ISSA Proceedings 2010 – Concepts And Contexts – Argumentative Forms Of Framing

1. Introduction

The concept of framing – and the underlying theoretical mindset – is familiar to a number of scholarly fields and discussions. Although the notion of framing has its roots in sociological thinking, it has made its way into many other fields. Thus, framing is applied to management studies (Hodgkinson et al., 1999; Conger, 1991; Smircich & Morgan, 1982), rhetorical studies (Kuypers, 2009; 2006; Cappella & Jamieson, 1997), media studies (de Vreese & Elenbaas, 2008; Scheufele, 1999; Entman, 1993; Iyengar, 1991), and linguistics (Tannen (Ed.), 1993) – to name but a few of the most relevant fields. Framing, then, has undergone quite an expansion from being conceived as a tool for micro-analysis of social interaction to its current broad interpretation and diversified application.

When taking this development into account it is not surprising that framing is also to be found within the field of argumentation and that it is used in various ways within this field. An overview of argumentation studies shows that use of the concept is distributed along a continuum from intuitive and implicit to theoretical and explicit. At one end of the spectrum we find a commonsensical use of framing that is often neither expanded nor explained (see inter alia Bertea, 2004; Freeman, 2001; Garrett, 1997). At the other end of the spectrum we find contributions that take their starting point in framing (and the literature on the concept) and bring it to bear on discussions that are of relevance to the theory of argumentation. Be it in the understanding of 'playful argumentation' (Hample, Han & Payne, 2009), in the development of 'interpersonal arguments' (Hample, Warner & Young, 2008) or in the conceptualization of 'non-deductive argumentation' (Wohlrapp, 1998) – again, only highlighting a few relevant examples.

Framing is used to define a number of processes and functions that oftentimes do not exist on the same plane of theoretical reasoning or level of empirical analysis.

As we will unfold in the following, framing is sometimes thought of as cognitive processes of understanding while it is seen as communicative tools in other contexts. The notion of framing is, in other words, not a simple, clear cut one; a point which is often stressed in the literature. Robert Entman, for instance, begins from the assumption that "despite its omnipresence across the social sciences and humanities, nowhere is there a general statement of framing theory that shows exactly how frames become embedded within and make themselves manifest in a text, or how framing influences thinking" (1993, p. 51). Michael Hoffman laments that "…in spite of its prominence in scientific discourses, the concept of 'framing' and its derivatives are used in very different ways. Obviously, there is no shared understanding of what 'framing' exactly means, and what kind of activities can count as 'framing' and which cannot" (2006, p. 2). And Kirk Hallahan sums up both the potentials and the problems: "although a theoretically rich and useful concept, framing suffers from a lack of coherent definition" (2008, p. 209). The question is, therefore, what we actually gain from introducing framing into various subjects and fields? If framing is not a clear concept, the subject it is intended to illuminate will not become clearer.

In an attempt to solve these issues in the context of argumentation and show how the notion of framing may become more useful to argumentation scholars we will reverse the typical order of application. Rather than applying the notion of framing to one or the other aspect of argumentation we will try to explain and clarify framing by starting from the field of argumentation. It is possible to draw parallels between classical argumentative concepts and the concept of framing (Pontoppidan, Gabrielsen & Jønch-Clausen 2010; Just & Gabrielsen 2008), and it is this line of thinking that we will build upon in the following. What may we learn about the types of argumentative moves that may be typified as framing by viewing them through the lens of classical theories of argumentation?

In order to answer this question we introduce the classical rhetorical theory of stasis, the teaching about how to locate the disputed point in a debate, as a means of clarifying and ordering what is meant by framing. There are four stases dealing with 1) fact (status conjecturalis), 2) definition (status definitivus), 3) quality (status qualitatis), and 4) jurisdiction or transcendence (status translativus), and we argue that when filtered through the stases framing refers to at least two different argumentative moves or patterns. One is an internal definition or categorization of the concepts in question; the other is an external shift or

transcendence in the context of the case. As an example of the internal definition/categorization one can, for instance, argue that the recent fall in the prices of real estate that has affected most of the Western hemisphere was not a bursting bubble, but a natural correction, thus redefining the matter and reframing the issue. And as an example of the external shift/transcendence of context one can argue that a house should not be bought as an investment, but because it is the house of one's dreams, thus changing the context of the argumentation and shifting the issue from an economic to an emotional frame.

In making the link between framing and the theory of stasis, we do not claim to offer a comprehensive analysis of the argumentative forms involved in framing – we only claim that the theory of stasis exposes that the notion of framing contains (at least) two different types of moves. Both definition and transcendence are argumentative forms of framing, but they point to two quite different ways in which a matter may be framed. Furthermore, we indicate that while framing is not just one argumentative move, it is nevertheless a particular type of argumentation which does not seem to include the issues of fact and quality as these are defined in the theory of the stasis. Thus, applying the stases to the field of framing both allows us to point to what argumentative frames are and what they are not.

The issue of how the stases may relate to and help clarify the notion of framing is primarily a theoretical one, but we will illustrate the notion that the stases point to basic argumentative forms of framing by means of generic examples constructed on the basis of the Danish public debate on the value of real estate – as we have already done in the initial example of how the stases of definition and transcendence may be linked to framing.

Before we begin our exploration of framing from the viewpoint of the stases, we unfold our initial claim; namely, that the concept of framing is a pluralistic one. Different scholars have stressed different aspects of the concept and developed it in different directions, and we will present a few highlights from the discussion of what framing is and how it should be studied. Following the introduction to the concept of framing as such we will delimit our notion of framing as a form of argumentation from the broader understandings of framing and thereby offer a definition of what is meant by framing in this particular study of the concept. Then we will briefly introduce the theory of stasis and go on to discuss how the stases may explain and typify what framing is.

2. Framing: A pluralistic concept

Since Erving Goffman introduced the concept of framing, it has not only been developed and diversified, but also repeatedly challenged. Much of the subsequent debate derives from the great explanatory potential, but also the great vagueness of the concept as Goffman defined it. Frames, to Goffman, are the "…principles of organization which govern events – at least social ones – and our subjective involvement in them" (1974, p. 10-11). More specifically, frames are the "schemata of interpretation" that allow people to partake in social interaction; frames are means of locating, perceiving, identifying and labeling experiences that provide the interpreter with an understanding of what is going on and how he/she should react to it (1974, p. 21). In Goffman's microsociological conception, then, frames help individuals structure and interpret their surroundings, but this does not mean that frames are purely cognitive phenomena. Rather, Goffman suggests that frames do not just exist in our heads, but may be read out of – or perhaps into – the social interaction (1981, p. 62). Here, crucial questions arise: Are frames cognitive or communicative phenomena? And if they are both, how may they be studied as such?

Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky provide one possible answer to these questions. Kahneman and Tversky set up experiments testing peoples' reactions to a text in which specific words were changed. Thus, they have shown that people choose different courses of action according to the positive or negative framing of a matter; whether an event is framed in terms of 'saving' or 'dying' is literally a matter of life and death (Kahneman & Tversky 1984). Whereas this psychological take on the issue includes the communicated dimension of framing as the independent variable (the factor that is changed in order to measure people's reactions to the change), it is the cognitive dimension that is at the heart of the research.

A more explicit focus on the communicative dimension of framing is found in the work of cognitive linguists such as George Lakoff. Although maintaining the cognitive importance of frames, Lakoff focuses more on what causes the cognition than on the cognitive process as such; that is, his focus is on language. Lakoff coins the term surface frames for the communicative dimension of framing, and he studies how specific changes in the surface frames may alter our perception of the phenomena in question (Lakoff, 2004; 1999). His prime examples stem from political debate in the US, and he argues that the Democratic Party has overtaken frames that are to the advantage of the Republican Party instead of establishing

their own alternative frames. For instance, framing the discussion on whether or not to lower the taxes in terms of 'tax relief' means that taxation is basically seen as a burden, and this gives the Republicans the upper hand (Lakoff, 2004, p. 24-26). Although Lakoff is concerned with the effects of framing, he does not conduct experimental research, but focuses on the ways in which topics are framed in communication and what frames come to dominate public debates (and other communicative processes).

Within media studies a combination of the foci on communication and cognition is seen in several influential investigations. For instance, Shanto Iyengar and Donald R. Kinder (1987) and Joseph Cappella and Kathleen Hall Jamieson (1997) have conducted major studies that both identify dominant news frames and people's reactions to such frames. In this context the notion of framing is linked to that of agenda setting; what is presented in the news, how is it presented, and what are the consequences? (Dainton & Zelley, 2005, p. 199-200). Hence, there is a movement from the institutionalized forms of communication of the news media to the perception of the news that takes place in the minds of individual recipients.

The movement from media to recipients that characterizes studies of the communication and reception of news frames points to another crucial ambiguity in Goffman's conception of frames: are they individual or are they social? Goffman himself emphasized the primacy of the social, but nevertheless studied frames in their individual manifestations (1974, p. 13). The application of frames in media studies seems to begin from the social level and move to the individual level. In focusing on social movements Robert Benford and David Snow (1988; 2000) have performed a similar move. Furthermore, they emphasize how frames may provide the backdrop of not only individual, but also social action. Thus, the locus of framing is placed at the level of "situated social interaction," and quoting Mikhail Bakhtin Snow and Benford define framing as a dialogical phenomenon that exists "not within us, but between us" (2005, p. 205).

Addressing the issue of the individual or social character of framing, then, implicitly tackles the issue of their cognitive or communicated status as well. If frames are social, they are also communicated, existing as forms and patterns of dialogue and debate before they come to organize and define the individual's interpretation of social actions and events. This does not mean that studying cognitive reactions to or applications of frames becomes uninteresting, but it means that analysis of the communicated – or surface – frames is the place to

start.

3. Argumentative frames

As our short review of the field shows, framing is a rather broad and slippery concept. Goffman's introduction of the concept laid the ground for this ambiguity, and two issues have been particularly central to the subsequent discussions on the definition and use of framing: are frames cognitive or communicative processes? And are they individual or social phenomena? As indicated above, different schools, fields, and perspectives have placed the emphasis differently, wherefore there are today both theories that view frames as pertaining to the level of individual cognition and theories that highlight the social and communicative aspect of framing. In other words: one concept, many interpretations.

In the following we will adopt a narrow focus, and instead of seeking direct answers to the traditional issues of framing – cognitive or communicative, individual or social – we will look at framing as argumentation and ask: which argumentative forms does framing represent? Should one particular form of argumentation or several different forms be linked with framing? In other words, what argumentative moves are performed when one argues by framing?

Before answering these specific questions, however, it seems necessary to consider what we generally mean by framing in an argumentative context. We must make an initial distinction between the types of argumentative moves that may be linked to framing and the types that may not. What we are looking for is a tentative and pragmatic definition and delimitation of the phenomenon of argumentative framing. The following considerations, then, are meant as a means of pointing at the type(s) of argumentation that will be analyzed and discussed in the following, not as an exhaustive list of argumentative frames, let alone a definition of framing as such.

For our specific purposes Jim Kuypers' rhetorical approach to framing offers a useful starting point. According to Kuypers "framing is a process whereby communicators, consciously or unconsciously, act to construct a point of view that encourages the facts of a given situation to be interpreted by others in a particular manner…" (2006: p. 8). Several keywords of this quote point to our understanding of what is at stake in argumentation that hinges on framing. First, the word 'construct' shows that we are dealing with argumentation that orders or forms the object of the argumentation – as opposed to argumentation that works

by inferring or deducing the relevant conclusions. Second, the word 'interpreted' suggests that argumentation based on framing is meant to make the audience view the object in a certain way – again, in contrast to making the audience infer particular conclusions. Finally, framing-based argumentation is characterized by its starting point in 'a given situation', not a given set of premises.
It is the move from the case to its premises that is at stake in framing-based argumentation – not the move from premises to conclusion which is the point of other argumentative forms. The argumentative forms of framing begin from a given situation and work by constructing a certain perspective that makes the audience interpret the case in a specific manner. Thus, framing is set apart from argumentative forms as such; the notion comes to encompass a certain set of moves within argumentation – a certain way of arguing. The type of argumentation which relates to framing and which we will seek to unpack by means of the theory of stasis, then, is argumentation aimed at changing and/or deciding what is to count as the premises of a case.

4. The teaching of stasis

The coupling of framing with argumentation aimed at changing and/or deciding what is to count as the premises of a case narrows in the argumentative field to which the concept holds relevance. However, it is not necessarily a singular definition pointing to one and just one argumentative form. Even when starting from a given situation, there are several possible means of constructing a perspective that will make the audience interpret the case in a certain way. In the following we will explore different possibilities; that is, specific argumentative forms of framing. Taking our starting point in the theory of stasis we will show that framing-based argumentation can be divided into (at least) two groups and that these groups refer to quite different modes of reasoning. In order to do so we will first present the rationale behind the classical theory and introduce the four stases that form the centerpiece of it. Then we will argue that two of the four stases – status definitivus and status translativus – represent two distinct forms of framing-based argumentation, whereas the other two stases – status conjecturalis and status qualitatis – should not be seen as framing devices. In unpacking the argumentative forms of framing that may be associated with status definitivus and status translativus we hope to establish a distinction that may help clarify what argumentative framing actually is and what it can be used for.

As is the case with other classical rhetorical concepts and systems, the origin of

the theory of stasis is somewhat disputed – just as discussion on the right interpretation of this theory prevails. In a work that is now lost Hermagoras supposedly was the first to present the theory of stasis as we know it today; that is to say, as a theory the purpose of which is to determine the central issue of dispute in a given case (Hohmann, 2001, p. 741; Braet, 1987, p. 79). The central question, then, is: at what level should discussion be conducted? There is some dispute as to how many levels the answer to this question should result in: three or four? (Hohmann, 1989). In the Greek tradition as introduced by Hermagoras and elaborated by Hermoganes four distinct stases were applied (Nadeau, 1964), but in the Roman tradition as primarily represented by Cicero and Quintilian only three stases were employed (Cicero De Oratore II, p. 113; Orator, p. 45; Quintilian Institutio Oratoria, book VII; for an exception to this rule see Cicero De Inventione I, p. 10). The reason for only mentioning three stases was a desire to present a system that could be applied to rhetoric broadly, and the fourth status was said to relate only to the forensic genre (Hohmann, 2001, p. 742-743). As we will explain below, we tackle the issue of the fourth status differently and, therefore, propose to include all four in broader conceptualizations of the teaching of the stasis and not only in the version of the theory that pertains narrowly to legal disputes.

The theory of stasis, then, lists four possible levels of dispute – four different stases: status conjecturalis, status definitivus, status qualitatis, and status translativus. In the following table we present the four stases, the level at which each status operates, a classical example, and examples from the debate on the real estate market so as to begin the coupling of our modern example of choice and our theoretical focal point.

The four stases

Name	*Status conjecturalis*	*Status definitivus*	*Status qualitatis*	*Status Translativus*
Level of inquiry	The *factual* level At this level the facts of the case are discussed: what is the case?	The *defining* level At this level the categorization of the case is discussed: how should the case be defined?	The *valuating* level At this level the evaluation of the case is discussed: what should we think of the case?	The *transcending* level At this level the criteria of evaluation of the case are discussed: which criteria should be used to evaluate the case?
Classical example (Conley 1990, p. 32)	A man is caught burying a corpse in an isolated place and is accused of murder: he did not kill him.	He acted in self-defense and did not commit murder.	The action was honorable, because the man was an adulterer.	The current court is not the proper judge of this case.
Examples about real estate	Various market indicators point to immanent changes in the market: the prices of real estate are not falling.	Developments on the real estate market are expressions of: - a soft landing - seasonal changes.	It is positive that the prices are adjusted because: - we will avoid a collapse of the market - first time buyers are allowed to enter the market again.	The important issue is not prices, but: - psychological factors - economy on a larger scale - long-term market developments.

