ISSA Proceedings 2006 – Aesthetic Reason: Expanding The Role Of Argumentation & Deliberation Within Aesthetic Theory

As many of its commemorative predecessors, Reflecting Absence, the winning design in the World Trade Center (WTC) site memorial competition, has rarely, if ever, enjoyed the full support of its major stakeholders. Over the past two years, Michael Arad's original austere and contemplative design has been slowly modified – making aesthetic concessions for a myriad of reasons ranging from finances and security to morality and respect for the dead. For many, Reflecting Absence's aesthetic strength and affect has often been the last concern in this battle over the memory of September 11th. However, this endless barrage of artistic compromises prompted by good intentions warrants investigation. As noted memorial scholar and design competition juror James Young warns: "The memorial at ground zero is not a zero-sum project in which one interested party gets its way. It is, rather, an accretion of personal and civic memorial needs, a place for memory, mourning and the history of that horrible day" (Young and Van Valkenburgh, 2006).

The intensely personal loss felt by so many on that tragic day is profound, making it simple to understand the emotional needs this memorial must fulfill. As a native New Yorker, who was working in Manhattan on 9/11, I can attest to the personal needs the memorial needs to fill. This can and should become a place of mourning. But identifying the civic needs this memorial will attempt to satisfy becomes more difficult to explicate. How does an aesthetic representation of the mortal loss incurred on September 11th fulfill a civic need? Memorials are more then simply rhetorical texts; they create spaces of aesthetic experience which visitors subject themselves to. Together, memorials and the aesthetic experience they inspire present individuals with an embodied argument on civic duty that contends both what to think but more importantly, how to think about September 11th. Just like any other argument, these aesthetic memorial arguments should be assessed with regard to the reasonableness of their claims.

To do so, the recent changes to the design of Reflecting Absence will be problematized utilizing Alan Singer's theory of aesthetic reason. Underlying Singer's theory is the assumption that aesthetic experiences are not solely affective. Rather the importance of the cognitive effect the aesthetic elicits needs to be reestablished. Neither the cognitive nor the affective are privileged during the aesthetic experience; instead they ground each other within an intersubjective reasoning process. With regard to public memorial artworks, aesthetically reasonable memorials will prompt visitors to engage in this process via a reflexive turn educed by the aesthetic experience of these memory spaces. A constitutive process by nature, experiencing aesthetically reasonable public memorials can, ideally, enhance visitors' deliberative skills and character. Thus, the purpose of this process is the cultivation of a deliberative ethos in democratic citizens. To further explicate this, I will first discuss my theoretical framework consisting of a discussion of aesthetic reason, its ties to the deliberative ethos and the normative standards for analyzing aesthetically reasonable memorials. Then I will examine the recent changes to Reflecting Absence. Finally, I will analyze the new design changes to assess the impact they may have on the aesthetic reasonableness of this proposed memorial.

1. *Aesthetic Reason*

Aesthetic reason is an attempt to rethink the power of the aesthetic without privileging transcendent sensuous immediacy over cognitive reason. Singer (2003) asserts that the cognitive efficacy of the aesthetic is bound to individual agency as it culminates in the act of rational choice making, i.e., one's ability to utilize the knowledge of the particular to inform her/his acts of judgment. When we reason aesthetically, the imagination is enlivened which "extends thought, [and] stretches the mind" (Diffey, 1986, p. 11). The foundation for a cognitive theory of the aesthetic can be traced to, Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten who established the field of aesthetics as a philosophical discipline that "concentrated on the perception of the human senses" in all of its particularity (Weissberg, 2001, p. 15). Aesthetics as the study of sensate perception focused on the determinate nature of how we "know" things through our senses. This is best understood when a distinction is made between art and aesthetic experience. Although works of art can typically prompt an aesthetic experience within viewers, this type of *experience* is not limited to the artistic realm. An artwork is a rhetorical text that presents the possibility of an aesthetic experience; however it is the experience that defines an object as art, not the other way around. As

Mitias (1986) explains, "Art is, and should be, defined not on the basis of how an art work 'ordinarily' merely, or naively appears to the senses but on the basis of what it does to the imagination. This is based on the fundamental assumption that the *artistic* about art, or what makes an object art, is not a finished product or aspect but a spiritual content which acquires its structure and meaning in the process of aesthetic perception" (p. 52). Aesthetic experience, etymologically speaking "breathing in" our surroundings, is prompted by our *attention* to the sensuous particulars of that which we encounter (Maclagan, 2001, p. 10). This emphasis on the truly unique combination of sensuous perceptions allows individuals to experience the world anew. When special attention is paid to our sensuous perceptions we are not (re)presenting that which we encounter, rather we must work to *make sense* of the new information we have taken in.

Artworks, therefore, become contexts for contemplating what rational choices individuals should make about the sensate information they gather when encountering it. This places the aesthetic within the realm of action informed by cognitive interests. The choices made will be a product of the reciprocal (re)cognition of our intersubjective sensate experience in concert with our existing bodies of knowledge. Ultimately these choices inform the judgments we make regarding the feelings induced by our sensate experiences. Judgments about the aesthetic are, therefore, not based on universal norms but rather take the particulars of each situation into consideration before a decision is made.
Singer (2003) asserts that art which is tragic by nature possess the aesthetic qualities necessary to engage us in the act of aesthetic reason. Tragic drama as articulated in ancient Greece, "occurs coincidentally when the Greek law itself lacks a consensus about the proper conduct of individual agency" (Singer, 2003, p. 178-9). In these types of tragic situations, there are no guiding rules or laws for behavior since this situation has yet to be encountered. Thus, tragedy creates a space that is defined by its relation to the unknown. "In this view the aesthetic crux of the tragic protagonist is precisely his or her mandatory deliberation about what is the most relevant context of knowledge in which to act" (Singer, p. 180). The tragic protagonist, therefore, must become skilled in adaptation, learning and deliberation in order to survive.

In ancient Greece it was believed tragic drama aided in the citizen's development by honing one's deliberative abilities. These tragic dramas beckoned their audiences to assess unknown situations via a process of reciprocal (re)cognition

that aids in the development of the same skills as the protagonist. Audience members were invited to engage in aesthetic reason to not only recognize the tragic situation but also their place in relation to this tragedy. Aesthetic reason, therefore, thrives in the space of the unknown to help provide a means of reacting to the singularity of a tragedy and making choices in response to its unique context. Arendt describes this as "the problem of the new" in her critique of Kant's theory of determinate judgment. "The problem of the new is a political question about how we, members of democratic communities, can affirm human freedom as a political reality in a world of objects and events whose causes and effects we can neither control nor predict with certainty" (Zerilli, 2005, p. 162). According to Zerilli (2005), Arendt's assertion that political judgment is more comparable to Kant's aesthetic rather than determinate judgment is based on her belief that the affirmation of human freedom, not calculative thinking, is the basis of political action. Arendt explains that the freedom of the imagination, as the basis of aesthetic judgment, incites dynamic, opposed to routine, action. "Imagination, when it is considered in its freedom…is not bound to the law of causality, but is productive and spontaneous, not merely reproductive of what is already known, but generative of new forms and figures" (Zerilli, 2005, p.163). It is our imaginative capacity of reason that enables us to account for the modern condition of plurality. For Arendt, our imagination allows us to base our decisions on what will count as part of our shared world through a process of aesthetic judgment. Politics, from an aesthetic perspective, deals with the opening up of the world not the reconceptualization of it via our pre-understanding (Zerilli, 2005, p. 168).

The aesthetic (re)presentation of tragedy is the catalyst of the imagination which restores personal choice rather than the simple application of laws or universalized norms. One chooses what actions to take in the face of tragedy without complete knowledge or information because of the uniqueness of the situation. As Zerilli (2005) explains, "The creative discovery of relationships among appearances that have no logical connection, it is an exercise of radical imagination" (p. 173). Sole reliance on cognitive reason will not enable our imagination because without sufficient knowledge, reasons cannot be deemed valid and thus cannot be action upon. However, "Spectators do not produce judgments that ought then serve as *principles* for action or for other judgments; they create the *space* in which the objects of political judgment, the actors and actions themselves, can appear, and thus alter our sense of what belongs in the common world" (Zerilli, 2005, p. 179). The aesthetic focus on sensate information

gathered at that moment will provide the intersubjective knowledge needed to make a decision about the limits of our political community. "To judge objects and events in their freedom expands our sense of community, not because it tells us what is morally or politically justified and thus what we should do, but because it expands our sense of what is real or communicable" (Zerilli, 2005, p. 178). When we aesthetically reason, our imagination is expanded, to use Kant's term, in a 'free play' of ideas that enlarge our mentality.

However not all tragic artwork is aesthetically reasonable; some is overshadowed by mythic tragic fate. In mythic tragic fate, catharsis is overemphasized as "the premier aesthetic effect and even purpose of tragedy" (Singer, 2003, p. 223). Cleansing oneself of the tragic experience does not necessarily prompt, and oftentimes counters, intersubjective reasoning about the tragedy. Thus, feeling and thought become two mutually exclusive categories that function individually and even contradictory. Intense melancholy induced by mythic tragedy does not have the capacity to enliven the imagination through thought which is "crucial for breaking the boundaries of identity-based experience: taking account of plurality and affirming freedom" (Zerilli, 2005, p. 174). In contrast, choice which can lead to character development is the effect and purpose of a cognitive aesthetic of tragedy. It is the combination of both thought and feeling in moments of unknown territory that enable choice thus becoming a moment of action. Choice, which informs our judgments of the aesthetic, is then not an either/or designation, but rather a moment of intrapersonal and collective deliberation that can be transformative. Ultimately, the intersubjective sensate knowledge we acquire through aesthetic reason can aid this transformation and also assist in the development of our deliberative ethos.

In this way, aesthetic reason is similar to Arendt's concept of representative thinking. According to Zerilli (2005), representative thinking "involves coming to 'see the same world from one another's standpoint, to see the same in very different and frequently opposing aspects.' At stake is the difference between understanding another *person* and understanding the *world*, the world not as an object we cognize but 'the space in which things become public'" (Arendt quoted in Zerilli, p. 176-7). During the transformative process of aesthetic reason, we learn that the key to good choice making is the ability to assess the issue from a multitude of perspectives and analogous situations that contextual the situation within our public rather than solely private life.

When public memorials have a similar tragic nature to ancient Greek dramas, it has the same effect. These artworks "requires a 'public scene' in which 'moral agents are at once actors and spectators, and in which the ways actors act informs the way they see things and the way they see things regulates the way they act'" (Wiggins quoted in Singer, p. 197). Public memorials present just such a public stage at which visitors become both actors and spectators of tragedy. Tragic memorials trigger the internal deliberations of aesthetic reason, which is the precursor to judgments about the aesthetic and the space where visitor may form shared reasoning premises regarding the commemorative subject. These shared premises are the hallmark of public reasoning processes; typically signally the beginning of deliberation. When a memorial is crafted in a way to provoke contemplation, as opposed to sublime shock and awe, it functions tragically since it presents us with a problematic situation but does not offer any answers.

The genre of memorials Blair and Michel (1999) outline are best understood as tragic since they invoke critical reflection and "invite us to *confront* our own values... [and] *engage* us by asking us to think" (p. 37). When encountering this type of memorial, individuals go beyond identity politics and the discourse of knowledge that constrain it, to engage in aesthetic reason which allows them to recognize the particularities of the situation and their unique relation to it in order to make a choice about what this memorial means. This is possible because the process is based in the assumption that intersubjective plurality is a necessary condition for arriving at reasonable decisions. Thus, "the aesthetic is now profitably seen as instantiating a public space where an agent's maximizing of consideration – based, not on a presumptive rational practicality, but on the reciprocity of actor and spectator – are put in the service of an ideal of practical deliberation" (Singer, 2003, p. 197-8). Thus, as a public scene, tragic memorials do not presuppose a visitor deliberative skills or character but rather aids in their development.

2. *The Deliberative Ethos*

The public spaces created by tragic memorials that provoke aesthetic reason and culminates in an act of rational choice-making become the training ground of a deliberative ethos. "This disposition," according to Singer (2003), "privileges the widest repertoire of adaptations to any circumstance of human inquiry. There is an implicit understanding here that the ideal practical deliberator brings to bear on any situation the greatest number of pertinent concerns and understandings commensurate with the context of deliberation" (p. 197). Furthermore, frequent

engagement in aesthetic reason helps cultivate our deliberative ethos and abilities which is due, in part, to the act of rational choice-making which is "a constitutive aspect of aesthetic knowledge" and judgment (Singer, 2003, p. 219). However, it is important to note, neither Singer nor I are claiming aesthetic reason will necessarily improve one's deliberative ethos or skills. Rather, aesthetic reason is but one part of the development process which functions constitutively. Hicks and Langsdorf (1999) take a similar position when they explain "the very experience of participating in critical discussion produces individuals with more critical-rational and democratic dispositions; individuals who are more tolerant, better able to examine their preferences, more willing to take the claims of others seriously, and more prepared to submit their judgments to the test of critical scrutiny" (p.150). In other words, the process and practices individuals engage in help constitute individuals that are better skilled at that form of communication; i.e. deliberation produces agents who deliberate (Hicks and Langsdorf, 1999). If memorials provoke contemplation and critical thinking, they will produce agents who reason aesthetically rather than simply appreciate commemorations' artistic quality or agree with their rhetorical symbolism.

3. *The Aesthetically Reasonable Memorial*

The normative standards for the rational choices made when one is engaged in aesthetic reason are based on an ideal 'sense' of community that is not universal but rather a deeply contextualized vision of an ideal community. "The imperative for self-justification," as Singer (2003) notes, "implicates the subject in the interests of a communitarian identity" (p. 226). The choices made, therefore, would aid in the creation of this ideal community in relation to the subject the memorial (re)presents. An aesthetically reasonable memorial would equip its visitors with the skills needed to deal with the "sociopolitical pressures that human subjects contend with in the prospect of sharing a common world" (Singer, 2003, p. 238). In other words, the designation of an aesthetically reasonable memorial identifies artworks that not only spark a sense of mental play within individuals but also "fit[s] more exemplarily with our shared sense of who we could be at our best" (Ferrara, 2004, p. 593). Therefore, aesthetic exemplarity is the normative standard of aesthetic judgment when determining whether or not a memorial is aesthetically reasonable. Aesthetic exemplarity of public memorials is based on three standards: the ability to create a transformative aesthetic experience, the ability to aid in development of visitors' deliberative ethos, and the presentation of subject matter from a communitarian ideal.

Essentially, when a memorial is aesthetically reasonable it will be judged as an aesthetic exemplar if it not only aids in the transformation of its visitor and assists in the development of their deliberative ethos, but also signifies an ideal vision of the society people hope to achieve. Therefore, the aesthetically reasonable memorial will be tragic and engage visitors in a continual sense of mental play that is intersubjectively based on the public significance of the tragedy rather than simply one's private remembrance and feelings. This mental play would culminate in the visitor's embodiment of the memorial space and the act of rational choice-making. In this sense, 'embodiment' is a moment at which both past and future are realized in the present creating a temporal unity that promotes self-realization and transformation. However, the designation of being aesthetically reasonable is not totalizing, rather it is best understood along a continuum of reasonableness, provoking contemplation on some issues but limiting or disregarding others. In other words, even though a memorial is aesthetically reasonable it can still exclude others by constraining the deliberation process via its rhetorical symbolism. We can only deliberate about what we recognize as the issue put forth by the memorial. However, aesthetically reasonable memorials will tend to be non-allegorical making visitors work to understand their meaning. Yet, simply having these characteristics does not categorically determine the aesthetic reasonableness of a memorial. Analyzing the aesthetic reasonableness of a memorial can help determine whether or not a memorial should provoke aesthetic reason and to what extent it is limited. Ultimately, an aesthetically reasonable memorial will be an aesthetic exemplar if it invites visitors to critically analyze the memorial subject from an intersubjective perspective that promotes rational choices based on the creation of an ideal community.

4. *Design of Reflecting Absence*

The design for "Reflecting Absence" is in the midst of its fourth revision. The original concept, created by Michael Arad, was considered too stark and solemn. The focus was solely on loss whereas it also needed to symbolize hope. Arad enlisted the help of Peter Walker, a landscape architect, to help sculpt the stark exterior of the plaza and a third architect, Max Bond, was brought in to investigate design advancements to ensure the most "poetic and precise" memorial would be created. To understand the design changes which were proposed on June 20, 2006, I will explicate the differences between the third and fourth revisions.

The third design consisted of three levels: the Memorial Plaza, Memorial Hall and the Bedrock Level. The Memorial Plaza would be on street level and consist of hundreds of oak trees that would canopy over its visitors creating "an unexpected forest in the city" (*Reflecting Absence,* n.d.). As the first and last aspect of the memorial visitors would experience, originally the exterior needed to be both welcoming and soothing. Two enormous voids in the exact dimensions of the twin towers would be at the forest's center. Waterfalls would line the interior of each void and their cascading water would drop nearly thirty feet collecting in two reflecting pools below. Long ramps directly on the plaza would lead down into the second level, Memorial Hall, where visitors would access eight viewing galleries to the pools through the veil of water flowing from the aforementioned falls. Surrounding the reflecting pools, low parapets would indiscernibly listed the deceases' names however, "the police officers, firefighters, and other rescue workers [would] be designated with individual shields" with their organization's insignia on it (Collins & Dunlap, 2004). The final, Bedrock Level would travel down to base of the original World Trade Center towers' foundation; a 70-foot section of exposed slurry wall. The slurry wall would be the centerpiece of the 9/11 memorial museum also housed on this level. The museum would be "A vast below-grade museum telling the stories of September 11, 2001, and February 26,1993,... contain[ing] information about the lives of those lost, and convey[ing] the events of the day and the breathtaking worldwide outpouring of support in the rescue and recovery" (Sciame, 2006). Additionally, a family room, contemplation area, and space for the medical examiner would be on this level. The family room would be specifically created to give the victims' families a place to collectively share their memories of their lost loved ones. This room would include a window to the final resting place of the unidentified victims' remains. Adjacent to the family room would be a public contemplation room, which would have had at its center a symbolic vessel to represent a mausoleum for visitors to express their condolences.

