. Houtlosser proposed the concept of strategic manuevring and at the beginning of the 21th century they conjoined dialectical and rhetorical dimensions of argumentation with the help of Aristotelian principle ἀντίστροφος (usually translated as: 'a mirror image', 'a counterpart', 'a correlative', 'a coordinate', 'a transformation' which is reciprocal and reversible, 'a subordination', 'a mutual dependence', etc.). Indeed, in "*Rhetoric*" Aristotle denoted the type of relationship between rhetoric and dialectic using the word '*ἀντίστροφος*'. It is interesting to note that in the latest English edition of "*Rhetoric*" the word '*ἀντίστροφος*' is not translated and is given in transcription: "rhetoric is an antistrophos to dialectic" (Aristotle, 2007, p.30). It is important to admit that in the Russian edition of this book the word '*ἀντίστροφος*' is translated as correspondence: "*rhetoric is a correspondence of dialectic*" (Aristotle, 2000, p. 5).

The Dutch theorists offer the concept of strategic maneuvering as the continuation of the ancient rhetorical and dialectical tradition (van Eemeren, 2013, p. 49-70). One may insist on the fact that the strategic maneuvering is a bridge from rhetoric to dialectic of argumentation. But what does it mean? According to F. van Eemeren, the integration of dialectical and rhetorical approaches should be *functional* (van Eemeren, 2010, p. 90).

The other three inseparable aspects of strategic maneuvering are: *topical potential* (selecting among possible topoi in the discussion), *audience demand* (adapting to audience's commitment store) and *presentational devices* (selecting the communicative means that can increase an adherence to argumentative moves). Of course, all of them correspond to classical areas of rhetoric: the study of invention, the study of audience adaptation and the study of elocution and pronunciation (van Eemeren, 2010, p. 95).

Argumentation also refers to different conventionalized communicative practices. They are institutionalized in the sense that the constituents of these practices are organized in order to reach the institutional aim. The other aspect of the institutionalization of argumentation is the implementation of the genres of communicative activity. They are adjudication, deliberation, mediation, negotiation, consultation, disputation, promotion, communion, and others (van Eemeren, 2010, p. 139). The unity of institutional and organizational aspects of argumentation one can simply call *organizational and verbal* (OV) rules of argumentation.

It is necessary to stress that the strategic maneuvering as well as the principle of sufficient reason and the rule of justice don't give us insight into the philosophy of rhetoric and dialectic of argumentation.

However, using the philosophy of *imitation*, one may suppose that the rhetorical maximum of argumentation is imitated and extended in its dialectical minimum and vice versa (Tchouechov, 2008, pp.37-49).

The dialectical minimum of argumentation consists of the *basic dialogical law* and *three rules* (*four sub-rules*) of argumentation (Tchouechov, 2009, pp. 194-195).

Today dialectic (dialogics) of argumentation is usually considered as the theory of dialogue. Dialogue is a multifaceted communicative process. Depending on what goals people have or are trying to achieve, various forms of dialogue can be distinguished. Argumentation has a crucial role in each of these forms. Even from Ch. Perelman's rhetorical point of view

dialogue, as we consider it, is not supposed to be a debate, in which the partisans of opposed settled convictions defend their respective views, but rather a discussion in which the interlocutors search honesty and without bias for the best solution to a controversial problem (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1971, p. 37)

Although it doesn't exhaust all the aspects of quarrel, polemics, discussion and other forms of dialogue, argumentation is understood as their *inseparable element*.

Therefore the philosophical bridge from logic to rhetoric and dialectic (*dialogics*) of argumentation is based on the above mentioned dialogical law and the rules of argumentation. *The basic dialogical law of argumentation* states the following: *the lesser weight argumentation holds in the life of society, the greater weight violence and (or) threats of its use would hold*.

The highest organizational form of dialogue in epistemological perspective is critical discussion which is centered on the process of truth finding. Following Gricean Cooperative principle as well as his Maxims of conversation and according to pragma-dialectical rules of critical discussion and the concept of strategic maneuvering (Grice, 1975, pp. 45-58; van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992; van Eemeren, 2010), the next general rules of dialogue (critical discussion (CD)) organization are worth distinguishing.

They are the following rules and sub-rules of dialogue (CD). *The first* organizational-verbal (OV) rule – a participant in discussion must be interested in achieving its final goal.

The second OV rule – a participant in discussion must strongly contribute to the achievement of its final goal. It is known, that according to P.Grice, the Principle of Communication is the basis of interaction among people. This principle can be concretized by way of the following postulates or, in my terms, *sub-rules of dialogue*.

The first OV sub-rule – all information on certain standpoint must be contained in discussion. *The second* OV sub-rule – only truthful information must be used in discussion. *The third OV* sub-rule – only relevant information must be applied to discussion (compare to the Gricean Maxim of Relevance). *The fourth* OV sub-rule – only comprehensible and clear information must be used in discussion (compare to the Gricean Maxim of Manner). Obviously, the generalization of the Gricean one to four (1-4) sub-rules leads to the formulation of *the third* OV rule – participants in CD must be honest, objective, efficient and clear. Dialogical (dialectical) rules of critical discussion are generalization, imitation and extension of logical and rhetorical laws and principles.

It should be noted that the revision of both the amount of rules and their content has a great impact on any procedure of responding to a fallacious move of any kind. For example, H. José Plug, a Dutch scholar, correctly distinguished five ways (basing on the works of F. van Eemeren) of reaction to fallacious moves (to ignore a fallacy, a discussion stoppage, a counter fallacy, a meta-dialogue and a fallacy readjustment) (Plug, 2010, pp.1-12). A study of the list of discussion rules and their content may lead to the creation of a new critical responding technique and change the above mentioned ones, because while criticizing we are making an appeal to some list of discussion rules. Basic dialogical law and OV dialogical rules of argumentation together form dialectical maximum of argumentation.

I think that dialectical maximum of argumentation is imitated and extended in epistemological minimum of argumentation. Important information on epistemological maximum of argumentation can be found in the works of Norwegian philosopher A. Naess (Naess, 1966). But this idea needs further consideration which is beyond the scope of my article. Let me make only one hint about that perspective.

According to Biro and Siegel, an epistemic approach "founds itself on the claim that it is a conceptual truth about arguments" and that argumentation should provide "a bridge from known truths or justified beliefs to as yet unknown (or at least unrecognized) truths or as yet unjustified beliefs" (Biro & Siegel, 1992, p. 92).

From argumentological point of view, the argument of Biro and Siegel, that "argumentation theory should be understood as being concerned with ability of arguments to render beliefs rational" (Biro & Siegel, p. 97) should be complemented with following: epistemology of TA should be understood as being concerned with ability to render basic dialogical law and rules of argumentation. The epistemological maximum of argumentation is imitated in the ontological minimum of argumentation. Again, this minimum is connected with the Basic law and three dialectical rules of argumentation. Consequently, one may think that it's possible to establish an unbroken unity of ontology, methodology and epistemology of Homo arguer.

By the way, Carl Linnaeus introduced not only the concept of Homo sapiens. He also distinguished it from two other concepts: a *troglodyte* and a *monster*. For me it means that a man (Homo arguer) who is not able to catch the ontological-

dialogical minimum of argumentation can be considered to be a modern caveman or a troglodyte, whereas a man who can argue sophisticatedly has all grounds to transform into a post-human or an *argumentative superman.* It is obviously that today this kind of man would face difficulties in communicating with a less educated man, who does not match the unattainable ideal of Homo arguer.

Today various theories of argumentation propose a lot of necessary conceptions about ideal Homo arguer. One of the examples is pragma-dialectics of the Amsterdam school. Firstly, this theory of argumentation has provided a researcher and a user of argumentation with 21 rules of reasonableness and then their number was decreased to 10 (van Eemeren, 1992, p. 208). Of course, 10 rules is less than 21, but is more than one law and three rules. Consequently, the theory of argumentation supported by basic law and three rules of argumentation is more up-to-date to almost all contemporary theories and practices of argumentation. It allows us to consider pragma-dialectics as well as other too sophisticated theories of argumentation not argumentological supported by serious backgrounds. They are a plethora of ways to scrutinize Homo arguer as a superman.

3. *Conclusion*

Homo arguer does not exist in vacuum but acts and argues in the real historical process. His yesterday, present and tomorrow stance depends not only on him, but also on his audience, argumentative means used, peculiarities of civilization and culture. This indicates that not any argumentological turn in TA is of current importance nowadays. We must seek for such an argumentological twist in which context-dependent, dynamical, ultimate grounds of theory of argumentation will be studied and evaluated thoroughly. Consequently, there are several logical, rhetorical, dialectical, and epistemological theories of argumentation, but the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation (initially formulated at the Amsterdam school by the professors Franz van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst) is the most instructive of them.

But in order to provide unity of theory and practice of argumentation we need a more profound contemporary socio-historical and dialectical argumentology to correct the minimum and the maximum of ontology, epistemology, dialectic, rhetoric, and logic of argumentation.

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ISSA Proceedings 2014 – About An Emotion, Indignation, And Its Argumentation. The Case Of The

Argumentum Ad Selectivum

Abstract: This paper is about Indignation (defined as Anger about something Unjust) in everyday argumentation, when it becomes the object of an argumentative construction involving the pathos (genuine or phony emotion), the logos (legitimacy of the sets of beliefs and judgments concerning the state of affairs that generated the emotion) and the ethos (righteousness of the Indignant Person or Institution). I will focus on a frequent refutation in public discourse of someone's Indignation, that is its Selectiveness.

Introduction

At the origin of this paper, there was the international popularity of the word 'Indignation/Outrage' in 2011 and the debates and polemics in France following the editorial success of Stéphane Hessel's little book, *Indignez-vous!*(American title: 'Time for Outrage!'). As a discourse analyst, my main interest is in the approach of an Emotion (Indignation) in every day argumentation, following Plantin (2011) and Micheli (2010): the expression of emotion can be used as a persuasive argument to bring people into action, and can be evaluated as such, but the emotion may first need to be legitimized, and this process of legitimization will concern the three means of persuasion and their interaction: Pathos (genuine or phony emotion), Logos (righteousness of the object of indignation, legitimacy of the sets of beliefs and judgments concerning the state of affairs that generated the emotion) and Ethos (righteousness of the Indignant Person or Institution).

I will first specify the meaning of the word Indignation, and then will make a brief reference to approaches to Indignation in philosophy and argumentation studies. I will illustrate this argumentation of Indignation with examples mostly taken from the French media, the Internet and small publications concerning the Stephane Hessel controversy. This will be followed by an exploration of the frequent denunciation of the Selectiveness of Indignation, and a reflection on its argumentative value.

1. *Indignation*

In definitions of Indignation, we find three words, 'anger', 'moral' and 'injustice',

the cause of anger being something unjust, contrary to morality, moral norms' (Merriam-Webster). A first interesting difference with another strong, violent emotion, Anger, is the fact that Indignation is never directed at oneself, which for some people weakens its moral dimension: "Ce sentiment est de ceux qui ne s'appliquent qu'aux autres, jamais à soi, (…) et la morale authentique suppose d'abord des exigences qu'on formule pour son propre compte".**[i]** Indignation has drawn the attention of philosophers since Plato. Mattei (2005) presents a summary that refers in the first place to the source and nature of indignation: "sentiment que nous éprouvons face au déni de dignité dont souffre injustement un homme ou un groupe d'hommes. C'est la dignité comme *principe* premier de l'humanité qui justifierait l'indignation, comme *sentiment* second d'humanité"(p.14).**[ii]** In his chapter on political indignation, with references to the Valladolid controversy and the Dreyfus Affair, he writes: "S'indigner, c'est souffrir et, dans un premier temps, nous souffrons seuls" (p.126). Then comes a second reaction, which moves from the unjust act to the Victim (Pity) and to the Agent (Anger). If felt repeatedly, Indignation engenders hatred. The just Indignation can then become wrong or false, as it is less involved with justice and more with vengeance. In another chapter, 'Attac, ou l'indignation idéologique', Mattei refers to collective Indignation (illustrated by Anti-globalization movements), and its dangers as it moves the accusation of individuals, real persons to nations or systems, leading to collective culpability.

Cognitive antecedents, that is the awareness of an injustice, are usually recognized in emotions such as pity or indignation. But the emotion is not universally shared, as it will depend on beliefs and judgments of the Indignant. For Boltanski (1993), the consequence is that "Quand certains indignés en viennent à s'indigner des indignations des autres, et non des offenses faites à la justice, ils considèrent comme indignes les sentiments de leurs adversaires, et bientôt, leurs adversaires eux-mêmes » (p.22).

Elster (1999) describes Indignation as a *social* emotion that feeds on comparison.**[iii]** It is also described as a *triadic* emotion: A feels indignant about B's treatment of C. I will add a fourth element, making it a *quaternary* emotion: A feels indignant about the injustice B done to C by D, as any argumentation of Indignation will concern, one of, or more often, these four elements.

A distinction has to be made between the emotion itself and its public expression (speech, article, book, street protests, art). I will focus on the verbal expression

and its context. The speech act that manifests Indignation is a denunciation-accusation of what is considered unjust and against moral norms, and of the Agent judged responsible for said injustice**[iv]**.

In order to argue in favor of Indignation as a moral, righteous, virtuous emotion, we have to consider the three means of persuasion and their interaction. In the following, I will focus on the argumentative construction of Indignation.

2. *Argumentation of indignation*

In the field of argumentation, following cognitive and philosophical studies of the relation between cognition and emotion, recent studies have considered emotions as arguments and defined the conditions of their reasonableness (Walton, 1992). Other recent studies have focused on the argumentation of emotions (Plantin, 2011, Micheli, 2010).

Brinton (1988) in his « Appeal to Angry Emotions considers the relationship between emotions and reason, and the conditions for a strong emotion to be justified and legitimate, according to a general or circumstantial approach to morality. In reference to Aristotle, Brinton sees in Indignation a call for action: "But, even in this narrow 'strict' sense, indignation is not a mere cool assessment or judgment; it is, or includes, a feeling or a complex of feelings – it is an emotion of passion. As such, it is a motivation to action, which is why it is appealed to in rhetorical situations, for example in public speeches whose aim is to get people to take certain courses of action" (p.81). He proposes an *Argumentum ad Indignationem* the logical correctness of which will be a matter of two things : "(1) whether the reasons given for the emotion are good ones, whether the truth of certain propositions, namely those which are appealed to, would, in fact, justify the feelings which they are supposed to arouse ; (2) whether the degree or intensity of the emotional responses (or intended emotional response) is appropriate to the reasons given, in the context of the rhetorical situation considered as a whole" (p.81). "When the grounds appealed to are inappropriate or inadequate, either for indignation , or for the called-for degree of indignation, then there will be a logical failure" (p.83) . Brinton warns that the evaluation of *ad indignationem* "is often difficult and often has to be tentative, or has to be made relative to a restricted point of view" (p.83).

In other words, a virtuous Indignation will, as claimed by Aristotle (quoted in Brinton p.78), depend on "feel[ing it] at the right times, with reference to the

right objects, towards the right people, with the right motive, and in the right way". Arguing for or against Indignation will involve the three modes of proof:

Pathos: genuine emotion (vs. manipulative strategy), form given to the pathetic discourse
Logos: legitimacy of the Object of Indignation (Injustice, Victim, Agent)
Ethos: Righteousness of the Indignant Person/Institution**[v]**

The accusation of Selective Indignation (in the following SI) will stress the interaction between the three modes of proof. I will briefly illustrate this process with the Hessel Controversy.

3. *Counter-argumentation of an indignation*

3.1 *The Hessel controversy*
In October 2010, a short text (19 pages, in the first edition of 8000 copies), based on a speech held for an audience of French youths**[vi]**, was published without any prior publicity by a small publishing house (Editions Indigènes, Montpellier)**[vii]**. The author was Stephane Hessel, 93 years old, an ex-diplomat, a member of the French resistance, a survivor of concentration camps, with a life filled with activities in the domain of human rights and social justice. The success of the publication was immediate: almost 800,000 copies had been sold in France by the beginning of 2011. It then became international, with translations into different languages (34, according to *Le Monde*, on September 28, 2011).