All four stases make for interesting forms of argumentation, but status definitivus and status translativus are of particular importance to the present investigation. These two stases may be identified as argumentative forms of framing: argumentation based on categorization and definition as well as argumentation based on displacements of the employed criteria of evaluation basically function to make the case appear in a certain manner, to make the audience interpret the various elements of the case in one way rather than the other – the central issue of our definition of framing. In other words, we claim that both status definitivus and status translativus are movements from the case to the premises; it is the understanding of the case as such that is at stake in these two forms of argumentation. In this sense, the two stases resemble Kuypers' observation that framing is about content as well as context (2009, p. 188), a point which we will explore in further detail below, but first let us consider the other two stases in order to explain why we do not think they are argumentative forms of framing.

Status conjecturalis and status qualitatis are classical enthymematic arguments in which the conclusion follows from the premises and, therefore, do not appear to be argumentative forms of framing. Two explications of the warrants that are often implicit in practical use of the stases may illustrate this: if the experts say there is no fall in prices, there is no fall in prices (conjecturalis); if the prices are falling, first-time buyers will benefit (qualitatis). In both cases the arguments follow inferential patterns rather than performing the establishment or shift in the premises of interpretation that is characteristic of framing. This is not to say that it would be impossible to reinterpret status conjecturalis and status qualitatis as argumentative forms of framing. We only argue that status definitivus and status

translativus take up a special position since they are immediately compatible with the notion of framing. Status definitivus and status translativus also immediately point to two distinct forms of framing and this is what makes it particularly interesting to unfold them here.

The interpretation of status definitivus as an argumentative form of framing follows more or less directly from the usual definitions of definitivus on the one hand and framing on the other. First and foremost the term 'definition' is an explicit part of many definitions of framing (most notably Entman 1993, p. 52). A definition of the disputed issue – or case in question – is central to the audience's reading and interpretation of it. By placing a matter in one category, other categories are rejected. Moreover, definitions usually work at the level of specific words or concepts at which attempts at framing is arguably most clearly visible (cf. Lakoff's notion of surface frames that is tied to a choice of words).

The discussion on how to categorize developments on the real estate market clearly illustrates how framing through definition works at the level of words and concepts: is an apparent fall in prices a bubble bursting, a soft landing or a natural correction? Each definition becomes possible by highlighting some elements of the case rather than others, and, in turn, functions to make the audience highlight the same elements when interpreting the matter. The choice of definition – or frame – actualizes one set of premises rather than other possible starting points of argumentation and alters the interpretation of the case that audiences are invited to make.
At its most basic, the strategy of definition can be described by the formula A is B wherefore this argumentative form of framing is internal to the case. As illustrated above, a definition is based on weighing the different elements of the case against each other: is the fall in prices accelerating (a sign of a bursting bubble), is it a slow movement (closer to the notion of the soft landing), was it long expected (a natural correction)? And how may the use of definitions induce audiences to interpret the case as either a fast, a slow, or an expected development?

To conclude the discussion of status definitivus, it is by considering, selecting, and labeling the available information that the case may be defined. When framing through definition, then, focus is directed inwards at the different elements of the case and the various categories that it is possible to apply to these elements. The form of framing that is exposed through consideration of

status definitivus is about the conceptualization and categorization of the case. Thus, the interpretation of the case is steered or given direction by accentuating some elements of the case and ignoring others.

The interpretation of status translativus as a form of framing is, perhaps, less obvious. Classically understood, this status is a movement of the physical setting of a case: for instance, from the High Court to the Supreme Court or from a court of justice to 'the court of the people'. However, we believe that translativus may also be understood as a change of scenes in a broader, metaphorical sense (Just & Gabrielsen 2008). Here, we follow the line of thinking that suggests this fourth status must be redefined in order to be applied to a broad range of contemporary issues rather than just the juridical genre of classical times (Gross 2004; Kramer & Olson 2002). Instead of delimiting translativus to being about deciding who should judge, we see it as being more broadly about deciding the criteria for judgment.

Thereby, status translativus becomes a general strategy that may be used outside of the narrowly forensic context. Moreover, this widening of the strategy makes the interpretation of translativus as an argumentative form of framing more apparent: changing the criteria used in judging a case is a basic way of influencing how the audience interprets the case. When understood metaphorically, changing the scene is akin to framing; it is a strategy that changes the premises of the case.
When this status is used by the participants in the debate on real estate several possible shifts are employed and discussed: should the developments on the real estate market by evaluated in the short or the long term? Should economic or emotional criteria be used as the basis of evaluation? And who should perform the evaluation – sellers, buyers, real estate agents, economists, or some other party? Depending on which frame is used – and which becomes dominant in the debate – the criteria for interpreting and evaluating the case change.

When reinterpreted in this manner status translativus can be described by the formula A should be evaluated on the basis of B, making it an argumentative form of framing that is external to the case. In opposition to definitivus which functions as an internal conceptualization of the case translativus works as an external contextualization. Rather than weighing the elements of the case and including/excluding them in the definition, the strategy of translativus works by setting up the factors or criteria which the case is held up against. As exemplified

above the real estate market may be held up to the standard of making profit which is a frame of private economy, but it may also be reinterpreted as a matter of national economy or the economic frame may be swapped for an emotional one: buy with your heart rather than your wallet.
In sum, framing by means of status translativus directs attention outwards at the various factors with which the case should be associated and/or the criteria with which the case should be evaluated. The form of framing that is exposed through consideration of translativus is focused on the contextualization of the case. The interpretation of the case is influenced through a change of the external criteria on which interpretation and evaluation should be based.

As the examples of how status definitivus and status translativus may be applied to the real estate market indicate the basic formulas of the two stases are rather similar at the formal level. This becomes most apparent when considering the type of definition that may be labeled dissociative (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, p. 444): A is not B, but C; we are not witnessing a recession, but a deceleration. Almost the same extension may be used in the case of the basic formula of translativus: A should not be judged in terms of B, but C; you should not buy a house as speculation, but because you need a place to stay. The similarity in the two stases shows that they are both argumentative forms of framing, but the examples also illustrate the difference of the two stases as frames: one frames the case in terms of its internal concepts, the other frames it in terms of its external context.

5. Conclusion
We have drawn attention to the ways in which status definitivus and status translativus function as argumentative forms of framing. The levels of dispute that they represent are both about how to interpret the case – and about what should be the premises of the case – and it is in this sense that they may be understood as framing. However, the two stases do not represent the same form of framing; rather, internal definition and external transcendence are quite different moves. Thus, we have identified two distinct argumentative forms of framing that may clarify what framing is.
Such clarification is important because the notion of framing has been an export success. From its origin in the microsociological work of Erving Goffman it has, as we have briefly sketched out, been applied within a wide variety of fields. The concept of framing has proved to contain a large explanatory potential, but it has

also become a diffuse and contested concept, and scholars have repeatedly called for a clarification of it.

By reversing the direction of import-export and applying the teaching of stasis – a center-piece of classical argumentation theory – to the notion of framing we hope to have contributed to the clarification of framing in the context of argumentation. Furthermore, we hope that this movement from argumentation theory to framing may be followed up by taking the revised and refined notion of framing back to the field of argumentation, that it will now prove to be both more readily applicable to studies of practical argumentation, and that such applications may be more rewarding.

In discussing framing in terms of the stases we have both pointed out that not all forms of argumentation are framing and that there is more than one argumentative form of framing. Thus, we do not believe status conjecturalis and status qualitatis to be argumentative frames, whereas we believe status definitivus and status translativus to represent distinct argumentative frames. We are by no means certain that there are only two argumentative forms of framing, but the internal framing of concepts that emerges from the consideration of status definitivus and the external framing of contexts that is pointed out through the reconceptualization of status translativus are in our opinion very basic and important argumentative forms of framing. The identification of these two forms may form the starting point for both applications of the concept of framing in studies of practical argumentation and further refinements of the concept in terms of argumentation theory.

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ISSA Proceedings 2010 – Strategically Manoeuvring With Reporting In The Argumentation Stage Of A Critical Discussion



1. Introduction

This analysis is part of a larger research project**[i]** which investigates the argumentative potential of reports within the theoretical background of pragma-dialectics enlarged with rhetorical insights, as it has been developed by van Eemeren & Houtlosser (1999, 2000, 2002). We are more specifically interested in exploring the possibilities for strategic manoeuvring with anonymous reports, i. e. reports that provide no specific reference to the information source, but vaguely place it under the responsibility of the community as it is the case with utterances such as *People say that, The word goes that, Rumour has it that*, etc. This analysis is confined to the investigation of the dialectical and rhetorical goals that might be served in using the specific presentational device of anonymous reports in the argumentation stage. In doing it, we shall first provide a pragmatic description of this type of assertives in order to point to the effects of their use in discourse. In general terms, in using anonymous reports, the speaker has the possibility to advance information for whose truthfulness he cannot be apparently held responsible. Given this peculiarity of presentation in adducing arguments, we shall examine how the dialectical aim of the argumentation stage is fulfilled, while, in point of rhetorical goal, we shall describe to what extent the use of this presentational device makes the speaker's arguments stronger and more efficient.

2. Anonymous reports: pragmatic description

Anonymous reports such as *People say that, The word goes that, Rumour has it that,* etc. may be defined as an instance of indirect reported speech characterized by the occultation of the identity of the information source. They belong to the large category of hearsay evidentiality which opposes, according to Gâță (2009, p. 490), two main subcategories, quotative vs. non-quotative and reporting one's assertions vs. reporting the other's words. According to this classification, anonymous reports are non-quotative and they are used to report the other's words.

Reporting amounts to the accomplishment of a polyphonic communicative act where boundaries may be set between the constitutive voices, i. e. the original speaker and the reporting one. Given the existence of the two instances, the question of commitment to content rises: Who commits to which content? Since reporting represents the linguistic process meant to entirely or only partially display or render an original utterance, in terms of commitment and responsibility taken, in the indirect reported speech, the speaker is generally supposed to vouch for the previous performance of a speech act where he was either the addressee or a witness. In reporting it, he makes himself responsible for the interpretation of this initial speech act and engages upon rendering both its content and the form under which the content was initially uttered. Coulmas (1986, p. 2) speaks about a change in perspective when referring to indirect reported speech: unlike the direct style where the reporter quotes the reportee's speech and reports it from the latter's perspective, in the indirect reported speech, the reporter interprets the reportee's discourse and reports it with his own words. An accurate reporting depends on several conditions: the reporting speaker's access to the context where the initial speech act was performed, his capacity to correctly decode the communicative effect aimed at by the original speaker and, not in the least, his real intention to provide a faithful report. Since the insertion of reports in the host discourse is meant to achieve certain purposes, speakers may resort to deliberate omissions, emphases, adaptations or alterations of the original speech act in a way that best suits their interests. Moreover, Bakhtin (1981, p. 340) states that "the speech of another, once enclosed in a context, is – no matter how accurately transmitted – always subject to certain semantic changes".

In reporting another's speech, speakers signal the degree of correspondence between the reported content and the original one through the type of reportive

prefix used. In English, there is a wide range of phrases that can be used in making anonymous reports, their selection depending on what the reporting speaker can or is willing to disclose about the author's identity of the original speech act or, more generally, about the context of performance of the initial speech act. The type of reportive prefixes we focus this analysis on puts forward the community as the author of the original speech act. This doxa voice may be directly designated by the hyperonim *people* or the indefinite *they* combined with a speech verb (*say, tell, rumour, report*, etc.) or metonymically by speech nouns such as *word, rumour, report, story, etc.* In the latter case, the nouns may be combined with a movement verb lexicalizing the indefinite trajectory in spreading the report and may optionally take a locative, resulting into utterances such as *The word / story / report goes that, There is some talk that, There is a rumour abroad / afloat / in the air that, There is a report going, Some gossip is flying round*, etc. We also include in this category of reportive prefixes the idiomatic phrases *Rumour / Report has it* which feature speech nouns as well as the passivised structures *It is said / reported / rumoured that*, etc.

In using this type of reportive phrases, the reporting speaker holds himself responsible for reporting information which circulates within a community, without being able to specify the identity of the original speaker and to certify whether the reported content is the exact representation of the original one. In spite of this information implicitly communicated to the hearer, when using anonymous reports in an argumentative context, the speaker is expected to have a certain position to the content. Therefore, be it less overtly, the speaker commits himself to the truth of the propositional content reported, and, moreover, as anonymous reports represent a subclass of assertives, he is expected to be able to present evidence to account for it if requested (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992, p. 38).

In point of discourse effects, the speaker benefits from the apparent attitude of reserve implied by the use of anonymous reportive prefixes which put forward the community as lying behind the creation and circulation of the report. Resembling at this point the popular opinion type of utterances by seemingly invoking commonly accepted presumptions and opinions, anonymous reports enable the speaker to bring some information to the hearer's attention. This form may be favoured against the plain assertion because the opacity of an anonymous report allows him to do more than he claims to be doing: while only pretending to ensure

the further transmission of the content, he hides behind the public voice with a view to getting across some information and to using it in the argumentation.

3. Arguing with anonymous reports

As an instance of assertives, anonymous reports may be used in a critical discussion at the confrontation stage where they can express the standpoint at issue; at the argumentation stage, as arguments adduced in defence of that standpoint or in the concluding stage to express the outcome of the discussion (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992, p. 38). According to the model of critical discussion, "the argumentation stage corresponds with the phase in which one party adduces arguments in order to overcome the other party's doubts about the standpoint, and the other party reacts to those arguments" (van Eemeren, Grootendorst & Snoeck Henkemans 1996, p. 282).

In the argumentation stage, the arguers proceed to justify or refute the standpoint at issue, resorting to argumentation schemes which enable them to create specific relationships between the arguments adduced and the standpoint in case. According to the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation, there are three main types of justifying relationships argumentation is based on, i.e. argumentation by comparison, instrumental argumentation, and symptomatic argumentation (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992, pp. 96-102). When making use of a particular argumentation scheme, the speaker takes the first step in a dialectical testing procedure that verifies whether the argumentation is resistant to specific forms of criticism. As a protective measure in ensuring the success of the justification process, the speaker may respond in advance to the anticipated criticism raised by the opposition by providing responses to possible objections.

Dialectically, anonymous reports are vulnerable because of the speaker's impossibility to produce evidence for the truthfulness or correctness of the content reported since he acknowledges having had access to the information via hearsay. That is why advancing anonymous reports as arguments is excluded in argumentation in institutionalized contexts such as legal, political, academic discourse since practicing argumentation in these contexts is necessarily evidence-based. Nevertheless, in less constraining types of discourse, resorting to anonymous reports to support a standpoint is current when disclosing unconfirmed information, as it is the case with journalistic discourse where there is a protection policy of information sources. However, even in this context, choosing anonymous reports as arguments does not comply with the dialectical

standards of reasonableness. This particular way of presenting an argument implies the speaker's impossibility to have access to the context where the initial speech act was performed, therefore to the initial assertive act, and to prove the truth of the propositional content. But this is exactly what the speaker wants to elude: he deliberately prefers to build his plea based on arguments whose accuracy is difficult to check and thus more difficult to refute.