Although there was general acceptance of this design from the public, there were three main catalysts for the proposed revisions. First, the building costs which were originally estimated at $493 million had risen to almost $1 billion dollars making Reflecting Absence too expensive to build. Second, there were numerous security concerns regarding the safety of an underground memorial especially at such a tempting location for terrorist attacks. Lastly, the Put It Above Ground campaign which was launched by a group of 9/11 families' believed having an *underground* memorial was a dishonor to their loved ones. Supporters of this

campaign felt placing the names below ground signified shame in our loss and felt the deceased deserved a more hopeful and heroic memorial. This group "had collected more than 14,000 signatures in favor of getting 'the names raised to the light of day'" (Dunlap, 2006c). In response to these conditions and concerns, both Governor Pataki and Mayor Bloomberg placed a $500 million dollar cap on memorial costs and hired Frank J. Sciame, a construction executive, to revise the memorial plans to remain within budget while retaining its original vision.

Although the fourth design revisions preserves many of the hallmarks of the third design it also includes several important changes. Most importantly, the galleries containing the low parapets with the victims' names will now be above ground lining the waterfalls. Making the parapets directly accessible from the street, Sciame explains that, "As visitors read the names, they can look out over the waterfalls and view the reflecting pools and the voids that are the empty footprints of the Twin Towers" (Sciame, 2006). Although Memorial Hall would still be below ground, six of the eight original waterfall viewing galleries would be closed leaving only two interior vistas of the falls and reflecting pools. The plaza entry ramps will be removed and a consolidated entrance to Memorial Hall and the Bedrock Level will only be accessible from the Visitor Education and Orientation Center. "Rather than journeying down a long ramp into underground galleries to contemplate the inscribed names, then coming back up to enter a separate museum, a visitor would walk around the plaza before entering an orientation center leading to a smaller museum, most of it near bedrock" (Dunlap, 2006b). Also, the family and contemplation rooms will be merged into one space for family members and visitors alike to view the unidentified remains. For brevity, this paper will only analyze one of these design changes: the relocation of the victims' names above ground.

5. *Analysis*

The first step in assessing the extent Reflecting Absence, as currently proposed, is aesthetically reasonable is establishing its tragic nature. Can Reflecting Absence incite the imagination in a free mental play that encourages transformation, hones one's deliberative ethos and promotes an inclusive communitarian ideal?

The most contested change to the memorial design plans has been the migration of the names above ground. Although this change was requested by a large faction of the 9/11 families, many feel this detracts from the aesthetic power and affect of the memorial. Arad, the original memorial designer, felt these were 'painful cuts' to the overall effect of Reflecting Absence; but why? By moving the

names of the deceased above ground what is lost? Simply put, silence and the journey. The original design had consciously attempted to mimic the cycle of life, death and rebirth. There was meaning in the journey of entering into a forest in the midst of the concrete laden streets of Manhattan, descending down into a quiet, stark space apart from the chaotic, cluttered city, to finally re-emerge into the commotion of life. The structure of this aesthetic journey of the memorial bears a striking resemblance to Plato's cave allegory. First, there is a turning away from what we know as well as what imprisons us; the hurriedness of life in New York City. Then there is the turning towards the unknown by facing the tragic text of the memorial. Lastly, there is the turning back to the plaza, to the hurried life, ideally with a new understanding of the community we are a part of. This three part journey contains the possibility for aesthetic reason by simply creating a space that fosters reflection. The aesthetic experience of the third memorial design consists of both the memorial's symbolism and the sensate embodied action of extricating oneself from the hurriedness of everyday life to a space of solace and contemplation where the only things presented to you are: the names of the deceased, the unidentified remains, the waterfalls, reflecting pools, artifacts from September 11th and your fellow visitors. As Monica Iken, "a memorial foundation board member, ... founder of September's Mission," and 9/11 widow explained, by moving the names above ground, "you will lose the experience of what the memorial is … There is a meaning behind the descent … You become immersed in that space and you enter a place of peacefulness, reverence, reflection and honor. And you become part of that experience. And you forget about everything outside" (Dunlap, 2006a). In the midst of the largest city in the US, the third design was specifically created to shut out the sights and sounds of the city and replace it with a sober space and reverberations of rushing waterfalls as a means to induce reflexivity.

By moving the names above ground we no longer take this journey into silence and contemplation, however, this does not necessarily mean the memorial is aesthetically unreasonable. First we must imagine the experience in all its potential. We walk in the Memorial Plaza through a sea of oak trees that create a canopy overhead. There are competing sounds – the buzz of the city, consisting of car horns, loud talking, and ever present construction in concert with the rush of running water from the immense waterfalls filling the voids. We come upon these running voids and look down at the parapets with the names of the deceased – the enormity of this loss is upon us. Yet what is the context of this loss? By placing the names within the "life" of the city without creating a silence from this clutter we

recognize the inevitability of death. Yet, this inevitability does not stem from the natural cycle of life and death. Rather this death is illogical and massively imposing itself upon the living. As proposed, this memorial presents us with a mythic tragic fate that will most likely provoke contemplative melancholy via awe at the physical size of the loss. In the densely populated area of New York City, two voids – each sprawling over an acre of empty land – creates a sense of infinite loss. Nothing will ever be able to fix this. Nothing will ever be able to fill this space again. There is no return to everyday life since there is no space separate from it to make sense of the loss from September 11th.

The intense melancholy of this symbolic message can not enliven the imagination to examine the loss from an intersubjective perspective that promotes transformation. Simply symbolic memorials tend to provoke "contemplative melancholy (a de facto inhibitor of deliberative mind) [as] its object ... The resulting melancholy evokes, on the part of the reader, a deep affective ambivalence" (Singer, 2003, p. 228). Thus, as newly proposed, Reflecting Absence may be emotionally overwhelming to the point that that visitors can think of nothing more than what a tragic fate this was. There is the production of an emotion but no self-transformation or development of a deliberative ethos since we do not have to work for the meaning of this memorial. Catharsis is solely an individual affective reaction rather than an intersubjective cognitive action. We may cry to "let it all out"; overcome with sympathy for the victims and the families they left behind. However, this fourth design is allegorical; we do not need to make sense of the memorial since the size of the voids is representative of the size of the America's loss. A deep sense of remorse over such an illogical and immense loss becomes the main effect of the memorial aesthetic experience.

Granted the rhetorical symbolism of the memorial design, regardless of the proposed revisions, is highly US centric. In the third design it is the experiential journey that is allegorical, (re)producing the cycle of life, not its symbolic message. Although the third design offered an experience that was also allegorical; recreating the cycle of life, the tragedy of September 11th becomes something we will change and grow from during the rebirth stage when we return above ground. Ideally, this transformation would have been triggered by the intersubjective process of aesthetic reasoning visitors experience during the memorial journey. By viewing and embodying tragedy as something that is infinitely human, something all people experience, September 11th becomes an event that links us to all cultures. Throughout the world, all cultures have

experienced some type of tragic loss they have had to rise up from. Admittedly, this is not be the most ideal or inclusive perspective of society, however, it is, at least, more intersubjective than the narrow notion of community promoted by the fourth design. In the fourth design, 9/11 is not a journey one goes through, overcomes and changes from but rather something that infinitely scars the US. In other words, we are not offered a means to consider this loss from a perspective other than the 'victimized American'.

The fourth design solidifies the hermeneutical framework of the memorial in the notion that Americans are hapless and innocent in the global community; America simply wishes to help spread freedom and democracy throughout the world and in return Arab terrorists target us as the enemy. There is no space for deliberation regarding what may have lead to the unfortunate loss on September 11th or critical reflection on the common ground that exists between the US and other cultures. Tragedies, such as 9/11, do not become an inevitably part of human life people go through and are eventually reborn. Rather this tragedy is something specifically done to the US, giving Americans cause to perpetuate a cycle of aggression against the perpetrators. Therefore, the vision of community promoted by the fourth design is not only US centric; it can also create a sense of entitlement. We are allowed to wage war with whoever may pose a terror threat because of the illogical loss we've incurred. Yet what of the loss we've inflicted on others? This new design also enables us to remain blind to the role we've played in September 11th since this tragedy is a terrifying anomaly in life done to us *simply because of who we are, not what we've done*. Furthermore, signifying 9/11 as a complete anomaly of life which American were innocent victims of creates a sense of fear that another attack can happen at any moment, especially when we least expect it.

The controversy surrounding the security risks of this memorial emphasize the fear that continues to haunt this site. According to the New York Times, "A recently disclosed memo from James K. Kallstrom, Governor Pataki's senior adviser for counterterrorism, called on the architects to 'significantly reduce the opportunity for a satchel charge explosive or airborne contaminant dissemination device to be cast, or a suicide attempt to be made into the void.' It stands to reason that if visitors were not standing around the bottom of the voids because there were no galleries to stand in, their attractiveness as targets would diminish" (Dunlap, 2006a). As evident from this quote, aesthetic reason is no longer the main concern when building this memorial. First, we need to make sure this type of tragedy will not happen again so visitors should not 'stand around' being

contemplative or they may become another American victim. By creating a 9/11 memorial that limits aesthetic reason more that it promotes it, we Americans concede to their need for security and comfort over the possibilities of transformation, honing our deliberative skills and creating a more ideal community. Rather than affirming our freedom through the act of aesthetically reasoning in crucial spaces of public memory, the new changes to Reflecting Absence creates an aesthetic experience that will perpetuate a cycle of victimization, ethnocentrism, and entitlement.

6. *Conclusion*

This paper offers aesthetic reason as a new theoretical means to assess the aesthetic arguments presented by public memorials. This theory, originally conceptualized by Singer (2003) has been modified here to explicate the unique transformative possibilities inherent within the aesthetic experience prompted by tragic memorials and their capability to develop the deliberative ethos of the memorials' visitors. Aesthetic exemplarity was offered as the normative standard for assessing the arguments embedded in aesthetic experience of memorials to determine the extent to which these commemorations of aesthetically reasonable. The most recent changes to Reflecting Absence, the proposed memorial to September 11th at the WTC site was then problematized using this revised version of Singer's theory. This analysis concludes that the new modifications to Reflecting Absence will provide a less aesthetically reasonable experience for its visitors. The changes made present a more symbolically allegorical memorial that does not make visitors work for its meaning and perpetuates a narrow, ethnocentric vision of an ideal community. By changing the aesthetic experience of the memorial, we lose the chance at transforming our understanding of 9/11 through aesthetic reason and honing our deliberative ethos. Furthermore, as America has troops deployed in both Iraqi and Afghanistan in its war on terror which was the US's direct response to September 11th, what we truly lose is our ability to respond to tragedy with something other than violence.

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ISSA Proceedings 2006 – Polyphony Of Interpretations In Providing Argumentation In Modern Media Text

The 21st century political discourse has mass media as its integral part in supplying persuasive tools influencing the public. In political communication mass media can be interpreted as a certain mediator between people and the politically elite. This mediating process can be carried out through the various communicative function roles that journalists use in providing information directly or indirectly. These are the role of the direct presenter (direct speech), the story-teller (indirect speech), the interviewer (question-comment procedure), and the commentator (analytical narrative speech). These roles and corresponding types of speech always have references to some precedent texts. Thus information is provided not through one voice, but through many voices construing the polyphony of the media text, both oral and written.

The polyphony of interpretations as a mass media phenomenon is understood as the processing of fragmented meanings coming from different sources used by journalists on the TV screen, the computer screen or on paper presentation. There can be a chain of actual and fictitious senders and receivers, often intentionally quoting the same messages referring to the same events but implying different interpretations. The vector of devising polyphony lies both in presentation and in interpretation of fragments which can be compared to "clips" of different styles and carrying out different functions. The communication participants may be separated from each other in time and /or space, and the gaps can be bridged through various means of recording and transmission or interpretation.

In terms of linguistic semantic theory the object depicted by the text is reduced to the meanings that could be deduced by the receiver via getting signs of the

reliability of the information. These signs form a system which is inherent in the text. Here we argue that it is through Peircian semiotics that we can define some major chords in the language of the media text.

Charles Sanders Peirce (1931-1958) introduced the *interpreter* and the *interpretant* to his semiotic system. The interpreter designates the receiver and decodes the message. The result of the decoding can be stated with certain accuracy only by introspection. Whereas, the interpretant is the key which the interpreter uses in order to understand the message and it is the interpretant that the linguist uses in constructing the semantic structure of the object. There is one more aspect in Peircian theory of interest to the language analyst dealing with media texts. This is the idea that all three types of signs: *index, icons* and *symbols* can be identified in the media text. Originally the main distinction between these signs was in the domain of observable or unobservable planes of expression. An index has a visual message, an icon is a visual message which has some integrated meaning, and a symbol is a sign connected with the referent only by certain conventions. Actually it is the conventional rules that make the symbols interact within a system. These signs are not separate classes. Peirce (1985) considers them as *modes* where one can become predominant over the others, and notes that there are no demarcation lines between the signs. (Peirce, 1985, pp.166-171). In addition, the researches in developmental psychology have shown that conventional signals appear in constant interaction between these three types of signs (Bates, 1979, pp. 33-68).

We extrapolate this idea into media text as a text combining these three types of signs. Here a hypothesis can be drawn that when referring to a particular event, or particular words in the domain of indexes is constructed, when using visual messages, including photos, caricatures in press, For example, in the case where icons interact with indexes we deal with complex modes and when terms, slogans are concerned with we are mostly concerned with symbolic communication. The polyphony in interpretation of concepts from the vantage point of the sign system can be connected with symbols, indexes, and icons.

The main concern of this paper is to show the polyphony of the modern press in providing argumentation from the point of view of "political linguistics" as a part of discourse linguistics, bearing in mind Peircian semiotics. First, some aspects of political linguistics as a special discipline will be covered. Then the focus will turn to signs as symbols and indexes, finally different types of *ipse dixit* functions used by journalists in the press will be covered.

Discourse linguistics is connected with different text genres that can deal with a variety of research paradigms (Tretyakova, 1999). According to rhetorical tradition there are three genres which are forensic, deliberative and epideictic having a common characteristic of trying to persuade an audience. The forensic genre relates to judicial situations, the epideictic to ritual and the deliberative one relates to political situations. (Van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1994, p.145). It is the deliberative genre that underlies the modern tendency in shaping the study of the language of politics as an independent discipline.

This discipline has been called "political linguistics". Unlike political discourse analysis that mostly deals with the political constituent and the interpretation of social practices aimed at reaching consensus, political linguistics is aimed at identifying the typical language forms used as functional tools of communication within political discourse. In actuality, this discipline combines diverse research programs concerning the critical analysis of the politicians' language, the study of language in the decision making process, and types of persuasion and methods for manipulating the public.

Political discourse has certain characteristics that distinguish it from ordinary discourse. It refers mainly to the specific use of "ordinary" words and includes a certain number of specific terms. There are even special genres such as debates, interviews, meetings and diverse media forms as a way of influencing society. Political communication is normally connected with the struggle for power and establishing the dominant or more stable position in the social environment. Though discourse theory constitutes a relatively new approach to political analyses, attention has been drawn to articulation in political practices including not only "collective actants" like political institutions and organizations, but also individuals. When dealing with the language as a persuasive instrument through which diverse political programs are undertaken we can look at it as a sign system dealing with different interpretations. The two major domains of interpretations discussed here are based on the language structures reflecting rituals and quotations.

Rituals are associated with symbols. *Symbolic intepretation* of a sign is connected with a learned, agreed upon contiguity. The relations between symbols of the system are regulated through conventional rules. The symbols of political discourse have transplanted certain ideas and concepts into the social conscience. Such notions as "freedom", "democracy" and "justice" can imply a number of

different and competing meanings. Each of these concepts may have different interpretations and practices. Frans H. van Eemeren (1996), for example writes:
The representative system of Anglo-Saxon-type democracy, with its technocratic style and ineffective way of policy making, may easily undermine popular support for democracy, especially in Eastern Europe where the newly-developed democracies need to carry out a stringent program of social and economic reforms (p.8).

Indeed, by the end of the 1990s the term "democrat" had become a derogatory one in Russia. In order to make the organizational system function well one should observe four different dimensions:
(a) the *rational* dimensions that refers to formal structural aspect of the system;
(b) the *social* dimension dealing with human resources;
(c) the *political* dimension that pertains to the power aspect and
(d) the *symbolic* dimension that relates to the ceremonial, ritual aspect of the system. "It is only if all these four dimensions are given their proper due that the organizational system is likely to appreciate the full depth and complexities of the real-life practices" (pp. 9-10).

Nowadays the term 'empire' has become ambiguous in its interpretation:
Today, the 'American empire' is a term of approval and optimism for some and disparagement and danger for others. Neoconservatives celebrate the imperial exercise of US power which in a modern version of Rudyard Kipling's "white man's burden" is a liberal force that promotes democracy and undercuts tyranny, terrorism, military aggression and weapons proliferation. Critics who identify an emerging American empire, meanwhile, worry about its unacceptable financial costs, its corrosive effect on democracy, and the threat it poses to the institutions and alliances that have secured US national interests since World War II (Foreign Affairs, 2004, p.37).

The transfer of concepts through language is specifically evident in totalitarian regimes which took place in Fascist Germany and Soviet Russia. At present, hegemony practices of introducing "dominant rules that structure the identities of discourses and social formations" are concealed under liberal and democratic rhetoric. It happened in the Conservative Party policy during M. Thatcher time (Howarth, 1995, pp.124-127) and is taking place in present US foreign policy. An example illustrating how hegemony is achieved can be drawn from Humpty Dumpty's conversation with Alice in Lewis Carroll's *Through the Looking Glass*.

(Carrol 1987):

"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scornful tone, "It means just what I choose it to mean. Neither more nor less."

"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so many different things."

"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "who is the master. That is all" (p.124).

The concept of hegemony is centered on who is going to master the situation. That is to say, it depends on the choice of political force that is going to decide the dominant forms of conduct and the meaning in a given social context. This has reference to the language of ideologies. Here we come across such symbolic rhetoric.

Another area of political language analysis is connected with the analysis of propaganda language. They are known sometimes referred to as Political Doublespeak. Examples of this are Haigspeak, Nukespeak, Falkland talk, Clintonspeak, Gorbachevspeak etc. All this political jargon is pretty close to what G. Orwell (1984) in "1984" called "Newspeak" and could be characterized by the overuse of clichés, euphemisms, and references to the past. Many of these language issues are found in modern political discourse. The globalization process, happening now due to the electronic means of communication, depends a lot on the use or overuse of clichés and stereotypes.