In the first place, it is an appeal to an emotion, Indignation, said to be the first motif of the Resistance in World War Two, and presented as the opposite of indifference and passivity, an appeal which argues for action and involvement against various injustices. The winter and spring of 2011 saw many discussions and reflections in France on the emotion and its intentional object. At the same time came the protest movements in the Middle East, in Europe and North America, which saw hundreds of thousands of people, mostly young, take to the streets and to symbolic places (squares, rich avenues, financial centers).

In Spain, the movement adopted the name of *Los Indignados*, in reference to Hessel's brochure. Historians will have the task to determine the real influence that Hessel's publication, and its mediatization**[viii]**, have had on these events.

In France the editorial success has been differently interpreted: as an

extraordinary intuitive feeling of deep anger and fear for the future of many people that ignited a mood of protest, as an illustration of the intellectual poverty of the buyers/readers (mostly said to be related to left wing thinking and politics), as the instrument of a political (leftish) manipulation, sometimes correlated to the proximity of the French presidential elections (2012), or as propaganda against Israel, and a strategy of the Boycott-Divestment-Sanctions Movement (BDS). This last accusation was related to the two pages of the brochure expressing the author's current Indignation regarding the Palestinian question and illustrated by the situation in Gaza.**[ix]** These pages generated critical reactions from journalists, polemists, politicians and ordinary people, and as many critical counter-reactions. This offers a very rich field of observation on the argumentation of the emotion, Indignation, and of its Object.

3.2 *Argumentation against a particular Indignation*
The Object of Hessel's personal, current Indignation is the situation in Gaza/of the Palestinians. In critical commentaries, this is considered to be a one-sided position, as nothing is said about the crimes of Hamas. This SI originates in a personal obsession, which is hatred of Israel/Jews.

3.2.1 *The Pathos*
The emotion is denounced as being 'dépassée' (out-moded), naïve or disproportionate, possibly as the result of manipulative actions undertaken by the BDS movement, aggravated by the senility of the Indignant. In the most extreme critical reactions, the emotion is related to hatred towards Israel, and so is its editorial success, which is "au coeur même de cette indignation aussi obsessionnellement sélective qu'effroyablement, monstrueusement, pathologiquement, indignement disproportionnée "(Goldnadel, 2012: 19).

3.2.2 *The Logos*
The Logos concerns the Injustice committed (the blockade of Gaza, the Cast Lead Operation, the Palestinian question), the Victims (the Palestinians in general and in Gaza in particular), and the Agent (Israel, its army). The argumentation against Hessel's Indignation concentrates on what is perceived as a fallacious representation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It questions the nature of the Injustice, and reconsiders the attribution of the roles of Victims and Agent. In its most developed forms (such as Szlamowicz 2011), it combines the denunciation of the numbers given by Hessel (of Palestinian refugees, of victims from both sides) of the Palestinian narrative (Nakba), of the 'lies' concerning actions by the Israeli

army and specific interventions (Cast Lead in Gaza); words such as 'settlements/occupation' are rejected based on 'historical facts'(San Remo Treaty 1920, territories legally obtained through winning wars, security- reasons), questions are asked about the Palestinian ideology (undemocratic, focused on destruction and judeophobia[x], Hamas terrorism), and about the existence of a 'Palestinian people'. There is talk of a one-sided position in Hessel's text, as nothing is said about the crimes of Hamas[xi] and of the Palestinians. The designation of Palestinians as 'réfugiés' is rejected, as well as 'victimes', since "la part active du camp arabe dans ce conflit interdirait moralement de solliciter le statut de victimes" (34).[xii] The conclusion is that the denomination ('réfugiés/victimes') is equivalent to the premises of an argumentation: Israel is the oppressor. Denying the premises leads to another conclusion: there is no injustice, there are no (Palestinian) victims.

Then comes the accusation of SI. An example: "Vous n'y trouverez pas non plus d'indignation sur la violation des droits de l'homme en Birmanie, en Chine, en Iran, en Corée du Nord, en Libye, en Tunisie et dans d'autres pays car l'indignation de Stéphane Hessel est à géométrie variable. Manifestement, sa boussole intérieure s'est bloquée sur ce pays honni" (Assouline, cf. Torck 2013). Goldnadel (2012) criticizes the title, which, contrary to what its generic form might lead one to expect, is not an appeal for an "indignation universelle" since the book "ne s'indigne de rien, ou presque", and then enumerates a dozen countries that should have been the object of Hessel's Indignation (17).

The SI argument is composed of two elements: the accusation of focusing on one country and the mention of other countries that deserve Indignation, as a form of *X Quoque*. The most common counter-arguments to the Argument of Selectiveness, in relation to these two pages, are the following. First, Israel is a democracy, whereas the other countries usually mentioned are not democracies. Land occupation (and its consequences for the population) is not democratic. So Israel may be/should be criticized for its politics. The second argument is the Argument of Proximity, which argues, on historical (Jews in European/Western history), cultural (religion, sciences, art), geopolitical (Israel is in the Middle-East) and economical grounds (financial help from Europe to the Palestinians), for a natural, legitimate interest in Israel's actions.

Hessel's SI is seen as a one-sided strategy and is quickly connected to the Ethos of the Indignant: "Non seulement il ne dit pas la vérité historique et factuelle du

conflit mais, *quand même il dirait vrai*, pourquoi son indignation s'exerce-t-elle uniquement sur ce pays et nullement sur les dictatures islamiques, la Chine, l'Iran, ou les massacres d'opposants régulièrement perpétrés par le Fatah et le Hamas ? "(Szlamowicz, p.9, my emphasis). When Personal Indignation is seen as a personal obsession, to which a name can be given (Hatred of Zionism/Israel/Jews = anti-Semitism), then we turn to the Ethos of the Indignant. As the French adage says, tell me what your indignation is, and I will tell you who you are.

3.2.3 *The Ethos: 'the despicable old man' ("le vieil homme indigne")*

The denunciation of Hessel's Ethos concerns his social Ethos, Amossy (1999)''ethos préalable', the image and reputation of the person, and the discursive Ethos. The attacks on his Social Ethos concern his family first, and his earlier self-presentation as a Jew (his grand-parents were Jewish immigrants who joined the Lutherian Church, his mother was "la fille d'un banquier prussien et antisémite", precizes Goldnadel p.(31). Then there is his alleged participation in the writing of the Declaration of Human Rights. In fact, he turns out to have only been an 'observer to the editing of the Declaration'. His participation in the Resistance and his deportation to concentration camps (Buchenwald, Dora) are not usually questioned, although his declarations about the Resistance and his experience are the object of various comments (Who gives him the right to speak in the name of the Resistance? being the most frequent).

The Discursive Ethos is the topic of Szlamowics (2011). His objective is to show "comment le texte de Stéphane Hessel, en tant qu'il participe plus largement du mouvement politique que constitue la nébuleuse du BDS, veut influer sur la langue pour instituer un halo de connotations négatives autour du mot « Israël » " (p.21). Chapter IV ('Indignation et Emphase: la posture du succès'), following one chapter on linguistic approaches, and two chapters which denounce the ' myths' and 'factual lies', concerns Hessel's Ethos: the claim of Jewishness (which has already been denounced as false) is presented as a way to escape the accusations of anti-Semitism, and to advance an Authority argument. Mention is made of the 'Alterjuifs' (the Self-Hating Jews), for who "l'antisionisme est aujourd'hui le plus sûr moyen de faire carrière médiatique" (p.81). The Authority argument is also based on the creation of an image by the author through references to the War and the Resistance, to his age, his family and cultural background. With the title of the brochure: Hessel "s'offre ainsi au lecteur comme modèle déontique", "cette déonticité (…) qui articule indignation et action, formule un appel au militantisme

qui ressemble fort à un discours de sergent recruteur. C'est d'ailleurs la stratégie avouée du BDS " (p.77). Again, the main aim of Hessel's text is said to be the denunciation of Israel; if there is mention of other objects of indignation, it is seen as a construction which might be attractive to young people. The chapter concludes that the "incohérences philosophiques" have nothing to do with Logos, but with Ethos and Pathos, with "la posture qu'il entend camper: l'indignation pacifique" (p.84). As the French adage says, tell me what your indignation is, and I will tell you who you *really* are.

Two remarks as a conclusion to this part of the study. First, Szlamowicz's aim was to show that Hessel's call was, in the first place, a strategy of the BDS movement. This, however, was repeatedly taken as a given fact. Surprisingly, for a linguist, there is also no reference to the textual genre and its context**[xiii]**. Second, there is a total absence of reflection on, or even reference to, the events taking place in different countries. Published in April 2011, the 'study' limits itself to the two pages on Gaza, while hundreds of thousands of people had taken to the streets for reasons that had nothing to do with Israel or Gaza. I will now enlarge the descriptive field, looking at other uses of the argument of Selective indignation.

4. *Selective indignation*
'Selective' can be understood as resulting from a process of selection, often related to specific goals or norms (highly selective admission process to a club for instance, selective tastes as choosy, particular tastes). Combined with a word of emotion, the implication often will be related to the person having the emotion (his past, his personality, his character, etc..). A selective fear for dogs, but not for snakes, will possibly be related to a childhood experience; a selective anger, to the person's character (she doesn't care about the mess I make but gets really mad when I borrow something from her without asking).

In the following I will consider some examples of accusations of SI taken from a data collected on Google.fr/com, using the search terms 'Selective indignation/Indignation sélective' in the winter and spring of 2013, and in March 2014. It shows a big diversity of Addressees (accused of SI), but by far the most frequent are governments, organizations, institutions, (political) groups, (protest) movements, media or their representatives (vs. Individuals). The Indignation, sometimes considered legitimate, is then opposed to silence or indifference regarding other Objects.

4.1 *A brief exploration of Accusations of Selective Indignation*

(1)
Looking at [Australian] Foreign Minister Bob Carr's ministerial website, though, you could be forgiven for wondering exactly what criteria the Foreign Minister uses to condemn incidents. There appears to be no rhyme or reason as to the threshold for such public utterances. Why for instance, does the Foreign Minister expressly condemn the firing of three rockets from Gaza into Israel on 26 February that caused no injuries, as well as a bomb attack in Hyderabad that left 15 people dead, and yet say nothing on the record regarding a targeted series of attacks against a religious minority in Pakistan that has left more than 250 people dead in a little more than a month?**[xiv]** Note that two events on a specific day are opposed to one event or series of events that took place in a period of a month; another difference is the number of victims, 0/15 as opposed to more than 250.

(2)
Why should it be impossible for the Indian intelligentsia to read Israeli novels and poetry, attend exhibitions by Israeli artists, listen to Israeli musicians, watch Israeli theatre performances, and still stay sensitive to the cause of Palestinians? I have not heard of boycotts anywhere of Chinese goods, Pakistani novels or Indian films, though these originate in states that oppress people in similarly unbearable ways.**[xv]** The argument against the boycott seem relevant, especially because it concerns the Israeli Art world, which is almost entirely located within the Green line, as opposed to the boycott of goods made or harvested on the West Bank. Note the form given to the 'comparison' of Injustices with the expression "in similarity unbearable ways", while denying the legitimacy of the 'choice'. This seems to argue in favor of another motivation behind the emotion. Religion appears frequently as a criterium for Selective Indignation. In France, it will often concern the attention given to Jews and Muslims vs. Christians, as Agents or Victims, as in

(3)
Affaire Charlie Hebdo : une indignation sélective? Après l'incendie criminel de la rédaction du journal Charlie Hebdo dans la nuit de mardi à mercredi, la question de la liberté d'expression face aux sensibilités religieuses est à nouveau posée, une liberté d'expression défendue à géométrie variable selon les polémiques. Déjà en 2006 Charlie Hebdo avait suscité la colère de certains musulmans avec des

caricatures de Mahomet. …)Au-delà du milieu médiatique, c'est la classe politique dans son ensemble qui s'est indignée (…) Cette véritable union nationale, ces avalanches de communiqués de soutien défendant la liberté d'expression, le *"droit au blasphème"*, la libre pensée ou la laïcité, ont pris une telle ampleur qu'elles posent désormais la question du traitement partial ou non, égal ou non, des affaires mêlant liberté d'expression et religion. (…) Car avant les attaques contre la rédaction du journal *Charlie Hebdo*, ce sont des catholiques intégristes qui ont suscité la polémique, celle-ci ne créant en aucun cas le même élan de solidarité et de soutien que pour l'hebdomadaire satirique.(….) Et aucun ministre n'a alors pris la peine de s'exprimer sur la question.**[xvi]**

The data is rich in alternative Objects that refer to states of affairs or events of a different nature, from a different time or place. For instance: addressing the Media, Object 1 : Aggression DSK-Diallo and its media coverage opposed to Object 2, silence on rapes and crimes on women in Africa; addressing Politics/Media/Public, O1: Bin Laden as opposed to O2: dictators supported by the US, victims from US sanctions and bombing in Iraq and Native American slavery; On LeMondeJuif.fr site, O1, support of some French mayors for the liberation of Palestinian prisoners, silence on 02, violence in Palestinian jails and detention conditions in French jails. The Site Altermedia/Libération opposes 01, acquisition by Bernard Arnault of the Belgium nationality for 'tax evasion', to the silence over 02, Rothschild (French, part owner of the newspaper) and his Israeli citizenship.

The following example concerns the Indignation of an historian, about the French Memory Laws in France and the interference of politics in science (History) through legislation, for instance relative to the condemnation of the Armenian genocide. If this indignation is recognized as righteous, it is judged 'incomplete':

(4)
Il est dès lors regrettable que Pierre Nora ne dise pas un mot, dans sa tribune, du harcèlement juridique, policier, ou parfois mafieux, des chercheurs et des écrivains qui jugent que le mot *"génocide"* est approprié pour décrire les massacres d'Arméniens par les Turcs autour de 1915. »**[xvii]**

One reaction to the accusation:
Il existe des dizaines de pays qui contestent les génocides, des pays arabes par exemple qui pratiquent le négationnisme sur la Shoah. En utilisant le même procédé que vous, M. Chouat, on peut donc vous renvoyer la balle, votre

indignation est sélective. Nora a dénoncé l'évolution juridique du moment dans le domaine qui est le sien, l'histoire, et du pays qui est le sien.

Nora's Ethos is questioned in another reaction:
Le GROS problème de la démarche de Pierre Nora c'est qu'elle est clairement a motivation idéologique. Jamais Pierre Nora ne dénoncera l'attitude de la Turquie et son historiographie d'état..... Il demande donc clairement une protection des négationnistes (et de la violence sous-jacente de leur attitude) sans oser prendre position sur la défense de la vérité historique qu'il prétend prôner.

Examples (5) and (6) illustrate accusations of SI directed to the Victims-Indignant or to the Indignant close to the Agent:

(5) Selective indignation on the streets of Israel. Middle-class Israelis, aware they have lost social security and affordable housing, are protesting by pitching tents and demonstrating in city streets. But will they demand equality for all? For now, they seem intent only on their own lost privileges.**[xviii]**

(6) There's nothing wrong per se with paying more attention to tragedy and violence that happens relatively nearby and in familiar places. Whether wrong or not, it's probably human nature, or at least human instinct, to do that, and that happens all over the world. I'm not criticizing that. But one wishes that the empathy for victims and outrage over the ending of innocent human life that instantly arises when the US is targeted by this sort of violence would at least translate into similar concern when the US is perpetrating it, as it so often does (far, far more often than it is targeted by such violence).**[xix]**

The following example presents a very rare case of an identical Injustice (death penalty) and its Victims (executed persons), taking place at the same moment, in the same country:

(7)
Dans la nuit du 21 au 22 septembre dernier était exécuté par injonction létale, dans un pénitencier de l'Etat américain de Géorgie, Troy Davis, un jeune noir accusé du meurtre, en 1991, d'un policier blanc, mais que tout portait à croire, faute de preuves matérielles et de témoins fiables, innocent. Le monde entier, l'opinion publique comme la presse internationale, s'était alors ému, très justement, de cet horrible et cruel sort que cette justice aussi barbare qu'aveugle avait ainsi réservé à ce malheureux devenu, bien malgré lui, le symbole planétaire

de la lutte contre la peine de mort. (..) Et, pourtant, les opposants résolus à la peine de mort que nous sommes auront-ils failli, sur le plan moral, ailleurs. Car le même jour, quasiment au même moment, mais dans l'indifférence générale et en un oubli d'autant plus indécent, était exécuté, dans un autre pénitencier d'un autre Etat américain, le Texas, un autre condamné à mort : Lawrence Brewer, un jeune blanc, membre de l'infâme et très raciste Ku Klux Klan, accusé, en 1998, d'un meurtre particulièrement odieux, qu'il a par ailleurs toujours revendiqué, à l'encontre d'un citoyen noir. (…) Mais il n'empêche : l'opposition à la peine de mort, quant à elle, ne peut souffrir, en tant que règle universelle et principe absolu, d'aucune exclusive, ni hiérarchie.**[xx]**

4.2. *Value of the Selectiveness argument*
Most of the examples refer to media texts, political declarations, street protests and topical articles, produced at a certain moment, in a particular context, by different people, who may be or are politically or ideologically oriented. When the accusation is addressed to an institution (governments, political groups, media, NGO's), in order to be considered legitimate, it would have to be based on a large corpus, analyzed *on the long term***[xxi]**. Its study would not be, in the first place, rhetorical or discursive, but political and critical of the media. When it comes to the Indignation of an individual (much less frequent in the analyzed data), the accusation of SI may lose all grounds for the following reasons.