For instance, when arguing that
(1) During recession some rich people become richer. People say that the billionaire Bill Jones has seen his fortune doubled since last November.
the speaker uses an anonymous report as an argument from example, a subtype of symptomatic argument, to support the standpoint that *during recession some rich people become richer*. The dialectical profile established by van Eemeren, Houtlosser and Snoeck Henkemans (2007, pp. 154-155) for the symptomatic argumentation describes the type of relationship the speaker creates between the argument and the standpoint at issue as "a property, class membership, distinctive characteristic, or essence of a particular thing, person, or situation" that is mentioned, implying "that this thing, person or situation also has the characteristic property that is ascribed to it in the standpoint". In advancing this argument from example, the speaker builds his argumentation by pointing out to the existence of a relation of concomitance between what is stated in the argument and what is stated in the standpoint. In (1), the billionaire Bill Jones's financial growth since last November counts, in the arguer's point of view, as an illustration of the generalising statement claimed in the standpoint which is typical for the argumentation of example where "separate facts are represented as special cases of something general" (Garssen in van Eemeren, Houtlosser & Snoeck Henkemans 2007, p. 155). There are several elements of concomitance that the speaker bases his argumentation from example on: the lapse of time referred to (*since last November*) coincides with the recession period, *the billionaire* Bill Jones's present financial state accounts for his belonging to the class of the rich, and, not in the least, what counts in (1) as the unexpressed premise the arguer can be held responsible for, having one's fortune doubled is a sign of getting richer. In the case of argumentation from example, the weight of the example ensures the transfer of acceptability from the argument to the standpoint and, in advancing one, the arguer is bound to wonder whether the particular case invoked is really representative for what is claimed in the standpoint. However, unless the speaker can produce evidence to account for the

truth of the reported news concerning Bill Jones's financial growth, the argumentation scheme he uses cannot resist the exam of dialectical reasonableness. This is also proved in (2) where the speaker uses coordinative argumentation in order to supplement the potency of the example expressed through an anonymous report with an additional argument from example:
(2) Much daunting stories and myths about the beige spider often give people the creeps: the word goes that this species can eat out flesh portions after injecting a form of anesthetic in the victim's body, not to reveal that its dimensions are justly impressive.**[ii]** (http://www.articlealley.com/article_784314_54.html)

The characteristic of devouring victims is reinforced by the impressive dimensions of the arachnid, which results into picturing a savage description of the beige spider. These features are thought to be relevant for considering the spider a fearful species that makes daunting stories circulate on its account. In this case, the argument from example appears as more resistant to attacks since it provides factual data that can be verified with respect to their accuracy. The fact that this content is presented as the object of an anonymous report, a common opinion that is widely spread around, is meant to substantiate its truth value. Nevertheless, this strategic choice is bound to fail provided that evidence cannot be produced to prove the information right.

In the following excerpt, the anonymous report functions as a causal argument:
(3) I am considering buying a house on the outskirts. The word goes their price will rocket in the following years.

Argumentation based on a causal relationship is defined by van Eemeren, Houtlosser, Snoeck Henkemans (2007, p. 164) as representing the cause of the standpoint, or, the other way round, the standpoint as the cause of the argument. In (3), the argument features the cause of the result presented in the standpoint, namely that the predicted boom in the price of outskirts houses is the cause for considering buying one. In using this argumentation scheme, the speaker holds himself responsible for considering that prognosticated rising prices of houses leads to wanting to buy one at a lower price. The speaker presents the content of the anonymous report as sufficient cause leading to making the decision referred to in the standpoint. The causal relationship proposed by the speaker is supported by the fact that the realization of the state of affairs described in the causal argument is very likely to happen and matches people's beliefs and representations of life: continuous rise in prices is not excluded in the context of

unstable financial market. Nonetheless, as it was the case with (1) and (2), (3) may be reasonably accepted as long as proofs can be adduced to support the truth of the propositional content.

Irrespective of the type of argumentation scheme where anonymous report arguments may be included, in using them, the speaker advances contents whose truthfulness he commits to, even though he presents them as belonging to and emanating from the community. Being unable to vouch for the truth of the content, the speaker presents this information as widely circulating around with a view to conferring it argumentative tenability. In fact, the arguer is well aware of the fact that, psychologically, people are bound to accept as true what many others have accepted as such since one condition in ensuring the survival and perpetuation of rumours – to which anonymous reports are similar – is that they should match people's beliefs or representations of life. Anonymous reports appear therefore as making part of a strategic schema used by the speaker in order to make a standpoint seem valid based on what people say and which should consequently be granted credibility.

4. Strategic manoeuvring with anonymous reports

Van Eemeren and Houtlosser (1999, 2000, 2002) enlarged the pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation by incorporating a rhetorical component in the framework, starting from the prerequisite that, in argumentative discourse, arguers conduct the discussion based on reasonable standards in a way that is most favourable to them. Along the resolution process deployed within a critical discussion, arguers strategically manoeuvre with a view to reduce "the potential tension between pursuing at the same time a 'dialectical' as well as a 'rhetorical' aim" (Van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2002, p. 135). For each of the stages of a critical discussion, there is a dialectical aim corresponding to the allowable moves specified in the dialectical profile balanced by a rhetorical aim consisting in making the moves in the most efficient and convenient manner that serves the arguers' interests. According to Van Eemeren and Houtlosser, "strategic manoeuvring can take place in making an expedient choice from the options constituting the 'topical potential' associated with a particular discussion stage, in selecting a responsive adaptation to 'audience demand', and in exploiting the appropriate 'presentational devices' " (2002, p. 139). Our approach focuses on the analysis of anonymous reports as presentational device in an attempt to describe them as achieving the dialectical and rhetorical aims in the argumentation stage.

The dialectical objective in the argumentation stage is to test the tenability of the standpoints that have shaped the difference of opinion in the confrontation stage, starting from the point of departure established in the opening stage (van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2002, p. 139). The rhetorical aim is for the arguers to make the strongest case and to launch the most effective attack. In order to achieve it, they will adduce arguments in favour or against the standpoint in the most efficient way possible. In using anonymous reports as arguments, the speaker takes benefits from the credibility of *Everybody thinks so* type of utterance on whose pattern *People say / The word goes that / Rumour has it that*, etc. utterances are shaped. Practically, in building their case, speakers act as if the contents prefixed by these reportive phrases were widely acknowledged truths on which basis acceptability is transferred to the standpoint they are meant to support. In point of strategic manoeuvring, awarding a content a wider scope of circulation than it might be the case reveals the arguers' attempt to present the argument in a way that makes them stronger. It is more difficult to attack the voice of the community and besides, within a cause – effect reading (*there is no smoke without fire*), people are bound to grant credibility to rumours or assumptions presented as commonly shared within a community. When considering the anonymous report argument, one cannot refrain from wondering whether the content reported might not be the speaker's opinion which he presents as emanating from the community. In choosing this presentational device, the speaker counts on stirring the hearer's attention and curiosity since, according to psychologists (DiFonzo & Bordia 2007), rumours, to which anonymous reports are similar, feed on emotions, incite people and may result into changing their attitudes and behaviour. Consequently, people do not remain impassible to rumours, but in judging them, they are more likely to consider first the consequences or implications of what is rumoured and secondly consider their accuracy.

In the following excerpt, by employing anonymous reports in his argumentation, the speaker presents his argument in a way that makes it more prominent and grasps the hearer's attention.
(4) From the middle ages onwards (and probably even earlier) Belgium also has been a prime source for marble, actually it's not a genuine marble but a dense and hard limestone that shows very appealing ornamental patterns. Especially the red "marble" found around Rochefort and the black "marble" encountered around Yvoir where in high demand and got exported throughout Europe (the word goes

that there's Belgian marble in St Peter's church in Rome).
(http://www.mindat.org/article.php/563/Belgium,+Calcite+paradise)

In this case, the example is suspended between brackets as an additional and supplementary extra-argument, apparently unnecessary in the economy of the discourse, yet mentioned just to replenish the argumentation process. Despite this facultative appearance of the example, the speaker is well aware of the role it has, namely bringing the particular on the stage in order to exemplify the validity of the claim, i.e. *Belgium has been a prime source of marble from the Middle Ages onwards*. Another gain is that the hearer will examine the argument from the perspective of the source, the community, which facilitates belief and contributes to lending credibility to the standpoint. However, this might not be the case when the hearer is knowledgeable about the truthfulness of the propositional content put forward in the anonymous report (namely the source of the marble used in building St Peter's church in Rome) and proceeds to attack the argument and point to its invalidity. Proving the argument wrong is one of the ways to refute anonymous reports. A more rhetorically-oriented means to do it is to undermine the authority of the source used to grant credibility to the anonymously reported information. This can be done by advancing counterarguments emanating from an authority which is superior to the community. In this case, the anonymous report finds itself counterattacked with the same rhetorical device – the use of an authoritative source to prove the content true. This is reflected in the following excerpt where the speaker rejects the truth of what is anonymously reported around by introducing information originating in the Granth Sahib, the Holy Scripture of the Sikhs, a supreme authority in the speaker's point of view:
(5) But many misconcepts have taken place. For example, people say that sikhs cannot eat beef. This is utterly nonsense. It is not said in the granth sahib that beef cannot be eaten. And either is it said that people cannot eat meat.

The force of anonymous reports when used to put forward argumentation lies in the authority of the information source. In spite of the vague reference to the identity of the source, the speaker counts on the rhetoric use of anonymous reports which are based on popular-opinion like reading and are therefore readily granted credibility. The use of anonymous reports in argumentation appears therefore as an instance when the speaker reveals himself as being prone to persuading the opponent at the expense of remaining within the boundaries of dialectical reasonableness.

5. Conclusion

Anonymous reports represent a particular type of reported speech characterised by the occultation of the information source. In uttering them, the speaker transfers the responsibility for the creation and circulation of the information to the community. In spite of this denial of authorship, when used in an argumentative context, the speaker commits to the truthfulness of the content reported and may use the utterance as an argument, taking benefit from this particular way of putting forward information. Being dialectically vulnerable because of the speaker's impossibility to account for the truthfulness of the content, anonymous reports represent rhetorical tools strategically manoeuvred by arguers in order to construct the most efficient claim and to attain their persuasive goal. While only pretending to restate what the others rumour round, arguers advance an argument in a way that best suits their interest, namely under the cover of the community voice, an authoritative instance, which makes any attack directed against the validity of the argument more difficult to pursue.

NOTES

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[ii] All the examples in this paper are provided with their original spelling.

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ISSA Proceedings 2010 – On 'Life Expectancy' Of Dissociated Terms

1. Introduction

This study takes as a premise the idea that dissociation (in the sense of Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca's *New Rhetoric*) relies on a semantic mechanism and a conceptual one which translate into linguistic and discursive elaboration, and has as a result the creation of a new notion, or concept. The main hypothesis of this study is that the contents of the notion created by dissociation, its structure and its existence over a specific time interval are determined by contextual (situational and co-textual, or discursive) circumstances.**[i]** This hypothesis is tested on the basis of evidence provided by various instances of discourse which are provided as empirical data borrowed from other studies on the same topic or related topics or identified as such in communicative interactions. Dissociation is seen in this study as one of the mechanisms allowing creation of new representations, notions or concepts on a discursive basis, in an argumentative context.

2. On the Concept of Dissociation

Dissociation is a discourse technique which the authors of the *New Rhetoric* (*NR*, Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958, vol. II, pp. 550-609) introduce to the field of argumentation studies as used by the speaker to suggest rearrangement and restructuring of notional information in a new way. Dissociation allows the speaker – at least for a limited time interval – to remove an incompatibility between propositions or inside a given notion N_0. Through dissociation "a more or less profound change is brought about in the conceptual basis of an argument" (van Rees 2005, p. 53): an existing, given notion N_0, displaying a certain – at least apparent – unity, is rebuilt by the speaker into two notions, one of which looks more or less like N_0, and the other one is felt or introduced as a completely new notion, N, or presumes as new for the audience a specific discourse addresses. In other words, the rational and linguistic dissociative mechanism starts from an existing notion N_0, whose content gives rise to an incompatibility, or to opposed views in the same discussion matter.

For instance, when referring in a particular context to a notional content such as that of *the truly needy*, the speaker dissociates from the given (old) notion N_0 = (THE) NEEDY**[ii]**, which is thus – explicitly or implicitly – qualified as pure appearance, a new notion N = (THE) TRULY NEEDY, the latter not being necessarily defined or elaborated, but – explicitly or implicitly – qualified as reality. The old notion is also referred to in the *NR* as the first term of the dissociation (Term I, T I, here N_0), and the new notion as the second term of the dissociation, or the dissociated term (Term II, T II, here N or N'). In Goodwin's words, "Term I, therefore is aligned with whatever is deemed, for cognitive or social purposes, merely apparent, illusory, insubstantial, irrelevant, erroneous. Term II, on the other hand, corresponds with whatever is considered to be actual, substantial, relevant, coherent, true." (1991, p. 150) While N_0 is discarded in the argumentative context, N or N' is valued argumentatively, i.e. N will serve as a new starting point of an argumentation on the same matter in which the use of N_0 proved unsuccessful or led to incompatibilities between the views of the speakers or conflicts or did not appear as stable or adequate enough for one of the parties(' purposes). The main goal of dissociation is to distinguish and contrast appearances from reality.

Another example of another type is that of the new notion N = SPIRIT OF THE

LAW, built by dissociation from LAW = N_0 on the basis of a semantic process of metonymy. In this case, two new notions are created by two distinct dissociations, both based on metonymy, the second being the notion of LETTER OF THE LAW = N', forming a couple with the former. This notion is dissociated from LAW = N_0 to show, for example, that a particular situation is not covered in practice by the *letter of the law*, yet it is conceivable – from the legal point of view – through an interpretation of the law, so it is nevertheless in the *spirit of the law*. (A)**[iii]** In such cases, when two new notions are created, I suggest that the term 'double dissociation' should be used.**[iv]**

Thus, when a particular ruling in court is debatable or questionable (i.e. is a matter of incompatibility of opinions), an advocate of that ruling may argue for it by contending that it obeys or conforms to the *spirit of the law*, although it is not present as such in the text of the law. Or, on the contrary, one may argue for an application of the *letter of the law*, depending on each specific circumstance. N_0, considered as a unitary notion, and accepted as such by the community, is referred to by a specific linguistic expression, or initial term, E_0. By dissociation, the speaker distinguishes and separates between acceptable and unacceptable aspects of N_0 and, by maintaining the former set of (acceptable) aspects, builds up discursively a new content, most often denominated in studies on dissociation a *new notion N*, by necessarily assigning it a new linguistic denominator E, more or less related or similar to E_0. The new notion N is judged able to serve local particular argumentative objectives or more general ones. (see also van Eemeren et al. 1996, Grootendorst 1999)

Dissociation can thus be used persuasively by the speaker: features of the initial notion appearing as disadvantageous to the argumentative position are qualified as mere 'appearance', while advantageous features are (usually tacitly or implicitly) declared as representing 'reality'. This is why "dissociation trades on a presumed gap between 'appearance' and 'reality'." (Olson 1996, p.197)

As Warnick and Kline underline, "The Term I (appearance) component of the pair, which is actual, obvious, and immediate, is devalued; the Term II concept, a construction that can only be known indirectly, is valued. The appearance / reality pair reflects other, similar pairs composed from pervasive and culturally bound value orderings: verbal / real (B), means / end (C), subjective / objective (D), opinion / knowledge (E)"[v] (1992, p. 12). In such cases one has to do with (two)

dissociations: instead of speaking about an action, one does not speak of an action in itself, but of its means or of its end, or of both, since either seems more appropriate to discuss a particular matter from the speaker's argumentative perspective. This is also the case of the couple competence / performance (F), either of the terms replacing the term *language use*. One similar dissociation may be added to those pointed to in the *NR*: the use of the expressions *the spirit* and the *letter* of the divine law (G) at various times in the Scriptures, to which the probably later dissociation between the spirit and the letter of the law is related.

In the previous example (letter / spirit), two new notions have resulted from an old notion, and this seems to be the case in institutional settings, governed by certain rituals and functioning principles. This is also the case of scientific, technical, professional discourse or of various jargons. Many examples provided in the *NR* are usually of this type as well since the authors deal with well established cognitive domains, such as philosophical systems, in which one is not expected to speak plainly about an event, but make a distinction between the causes and the consequences of an event. In many usual daily situations only one new notion is created, as in the prototypical cases of expressions with the adjectives *real*, *true*, and their derivatives, when only one new notion – such as *true love* or *the truly needy* (see Zarefsky et al. 1984) – is created and valued.