A certain move from symbolic interpretation to an indexical one can be shown in the interpretation of politically correct language and in number of euphemistic journalese phrases. When speaking of the language of politically correctness or euphemisms we can speak of *indexical symbols* or symbols conveying an indirect meaning. They can be judged as indexes as they demonstrate reference to certain concepts "clicking" to a different scheme and tone. The manipulation is carried out through reference to the same object carrying other connotations such as: *tax increase = revenue enhancement; used car = pre-owned car, pre-driven car; married=formerly single* etc. Such phrases are starting to be used in the press as journalese euphemisms: *ethnic cleansing= genocide; destroy=suppress the target; to lie= to be economical with the truth; active air defense = air bombing raid; pacification=punitive operation; collateral damage=unintended killing of civilians* etc.

Further examples can be provided by politically correct English when ordinary words are replaced by politically correct ones. Such example include:

"stewardess", "secretary", "fireman" and "poor" when replaced nowadays by "flight attendant", "office administrator", "firefighter" and "culturally deprived" respectively. As a result it is clear that this language change has been purposefully done. We can speak of a certain "political diglossia" as we see differences between ordinary language and political language, as well as ordinary language and propaganda language.

There are all sorts of clichés and catchphrases with reference to the precedent texts: "We did the best, you know the rest" (The phrase by Russian Vice-President Tchernomyrdin) or "Process is underway" (Gorbachyov); "I have a dream" (M.L.King); "Speak softly and always carry a big stick" (Roosevelt). Some phrases have become comment clichés without any references to a particular person: "There'll be a holiday in our street." "A fish rots from the head first". "You scratch my back, I'll scratch yours". These phrases are constantly on the move and they start to be used in everyday speech as comment ironic or sarcastic phrases. Such program slogans "Economy should be economical" (Brezhnev); "New Frontier" (Kennedy); "Axis of evil" (Bush) can be met as catchphrases in everyday speech.

Political Doublespeak as a sign and a special code may hold the whole model of expression that deals more with purposeful violation of maxims of cooperation. Dealing with the textual implicatures and interpretations of speeches by journalists are is particularly interesting. An example of this can be taken from the following Bush statement made in 1999 concerning Affirmative Action cited by A Reznikov (2002):
I support the spirit of no quotas and no preferences. But it's important to say it's not what you're against but what you're for. In our state, I am for increasing the pool of applicants, opening the door so that more people are eligible to go to the university system. (p.77) This statement got two interpretations: "The Washington Post" thought that the President supported Affirmative Action and a "New York Times" correspondent thought that he attacked it (pp.77-78).

Some statements of political bizarre provide analysts with unique material for interpretation. Quite interesting or rather weird is the Bill Clinton's comment on the meaning of the ambiguity English verb "to be": "It depends on what the meaning of the word "is" is, and never has been, that's the one thing. If it means there is none that was a completely true statement." (p.86). The interpretation of the existential predicate is shifted into the sphere of tense/aspect mode. Thus ambiguity of interpretation allows camouflaging the very idea of interpretability.

This hoax of intentional misleading has become one distinctive feature of modern political discourse.

One more US President's statement concerns such abstract categories as "the truth" and "time/tense" reconstruction: So that anyone generally speaking in the present tense saying that was an improper relationship would be telling the truth if that person said there was not, in the present tense – the present tense encompassing many months. (cited in Reznikov, 2002, p. 86) The concept of "truth" is tainted with the concept of "power" as the latter one establishes the norm for interpretation of the truth.

These newspeaks of political figures provide analysts with a number of aphoristic devices and fallacious arguments. Thus, it is possible to conclude that political discourse may be looked upon as an example of argumentative discourse aimed at producing a change in political and social paradigm or a change in the coverage of some old problems.

The third type of interpretation lies in the sphere of *iconic* presentation where pictorial and verbal information play an interactive part. This is extremely important nowadays especially keeping in mind the clip information effect in for example the situation caricatures. Caricatures can be interpreted as icons and iconic text as an act of code – making. In this respect iconism is not a single phenomenon. The polyphony here is construed in two domains of discourse practices – the visual and narrative. The structure is composed of two frame types which are referred to as pictorial and textual. The pictorial frame deals with background and key objects interacting with the headline, the lead. The content of the article interacts in the argumentative scheme. The interpretation of the icon, symbol and index scheme may lie in the sphere of looking for precedent texts and situations.

Having observed the interaction of symbols, indexes and icons in the interpretation of the language of media text it is necessary to stress the importance of the triad <Language – Text – Discourse> within the framework of the existing paradigms for political language research. The first is dealing with signal units. The second deals with the code in both articulation and the functions producing the text-type, and the third deals with the argumentative scheme.

The pragma-dialectical approach for argumentative analysis proves to be very fruitful as it includes philosophical, theoretical, empirical, analytical, and practical components. It is based on the assumption that a philosophical ideal of

reasonableness must be developed from which a theoretical model for acceptable argumentative discourse can be derived (Van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992). Ordinary dialogue provides us with lots of discrepancies which can still be encompassed by the pragma-dialectical approach. The study of argumentation is approached with four basic meta-theoretical premises, each of which represents a point of departure from other contemporary perspectives, that is externalization, socialization, functionalisation and dialectification. These factors in the notion of argumentation are realized by making use of pragmatic insights from discourse, conversational analysis and dialectical insights from critical rationalist philosophy and dialogical logic.

From the philosophical point of view crucial the model of critical discussion that provides the procedure for establishing whether or not a standpoint is defensible is in grounding the pragma-dialectical theory. The model specifies various stages and rules of the resolution process, and the types of speech acts used at each particular stage. The rhetorical insight helps to define strategic maneuvering in resolving the differences of opinion. (Houtlosser, 2001). From the linguistic point of view there appears to be a certain symbiosis of pragmalinguistics, functional semantics and dialectics.

The most obvious language structure dealing with the polyphony concept is the citation and quasi-citation structures. The argumentative scheme in providing polyphony of voices through direct or indirect citation actually camouflages the tendency to manipulate readers. The argumentative scheme in providing polyphony of voices through direct, indirect and quasi citation. Starting with the medieval exempla citing was later used as a type of reference to the authority in obtaining approval for reasonable statements and actions. It became an index of truth providing a special universal form of a speech act which defined the act of perception of other speech acts connected with the idea of truth. Guaranteed truth of statements used as citations is used by journalists now as a preconceived idea. Coherence of utterances with citation is based on the structural (i.e. semantic and argumentative) relations of the primary speech genre and the secondary one. As it has been shown argumentative schemes, thesis, and arguments present a diverse interactive field for uncovering the relations between types of quotations and premises and arguments (Tretyakova & Smirnova, 2005).

One of the most popular types of type argumentum, *ad ipse dixit*, deals with theolological grounds. The function of the analysis is the imperative for action as

follows from the example:

A 20 – storey tower block should be built 50 meters from the entrance of the Tate Modern.

Ken Livingstone, London's mayor, takes a similar view, because the project includes affordable homes.

A spokesman for London Town said that the building would "boost the vitality of the area" and that the project would include a grant for environmental improvements

(*Guardian*, July 9, 2003, p.9.)

Here the action is justified by the noble goals beneficial for most of the people. Benefactors are respectable people of the community.

The polyphony of textual structure, devised by the interaction of an argument and certain appeals is expressed by the embedded proposition. For example, the arguments at the primary and secondary levels can interact. For example, *ad vericundiam* interacts with the argument *ad populum*. Instead of developing the premise proof the persuasion procedure is psychologically concerned with different appeals/references such as appeals to material wealth, public interests, fairness etc. (pp.85-86). In the analysis of cited *ipse dixit* arguments different functions can be drawn out. These are referential as in a previous example, metalingual if the citation has one more reference to other words, emotive when the argument has reference to emotions:

The focus of attention is dealing with the threat of uncertainty. Among other functions the aesthetic function of humour or irony can be mentioned. For example, M. Chirac never achieved anything substantial. "Le Point" magazine illustrated his often unremarkable and sometimes ropey career by a joke about the man who falls from a skyscraper and shouts at each floor: "So far, so good." (*Times*, March 15, 2002, p. 26)

The difference between pseudo citations and citations lies both in the structural and functional sphere with quasi-citations being more multi-functional with conative, aesthetic, phatic, and poetic functions.

Conclusion.

It is possible to conclude that political discourse may be looked upon as an example of argumentative discourse aimed at producing a change in the political and social paradigm or a change in coverage of some old problems. Along with political discourse we can speak of political linguistics which can be called an integrated discipline incorporating political discourse methods and the apparatus of communicative linguistics. In the study of political discourse and political linguistics rhetoric and argumentation theory are incorporated into linguistic research.

Discursive practices of modern media texts with "clip" structures and the "clip mentality" of the receivers make Peircian semiotics applicable to the interpretation of the text. The concept of the interpretant allows interpreting symbols, indexes and icons as modes showing multidimensional communicative reality in a media text. One of these structures used in modern press as a specific means of persuasion is connected with citation.

Framing political discourse as a metaphorical battlefield allows looking at the language as a means of combat and communicative situations as strategies. Linguistic discursive analysis focuses on ritualized communication, political doublespeak, the procedure of decision making, and the resolution of confrontations. We can conclude that political linguistics refers to the study of the language of persuasion in the political sphere (including the language of the mass media) and it is part of argumentation studies as it concerns pointing out various persuasion devices.

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ISSA Proceedings 2006 – The Polemical Interaction Between Darwin And Mivart: A Lesson On Refuting Objections

Charles Darwin and George Mivart once engaged in a famous polemic concerning the origin of species. I will analyze this polemic in the light of the conceptual framework and argumentative strategies of Darwin's *On the Origin of Species* (1872)**[i]** and Mivart's *On the Genesis of Species* (1871). In order to understand the

nature of their polemic, I will compare the problems they intended to deal with, their answers as well as their motivations, presuppositions, arguments, and argumentative strategies. In particular, I will focus on Mivart's objections and Darwin's responses as part of their argumentative strategies.I will treat refutation in its widest sense (without reducing it to merely proving falsehood) as a collection of procedures to challenge an opponent's position or proposition.

1. *Problems*

1.1 *Darwin's problem*

What is the subject of *Origin of Species*? If one looks at the table of contents, the *Origin* covers all the branches of Natural History in order to answer the central question: how are species produced in Nature? The *Origin* is a narrative which, by pulling together a great variety of threads, weaves a web whose purpose is clearly expressed in the Introduction: in dealing with the "origin of species", it is not enough to conclude that the various species were not created independently. It is necessary to show how species originate from one another. This question appears in several forms (Darwin 1875, chapter III, p. 48-9): How are species produced in Nature? How do co-adaptations take place? How do varieties become good species? How are genera, groups, and sub-groups formed?

1.2 *Mivart's problem*

The purpose of *On the Genesis of Species* is to find a path which reconciles apparently opposing scientific, philosophical, and religious views. Mivart's main concern is how to reconcile evolution and theology. In order to answer this question, he first has to remove what he sees as "a few misconceptions and mutual misunderstandings which oppose harmonious action" (Mivart 1871, p.15), and to attack a theory of evolution which clashes with his own religious views. The Darwinian theory of Natural Selection is his main target, but he also attacks Herbert Spencer and Alfred R. Wallace's views on ethical or moral questions (Darwin's *Descent of Man* and *Expressions and Emotions in Man and Animals* had not yet been published).

2. *Answers*

2.1 *Darwin's answer*

From the very beginning of his long narrative, Darwin's guiding answer is:

"… I am convinced that Natural Selection has been the most important, but not the exclusive, means of modification." (Darwin, 1875, Introduction, p. 2).

The central role played by the Principle of Natural Selection in Darwin's theory can be seen in its "definitions":

"I have called this principle, by which each slight variation, if useful, is preserved, by the term Natural Selection, in order to mark its relation to man's power of selection. But the expression often used by Mr. Herbert Spencer of the Survival of the Fittest is more accurate, and is sometimes equally convenient" (C.Darwin, 1875, p.49.).

"This preservation of favorable individual differences and variations, and the destruction of those which are injurious, I have called Natural Selection, or the Survival of the Fittest" (Darwin, 1875, p.63).

"... Natural Selection, as we shall hereafter see, is a power incessantly ready for action, and is immeasurably superior to man's feeble efforts, as the works of Nature are to those of Art" (Darwin, 1875, p.49).

"Nature, if I may be allowed to personify the natural preservation or the survival of the fittest, cares nothing for appearances, except in so far as they are useful to any being. She can act on every internal organ, on every shade of constitutional difference, on the whole machinery of life. Man selects for his own good: Nature only for that of the being which she tends" (Darwin, 1875, p.65).

2.2 *Mivart's answer*

Mivart's looks for a *tertium quid* to provide a comprehensive and conciliatory view of the genesis of species which will "completely harmonize with the teachings of science, philosophy, and religion" (Mivart 1871, p.15). In relation to science, Mivart's contribution aims at proving scientifically that the Darwinian theory is not the only view of evolution (indeed that it is not scientific at all), and in proposing an alternative view of evolution. In relation to religion and philosophy, in chapter IX, "Evolution and Ethics", Mivart examines the fact of morality to prove the dual origin of man, and thus the existence of God. Human beings, according to Mivart, have a dual origin: the dust of the earth and God's breath of life (Mivart 1871, p. 269). "Grace" and "Nature" combine to create something unique (Mivart, 1871, p. 305). In his concluding chapter, "Theology and Evolution", he initially dismisses those who identify religious orthodoxy with the narrow-minded opinions with which they were brought up, as well as those who are hostile to religion.

The action of God in the physical world takes place through what Mivart calls

"derivative creation" as the "natural" action of God, which occurs by means of "secondary laws" and presupposes God's direct and supernatural action (Mivart 1871, p. 269). "Evolution" (which cannot be completely explained) is defined as the manifestation to the intellect, by means of impressions of the senses, of some ideal entity (power, principle, nature, or activity) which was previously in a merely "potential" state, but capable of becoming present, or manifest, under the requisite conditions. Species are "peculiar congeries of characters or attributes, innate powers and qualities, and a certain nature realized in individuals (…) which before were latent" (Mivart 1871, p. 288).

3. *Motivations*
3.1 *Darwin's motivations*
From the time of his *Notebooks* (1836 and 1837), or even earlier during his voyage on the Beagle, Darwin was moved by what he called the "mystery of mysteries", i.e. the origin of species, and the questions he raises reveal his search for explanations based on "natural" causes which do not depend on "supernatural" ones. From early on, he dreamt of the idea of making a contribution to science, and of being recognized for this by his fellow scientists.

3.2 *Mivart's motivations*
Mivart says that the aim of his work is "to endeavor to add one stone to this temple of concord, to try to remove a few of the misconceptions and mutual misunderstandings which oppose harmonious action" (Mivart 1871, p. 15). His reflections suggest an almost desperate physical, epistemological, and ontological search for harmony, in spite of the dualisms on which many of his beliefs are based, and which he tries to overcome. Although Mivart tries to refute Darwin's theory scientifically, he does not attempt to hide his religious motivations.

4. *Presuppostions*
4.1 *Darwin's presuppostions*
Darwin's approach to the problem of the origin of species presupposes gradualism and naturalism as epistemological and ontological tenets, and evolution as a "natural" process of formation of new organic forms which are to be explained by "natural" means, together with a non-essentialist view of species (he compares species with individuals). On the basis of his approach there is a view of Nature as a system, and, in accordance with this view, one of his strongest methodological tenets is the interdisciplinary support that evidence from different fields can provide.

4.2 *Mivart's presuppositions*

Mivart advocates a rational theism, and believes that the general theory of evolution is "perfectly consistent with the strictest and most orthodox Christian theology" (Mivart 1871, p. 16). Physical science, philosophy, and theology belong to different domains. Physical science and "evolution" have nothing to do with absolute or derivate creation, inasmuch as the latter is simply the working of divine action through natural laws. Mivart holds an essentialist view of "evolution" and "species". In addition to his religious beliefs, Mivart had a scientific background as an accomplished anatomist.

5. *General arguments*
5.1 *Darwin's general argument*

Darwin asks the reader to understand his work as "one long argument". Its structure follows five main argumentative steps:

I. Historical Sketch – which situates Darwin's theory within the framework of evolutionary thought;

II. Introduction – Darwin presents his aims, facts to be explained, the need to show how evolution takes place, in order to differentiate evolutionism from creationism, and the new demands for investigation to be created by his theory;

III. The logical-conceptual framework of the theory (chapters I-V) – Variation, Nature, the Struggle for Existence, Natural Selection, and their interrelationships;

IV. The explanatory power of Natural Selection;

IV.I The treatment of the difficulties that the theory has to overcome (chapters VI-IX) – the difficulties raised by Mivart, miscellaneous objections, instinct, and hybridism;

IV.II The transformation of unfavorable into favorable evidence (chapter X) – the exploitation of the imperfection of geological records;

IV.II. Cases which are clearly favorable to the explanatory superiority of the Darwinian theory over the Creationist view (chapters XI –XIV) – the geological succession of organic beings, their geographical distribution, morphology, embryology, rudimentary organs, and classification;

V. Recapitulation and Conclusion – the "one long argument" that constitutes the book is concisely presented as a single whole.

5.2 *Mivart's argument*

There are three main steps in Mivart's attempt to show that the Darwinian theory

of evolution is not the only one (indeed that it is not a scientific theory at all), and to open the path for a theory designed to reconcile evolution and theology:

I. Introduction: Mivart tries to establish the legitimacy of a *tertium quid* by criticizing Darwin's general argument, and sets out the reasons for the wide acceptance of Darwin's theory;

II. The scientific reasons for not accepting the Darwinian theory, and for the plausibility of an alternative evolutionary view (chapters I-XI) – Mivart criticizes Darwin's basic concepts, such as "species" and "natural selection", and attributes the wide acceptance of Darwin's theory to half-educated people. He attempts to show the inability of Natural Selection to explain certain natural phenomena and morality, by drawing up a list of general objections, and carefully examining some particular cases.

III. The main points of Mivart's attempt to reconcile evolution and theology are discussed (chapters IX and XII). Mivart's main arguments are: God exists and our belief in God's existence is not based on physical phenomena (Mivart, 1871, p. 272), but justified by our primary intuitions, such as the uncontroversial intuitions of free will and causation, and morality and responsibility. As regards evolution, Mivart says that if causes other than Natural Selection can be proved to have been involved – for instance, variation – then Natural Selection is not the sole cause of evolution, but depends on these other causes, and only supplements them (Mivart 1871, p. 32). (It is worth noting that Darwin clearly states that variation must be provided by Nature in order for Natural Selection to act upon it. To this extent, Mivart's critique misses its target).