First, one could consider that the expression 'selective indignation' is a pleonasm. Each violent emotion can be said to be unique, as it concerns one person, at a certain moment, in a specific context, and whose intensity will depend on the identity of the Indignant (his/her life story), the direct knowledge of the Injustice, the personal involvement, or in other words, the Proximity. As said by Mattei (2012:24): "Ce sentiment s'éveille devant une *injustice vécue, dont nous sommes les témoins*" (my emphasis); "Il s'agit donc non d'un jugement intellectuel, d'un choix idéologique ou d'une posture sociale, mais d'une émotion spécifique, à elle-même sa propre fin" (27) This makes it difficult to force an universal dimension to the emotion itself (as done by Mattei**[xxii]**). But, Indignation is also seen as a judgment of value, is related to what is perceived as an injustice according to universal justice principles. If Indignation is accepted as a primary affect, some will say that it loses its virtue once it is subjected to reason (and public expression!)': " Dès lors que l'indignation n'obéit plus aux ordres du coeur mais se plie aux décrets de l'entendement, elle trouble sa pureté pour se mettre au

service de l'idéologie. Et l'idéologie, même quand elle combat le mal au nom de la justice ne repose le plus souvent que sur le ressentiment" (Mattei, 2012 : 28).

In the second place, as the emotion embodies a person's knowledge and beliefs about the Object, it will most often lead to an Ethotic argument, as the Object of Indignation, and the expression of the emotion, will be related to and explained by the personality and beliefs of the person. And the denunciation will as often be related to the personality and beliefs of the denunciator.**[xxiii]** In very sensitive cases, such as the Israel-Palestine question, this accusation can /will back-fire on the denunciator of the Selective Indignation (see Torck 2013).

In the third place, it brings the denunciation into slippery argumentation fields: argument of Incompleteness**[xxiv]**, Justice Argument, Double Standard, Red Herring, forms of *Tu Quoque*, and especially Arguments of Comparison (weak analogy or comparison[xxv], hierarchy of Injustices or Victims). All can be linked to varieties of Ethotic arguments. What does it say for instance of the Feminist who is indignant about a Muslim woman wearing a Hijab in Quebec, and says nothing about a Jewish Hassidic woman wearing a wig? And who ignores the deaths or disappearance of Native women?**[xxvi]**

In a provisional, pragmatic, conclusion on the Argument of Selectiveness, I will leave the floor, so to speak, to a French humourist, frequently quoted in the debates, Guy Bedos: "Il y a des gens qui ont des indignations sélectives. Moi, j'ai des indignations successives".

Conclusive remark
Can Indignation be considered a virtuous emotion? To answer this question, one is tempted to quote Aristotle again (a virtuous emotion will be felt at the right time, about the right object, towards the right people, with a right motive, in the right ways), as this covers all the sensitive domains of the evaluation of Indignation. If one accuses someone else of SI, it often takes the form of an emotional discourse, one Indignation reacting to another, both claiming righteousness, but directed to different Objects. In the Hessel case, the Injustice is questioned, or reversed, as we are dealing with opposite, and concurrent, Victims and Agents (Palestinians vs. Israel/Jews).**[xxvii]**

The interaction between Pathos, Logos and Ethos was particularly present in the case studied, but is also specific for the emotion itself. As a strong emotion, which

is never directed to oneself as an Agent, and refers to principles and norms of justice, Indignation is never just a personal emotion, once publically expressed, and consequently generates questions and doubts about the Injustice and its corollaries, the Victim and the Agent. But as it is also an accusation, it makes the Indignant (and his/her Ethos) an object of debate. Le café philosophique de Margency, organized a meeting on the topic of the usefulness of Indignation (January 2011), and posted on its site the results of the discussion, on topics such as Objects of Indignation**[xxviii]** , social changes that were founded on Indignation (abolition of slavery, human rights, education,…), controversial Indignations (abortion, euthanasia, arms control,…). The question "Why does one become indignant?" combined with the adage 'Dis-moi ton indignation, je te dirai qui tu es' provided 14 brief answers, of which only one can be considered positive: "par conviction morale". The others threw a negative light on the Indignant ("pour paraître moral"), on his/her motivations ("peur de l'autre, de l'avenir", "pour déconsidérer un adversaire", pour dire son appartenance ou son opposition à un groupe (politique ou catégorie sociale), par suivisme". This distrust is also to be found in philosophical commentaries (frequently quoting Nietszche's "No one lies so boldy as the man who is indignant') and sociological studies, as Indignation is said to often drift to personal or ideological resentment. As for the public expression of it, distrust will be, with good reasons, related to the pathemization and personalization of news and politics.

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Intervalles.

ISSA Proceedings 2014 – Bingo! Promising Developments In Argumentation Theory

Abstract: On the occasion of the publication in 2014 of the new *Handbook of Argumentation Theory*, which provides an overview of the current state of the art in the field, van Eemeren identifies three major developments in the treatment of argumentation that he finds promising. First, there is in various theoretical traditions the trend towards empiricalization, which includes both qualitative and

quantitative empirical research. Second, there is the increased and explicit attention being paid to the institutional macro-contexts in which argumentative discourse takes place and the effects they have on the argumentation. Third, there is, particularly in the dialectical approaches, a movement towards formalization, which is strongly stimulated by the recent advancement of artificial intelligence. According to van Eemeren, if they are integrated with each other and comply with pertinent academic requirements, the developments of empiricalization, contextualization and formalization of the treatment of argumentation will mean "bingo!" for the future of argumentation theory.

Keywords: contextualization, dialectical perspective, empiricalization, formalization, pragma-dialectics, rhetorical perspective, state of the art

1. *Changes in the state of the art of argumentation theory*
Since the conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation held in Amsterdam in July 2014 was the eighth ISSA conference, argumentation theorists from various kinds of backgrounds have been exchanging views about argumentation for almost thirty years. My keynote speech at the start of this conference seemed to me the right occasion for making some general comments on the way in which the field is progressing.

I considered myself in a good position to strike a balance because during the past five years I have been preparing an overview of the state of the art in a new *Handbook of Argumentation Theory.* I have done so together with my co-authors, Bart Garssen, Erik C. W. Krabbe, A. Francisca Snoeck Henkemans, Bart Verheij, and Jean H. M. Wagemans. In this complicated endeavour we have been supported generously by a large group of knowledgeable reviewers and advisors from the field. On the 2 July reception of the ISSA conference the *Handbook* was to be presented to the community of argumentation scholars.

The Handbook of Argumentation Theory is the latest offshoot of a tradition of handbook writing that I started with Rob Grootendorst in the mid-1970s. We presented first several overviews of the state of the art in Dutch before publishing the handbook in English, the current lingua franca of scholarship (van Eemeren, Grootendorst & Kruiger,1978, 1981, 1986, and van Eemeren, Grootendorst & Kruiger, 1984, 1987, respectively). The most recent version of the handbook is *Fundamentals of Argumentation Theory*, which appeared in 1996 and was co-authored by a group of prominent argumentation scholars (van Eemeren et al.,

1996).

The overview offered by the newly-completed version of the handbook constitutes the basis for giving a judgment of recent developments in the discipline. It goes without saying that a short speech does not allow me to pay attention to all developments that could be of interest; I limit myself to three major trends that I find promising. They involve innovations which are, in my view, vital for the future of the field.

Argumentation scholars are not in full harmony regarding the definition of the term *argumentation*.**[i]** There seems to be general agreement however that argumentation always involves trying to convince or persuade others by means of reasoned discourse.**[ii]** Although I think that most argumentation scholars will agree that the study of argumentation has a descriptive as well as a normative dimension, their views on how in actual research the two dimensions are to be approached will diverge**[iii]**. Unanimity comes almost certainly to an end when it has to be decided which theoretical perspective is to be favoured.**[iv]**

The general theoretical perspectives that are dominant are the *dialectical*, which concentrates foremost on procedural reasonableness, and the *rhetorical*, focusing on aspired effectiveness. In modern argumentation theory both theoretical traditions are pervaded by insights from philosophy, logic, pragmatics, discourse analysis, communication, and other disciplines. Since the late 1990s, a tendency has developed to connect, or even integrate, the two traditions.**[v]** Taking only a dialectical perspective involves the risk that relevant contextual and situational factors are not taken into account, while taking a purely rhetorical perspective involves the risk that the critical dimension of argumentation is not explored to the full.**[vi]**

Compared to some thirty years ago, both the number of participants and the number of publications in argumentation theory have increased strikingly. Another remarkable difference is that nowadays not only North-American and European scholars are involved, but also Latin Americans, Asians and Arabs. In addition, an important impetus to the progress of argumentation theory is given by related disciplines such as *critical discourse analysis* and *persuasion research*.**[vii]**

Today I would like to concentrate on some recent changes in the way in which

argumentation is examined. In my opinion, three major developments in the treatment of argumentation have begun to materialize that open up new avenues for research. Although they differ in shape, these developments can be observed across a broad spectrum of theoretical approaches. The three developments I have in mind can be designated as *empiricalization*, *contextualization*, and formalization of the treatment of *argumentation*.**[viii]**

2. *Empiricalization of the treatment of argumentation*
Modern argumentation theory manifested itself initially by the articulation of theoretical proposals for concepts and models of argumentation based on new philosophical views of reasonableness. In 1958, Stephen Toulmin presented a model of the various procedural steps involved in putting forward argumentation – or "argument," as he used to call it (Toulmin, 2003). He emphasized that, in order to deal adequately with the reasonableness of argumentation in the various "fields" of argumentative reality, an *empirical approach* to argumentation is needed. On their part, Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, who co-founded modern argumentation theory, claimed to have based the theoretical categories of their "new rhetoric" on empirical observations (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969).**[ix]** Like Frege's theory of logic was founded upon a descriptive analysis of mathematical reasoning, they founded their argumentation theory on a descriptive analysis of reasoning with value judgments in the fields of law, history, philosophy, and literature.**[x]**

In spite of their insistence on "empiricalization" of the treatment of argumentation, the empirical dimension of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's own contributions to argumentation theory remains rather sketchy. In fact, all prominent protagonists of modern argumentation theory in the 1950s, 60s and 70s concentrated in the first place on presenting theoretical proposals for dealing with argumentation and philosophical views in their support. This even applies to the Norwegian philosopher Arne Næss, however practical and empirical his orientation was.**[xi]** The empirical research Næss wanted to be carried out with regard to argumentation was designed to lead to a more precise determination of the statements about which disagreement exists.**[xii]** In his own work however he refrained from giving substance to the empirical dimension of argumentation theory.

Despite the strongly expressed preferences of the founding fathers, I conclude that the development of the empirical component of argumentation theory did not

really take off until much later. Making such a sweeping statement however, forces you often to acknowledge exceptions immediately. In this case, I must admit that there is an old and rich tradition of empirically-oriented rhetorical scholarship in American communication studies.**[xiii]** The empirical research that is conducted in this tradition consists for the most part of *case studies*. One of its main branches, for instance, "rhetorical criticism," concentrates on analysing specific public speeches or texts that are meant to be persuasive. An excellent specimen is Michael Leff and Gerald Mohrmann's (1993) analysis of Abraham Lincoln's Cooper Union speech of February 27, 1860, designed to win nomination as spokesman for the Republican Party. David Zarefsky (1986) offers another example of such empirical research of historical political discourse in *President Johnson's War on Poverty.* His more encompassing central question is how Johnson's social program, put in the strategic perspective of a "war on poverty," and laid down in the Economic Opportunity Act, gained first such strong support and fell so far later on.

In my view, in argumentation theory argumentative reality is to be examined systematically, concentrating in particular on the influence of certain factors in argumentative reality on the production, interpretation, and assessment of argumentative discourse.**[xiv]** Two types of empirical research can be pertinent. First, *qualitative* research relying on introspection and observation by the researcher will usually be most appropriate when specific qualities, traits or conventions of particular specimens of argumentative discourse need to be depicted. Second, as a rule, *quantitative* research based on numerical data and statistics is required when generic "If X, then Y" claims regarding the production, interpretation or assessment of argumentative discourse must be tested. It is basically the nature of the claim at issue that determines which type of evidence is required – examples or frequencies – and which type of empirical research is therefore most appropriate. Although *qualitative* as well as *quantitative* empirical research has its own function in examining argumentative discourse, and the two types of research may complement each other in various ways, carrying out qualitative research is in my opinion always a necessary preparatory step in gaining a better understanding of argumentative reality.**[xv]**

In France, Marianne Doury has recently carried out qualitative empirical research that is systematically connected with research questions of a more general kind (e.g., Doury, 2006). Her research, which is strongly influenced by insights from

discourse and conversation analysis, aims at highlighting "the discursive and interactional devices used by speakers who face conflicting standpoints and need to take a stand in such a way as to hold out against contention" (Doury, 2009, p. 143). Doury focuses on the "spontaneous" argumentative norms revealed by the observation of argumentative exchanges in polemical contexts (Doury, 1997, 2004a, 2005). Her "emic," i.e. theory-independent, descriptions contribute to a form of argumentative "ethnography" (Doury, 2004b).

In contrast to theoretical research, in "informal logic" empirical research is rather thin on the ground. Nevertheless, Maurice Finocchiaro has carried out important qualitative research projects focusing on reasoning in scientific controversies (e.g., Finocchiaro, 2005b). His approach, which is directed at theorizing, can be characterized as both *historical* and *empirical.* Finocchiaro states explicitly that the theory of reasoning he has in mind "has an empirical orientation and is not a purely formal or abstract discipline" (2005a, p. 22).**[xvi]** Rather than judging arguments in historical controversies from an *a priori* perspective, as formal logicians do, Finocchiaro holds that the assessment criteria can and should be found empirically within the discourse.

The oldest and most well-known type of quantitative empirical research of argumentation takes place, mainly in the United States, in the related area of *persuasion research.* More often than not however persuasion research does not concentrate on argumentation. When it does, it deals with the persuasive effects of the way in which argumentation is presented (*message structure*) and the persuasive effects of the content of argumentation (*message content*). In the past years, both types of persuasion research have cumulated in large-scale "meta-analyses," carried out most elaborately by Daniel O'Keefe (2006).

Recently the connection between argumentation and persuasion has been examined more frequently, also outside the United States, in particular by communication scholars from the University of Nijmegen. Their research concentrates for the most part on message content. Hans Hoeken (2001) addressed the relationship between the perception of the quality of an argument and its actual persuasiveness. His initial research, which can be seen as an altered replication of research conducted earlier by Baesler and Burgoon (1994), examined the perceived and actual persuasiveness of three different types of evidence: anecdotal, statistical, and causal evidence. The experimental results indicate that the various types of evidence had a different effect on the

acceptance of the claim. However, the differences only partly replicate the pattern of results obtained in other studies. Contrary to expectations, in Hoeken's study causal evidence proved not to be the most convincing evidence. It was in fact just as persuasive as anecdotal evidence, and less persuasive than statistical evidence.**[xvii]** Later research conducted in Nijmegen has focused on the relative persuasiveness of different types of arguments.