Dissociation is may give birth to new philosophical systems or scientific perspectives. For instance the notion of QUANTUM PHYSICS is dissociated from the notion of PHYSICS, and a second dissociated notion thus evolves, termed *Newtonian physics* (H). They are not opposing each other, but the couple is necessary for building a new paradigm, and dealing with physical phenomena and processes in completely different systems of reference. Like in this case, where both notions are maintained, dissociation does not always involve discarding the old notion N_0. In ordinary communication N_0 is temporarily discarded only for the very specific purpose of argumentation. In institutionalized communication (law, meetings of organizations), a particular dissociation may result in adopting a (notional) solution available also in the future (see Gata 2009, comments on *sustainable development*). This means that in some cases, the particular type of 'compromise' reached by dissociation is temporarily adopted and then the solution is forgotten, while in other cases the solution is maintained for future similar cases of incompatibility.

Two main ideas have been stressed upon in this section:
1) Dissociation allows the speaker to build a new notion in a particular discursive context. The creation of this new notional representation has an argumentative goal. In institutional settings two new notions may be created to replace – as a pair – an old notion whose content proves incompatible with the discussion upon a particular matter.
2) The new notion is either temporarily or definitely available – i.e. some new notions created by dissociations are used in common everyday conversations and some other notions are used in institutionalized contexts, re-used, and become established notional representations, giving birth to concepts to be used in theories, developing (scientific) paradigms.

In what follows the hypothesis to be tested is in connection with the second idea listed above, namely that the new notion (the dissociated term) has a shorter or a longer life, depending on the paradigm and the social setting in which it appears, on its interior makeup and dissemination force, on its author's notoriety, and on the mediating channel. This hypothesis is also to be tested in connection with the first idea listed above, in the sense that the 'double' dissociation is characteristic of discourse taking place in institutional settings (see examples A-H above).

3. 'Life expectancy' of dissociated terms
The main starting point of this study is that dissociations may occur in more or less conventionalized and institutionalized contexts and its result(s) – namely the concepts or notional representations created – are argumentatively valued in the context.

Three different situations may be distinguished in dealing with dissociation terms as results, or products, of the dissociation mechanism, and the initial hypothesis is thus branched: 1) terms resulting from dissociations taking place in institutional settings (scientific / academic / philosophical discourse) have 'long life expectancy' and are maintained subsequently as (technical / scientific / professional) terms in a given socio-historic context – these may be considered concepts proper; 2) terms resulting from dissociations taking place in ordinary communicative activities (everyday conversations on various topics) have 'short life expectancy' and are functional only within the activity or situation in which they evolved; 3) some terms resulting from dissociations taking place in ordinary communication or in institutional settings may have 'medium life expectancy' if they are later re-used, evoked, reported, re-built as such owing to their particular

suggestive force or persuasive potential.

3.1. The first sub-hypothesis is that terms resulting from dissociations taking place in institutional settings (scientific / academic / philosophical discourse) may have 'long life expectancy' and maintained subsequently as (technical / scientific / professional) terms in a given socio-historic context – these may be considered concepts proper. Such a term denotes a notion or a concept endowed with 'long life expectancy', i.e. the potential of definitely and clearly outliving the particular discourse activity under which it was proposed to an audience. Among such terms, the following will be discussed below: *sustainable development*, *the letter / spirit of the law*, *Newtonian / quantum physics*, *global warming.*

3.1.1. Sustainable development

The notion of SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT**[vi]** is dissociated from the notion of DEVELOPMENT since the latter refers to activities which – as practiced by some human communities – led to negative consequences for the following generations. It is thus alleged that another kind of development is more profitable to mankind, the one that *sustains* itself or makes itself last (Fr. *développement durable*), by preserving enough resources for the future generations. This concept was first promoted on a large scale in 1987, on the occasion of the publication of the issues of an international meeting providing a historical report: *Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development* known as the "Report of the Brundtland commission" or Brundtland Report (BR).

Historically, the concept of SUSTAINABILITY is reported to be used first in relation with scarcity of resources: this was related to population growth in the eighteenth century and to coal shortage in the nineteenth century.**[vii]** In 1980 the term *sustainable development* was first used with respect to creating an environment apt to ensure conservation of nature and natural resources.

The creation of the concept was supported and justified discursively in the BR not only by various strategies of definition**[viii]**, but also by the contrast established between the (old) notion of PROGRESS, as it was commonly conceived of at the time, and the newly dissociated concept of SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, in favour of the latter; i.e. the latter is positively valued in two ways: firstly, in defining it by opposition to anything that might have been seen as 'progress' up to that time and, secondly, in arguing in favour of many types of (strategic) changes which should take place in order to ensure real development. An antithesis

highlights the contrast in the following excerpt:
(1) The world must quickly design strategies that will allow nations to *move from their present, often destructive, processes of growth and development* onto *sustainable development paths*." (BR, art. 27) (my italics)

The need for a clear and mutually shared representation of the newly created concept is insisted upon in various documents issued at that time:
(2) Arriving at a commonly accepted definition of 'sustainable development' remains a challenge for all the actors in the development process. (*Making Common Cause*, U.S. Based Development, Environment, Population NGOs, WCED Public Hearing, Ottawa, 26-27 May 1986)

Moreover, authorities are interested in disseminating the concept and its content:
(3) How are individuals in the real world to be persuaded or made to act in the common interest? The answer lies partly in education, institutional development, and law enforcement. (BR, art. 16)

The concept created by dissociation has been largely used ever since: the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development was created in 1992 as a further step forward in applying the principles established by the BR; the United Nations presently guide actions and strategies in the area of sustainable development by its Division for Sustainable Development; as a natural consequence of the use of this concept other concepts have evolved, referred to by terms such as *sustainable growth*, *sustainable management (of resources)*, *sustainable consumption / production (patterns)*, *environmental sustainability*. The concept is still widely used at present and the large choice of actions and activities performed by the international organisms previously mentioned, to which add lots of national agencies, support the idea that the dissociated concept of SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT has a long life expectancy.**[ix]** The adjective *sustainable* has been associated to many other nouns yielding a profusion of specialized terms: *sustainable cities / culture / yield*.

In the cases discussed under 3.1.1.-3.1.4., as in other similar cases, I find it adequate to speak about dissociation giving birth to a 'new notion' as the following development stage of a 'dissociated term'. When the linguistic expression corresponding to a dissociated term enters a dictionary – and often in a specialized dictionary, vocabulary or glossary – or whenever there is obvious evidence that it exists in the collective memory, then it can be equated to a 'new

notion'.

3.1.2. The letter and the spirit of the law

While the term *sustainable development* and its definition can be found in various glossaries or dictionaries, notions such as *the letter of the (divine) law* or *the spirit of the (divine) law* are not included in general language dictionaries; yet, they are widely used and understood, or at least acknowledged and appropriated by large communities of people.

In the following excerpt, the article author quotes a Rabbi who justifies what might be called a 'communitarian theft' after federal indictments against six members of the Hasidic community of New Square, N.Y. for misuse of government education money**[x]**:

(4) Without going into the question of whether or not they were obeying *the letter of the law*, *the spirit of the law* was always being complied with," declares Rabbi Mayer Schiller (…) The purpose of the law was to support education, says Schiller, and that's exactly what the money was used for, even if the studies were not conducted in the formal manner required by the Pell Grant Program. (my italics)

http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2001/1/31/174956.shtml

Although referred to explicitly in the Rabbi's utterance, the notion of LAW is avoided in the justification, since it does not allow for explaining how the use of the governmental support could be viewed as legal. The two dissociated notions *spirit of the law* and *letter of the law* are mentioned and in some way opposed: in a somewhat naïve way – which he might wish for as transparent – the speaker mentions not going into details about the fellows obeying or not obeying the letter of the law, but states that the money obtained from the government was employed for study, which was in the spirit of the law, the adverb *always* being used to strategically emphasize the truthfulness of the assertion. This is also the case of the couple *langue* and *parole*, where two new notions have been dissociated from a unitary notion, LANGUAGE.

3.1.3. Quantum Physics

In a similar way, the notion of QUANTUM PHYSICS was dissociated from PHYSICS, after which a need was felt for renaming the 'initial' science of physics, and a new term has been created, *Newtonian physics*. This situation could be schematized as follows:



N_0 stands for the old notion not necessarily re-configured or re-defined, such as in the couple *development / sustainable development*, while N_0' corresponds T I of a double dissociation, being invertible with N as T II, depending on what member of the couple is valued in the argumentation, such as in *Newtonian physics / quantum physics*.

According to Goodwin (1991, pp. 150-151), an assertion such as *This calculation is correct* can be supported by establishing a point of reference, a principle whose application may show the assertion as true in quantum physics and false in Newtonian physics: thus, "in the presence of quantum physics, Newtonian physics only *appears* to be a solid ground for holding the initial claim." (Goodwin 1991, p. 150) On the contrary, the opponent may give Newtonian physics the status of T II, since the speaker may be interested in its economical character as opposed to the completeness of quantum physics. Or else, this can happen in other discursive circumstances, in a different setting and when a different matter is under discussion.

The result of dissociation can be used outside the particular field of science, as in the following excerpt:
(5) Action learning acknowledges what scientists proved nearly a hundred years ago, namely that *Newtonian physics does not and cannot explain reality*. Action learning recognizes that the old way of thinking and solving problems does not work, especially in today's rapidly changing environment. Action learning *therefore utilizes quantum physics, chaos theory, and systems thinking*. (Marquardt, 2004: 93)**[xi]** (my italics)

In this context, the two terms are used to distinguish between a possible old approach to action learning and the suggested innovative way of approaching such activities. Although marginal, this looks like a prototypical example of translation of the dissociated concepts to another field or referential area by means of an implicit analogy. It looks like the terms of such dissociation are – like in the case of *spirit* and *letter of the law* – powerful enough and well established

in the common representation to be easily applied to and used in any situation, their rhetorical potential fully contributing to an argumentative scheme based on analogy.

3.1.4. Global warming

An interesting example of dissociation of this type is provided by the current polemic (lasting for many decades now) on global warming (GW = "rise in temperature on a large temporal scale – more than a decade"). Although the issue is being widely discussed in the media, little is known in the same environment about the actual dilemmas in the field, which are constantly dealt upon by specialists in the field. Four categories of scientists might be identified in GW study**[xii]**: 1) the skeptics – perhaps the smallest group – those who do not believe there really is any GW; 2) the GW move – the largest group – those who preach that GW is caused by increased concentrations of greenhouse gases (and this because of various human activities; in this paradigm GW has anthropogenic causes); 3) the global change (GC) move**[xiii]** – a rather small group – those who acknowledge there is a rise in temperature but attribute it to natural causes; their opinion is that the present warming is a natural consequence of what is called "the Earth's recovery from the little ice age"; 4) a group who acknowledge the rise in temperature but attribute it to a mixture of factors. The second and the third categories are interesting for the present discussion since they oppose each other, and this on the basis of a profound difference of paradigm. Without necessarily identifying one of the two notions – GW and GC – as the 'initial' one, one may eventfully detail upon the existing dissociation by means of the following representation:



In order to defend the standpoint that the GTR can be diminished and prevented from now on, the members of the second category above dissociate a new notion N = GTR caused by anthropogenic factors (GW) from the notion including incompatibility between possible causes N_0 = GTR. GTR caused by anthropogenic factors is seen as a consequence of human activity, usually referred to by the phrase *global warming*, while discarding any other (natural) causes – the theory itself being known as *anthropogenic global warming theory* (AGW). The evolvement of this paradigm has as a consequence the fact that the programs and actions devised within this framework are meant to fight the causes, while it may

well be the case that the anthropogenic factor is not the cause. In the politics realm this theory is supported by liberals and socialists. In order to defend the standpoint that the GTR cannot be fought (and that perhaps money should be invested in predicting various consequences of the GTR and ways to prevent negative ones), the members of the third category above dissociate a new notion from that of N = GTR, N' = GTR as produced by natural factors, usually referred to by the phrase *global change* or *climate change*. The notion of GC, or CLIMATE CHANGE, is more comprehensive than the notion (A)GW since it does not exclude global warming as a change and allows for the idea that global decreases in temperature may also be the case.

3.1.5. Remarks on long life expectancy dissociations

When a dissociated term has a 'long life', it is no longer part of the original argumentative context, it becomes part of a cognitive system and a social knowledge representation framework. This is the case of dissociated terms such as *letter of the law* and *spirit of the law*. They maintain their argumentative potential and, when integrated to a new context, they may have a flexible representation, which the speaker may infuse with new notional aspects in order to make it stronger. Such a dissociated notion may be frequently inventoried in dictionaries, often pertaining to a specific field of activity.

In this way the audience by which it was initially accepted is enlarged to an audience practically indefinite in point of dimensions, i.e. as large as can be the set of individuals taking contact with that particular field or becoming members of a given community professionally, socially, culturally or historically determined. The most important element to be taken in consideration when establishing whether a dissociated term has become a new notion is its inclusion (and definition) in a dictionary or glossary, and its use within a specialized domain of activity or, at least, its presence in treatises, journal articles, institutional debates. Such terms denoting new concepts or notions are generally used by professionals, specialists in the field, who authorize and validate the term, its definition and its contextual use, which becomes the most important basis for their long life expectancy.

3.2. Dissociation may give birth to a 'new notion' improperly named so since endowed with 'short life expectancy', when it displays the potential of serving only a local purpose of resolving a difference of opinion. In this case it does not outlive the given local discursive situation and cannot be carried away from the

context at all or any such attempt fails to propagate the 'new notion' with (exactly) the same meaning and potential.

The second sub-hypothesis is that terms resulting from dissociations taking place in ordinary communication (everyday conversations on various topics) have 'short life expectancy' and play an argumentative role only within the activity or situation in which they evolved. Such terms result from distinctions between notional representations which are different or incompatible for the speaker and the audience, the addressee (opponent) or some imaginary interlocutor.

3.2.1. Love of beautiful clothes is not vanity

Relying on examples provided in the literature on the topic, this could be the case with a 'dissociated term' such as LOVE OF BEAUTIFUL CLOTHES in the example discussed by van Rees (2009: 8):

(6) *She loved beautiful clothes, but was not vain*.

Love of beautiful clothes is a term dissociated from VANITY. In this case, the process is reversed, the interpretation process being something like: *Real vanity is something else than just love of beautiful clothes* or *Love of beautiful clothes is only in appearance / looks like vanity but is something else than vanity*.

3.2.2. Virtue is political virtue

An interesting example of such a dissociation and also a meta discourse on it is to be found in the introduction (*Avertissement*) to *The Spirit of Laws***[xiv]** by Montesquieu:

(7) … what I distinguish by the name of virtue, in a republic, is the love of one's country, that is, the love of equality. It is not a moral, nor a Christian, but a political *virtue*; and it is the spring which sets the republican government in motion, as honour is the spring which gives motion to monarchy. Hence it is that I have distinguished the love of one's country, and of equality, by the appellation of political virtue. (Author's italics.)

The notion of VIRTUE evolved for Montesquieu from more general (1725, *Discours sur l'équité*) to more precise (1757, *The Spirit of Laws*)**[xv]**. In the excerpt above the author is also in search of a name for the new notion he proposes; the one he finds and he points to explicitly – by a meta discursive / linguistic reference – is *political virtue*, equated with the meaning of "love of one's country and/or of equality". Although this notion is rather ambiguous, especially that there are other notional contents which Montesquieu assigns to fr. *vertu*, the

discourse will be consistent with this notion of VIRTUE defined or described by the author. The meta-linguistic comments continue and are probably meant to clearly suggest separation from other possible interpretations and also delineate the author's position more specifically against criticisms brought to his previously advanced standpoints. The text goes on as follows:
(8) My ideas are new, and therefore I have been obliged to find new words, or to give new acceptations to old terms, in order to convey my meaning. They, who are unacquainted with this particular, have made me say most strange absurdities, such as would be shocking in any part of the world, because in all countries and governments morality is requisite. […] I have set these matters in a clearer light in the present edition, by giving a more precise meaning to my expression: and in most places where I have made use of the word *virtue* I have taken care to add the term *political*.