6. *Argumentative strategies*
6.1 *Darwin's argumentative strategies*
Throughout his explanatory task, Darwin is clearly aware of the fact that explanation always depends on a given theoretical view or assumption and, in particular, on the comparison of different views, and that facts can be seen from these different viewpoints. In particular, in explaining the origin of species one cannot rely on immediate and conclusive empirical evidence.
Certain Darwinian strategies are central to the general structure of his "one long argument", such as the whole-part movement designed to put together Darwin's argument; his appeal to explanatory power as a whole; the comparison of his view with those of his opponents in order to emphasize its superior explanatory power; the balance of reasons for and against any issue; the interplay of the real and the

possible by focusing on what is actually given, on the existence or inexistence of contrary evidence, and on what is logically and/or factually possible; and the treatment of difficulties / objections / exceptions. He considers the latter strategy so important that, when defending the explanatory power of his theory, Darwin begins by presenting and refuting difficulties and objections. By anticipating and discussing them, Darwin is able to make even the weakest points of his theory plausible.

The explanation of difficulties / objections /exceptions consists in: confronting them directly; accounting for their nature and source as the result of our ignorance of the relevant factors; clarifying their objective content, "resolving" the "apparent" difficulties, or "solving" the "real" ones, and weakening their impact; showing the reasonableness / unreasonableness of objections in the light of the appropriate approach to the subject; filling gaps through pertinent assumptions; confronting the presuppositions and/or procedures of the objector by showing that they are objections which have to be confronted by all theories, and by progressively rendering the objection more and more relative, until it is neutralized, or converted into mere "appearance", or by changing it into evidence favorable to the explanatory power of the Darwinian theory; the treatment of the exceptions not only sets limits on the validity of the explanations to be given, but discussing them extends the scope of Darwin's explanatory efforts in such a way that the surprising may be converted into the expected.

In addition, Darwin appeals to our ignorance, to the authority of the scientific community and its values and ideals, to the psychological conditions of scientific investigation, to mental habits, to the progressive minds of those from whom Darwin expects support for his theory, and to its revolutionary nature, by demanding the re-structuring of existing disciplinary fields and the creation of new ones.

6.2 *Mivart's argumentative strategies*
Besides criticizing the Darwinian view, Mivart's basic strategy for defending his ideas is to rely on very general (and repeated) religious and philosophical considerations. His more specific strategies consist in: separating the domains of physical science, philosophy, and theology in such a way that the "facts" of the first domain cannot prove or disprove the beliefs related to the other two; establishing careful semantic distinctions, such as between the meanings of "creation", "evolution" and "specific forms"; on the basis of these distinctions,

avoiding incompatibility between these separate realms; and discussing the positions of scientists, philosophers and theologians, whose prestige appears to convey a certain scientific legitimacy to his speculations. In order to attack Darwin's theory "scientifically", his basic strategy consists in attempting to show the inconsistencies of Natural Selection as an approach to evolution by discussing a series of counter-examples and, in the light of these, arguing that explanation by means of Natural Selection does not exclude other kinds of explanation.

Additional strategies used by Mivart include: the exploitation of emotional resources – he takes advantage of the emotional tone with which some of Darwin's supporters attacked theology to emphasize their intolerance and narrow-mindedness; and a mixture of candor and irony, of recognition and reprobation – he recognizes the positive scope of Darwin's efforts, and then indicates certain "absolutely insuperable" difficulties (Mivart 1871, pp.16-17). Mivart says that the great problem of the origin "of different kinds of animals and plants seems at last to be fairly on the road to receive – perhaps at no very distant future – as satisfactory a solution as it can well have" (Mivart 1871, p. 13). Thus, all efforts made before Mivart – including Darwin's long work – have only amounted to an effort to put things "fairly on the road" to receiving a satisfactory solution in the future! Having ruled out the Darwinian approach, Mivart then politely says that we are indebted to the "invaluable labors and active brains" of Darwin and Wallace, which have helped us to come closer to the solution for the problem. Even short comments within brackets are used to this end, such as the remark that "on account of the noble self-abnegation of Mr. Wallace" (Mivart 1871, p. 22), the theory of Natural Selection is in general exclusively associated with Darwin's name.

7. *Objections and responses*
7.1 *Mivart's objections*
7.1.1 Mivart criticizes Darwin for never admitting that the absence of reconciliation between his theory and theism is unfounded. If Darwin has not studied Christian philosophy well enough, Mivart argues, he should not accept the antagonism between "creation" and "evolution" as an unchallengeable fact. Darwin has nothing to offer in terms of the dilemma of an Omnipotent God who would either render "Natural Selection" a superfluous law of Nature, or would be responsible for preordering so many deviations (Mivart 1871, p. 272). Having made all due restrictions, Mivart can then admit to the usefulness of Darwin's theory for explaining certain facts, but adds that "the utility of a theory by no

means implies its truth" (Mivart 1871, p. 22).

7. 1.2 Mivart criticizes the ready acceptance or rejection of Darwin's theory. The ease with which Darwin's theory coincides with facts can only be appreciated by physiologists, zoologists, and botanists (Mivart 1871, p. 23). One reason for this ready (and non-scientific) acceptance is the "remarkable simplicity" of Darwin's theory in explaining all complex phenomena "by the simple phrase 'survival of the fittest'" (Mivart 1871, p. 23). This "simplicity" makes Darwinism a subject for general conversation, in the same way as hydropathy and phrenology, "in the eyes of the unlearned or half-educated public".

7.1.3 Some difficulties are raised against basic tenets of Darwin's theory. Immediately after saying that the solution to the problem of the origin of species "is fairly on the road", Mivart adds that the birth of species cannot be compared to that of an individual being. Darwin's theory, which is based on such a view, is placed "out of the road" from the start. Mivart's argument against this comparison is determined by the concept of species he assumes, i.e. "species" as "common natures". One might in turn ask why Mivart's concept of species as a congeries of "powers" and, moreover, of "innate powers", should be accepted. Mivart interprets Darwin's argument as follows:
(1) Every kind of animal and plant tends to increase in numbers in a geometrical progression.
(2) Every kind of animal and plant transmits a general likeness, with individual differences, to its offspring.
(3) Every individual may present minute variations of any kind and in any direction.
(4) Past time has been practically infinite.
(5) Every individual has to endure a severe struggle for existence, owing to the tendency to geometrical increase of all kinds of animals and plants, while the total animal and vegetable population (man and his actions excepted) remains almost stationary.

(Conclusion) Thus, every variation of a kind tending to save the life of the individual possessing it, or to enable it more surely to propagate its kind, will in the long-run be preserved, and will transmit this favorable characteristic to at least some of its offspring, which peculiarity will does become intensified till it reaches its maximum degree of utility. On the other hand, individuals presenting unfavorable peculiarities will be ruthlessly destroyed. The action of this law of

'Natural Selection' may thus be well represented by the convenient expression, 'survival of the fittest'.(Mivart 1871, pp. 17-18).

Premises 1 and 2 were broadly accepted at the time, and they were not at issue. In relation to premise 3, Mivart seems to confuse "kind" and "direction" of variations (he will later make use of the possibility of dealing with variations "in any direction" to argue against the power of Natural Selection in the formation of new species). The "kind" of variation, according to Darwin, depends on laws of variation that are for the most part unknown to us. Once they arise, they may be useful, injurious or neutral. Once variability begins, Darwin believes that there is a tendency to continue in "that direction", so that the accumulation of useful variations through Natural Selection in the right direction will lead to the production of new species. Instead of emphasizing variation in "any direction", Darwin emphasizes variation "in the right direction".

In relation to premise 4, one must be reminded that Darwin does not focus on the infinity of time, but on the limits of our imagination to perceive geological time.

In relation to premise 5, this might be a useful premise to ensure control over individuals and populations in order to preserve harmony, which is what Mivart is seeking. However, what Darwin says is that if there were no checks to the balance of nature, the natural tendency of populations to increase their numbers to the maximum level would not be controlled, and he does not exclude man from this balance.

Lastly, the phrase "till it reaches the maximum degree of utility" in the conclusion may be in accordance with Mivart's own ideas, but it is at least a distortion of Darwin's conceptions.

7.1.4 On p. 34, Mivart lists objections on general issues:

1. "That 'Natural Selection' is unable to account for the incipient stages of useful structures"

2. "That it does not harmonize with the coexistence of closely-similar structures of diverse origin."

3. "That there are grounds for thinking that specific differences may be developed suddenly instead of gradually." (Mivart admits that both are possible, but thinks the first is more likely)

4. "That the opinion that species have definite though very different limits to their variability is still tenable".

5. "That certain fossil transitional forms are absent, when they might have been

expected to be present".

6. "That some facts of geographical distribution complement other difficulties." (Mivart attributes a lesser grade of difficulty to the phenomena of geographical distribution)

7. "That the objection based on the physiological difference between "species" and "races" is still unrefuted".

8. "That there are many remarkable phenomena in organic forms upon which "Natural Selection" throws no light whatever, but the explanations of which, if they could be attained, might throw light upon specific origination".

Several of these difficulties are discussed by Darwin in chapter VII of his 6th. edition when responding to Mivart's specific objections, although many of them had already been discussed in the *Origin*.

Objections 2, 4 and 8 are based on irreconcilable viewpoints. Darwin deals with difficulties 2 and 8 in Chapter XIV of the *Origin*, and Difficulty 4 is examined in chapter I (According to Darwin, the more uniform the conditions of life, the less variation occurs, and he returns to his objector the *onus probandi* for the existence of limits to variability once it has begun). Difficulties 1 and 3 are closely related to each other, and have to do with Darwin's basic presuppositions of gradualism. Difficulty 1 is dealt with in Chapter VI, Difficulty 5 in chapter X, Difficulty 6 in chapters XI and XII, and Difficulty 7 is extensively examined in Chapter IX.

7.1.5 Specific difficulties are carefully examined by Mivart from chapters II to VIII.**[ii]** Among these are: the formation of the giraffe's neck; cases of mimicry; the eyes of flat-fish; the formation of the whalebone; the physiology of the young kangaroo; the utility of sea-urchins' pedicellaria; the co-adaptation of orchids and visiting insects; the case of sterile insects; the formation of the mammary gland; the formation of organs of senses; homologies. Mivart dedicates a very detailed analysis of each of these cases. All of them involve the issue of gradualism, which was the first of the general difficulties raised by Mivart: "That 'Natural Selection' is unable to account for the incipient stages of useful structures".

7.2 Darwin's responses. Darwin claims that all of Mivart's objections are considered in his 6th edition of the *Origin of Species* (Darwin 1875, pp.176-177). Mivart's book had had a significant impact on the public. Darwin had been preparing the 6th edition of the *Origin* since June, 1871. From July to September Darwin answered Mivart's objections, his "cleverest and least fair enemy"

(Peckham 1959, p.22). The answers took up the largest part of a chapter included by Darwin in the 6th. edition, which was a new chapter VII.

Mivart's book was reviewed by Chaunchey Wright (*North American Review*, July, 1871), who had sent Darwin a letter on June 21, 1871 (Darwin, 1888, III vol. p. 143) with the revised proofs of his article, and a comment on using Mivart's book as the basis on which to illustrate and philosophically defend the Theory of Natural Selection. Darwin thought about asking Wright to publish his review as a shilling pamphlet, together with additions not previously included. Darwin would treat the subject much more concretely, so that he and Wright would not duplicate each other's comments. Darwin consulted Wallace about Wright's article, and said:

"... after studying Mivart, I was never before in my life so convinced of the general (i.e not detailed) truth of the views in the *Origin*. I grieve to see the omission of the words by Mivart, detected by Wright. I complained to Mivart that in two cases he quotes only the commencement of sentences by me, and thus modifies my meaning; (...) There are other cases of what I consider unfair treatment. I conclude with sorrow that though he means to be honorable, he is so bigoted that he cannot act fairly" (Darwin, 1888, III vol. p. 144-145).

7.2.1 Wright's pamphlet was published on October 23, 1871. In this way, Darwin involved the philosophical and scientific community in his cause against Mivart. By publicly accepting a minor objection from Mivart to certain laws of correlation stated in Chapter V, Darwin showed a reasonable attitude towards Mivart. (Darwin, 1875, p.115), and thus increased the impact of his chapter VII. He begins his answers to Mivart by discrediting him before the reader – he claims Mivart does not intend to set out the various facts and considerations opposed to his conclusions, nor does he leave any space for the reader's reason or memory (Darwin, 1875, p.177).

Let us now consider some of Darwin's responses to Mivart's specific objections.

7.2.2 The case of the whale-bone belongs to a pattern of explanation of difficulties already mastered in chapter VI. In this chapter, Darwin deals with the General Objection 1, and offers a detailed argument for the formation of "organs of extreme perfection and complication" which spring from minute variations, and gives the case of human eyes as an example. In this kind of argument, the interplay of the real and the possible, the explanatory power as a whole, the balance of reasons, the comparison between the explanatory power of Darwin's

theory and that of his opponents, and the careful descriptions of the organs of the different groups to be compared – all play an integrated part. The treatment of this objection also serves as an answer to Objection 2 concerning the co-existence of closely-similar structures.

In the case of the whale-bone Darwin starts with very careful descriptions of the baleen, or whalebone. He carefully examines the possible gradations that go from the beak of a member of the duck family to that of a shoveller, by way of the beak of the Egyptian goose and of the common duck. Returning to the whales, considering that the Hyperoodon Bidens has a roughened palate with small, unequal, hard points of horn, there is, claims Darwin, nothing unusual in supposing that some early cetacean form had similar but more regularly placed points of horn on the palate, and that these were converted through variation and Natural Selection into well-developed lamellae. Subsequent gradations, which may be observed in existing cetaceans, would lead to the enormous plates of baleen in the Greenland whale.

7. 2.3 In answering the objection about the formation of the giraffe's neck, Darwin points out that the acquisition of certain organic structures depends on the fact that some species are much more variable than others, and that a set of conditions must exist: the co-adaptation of several other parts of the organism; the variability of the necessary parts in the right direction and to the right degree; external and continuingly conditions favorable to the action of Natural Selection; the concurrence of the laws of growth; and living habits. In addition, the treatment of the case of the giraffe's neck serves to emphasize that certain explanatory aims must be general and vague.

7.2.4 The case of the mammary gland seems to raise a major difficulty: could the young be saved from destruction by sucking a drop of a barely nutritious fluid from the accidentally hypertrophied cutaneous gland of its mother? And even if this was so, what chance was there of the perpetuation of such a variation?

Initially Darwin replies by attacking the basis for this objection: the case is not put fairly. Most evolutionists admit that mammals are descended from a marsupial form; if so, the mammary glands would have at first developed within the marsupial sack. "Now with the early progenitors of mammals (…), is it not at least possible that the young might have been similarly nourished?" (Darwin 1875, p.189). In this case, the individuals who secreted the most nutritious liquid (similar to milk) would in the long run have reared a larger number of well-

nourished offspring. Thus, the cutaneous glands, homologues of the mammary glands, would be rendered more effective, and more highly developed than the remainder of the sack due to whatever cause. In consequence, they would have initially formed a breast without a nipple as in the Ornithorhynchus. But the development of the mammary glands would have been of no use, unless the young at the same time were able to partake of the secretion. But there is no greater difficulty in understanding how young mammals have instinctively learnt to suck the breast, than in understanding how unhatched chickens have learnt to break the egg-shell, or how a few hours after leaving the shell they have learnt to pick up grains of food.

7.2.5 Related to the above difficulty is the case of the young kangaroo: the young kangaroo only clings to the nipple of its mother, who has the power of injecting milk into the mouth of her offspring. Mivart remarks that some special provision exists to avoid the young being choked by the intrusion of the milk into the windpipe. Darwin responds: there is a special provision. The larynx is so elongated that it rises up into the posterior end of the nasal passage, and is thus enabled to give free entrance to the air for the lungs, while the milk passes harmlessly on each side of this elongated larynx, and so safely attains the gullet behind it. But if so, how would Natural Selection remove this perfectly innocent and harmless structure in the adult kangaroo (and in most other mammals, provided they are descended from a marsupial form)? Darwin answers that the voice, which is certainly of high importance to many animals, could hardly have been used with full force, as Professor Flower suggests, while the larynx entered the nasal passage.

7.2.6 After meeting Mivart's chief objections against Natural Selection, Darwin attacks the inconsistencies of their fragile bases. They do not have the character of demonstration that Mivart requires for the explanatory power of Natural Selection. Mivart invokes an unknown "internal force or tendency" instead of the well-known tendency to ordinary variability, which through the aid of selection by man has clearly given rise to many well-adapted domestic races, and which through the aid of Natural Selection would give rise by graduated steps to natural races or species.

Also, Darwin claims that there are reasons for disbelieving in great and abrupt modifications on the bases of what we know about the rarity of occasional specific and abrupt changes in domestication. On the one hand, as species are more

variable under domestication than under Nature, the frequent occurrence of such great and abrupt variations in Nature is not probable. To believe in the sudden appearance of a new species, one would also have to believe that several miraculously-changed individuals could appear simultaneously within the same geographical area!

On the other hand, many large groups of geographical distribution, geological succession of forms, classification, and embryology are intelligible only on the principle that different species have evolved by very small steps. The only evidence that seems to support a belief in abrupt development, i.e. the sudden appearance of new and distinct forms of life in our geological formations, depends entirely on the unproven belief in the precision of geological records.

Conclusion

Comparing Darwin and Mivart, one sees that they put different emphases on the issue of the origin of species, and this fact has consequences for the specificity of their problems, answers, and arguments. Darwin's problem is much more specific, focusing on "natural" phenomena, while Mivart's attention concentrates on a very general point of view by trying to reconcile evolution and theology. Darwin's answer is definite, and concerned with a "natural" cause to explain a host of natural phenomena. Mivart's answer is based on general religious and philosophical beliefs, and much more indefinite in terms of their concrete explanatory scope. In relation to the explanation of natural phenomena, he concentrates his efforts on raising difficulties to Darwin's theory, rather than proposing an explanation of his own. The combination of these different levels of questions turns Mivart's argument less structured than Darwin's.

Their presuppositions are radically opposed to each other and built on different meanings of central ideas, such as those of "evolution" and "species". Darwin has a naturalistic orientation, and Mivart has a theistic one. Whereas Mivart tries to conciliate Science and Religion, Darwin wants to keep them apart. According to Darwin, to accept all the analogies required by Mivart, and which Wright proved to be false, is "to enter into the realms of miracle and to leave those of Science" (Darwin 1875, p. 204).