Since the 1980s, quantitative empirical research has also been carried out in argumentation theory, albeit not by a great many scholars. In order to establish to what extent in argumentative reality the recognition of argumentative moves is facilitated or hampered by factors in their presentation I conducted experimental research together with Grootendorst and Bert Meuffels (van Eemeren, Grootendorst & Meuffels, 1984).**[xviii]** Dale Hample and Judith Dallinger (1986, 1987, 1991) investigated in the same period the editorial standards people apply in designing their own arguments.**[xix]** And Judith Sanders, Robert Gass and Richard Wiseman (1991) compared the assessments given by different ethnic groups in evaluating the strength or quality of warrants used in argumentation with assessments given by experts in the field of argumentation and debate (p. 709).**[xx]**

Several quantitative research projects have concentrated on ordinary arguers' pre-theoretical quality notions – or *norms of reasonableness.* Judith Bowker and Robert Trapp (1992), for example, studied laymen's norms for sound argumentation: Do ordinary arguers apply predictable, consistent criteria on the basis of which they distinguish between sound and unsound argumentation? Their conclusion is that the judgments of the respondents partially correlate with the reasonableness norms formulated by informal logicians such as Ralph Johnson and Anthony Blair, and Trudy Govier (p. 228).**[xxi]**

Together with Garssen and Meuffels I carried out a comprehensive research project, reported in 2009 in *Fallacies and Judgments of Reasonableness*, to test experimentally the intersubjective acceptability of the pragma-dialectical norms for judging the reasonableness of argumentative discourse (van Eemeren, Garssen & Meuffels, 2009).**[xxii]** Rather than being "emic" standards of reasonableness, the pragma-dialectical norms are "etic" standards for resolving differences of opinion on the merits. They are designed to be "problem-valid" – or, in terms of Rupert Crawshay-Williams (1957), *methodologically necessary* for serving their purpose. Their "intersubjective" – or, in terms of Crawshay-Williams,

"conventional" – validity for the arguers however is to be tested empirically. The general conclusion of our extended series of experimental tests is that all data that were obtained indicate that the norms ordinary arguers use when judging the reasonableness of contributions to a discussion correspond quite well with the pragma-dialectical norms for critical discussion. Based on this indirect evidence, the rules may be claimed to be *conventionally valid* – taken both individually and as a collective.**[xxiii]**

3. *Contextualization of the treatment of argumentation*
A second striking development in argumentation theory is the greatly increased attention being paid to the context in which argumentation takes places. By taking explicitly account of contextual differentiation in dealing with the production, analysis and evaluation of argumentative discourse this development goes beyond mere empiricalization. All four levels of context I once proposed to distinguish play a part in this endeavour: the "linguistic," the "situational," the "institutional," and the "intertextual" level (van Eemeren, 2010, pp. 17-19). Most prominent however is the inclusion of the institutional context I designated earlier the macro-context, which pertains to the kind of speech event in which the argumentation occurs. Paying attention to the *macro*-context is necessary to do justice to the fact that argumentative discourse is always situated in some more or less conventionalized institutional environment, which influences the way in which the argumentation takes shape.

Although in formal and informal logical approaches the macro-context has not very actively been taken into account,**[xxiv]** in modern argumentation theory the contextual dimension has been emphasized from the beginning. In the rhetorical perspective in particular, contextual considerations have always been an integral part of the approach, starting in Antiquity with the distinction made in Aristotelian rhetoric between different "genres" of discourse. Characteristically, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca see context in the first place as "audience," which is accorded a central role in their *new rhetoric*. Christopher Tindale (1999) insists that in a rhetorical perspective there are still other contextual components than audience that should be taken into account (p. 75).**[xxv]**

According to Lloyd Bitzer (1999), rhetoric is situational because rhetorical discourse obtains its character from the situation which generates it. By the latter he means that rhetorical texts derive their character from *the circumstances of the historic context in which they occur*.**[xxvi]** The rhetorical situation should

therefore be regarded "as a natural context of persons, events, objects, relations, and an exigence which strongly invites utterance" (1999, p. 219). Thanks to Bitzer, more and more rhetorical theorists began to realize that their analyses should take the context of the discourse duly into account.

In the 1970s, in "contextualizing" the study of argumentation, American communication scholars picked up Toulmin's (2003) notion of fields. In 1958, Toulmin had maintained that two arguments are in the same field if their data and claims are of the same *logical type.* However, the difficulty is that he did not define the notion of "logical type" but only indicated its meaning by means of examples. Some features or characteristics of argument, Toulmin suggested, are field-invariant, while others are field-dependent. In 1972, in *Human Understanding*, Toulmin had already moved away from this notion of fields, and had come to regard them as akin to academic disciplines.**[xxvii]**

Because, in Zarefsky's view, the concept of "fields" offers considerable promise for empirical and critical studies of argumentation, he thought it worthwhile to try to dispel the confusion about the idea of field without abandoning the concept altogether (1992, p. 417).**[xxviii]** He noted an extensive discussion at conferences of the communication and rhetoric community in the United States on whether "fields" should be defined in terms of academic disciplines or in terms of broad-based world-views such as Marxism and behaviourism (2012, p. 211). It can be observed however that, varying from author to author, the term *argument fields* is generally used more broadly as a synonym for "rhetorical communities," "discourse communities," "conceptual ecologies," "collective mentalities," "disciplines," and "professions." The common core idea seems to be that claims imply "grounds," and that the grounds for knowledge claims lie in the epistemic practices and states of consensus in specific knowledge domains.**[xxix]**

Currently, in communication research in the United States the notion of "argument field" seems to be abandoned. Instead, a contextual notion has become prominent which is similar but not equal to argument field. This is the notion of *argument sphere,* **[xxx]** which was in 1982 introduced by Thomas Goodnight.**[xxxi]** Each argument sphere comes with specific practices.**[xxxii]** Goodnight offers some examples but does not present a complete list of such practices or an overview of their defining properties. For one thing, spheres of argument differ from each other in the norms for reasonable argument that prevail.**[xxxiii]** Members of "societies" and "historical cultures" participate,

according to Goodnight, in vast, and not altogether coherent, superstructures, which invite them *to channel doubts through prevailing discourse practices*. In the democratic tradition, these channels can be recognized as the *personal*, the *technical*, and the *public* spheres, which operate through very different forms of invention and subject matter selection.**[xxxiv]** Inspired by Habermas and the Frankfurt School, Goodnight aims to show that the quality of public deliberation has atrophied since arguments drawn from the private and technical spheres have invaded, and perhaps even appropriated, the public sphere.**[xxxv]**

A rather new development in the contextualization of the study of argumentation is instigated by Douglas Walton and Erik Krabbe (1995), who take in their dialectical approach the contextual dimension of argumentative discourse into account by differentiating between different kinds of *dialogue types*: "normative framework[s] in which there is an exchange of arguments between two speech partners reasoning together in turn-taking sequence aimed at a collective goal" (Walton, 1998, p. 30).**[xxxvi]** Walton and Krabbe's typology of dialogues consists of six main types: persuasion, negotiation, inquiry, deliberation, information-seeking, and eristics, and additionally some mixed types, such as debate, committee meeting, and Socratic dialogue (1995, p. 66).**[xxxvii]** The various types of dialogue are characterized by their initial situation, method and goal.**[xxxviii]**

Over the past decades the pragma-dialectical theorizing too has developed explicitly and systematically towards the inclusion of the contextual dimension of argumentative discourse, especially after Peter Houtlosser and I had introduced the notion of *strategic manoeuvring* (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2002). Strategic manoeuvring does not take part in an idealized critical discussion but in the multi-varied communicative practices that have developed in the various communicative domains. Because these practices have been established in specific *communicative activity types*, which are characterized by the way in which they are conventionalized, the communicative activity types constitute the institutional macro-contexts in which in "extended" pragma-dialectics argumentative discourse is examined (van Eemeren, 2010, pp. 129-162). The primary aim of this research is to find out in what ways the possibilities for strategic manoeuvring are determined by the institutionally motivated extrinsic constraints, known as *institutional preconditions*, ensuing from the conventionalization of the communicative activity types concerned.

In order to identify the institutional preconditions for strategic manoeuvring in the communicative activity types they examined, the pragma-dialecticians first determined how these activity types can be characterized argumentatively. Next they tried to establish how the parties involved operate in conducting their argumentative discourse in accordance with the room for strategic manoeuvring available in the communicative activity type concerned. To mention just a few examples: in concentrating on the legal domain, they examined strategic manoeuvring by the judge in a court case (Feteris, 2009); in concentrating on the political domain, strategic manoeuvring by Members of the European Parliament in a general debate (van Eemeren & Garssen, 2011); and in concentrating on the medical domain, the doctor's strategic manoeuvring in doctor-patient consultation (Labrie, 2012).

Meanwhile, at the University of Lugano, Eddo Rigotti and Andrea Rocci have started a related research program concentrating on argumentation in context. Characteristic of their approach is the combination of semantic and pragmatic insights from linguistics, and concepts from classical rhetoric and dialectic, with insights from argumentation theories such as pragma-dialectics. The communicative activity types they have tackled include mediation meetings from the domain of counseling (Greco Morasso, 2011), negotiations about takeovers from the financial domain (Palmieri, 2014), and editorial conferences from the domain of the media (Rocci & Zampa, 2015).

Recently the pragma-dialectical research of argumentation in context has moved on to the next stage. It is currently aimed at detecting the *argumentative patterns* of constellations of argumentative moves that, as a consequence of the institutional preconditions for strategic manoeuvring, stereotypically come into being in the various kinds of argumentative practices in the legal, political, medical, and academic domains.**[xxxix]**

4. *Formalization of the treatment of argumentation*
The third development I would like to highlight is the "formalization" of the treatment of argumentation. When Toulmin and Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, each in their own way, initiated modern argumentation theory, they agreed – unconsciously but emphatically – that the formal approach to argumentation taken in modern logic was inadequate. In spite of the strong impact of their ideas upon others, their depreciation did not discourage logicians and dialecticians from further developing such a formal approach.

It is important to note that in the various proposals "formality" enters in rather diverse ways and a borderline between approaches that are formal and those that are not is not always easy to draw. A theory of argumentation, whether logical or dialectical, can be "formal" in several senses – and can also be partially formal or formal to some degree.**[xl]** Generally, in a "formal logical" or a "formal dialectical" argumentation theory "formal" refers to *being regimented* or *regulated*. Often, however, "formal" also means that the locutions dealt with in the formal system concerned are rigorously determined by grammatical rules, their *logical forms being determined by their linguistic shapes*. Additionally, an argumentation theory can be "formal" in the sense that its rules are wholly or partly *set up a priori*.

A formal theory of argumentation can be put to good use in different ways. The most familiar kind of use probably consists in its application in analyzing and evaluating arguments or an argumentative discussion. Formal systems often used for this purpose are propositional logic and first order predicate logic. Their application consists of "translating" each argument at issue into the language of one of these logics and then determining its validity by a truth table or some other available method.

Using a formal approach to analyse and evaluate real-life argumentative discourse leads to all kinds of problems. Four of them are mentioned in the *Handbook.* First, the process of translation is not straightforward. Second, a negative outcome does not mean that the argument is invalid – if an argument is not valid according to one system it could still be valid in some other system of logic. Third, by overlooking unexpressed premises and the argument schemes that are used the crux of the argumentation is missed. Fourth, as a consequence, the evaluation is reduced to an evaluation of the validity of the reasoning used in the argumentation, neglecting the appropriateness of premises and the adequacy of the modes of arguing that are employed in the given context. Formal logic can be of help in reconstructing and assessing argumentation, but an adequate argumentation theory needs to be more encompassing and more communication-oriented.

A second way of using formal systems consists in utilizing or constructing them to contribute to the theoretical development of argumentation theory by providing clarifications of certain theoretical concepts. In this way, John Woods and Douglas Walton (1989), for instance, show how formal techniques can be helpful in dealing

with the fallacies. Employing formal systems to instigate theoretical developments is, in my view, more rewarding that just using them in analyzing and evaluating argumentative discourse.

From Aristotle's *Prior Analytics* onwards, logicians have been chiefly concerned with the formal validity of deductions, pushing the actual activity of arguing in discussions into the background. This has divorced logic as a discipline from the practice of argumentation. Paul Lorenzen (1960) and his Erlangen School have made it possible to counteract this development. They promoted the idea that logic, instead of being concerned with a rational mind's inferences or truth in all possible worlds, should focus on discussion between two disagreeing parties in the actual world. They thus helped to bridge the gap between formal logic and argumentation theory noted by Toulmin and the authors of *The New Rhetoric*.

Because Lorenzen did not present his insights as a contribution to argumentation theory, their important implications for this discipline were initially not evident. In fact, Lorenzen took not only the first step towards a *re-dialectification* of logic, but his insights concerning the dialogical definition of logical constants also signal the initiation of a *pragmatic* approach to logic. In *From Axiom to Dialogue*, Else Barth and Erik Krabbe (1982) incorporated his insights in a formal dialectical theory of argumentation. Their primary purpose was "to develop acceptable rules for verbal resolution of conflicts of opinion" (p. 19). The rules of the dialectical systems they propose, which are "formal" in the regulative and sometimes also in the linguistic sense, standardize reasonable and critical discussions.

A third kind of use of formal systems consists in using them as a source of inspiration for developing a certain approach to argumentation. Such an approach may itself be informal or only partly formal. In argumentation theory the approaches inspired by formal studies serve as a link between formal and informal approaches. The semi-formal method of "profiles of dialogue" is a case in point.**[xli]** A profile of dialogue is typically written as an upside down tree diagram, consisting of nodes linked by line segments. Each branch of the tree displays a possible dialogue that may develop from the initial move. The nodes are associated with moves and the links between the nodes correspond to situations in the dialogue.

In pragma-dialectics, the method of profiles of dialogue inspired in its turn the use of "dialectical profiles" (van Eemeren, Houtlosser & Snoeck Henkemans,

2007, esp. Section 2.3), which are equally semi-formal as argument schemes and argumentation structures. A *dialectical profile* is "a sequential pattern of the moves the participants in a critical discussion are entitled to make – and in one way or another have to make – to realize a particular dialectical aim at a particular stage or sub-stage of the resolution process" (van Eemeren, 2010, p. 98).

A fourth and last use of a formal approach proceeds into the opposite direction. This is, for instance, the case when insights from argumentation theory are employed for creating formal applications in Artificial Intelligence. In return, of course, Artificial Intelligence offers argumentation theory a laboratory for examining implementations of its rules and concepts. Formal applications of insights from argumentation theory in Artificial Intelligence vary from making such insights instrumental in the construction of "argumentation machines," or at any rate visualization systems, interactive dialogue systems, and analysis systems, to developing less comprehensive tools for automated analysis. Of preeminent importance in these endeavours is the philosophical notion of *defeasible reasoning*, referring to inferences that can be blocked or defeated (Nute, 1994, p. 354). In 1987, John Pollock pointed out that "defeasible reasoning" is captured by what in Artificial Intelligence is called a non-monotonic logic. A logic is non-monotonic when a conclusion that, according to that logic, follows from certain premises need not always follow when more premises are added. In a non-monotonic logic, it is possible to draw tentative conclusions while keeping open the possibility that additional information may lead to their retraction.**[xlii]**

Although in *The Uses of Argument* the term *defeasible* is rarely used, Toulmin (2003) is obviously an early adopter of the idea of defeasible reasoning. He acknowledges that his key distinctions of "claims," "data," "warrants," "modal qualifiers," "conditions of rebuttal," and his ideas about the applicability or inapplicability of warrants, "will not be particularly novel to those who have studied explicitly the logic of special types of practical argument" (p. 131). Toulmin notes that H. L. A. Hart has shown the relevance of the notion of defeasibility for jurisprudence, free will, and responsibility and that David Ross has applied it to ethics, recognizing that moral rules may hold *prima facie*, but can have exceptions. The idea of a *prima facie* reason is closely related to non-monotonic inference: Q can be concluded from P but not when there is additional information R.

In order to take the possibility of defeating circumstances into account, in Artificial Intelligence the notion from argumentation theory called *argument scheme* or *argumentation scheme* has been taken up.**[xliii]** The critical questions associated with argument schemes correspond to defeating circumstances. Floris Bex, Henry Prakken, Christopher Reed and Walton (2003) have applied the concept of argumentation scheme, for instance, to the formalization of legal reasoning from evidence. One of the argument schemes they deal with is *argument from expert opinion*.