In the two excerpts above, Montesquieu is saying neither *Virtue is …* since he does not intend to present the generally accepted definition of *virtue* – nor *True virtue is …* which would indicate a dissociation in a somewhat clearer and semi-explicit way. In saying *what I distinguish by the name of …* he could be pointing to a meaning clarification or to a dissociation. In both cases – by applying a strategy of maximally argumentative interpretation and the pragma-dialectical model of a critical discussion – this utterance can be considered to belong to the opening stage, where starting points of the discussion are established. Normally, dissociation brings any discussion to its opening stage and, from the moment it is being deployed it allows changing the starting points or creating new ones, and consequently opens a new discussion.

Thus Montesquieu presents a dissociation which he introduced less explicitly on other occasions. This dissociation is now mentioned at the very beginning of the treatise in order to allow consistent use of the new notion POLITICAL VIRTUE throughout the work and also in line with the audience's expected interpretation. This could also be ranged in the category 3.2.c) above.

3.2.3. Legitimate economic purposes
In the context of discussions about law violation by Goldman Sachs Group Inc., Bill Clinton expresses his opinion that Goldman is not guilty since there was no economic purpose in the actions under discussion:
(9) "I don't think it is self-evident" Goldman Sachs broke the law because investors "had access to the same information" as Paulson, Clinton said at a

conference in Washington focusing on the federal government's financial picture. "What is evident to me is that, whoever wins and loses in that deal, there is no larger purpose for the American economy – *nobody really benefits except the person that wins the gamble*." (..) He said "too much of this stuff has no economic purpose," while also saying he backs farmers' "fundamentally different" use of derivatives to protect themselves against poor harvests. "*Derivatives that serve a legitimate economic purpose ought to be treated differently than those that don't*, and I do not believe that there was any *legitimate economic purpose* advanced by the derivative at issue in the Goldman case," Clinton said. (my italics)
http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-04-29/ex-president-clinton-skeptical-goldman-violated-law-update1-.html

The term *legitimate economic purpose* does not have a clear unambiguous representation and does not correspond to a notion proper. It is however used by the speaker to distinguish the action of Goldman from other actions which may be thought of as having legitimate economic purposes and could be treated as infringements of the law, while in the Goldman Sachs case the beneficiary is thought to be only one person. In the given context, the lack of a more obviously delimited dissociated notion of LEGITIMATE ECONOMIC PURPOSE prevents Clinton from giving his assertion a heavy weight. This is a good example of the lesser (argumentative) impact of dissociated terms which are not provided with a sound definition and clearly delineated notional content. This could be one of the reasons for which Clinton is using the formula *I do not believe that there was any legitimate economic purpose…*

3.2.4. Remarks on short life expectancy dissociated terms
Such a dissociated term cannot be referred to or revived in the absence of the contextual data of its creation, i.e. it has not any potential of outliving the particular discourse activity under which it was proposed to a given audience. Another characteristic is the fact that the linguistic expression assigned to such a notional content does not have lexicalization features, i.e. the lexical items which make it up occur as a free combination. If at any time this dissociated representation is recalled or re-used, then another linguistic expression may be used and the phrase initially used in the dissociation is not necessarily maintained. Reviving such a notional content is possible only in the following situations and for:
a) the same speaker rebuilding an argumentative situation on the basis of her

past experience and previous use of the dissociated term (i.e. the dissociated term has outlived the initial discursive situation as a 'new notion' only for the speaker who has a memory of that particular dissociation); however, in a new setting the dissociation may have a different turnover, and the dissociated term can be used differently;
b) the speaker's opponent or a member of the audience re-telling (narrating the argumentative situation – a reported dissociation); in this case, the functions of dissociation and of argumentation are not the same as in the initial situation;
c) the speaker's opponent or a member of the audience re-creating the same argumentative context by rhetorically mimicking for his own purpose the initial argumentative discourse (i.e. the speech situation is re-created in another environment, with this other speaker re-using a past passive experience and re-making it into his own as a current active argumentative action).

This type of dissociation can be more easily identified by means of grammatical and discursive devices, some of the 'tool-words' of a language. Such indicators could be: negation (X is not x …), use of adversative or concessive *but*, and of other concessive adverbials (*yet, however*), the adjectives *true* and *real* and their derivatives, prefixes such as *non-*, *pseudo-*.

3.3. A third possibility, placed somewhere among the two, is that dissociation gives birth to a 'new notion' endowed with medium life expectancy, i.e. the potential of being revived occasionally by the same speaker or by various speakers and thus outliving the particular discourse activity under which it was initially proposed to an audience. A prototypical case is that of the dissociated term *truly needy* or *true need* used by Reagan in some of his discourses trying to justify austerity measures (example largely discussed in Zarefsky et al. 1984; see also Rosner 1982). In a speech given in 1981, President Reagan said:
(10) "We will continue to fulfill the obligations that spring from our national conscience, […] *those who through no fault of their own* must depend on the rest of us, the poverty-stricken, the disabled, the elderly, all those with *true need* can rest assured that the social safety net of programs they depend on are exempt from any cuts". (quoted by Rosner 1982, p. 381; Rosner's italics; excerpted from *New York Times*, March 17th, 1981)

Some of the features of this type of dissociation are the following: a) it cannot be included in the dictionary; b) it obviously serves a rhetorical purpose – not a

dialectical one; c) it addresses large audiences made up of various subgroups; d) it can be easily propagated in space and time through media; e) consequently, it dwells in the public memory and can be easily used in new circumstances with the same initial potential, eventfully with changes of meaning, yet carrying part or all of the initial rhetorical and dialectical potential, especially when used by the same speaker and addressing the same audience. Two structural elements in the example above contribute to specifying the meaning of the expression *truly needy*:
(a) *those who through no fault of their own must depend on us*;
(b) *the poverty-stricken, the disabled, the elderly*.

The phrase (a) is likely to be kept as such in the collective memory, although it is relatively ambiguous: no one has a precise representation of what a *fault of one's own* is. To this vague notional content add the meanings corresponding to the elements in the enumeration (b), but it is unclear – since the sentence is syntactically ambiguous – whether the elements of this enumeration are specifications of the phrase (a) and whether the category covered by (a) extends only to these three instances.

Since such expressions appear to display features of both the category of 'new notions' referred to under 3.1. and that of 'dissociated terms' referred to under 3.2. above, I find it adequate for the moment to name these 'value-laden notions' (I am borrowing this phrase from Rosner 1982, p. 355). In dealing with the phrase *truly needy*, Rosner points to the fact that it can be assigned several definitions: "The variety of definitions of the « truly needy » will be shown to reflect far more the different political and social interests of charity workers, hospital and dispensary trustees, and public spokesmen, than any basic philosophically consistent moral position." (1982, p. 356) In this case we are in front of a prototypical example of 'medium life expectancy' dissociated term. The more so as part of the notional content corresponding to the dissociated term is maintained throughout decades, according to Rosner: "there is a similarity of meaning and analysis in arguments over definitions of the « truly needy » over the proper eligibility criteria for a variety of health programs like Medicaid and Medicare, and for the scope of other social service programs such as food stamps and welfare." (1982, p. 381)

It is nevertheless important to point out that such dissociated terms are not introduced in dictionaries; their life mainly relies on the propagation strength of

the various media and of literature – sometimes also of the hearsay practice, mainly for communities who have less access to school(ing), culture, information. Another factor contributing to the 'medium life expectancy' status of such expressions is the notoriety of the speaker introducing the dissociation and the dissociated term.

4. Final Remarks

Assessing the life expectancy of a dissociated term may indicate whether it can give birth to a paradigm or reference system or it will only live throughout the discussion which generated it or allowed for its existence. An interesting point to be further studied is the way in which the linguistic expressions assigned to dissociated terms are infused with emotional meaning, which is their predictable semantic behavior in point of audience interpretation and relationship with other expressions in the vocabulary of the language.

NOTES

[i] This study is funded by the Romanian Ministry of Education, through the National Research Council under Project ID 1209/2007 (Ideas).

[ii] Throughout the text of this article italics stand for a linguistic expression encountered in discourse, such as *true humour*, while terms in capitals, such as HUMOUR, point to a notion, a conceptual content eventfully corresponding to a linguistic expression in a given language.

[iii] Letters between brackets point to specific cases of dissociation (examples A to H) in which two new notions may be created. The letters point to specific examples borrowed from the literature on dissociation or identified as dissociations in various instances of discourse by the author of the present article.

[iv] The definition I propose is the following: A double dissociation occurs when two new notions are created, both having argumentative potential in contrasting discursive situations; in the case of a double dissociation, the two new notions are expected to be assigned linguistic denominators different from the expression used to refer to the initial notion.

[v] The letters between brackets are mine (A.G.) to indicate, as mentioned above, the two dissociated terms on the basis of two dissociations.

[vi] In this endnote I provide definitions of the concept of SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT which I find most useful in the context of the present article: 1. First (historical) definition of *sustainable development*: "Development which meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future

generations to meet their own needs" (1986, UNESCO Commission, *Our Common Future*); 2. "a concept that has emerged in recent years, based on the premise that development must meet the needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs" (Glossary published on the website of the Institute for Sustainable Development); 3. "A development path along which the maximisation of human well-being for today's generations does not lead to declines in future well-being" (definition taken from the glossary published on the site of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), *Sustainable Development's Glossary*).

[vii] For a detailed and clear presentation of the concept of SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, see, among others, Baker, Susan (2006). *Sustainable Development*. Oxon: Routledge.

[viii] The various strategies of definition used in the Brundtland Report are in themselves a very interesting research direction in terms of argumentation study.

[ix] See Baker 2006: 27 ff. for *sustainable development* as a political concept.

[x] "(…) the indictments allege, among other things, the fraudulent misuse over a 10-year period of $10 million in federal Pell grants that were earmarked for financially needy post-secondary students. The defendants are accused of transmitting the funds through bogus schools of independent study in which no real study took place, in which students did not meet regularly with their mentors as required, and where very few degrees were awarded, even to students who had been registered in the programs for years." (article introduction, http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2001/1/31/174956.shtml)

[xi] Marquardt, Michael J. (2004). *Optimizing the power of action learning: solving problems and building leaders in real time*. Mountain View: Nicholas Brealey Publishing.

[xii] The scientific data and information were provided by Mirela Voiculescu, Assistant Professor and researcher in the field of Atmospheric Physics at Dunărea de Jos University of Galaţi, Romania.

[xiii] The GC towards warming is said to be natural because there are areas where the temperature is either constant or decreases; the last ten years have witnessed a stabilization of the global temperature. There are measurements and data evidential of two major increases in global temperature: the first one in 1910-1950, followed by significant decreases in 1950-1970/5; the next increase since 1975 – up to now has a similar rate. Major reasons for claiming that global warming is a global natural change are the following: α) The first increase cannot be explained by anthropogenic factors since pollution and industry did not have

so high rates at the time. β) There is no clear relation or connection between the second increase and the greenhouse gases increase. γ) The main aspect is that no one can identify a unidirectional relationship – either can influence the other.

[xiv] *The Spirit of Laws*, by Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu, translated by Thomas Nugent, revised by J. V. Prichard, based on a public domain edition published in 1914 by G. Bell & Sons, Ltd., London, rendered into HTML and text by Jon Roland of the Constitution Society.

[xv] See also article *Vertu*, Dictionnaire électronique Montesquieu: http://dictionnaire-montesquieu.ens-lyon.fr/

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Do politicians argue with their bodies? Argumentation deals with attitudes and opinions proposed through claim and ground. It thus appears impossible for a person's nonverbal communication to make arguments. Neither body nor voice – it seems – can create the verbal two-part structure of an argument. However, if such nonverbal communication can work as a stimulus evoking a receiver's cognitively generated argument, then also non-verbal communication may function as rhetorical argumentation.

In this article we explore the nonverbal argumentative communication of Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama in the 2008 televised primary debates for the Democratic Party. Our aim is neither to describe the communication styles of the two contenders, nor to make generalizations about the nonverbal communication

they employ in the debates. Instead we primarily use the analysed instances to exemplify that nonverbal communication can have argumentative functions, and to illustrate how such communication works. More specifically, we examine how nonverbal communication performs argumentative functions in acclaiming and defending the debater's own ethos and in attacking the opponent's ethos.

1. Our Theoretical and Methodological Starting Points

In our view, argumentation can occur in a host of different forms of expression, including speech, pictures and nonverbal behaviour. With Wayne Brockreide, we believe that arguments are found "not in statements, but in people" (Brockriede 1992). Further, we subscribe to a contextual and cognitive view of argumentation (Hample 1980, 1992, Kjeldsen 2007), where the message – for instance the nonverbal behaviour – performs as "a stimulus for the receiver's (cognitively generated) argument" (Hample 1992, p. 93; cf. Gronbeck 1995). We consider argumentation as communicative action, which is performed, evoked, and must be understood, in a rhetorical context of opposition (Kjeldsen 2007, 2011).

Of course, there is no denying that the semiotic mode of verbal communication allows for more precise and elaborate forms of argumentation than pictures or nonverbal communication. However, we will try to show that this does not prevent nonverbal communication from performing certain types of argumentative acts.

Nonverbal communication concerns facial expressions, hand gestures, movements, postures and the use of voice. When rhetorically performed in public speaking we refer to these nonverbal means as *actio*. Actio differs from nonverbal communication in general in that actio is performed in a rhetorical situation with the intention to be persuasive.

In order to capture the argumentative workings and functions of the nonverbal communication, we apply a rhetorical, interpretative analysis of four examples from the debates in the 2008 democratic primaries. We have chosen to focus on the interactions between Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama, because they generally exhibit two dissimilar debating styles, and because their rhetorical exchanges provided a rich source of illustrative material for the exemplification of nonverbal argumentation.

Our interpretation and analysis of the empirical data is grounded in a rhetorical

and hermeneutic view (cf. Richards 1956, Foss 1991, Palmer 1977, Ödman, 2005). The interpretive process takes place not only between the part and the whole, but also between object and context and between preconception and understanding of the phenomenon. In this way the interpretations are confirmed by congruence within the material and through comparison with other relevant research.

In order to interpret actio it is important to gain an understanding of the context within which it is performed because the recipients in a rhetorical situation normally interpret a speaker's actio in accordance with the constraints within the situation. Constraints are one of three aspects which Lloyd F. Bitzer used in the 1960s to define a rhetorical situation. Bitzer's constraints, which are somewhat similar to Bourdieu's concept of *doxa*, refer among other things to the preconceptions and expectations that are present in any given situation (Bitzer 1968, Bourdieu 1990). For instance, one can assume that the preconceptions and expectations regarding actio during a private conversation are different to those in a public debate among politicians. Hence, what is considered credible and valuable actio can differ in various rhetorical situations. For instance, the expressive actio of the orators on the rostrum in ancient Greece and Rome would not be equally persuasive in the television debates of today. In this way, actio is a historically, socially, and culturally situated activity.

Our perspective differs from nonverbal communication research where it is not uncommon to carry out quantitative studies, not least within voice research (Scherer 2010, Martin 2010). We also depart from the kind of contemporary rhetorical research about actio which has as its main aim to find correlations between certain expressions performed by a speaker and the effects this creates among the audience (Mehrabian 1972, Burgoon *et al.* 1990, to some extent also Jørgensen *et al*. 1994, 1998).

Our study differs in two ways from such studies, and other common nonverbal types of research (e.g. Kendon 2004, Streeck 1993). Firstly, using a multimodal approach we examine how different human modalities – such as gestures, facial expression, and nuances in voice – interact and work simultaneously. Secondly, we are not only interested in *what* a speaker does (for instance nodding her head), but also – and in particular – *how* she is doing it (nodding eagerly or hesitantly).

The importance of the first approach, the multimodal approach, is confirmed in

previous research on actio, which found that the recipients of a message in a rhetorical situation create their perception of the speaker through a holistic perspective. In other words: An audience evaluates an orator or speaker based on how they perceive the different modalities of actio interact simultaneously (Gelang 2008, about multimodality see also; Mondada and Lindström 2009). For instance, when an audience was asked to explain why they felt the speaker was committed, they usually commented on several different modalities such as eye contact, gestures, postures, voice management, and how these interacted. For example, feeble or a lack of gestures could be offset by a pleasant voice, and poor eye contact could be compensated for by vibrant and energetic gestures when the recipients described a speaker's committed actio (Gelang 2008).