Both thinkers share a strong motivation: making a personal contribution to science. They both appeal to emotional overtones, and to argumentative maneuvers to rule out the opponent. Each of them feels personally attacked by the other. Mivart makes use of some intellectual strategies mastered by Darwin, like the interplay of the actual and the possible, the appeal to the scientific

community, which is so fundamental to Darwin's argumentation. Both also appeal to the complexity of the problem, and to our ignorance about several matters involved in it. Nevertheless, Darwin develops a larger repertoire of sophisticated cognitive strategies. Mivart explicitly raises objections to Darwin in order to build his own explanation. Darwin's treatment of difficulties / objections / exceptions is a leading strategy to show the explanatory superiority of his theory.

As a result, we might expect that distortions by the opponent's ideas by each one of them would play an important role in the polemics. And they do. On the one hand, Mivart unquestionably assumes an anti-Darwinian concept of "species", and subtly makes little distortions in his reconstruction of Darwin's argument. Darwin clearly referred to Mivart's omissions and distortions in his citations of Darwin. Many difficulties of Darwin's theory raised by Mivart presuppose the adoption of his viewpoint, as his general Objection 2. On the other hand, Darwin finely takes advantage of circumstances favorable to create an anti-Mivart atmosphere before responding to his objections. In responding to them, Darwin first shows the explanatory capacity of his theory, and secondly attacks the bases of Mivart's objections. Objections and answers are moved by irreconcilable viewpoints.

One can learn several lessons from this polemics. I will point out three. First, that it is deeply founded on radically different presuppositions, and that it is clearly about "views" rather than about facts, and has consequences for what should be the "facts", how to interpret them, and how to make science. Second, that they are not trying to persuade one another, but a larger audience, the scientific community. Third, we can also learn something about "rationality". Mivart espouses a dual view of the human, in which rationality is on the side not shared with other "natural" beings. In turn, Darwinian procedures belong to the rational effort we can achieve as "natural" beings. At the bottom of his efforts, there was a hidden "if" clause: "if there is a rational (according to 'natural' faculties and 'means') answer to the question about the origin of species, then (it should be like his)".

NOTES

[i] The first edition of the Origin of Species was published in 1859.
[ii] As the attention of this paper is focused on The Origin of Species, the questions about pangenesis (chapter X) will not be referred to.

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ISSA Proceedings 2006 – The Normativity Of The Progymnasmata Exercises

The last four years I have been involved in a research project concerning ancient rhetorical exercises and contemporary education. In this paper I will try to conclude some of the results that possibly could have bearing for our argumentative pedagogy. This paper claims the ancient rhetorical preliminary exercises, called *progymnasmata*, could help us in our endeavour to provide students with a suitable set of analysing tools and a wide range of efficient language choices (*copia*). Furthermore it is claimed that the exercises are normative in the sense that the exercises deal with the question whether an argumentation is a good argumentation, i.e. should it be allowed to guide our attitudes and actions?

1. *Rhetorical exercises*
Rhetorical exercises have throughout the history been used for teaching argumentation. Rhetoric is an old art; so is the art of teaching rhetoric. During the Hellenistic era, when Greek culture dominated the Eastern Mediterranean region, a need for a formalistic educational program evolved. It was given the name *enkyklios paidea*, i.e., "comprehensive education" (we recognize in the

Greek the origin of our term "encyclopaedia"). The art of rhetoric became an essential, perhaps *the* essential part of *enkyklios paidea*. The rhetorical training was soon organized according to a set of distinguished exercises, *progymnasmata*.

It is a series of progressive, interdependent exercises of increasing complexity, with each new exercise building on prior skills while introducing students to new ones. They are "preliminary" in the sense that they provided a foundation for understanding a comprehensive system of rhetorical theory and practice, including the three traditional types of rhetoric (forensic, deliberative, and epideictic), rhetoric's five traditional parts, and stylistic ornamentation (figures of thought and speech). The initial exercises consisted of paraphrasing, imitating, and amplifying myths, fables, stories, anecdotes, and proverbs; the intermediate ones developed skills related to refutation and confirmation, commonplace, encomium, comparison, personification, and description; and the final assignments were compositions on theses and law proposals.

The exercises led the student from simple translations and paraphrases to more elaborate ones, and eventually to the development of original compositions responding to a particular source or situation.

It is truly intriguing to see the increasing interest in the ancient rhetorical exercises *progymnasmata*. Ten years ago hardly anyone had heard about progymnasmata. Today a simple web-search will generate 100.000 hits. At most conferences on rhetorical or argumentation pedagogy you will find sections or panels on progymnasmata. There is no longer any reason to talk about a neglected interest in the exercises.

2. *Argumentation pedagogy*

What are the goals of our argumentation pedagogy? From one point of view it could be said to help us to a higher degree act according to our intentions, and to a higher degree hold opinions in line with our believes. Even if there rarely are any theoretical considerations why these exercises might do the job, such considerations are inherent in the exercises. It is assumed that an attempt to extract the theoretical considerations behind the exercises might teach us something vital for today's argumentative teaching.

There are a number of axioms for my research. One is that we are completely free to choose what language to use in argumentation. This fundamental axiom stems from the recognition of the arbitrary relationship between language and reality, that there is no forcing logical relation between language and what it denotes. In

rhetorical theory this is captured in the distinction between res and verba – the distinction between reality and the language we are obliged to use to be able to think about and reflect over this reality.

From a contemporary argumentation pedagogical as well as epistemological view this distinction and necessary union between language and reality, form and content, might be the focal point for argumentation pedagogy.

The term 'epistemological' was used above. A better term – a better verba for the res I aim at – may well be *doxological.* I will do short digression and give some reasons for that. As a rhetorician I do believe that the words we choose have an impact on our perception of the assumed reality, and if we use the word *episteme*, Plato's term for sure knowledge that could not be otherwise, as the stem for how to phrase our theory of knowledge, we are already standing with one foot in Plato's camp. The term doxology, in this meaning, was coined by the Swedish philosopher Mats Rosengren (Rosengren 2002 & 2006). The term has started to do some academic work, and is used in different disciplines (Nilsson 2005). Rosengren starts from the fact that all the knowledge we as human beings have – from theoretical understandings to practical attainments – are *our* human knowledge. By talking about "our human knowledge" all dreams about the stability and ground of knowledge are abandoned. Rosengren shifts the valuation of the terms in the classical opposition between doxa – what we believe about the world and ourselves – and episteme – how thing really are. Doxology, as a contrast to epistemology, has to consider both the practical and theoretical aspects of knowledge, as well as the simple condition that it is people with different interests and possibilities that carry the knowledge, and create the practices and formulate the theories. There is no given epistemological certainty. We have to accept that no clear and sharp border between true knowledge and pure beliefs can be drawn, and see the conditioned, assumed and biased knowledge. Since no truth, evidence or knowledge exists outside or beyond its human context, rhetoric is with its perspectivistic view of knowledge central to all knowledge. The basis for knowledge is the good arguments and not the incontestable proofs, arguments that are regarded as good in a specific historical situation, a particular society, group or scientific discipline. Rosengren means that doxology is about situated, changing and interested knowledge. He argues that criteria for knowledge should not be "true" or "objective" in the way of corresponding to a non-human, objective and neutral reality, but *interesting* in relation to the specific knowledge situation. One of the reasons for Plato's, and

later philosophers' and argumentation scholars', quest for secure foundations rather than an acceptance of argumentative success, is of course that such a quest aims at reducing a misuse of the power of language. The problem is to know when such a situation exists, something that, from a rhetorical point of view, cannot be decided without a negotiation with argumentative success for one side. This is at the root a democratic project, which possibly to a higher degree could be a remedy to different kinds of power abuse. Doxology sees knowledge as localized and produced in and through action – the practices that produce and maintain knowledge is inseparable from knowledge itself. Rhetoric can become a tool for scientific inquiries into our human knowledge. Shifting the role of rhetoric from showing how to influence a certain person or audience at a certain occasion, to instead being an instrument to show what this person or audience believes, values and knows in a specific context and moment. This way of describing the elements in rhetoric – how to make an inventory of the topic, arrange and deliver your arguments based on reason, emotions, confidence etc. – show what is possible to do or imagine, what values that are prevailing, what conceptions and knowledge that are accepted, and who has the privilege of formulating the problem.

Other axioms for my research are that argumentation takes place in a cultural context that is characterized by conflicting alternatives, that the urge to argue stems from a desire to influence and guide the decision making among these alternatives, that argumentation is the alternative to violence and brutal force, and thereby the foundation for democracy, and that argumentation pedagogy is there to help us chose and decide as good as possible.

The object of study for argumentation pedagogy is communication. As a lot of other words it stems from Latin *communicare*, which means to make something common with someone (communion, communism). To study communication is to study how a sender tries to make a thought common with a receiver within a context. Argumentation scholars study how communication is used to convince and persuade, i.e. how a sender tries to make a receiver believe and act according to the transmitted thought.

We all participate in argumentations every day. We have models for effective and constructive argumentations in our heads. What argumentation pedagogy tries to do is to give us tools for conscious reflection over how these models works. And these tools are the meta-cognitive devices in the form of different tools and concepts that will enable us to communicate with our own models, to check

whether they are working as good as we want them to or if we could make them work even better.

A key-term in argumentation pedagogy is, as mentioned, choice. Beside these meta-cognitive devices that can help us chose as constructively as possible, we must have something to chose from. That is one of the reasons why we have different exercises, to give us a broader palette to choose from, exercises for enlargement of our repertoire – *copia* is rhetorical term for this repertoire. And copia is what the ancient rhetorical exercises progymnasmata is all about.

Constructing dichotomies is an often used and often efficient pedagogical device, as long as we remember that they are constructions and not reality itself. One such dichotomy is the distinction between descriptive and normative ambitions in your academic work. At the ISSA conference in Amsterdam it is easy to try to make the case why normative ambitions are important – that our aim should not be just to describe argumentation, but to be able to say whether this is a good argumentation that should be allowed to guide our attitudes and actions. Rhetoric and pragmadialectics share this normative trait. For rhetorical pedagogy normativity has been a characteristic feature since the very beginning. The Quintilian quotation "Vir bonus" is often mentioned. Argumentation pedagogy, pragmadialectic as well as rhetorical, could from an educational point of view be seen as aiming for an increased awareness of the impact of our choice of language for our reflected standpoints and actions. But there are differences.

From the strict distinction between rhetoric-dialectic, pragmadialectics sees rhetoric, with a well-put formulation, as among other things as *antropo-relativistic-audience oriented*, while pragmadialectic is *critical-rational-solution oriented* (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1994: 3-8). For the pragmadialectic view any audience reactions are irrelevant when it comes to judging whether an argumentation is as it should be, when to decide whether the argumentation should contribute to the solution of the problem with different standpoints. There are different forms of theoretical and empirical inferences, established more or less logically, that validate what is to be counted as just and sound. For a more rhetorically oriented argumentation theory that is an untenable stance. That the decision-making concerning possible ways of actions always is made by humans (*antropos*); that the question under discussion, with the words of Aristotle, concerns matters "that could be otherwise, contingent" (the truth of the question is relative, or at least perspective-dependent, *relativistic*); and that the decision-making always takes place within a specific situation, a context where there are

receivers, at least ourselves (*audience*); this clearly shows the doxological differences between rhetoric and pragmadialectics.

The difference is perhaps best captured in the ancient accusation that rhetoricians taught how to make the weaker argument seem the stronger (Gagarin 2001, Hoffman 2003). We usually ascribe the quotation for this ability to a fragment by Protagoras (Schiappa 1991), and it occurs in chapter twenty-four of the second book of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (a fundamental chapter for argumentation analysis; here he displays argumentation that should not be accepted as guidelines since they do not constitute the whole triad of ethos, logos and pathos). To make the weaker argument seem the stronger is a characterisation that lays one's finger on the doxological differences between a rhetorical argumentation pedagogy, and a more philosophical ditto. The philosophical accusation is legitimate. The rhetorical doxology tells us that it is our choice of language, for making us see constructing ways of perceiving a reality that is decisive when it comes to determining what is to be counted as the strongest argument. If this was not the case, it would have been determined beforehand which is to be counted as the strongest argument. Determined before the weight or truthfulness of an assertion has been tested in a critical discussion, where the articulation of opposed alternatives also are allowed. To presuppose the strength of an argument is diametrically opposed to a rhetorical doxology that tells us that the strength of an argument is determined when it is met by the critical eye of an initiated dialogue partner in an open discussion where the whole triad of ethos, logos, and pathos are recognized as rational grounds for a reflected standpoint. So, we will always have to try to make the weakest argument the strongest in order not to risk to be stuck with a possibly erroneous standpoint.

3. *Progymnasmata*
I will now try to make the perhaps trickier case that the progymnasmata are normative exercises in the way that they enhance our ability to choose suitable language forms in normative questions. The exercises are very much hands-on without heavy theorization. But it is easy to deduce and abstract theoretical reasons from the exercises, reasons that will be parts in a theoretical framework. At least it is easy if you have had the opportunity to give the course *Progymnasmata – ancient rhetorical exercises for contemporary education*, as I have. I will now go through the exercises one by one and highlight the normative trait, before I give a short conclusion.

The first exercise, the Fable, always has a moral point. You practise how to prolong, shorten, and paraphrase fables like the dog with a piece of meat in his mouth that sees his own reflection and wants to have that piece as well. But it is this moral point that shows us a theoretical assumption that is something more than mere practical skills. From the very beginning in the exercise-series the normative trait is set. It is not about any objective description of an indifferent reality, there is no such thing. The question is not whether something is true or false in some naive way, but rather whether it is good or bad, evil or just. The moral point of the Fable is always that you should avoid the negative and evil, and instead choose a good alternative. Sometimes almost too obvious like Aphthonius' – his version of the progymnasmata is the most famous and widespread – example of the fable about the ant and the cricket, where the ant works and strives all summer while the cricket is just playing his violin and having fun. When the winter comes the cricket freezes to death while the ant is having a good time in his nest, Apthonios writes, "Similarly, youth that does not wish to toil fares badly in old age" (Aphthonius 2003, p. 96).

The Narratio is the next exercise. From an argumentation point of view every act of communication wants and asks the receiver to look at the world from a certain perspective. While the Fable, as mentioned, is a work of fiction with a moral purpose, narration is a historical account of something that is presumably true or could be true. Like the systematic Aristotle wrote: "Everyone who effects persuasion through proof does in fact use either enthymemes or examples: there is no other way" (Aristotle, 1356b). Examples could be actual or made up, narrations belongs to the former. In any given narration, the storyteller chooses what to say to make the listener or reader perceive the story from a particular perspective. The scientific text is affected by the theoretical stand of the writer, and the holiday narration is forced to pick some aspects and drop some. No narration is a simple reflection of a given reality. As in all communication situations, the narrator must pick one perspective among a multitude of possibilities. By highlighting this choice – that includes the choice of actual wordings – the subjectivity of the narration is made obvious. Among a vast number of possible perspectives and language-choices, the narrator has, with a certain purpose, chosen this particular perspective in an attempt to try to make a certain way of looking at the world communal with the receiver. If this is clear to us as receivers we are well prepared to take a constructive stand to the truth of the narration as the one and only. The narration illustrates the probability of a standpoint in some form of argumentation, at least that the chosen perspective

for some reason is worth taking into account. The narration could then be seen as an inductive support for that claim. The narration could transmit insights that are crucial for our stand on a certain question, insights that hardly could have been conveyed by "saying how it is", simply for the reason that our existence often is so multilayered and cloudy that straight assertions can risk to hinder our ability to see clear.

Next exercise, the Chreia, is the exercise that most clearly captures the theory and didactic of progymnasmata. It is about amplification according to a set scheme of topoi. Topoi that not only are heuristic in the sense that they help us understand the reasons behind a certain standpoint, reasons that do not stop at a logos-centred rationality, but recognizes the importance of ethos and pathos for a reflected standpoint. This is done for example by the topics "why listen to this person", and "What other ethos-strengthening references are there".

One such topic is the counterargument. In progymnasmata the counterargument is a recurring topic in the disposition-schemata. In the most simple way, as many ancient sources do (Aphthonius for example), it could be seen as a suggestion to show the absurdity of the opposite standpoint. But the counterargument topic could also be perceived more heuristically. Not only is it no doubt ethos-strengthening to bring up the strongest counterarguments to your standpoint yourself, it also enhances the possibilities for successful communication: We don't want the ones we are communicating with to afterwards find counterarguments, and thereby give up looking at the question from our point of view. But most of all the counterargument-topic could be seen as a topic for actually trying to listen to the counter-arguments that do exist, and from a heuristic angle that is crucial. If we do not listen to others and are not ready to take in and see a given issue from different perspectives, we have closed the door for the possibility that the matter under discussion could be otherwise – and the earth would still be flat.

The next exercise, the maxim, has the same topic pattern as the chreia, but without the author. Except amplification and heuristic understanding of the reasons why it might be reasonable to apply a maxim to a specific situation, this exercise once again highlight the importance of ethos, critical as well as confirmative. Why is something sound and justifiable just because collective life-experience has been captured in a flagrant formulation?

Refutation and Confirmation are the next exercises. Now it is time for pro et contra argumentation. The theoretical insight from this exercise is nothing less than the perspectivistic doxology behind all these exercises. It is not surprising

that during the renaissance it was seen as a sign of strong ethos to be familiar with the pro and contra-exercises: A person who has the ability to argue for and against a given standpoint ought to have better chances to find the most constructive stand, why it could be a good strategy to trust such a person.

The focal point of the exercise Common topics is not, as one could believe, general argumentation-topics that could be used no matter in what context. Instead it is about the almost dichotomical chain of succession that is captured in the simpler versions of the stasis-theory (in for example Quintilian, 1856). It is about being aware of the fact that a language- or position choice will have consequences for the ability to make further choices. That it is not just possible to understand a communication process as a flow-chart, sometimes such an understanding is necessary for successful communication.