Viewed from the perspective of Artificial Intelligence, the work on argument schemes of Walton and his colleagues can be regarded as a contribution to the theory of knowledge representation. This knowledge representation point of view is further developed by Bart Verheij (2003b). Like Bex, Prakken, Reed and Walton (2003), he formalizes argument schemes as defeasible rules of inference.**[xliv]**

5. *Bingo!*
In my view, argumentation theory can only be a relevant discipline if it provides insights that enable a better understanding of argumentative reality. The empiricalization, contextualization, and formalization of the treatment of argumentation I have sketched are necessary preconditions for achieving this purpose. Without empiricalization, the connection with argumentative reality is not ensured. Without contextualization, there is no systematic differentiation of the various kinds of argumentative practices. Without formalization, the required precision and rigour of the theorizing are lacking.

Only if all three developments have come to full fruition, an understanding of argumentative reality can be achieved that constitutes a sound basis for practical intervention by proposing alternative formats and designs for argumentative practices, whether computerized or not, and developing methods for improving productive, analytic, and evaluative argumentative skills. In each case, however, there are certain prerequisites to the indispensable empiricalization, contextualization, and formalization of the treatment of argumentation.

Case studies, for instance, can play a constructive role in gaining insight into argumentative reality by means of empirical research, but, however illuminating they may be, they are not instrumental in the advancement of argumentation theory if they only enhance our understanding of a particular case. *Mutatis mutandis*, the same applies to other qualitative and quantitative empirical

research that lacks theoretical relevance.**[xlv]** Some scholars think wrongly that qualitative research is superior because it "goes deeper" and leads to "real" insight, while other scholars, just as wrongly, consider quantitative research superior because it is "objective" and leads to "generalizable" results.**[xlvi]** In my view, both types of research are necessary for a complete picture of argumentative reality, sometimes even in combination.**[xlvii]** In all cases however it is a prerequisite that the research is systematically related to well-defined theoretical issues and relevant to the advancement of argumentation theory.

In gaining insight into the contextual constraints on argumentative discourse both analytical considerations concerning the rationale of a specific argumentative practice and a practical understanding of how this rationale is implemented in argumentative discourse play a part. In order to contribute to the advancement of argumentation theory as a discipline, the analytical considerations concerning the rationale of an argumentative practice should apply to all specimens of that particular communicative activity type – or dialogue type, if a different theoretical approach is favoured. To enable methodical comparisons between different types of communicative activities, and avoid arbitrary proliferation, the description of the implementation of the rationale must take place in functional and well-defined theoretical categories.

In the recent trend towards formalization, which has been strongly stimulated by the connection with computerization in the interdisciplinary field of artificial intelligence, not only logic-related approaches to argumentation are utilized, but also the Toulmin model and a variety of other theories of argumentation structure and argument schemes, such as Walton and Krabbe's (1995). However, responding to the need for formal adequacy so strongly felt in information science may go at the expense of material adequacy, that is, at the expense of the extent to which the formalized theorizing covers argumentative reality. Relying at any cost on the formal and formalizable theoretical designs that are available in argumentation theory, however weak their theoretical basis may sometimes be, can easily lead to premature or too drastic formalizations and half-baked results. Because of the eclecticism involved in randomly combining incompatible insights from different theoretical approaches, these results may even be incoherent.

Provided that the prerequisites just mentioned are given their due, empiricalizing, contextualizing, and formalizing the treatment of argumentation are crucial to the future of argumentation theory, and more particularly to its applications and

computerization. As the title of my keynote speech indicates, succeeding in properly combining and integrating the three developments would, in my view, mean: "Bingo!".

Let me conclude by illustrating my point with the help of a research project I am presently involved in with a team of pragma-dialecticians. The project is devoted to what I have named *argumentative patterns* (van Eemeren, 2012, p. 442). Argumentative patterns are structural regularities in argumentative discourse that can be observed empirically. These patterns can be characterized with the help of the theoretical tools provided by argumentation theory. Their occurrence can be explained by the institutional preconditions for strategic manoeuvring pertaining to a specific communicative activity type.

Dependent on the exigencies of a communicative domain, in the various communicative activity types different kinds of argumentative exchanges take place. The discrepancies are caused by the kind of difference of opinion to which in a particular communicative activity type the exchanges respond, the type of standpoint at issue, the procedural and material starting points, the specific requirements regarding the way in which the argumentative exchange is supposed to take place, and the kind of outcome allowed.**[xlviii]**

Each argumentative pattern that can be distinguished in argumentative reality is characterized by a constellation of argumentative moves in which, in dealing with a particular kind of difference of opinion, in defence of a particular type of standpoint, a particular argument scheme or combination of argument schemes is used in a particular kind of argumentation structure (van Eemeren, 2012).**[xlix]** The theoretical instruments used by the pragma-dialecticians in their qualitative empirical research aimed at identifying argumentative patterns occurring in argumentative reality, such as the typologies of standpoints, differences of opinions, argument schemes, and argumentation structures,**[l]** are formalized to a certain degree.**[li]** Further formalization is required, in particular for computerization, which is nowadays a requirement for the various kinds of applications in actual argumentative practices instrumental in realizing the practical ambitions of argumentation theory.**[lii]**

Certain argumentative patterns are characteristic of the way in which argumentative discourse is generally conducted in specific communicative activity types. In parliamentary policy debates, for example, a "stereotypical"

argumentative pattern that can be found consists of a prescriptive standpoint that a certain policy should be carried out, justified by pragmatic argumentation, supported by arguments from example. Such stereotypical argumentative patterns are of particular interest to pragma-dialecticians because an identification of the argumentative patterns typically occurring in particular communicative activity types is more insightful than, for instance, just listing the types of standpoints at issue or the argument schemes that are frequently used.**[liii]** Thus documenting the institutional diversification of argumentative practices paves the way for a systematic comparison and a theoretical account of context-independency and context-dependency in argumentative discourse that is more thorough, more refined, and better supported than Toulmin's account and other available accounts. In this way, our current research systematically tackles one of the fundamental problems of argumentation theory: universality versus particularity.

NOTES

i. See van Eemeren (2010, pp. 25-27) for the influence of being or not being a native speaker of English on the perception of argumentation and argumentation theory.

ii. In my view, instead of being a theory of proof or a general theory of reasoning or argument, argumentation theory concentrates on using argument to convince others by a reasonable discussion of the acceptability of the standpoints at issue. My view of argumentation theory is generally incorporated in more-encompassing views that have been advanced.

iii. As we observed in the new Handbook, "[s]ome argumentation theorists have a goal that is primarily (and sometimes even exclusively) descriptive, especially those theorists having a background in linguistics, discourse analysis, and rhetoric. They are interested, for instance, in finding out how in argumentative discourse speakers and writers try to convince or persuade others by making use of certain linguistic devices or by using other means to influence their audience or readership. Other argumentation theorists, often inspired by logic, philosophy, or insights from law, study argumentation primarily for normative purposes. They are interested in developing soundness criteria that argumentation must satisfy in order to qualify as rational or reasonable. They examine, for instance, the epistemic function argumentation fulfills or the fallacies that may occur in argumentative discourse" (van Eemeren et al., 2014, p. 29).

iv. According to the Handbook of argumentation theory, "The current state of the

art in argumentation theory is characterized by the co-existence of a variety of theoretical perspectives and approaches, which differ considerably from each other in conceptualization, scope, and theoretical refinement" (van Eemeren et al., 2014, p. 29).

v. See for various views on combining insights from dialectic and rhetoric van Eemeren and Houtlosser (Eds., 2002). Van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2002) have proposed to integrate insights from rhetoric into the theoretical framework of pragma-dialectics. According to Tindale, who considers the rhetorical perspective as the most fundamental, the synthesis of the logical, dialectical and rhetorical perspectives should be grounded in the rhetorical perspective (1999, pp. 6-7).

vi. In our new Handbook we take the position that argumentation theory can best be viewed as an interdisciplinary study with logical, dialectical, and rhetorical dimensions (van Eemeren et al., 2014, p. 29).

vii. According to van Eemeren et al. (2014), a great number of contributions to the study of argumentation are not part of the generally recognized research traditions; some of them stem from related disciplines or have been developed in non-Anglophone parts of the world. See Chapter 12 of the Handbook.

viii. It goes without saying that, depending on one's theoretical position and preferences, other promising trends can be distinguished. A case in point may be the study of visual and other modalities of argumentation.

ix. In spite of various criticisms of the empirical adequacy of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's taxonomy of argument schemes (van Eemeren et al., 1996, pp. 122-124; van Eemeren et al., 2014, p. 292), Warnick and Kline (1992) have made an effort to carry out empirical research based on this taxonomy.

x. The norms for rationality and reasonableness described in the new rhetoric have an "emic" basis: the criteria for the evaluation of argumentation that Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca provide are a description of various kinds of argumentation that can be successful in practice with the people for whom the argumentation is intended.

xi. In Interpretation and Preciseness, published in 1953, Næss revealed himself as a radical empirical semanticist, who liked questionnaires and personal interviews to be used for investigating what in particular circles is understood by particular expressions. However, he did not carried out such investigations himself.

xii. Although Næss's empirical ideas stimulated the coming into existence of the "Oslo School," a group of researchers investigating semantic relations, such as synonymy, by means of questionnaires, their influence in argumentation theory

has been rather limited.

xiii. Already since the 1950s, contemporary argumentative discourse in the political domain has been carefully studied by rhetoricians such as Robert Newman (1961) and Edward Schiappa (2002), to name just two outstanding examples from different periods.

xiv. Because of its ambition to be an academic discipline which is of practical relevance in dealing with argumentative reality, argumentation theory needs to include empirical research relating to the philosophically motivated theoretical models that have been developed. To see to what extent argumentative reality agrees with the theory, the research programme of an argumentation theory such as pragma-dialectics therefore has an empirical component.

xv. Although in general quantitative research is only necessary with regard to more general claims, claims pertaining to a specific case can sometimes also be supported quantitatively. In any case, quantitative research is only relevant to argumentation theory if it increases our insight into argumentative reality.

xvi. At the same time, Finocchiaro emphasizes that "the empirical is contrasted primarily to the a priori, and not, for example, to the normative or the theoretical" (2005a, p. 47).

xvii. Corresponding with its actual persuasiveness, statistical evidence is rated as stronger than anecdotal evidence. Ratings of the strength of the argument are in both cases strongly related to its actual persuasiveness. In contrast, causal evidence received higher ratings compared to its actual persuasiveness.

xviii. See Garssen (2002) for experimental research into whether ordinary arguers have a pre-theoretical notion of argument schemes.

xix. More recently, Hample collaborated with Fabio Paglieri and Ling Na (2011) in answering the question of when people are inclined to start a discussion.

xx. Another type of quantitative research focuses on cognitive processes. Voss, Fincher-Kiefer, Wiley and Ney Silfies (1993), for instance, present a model of informal argument processing and describe experiments that provide support for the model.

xxi. Making also use of an "empiricistic" method, Schreier, Groeben and Christmann (1995) introduced the concept of argumentational integrity to develop ethical criteria for assessing contributions to argumentative discussions in daily life based on experimental findings.

xxii. This research was, of course, not aimed at legitimizing the model of a critical discussion. All the same, by indicating which factors are worth investigating because of their significance for resolving a difference of opinion on the merits,

the model gives direction to the research.

xxiii. Within the field of experimental psychology, Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber (2011) have recently proposed an "argumentative theory" which hypothesizes that the (main) function of reasoning is argumentative: "to produce arguments so we can convince others and to evaluate others' arguments so as to be convinced only when appropriate" (Mercier, 2012, pp. 259-260). Putting forward this hypothesis on the function of reasoning enables them to (re)interpret many of the findings of tests conducted in experimental psychology. As to further research, Mercier (2012, p. 266) proposes to take typologies regarding argument schemes and their associated critical questions developed in argumentation theory as a starting point for experimental studies regarding the evaluation of arguments. In this way, it might become clear which cognitive mechanisms are at play when people evaluate certain types of argumentation.

xxiv. The exception is "natural logic," which studies arguments in a context of situated argumentative discourse in describing the "logic" of ordinary argumentative discourse in a non-normative, "naturalistic" way.

xxv. A first contextual component Tindale (1999) distinguishes is locality, "the time and the place in which the argument is located" (p. 75); a second one is background, "those events that bear on the argumentation in question" (p. 76); a third one is the arguer, the source of the argumentation (p. 77); and a fourth component of context he distinguishes is expression, the way in which the argument is expressed (p. 80). Characteristically, Tindale defines audience relevance – an important element of contextual relevance which is a precondition for the acceptability of argumentation – as "the relation of the information-content of an

argument, stated and assumed, to the framework of beliefs and commitments that are likely to be held by the audience for which it is intended" (1999, p. 102, my italics).

xxvi. In Bitzer's view, every rhetorical situation has three constituents: (1) the exigence that is the "imperfection" (problem, defect or obstacle) which should be changed by the discourse; (2) the audience that is required because rhetorical discourse produces change by influencing the decisions and actions of persons who function as a "mediator of change"; and (3) the constraints of the rhetorical situation which influence the rhetor and can be brought to bear upon the audience (pp. 220-221). The rhetorical situation may therefore be defined as "a complex of persons, events, objects, and relations presenting an actual or potential exigence which can be completely or partially removed if discourse,

introduced into the situation, can so constrain human decision or action as to bring about the significant modification of the exigence" (Bitzer, 1999, p. 220).

xxvii. In spite of the confusion, some argumentation scholars still found the idea of argument fields useful for distinguishing between field-invariant aspects of argument and aspects of argument that vary from field to field.

xxviii. Zarefsky identifies and discusses three recurrent issues in theories about argument fields: the purpose of the concept of argument fields, the nature of argument fields, and the development of argument fields.

xxix. The positions of the advocates of the various denominators can be interpreted by inferring the kinds of backgrounds they presuppose: the traditions, practices, ideas, texts, and methods of particular groups (Dunbar, 1986; Sillars, 1981). Willard, for one, advocated a sociological-rhetorical version of the field theory. For him, fields are "sociological entities whose unity stems from practices" (1982, p. 75). Consistent with the Chicago School, Willard defines fields as existing in the actions of the members of a field. These actions are in his view essentially rhetorical. Rowland (1992, p. 470) also addresses the meaning and the utility of argument fields. He argues for a purpose-centred approach. In his view, the essential characteristics of an argument field are best described by identifying the purpose shared by members of the field (p. 497).

xxx. See Goodnight (1980, 1982, 1987a, 1987b). For a collection of papers devoted to spheres of argument, see Gronbeck (Ed., 1989).

xxxi. Although Goodnight does not reject the notion of argument field, he finds it "not a satisfactory umbrella for covering the grounding of all arguments" (2012, p. 209). In his view, the idea that all arguments are "grounded in fields, enterprises characterized by some degree of specialization and compactness, contravenes an essential distinction among groundings" (p. 209).

xxxii. Zarefsky (2012, pp. 212-213) proposes a taxonomical scheme for spheres which consists of the following distinguishing criteria: Who participates in the discourse? Who sets the rules of procedure? What kind of knowledge is required? How are the contributions to be evaluated? What is the end-result of the deliberation?

xxxiii. While the notion of "argument field" seems to be abandoned, argumentation scholars still frequently use the notion of "sphere." Schiappa (2012), for instance, compares and contrasts in his research the arguments advanced in the technical sphere of legal and constitutional debate with those used in the public sphere.

xxxiv. Michael Hazen and Thomas Hynes (2011) focus on the functioning of

argument in the public and private spheres of communication (or, as they call them, "domains") in different forms of society. While an extensive literature exists on the role of argument in democracy and the public sphere, there is no corresponding literature regarding non-democratic societies.

xxxv. Goodnight (2012) suggests that the grounds of argument may be altered over time: A way of arguing appropriate to a given sphere can be shifted to a new grounding. This means that spheres start to intermingle. It is important to realize that Goodnight combines in fact two ideas (the idea of the spheres and the idea of a threat to the public sphere), but that this is not necessary: One can find the "spheres" notion analytically useful without accepting the idea of a threat to the public sphere.

xxxvi. Walton (1998) defines a dialogue as a "normative framework in which there is an exchange of arguments between two speech partners reasoning together in turn-taking sequence aimed at a collective goal" (p. 30). There is a main goal, which is the goal of the dialogue, and there are goals of the participants. The two kinds of goals may or may not correspond.