In the same way, we believe that knowledge about rhetoric and argumentation in television debates cannot be acquired by looking at the different modalities of nonverbal communication separately, examining them one by one. The communicative – and argumentative – action is created in the way these modalities interact and function together. This even includes the words accompanying the bodily actions. So, even though our main focus in this article is the multimodality of nonverbal communication, our interpretations are also based on the words that follow.

The second approach, examining *how* a gesture is performed, we refer to as studying *actio qualities*. The actio qualities are the aspects of actio that create the nuances, and make actio appear with variation (Gelang 2008). The *way* a gesture is performed is at least as important for its rhetorical impact and argumentative dimensions as the gesture chosen. What we call actio qualities is in many ways similar to the concepts *paralinguistics* and *paracommunication*. Paralinguistics (Argyle 1988) describes different qualities in relation to the voice, for example variations of tone, while paracommunication describes qualities in relation to bodily communication, for example how energetically a gesture is carried out (Scheflen 1973, Birdwhistell 1970). Similar aspects are also noted within artistic research, for instance in relation to a dancer's movements or an actor's on-stage actions (Laban 1974, Sjöström 2007).

Although these qualities are often mentioned in research on nonverbal communication they are seldom the main topic. Some studies from the early 1970s have given attention to these qualitative aspects of actio, especially regarding the voice. Mehrabian (1972), for instance, showed that a credible

and/or convincing speaker conveys a sense of power, energy, activity, and vitality. More recent research has employed concepts such as openness, firmness, precision, relaxation, and energy to describe a successful speaker (Jørgensen *et al*. 1994, Babad *et al.* 2004).

In judging the *how* of actio, we distinguish between the three actio qualities energy, dynamism and tempo/rhythm (Gelang 2008). Some research points to energy as a particularly important factor in nonverbal communication (Mehrabaian 1972, McCroskey 2001, Babad *et al*. 2004). One study of 37 television debates concludes that the speakers who were considered to be winning the debates were characterized by modulated voice, energetic articulation, intense gaze, energetic posture, eager gesticulations and firm, directive gestures in comparison with their opponents and in relation to the rhetorical situation (Jørgensen *et al.* 1994, 1998).

Energy concerns flow, intensity and focus. Flow refers to the energy, constant or variable, that exists in the succession of expressions that the speaker produces in a public appearance. Intensity refers to the degree of energy in a particular modality or in the multimodal expression. Focus refers to the way in which energy is concentrated on the most meaningful modalities. The second actio quality is *dynamism*, which concerns variations. Dynamism is a quality that is related to the variations in actio. The dynamic variations usually occur with the help of other qualities such as energy, rhythm and/or the magnitude of the expressions. The third actio quality, *tempo and rhythm*, concerns flow, speed and timing. Tempo refers to the basic rate that pervades the entire performance, while rhythm refers to the variations of pace that can occur by means of changes in one or more modalities. Timing concerns the right actio at the right time.

Naturally the actio qualities occur most often in parallel, and it can be about energy and dynamism at the same time. So, in our analysis we have focused on actio as a multimodal activity and the actio qualities as defined above. We believe that it is the degree, strength, and intensity of the actio qualities, working simultaneously and jointly with the number and modes used, that are of importance in the rhetorical situation.

2. Nonverbal Communication as Symptomatic Argumentation

A wide range of studies suggest that nonverbal communication affects the audience in their liking or disliking of different debaters or leaders (Sullivan &

Masters 1988, Atkinson 1988, Bucy 2000, 2003, Bucy & Bradley 2004, Jørgensen *et al.* 1998). One general finding in such research is that non-speaking debaters expressing nonverbal disbelief or disagreement when their opponent is talking, are perceived as deceptive, less likable and less credible, when compared to debaters not exhibiting such background behaviour (Seiter 2001, Seiter *et al.* 2009, Seiter *et al.* 2006). We suggest that such evaluation of speakers and debaters contains argumentative dimensions.

In order for any discourse to be argumentative it must address some sort of difference of opinion (cf. van Eemeren, Grootendorst & Snoeck Henkemans 2002, p. 3 ff., van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992). The television debate is a genre that can be described as an institutionalized difference of opinion. It is a constitutive trait in presidential debates – as well as other kinds of debates – that the candidates will argue for their own view and against the view of the opponent, while simultaneously trying to weaken the opponent's ethos and strengthening their own.

As functional theory proposes, political debaters may *acclaim* (praise, boast of, tout) their character and policy. They may attack (criticize, condemn) their opponent's character or policy, and they may *defend* those accusations (Benoit & Wells 1996, Benoit, Pier & Blaney 1997, Benoit & Harthcock 1999, Benoit & Brazeal 2002).

The audience will interpret both the verbal and the nonverbal discourse of the candidates according to these generic conventions. Thus, nonverbal communication can be taken as signs for spoken or unspoken premises and propositions about the candidates' or the opponents' character or policy. This can be executed through singular acts (such as shaking the head) *and* through the amount of energy put into their nonverbal communication (such as shaking vigorously). When a candidate exhibits an active, energetic actio it may be taken as an argumentative act of *acclaiming*, *attacking* or *defending*. In all three instances, nonverbal communication is used as ground for propositions claiming the praiseworthy ethos of the candidate, the blameworthy ethos of the opponent, or the injustice of the attacks directed at the candidate. We refer to such active manifestations as *enacted actio*, because the candidate appears to enact an inner mental state, an emotion or opinion.

Enacted actio can function as a symptomatic argument scheme (van Eemeren,

Grootendorst & Snoeck Henkemans 2002, p. 96ff., Garssen 2001, p. 91ff). In an argument scheme based on a symptomatic relation "a standpoint is defended by citing in the argument a certain sign, symptom or distinguishing mark of what is claimed in the standpoint. On the grounds of this concomitance, the speaker claims the standpoint should be accepted" (van Eemeren, Grootendorst & Snoeck Henkemans 2002, p. 97). The general symptomatic argument scheme may be expressed like this:

Y is true of X,
because Z is true of X,
and Z is symptomatic of Y.

Nonverbal communication can function as such symptomatic arguments. For instance:

Politician A is an involved and passionate person,
because He exhibits energetic nonverbal communication,
and Energetic nonverbal communication is a sign of an involved and passionate person.

Performing the nonverbal argument that you are involved and passionate is important for establishing the character (arete) and goodwill (eunoia) of the speaker. By the same token, fluent speech may also function as an implied argument about the competence (phronesis) of the speaker. Needless to say, such assessments are always culture specific.

If an orator or a debater uses a nonverbal style of communication that is more expressive and unrestrained compared to what people normally experience in speeches or television debates, he risks appearing exaggerated and out of control (cf. Jørgensen *et al.* 1994, Streeck 2008). The now famous "Dean Scream" is an example of this: During the US 2004 primaries, Howard Dean (D) spoke at a rally in Iowa, finishing a section of the speech with a screaming "Yeah!!", supported by huge swing of his arm. This outburst caused the speech – and hence Howard Dean – to be framed as loud, peculiar, and un-presidential. Senator Dean was widely ridiculed, and the "Yeah!" was widely distributed on the web (cf. Warnick 2007: 11)**[i]**. Such behaviour may be read by the audience as an argument suggesting that a candidate is not fit to be president. It is likely that fear of this kind of gaffe leads to a restrained actio.

Moderate physical movement can in some circumstances be taken as a premise for the claim that a person is suitable as president; because it signals that the speaker is in control, where other people would be steered by their emotions. We refer to this kind of moderate movement, exhibiting a limited degree of expressiveness, as *restrained actio*. Like the enacted actio, restrained actio may work argumentatively on the basis of a symptomatic argument scheme.
Because a debater in a presidential debate rhetorically must appear to be in control, as well as both involved and passionate, she must display both enacted and restrained actio, and try to balance these.

3. Actio Analyses of the Debates
We will now present a rhetorical actio analysis of four film clips from three different debates. The clips show Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton in their contest for the 2008 American Democratic presidential nomination. All of the film clips can be found on www.youtube.com, references to the links can be found in our endnotes.

We have performed an interpretative, multimodal close reading (cf. Leff 1980) of the clips, directed by our understanding of nonverbal multimodality, the actio qualities, and the television debate as a rhetorical situation. More specifically we have studied how the nonverbal communication of the participants may evoke argument schemes in acclaiming and defending a debaters' own ethos and in attacking the opponents' ethos.
Let us first give an example of how the debaters *acclaim* their ethos through nonverbal communication. In a sequence from a debate in Ohio on 26 February 2008**[ii]**, one can see how Hillary Clinton is acclaiming her ethos through her nonverbal communication. Clinton is answering a question about her view on public health care. She comments briefly on this and goes on to explain what she would like to do if she is elected president.

Clinton has an open face with raised eyebrows and a moderate smile, leaning slightly forward while constantly keeping eye contact with the audience. Her use of voice is steady, clear and determined. She is speaking and making gestures with an energy that sets a rapid tempo to her performance and supports her ethos. The qualities in actio, energy and tempo, together with a multimodal activity, face, posture, gesture and voice in simultaneous use, create a dynamic actio that indicates resoluteness and determination. Clinton hereby performs an enacted actio that works as a symptomatic sign – a premise – supporting the claim

that she is a committed and passionate person.

Compared to Clinton's energetic, enacted actio, Obama's nonverbal communication is often more restrained. He does not express as much energy and emotion in his gestures and facial expression, thus safeguarding him against "Howard Dean-like Yeah-gaffes". At the same time, such calm and self-controlled actio risks presenting the candidate as reserved and aloof.
However, Obama often exhibits energy and trustworthiness through his deep, pleasant, and commanding voice. His speech has variation in melody and an almost perfect sense of tempo, with excellent timing expressed by pauses and well-placed emphasis.

In a debate in Texas on 21 February 2008**[iii]**, Obama is explaining how he will handle the economy. He performs less facial expression, more restrained gestures, and less body movement than that which can be seen in the Clinton example above. Obama expresses most of his nonverbal energy through the dynamic and varied use of his voice and a few distinct gestures performed with his left hand.

Compared to Clinton, Obama here exhibits less bodily energy and thus appears a little less committed and passionate. Nevertheless, this kind of restrained impression management may be taken as a symptomatic sign of a person in control, and consequently of a person fit to be president. This is not to say that restrained or enacted actio will predict a person's ability to become a president; there are many skills that are necessary to become a political leader of a country, with debating being just one of them.
A debater can also use nonverbal communication both to *attack* the opponent's ethos and *defend* her own, as the following examples will illustrate. In debates, the nonverbal defending and attacking will often be performed simultaneously. We can see this in a debate in South Carolina on 21 January 2008**[iv]**. In this sequence of the debate Hillary Clinton is defending her claim that Obama has not been clear about his view on the war in Iraq, while at the same time attacking Obama's ethos.

Compared to the previous Clinton example, the tempo of her movements and speaking here is much slower, and she takes longer and more frequent pauses. In the first example, her eagerness indicated commitment and passion. In this example, she still exhibits energy, through firm, directive gestures and focused

eye contact, but the more restrained, focused and insisting actio is a nonverbal signal telling the audience that Clinton takes the criticism very seriously. Here, Clinton's actio both helps communicate her argument in a clear way, and functions as a symptomatic premise for the claim that she is a sincere and conscientious candidate who is taking the issue very seriously.

During Clinton's presentation, Obama is seen lifting his finger, signalling that he would like to comment on Clinton's allegations that he "agreed with President Bush", thereby implying that she is wrong. By means of this hand gesture, Obama is attacking Clinton's ethos, signalling that she is proposing some issue that he must be allowed to address.

In the same debate in South Carolina on 21 January**[v]**, Obama criticizes Clinton and her husband, stating that they incorrectly claim that Obama praises the Republicans, while they are actually the ones praising Reagan and the GOP.
During his attack, Clinton stands motionless, looking at Obama with an expressionless face, avoiding any nonverbal admission. However, when Obama involves her husband and accuses them of playing "political games", she exclaims, "Now wait a minute, wow, wait a minute!" She lifts her hand, with the palm facing Obama as if to stop his unreasonable words. When he continues nonetheless, she takes a step towards him invading his 'territory' in order to better contain his attack. Clinton's nonverbal reaction, we suggest, presents an implicit argument about Obama's ethos, which can be rendered like this:

Obama's behaviour is unreasonable,
because I react strongly to his behaviour,
and when behaviour is unreasonable, people react strongly.

This argument is created both verbally and nonverbally. The nonverbal enacting of the argument is done through a specific gesture (the stopping palm) and a specific movement (stepping forward) – the *what* of nonverbal communication. But it is also, perhaps particularly, enacted through the use of actio qualities – the *how* of nonverbal communication. The change of tempo in her performance creates a suddenness in the actio, the use of intense energy and focused gaze together with a varied consequently dynamic and forceful response creates Clinton's nonverbal argument, and makes it believable.

Because the nonverbal acts must be understood in the rhetorical situation in

which they are performed, there are no external, scientific units of measurement for determining the energy, dynamism and tempo that establishes the premise "I react strongly to his behaviour". It is also not possible to determine singular gestures or movements as premises or arguments in themselves. The rhetorical action of the stopping palm, for instance, does not create an argument in itself. This gesture is ascribed argumentative meaning through its joint interaction with the words "wow, wait a minute", the verbal assurance that she has not praised Ronald Reagan, and all the other accompanying nonverbal action.

To summarise, in order to fully understand the argumentative dimensions of political television debates, it is not enough to analyse transcriptions of the verbal communication. We also have to examine the multimodality of nonverbal communication, and we should not only look at *what* debaters do nonverbally, but in particular at *how* they do it with the help of actio qualities.
When doing so in the examples we have analysed here, two main nonverbal rhetorical argumentative strategies emerge: enacted actio and restrained actio. A restrained actio refers to active manifestations, while an enacted actio refers to moderate movement, exhibiting a limited degree of expressiveness. These two strategies of basic nonverbal communication may take many forms, of course, but they can all be interpreted as premises in variations of a symptomatic argumentation scheme, signalling a political debater's ethos. As described above, such nonverbal communication can be used by debaters to acclaim and to defend their own ethos and/or to attack the ethos of the opponent.

In accordance with our multimodal and interpretative approach we have examined arguments that are evoked by rhetorical situation, words and nonverbal communication in joint collaboration. Our examples illustrate how nonverbal communication can evoke ethos argumentation that is relatively independent of the words spoken. The way a presidential debater conducts himself or herself through enacted or restrained actio, will affect the audience perception of the debater's general character, and thus offer an argument for or against the person's ability to be president. Of course, the more the bodily actions and the words uttered are in accordance and harmony with each other, the more clearly an argument will appear.
Our examples, perhaps especially the last one, also illustrate how nonverbal communication may support and co-create arguments concerning specific contested issues in the debate. In this case arguments that are also (partly)

verbally expressed.

We have examined some argumentative dimensions of nonverbal communication in a specific genre and culture: the televised presidential primary debates in the US. We have argued that because of the immanent context of opposition in this rhetorical situation, nonverbal communication can have argumentative dimensions and communicate arguments both about ethos and about specific issues of controversy. In other similar contexts of opposition, we may expect to find similar possibilities of nonverbal argumentation.

NOTES

[i] Cf. Wikipedias article on Howard Dean http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Howard_Dean

[ii] See: "Huge mistake" 5.09-5.45: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7JAJ-f4mtMc

[iii] See: "Silly Season" 1.55-2.14: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2vO1QjTRaEU

[iv] See: "Tension Flare" 2.34-3.40 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MD9F1t9GQzA

[v] See: "Tension Flare" 5.25-5.38 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MD9F1t9GQzA

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ISSA Proceedings 2010 – Hidden Premises, Hidden Treasures?