Encomium and vituperatio – praise and blame. Throughout the exercises the whole triad of ethos, logos and pathos is taken for real. It is easy to see that that is a fact in our everyday argumentation, but another thing to give theoretical reasons why that is the case, and why it is right and sound that it should be that way. In the exercises praise and blame, appeals to emotions are practiced to make the students aware of the importance of pathos. It is not by chance that they, since antiquity, have to praise and blame the same object. A theoretical problem is how to justify the blaming. How can I as a university-teacher justify practising the ability to blame other people? The answer is that rhetoric and the ability to argue well is the alternative to mere violence. We rhetoricians use to claim it is not by chance rhetoric and democracy was born at the same time in ancient Greece. Sometimes more ethos- or logos oriented arguments are not enough to show that a certain behaviour is not accepted. The exercise Blame could from one point of view simply be seen as the art of saying enough is enough.

The Comparison is the next exercise. Here is the thought of increasing difficulty in progymnasmata obvious, again. The comparison is a double praise or blame, or a mix. The theoretical aspect in focus is once again our doxological perspectivism. You often have to compare something with something else to see salient traits. And the choice of what to compare with determines what traits are to be seen. There is another doxological point to be made. In the previous exercises the topic "metaphor" has had it's own position in the disposition. From one point of view you could say that when we understand something, we understand it as something else. All new knowledge is in relation to what we previous thought or

knew. The comparison highlights and makes evident this relational trait within our ability to know things.

The Ethopoeia or the Characterisation – to compose and deliver a speech that someone else, as different as possible from you, could have done in a specific situation. It is not just an exercise in seeing the world from a different perspective, but also how to experience the emotions that are to found in that position. From a pedagogical definition of argumentation as solving a problem by means of language, you could say that when I argue I try to solve the problem of a receiver. Such a definition high lightens the dialogical trait of argumentation by paying attention to the importance of the receiver for communicative success. As a sender, it is the receiver's problem you try to solve, he or she does not hold the opinions or act in a way you think he or she should. And to solve another person's problems demands fantasy, the ability to change perspective, and not the least empathy. This is practiced in the Ethopoeia.

The exercise Description highlights the importance of evidentia, the impact of our choice of wordings for the perception of our reality. And that we are responsible for the way we choose to construct a perception of a given reality by our choice of wordings.

The next exercise, the Thesis, is a pro and contra exercise also, or perhaps foremost, for yourself, with an incorporation of what has been learned before. What is it that makes us believe and act in a certain way, what does the alternative look like, and what are the reasons for these alternatives? We are forced to take a stand and make a choice. The theoretical questions in this exercise will be ethical.

The last exercise, Proposal of a law, concerns the question what communal rules should determine our set of options? The natural freedom that everyone does what he or she likes is a bad alternative from a normative point of view. The theoretical focus will be on the connection argumentation – democracy, and the accompanying problem that the majority de facto could take a less constructive stand.

4. *Conclusion*

Aristotle named the art of argumentation a *techné*, i.e. both the theoretical consideration what constitutes a good argument, and the art of participating in good argumentations. The ancient rhetorical exercises progymnasmata practises this normative trait of argumentation pedagogy, and gives us a wider range of

language choices to choose from in actual argumentation. To sum up:

Argumentation is about good or bad (the Fable)

This could be conveyed from many different perspectives (the Narratio)

How to find the right or good? (The Chreia and the Maxim)

How to determine whether something is right? (Refutation and confirmation)

What consequences will the choice of right/wrong give? (The Commonplace)

Are there other ways to determine right/wrong? (Encomium and vituperatio)

How does this fit in with the rest of our knowledge? (Comparison)

Could other people have another right appreciation of what is right? (Ethopoeia)

How can we make this evident? (Description)

How can we test whether it is right? (Thesis)

Should this what we find to be right also go for other people? (Proposal of law)

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ISSA Proceedings 2006 – Theorizing Visual Argumentation: Three Approaches To Jacob Riis

One day, quite some time ago, I happened on a photograph of Napoleon's youngest brother, Jerome, taken in 1852. And I realized then, with an amazement I have not been able to lessen since: 'I am looking at eyes that looked at the Emperor' (Barthes 1981, p. 3).

In the opening paragraphs of *Camera Lucida*, Roland Barthes at first seems transfixed by the space between the image captured on a photograph's surface and the materiality of the photograph itself, yet as he treats that conundrum, he begins to understand that he first must come to terms with his own subjectivity. He must wrestle with his subjective relationships to the objects of photographs, the events-being-photographed, and, indeed, the vision – the subjectivity – of the photographer. Barthes could aestheticize the arts and artists of photography, yet knew that he had more than an artistic relationship with the subjects within the frame, even the world from which they came. He was looking at the Jerome's eyes, eyes that had looked at the Emperor himself more than a century before. He, Roland Barthes, was sharing mid-nineteenth-century French life, thanks to Jerome's vision.

Barthes' reactions to the photo of Jerome parallels in attitude and description Ansel Adams' reactions to Jacob Riis's photographs of late nineteenth-century New York City slum life:
These people live again for you in the print – as intensely as when their images were captured on the old dry plates of ninety years ago…. I think that I have an explanation for their compelling power. It is because in viewing these prints I find myself identified with the people photographed. I am walking in their alleys, standing in their rooms and sheds and workshops, looking in and out of their

windows. And they in turn seem to be aware of me. (Alland 1974, p. 6)

And so Adams, writing a preface to the first coffee table art book compilation of Riis's pictures, decontextualizes the photos and yet throws himself into a communicative relationship with the people being photographed.

Both Roland Barthes and Ansel Adams raise important questions about photography in particular and mechanically, chemically, and electronically reproduced visuality more generally. Why are our relationships to visual images so varied and disorganized? In what ways do the contexts within which we view pictures affect our relationships with them? And, for students of argument theory, why does the place of pictures in discursive arguments vary from theorist to theorist? For example, to Gronbeck (1995), they are essentially evidence, similar to Slade's (2003) belief that they provide reasons for assent; Finnegan (2003) expands this approach, arguing that they are enthymematic and hence a part of the inferential machinery. To Shelley (1996), they are visual substitutions for verbal discourse, while to Hariman and Lucaites (2002), especially iconic pictures evoke their earlier discursive and hence argumentative contexts.

I wish to take a somewhat different position in this essay. I will argue that the place of photos – and other visual imaging technologies as well – in argumentative processes is in fact variable. The place of visual objects in argumentation depends upon those objects' relationships to other oral and written, even performative, discursive processes. Pictures and other kinds of images have variable use within argumentation depending
(1) the approach taken by the disputant,
(2) material characteristics of the pictures themselves,
(3) the contexts within which the arguments are being framed, and
(4) the conceptualizations of pictures generally held by the disputant.

The roles of photos in argumentation, therefore, vary because of personal predilection or credibility, material representational technologies, the rhetorical situation, and even theories of visuality. Visual materials perform different kinds of jobs in argument because, I finally will argue, they exist and have force in webs of discourse, where their jobs depend largely on how they are conceived or understood. Ultimately, what a photograph is conceived to be directly affects what it does in human talk and decision making.
My title suggests that I will want to spend most of my time with that last point:

the place of visual theory in explaining how images are employed argumentatively. I will treat the other three factors of variability briefly, however, as I first background Jacob Riis for those who do not know him and then talk about four stages through which his photos went in their journey from the 1890s to the present.

1. *Jacob Riis, Photographer and Citizen*
Riis was a twenty-one-year-old Danish immigrant who arrived in New York City in 1870 (biographical details from Meyer 1974; Pascal 2005; Riis 1901/1935). Failing to make a living as a carpenter, he got involved in newspaper work as a night reporter in what was called the Five Points region of lower Manhattan. The more he saw of late nineteenth-century slum life, the more indignant he became in the face of poverty, urban decrepitude, immigrant victimage, and the roles of environmental conditions in degenerating the quality of human life. (In the nature-nature debate raging at the time, he definitely was an advocate of nurture: changing conditions-of-life could drag down or elevate the personal, social, and moral character of human beings.) Riis worked out a reporters' office in Mulberry Bend, across the street from the police station, where he followed the police, fire fighters, and health officials into the worst of the Bend's environments to get his nighttime stories.

As Riis grew more distraught with what he was covering, he was motivated to shift his work in two directions: (1) He started taking pictures of the squalor in which he lived and worked in 1887, writing illustrated short pieces for other newspapers and magazines. (2) And, he began to offer lectures in churches, calling for reform in talks that he illustrated with magic lantern slides. His reputation exploded with the publication of a best-seller in 1890, *How the Other Half Lives*, and he spent the rest of his life – until his death in 1914 – writing many other books, articles, and letters, working the lecture circuit across the country urging slum reform, and working with the Progressives, primarily Theodore Roosevelt, to combine public legal reform with charitable, largely Christian, private-side aid to children and the development of public parks, schools, and shelters.

His magic lantern shows marked him as a Christian social reformer. His pictures began as 3.25 x 4.00 inch glass slides projected into images ten feet or more across. Magic lanterns were projection boxes invented sometime in the seventeenth century and were the first screen-based artistic medium (Manovich 2001, pp. 282-283), using everything from candles and low-grade oils to limelight

and electric bulbs as light sources. Riis would organize lectures around 50-60 slides, using the images to cue his thoughts and language. His pictures caused great public interest because he had used a flash powder to take nighttime shots of the worst of tenement squalor. With the slides, from which he said "there is no appeal" (Riis 1901/1935, p. 177), he believed that had imagaic evidence that carried his arguments for tenement reform, playgrounds, and public sanitation projects.

His 1890 book contained far fewer pictures: only forty-three images, eighteen of which were photos, six of which were diagrams, and nineteen of which were sketches or engravings. The half-tone printing process was in its infancy, so the quality of printed photos was terrible-blotchy, with contrast almost non-existent—and offered only in a small size to help increase density. In the book, words took over the proof process, with the pictures serving not as evidence – as they had in the lantern shows – but as mere illustration of cues to topics being discussed (Gronbeck in press).

The pictures then were more or less forgotten after he died until post-World War II, when boxes of them were found and sold to the Museum of the City of New York. There, they were restored by Museum staff photographer John Harvey Heffren and photographer Alexander Alland, Sr., who reworked Riis's negatives and positives, cropping some, adjusting exposure and contrast, straightening many, even improving focus, and then making large, luscious silver gelatin prints. With those prints, Riis became known as a pioneering artist, the first great nighttime photographer of the United States. In a 1974 coffee table/art book edition of eighty-two of Riis's photos, Ansel Adams's preface beatified Riis as a photographer whose pictures "are magnificent achievements in the field of humanistic photography" because of their "intensity, *living* quality" (Alland 1974, p. 6). Adams, as we shall see, totally aestheticized Riis's work, removing the pictures from their verbal contexts, from concrete thoughts about slum reform, and saw them, yes, as social-documentary photography, but, really, as pictures that transcended the time from which they had come. Adams' eyes were meeting the gazes of transhistorical subjects, just as Barthes's gaze had.

But, in the next two and a half decades, another group of commentators got ahold of the pictures, and turned them into objects of cultural judgment: students of Cultural Studies found Riis's work, and they were not happy. E.T. O'Donnell (2004) found the gaze that Adams thought so affecting and powerful to be a

defiant glare by the underclass for their overlords. Maren Stange (1989, p. 296) accused Riis of practicing "photography as [political] surveillance," and Ryan (1997, p. 193, qted. in O'Donnell) roared that his pictures bespoke a "language of benevolent violence" that "wages a war on the poor." Reggie Twigg (1992) charged Riis with actually increasing the distance between viewers and the subject of his photos, while Keith Gandal (1997) thought that he was practicing a kind of Christian voyeurism, titillating the good church people by showing them scenes of human misery that they would not otherwise have had access to. And, Carrie Tirado Bramen (2000, p. 446) invoked a theory of the "picturesque" – the "aesthetic discourse of the urban picturesque [that] helped to equate ethnic variety and urbanism with modern Americanism," with Riis as a "tour-guide" showing off the United States as a melting pot that was cooking a cultural stew made up of many different ingredients.

Over the century-plus that Jacob Riis's photographs have been displayed publicly, they have moved in tortured ways through different modes of presentation and fields of social reaction and commentary. How can we account for such diametrically opposed, even contradictory readings of those pictures? In part, of course, we are dealing with recontextualization and rematerialization. That is, the pictures were seen as different kinds of objects as they were made to do different kinds of work in varied situations. They served as evidence in Riis's reformist lectures, as illustrations in his books, as artistic artifacts in museums and display books, and as data for critical-cultural historians; recontextualization positioned the photos in multiple webs of discourse, within which they seemed to possess differing kinds of social and political utility. And as well, of course, the pictures were remade materially as they moved from glass slide to half-tone picture or sketch to silver gelatin print to a trace-of-life offered to today by an observer from the past. Rematerialization physically made them into different objects of contemplation, and so altered their relationships to those who gazed upon them.

One last point: the public persona of Riis himself was altered across time and place. When giving lantern shows, he was the expert observer-reporter, showing those whom he hoped would become involved how the other half lived; his pictures were documentary evidence of that life. As author of books and articles of advocacy, he was the prototypical person of words, and the photos, sketches, and diagrams were topical illustrations, providing human interest or orientation, with the heart of reform arguments beating in his prose. Once he was identified as an artist, the pictures broke free from both context and the oral and written

media that had melded with them; now they became artistic renderings that could transport the minds of observers to other times and places, as art always has done. Only when the cultural critics and historians got ahold of his pictures and writing about them was he pulled back from the aesthetic sphere and turned into a bigot and exploiter of the underclass; the pictures once again became evidence, not of human misery so much as of acts of privileged social and economic uses of others.

2. *Theories of Visuality and the Reception of Riis's Pictures*
But – and now I move to my actual topic for this paper – we also are seeing different conceptions of visuality and of visual argumentative processes at work across these four stages of reactions to Riis and his photos. Three very different theories of visuality, I argue, are being used to describe and make sense of these pictures. What often is called *semiotic-structuralism* focuses on the picture as text, decoding its array of signs and their arrangements to specify processes of signification.

Phenomenological approaches to pictures explore the work done with and on them subjectively, attempting to specify operations of the interiority of human perception. And, *culturalism* preaches the gospel of collective power, of the ways in which scopic regimes, legitimated in particular times and places, govern human understanding of visual objects and material environments, and hence of human evaluations of what is seen and where it is shown. Generally speaking, then, semiotic-structuralism examines the picture as text, phenomenology, the viewer as text, and culturalism, social-political conventions and/or collectivist institutions as text. Let me examine each theoretical approach in concert with commentaries on Riis's photos.

Far and away the most usual way to approach the analysis of the static and moving pictorial arts in our time is semiotically (Vande Berg, Wenner, & Gronbeck 2004, pp. 66-109, Ch. 5). Here, a picture usually is seen as an array of signs, signs whose selection and arrangement on a plane or in a viewing area convey or evoke significations in viewers. The frame of a picture cuts off other signs from the viewer and so further enhances or makes seemingly important those signs that are encased within the frame; a viewer is encouraged by the frame to examine that which is depicted semiotically within it. And then, the vantage point from which the plane or area is observed becomes a subject position from which the viewer is allowed (or required, in a sense) to see the

symbolic world of the picture. This last point within semiotic studies is underwritten by Louis Althusser's idea of interpellation (1970) or Laura Mulvey's theory of the gaze (1975).

The best example of someone reading Riis's pictures semiotically is Ansel Adams, of course himself a dominating figure in the world of photography. In his preface to Alland's art book of Riis's pictures, Adams implicitly worked from the idea that signs comprise photos both as images within the frame and as the technology of photography itself, which can be manipulated and put to human use every bit as easily as the symbol system we call verbal language. So, of Riis's control over the technology, Adams (Alland 1974, p. 7) said: "the quality of his flash illumination is extraordinary; the plastic shadow-edges, modulations and textures of flesh, the balance of interior flash and exterior daylight – what contemporary work really exceeds it in competency and integrity?" And of the people who comprised the objects within the photographic scenes, Adams was fascinated with the head-on quality of the images, as I've noted. He (ibid. p. 6) went on: "[I]n many of these the subjects are looking at you – you are there with them, you may almost speak to them. Because of this intimacy, reality is magically intensified, another dimension of response is added to the dimensions of statement."

Here, then, is a decontextualization of photography that permits a union of the picture and its viewer at some transcendent point in time and space. Vivian Sobchack (1992, p. 59) explains:

In the still photograph, time and space are abstractions. Although the image has a presence, it neither partakes of nor describes the present. Indeed, the photograph's fascination is that it is a figure of transcendental time made available against the ground of a lived and finite temporality. Although included in our experience of the present, the photograph transcends both our immediate present and our lived experience of temporality because it exists for us as ever engaged in the activity of *becoming*.

That sense of sign-images existing in a state of transcendent becoming was captured by Adams (Alland 1974, p. 6) explicitly when he argued: "Alland's beautiful prints, by exalting the physical qualities of Riis's work, intensify their expressive content. The factual and dated content of subject has definite historical importance, but the larger context lies in Riis's expression of people in misery, want and squalor." Working as a semiotic-structuralist, therefore, Adams reads photography's technical characteristics as a set of signs comprising a

language, while the objects of the photographs are bearers of significations at both a first- and a second order, which then evoke a structuralist understanding of relationships being construed between manifest or everyday life and transcendent, cultural or mythic dimensions of sociality.

This brings us to the second theory of visuality, the hermeneutic phenomenology of vision, which can account for other discursive accounts of photos. Though I am just doing my first systematic reading in this field, I go to hermeneutic phenomenology to get ahold of subjectivist reactions to the visual world unencumbered by psychoanalytic machinery. I have nothing against psychoanalytic readings. But, what I want to explore is the ways in which some commentators – especially Riis himself – draw on experience-based memory traces (see Levin, 1998, on Merleau-Ponty [esp. 1968] and Levinas) to construct the objects of pictures, or what Gestaltists term "figures," within their experiences of what Gestaltists call "grounds" or "fields," as a utilitarian way of speaking about the subjective dimensions of personal life. This brings us into languages not often spoken of in American conceptions of argumentative communication, though I can say that C. Caha Waite (2003, p. 76) has labored to translate phenomenological discourse into terms we are more familiar with, as when she argues that "It is the lived body that mediates one's experience of the world; the human sensorium discovers and rediscovers one's relationship to that world through the interrelationship of sight, sound, touch, and movement."
To understand subjectivity as a kind of negotiation between one's consciousness and the sensory fields of individual experience helps us understand, particularly, Riis's own use of his pictures in his lectures. Conventionally, lanternists put their slides in a stack, and then, when loading a slide into the lantern, began talking from memory. Indeed, Riis specifically said in a note penned on an 1891 lecture (Riis 1891) that "As I speak without notes, from memory and to the pictures, the result is according to how I feel." Magic lantern shows, therefore, usually were structured around pictures being used to cue memory and to place memories within particular perceptual fields, what Schutz and Luckmann (1973) termed "zones of experience," ranging from those distant in time and place to those in one's immediate circumstances, to create a complex unity or whole.