xxxvii. In a recent version of the typology (Walton, 2010), the list consists of seven types, since a dialogue type called discovery, attributed to McBurney and Parsons (2001), is added to the six types just mentioned.

xxxviii. An inquiry, for instance, has a lack of proof as its initial situation, uses knowledge-based argumentation as a method, and has the establishment of proof as a goal.

xxxix. The underlying assumption here is that in the argumentation stage protagonists may in principle be supposed to aim for making the strongest case in the macro-context concerned by trying to advance a combination of reasons that will satisfy the antagonist by leaving no critical doubts unanswered. In the process they may be expected to exploit the argument schemes they consider most effective in the situation at hand and to use all multiple, coordinative and subordinative argumentation that is necessary to respond to the critical reactions the antagonist may be expected to come up with.

xl. Of the three distinct senses of "formal" pointed out by Barth and Krabbe (1982, pp. 14-19), and the two added by Krabbe (1982, p. 3), only three are pertinent to argumentation theory. Krabbe's first sense refers to Platonic forms and need not be considered here. The same goes for the fifth sense, which refers to systems that are purely logical, i.e., that do not provide for any material rule or move.

xli. Walton was probably the first to introduce profiles of dialogues by that name

(1989a, pp. 37-38; 1989b, pp. 68-69). Other relevant publications are Krabbe (2002) and van Laar (2003a, 2003b).

xlii. Dung (1995) initiated the study of argument attack as a (mathematical) directed graph, and showed formal connections between non-monotonic logic and argumentation. Just like Bondarenko et al. (1997), Verheij (2003a) developed an assumption-based model of defeasible argumentation. Prakken (1997) explored the connection between non-monotonic logic and legal argumentation.

xliii. In the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation, argument schemes are distinguished from the formal schemes of reasoning of logic. These argument schemes are defeasible. They play a vital role in the intersubjective testing procedure, which boils down to asking critical questions and reacting to them. By asking critical questions, the antagonist challenges the protagonist to make clear that, in the particular case at hand, there are no exceptions to the general rule invoked by the use of the argument scheme concerned.

xliv. Reed and Rowe (2004) have incorporated argument schemes in their Araucaria tool for the analysis of argumentative texts. Rahwan, Zablith and Reed (2007) have proposed formats for the integration of argument schemes in what is called the Semantic Web. Gordon, Prakken and Walton (2007) have integrated argument schemes in their Carneades model.

xlv. A great deal of the qualitative empirical research that has been carried out in argumentation theory is not only case-based but also very much ad hoc. In addition, a great deal of the quantitative persuasion research that is carried out suffers from a lack of theoretical relevance.

xlvi. An additional problem is that the distinction between qualitative and quantitative research is not always defined in the same way. Psychologists and sociologists, for instance, tend to consider interviews and introspection as qualitative research because the results are not reported in numerical terms and statistics does not play a role. There are also less restrictive views, in which numerical reporting and the use of statistics are not the only distinctive feature.

xlvii. In the pragma-dialectical empirical research concerning fallacies, for instance, qualitative and quantitative research are methodically combined – in this case by having a qualitative follow-up of the quantitative research, as reported in van Eemeren, Garssen and Meuffels (2009).

xlviii. Viewed dialectically, argumentative patterns are generated by the protagonist's responding to, or anticipating, (possible) criticisms of the would-be antagonist, such as critical questions associated with the argument schemes that are used.

xlix. If an argument in defence of a standpoint is expected not to be accepted immediately, then more, other, additional or supporting arguments (or a combination of those) need to be advanced, which leads to an argumentative pattern with a complex argumentation structure (cumulative coordinative, multiple, complementary coordinative or subordinative argumentation (or a combination of those), respectively).

l. We will make use of the qualitative method of analytic induction (see, for instance, Jackson, 1986).

li. To determine and compare the frequencies of occurrence of the various stereotypical argumentative patterns that have been identified on analytical grounds while qualitative research has made clear how they occur, the qualitative empirical research will be followed by quantitative empirical research of representative corpuses of argumentative discourse to establish the frequency of occurrence of these patterns. This quantitative research needs to be based on the results of analytic and qualitative research in which it is established which argumentative patterns are functional in specific (clusters of) communicative activity types, so that theoretically motivated expectations (hypotheses) can be formulated about the circumstances in which specific argumentative patterns occur in particular communicative activity types and when they will occur.

lii. In view of the possibilities of computerization, other theories of argumentation that have been formalized only to a certain degree could in principle benefit equally from further formalization.

liii. An argumentative pattern become stereotypical due to the way in which the institutional preconditions pertaining to a certain communicative activity type constrain the kinds of standpoints, the kinds of criticisms and the types of arguments that may be advanced.

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ISSA Proceedings 2014 – Argumentation In Hierarchical And Non-Hierarchical Communication

Abstract: There are two major patterns of communication – hierarchical and non-hierarchical, depending on the communicative intention of the speakers. Hierarchical communication is a monologue or a pseudo-dialogue while intrinsic dialogism is a feature of non-hierarchical communication. Some argumentative strategies are characteristic to either hierarchical or non-hierarchical pattern. A line can be drawn between dialogue as an aim and dialogue as a form of communication. Both verbal and non-verbal arguments are considered.

Keywords: communicative intention, hierarchy, non-hierarchical, monologue, pseudo-dialogue.

1. *'Vertical' and 'horizontal' rhetoric*
Rhetoric is an art of using arguments, that is, an art of using language to achieve certain goals. There have been many studies of argumentative strategies, rhetoric devices, kinds of pathos. The effectiveness of these strategies and devices can be evaluated with regards to various kinds of addressees. The task of my report is to specify two principally different strategies – "vertical" or hierarchical and "horizontal" or non-hierarchical.

These two major patterns of communication depend on the communicative intention of the speakers. Intentions can be very different, and if we approach language as a set of tools, we choose the instrument according to the job we want to do. Another question to ask is how we want the job to be done and what social costs we are prepared to bear.

However important communication may be in our life, it is not an end in itself, we communicate with other people to solve certain tasks. When we follow the "vertical" pattern we either want to use power to achieve our goals or power is the goal in itself. In any case, other people are considered as an enemy force which we need to neutralize. In case of the "horizontal" pattern we aim at cooperation with other people. In this latter case each participant of the communicative act is free to use the information they receive in their own cognitive pursuits.

A modern Chilean philosopher and biologist H. Marturana writes about two possible ways of interaction between systems. The first case is the so called initialization – the behavior of the first organism rigidly determines consequent behavior of the second organism. Thus a chain is established, in which the second organism has no freedom of choice. In human society the possibilities of this model are limited. The aim of human communication is establishing a consensual area of behavior by means of developing cooperation (Marturana, 1996, p. 119). According to Marturana, we can only do something together if we do not deny each other in the process of doing. This second model is not based on power and it cannot be imposed on people without being destroyed. People can only establish it spontaneously in the life process.

The speaker's intentions (achieving a consensus or winning the case) influence the choice of argumentative strategies. Intrinsic dialogism is a feature of non-hierarchical communication. As M. Bakhtin wrote, understanding is already a response, it always provokes response in this or that form (Bakhtin, 1970, p. 254). This is why, the main means of influencing the addressee here is convincing them. To convince the addressee it is necessary to make them understand and accept the message. So, explanations and other rhetoric devices aimed at achieving understanding are so important in the "horizontal" pattern.

2. *Hierarchy as a monologue*
Hierarchical communication is a monologue or a pseudo-dialogue. Of cause, this does not mean that hierarchal discourse does not need explanations. The more authority the person has the less arguments they need. Sometimes, it is enough if it is understood that what the person says is an order and that the speaker has non-verbal means at their disposal to enforce it.

Yet, power is seldom absolute, authority is permanently challenged, it cannot only

rely on power. Typical arguments used in a "vertical" discourse include:

– expressing an order in the form of a request,
– use of such notions as "duty", "honor" or "disgrace",
– promising material and idealistic rewards for obedience and punishment for failing to execute the order,
– presenting the order as given directly by the people, motherland, etc.

As an example, we can quote here the famous order by Admiral Nelson before the Trafalgar battle: *England expects that every man will do his duty or the Soviet poster of the WWII time "Motherland calls".*

In real life it is difficult to find an example of purely monologue "vertical" communication, as even those, who have very much power have to engage in dialogue with their subordinates and listen to their objections. For an example we may turn to literary fairy tales where hierarchy is given from the very beginning by the opposition of humans and super-human beings, here we can clearly observe the strategies which are not so obvious in real life. The dialogue here is not an aim but only the form of communication, these can be called dialoguised monologues. This can happen in two situations:

a. The character who has power does not care about others and pursues the aims that contradict the aims of other characters;
b. This character "knows better" what others need and does not consider their possible objections serious enough.

The example from the book about Marry Poppins demonstrates the second scenario:

(1)
"Is that your medicine?" inquired Michel, looking very interested. "No, yours" said Mary Poppins, holding out the spoon for him. Michel stared. He wrinkled up his nose. He began to protest. "I don't want it. I don't need it. I won't!" But Mary Poppins's eyes were fixed on him and Michel suddenly discovered that you could not look at Mary Poppins and disobey her – something that was frightening and at the same time most exciting. The spoon came nearer. He held his breath, shut his eyes and gulped… He swallowed and a happy smile came round his face.
… But when she saw Mary Poppins moving towards the twins with the bottle Jane rushed at her. "Oh, no – please. They are too young. It would not be good for

them. Please!" Mary Poppins, however, took no notice, but with a warning terrible glance at Jane, tipped the spoon towards John's mouth. (Travers L. P. Mary Poppins. Moscow, 1979, p. 7)

The analyses of argumentation in vertical discourse enables us to specify two groups of lexical, grammatical and extra-linguistic means:

a. Means to achieve "lack of understanding" (avoiding questions and objections, using language or words that the addressee does not know, voluntary starting and checking the conversation, etc.);
b. means to achieve " agreeing without understanding" (mentioned above linguistic ones well as extralinguistic – glance, posture, gestures, "special effects" aimed at psychological influence.

In the above example we see means from both groups: brief, formal answer to the question putting the interlocutor to a standstill, the absence of any response to the request, "fixed eyes", "warning terrible glance", "something that was frightening and at the same time most exciting".

The power does not necessarily rely on institutionalized authority, we can speak about the use of power in all cases when the interests of the other part are being ignored. The speaker then may tend to disguise the monologue. A form of this disguised monologue is the so-called pseudo-dialogue. This is a strategy used when the speaker wants the listener obey by making them believe that they are making a decision themselves, without an outside pressure. According to E. Vargina and E. Menschikova (Vargina & Menschikova, 2013, pp. 16 – 27), pseudo-dialogue structure has to contain one or more of the following components.

1.
Question that does not require an answer:
(2) *Miranda's face was a wooden mask. She plumped up her pillows and sat up straighter. 'But there's no question of that, is there?*
(Murdoch I. An unofficial rose. Random House, 2008, p.167)

2.
Question already containing an answer:
(3) *'Did he say anything then which— well, about going away for good? He must have let you know that he was. Ann was breathless.*
(Murdoch I. An unofficial rose. Random House, 2008, p. 167)

3.

Answer that does not logically match the question/statement of the first speaker:

(4) *D.B.: We're gonna keep Big Daddy as comfortable as we can.*

B.M.: Yes, it's just a bad dream, that's all it is, it's just an awful dream.

(Williams T. Cat on a hot tin roof. New Directions Publishing, 1954, p. 81)

4.

Absence of answer:

(5) *"Look at that! Call that a signal fire? That's a cooking fire Now you'll eat and there'll be no smoke. Don't you understand? There may be a ship out there—" He paused, defeated by the silence and the painted anonymity of the group guarding the entry.*

(Golding W. Lord of the flies. Putnam Publishing, 1954, p. 92).

Another example of a pseudo-dialogue is when the speakers are indifferent to each other and exchange meaningless remarks.

For a dialogue to take place it is not only the exchange of information that is important, but the fact of communication itself, the desire to cooperate, work on solutions together. Pseudo-dialogue is a forged communication.

Lewis Carroll in his "Alice" presents different communication models in a situation of absurd, that is of total lack of understanding. Those who give others riddles do not know the answer, explanations make things even more vague and stories end at thee most interesting places. Yet, formally, the dialogue goes on and all recommended rules of politeness are observed:

(6)

"Well, then," The Gryphon went on, "if you don't know what to uglfy is, you are a simpleton".

Alice did not feel encouraged to ask any more questions, so she turned to the Mock Turtle and said, "What else had you to learn?"

(Carrol L. Alice in Wonderland. Moscow, 1979, p. 141)

– "And how did you manage on the twelfth?, Alice went on eagerly.

"That's enough about lessons", The Gryphon interrupted in the most decided tone: "Tell her something about the games now".

(Carrol L. Alice in Wonderland. Moscow, 1979, p. 142)

Wonderland is hierarchical and the close to the top of the pyramid the fewer dialogues and explanations. The Queen only gives orders, she does not attempt to understand others and does not care if others understand her. The only way of problem solving she knows is to behead. Queen's monologue continues until "grown up" Alice starts objecting her – then the monologue is over and the whole kingdom of cards falls into pieces.

Since Bakhtin much has been said about dialogue nature of a formally monological discourse, much less has been written about the monologue nature of a formal dialogue. Yet, in all speech genres, be it formally dialogical ones, like a learned dispute, political debate or an everyday argument, we can find features of a monologue. These are all attempts to ignore the interests of the other part, to impose something on other people. Beside the strategies we have seen in "Mary Poppins" example, here also belong all sophistic and eristic devices, use of overcomplicated language to make a text concerning the interests of many only understood by the few. All these are manifestations of power and it is no surprise that the language of power itself – the language of laws and regulations is so difficult to understand. Often, people cannot understand them without specially trained professionals, lawyers. Bureaucratic, overcomplicated language of a legal document is supposed to avoid ambiguity of interpretation. Yet, what is achieved is not clarity but monologue, exclusion of those whom the law concerns from the circle of communicators. To make a text understandable one needs not these devices, one needs dialogue, one needs the intention to achieve mutual understanding. The power does not need response, when it cannot avoid it altogether, it wants to make as much delayed, indirect and disperse as possible.

In a situation of power and subordination communication is an unaffordable luxury. In a democratic society – largely because "time is money". A person engaged in earning a living cannot afford serious involvement in something that does not bring profit. Not so long ago, when we taught English to Russian students we had to explain that to a standard question *How are you*? One is supposed to answer *Fine, thanks* and not try to explain how things really are. Now this difference between Russian and English mentality is disappearing.

In a totalitarian society there is another motivation – for freedom of being sincere and say what you think one has to pay a big price. It is not just the possibility of immediate repression, it is also the threat of not being the object of gift-giving any more. This might include certain privileges, good job, possibility to travel abroad.

If the power wants it can donate it all to a person and it depends on the person whether it will want to or not.

3. *Gift-giving as non-verbal hierarchical communication*
Hierarchical and non-hierarchical arguments can also be non-verbal. There are two great anthropological models of how to deal with the other – communication and gift-giving (Pelicci, 1986, pp. 85-89). If we transfer these models from anthropology to linguistics, we can say that communication is dialogue, equality of participants, while gift-giving is a monologue by nature The difference between a monologue and a turn of a dialogue is that the first is directed not to cooperation but to ignoring the other. To present means to establish a vertical, execute power, impose something on the partner. Power does not imply equal exchange, power is about gift-giving.

A material present may be accompanied by an idealistic substance – one can give friendship, love, patronage. There can also be a gift without a material part. The other side of a gift is a threat (verbalized or not) to seize giving. The principal here is that it is impossible to give something in return, which puts the receiver of the gift in a subordinate position. As soon as this possibility appears the gift turns into exchange. What is a gift then, which we have just associated with a monologue and authority? Does this notion need rehabilitation? Is there an unavoidable contradiction between gift-giving and cooperation?

If after giving a gift we expect a gift in return it makes gift a phenomenon of our culture. Culture evolves certain patterns of behavior, meaning is ascribed both to their observance and violation. In this sense all that we do can be treated as non-verbal arguments used to say something to our environment and as long as the people from our environment belong to the same culture as we do can understand our message and reply to it.