1. Introduction

Suppose one is confronted with the following argument:
(1) Argumentation theory is crucial to world peace. John Doe says so in his book Argumentation and the Rise and Fall of Empires.

How would one go about criticizing this argument? The most obvious reaction seems to be *'who is John Doe?'* Or maybe: *'John Doe is just saying so because he wants his research funded.'* Another criticism could be '*Frans van Eemeren says exactly the opposite*'. Or '*John Doe also says that the moon is made of green cheese!*'.
If we take look at the original argument, it is not right away clear what this criticism is directed at. It does not challenge the premise – the antagonist is not wondering whether in his book John Doe indeed did say that argumentation theory is crucial to world peace. Yet it is an effective way to argue against the argument.

It is (almost) generally accepted among argumentation theorists that critical reactions like these are directed at the hidden premise of the argument: a premise that is unexpressed but nevertheless forms part of the argumentation put forward. Moreover, most scholars agree that this premise is different from what Van Eemeren and Grootendorst have named the *´logical minimum´* a conditional sentence of which the antecedent contains the premise (or premises, in the case of coordinative argumentation) and the consequent the claim under discussion.

In this paper I will argue that the logical minimum is an adequate representation of the unexpressed premise. Not only are the grounds to reject it questionable, there are advantages to incorporating the logical minimum in the argumentation structure. A distinction between the hidden premise and its ground makes the consequences of criticizing the hidden premise less severe. Apart from that, it makes it possible to list critical questions connected to an argumentation scheme in a more systematic way. Of course including the logical minimum brings about difficulties, and I will discuss two. First of all, it will be very difficult to formulate

the ‘underlying principles’ in a systematic way. Secondly, the analyst may run the risk of making all reasoning deductively valid – even clearly invalid reasoning. But there is a bonus to this approach as well: expressing an unexpressed premise in the way I propose may help in bridging the gap between argumentation theory and logic.

2. Rejection of the logical minimum

The most straightforward way to make the hidden premise explicit is to formulate a conditional with the antecedent containing the premise and the consequent containing the conclusion. To use an example by Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992, p. 64):

(2) Angie is nosy, since she is a real woman.

The hidden premise in this example can be formulated as *‘If Angie is a real woman, then Angie is nosy.’* Van Eemeren and Grootendorst have named this premise the logical minimum.

Although everyone would acknowledge that this conditional represents the assumption that the claim under discussion follows from the premise put forward in support of this claim, the logical minimum is not seen as an adequate representation of the unexpressed premise. Hitchcock for instance claims that the unexpressed premise (or – to use his terminology – the ‘argument’s assumption’) is a specific universal generalisation of the if-then sentence containing the premise in the antecedent and the conclusion in the consequent (1985, p. 89).Van Eemeren and Grootendorst also reject the logical minimum and want it to be replaced by the pragmatic optimum ‘Real women are nosy’, for the following reason:

‘Pragmatically, this [adding the logical minimum–jmg] is not enough. From the very fact that he advances this particular argumentation for his standpoint it is already clear that the speaker assumes that this conclusion follows from this premise. The logical minimum contributes nothing new, and is, therefore, superfluous. Identifying this logical minimum as the unexpressed premise means that a violation of the third rule of communication [be efficient – jmg] is unnecessarily ascribed to the speaker’ (Van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1992, p. 64).

In my opinion, there is no reason not to equate the unexpressed premise with the logical minimum. To be sure, the logical minimum is ‘implied’ by explicitly putting

forward the direct premise and drawing the conclusion from it: in order to make the reasoning logically valid the logical minimum has to be added. That is why the speaker can leave the unexpressed premise (or the direct premise, or the standpoint) implicit (perhaps in order to avoid a violation of the third rule of communication). It is peculiar to claim that the analyst attributes such a violation to the speaker when making the unexpressed premise explicit.

More importantly however, Van Eemeren and Grootendorst concede that 'there are contexts where the analyst is forced to consider the logical minimum to be the pragmatic optimum' (Van Eemeren en Grootendorst 1992, p. 66). This can for instance be the case when a point of view is supported by an elaborate coordinatively compound argumentation. If the pragma-dialectical analysis is correct, then the speaker in such contexts would necessarily be guilty of a violation of the Cooperative Principle, which would be odd, given that the argumentation in such cases can be perfectly acceptable.

Finally, the analysis Van Eemeren and Grootendorst provide is problematic when the speaker does not leave the connecting premise implicit, but the standpoint, as in (3):
(3) If it is¨pouring – as it is now –, there is no reason to water the plants.

If we reason along the same lines, completing the reasoning by adding the standpoint 'therefore, there is no reason to water the plants' would lead to a violation of the third rule of communication. After all, the standpoint left unexpressed would be implied by putting forward the direct premise in combination with the connecting premise. It is hard to see how the logical minimum could be replaced by a pragmatic optimum in such a case.

The reasons to reject the logical minimum as an adequate representation of the unexpressed premise are not only questionable, there is also a disadvantage to replacing the logical minimum by the pragmatic optimum. Let us take another look at the argumentation put forward in (1). The argumentation structure – including the pragmatic optimum – can be represented as follows (Scheme 1):



Scheme 1

Now let us take a look at the criticism put forward in response to the argumentation:
(4a) Who is John Doe?
(4b) John Doe is just saying so because he wants his research funded.
(4c) Frans van Eemeren says exactly the opposite.
(4d) John Doe also says that the moon is made of green cheese!

It is clear what (4a) and (4d) are aimed at: both amount to questioning the authority of John Doe and can therefore be seen as criticizing the pragmatic optimum. However, it is not clear what part of the argumentation structure is criticized by (4b) and (4c). In those two statements, the authority of John Doe is not challenged, nor is it disputed that John Doe claimed that argumentation is crucial to world peace. Yet both (4b) and (4c) are relevant responses to the argumentation put forward.

3. Advantages to including the logical minimum in the argumentation structure
The disadvantage to replacing the logical minimum by the pragmatic optimum mentioned above, can be avoided if the logical minimum is included in the reconstruction of the argumentation structure. This does not mean that the pragmatic optimum plays no role in the argumentation. I would suggest that it can be seen as the ground for maintaining the logical minimum, resulting in the following argumentation structure (Scheme 2):



Scheme 2

In this structure (Scheme 2), it is clear where (4b) and (4c) are aimed at. They both challenge the connection between John Doe being an authority and accepting what John Doe says as true. In a sense, they both question whether it is true that 'If John Doe is an authority, then what he says about argumentation theory being crucial to world peace is true'. (4b) questions whether we should accept John Doe's opinions because he has vested interests, (4c) points at another authority who has a different opinion on the matter.

I would claim that it is important to make a distinction between the logical minimum and the grounds one has for maintaining this logical minimum. In this analysis, the logical minimum is a premise like all others. This means that the evaluation of such premises can proceed along the line in which other premises are evaluated: if a logical minimum is challenged, the speaker will have to support it, or retract it. The ground put forward in support of the logical minimum can subsequently be criticized by showing that the ground is untrue, or by showing that the ground does not justify the conclusion that the logical minimum is true.

This last way of criticizing is of special interest, since it brings an advantage: one could accept the ground and still reject the logical minimum. In such cases, one can accept the general rule, but deny that – or question whether – this general rule is applicable in a specific case. If we take the following dialogue:
(5) Tony: Max can fly.
Bob: How do you know?
Tony: Bats can fly
Bob: Max can't fly, his wings are torn.

Analysed in the traditional way, the argumentation structure which is reflected in this dialogue would be (Scheme 3):



Scheme 3

The criticism put forward by Bob can be seen as directed only at the pragmatic optimum 'Bats can fly'. The direct premise is accepted, whereas the conclusion is

rejected. Therefore, the second premise must be rejected and ‘Bats can fly’ must be retracted.

When the pragmatic optimum is seen as the ground for the truth of the logical minimum, the consequences of Bob’s criticism are less serious. In this analysis, the argumentation has the following structure (Scheme 4):



Scheme 4

Bob accepts that Max is a bat. He does not want to commit himself to the logical minimum ‘If Max is a bat, he can fly’. The torn wings confirm that the antecedent of this conditional is true whereas the consequent is false, and therefore the conditional is false. In this analysis, it does not mean that he has to reject the general statement ‘bats can fly’. He can maintain this statement, whilst denying that from this general statement the particular statement ‘If Max is a bat, Max can fly’ can be deduced. The criticism is directed not at the general statement that forms the ground of the unexpressed premise, but at the connection between this general statement and the specific conditional statement that functions as a connecting premise.

One could even think of an example where both the pragmatic optimum and the connection between the pragmatic optimum and the logical minimum are

challenged, as in (6):
(6) Jill: Ted can fly.
Peter: How do you know?
Jill: Birds can fly.
Peter: Ted can't fly, his wings are torn. And besides, he is a penguin.

In (6), Peter challenges the connection between the pragmatic optimum and the logical minimum by pointing out that Ted's wings are torn and questions the truth of the pragmatic optimum by making clear there is a category of birds that cannot fly (Scheme 5).



Scheme 5

There is a second advantage – of a more practical nature – to including the logical minimum in the argumentation structure: it makes it possible to list critical questions to an argumentation scheme in a more systematic way.

Over the years, argumentation theorists have described a great amount of argumentation schemes. Walton, Reed and Macagno provide an user's compendium of schemes that comprises 60 different ones, with many having over five subtypes, resulting in about one hunderd varieties (2008, pp. 308-346). The amount of critical questions associated to these schemes differs considerably. An argument from waste can be criticized by two, whereas value-based practical reasoning can be criticized by seven critical questions. Moreover, the critical questions described in the literature (that has been very conveniently summarized by Walton, Reed and Magnano) are not all of the same nature. Let me try to explain what I mean by this by comparing two argumentation schemes that Walton, Reed and Macagno discuss: argument from expert opinion and argument from witness testimony.

An argument from expert opinion can be described as having the following structure (the wording of the premises and the conclusion is by Walton, Reed and

Macagno, the schematic representation I have altered so to make it easier to compare this argumentation scheme with the argument from authority discussed earlier)(Scheme 6):



Scheme 6

For this argumentation scheme, the following critical questions have been proposed (Walton, Reed and Macagno 2008, p. 310):
(7a) How credible is E as an expert source?
(7b) Is E an expert in the field?
(7c) What did E assert that implies A?
(7d) Is E personally reliable as a source?
(7e) Is A consistent with what other experts assert?
(7f) Is E's assertion based on evidence?

Of these questions, (7a) and (7b) seem to question the ground for the logical minimum; they question whether E is an expert indeed. (7c) seems not to criticize the argumentation scheme, but the direct premise: is it true that E asserts that A is true? (7d) and (7e) seem to criticize the connection between the ground and the logical minimum. From the outset, it is not quite clear what (7f) is aimed at – it seems to be an independent support of the claim that A is true.

If we compare this list of critical questions to the one provided for witness testimony, we find some striking differences. An argument from witness testimony can be schematically represented as follows (again, wording by Walton et al., adjusted schematic representation)(Scheme 7):



Scheme 7

The critical questions that accompany this argumentation scheme are:
(8a) Is what the witness said internally consistent?
(8b) Is what the witness said consistent with other known facts of the case?
(8c) Is what the witness said consistent with testimonies of other witnesses?
(8d) Is there some kind of bias that can be attributed to his account?
(8e) How plausible is the statement A asserted by the witness?

First of all, it is striking that none of these questions is directed at the ground in support of the logical minimum, although it seems reasonable enough to question whether someone really was a witness – really was in a position to see what happened. A second difference between this list and the list of critical questions related to the scheme of expert opinion is that there is no critical question that challenges the direct premise: it is not challenged that W indeed said that A. The majority of the questions is aimed at the connection between the ground and the logical minimum. (8a) to (8d) all presuppose that W is a witness, and question whether this means that what W says may plausibly be taken to be true. The final question seems (like (7f) in the case of expert opinion) directed at the claim under discussion.

These differences are all the more remarkable since both argumentation schemes seem to hinge on the same principle: in both cases a statement is taken to be true / plausible because someone (an expert or a witness) has said that it is true. In that sense, they can be seen as two of the same kind: having a similar logical minimum, but a different ground in support of it (Scheme 8).



Scheme 8

In sum, including the logical minimum provides a heuristic benefit as well: in listing the critical questions, one can check whether indeed all parts of the argumentation structure have been scrutinized. Moreover, if all elements of the argumentation structure are made explicit in such a way, the correspondence between different schemes becomes apparent.

4. Difficulties in adding the logical minimum to the argumentation structure
Although I hope I have been able to indicate some benefits to including the logical minimum in the reconstruction of the argumentation structure, I do realize that the proposed approach brings along difficulties as well. The first difficulty is closely related to the general argumentation structure just sketched. By including the logical minimum and thereby differentiating between the connecting premise and its ground, the question rises how this connection should be formulated. If the logical minimum is included, a second arrow is introduced connecting the logical minimum to its ground. Now what is it this arrow stands for? Should one modestly state that the arrow reads 'If X is an authority then if X says A, A is true', or is a more general principle – like 'What an authority says is true' – in place? It will be difficult (but challenging) to find a formulation that characterizes the argumentation used and is not too general (since in that case it will be too easy to attack it).

A second difficulty is that in reconstructing the argumentation structure in the way I proposed, the analyst runs the risk of turning invalid reasoning into valid reasoning. An example may clarify what I mean. Suppose the analyst is confronted with the following line of reasoning (taken from Van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1996, p. 94):
(9) son: 'Mr. Townsend called.'
father: 'Anything important?'
son: 'he said he would call again next year.'
father: 'then it is important. Important matters take their time.'

In reconstructing the reasoning put forward by the father, the unattentive analyst might discern the claim 'It is important', the premise 'Important matters take their time' and add the conditional sentence 'If important matters take their time, then this is important' so as to turn the reasoning into a modus ponendo ponens. Of course the analyst thereby overlooks the fact that the father commits the

fallacy of affirming the consequent. The general statement ‘Important matters take their time’ must not be seen as the direct premise, but as the ground for the logical minimum, as in the following schematic representation (Scheme 9):



Scheme 9

It is clear right away that this logical minimum is not the same as a conditional where the premise is expressed in the antecedent and the claim in the consequent, and hence the reasoning does not represent an instance of modus ponendo ponens.

This means that in reconstructing the argumentation structure according to this proposal, the analyst needs to be able to differentiate between statements that function as a direct premise and statements that form the ground for the logical minimum; an excercise that can be a tricky one.

5. Summary and conclusions

Despite the difficulties mentioned in the last section, I hope that the proposal not to discard the logical minimum but to include it in the reconstruction of the argumentation structure is an interesting one. I have tried to show that the reasons to replace the logical minimum by the pragmatic optimum are not convincing and that including the logical minimum does have advantages. Not only does it mitigate the consequences of an attack at the hidden premise, by allowing the opportunity of retaining the ground of the hidden premise whilst rejecting the logical minimum. There is also a heuristic benefit to the reconstruction proposed. Incorporating the logical minimum brings correspondences between different argumentation schemes to the surface, since these schemes can be regarded as having a similar logical minimum but different grounds for maintaining it. Moreover, by making the various elements of the argumentation structure explicit, in listing the critical questions one can make sure that indeed all those elements have been adequately scrutinized.

Finally, there is a bonus to acknowledging the role of the logical minimum, since it may help to clarify an issue that has been discussed exhaustively among logicians. Although generally argumentation theorists are not that keen on logical paradoxes, maybe this case will raise your interest, since it is argumentation theory that may provide a way out. The logical paradox I am referring to is the following (Cooper 1978, p. 183):
(10) If Brown wins the election, Smith will retire to private life.
If Smith dies before the election, Brown will win the election.
So: If Smith dies before the election, Smith will retire to private life.

(10') $p \supset r$
$r \supset s$
$\therefore p \supset s$

Scheme 10

The reasoning in (10) can symbolically be represented as follows (Scheme 10):

The argument form represented in (10') is deductively valid: if the premises are true, the conclusion is necessarily true as well. Yet the natural language instance in (10) clearly yields a conclusion that is untenable.