Notice, for example, what Riis says in his 1891 lecture on "The Other Half and How They Live" when loading a slide of what we now call the Italian rag-picker:
If you want to understand just what [the struggle to keep children alive] means,

come with me at three o'clock some morning in July or August when these stony streets are like fiery furnaces, and see those mothers walking up and down the pavements with their little babes trying to stir some breath of God's air to cool the brows of the sick child and hear the feeble wails of those little ones! Then tell me they have no cause of complaint, that they ought to be content. Here (shows the picture of "Home of the Italian rag-picker" – Italian woman with child in her arms) is one of them, an Italian baby in swaddling clothes. You have seen how they wrap them around and around until you can almost stand them on either end and they won't bend, so tightly are they bound. It is only a year ago that the Italian missionary down there wrote to the city mission that he did not know what to do with these Italian children in the hot summer days, for 'no one asked for them.' They have been asked for since, thank God! Christian charity has found some of them out.

Notice the subjective flow in scenes in this object lesson of engaged ghetto motherhood. Riis calls from memory his sensory experiences with sweltering summer nights, peripatetic mothers walking the streets to get outdoor air into their children's lungs, an envisioning of how babies are swaddled, and a story about a frustrated church worker but with a seemingly happy ending to that story, thanks to the generosity of people like those in his audience. Notice, too, that the actual picture – her Madonna-like upward glance, her basement dwelling filled with bags of rags and her stove for boiling them, even the ladder that presumably is her way in and out of the basement with its dirt floor. That picture is neither described nor made specifically relevant to what Riis is saying. Rather, the figure in the picture cues Riis's zones of experience – from his nighttime reporting work, his observations of child care, his efforts at providing supportive settlement house for needy women and their children. He thus places the figure within grounds from his own life work. And so, memories are evoked by the picture from Riis's own subjectivity, his own fields of experience, demonstrating what Heidegger (qted. in Levin 1999, pp. 186, 193) said about re-presentation:
To re-present means here to present before oneself, to bring before oneself and to master, to attack things.... [T]o apprehend... means to let something come to one not merely accepting it, but taking a receptive attitude toward that which shows itself.

We could pursue a phenomenological analysis farther, dealing more fully with the obvious hermeneutic circle of relationships between past and present that are

illustrated in this excerpt, with observations of how memory traces (see esp. Levin, 1998) condition our experience of the Other and even, perhaps, our reactions to the Others' experiences of us, or with the great difficulty in operationalizing phenomenologists' claims that some traces are pre-personal and hence pre-linguistic apprehensions of the world – making an analysis of phenomenological argumentation a theoretically gnarly task. But, I will not go farther here. Perhaps we have seen enough, however, to suggest that a hermeneutic-phenomenological approach to visuality, to pictures, produces not an analysis of signs but an analysis of consciousness and subjectivity, where the perceiver and not the visual object is the text to be understood, rationalized, and interpreted.

And so we are left with culturalism, more particularly one or another variants of the critical-cultural theory that goes by the name of British Cultural Studies. To strict culturalists (those whom Anthony Woodiwiss 2001, terms "cultural representationalists"), human beings are born into a perceptual field of pre-coded or conventionalized understandings of the world and our relationships to it. For example, "horses" were named and valued – commodified if one wishes to talk use-values – long before you were born, and an important job in your growing-up was to learn both the linguistic sign and the significations at multiple levels or orders that have been attached to that sign. Those conventionalized codes and their significations dwell in a symbolic realm that is given force and applications in your life by primary groups such as family and secondary institutions such as banks, churches, governmental bureaus, and of course the American Quarter Horse Association. Acculturation, then, is a set of processes by which you gain access to the symbolic realm. You violate its conventions and expectations, in socially important situations, at your peril; insane asylums, rehabilitation centers, therapy, and prisons await those whose violations are adjudged severe.

And so, strict culturalists insist that you and I can encounter and understand the world – at least the world we might want to share with others – only through the linguistic and performative conventions that are a part of the society within which we are operating. Indeed, because those conventions pre-exist our encounters with others in life, they serve not only as tools for collective understanding but also measuring rods for collective judgment, and therein lies culturalism's characteristic modes of interpreting visual images. Let us return to the reactions to Riis's photos by contemporary cultural critics and cultural historians with which I began this paper.

E.T. O'Donnell (2004), like Ansel Adams before him, focuses on the eyes of the Riis's subjects, and argues that they are glaring at us. He does not know that, of course, but rather assumes that direct, face-to-face orientations together with facial displays that most would interpret as frowns are cultural markers of displeasure, even class consciousness, in situations where someone of a higher class, accompanied by law officers, takes pictures. An equally plausible account, of course, is that someone was sleeping when his or her room was invaded by someone else with exploding lye-magnesium powder and a group of other, unaccounted-for, legal authorities. O'Donnell's judgments are not based on firsthand knowledge, but, rather, cultural truisms.

Stange's (1989, May) interpretation of Riis's "politics of surveillance" was based explicitly upon a culturalist assumption that "many of the photographs Riis showed represented imagery already current in urban visual culture, and his text rehearsed familiar responses to such scenes" (Stange 1989, p. 2). His work, so far as Stange was concerned, was culturally pre-coded so as to play upon (*ibid*., p. 6) "middleclass fears and concerns," in ways that were (*ibid*., pp. 12-13) "consonant with Riis's larger text – the representation of 'Gotham's crime and misery.'" In this way, Riis's (*ibid*., p. 13) "[h]umorous or adventuresome anecdotes imposed a reassuring order on content whose 'crime and misery' might otherwise overwhelm. They also confirmed the privileged position of the viewer by implying that he or she had a right to be entertained by an encounter with such material even while absorbing Riis's moral strictures."

Stange's culturalist mode of thinking, thus, is clear. She has a binary conception of culture – of the an overclass and an underclass – that sustains opposing interests. She assumes that the overclass has dominating economic and political interests that make surveillance of the kind that Riis practiced as both police reporter and then photographer an essential part of social order. In his raced and classed commentary she also sees a kind of cultural violence and reductionism. Stange comes close – and Trachtenberg (1989) even closer – to simply transferring the language of multiculturalism from today to the 1890s, and in so doing subtly imposing today's cultural and even use values unto yesterday's actions. Trachtenberg (*ibid*., p. 171) goes so far as to argue that "To outsiders like Riis, the slums seemed a chaos of alien tongues, strange costumes and customs, foods, habits of child-rearing – a frightening caldron of poverty and despair."

Gandal's (1997) charges of Christian voyeurism and Tirado Bramen's (2000) interest in the urban picturesque both are instances of culturalists bringing

interpretive templates from critical-cultural theory and fitting Riis's activities into them. Nothing in Riis's writings or speeches suggests voyeuristic psychoses nor does he write in melting-pot terms. Both Gandal and Tirado Bramen – the one attacking Riis, the other affirming socially positive values in his actions – are applying external explanations of his motivation to his life work and the dynamics of the world within which he carried out that work.

And so, the culturalist, I would argue, is actually analyzing late nineteenth-century American urban culture, in this case with Jacob Riis and his photos as exemplars, rather than studying the man and his labors. "Culture" can become the text if human actions and products are ripped from their original context and then placed into an interpretive, remanufactured context, one with personal and collective motives and viewpoints rearticulated as parts of writing an enlightened cultural history. As Jackson (2003) suggests, the sort of objectification that photos viewed outside of their original rhetorical contexts seemed to produce never occurred in Riis's lectures, articles, and books because of the dual, sentimentalized discourse in which he clothed his arguments: he used the languages of both secular (Progressive) slum reform and religious (social gospel) commitments to make reform happen, with images of human sadness, misery, and yet hope embedded in both of those languages. The pictures were, therefore, never read in the 1890s as pre-coded, conventionalized signs independent of their actual, historically situated uses.

3. *Theories of Visuality and the Variability of Visual Argumentative Processes*
So then, what might one conclude from this meandering through the history of some pictures, the man who took and used them, the people who reacted to them, and conceptual accounts for how different interpretations and assessments of the pictures, the man, and the times articulated visual experience and argument? In a single essay, I really only can suggest the outlines of three conclusions.

(1) Photographs never simply mean, because they are so easily altered in a material way and hence are materialized in forms with varying communication characteristics. As Riis's photos went from magic lantern slide to sketch or half-tone picture to art object to cultural trace, they were literally different communicative signs. Photographic, photo-processing, and printing operations change and, with them, pictures themselves become different objects. Then, the pictures can be put on paper, glass, tee-shirts, steel plates, or pixilated circuits; printed very small or large; opaque or visible only when light is passed through

glass, celluloid, or other transparent surfaces; mounted individually on a wall, melded with other material, visual, verbal, or acoustic media; and sequenced as moving images or de-individualized in collage. As pictures are transformed in photographic, processing, and printing operations, so also are their values as signs. Pictures are inherently unstable sets of signs.

Additionally, as we have seen, as photographs are remade materially and recontextualized within varying discursive webs, so also is the public persona of the photographer re-symbolized. Jacob Riis became a different person as his persona was reconstructed in moves from one historical-discursive context to another. And as that persona moved, so did it seemly advance and also be asked to respond to different social, political, professional, and even aesthetic arguments.

(2) Second, various theories of visuality are not simply conceptual machines and philosophies of vision but also become varied ways of accounting for how we understand and value photographs and other visual media. The semiotic-structuralist, phenomenological, and critical-cultural theories reviewed here do not really "explain" pictures per se or explain the physics and chemistry of photographic processes. They are helpful principally as modes of talk-about pictures, as discourses of human perception, interpretation, and judgment of those objects we call pictures. Some of those modes, for example semiotic structuralism, aid us primarily in dissecting pictures themselves; others, for example hermeneutic phenomenology, attempt to account for our experience of visual stimuli; and still others, for example cultural representationalism, concentrate on showing how contextual conventions govern perception, interpretation, and assessment. Varied theories give us entrance into varied dimensions of human visual experience.

(3) And third, the social contexts or perceptual fields within which photos are put not only make them into different objects but also enable them to do different argumentative work: to serve as evidence of existence, as they did in Riis's magic lantern shows; to illustrate topics about which he was writing, as they did in his books and articles; to essentialize timeless embodiments of human destiny, as they did in art books, becoming a type of aesthetic warrant for arguments about the place of photography in social life; or even to mark ideological distortion and control, which to the culturalists work as evaluative warrants and even backing for such warrants because they become unchallenged assumptions about the

dynamics of political-economic power in collectivities. Visual argumentation, therefore, as suggested in the opening of this paper, is not a process that one can capture in a single Toulmin-like or syllogistic model. Rather, pictures become woven into complex argumentative discourses, and their places vary across different discursive practices.

John Hartley (1992, p. 28) captures this variability well:

No picture is pure image; all of them, still and moving, graphic and photographic, are 'talking pictures,' either literally, or in association with contextual speech, writing or discourse. Pictures are social, visual, spatial and sometimes communicative [read: argumentative]. As visual text and social communication they construct literal space within and between the frames and fields of which they're made.

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ISSA Proceedings 2006 – Reshaping Emperor Hirohito's Persona: A Study Of Fragmented Arguments In Multiple Texts

1. *Introduction*

The Imperial Rescript on New Year's Day of 1946 was Emperor Hirohito's first formal address to the nation after his official speech of surrender in World War II on August 15. The Rescript is popularly known as his "Declaration of Humanity," in which he renounced his divinity, the core of the war's ideology. The Rescript was not broadcast; rather it appeared on the front page of newspapers nationwide. Appearing alongside were articles covering

the Rescript, along with the Emperor and his family.

In this paper, I review how McGee's (1990) Theory of Fragmentation of Text explains the interactions between multiple texts and how they establish a new, human persona for the Emperor by constructing a coherent understanding of the Rescript. I demonstrate that the Rescript itself played a minor role in shaping this persona, and that fragments of text found in the article complemented the Rescript and constructed the "Declaration of Humanity" as it is remembered by most Japanese people today. First, I discuss the historical background of the study, exploring the political imperatives for the creation of the Emperor's new persona. Next, I analyze the arguments of the denial of divinity. I then discuss the differences between the original Japanese version of the Rescript and the official English translation. Next I address the argumentative characteristics in the Japanese Rescript and how they fail to redefine the ideology of the Emperor's theocratic authoritarianism. Finally, I analyze the newspaper articles surrounding the Rescript and discuss how their contents complemented the Rescript, helping reshape the Emperor's persona by defining his "Declaration of Humanity."

2. *Historical Background*

Emperor Hirohito is one of the most important public figures in Japan's modern history. Before and during the Pacific War, the Emperor was regarded as a living deity and his existence was used to justify Japanese ultra-nationalism and fascism (Dower, 1999, p. 277). The ideology stated that the Emperor was the direct descendent of the Sun Goddess Amaterasu, the most sacred and highly-ranked god in Shinto, Japan's indigenous religion (Dower, 1999, p. 277). *Shinmin no michi* (The Way of Subjects), a booklet issued by the Ministry of Education four months prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, reinforced the ideology of the Emperor's spirituality and supremacy. *Shinmin* (1974) states that the Imperial Throne is "coeval with Heaven and Earth" and that the Emperor is "the center" of all. Filial piety and loyalty to the Emperor are strongly emphasized. The pamphlet's goal is to promote a selfless devotion to the state, a dedication to national defense, and a quest to realize the "Great East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere" in the name of expanding the Emperor's supreme rule. In order to achieve these ends, the Emperor's "subjects" are taught to sacrifice even their lives for the sacred mission demanded by the Emperor. Dower (1999) writes that: "Emperor Hirohito was sacrosanct. His war was holy. The virtues he embodied were unique and immutable" (p. 277). This deified image of Emperor Hirohito had been created and maintained beginning with Japan's push for modernization in

1868. The spiritual quality of his image peaked during the Second World War, due to the political need to unify the people and justify aggression.

After the end of the war (August 15, 1945), Japan was occupied by the Allied Powers, the United States in particular. The occupation policy was the "Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for the Occupation and Control of Japan." This plan was approved by President Truman and sent to General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP). One of the fundamental objectives of the occupation stated in the "Basic Directive" was to bring about a democratic state in which individual liberty, freedom of speech, and, central to the topic of this paper, freedom of religion were guaranteed. Another objective was to disarm and demilitarize Japan so that it would not be a future threat to world peace (Takeda, 1988, p. 105).

The existence of the Emperor became a controversial issue, for his presence continued to signify Japanese militarization. There was intense debate as to whether an anti-democratic institution such as the Emperor system should be abolished. Takeda (1988) summarizes the abolitionists' arguments as follows:
… the institution of the throne in Japan was a cornerstone or sheet-anchor of the imposition of absurd myths of the Emperor's divine origin and of State Shinto. The emperor was regarded as having personified and perpetuated for the Japanese the myth of Japan's racial predominance with her manifest destiny to rule the world, which naturally resulted in military aggression. (p. 8)

In addition, there were many voices calling for "Hirohito's indictment as a war criminal," since "he was the person who gave official approval to the declaration of war" (Takeda, 1988, p. 8; Dower, 1999, p. 279). The abolitionist argument was prevalent among the Allied Powers; China, Australia and New Zealand officially called for a war trial for the Emperor (Matsuo, 1998, p. 25). A public opinion poll in the United States showed that 70 percent of Americans demanded an indictment of the Emperor as a war criminal (Hata, 1984, p. 166; Higashino, 1998, pp. 21-22)
Contrary to the abolitionist arguments, McArthur implemented a "utilitarian strategy" in which Hirohito would remain on the throne, serving as an instrument to facilitate the occupation (Large, 1992, p. 136; Dower, 1999, p. 283). According to Dower (1999), the Emperor's responsibility for the war "was never seriously investigated" by McArthur and "[w]hen members of the imperial entourage raised the possibility of [the Emperor's] abdication, [the] SCAP opposed this

emphatically" (p. 278). In a telegram to Army Chief of Staff Dwight D. Eisenhower, McArthur stated that, "No specific and tangible evidence has been uncovered with regard to the Emperor's exact activities which might connect him with the political decisions of the Japanese Empire during the last decade" (Takahashi, 1987, p. 34; Bix, 1992, p. 332). He went on to report that "the Emperor's political actions had been determined by his ministers of state, who bore responsibility for the war" (Large, 1992, p. 139). Instead of accusing the Emperor of war crimes, MacArthur believed that the Emperor was indispensable to the smooth running of the occupation and intended to "resituate him as the center of [Japanese] new democracy" (Dower, 1999, p. 278).

3. *McGee's Notion of the Fragmentation of the Text*
McGee's view of text as "fragments" provides valuable insight in an analysis of multiple texts. In his article "Text, Context, and the Fragmentation of Contemporary Culture," McGee (1990) contends that "no single text can comprehend all perspectives" in today's fragmented culture in which sources of information are expanded and diverse (p. 288). McGee explicates this condition of necessitating fragments of a text from two angles. First, he maintains that "changing cultural conditions have made it virtually impossible to construct a whole and harmonious text such as Edmund Burke's 'Speech on Conciliation with the Colonies'….[w]e have instead fragments of 'information' that constitute our *context*" (p. 287). These fragments of information are essential to understand a discourse, since the "*[d]iscourse ceases to be what it is whenever parts of it are taken 'out of context*'" (p. 283). Since those fragments work as a part of the context, removing or overlooking any of them results in an incomplete understanding of the discourse. Secondly, McGee argues the possibility of an "invisible text" emerging from the fragments. In other words, "an 'invisible text'… is never quite finished but constantly in front of us" (p. 287). Only by looking at text as fragments, can we find the "invisible texts" hidden among the fragments. McGee contends that a role reversal has taken place, "making *interpretation* the primary task of speakers and writers and *text construction* the primary task of audiences, readers and critics" (p. 274).
This view of fragmented texts posits that critics interpret them as providing a coherent understanding of perspectives represented in a discourse. With this in mind, I consider the multiple arguments in the newspaper articles surrounding the Rescript to be fragments. Furthermore, I argue that interactions among them expand the themes of the "Declaration of Humanity" which has become the

shared meaning of the Rescript itself.