J. Derrida said that everything that we tend to call a present is in fact an indirect form of exchange (Derrida, 1991, p.55). The gift-giving we have been discussing does not imply communication on equal turns. Let us consider an example of a gift as an argument in "vertical" communication.

A short documentary has been widely discussed in Russia recently. A well-known businessman throws five-thousand notes from the window of his Petersburg office and watches people pushing each other to get hold of the money. The people in

the street have two possibilities in this situation – to accept the unexpected present or to reject it The only thing they cannot do is to as easily give something equal in return. That is they do not have the right for their turn in the dialogue. If they had the act of the businessman would have been senseless. It only had a sense within a certain culture (including the memory of previous gift of this kind), certain social relationship and value system.

The fact of the recording and publishing this act transforms it from an action into an utterance having its own pragmatic task. Such presents always imply hierarchy and division into "us" and "them". The businessman and his friends on top, the people they experiment on – below. The utterance is not directed to them, having been published in the Internet it has other pragmatic tasks. We can only suppose what these tasks are.

It is this demonstrative establishing of a hierarchy between the donator and the public led made a lot of people who saw the video feel offended. They even discussed plans for revenge. Here are the ideas suggested: wait till the businessman leaves the office and throw small coins into his face, leave coins at the entrance to the office and even shoot coins into his window from a catapult. For us it is interesting that all these suggestions are in fact attempts of a reply, their aim is to make if only a symbolic return present, that is to make the donator accept those who are below as his equals, get him involved in communication on equal terms.

A gift can only be part of horizontal communication if it is not a ritual, if it is not meant to symbolize anything, if the person who gives it does not want anything in return. Then it stops being part of the hierarchy-based culture. For a non-hierarchical rhetoric the necessary prerequisite is separate individuals – subjects of communication, each with their own aims, interests and demands. It is only in this case that a dialogue between them is possible.

4. *Conclusion*
Although we live in a hierarchical world we can observe non-hierarchical communication in many instances. Let us specify the main features which let us distinguish "horizontal" argumentation from "vertical". First, we shall note that although there may be whole texts written in either this or that manner, particular arguments belonging to "horizontal" or "vertical" type can be found in the same text. We can base the analysis on consideration of the speaker's values,

which are used as the basis for choosing the arguments. Appealing to the so called "universal" values, which have very abstract nature and have a different meaning for different people, can be manifestation of an attempt of manipulation. This is especially so when appealing to these values is connected with dubious positions: *"You are a good boy, you love your Mum, don't you? Why did you, then, get a bad mark at the music lesson?!"*. "Universal" value good son thus gets a dubious attribute – necessity to do well in music.

Another example of this kind is the notorious referendum on preservation of the USSR in 1991. The question the people had to answer was the following: *Do you believe it is necessary to preserve the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics as a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics in which rights and freedoms of people of all nationalities will be fully guaranteed?*. "Universal" value rights and freedoms becomes rigidly connected with a highly controversial position – the necessity to preserve the USSR.

The conclusion we can make is that the division of rhetoric into "vertical" and "horizontal" mainly belongs to the sphere of methodology. It enables us to relate the aims of the speaker to the strategies used for their realization. Thus, analysis of language phenomena (arguments) becomes determined by non-linguistic phenomena. To be successful argumentation not only helps the speaker realize the goals they declare but it also helps realize the interests of the addressee and the society as a whole

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ISSA Proceedings 2014 – Self-Argumentative Words: The Case Of Nature And Natural

Abstract: The words nature and natural operate in a specific way while used in an argumentation. Observation confirms that these words are never used with a negative argumentative orientation. This functioning will be illustrated on a corpus of sequences of public debate about same sex marriage. The hypothesis according to which this fact is due to the intrinsic semantic properties of these words will be examined.

Keywords: nature / natural, point of view, semantics, argumentative potential

1. *Introduction*
Several words seem to be arguments in themselves: the choice of those words tend to determine a statement's argumentative potential. This idea, far from being new, has been sustained for a long time by various branches of *Argumentation Within Language*, a semantic theory developed by the French scholars Ducrot and Anscombre (1983). Its basic thesis consists in the claim that any sentence in any language can be used as an argument for some (but not any!) conclusion (Raccah, 2002). Consequently, this argumentational potentiality ought to be taken into account while semantic descriptions of sentences, and their components, are carried out. This potentiality can be described after shrewd observation of language use and a generalization of the observations results. That also means that observation of language use, in this framework, is not a purpose but a way towards abstraction.

It will be shown that in a debate, *nature* or *natural* are of the kind of words that influence consistently the outcome of an argument. Through the analysis of sequences of public debate on topics such as, for example, same sex marriage, we can observe that the inherent argumentative power of these words is independent of their relevance to reality and, in some cases, prevail over the argumentative

power of ideas.

Incidentally, a few theoretical issues will be addressed, among which the instability of words intrinsic value judgments through language evolution, and the relevance of the traditional distinction between connotation and denotation. Indeed, an examination of the words used in this study illustrates the position that, in at least some cases, properties that are usually relegated to the space of connotation are objectively describable semantic instructions, while denotation could only be described in vague terms.

2. *Words as arguments*

It is commonly admitted that the possible conclusions of argumentations are determined by several situational or contextual factors, but also restricted by their linguistic components. For example, any sentence containing the word but follows the same argumentative structure[i]. Many other examples could be listed of this kind of structural constraints triggered by connectives or operators.

It has been shown in Bruxelles & al. (1995) that some simple sentences (i.e. sentences without connectives or operators) can also be used in argumentations in a restricted way. This fact is due to the presence of words that crystallize widespread ideas in the language. Thus, said in a schematic way, peoples' ideas affect languages and languages affect peoples' ideas… This matter is abundantly discussed in Ducrot's and his followers' works, especially in those that deal with the Theory of Topoi. It is not the aim of this paper to repeat those demonstrations. However, the analysis of the words *nature* and *natural* and of their argumentative behaviour in the selected discourse sequences will illustrate and fully corroborate these findings.

2.1. *Examples*

The following examples have been selected with the aim of giving an insight of the way speakers use the words nature and natural in actual argumentations. This is a token corpus[ii], picked out from English speaking web articles, and their comments, about same sex marriage. The close context of the words under study is highlighted. There are arguments of both pro-gay-marriage and anti-gay-marriage.

(1)
If you plant a tomato seed, or a human seed and nourish them, they will grow

naturally to bear fruit in the form of luscious tomatoes or a beautiful child. That's nature at work. If you destroy the tomato and the human seeds in their gestation period, you violate Natural Law. If you condone and allow the marriage of two homosexuals, that's also a *violation of natural law.*
http://www.pennlive.com/opinion/index.ssf/2013/09/same-sex_marriage_violates_natural_law_as_i_see_it.html

Comments of Internet users on (1):

(1.1)
I think it would be considered more *"natural" to be with the person you fell in love with*, rather than choosing a partner someone else told you to be with. Should my wife and I utilize any particular position in bed, or should we wait until you approve it first?

(1.2)
I was unaware that tomato plants marry. Also, if humans intervene in the natural activity of something, it is not really breaking a "law" any more than, say, a lion interrupting zebras mid-coitus to eat one of them. Zebras and lions also do not marry. They gravitate together in a family unit, true, but humans are the only species that require someone else to approve and bless their "natural" union. You might say that "marriage" is a violation of natural law because man is interfering with the natural act of reproduction. How, then, is a church's mandate against pre-marital sex any different than your assertion that stomping down a tomato's right to reproduce is a violation of "natural law"? *If you are a proponent of "natural" law* then I suggest abolishing marriage as it limits what a man and woman can do with their sexual drives and relationships. Marriage is not a "natural" condition but a social contract developed by people to regulate who has sex, when, and why. You can make it whatever you want it to be. Be fruitful and multiply. Some marry without the desire or ability to bring children into the world. Is that interpretation of the word "unnatural"?

(1.3)
He should have noted that he supports *Christian Natural Law* as opposed to the classical liberal believe of natural law as put forth by thinkers such as Cicero and Rothbard. *Natural law simply states that through our creation we are born free and that our actions should not interfere with the freedom of others.* Homosexuals who wish to marry do not interfere with the actions of anyone and cause no harm

to anyone except the perceived harm inflicted on Gerard and his ilk. Under the belief that because homosexuals cannot produce offspring as a direct result of their union sets a dangerous precedent. There are numerous traditional unions of heterosexuals that cannot or will not produce offspring. Are you to say now that barren couple of child bearing age or couples past their child bearing age should not marry?

(1.4)
Just because one's own religious texts mislabel the diction concerning effeminate men as spunk pockets (the texts that say "homosexuality" is referring to debasing weaker men sexually, not entering into a whole, meaningful, lifelong relationship), doesn't make it against *natural law, especially considering that natural law actually has a rather set place for homosexual unions in all species*.

(2)
Much of the anti-gay-marriage argument rests on two commonly held assumptions: Life-long exclusive mate-bonding for purposes of rearing joint offspring is natural, and homosexuality is unnatural. Both assumptions have little basis in fact. Homosexual acts have, in fact, now been widely documented across a range of mammal species (that's right – we're 'outing' mammals!), including our closest relatives, apes and monkeys. […] Meanwhile, there seems to be *nothing particularly 'natural' about marriage.* Only about 3% of mammal species are monogamous – meaning they cohabitate – and few of these species mate for life. And nearly each partner in these 'animal marriages' engage in extra-pair mating. Lifelong sexual loyalty in nature is, it turns out, a vanishingly rare commodity.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/paul-j-zak/gay-marriage-is-natural_b_112256.html

(3)
Natural law's most elementary precept is that "good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided." By his natural reason, man can perceive what is morally good or bad for him. Thus, he can know the end or purpose of each of his acts and how it is morally wrong to transform the means that help him accomplish an act into the act's purpose. Any situation which institutionalizes the circumvention of the purpose of the sexual act *violates natural law* and the objective norm of morality. Being rooted in human nature, *natural law is universal and immutable.* It applies to the entire human race, equally. It commands and forbids consistently, everywhere and always.
http://www.tfpstudentaction.org/politically-incorrect/homosexuality/10-reasons-w

hy-homosexual-marriage-is-harmful-and-must-be-opposed.html

(4)
Is gay marriage also contrary to natural law? Many argue that it is, but there's no obvious reason to think so. The Vatican states that "marriage exists solely between a man and a woman", but even a cursory look at the history of marriage reveals that that isn't always the case. Marriages with multiple partners, for example, have been very common and same-sex unions have existed in one form or another in many cultures. Catholic teaching also says that the natural purpose of marriage and sex is procreation; thus, any union or sexual act where procreation isn't theoretically possible *isn't in accordance with natural law and is intrinsically immoral.* Curiously, only gay marriages are typically cited as examples of "naturally sterile" unions. Are they the only sort that exists? Of course not – but they are the only sort the Catholic Church wants banned by law. Unfortunately for the Vatican, however, most people today no longer consider procreation the necessary and intrinsic purpose of either sex or marriage.
http://atheism.about.com/od/gaymarriage/a/GaysUnnatural.htm

(5)
Comment of an Internet user on http://guardianlv.com/2014/03/same-sex-marriage-ban-violates-natural-law/
The natural law is what is in keeping with biology. *Same sex revulsion is natural, cause it is a species survival instinct.*

(6)
Marriage in general is unnatural. A romantic union recognised in law and based in a traditional ceremony isn't something non-humans have much time for. A lion does not fill out extensive legal documents whenever he mates with a lioness […].
http://www.theguardian.com/science/brain-flapping/2013/may/29/scientific-reasons-oppose-gay-marriage

Comments of Internet users on (6):

(6.1)
The article argues against the point that same-sex sexual interaction is unnatural by claiming that animals don't have marriage ceremonies. The author could have pointed out that some animals accidentally engage in same-sex interaction, but instead makes the pointless comment that animals don't have marriage

ceremonies. *That's like saying all deaths are natural because animals don't have funerals.*

(6.2)
[...] when one looks at the laws of nature there is not a gay couple on the face of the earth that can reproduce between themselves. This by itself should tell us that a gay marriage and a heterosexual marriage are not equal.

(6.3)
Marriage is a natural mating habit for humans of opposite sexes and has been for millennia. It is also an expression of their reason which distinguishes them from animals. End of science lesson.

(6.4)
It's funny how they make a conclusion that homosexualism (*sic!*) in humans is natural based on some examples from animal world. I know about some frogs and fish which can change their sex in absence of the opposite sex. Can humans do the same (without any surgeries, etc.)? So how applicable are those comparisons to frogs, birds, and other creatures? It's just ridiculous.

3. *The conception of instructional semantics*
Argumentation Within Language and the *Semantics of Points of View*, a theoretical model arose from the latter, which is the framework of this paper, belong to the so-called *instructional* branch of semantics. This type of semantics aims at describing the *modus operandi* of linguistic units, thus, the instructions that words (or linguistic structures) supply to their own interpretation. In order to understand the conception of semantics of this approach, an important conceptual distinction between sense and (word) meaning needs to be clarified.

According to this branch of semantics, *sense* concerns *utterances*; hence it is *variable* (with respect to language units), depending on the situation of utterance and other extra-linguistic elements. It is *subjective. Meaning (or sentence meaning)* concerns linguistic units, is stable in every situation of utterance and, therefore, is *objectively describable.*

The understanding of an utterance implies a process of interpretation. According to Raccah (2005, pp. 208-210, 2006, pp. 125,130,), the sense of an utterance is not transmitted from the speaker to the hearer but *constructed* by the hearer, by means of linguistic and extra-linguistic elements. These different inputs to the

construction of sense work as *instructions*: each of them demarcates more or less precisely the ways one can, or cannot understand the utterance (if there were no such constraints, there would not be any possibility of understanding each other). Extra-linguistic instruction can be difficult, sometimes even impossible to objectivize, while linguistic instructions – the ones that interest us – constrain the construction of sense in a systematic manner. The latter constitute *sentence meaning*, and is the object of *semantics* as a discipline.

3.1 *Lexicalized points of view*

With regard to the crystallized ideas in language, the Semantics of Points of View maintains that widespread ideologies, value judgements, etc (called in a more neutral way *points of view*) can be carried by words. These points of view become stable semantic instructions, thus, they are part of the *meaning* of these word. According to Raccah,

The points of view carried by words, which combine the yield to the argumentation of utterances are *implicit*: they are not the object of the discourse, but are necessary to accept (perhaps very provisionally) in order to *understand* the utterance. (Raccah, 2011, p. 1600).

The most simple of these points of view are the positive or negative value judgements. The words that carry these points of view are called *euphorical* (for the positive judgements) or *dysphorical* words (for the negative judgements). The positive (respectively negative) points of view that these words trigger are part of their *meaning*. Thus, they are independent of the situations of utterance. This is the case of words like *beautiful, honest, improve… / horror, spoil, ugly…* An important consequence of the stability of these points of view is that euphorical words cannot be used negatively, and dysphorical words cannot be used positively in argumentations (unless in specifically marked discourses).

3.2. *Nature / natural: euphorical words?*

The hypothesis according to which *nature* and *natural* belong to the euphorical category**[iii]** is likely to explain the above observed phenomenon. In fact, if these words cannot be used negatively in argumentations because their semantic properties do not allow it, it is not surprising that both sides in the debate appropriate the "nature"-argument. It is a simple explanation but it has to be examined and tested before we accept it.

First of all, we have to determine if *nature* and *natural* are euphorical words. Yet, at first sight, they seem to be absolutely neutral, neither positive, nor negative. The hypothesis has to be tested: if it is possible to use these words in a negative way in an argumentation, the hypothesis falls naturally. One single example is sufficient to illustrate the difficulty in using them negatively:

*Ex. * This juice is natural but it is really tasty.*

The oddness of this utterance indicates that a semantic constraint proscribes such an argumentative orientation. Many other examples can be found or invented, but this oddness remains in all cases. As it has been already said, the euphorical (or dysphorical) character of the words does not completely prevent the negative (or positive) argumentations: anything is *possible* in specifically marked discourses (literature, irony, etc). But if so, the oddness of this kind of argumentation is part of the effect of these discourses. So, unless the contrary is proved, we can consider that nature and natural belong to the category of euphorical words. One could object that the fact that the "nature"-argument is used positively is not necessarily bound to the semantic properties of these words but simply to the commonly accepted idea that "natural is good". Indeed, the commonly accepted idea is definitely the origin of its crystallization in the English language. But it could not explain the systematic character of the positive use of this argument. Every reasonable person knows that not everything that is natural is good. Firstly, philosophers have since long time acquired the painful conviction that there is no possible definition to the concept of nature. And yet, the "natural" argument is ubiquitous in food or cosmetics marketing... and it works. Moreover, we know that diseases and death are natural, too; but the "natural"-argument still remains positive. If we say in an argumentation that death is a natural thing, we do it, for example, in order to relieve the pain a person could feel, facing someone's death.