How can argumentation theory, and especially the notion of a logical minimum shed light on this logical paradox? As is mentioned above, the logical minimum is a conditional sentence where the antecedent contains the premise and the consequent the claim under discussion. This means that the symbolic representation of for example modus ponendo ponens reads as follows (Scheme 11):

$p \supset q$ p $\therefore q$	reads as	If [premise], then [claim] [premise] therefore:[claim]

Scheme 11

This interpretation of the symbolic representation of the conditional connective

puts a restraint on the propositions that can be filled in for p and q: it must be possible to assert those propositions independently. In Frege's words: both p and q must contain a Gedanke (1964: 2), something that can be judged to be true or false (1993: 84-85). After all, the same propositions form the premise and the claim put forward (Gerlofs 2009: 97).

If we take a look at the conditional sentences in (10) with this in mind, it becomes clear why this instance of an hypothetical syllogism is an incorrect one. Neither of the conditionals expressed in (10) could function as the logical minimum, since the antecedent of the conditionals does not contain a Gedanke in Frege's sense of the word. 'Smith dies before the election' is not a sentence that can be judged true or false, and hence cannot be put forward as a premise in support of a claim. The same goes for 'Brown wins the election'. The logical minimum therefore clarifies that (10) is not a real counterexample to the deductively valid argument form of hypothetical syllogism. A reason all the more to not to discard the logical minimum too hastily.

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ISSA Proceedings 2010 – Reason & Intuition: The Kisceral Mode Of Communication



There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio,
Than are dreamt of in your philosophy.
Shakespeare, *Hamlet* 166.

1. I have facts, you have axioms, she has intuitions

In 1994 when I first wrote about multi-modal argumentation I described four modes arguers employ when putting forward arguments, making points, defending positions, and so on. The first three were the logical, the emotional, and the visceral, this last involving physical and contextual communication. The fourth mode, and the one I viewed as most likely to cause trouble and discomfort was the kisceral mode. Let me quote myself.

The term 'kisceral' derives from the Japanese word 'ki' which signifies energy, life-force, connectedness. I introduce it as a generic, non-value-laden term to cover a wide group of communicative phenomenon. The kisceral is that mode of communication that relies on the intuitive, the imaginative, the religious, the spiritual, and the mystical. It is a wide category used frequently beyond the halls of academe.

I will not reiterate here my arguments for pursuing the study of kisceral arguments within Argumentation Theory, except to say that from a descriptivist point of view, we need to examine all forms of argumentation used by real arguers. (Vide Gilbert, 1997; Willard, 1989).

My purpose here is to describe a number of forms of kisceral argument some of which are very familiar and academically acceptable in order to examine the difficulties that arise when we try to find order in what some think to be chaos.

To begin with, the kisceral, especially in the form of intuition has a long and proud philosophical tradition. Notable appeals to intuition have occurred within philosophy as put forth by Descartes, Berkeley, Kant, Gödel and Kuhn to name but a few of many. Mathematics as well relies on intuition, and without it we would not be able to select a set of axioms. This tradition is deeply entrenched as it is regularly used in Philosophy, Mathematics, and a myriad of other disciplines. (Economics, after all, is entirely intuition.) Kisceral arguments are not only frequently used, but they are essential as well. Were it not for kisceral arguments we would always be facing infinite regress: first principles, axioms, loci, common knowledge all provide us a means for establishing other, more consequential and frangible truths (or, as I prefer, beliefs) that appeal back to and depend for their alethic status on intuitions that are not independently provable.

A long witness to the importance of intuition as an ultimate arbiter is Euclid's Fifth Axiom. The issue at stake was that this particular axiom was not deemed to be as obvious and intuitive as the other four. What is most crucial about this debate is not the results which, as we know were ultimately astounding, but, rather, *the fact of the debate itself.* The debate concerned, more than anything else, a sense of intuition, a *feeling* about what was right, what made sense, and what fit. As C. I. Lewis has said, "… we must, of course, appeal to intuition. A point of logic being in question, no other course is possible" (1932). So two important points emerge: first, an appeal to intuition is philosophically, mathematically, and scientifically acceptable, and, secondly, these intuitions are amenable to argument.

Like Euclid's Fifth, other undefended intuitions, i.e., kisceral arguments, go far back in philosophical history. *Tertium non datur*, The Law of the Excluded Middle [LEM], has been around since Aristotle, and remains unproven, i.e., it is a basal assumption that does not itself have independent backing. Indeed, there are those who would question its soundness and argue that it is not a worthy first principle. This group includes the philosophers C. I. Lewis, J. Lukasiewicz, L.E.W. Brouwer, and N. Belnap and A. Anderson, as well as a many other logicians and mathematicians. There have, in fact, been long and detailed debates about the LEM with attacks, defences and counter arguments. These arguments involve appeals to intuition that point for example, to consequences of the LEM and their absurdity. If we deny the authority of axiom A, the argument goes, then the result is consequence C, which is absurd, so, ergo, the LEM is true. Put formally, ~LEM

à C, but ~C, so LEM. Unfortunately, this proof is an instance of *reductio ad absurdum* which itself depends on the LEM for its acceptability. As Sosa states, "opposition to the reliability of intuition appears to involve a self-defeating appeal to intuition" (Sosa, 2006 643). In other words, it is circular reasoning in its most blatant form.

Consider also, the very idea of rejecting a consequence as absurd. The *OED* says that 'absurd' is derived from the Latin "ab" meaning "off" and "surdus" meaning "deaf." In other words, something sounds wrong, and is, "Out of harmony with reason or propriety; incongruous, unreasonable, illogical" (OED, 1971 11). Thus an absurdity is something that sounds wrong, or, using other senses, doesn't feel right, looks strange, or smells funny. But this just means that *identifying the absurd is exactly a kisceral activity.* It is our intuition that something is incongruous that allows us to apply the label. Unfortunately, individual intuitions vary widely across cultural, social, political, and other groups as well as between individuals. Even when conceptual frameworks are fairly well shared, intuitions can, as in the above logical and mathematical examples, disagree. (I say "unfortunately," but really, if we all agreed on everything it would be very boring, and there would be no such thing as philosophy.)

2. My Intuitions Are Sound, Yours Are Ill-Founded, Hers Are Mystical

We find ourselves in a dilemma. As philosophers and scientists we must rely on kisceral arguments in order to create our theories; they are the foundations of our intellectual edifices. It is the kisceral, that which is true (or accepted) but unproven that prevents the inevitable infinite regress that would otherwise appear in every argument we have. On the one hand we ourselves have principles that are accepted without argument, but on the other we want to limit the sorts of things that can be put forward as acceptable. Witness Parsons:

If we think of intuition as a fundamental source of knowledge, then in theoretical matters intuitions should be stable and intersubjective, but in many inquiries what is regarded as intrinsically plausible may depend on that particular context of inquiry, and moreover disagreements in "intuitions" are very common in most fields. (Parsons, 2000, pp. 304-305)

In other words, to use Toulmin's terminology (1958), different *fields* use different *warrants*, which in turn rely on different and potentially incompatible *backing*. And this brings us to the nub of the problem: we know we have to admit certain intuitions – there's simply no choice – but we do not want to admit others that we

find highly objectionable. We want to accept without quibble, for example, that 1 + 1 = 2, and that for any integer n, $n + 1$ is also an integer. But at the same time we want to reject the intuition that breaking a mirror brings seven years of bad luck, or that AIDS is a punishment from God brought down on homosexuals. This is a serious dilemma, and there is both good news and bad news. The bad news is that in many ways we cannot defeat the bad kisceral arguments while holding onto the good ones, but the good news is that we can reject them based on the qualities of the frameworks from which they flow.

First of all, we have to be clear that any and every assumption, every intuition, every kisceral insight or argument can be questioned – both the "good" ones and the "bad" ones, i.e., both the ones we like and the ones we do not like. There are arithmetics, for example, in which 1 + 1 = 2 does not work, i.e., addition as we normally apply it fails. Adding, for example, two drops of water to each other results in one drop of water; adding one colour plus one colour plus one colour does not result in three colours, but rather in one colour. These are not tricks, but examples of non-Diophantine arithmetics, a legitimate study in mathematics (Burgin, 2001). It is important for the ascendancy of what *we* might want to consider reasonable assumptions or strong kisceral arguments, that it is accepted that *all* intuitions, assumptions, and axioms rely upon and work within a conceptual framework. This may appear counter-intuitive, but when it comes to setting aside intuitions the strongest arguments can be made for or against the meta-level.

In most cases, intuitions are actually corollaries of higher level conceptual assumptions. That is to say, they are indeed supported by their own intuitional veracity or obviousness, but also flow from higher level intuitions. Axiomatic systems form the most obvious examples of such intuitional systems, with mathematics being a paradigm. Innumerable philosophical issues depend upon conflicts of foundational intuitions, which is why so many seem irresolvable. Within our own field of Argumentation Theory, the various schools also make foundational assumptions:
According to van Eemeren and Grootendorst, argumentation is a phenomenon of verbal communication which should be studied as a specific mode of discourse, characterized by the use of language for resolving a difference of opinion. The quality and possible flaws of argumentation are measured against criteria that are appropriate for the purpose of such discourse. (Eemeren, Grootendorst, & Snoeck

Henkemans, 1996 275)
Compare this framework creating assumption to one propounded by an eristic sophist. In Pragma-Dialectics fallacies are those argumentative maneuvers which interfere with the reasonable progress of a critical discussion, while in the latter theory they are tools to be used to win arguments.

In light of this I want to suggest a number of criteria that can be used to judge intuitions. I hasten to point out that these criteria are themselves intuitions, and all depend upon the basal axiom that, *no matter how strongly I believe something I may nonetheless be wrong.* Indeed, I am fond of telling my students that if, after their university education is complete, they can truly embrace that statement, then irrespective of anything else, their time was well spent. This axiom, which we may call the Principle of Defeasibility [PD], is exactly what separates a reasonable from an unreasonable intuition. Notice also that PD is reflexive and may itself be false; and that this paradox is part and parcel of PD, though an appeal to Gödel may help explain but not eliminate the *petitio*. PD then, is the foundational value for intuitions: a good intuition must be considered defeasible. This first point of judgment directly confronts one of the major concerns about intuitions which many of us regard as false, wrong, or silly.

It must be understood that the Principle of Defeasibility does not require one to believe that one *is* wrong, or even that one *will be* proven wrong; rather it requires that one believe that one *could* under some conceivable circumstances be wrong. How this comes about is immaterial: one might find empirical reasons, a more compelling but inconsistent intuition, or an unpalatable consequence leading to a *reductio*. One need not, as I suggested previously (Gilbert, 2008), even be required to know what circumstances would lead to the abandonment of the intuition. It suffices to accept that one *could,* under some, perhaps unforeseen, conditions abandon the assumption. (This, by the way, means that all theists are not, per the PD, made into agnostics.)

Sosa (2006) discusses the prejudice many have against intuition and in favour of perception. He makes an analogy between intuition and eye-witness testimony, pressing the point that observers are frequently mistaken about their perceptions and that witnesses to the same event can have dramatically varying accounts. Intuitions must be considered as frangible as eye-witness accounts, and the difference in intuitions among persons is no less to be expected than differing eye-witness testimony. He states,

whether one is having an intuition can serve as a legitimate ground for belief, … variation in intuition is (as with perception) reasonably understood as possibly a function of different perspectives, the fact of variation in intuition, unaccompanied by constancy of justification, does not begin to undermine the claim that intuitions are systematically justificatorily relevant, and the epistemic role of intuition is not easily filled by other familiar abilities. (Sosa, 2006 643)

I want to take the juridical analogy somewhat further. Just as one might be convinced on the basis of a series of perceptions that are consistent and compelling that a is true *beyond a reasonable doubt,* so an intuition f might similarly be so believed, even though one is still accepting the Principle of Defeasibility. In other words, believing beyond a reasonable doubt is different from believing dogmatically. This results from other corollary consequences of the PD of which time does not permit a thorough discussion. Instead, I will simply mention some other aspects with only brief comments.

Persuasibility: Most frameworks have basal assumptions which cannot, in truth, be attacked. Mathematics has several, as does religion. Note that within the basal assumption many sorts of variations are possible. Thus, in one mathematics parallel lines never cross, while in another they eventually meet. Similarly, in some religions God responds to individual prayer, while in others She does not. In our own field we believe that argument is a better alternative than violence. However, in each of these areas, the basal assumption notwithstanding, a "good" framework is one that allows for discussion and *persuasibility*. In other words, since the Principle of Defeasibility says that any assumption might ultimately be false, it follows that one might be persuaded to change one's assumption.

Consquentiality: All frameworks have assumptions and all assumptions have consequences. One must, therefore, be prepared to accept the consequences of one's assumptions. Those consequences themselves are subject to intuitional inspection, and, so, one might have conflicting intuitions. Granted, that some frameworks allow for this and even embrace it, most do not. Of course, the strongest position one can take is to accept completely all the consequences of a position without qualm. This is especially easy in abstract or idle discussion, much less so in real pragmatic decision-making.

Evidential Responsibility: Part of having a reasonable attitude toward intuitions is a willingness to accept certain sorts of evidence as relevant. The parents who

"just know" their child did not commit the crime alleged, may, at some point, yield in face of the evidence. The theist may abandon her belief when confronted with certain tragedies. The point is that when evidence speaks against an intuition it must be addressed. *If* one is going to have a reasonable approach to kisceral arguments, a form we all use all the time, then we want to distinguish between reasonable and foolish intuitions.

3. Physics rests on reality, economics rests on models, astrology rests on superstition.

I have been arguing in the above that all knowledge depends on core intuitions, axioms or assumptions. Within various contexts, i.e., frameworks, fields, arenas, different assumptions hold sway. In order to argue within those arenas, in order to investigate those intuitions, we sometimes enter an arena for the purposes of argument. One way of considering my point is to suggest that if such an endeavour is impossible, then the framework is not a good one, and the intuition ought be eschewed. Of course, before anyone else can say it, let me point out that this relies on intuition itself. I have, elsewhere, argued that there are restrictions on what we can believe and how arguments may work (Gilbert, 2007), and these considerations apply here as well.

There is a great deal about intuition I have not touched upon, and a great many people working on it from different aspects. The process of having an intuition can be viewed in many different ways from the mystical combined with devotion and meditation (Chang, 1954), to cognitive processes essential to survival (Damasio, 1994). My approach is to examine its role in argumentation. The issue is not whether kisceral arguments are used, but, rather, how we can distinguish good ones from bad ones, *even allowing that the argument for such differentiating criteria must per force be circular.*

Moreover, the reduction approach, i.e., alleging that intuitions or hypotheses are closet rational processes will not work. By this I simply mean that the rationalist is usually very good at recasting any purportedly non-rational experience into a rational one. Indeed, whole clubs of rationalists band together to do just this, and a book entitled, *How We know What Isn't So*, by. Gilovich, (1991) for example, is completely devoted to an attack on such beliefs as ESP and alternative medicine. But consider Fricker:

It must be made clear that in describing the workings of intuition as typically

subconscious I am not suggesting that the intuitive mode of thought is just thinly rational thought executed subconsciously. That view would be no more compelling (or, rather we should say, no more obligatory, for some people do hold the view in question) than saying that when tennis players hit the ball they must be subconsciously making calculations about where to move and when to hit the ball, using split second estimates of its velocity, weight, shape, etc. This is surely unconvincing. (Fricker, 1995 p. 183)

We must, in other words, remember that the justification of an intuition is not its discovery, but its openness to investigation, plausibility, utility, and ability to withstand inquiry.

Many of us have reservations about intuitions, and to a great extent they are legitimate. However, the intuitions that give us pause are those that defy the Principle of Defeasibility and are not open to inspection or question. The dogmatic, the obsessed, the delusional are wrong, but we cannot defeat them other than by pointing out that non-defeasible axioms are dangerous and have historically never proven reliable.

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