4. *The Problem of the New Year Rescript*

The Imperial Rescript consists of approximately six hundred words in eight paragraphs. The denial of the Emperor's divinity appears in the sixth paragraph. Here I quote the entire paragraph from the official English translation:

We stand by the people and We wish always to share with them in their moments of joys and sorrows. The ties between Us and Our people have always stood upon mutual trust and affection. They do not depend upon mere legends and myths. They are not predicated on the false conception that the Emperor is divine, and that the Japanese people are superior to other races and fated to rule the world. (Imperial Rescript, 1946)

In this paragraph, the Emperor disavows his divinity as well as the legends and mythology upon which his divinity is based. By this, the Emperor rejects the ideology which had underscored the ultranationalism leading up to the war. The Emperor also states that the ties between him and people are based on mutual trust and affection, attempting to establish a *human* relationship with the people, rather than the religious bond promulgated in prewar days. It is a declaration by the Emperor himself that he is no longer the religious center of a war ideology and therefore will not be a threat to peace.

To form a better understanding of the Rescript, differences between the original Japanese text and the English translation need to be clarified. The English is written in a vernacular language, plainly written for readers who envisioned an end to Emperor worship and militarism. The Japanese version, on the other hand, is more esoteric and obscure in addressing the old ideology, and thereby does not significantly contribute to the creation of a new, democratic image of the Emperor. The Emperor's words are written in classical language consistent with Imperial Rescripts from in prewar days. While this kind of text was intelligible to educated readers, it was very difficult for ordinary people to read, having been "worked over by a scholar of classical language and couched in the stiff and formal prose reserved for imperial pronouncements" (Dower, 1999, p. 316).

The formalized, obtuse language not only hampers people's understanding of the Japanese version of the Rescript, but also obscures the Emperor's denial of his own divinity. In the Japanese version "*akitsumikami*" is the corresponding term for "divinity" in the official English translation. Although *akitsumikami* is used in the prewar ideology of the Emperor, the term itself was arcane. Hence, "even

well-educated people had difficulty identifying the term when confronted with it in writing, or explaining it if asked to do so" (Dower, 1999, p. 316). Vice chamberlain Kinoshita laments in his diary on December 30, two days before the Rescript is issued, that there is one among the ministers who is not able to read the word even phonetically (Dower, 1999, p. 300). In the absence of a simple explanation of *akitsumikami*, the Japanese version of the Rescript fails to clarify what the Emperor is renouncing, thereby failing to redefine the ideology of the Emperor.

Moreover, The Five Clauses of the Charter Oath of the Meiji Emperor were inscribed in the Rescript at the Emperor's insistence (Togashi, 1989, p. 208; Tanaka, 1993, p. 116). The Charter Oath was a proclamation by the Meiji Emperor, Hirohito's grandfather, at the beginning of his reign in 1868, almost eighty years before the 1946 Rescript was written. In the Rescript, Hirohito is idealizing the Meiji era. The Oath is quoted at the beginning of the Rescript:

In greeting the New Year, We recall to mind that the Meiji Emperor proclaimed as the basis of our national policy, the Five Clauses of the Charter-Oath at the beginning of the Meiji Era. The Charter-Oath signified:
1. Deliberative assemblies shall be established and all measures of government decided in accordance with public opinion.
2. All classes, high and low, shall unite in vigorously carrying out the affairs of State.
3. All common people, no less than the civil and military officials, shall be allowed to fulfill their just desires so that there may not be any discontent among them.
4. All the absurd usages of old shall be broken through, and equality and justice to be found in the workings of nature shall serve as the basis of action.
5. Wisdom and knowledge shall be sought throughout the world for the purpose of promoting the welfare of the Empire. (Imperial Rescript, 1946)

The Emperor claims in the Rescript that the Oath is "the basis of our national policy." After quoting it, he praises the Oath as "evident in significance and high in its ideals." Here the Emperor emphasizes that Japan has had great political principles and that a democracy has existed in Japan since its adoption by the Meiji Emperor. The Emperor attempts to transform the old order into a new image of reform and restoration. As he claims in the Rescript, "We wish to make this oath anew and restore the country" and "construct a new Japan through thoroughly being pacific... attaining rich culture, and advancing the standard of

living of the people" (Imperial Rescript, 1946). By placing the Oath in a new context of reform and restoration, the Emperor is deflecting attention from the misruled government of Meiji and upholding it as a guiding principle for the peace and well-being of people in the future.

The inclusion of the Oath signifies the Emperor's desire to return Japan back to the state of the Meiji era and construct a new Japan from that starting point. His reference to this period is problematic, however, in that "the repression and virulent Emperor-centered indoctrination" in Hirohito's reign was, in fact, rooted in the Meiji era (Dower, 199, p. 313), resulting in the war of aggression in the Asia-Pacific region (Tanaka, 1993, p. 116). The inclusion of the Oath renders the Rescript a conservative argument preserving the old political system, rather than an argument discarding the old system for a completely new democratic government.

The Rescript does not, then, reject the old militaristic and undemocratic government; instead, it praises the Meiji era and nowhere denies the Emperor's status as the direct descendant of the Sun Goddess. Since it is written in esoteric, arcane language, however, the Japanese people paid little attention to the problematic Rescript and the Oath (Tanaka, 1999, p. 119). They recognized that the Emperor had made an important statement on New Year's Day, but did not clearly understand the meaning. Consequently, their attention was drawn to other newspaper articles which would help them interpret the Rescript. These arguments constructed various meanings of the Rescript.

5. *The Construction of the "Declaration of Humanity"*

The Japanese people retrospectively understand the Imperial Rescript as the Emperor's "Declaration of Humanity." Such an understanding, however, was created by the perspectives presented in other articles published on the same day and subsequent views. These complemented the Rescript, helping create the image of a human emperor.

Asahi (1946), a major national newspaper, put the Rescript at the top of the front page on January 1st.**[i]** There were also two commentary articles on the front page, appearing next to the Rescript itself. These commentaries, written in vernacular language, function as interpretations of the Rescript. One of the articles summarizes the Rescript in four points, the first being that the Emperor is concerned about the "confusion of thought" among people caused by the despair of losing the war and the devastation of the country, including the stagnating

economy and the food shortage (*Tenno*, p. 1). The other three points clarify the Rescript's renunciation of divinity: The affirmation of mutual trust and affection between the Emperor and the people, the denial of the superiority of the Japanese people, and the denial of the Emperor as akitsumikami. Significantly, the article does not provide a detailed explanation of akitsumikami; it simply redefines the pre-war Emperor as a *shinpiteki sonzai* or "mysterious existence." *Shinpi* is used in vernacular speech to refer to something outside ordinary human understanding, for example *sizen no shinpi* (the mystery of nature).**[ii]** Hence, the denial of divinity is expressed in vernacular language that the Emperor is no longer a mysterious existence. When the vernacular term is used to refer to the Emperor, then it connotes a sort of spirituality; since it is far less ideological than akitsumikami, however, it is difficult to interpret shinpiteki sonzai as a clear denial of divinity. The article interpreting the Rescript even avoids mentioning the former status the Emperor is denying. By identifying the pre-war Emperor as a "mysterious existence," the articles attempt to dissociate the post-war Emperor from the war ideology. This article concludes by affirming the Emperor's determination to overcome the post-war difficulties and construct a new Japan with the help of the people. This gives the Emperor a future- oriented image and clarifies that he will stay on the throne, working to rebuild the country.

The other front-page article is a commentary by Prime Minister Shidehara. As a conservative politician, Shidehara does not mention the Rescript's renunciation of divinity but emphasizes, in plain language, that the Oath is the founding principle of Japan's democracy. Here he asserts that, "a healthy development of our parliamentary politics was promised" by the principles of the Oath. Shidehara (1946) qualifies this by saying that, "unfortunately it [the healthy development] has been repressed by the recent reactionary forces and the respect for freedom and the growth of the will of people has bore no fruit, therefore the will of the Meiji Emperor has been in oblivion" (p.1). Shidehara blames "reactionary forces" for nullifying the country's democracy and the Meiji Emperor's will (p. 1). His argument creates a scapegoat for the abuses of the government, at the same time granting Hirohito immunity. Finally, Shidehara upholds devotion to democracy, pacifism and rationalism as keys to constructing a new nation (p.1).
Overall, the views on the front page promote peace, democracy, and restoration. The headline for the Rescript reads "devotion to peace and improvement in the quality of life." "Sovereign rights of the people" and "democracy" stand out in other headlines. In this context, the Emperor is not a "mysterious existence," but

presented as being "with the people" and working to reconstruct a democratic country.

The focus of these front-page articles is on the political aspects of post-war Imperial rule. On the second and third pages, the focus shifts to more humane aspects of the Emperor. *Asahi* (1946) features photos at the top of the second page depicting the secular life of the Emperor and his family. One shows the Emperor taking a walk with his 18-year-old daughter, Takanomiya. The Emperor is wearing a suit and soft hat and holding a walking stick. Takanomiya is standing beside him with a gentle smile. In the other picture, the empress and her three daughters are feeding their chickens on a farm. Such pictures would have been unthinkable in prewar days, given that it was considered beneath the Emperor to show his love for his family. These photos, then, imbue him with a strong family image, contributing to the construction of a "human" Emperor. One post in a reader's column in *Asahi* on January 10, 1946 demonstrates the public's reaction to the pictures:

When I took the newspaper on New Year's Day and saw the pictures of His Majesty, my entire body immediately started to shake with an indescribable emotion. .... For the first time in my life, I saw His Majesty as a "human." It is sad to see the differences between these pictures and those of him visiting *Yasukini* Shrine or in past military reviews... I saw, for the first time, the imperial house as a home and the Empress as a "mother," seeing her sewing a vest with her children. It was a view into a peaceful family, living together happily. (qtd. in Tanaka, 1993, p. 126)

The pictures on the second page accompany an article whose headline states: "With his hat off and answering questions: A group of newspaper journalists were granted an audience with the Emperor" (*Boushi* wo, 1946). The article's preface states how unprecedented it is to have an audience with the Emperor and have a conversation with him in person. It states that it is an honor to meet the Emperor, and at the same time it clearly notes the change which has taken place between the Emperor and people. The article goes on to describe how the Emperor shows common courtesy to other people. In greeting the journalists, the article states: "His Majesty stood and greeted each of us... bowing to each of us," and that the bow "was not like a slight nod...but a very gracious, deep bow with his soft hat in his hand" (*Boushi* wo, 1946). This clearly shows that the Emperor is no longer either akitsumikami or a mysterious existence, for he performs secular greetings

to the journalists in an extremely polite, even respectful manner.

However, this does not mean that the Emperor has become an ordinary person. Veneration for the Emperor is still maintained because every one of his acts is termed in the strongest honorific language available in Japanese. Such veneration is clear in the following sentence: "… if I am also permitted [to use my own] language [to describe His Majesty], he was wearing a white collar with gray necktie in brown suit … His Majesty looks like a 'gentle scholar' or a 'kind gentleman' to me" (*Boushi* wo, 1946). As further evidence of the Emperor's gentle personality, the article notes the questions he asked the journalists, such as: "It is said that the food situation is incommodious. How is it for you?" and "Wasn't your house burned down?" (*Boushi* wo, 1946). It can be seen here that *Asahi* has not completely rejected the prewar image of the Emperor, maintaining in its language a certain level of respect for the Emperor. This must have been acceptable to McArthur, maintaining as it did the Emperor's popularity, necessary to the smooth running of the occupation.

The article then contrasts this gentle persona with that perceived by the outside world, as the one responsible for the war:

Although it was a short, 10-minute audience with His Majesty, hearing his relatively high and clear voice and feeling his grace in feminine gentleness, there is no way to think that he is the "Emperor" who is made to stand in the storm of public opinions in the world. (Boushi wo, 1946)

The article claims that once you actually meet the Emperor in person, you will see his true personality, which ordinary people have never known before. The "truth" is that the Emperor is so gentle and kind that it is impossible to associate him with the war. The article continues to stress the Emperor's unimposing personality, stating that:

The general public imagines that an emperor who is surrounded by many subjects, would be proud, arrogant and selfish. However, there is no such trace seen in His Majesty. On the contrary, his trusting and amenable personality can be seen at first glance; he can even be seen as "weak." (*Boushi* wo, 1946) The image of the Emperor as a dictator leading Japan into war is rejected in this commentary. The only explanation for his involvement with the war is that others must have taken advantage of his rather weak personality and used him for their own ends.

The article boldly concludes that "[h]ere the mystery of three thousand years of

history is solved" and goes on to regret that it did not happen earlier (*Boushi* wo, 1946). As it explains, "[I]f we… could have met His Majesty like this [in person] much earlier or His Majesty himself had had the 'freedom of speech', we could have prevented a misfortune like this [sadness after losing the war] in advance" (*Boushi* wo, 1946). In the writer's argument, the cause of this misfortune is that the Emperor has been separated from the people, so that they have not known the truth about him. The implication is that the military or "reactionary forces" Shidehara identifies are to blame. The Emperor is depicted as a victim who has been repressed and manipulated. It is further implied that now the "mystery of three thousand years" has been solved, the people will prosper.

The third page of Asahi features an anecdote related by Prince Takamatsu, one of Hirohito's younger brothers. The headline reads: "My elder brother 'His Majesty the Emperor Dislikes Crookery: Strain of Worry Affects the Appetite" (*Oanigimi*, 1946). These details reveal the "truth" about the Emperor as professed by his brother, who knows him well. First, Takamatsu characterizes the Emperor as an "upright person" who "dislikes crookery" and is "full of benevolence." As the headline states, Takamatsu emphasizes that the Emperor is right and just. He then asserts that: "When there is an error or something that is different from the truth in the newspaper, His Majesty seems to be dissatisfied with it and wants to convey the truth" (*Oanigimi*, 1946). This not only emphasizes the Emperor's upright moral nature, but also implies that the newspapers have been reporting untrue things about him, and that he was powerless to contradict them. This ties into the claim on the second page that the pre-war Emperor had no freedom of speech, and was thereby unable to prevent the country's misfortunes. Takamatsu further depicts the upright personality of the Emperor by stating that the Emperor always reminds new Prime ministers of the need to be in compliance with the Constitution, which "clearly demonstrates that the Emperor himself considers the Constitution as a prime importance" (*Oanigimi,* 1946).

Takamatsu goes on to state that the Emperor plays by the rules when playing golf or other sports, and that the Emperor likewise "pays serious attention to international law and the like" (*Oanigimi*, 1946). With such a serious and upright personality, Takamatsu explains, the Emperor's mood "swings between joy and sorrow because of various problems, affecting his appetite" (*Oanigimi*, 1946). This somewhat delicate image of the Emperor is consistent with the depiction by the journalists on the second page. Additionally, it evokes readers' sympathy for an Emperor who is burdened with various important problems and worries.

Takamatsu goes on to establish the Emperor's personality as peace-loving. He confides that central to the Emperor's rightness is his belief that "violence is not right," demonstrating that he is "peaceful" (*Oanigimi*, 1946). He backs this up with how concerned the Emperor was when Takamatsu had a cold, and how he frequently asked about his condition. Takamatsu remarks on his gentle character and how well-known it is at court: "people in the court are truly touched by the Emperor's gentle heart on many occasions" (*Oanigimi*, 1946). The argument here is that those who know the Emperor personally could only agree with Takamatsu's view of the Emperor as gentle and kind. Takamatsu asserts that the Emperor has always wished for peace, though for various reasons, his wish has never come true. Takamatsu states that there are always terms such as "peace" and "sharing well-being with all other countries" in every imperial decree and "His Majesty has often spoke of peace… however a war like this happens. It makes me think more deeply" (*Oanigimi,* 1946). Here, Takamatsu is clearly implying that the military has countered the Emperor's wish for peace.

Third, the Emperor is given the image of a scientist. Takamatsu states that the Emperor is "not an active person," and that naturally he likes reading about "history," "political history," and "diplomatic history," as his position requires (*Oanigimi*, 1946). Nonetheless, the Emperor is interested in biology most, as Takamatsu states: "The Emperor does not particularly like paintings or music. He prefers biology or things of that nature. He is not a social person" (*Oanigimi,* 1946). To support this view, Takamatsu notes that "the Emperor caught baby spiders and played with them when he was a child" and the Emperor's current hobby is to "plant and grow wild grass in the palace" (*Oanigimi*, 1946). Takamatsu also emphasizes that the Emperor's interest is not in biology itself, but in its implications for the well being of the people. As Takamatsu puts it:
[His Majesty] is always concerned about the food problem. The other day, we talked about the lack of sugar. Then [he] started to talk about what kind of plant we can extract sugar from …. I heard that [His Majesty] is asking scientists about such things…. He always thinks about it in a way that it connects to the problems of the people. (*Oanigimi*, 1946)

The third page of the newspaper mainly characterizes the Emperor's personality. He is depicted as right and just, peace loving, and scientific. There is also an argument buried in Takamatsu's argument that implicates the military in the war and dissociates the Emperor from it.

6. *Conclusion*

As I have argued, the Japanese version of the Imperial Rescript on New Year's Day is conservative in its content. Moreover, it is written in esoteric classical language which hampers people's understanding of it. Therefore, the Rescript in itself does not significantly alter the Emperor's persona. The creation of the "Human Emperor" or the "Declaration of Humanity" is accomplished by the arguments presented in newspaper articles accompanying the Rescript. These complement the Rescript with human images of the Emperor so that in the population's mind the Rescript has been transformed into the "Declaration of Humanity" even today.

The fragmented arguments surrounding the Rescript represent the Emperor as "upright," "kind and gentle," "peace-loving," and "scientific." To transform him into a "human," the image of a family man is promoted through words and photographs. Simultaneously, arguments are presented which scapegoat others for the war and dissociate the Emperor from it.

This study has analyzed the arguments of the Emperor's New Year's Day Rescript. McGee's theory of the fragmentation of texts revealed how multiple arguments surrounding the Rescript interact with each other to create the notion of the "Declaration of Humanity." Also, this study has demonstrated that an important public statement can be supplemented or even contradicted by fragments of arguments and can thus be remembered by people in an entirely different way.

NOTES

[i] Asahi was the top selling newspaper during the occupation period. In 1946, for example, Asahi sold 3,319,045 copies in Japan; followed by Mainichi, 3,254,380 and Yomiuri 1,666,243 (Yamamoto, 1996, p. 650). English translation of Asahi is all mine.

[ii] See, for example, an authentic Japanese dictionary Kojien. It uses sizen no shinpi as an illustrative sentence for shinpi.

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