In summary, the euphorical character of the words nature and natural is more likely to explain the argumentative performance of the utterances containing them than the supposition that people actually think that natural things are always better than others.

4. *Two additional objections of principle*
One can easily observe that the positive point of view conveyed by the words nature and natural is rather a recent phenomenon in history. Indeed, the idealization of nature has progressively come along with the evolution of

civilization and languages (not only English) have crystallize this ideology. Which leads us to a first possible objection of principle: this fact seems to be contradictory with the above asserted stability of lexicalized points of view. To answer this objection, it has to be clarified that the stability concerns the situations of utterance *at a given moment.* No stability in language history is claimed. On the contrary, it is interesting to observe that words can carry a specific point of view at a moment in time, and may lose them at some other moment. This fact makes pointless the efforts people can deploy to justify an actual use of a word by its etymology (for example: to pretend that calling someone a *Negro* is not insulting because this word means originally *black*...).

A second objection of principle has to be briefly examined. The introduction of the terms point of view, *euphorical / dysphorical* words may seem to be redundant, given the existence of the concept of *connotation,* which refers to the same kind of phenomenon. Simonffy (2010, pp. 308-310) carries out a detailed comparison between lexicalized points of view and connotation. The main difference is that connotation is seen as *secondary* to denotation, while the different branches of Argumentation Within Language have always claimed the opposite of this assertion. Ducrot's early works (1972, 1980...) contain efficient demonstrations of the primacy of argumentative values over informative ones. Lexicalized points of view, as we have seen, belong to the realm of argumentation and are not considered to be secondary to denotation.

5. *Conclusion*

This short study has aimed at showing how linguistic units can constitute constraints in actual argumentations. We could observe that, in a debate, both sides are likely to be "trapped" by words that impose a specific point of view. Falling in this linguistic trap is not inevitable. Even if it is not possible (and maybe not even necessary) to use nature or natural in a negative way, it is possible to get round the problem by contesting the general relevance of the "nature"-argument. To be fair to the participants of the public debate about same sex marriage, let us cite a few who did so:

(7)
Ultimately, the "homosexuality is unnatural" argument fails to support the case against same-sex marriage because there is no clear and convincing content to the concept of "unnatural" in the first place. Everything that is claimed to be "unnatural' is either arguably very natural, arguably irrelevant to what the laws

should be, or is simply immaterial to what should be treated as moral and immoral. It's no coincidence that what is "unnatural" also happens to be condemned by the speaker's religious or cultural traditions. Just because some trait or activity isn't the norm among *humans doesn't make it "unnatural" and therefore wrong.*
http://atheism.about.com/od/gaymarriage/a/GaysUnnatural.htm

(8)

The nice thing about natural law is that it doesn't appeal to sectarian or confessional doctrine to justify its conclusions but on what is determined through the use of "reason" to be "natural" to human beings as rational animals – though it *often requires belief in a divine creator as the source of natural law.* Principles or goods derived from natural law can be things as basic as the duty of self-preservation or the care of children. What it isn't, however, is looking at nature for examples of "good behaviour" – for example, monogamous pairing among bird species is not a natural law argument – or at least not a good one – for monogamous marriage among human beings. You can always find a counter-example in nature; same-sex sexual behavior, for example, is commonly observed among animals.
http://www.uscatholic.org/blog/201212/birds-and-bees-natural-law-and-same-sex-civil-marriage-26711

(9)

The first issue is the massive amount of ground that the naturalness argument concedes to the opponents of gay rights. It is understandable to want to rebut the 'being gay isn't natural' argument, but the way many gay-rights campaigners have chosen to do so commits the exact same error as their opponents: the mistaken idea that morality has anything to do with what's natural. Change the subject of the opening quote above to, say, cannibalism, and the idea that we should look to nature and animals as a guide to what humans should be doing becomes obviously absurd. *Being gay's unnatural? So what?*
http://www.spiked-online.com/newsite/article/just_how_natural_is_homosexuality/13918#.U6_-UZR_vTp

The Semantics of Points of View supplies theoretical tools to the description of the semantic constraints that linguistic units trigger (cf. the concept of *lexical topical field*, Raccah 1990, Bruxelles & al. 1995). As discourse analysis has to deal with the linguistic elements that form texts and discourses, these tools can be used by

discourse analysts. This lead has been explored several times, among others in Chmelik (2007), Várkonyi (2012).

NOTES

i. (i) […] the presence of but in a sentence requires that its utterances present the argumentative orientations of the utterances of the two halves of the sentence as opposed […].

(ii) […] the presence of but in a sentence produces the effect that its utterances are presented as arguments for the same conclusion as utterances of the second half of the sentence would be arguments for.

(iii) The presence of but in a sentence does not require an absolute choice of a particular argumentative orientation, nor does it produce any effect in this sense. (Raccah, 1990)

ii. The corpus is not the object, in the sense it could be the object of a sociolinguistic study or one of discourse analysis, but an illustration. Therefore, it has not been relevant to restrict their origin to a specific geographic area, or a particular period.

iii. Unless they are used as technical terms, as terms are supposed to be free from value judgements.

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ISSA Proceedings 2014 – A Cognitive Style Parameter Of Argumentation

Abstract: A cognitive style is is viewed as individual traits in argumentation organization and processing. A parameter of CS is cognitive complexity (CC) / simplicity (CS). We studied how 200 Russian respondents used Toulmin functions in reconstructed argumentation of an education article. Claims given by both style groups were mostly of policy and evaluative. Evidence (Data) did not differ significately. Warrants mostly had grouping semantics in both CC and CS. Backings and Reservations (Rebuttals) were more actively used by CC-respondents, Quantifiers – by CS-respondents.

Keywords: argument components, argument interpretation, cognitive style, poles of a cognitive style, cognitive complexity, cognitive simplicity, functional semantics, the Toulmin Model

1. *Introduction*

People's communicative activities are interpretative. In our perception of

situations we often distort the initial state of affairs. According to psychological research such distortions are neither intentional nor accidental. They are based on personal peculiarities of people. The cognitive style approach is one of possible approaches that help operationalize such peculiarities in people.

According to psychological research cognitive style is an individual-specific mode of processing information about the environment manifested in peculiarities of perception, analysis, structuring, categorization and evaluation of a situation.

Depending on starting points of analysis, psychologists single out a number of independent dimensions that characterize individual features in processing information. Each of these dimensions have opposing sides (poles). They are: field dependence / independence; flexible / rigid cognitive control; tolerance / intolerance to non-realistic experience; focusing / scanning control; concrete / abstract conceptualization; cognitive complexity / cognitive simplicity. These features gave names to cognitive styles.

The cognitive style approach views a person in various types of activities, and the characterization of the person is linear.

What do these linear criteria mean? Their significance lies in opening a new road towards studying the intellectual actions of an arguing person. Earlier, it used to be a uni-polar psychological dimension of discourse activity. Respectively, the criteria were level-based, i.e. based on the principle 'high-rate VS low-rate'. Now the dimension becomes bi-polar with a typological criterion, i.e. belonging of a person to one or the other type of one and the same dimension. Also, the scheme of diagnostic analysis itself was changed. Earlier, an individual result was evaluated on the basis of its comparison with the norm. Now, there notion of norm is not used anymore, which means that no side of the same cognitive style is viewed as 'good' or 'bad' [Kholodnaya 2004].

2. *Cognitive style principles for argument analysis*
To generate an argument, a person should comprehend, interpret, and evaluate a situation with debatable ideas. How do we do it? We do it on the basis of our subjective experience. Not only the situation, but also our experience has a specific organization which needs to be considered.

According to G. Kelly (1955), our personal experience can be represented as a system of personal constructs. A construct is a bi-polar scale, and it is person-

specific. The scale has two principal functions: establishing similarity and detecting difference. These two functions manifest themselves when we evaluate people and things.

Constructs are not isolated phenomena, they are systematic, i.e. inter-related and inter-dependent. So, when we study argument activities, we are to remember that these activities are not identical – they depend on the arguing individuals. Argument is to a large extent an evaluative activity, and, as we all know, the evaluation differs from individual to individual. Still, such individuality can be systematized if we choose to view individuals as belonging to a group – for example, to one or the other pole of one and the same cognitive style. To study argument organization based on psychological principles we have chosen one cognitive style parameter – cognitive complexity / cognitive simplicity.

We can establish how complex or how simple our argumentative evaluative space is. To do that, we take into account the degree of differentiation and the degree of integrity of a particular construct system.

According to J. Biery (1955), cognitive differentiation is an ability to construct social environment (in our case, argumentative process). Such construction is made on the basis of a number of distinct parameters. Cognitively complex individuals have strongly-differentiated cognitive structures, while cognitively simple people have weakly-differentiated cognitive structures.

Operationally, the degree of differentiation is measured by means of the so-called factorial analysis. A factor is, simply speaking, a single unit of measurement. The less inter-connected isolated constructs are, the more measurements, or factors, can be singled out in the procedure of factorization of a construct matrix – so, the more differentiated system of constructs we find in a given person; in other words, the more cognitively complex the person is.

Actually, quantity of factors is not a decisive criterion. It is only one of important criteria of cognitive complexity of a person. Applied to our field, it is not only important how many elementary arguments are given for supporting a standpoint. No less important is if they are organized in cluster-arguments or not. Also important is how complex those cluster-arguments are. I state that the more cluster-arguments for a standpoint are given in a written argument, the more cognitively-complex a person is.

On the other hand, functional semantics of arguments can give innovative data for cognitively complexity / cognitively simplicity. By functions I here mean the roles of argument components described by S. Toulmin (1958) and later elaborated by a number of argumentologists (cf. Ehninger 1974; Ehninger, Brockriede 1963, 1978; Crable 1976).

For example, we detect preferences in using certain functions, Y-functions by cognitively complex people, and Z-functions by cognitively simple individuals. Out of that, if we have sufficient statistics, we can make predictions that in the same type of argument situations, cognitively complex people will be likely to use Y-functions, while cognitively simple – Z-functions. So, knowing that, we can analyze the arguments and we can easily detect what kind of person has written it – a cognitively complex, or a cognitively simple one. What is important here is diagnostics itself: we can reveal the cognitive type of the author of an argument without using complicated psychological experiments. Moreover, the experiments, like Kelly's grid, are made in the presence of live people. We, on the other hand, can detect the cognitive type of the author of written arguments with no physical presence of the former. In other words, we can speak about an innovative approach to argumentative expertise.

It is interesting for analytical purposes, but not only. For example, some cognitively complex students are known to prefer to hide their aggressiveness and use manipulative forms of communication. If we detect cognitively complex people by analyzing their arguments, we can be ready to confront or predict possible manipulation on their side in further communication with them.

3. *Cognitive complexity/cognitive simplicity revealed in arguments: results of the experiment*
Based on research done by Y. Besedina (2011) and myself, the following can be formulated.

3a. *Experiment details and methods used.*
Processing (subordinate) purpose: to get (a) cognitive style attribution to 200 Tsiolkovsky Kaluga State University students (both sexes, age of 17–23); (b) their interpretation (responsive discourse) of a Russian language argumentative text on secondary school exams.

Ultimate (primary) purpose: comparison of using arguments by the persons of the

opposing poles of the 'Cognitive Complexity / Cognitive Simplicity' style.

Stage 1. Respondents' cognitive style identification.
G.A. Kelly's personal constructs method of repertoire grids was used to reveal the respondent cognitive style; completed grids were processed by the IDIOGRID program for quantitative and qualitative analysis of the resulting constructs. Diagnostic Indices taken into account were: (a) the degree of differentiality (the 'matching score' parameter (Bieri 1955); (b) the degree of integrity (the 'intensity' parameter (Fransella and Bannister 1967)).

Results for Stage-1: division of the respondents into Cognitively Complex persons (37%, or 74 people), Cognitively Simple persons (55%, or 110 people), and Mixed Type (8%, or 16 people).

Stage 2. Argumentation trait detection in the experts' texts.
The respondents were asked to analyze an argumentative text by fulfilling the task "Expose the problems the author formulated and their argumentation". Y. Besedina and myself gave our own expert analysis of the initial text argumentation structure and functions to have an opportunity of checking the quality of the respondents' analysis.

3b. *Functional argument analysis of the respondents' texts.*
The analysis in question was centered on detecting argument functional components and their semantics. We used R. Crable's (1976) system of functional-semantic analysis who singled out the following:

(a) Claims of four types – Declarative; Policy; Classificatory; Evaluative;

(b) Evidence (=Toulmin's Data) of three compound types:
(b-1) Occurrences (Contrieved; Planned; Hypothetical);
(b-2) Reports of Occurrences (Unplanned; Contrieved);
(b-3) Expression of Beliefs (Personal; Reported);

(c) Warrants of four compound types:
(c-1) Comparison (Parallelism; Analogy);
(c-2) Grouping (Classification; Generalization; Residual);
(c-3) Causality (Correlation; Circumstance; Cause);
(c-4) Authority.

Also used were semantically non-differentiated Backings, Reservations (=Toulmin's Rebuttals), and Qualifiers. Argumentative texts made by our respondents were then analyzed structurally and functionally, and the results were compared to the data given in the expert analysis. The results gave us the following peculiarities of the lingvo-argumentative responses of the bearers of CC and CS poles.

CC respondents re-organized initial arguments rather actively, though almost all initial Claims and Warrants were retained. Peculiarities of the argumentation by CC people were these:

(1) most Warrants were made explicit;
(2) Warrants of Causality were most often used;
(3) Claims were mostly of Policy and Evaluative;
(4) implicit intentions and information in the initial arguments were made explicit;
(5) most arguments were structurally simple single and were manifested in separate
paragraphs;
(6) Reservations and Backings were often used in the arguments;
(7) almost no Qualifiers were given in the argumentation;
(8) on the global level, the Macro-Claims were placed in the beginning of the text.

CS respondents did not change the initial order of arguments, i.e. the author's sequence of arguments was retained. Explicit Claims, Evidence and Warrants given in the initial text were sometimes made implicit in the interpretations under this style. Peculiarities of the argumentation by CS people were these:

(1) Warrants in the arguments were sometimes implicit;
(2) Warrants of Generalization were most often used;
(3) among Claims, 3 types were practically equally used – Declarative, Policy, Evaluative;
(4) implicit intentions and information in the initial arguments remained implicit;
(5) many argumentative functions of the initial text were not used in resulting texts of this style;
(6) most arguments were structurally simple single and were manifested in separate paragraphs;
(7) almost no Reservations and Backings were used;
(8) Qualifiers denoting supposition were actively used;

(9) on the global level, the Macro-Claims were placed in the end of the text – as conclusions.

4. *How valid are the results?*
Some people would ask: does the cognitive style pole remain the same in all situations? No, it does not have to. In real conditions there can be movement from one pole to the other and even change of the poles [cf. Kholodnaya 2004]. But it is important to stress for our study, that we had only one problematic situation in our experiment. It means that there were no significant factors that could somehow influence the style-change (which is of frequent occurrence when people communicate in different situations). Thus, in our experiment, the temporal factor was stable (the time for the written assignment did not change for different respondent groups). The physical environment was also the same (the experiment was made in the same university classroom at the same time of the day). In other words, the conditions were stable, so our results are valid for at least Russian academic student atmosphere and there were no factors which could entail the 'pulsation' of the constructs that could make them move from one pole of the line to the other. It is also important to note that our both experiments (dividing our respondents into polar groups and their making their own argumentation) were made in the similar environment by the same experiment makers.

5. *Conclusion*
In sum, we detected considerable differences in argument interpretation by representatives of CC and CS poles of the style in question. It means that knowing such principal features of argument making, an argumentation scholar having no special training in psychology and using no special psychological techniques can differentiate the poles of the style using only such features and can see what kind of person gave specific arguments; the scholar can also predict how CC and CS people would construct argumentation in similar conditions.

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