Introduction
The subject of this paper [i] is the delimitation of Ethics in Wittgenstein´s work. For that, I take into account his view on ethics in the Tractatus[ii]  (1921) and in the Lecture on ethics  (1930), in connection with the intuitionism of Moore (Principia Ethica, 1903) and the last utilitarianism of Henry Sidgwick (The Methods of Ethics, 1874).

First I want to expound the main Wittgenstenian ideas about ethics: the relation between his ideas on ethics and language and his view on the essence of ethical language. I will propose an interpretation of the writings of Wittgenstein taking into account  the distinction between what is shown and what is said. After that, my intention is to comment on the posible connections between Wittgenstein´s view on ethics and one of the more decisive work on ethics for the ethical thought in the XX century, The Methods of Ethics  of Sidgwick, through its influence on one of the main founders of analytic philosophy, namely G. E. Moore.

The thesis I claim is the following one: There is a line of continuity between those three philosophers, a line that represents the western philosophical tradition and that leads  ethics to a problematic point. It is interesting to draw a line from Sidgwick´s and Moore’s recognition of ethical intuitions and of the idea that “good” is a simple notion and therefore that cannot be defined, until Wittgenstein´s statement that ethics taken as theory is imposible. Sidgwick, Moore and Wittgenstein are three examples of what I call “the maximum purification of Ethics”: the task of stripping ethics of its several contingent dimensions. Those three philosophers are worried about the grounds of ethics and in their task they tried to distinguish it from natural science and methaphysics. Then, ethics remains free from natural and methaphysical dimensions, its object of study has been limited. But the problem that I can see is the following one: in these ethical views the object of study cannot be defined and, therefore, this object has become more and more diffuse, abstract and indeterminate. In my opinion, Wittgenstein carries out until the last consequences this metaethical task, when he confines the ethical field on the one hand to what is shown, i.e. to what cannot be expressed by propositions, and on the other hand to private experiences.

1. Wittgenstein: to express and to show
In Wittgenstein´s words the crucial problem of philosophy is the distinction between what can be expressed (gesagt) by propositions and what cannot be, but only be shown (gezeigt). According to him, ethics is confined to the space of what is shown. In order to understand Wittgenstein’s thought on this point, it is necessary to know what is his notion of proposition, in particular, and of language in general. This inmediately leads us to consider the notions of figure, logical form and sense. Let me begin with the notion of “sense”. Wittgenstein inherits this term from his master Frege, as well as he takes from him a logical[iii] and antipsychological position. For Frege sense is what allows us to connect a word and the object that it refers, i.e. language and world. Sense is an objective propierty[iv] , though it suposses a way of looking, or at least, a perspective of the world. For Frege sense is the obligatory road to reach the reference of a term. It is also the thought (the propositional content) that a sentence conveys and, therefore, it allows the sentence to be true or false. Briefly said, what Wittgenstein had in mind when he used “sense”[v] is something objective that gives to a proposition the posibility to be true or false. Sense is concerned with the truth value of a proposition. We understand a proposition when we are able to imagine how the world would be if the proposition was true or false. These quotes from the Tractatus  show that very well:
4.021: A proposition is a picture of reality: for if I understand a proposition, I know the situation that it represents.
4.023: A proposition must restrict reality to two alternatives: yes or no.
In order to do that, it must describe reality completely. (…)
4.024: To understand a proposition means to know what is the case if it is true. (one can understand it, therefore, without knowning whether it is true). (…)

In Wittgenstein’s viewpoint a picture is a figure of  reality (4.01),  it is a description (true or false) of a state of affairs, that is, in Wittgensteinian terms, a description of facts. In order to make possible a description of a fact with a proposition,  a correspondence between elements or parts of language and entities of reality is necessary. The logical form is the necessary condition that makes possible to take propositions as figures:
2.18 What any picture, of whatever form, must have in common with reality, in order to be able to depict it – correctly or incorrectly – in any way at all, is logical form, i.e. the form of reality.

Independently from some justified attacks to this descriptive notion of language, I can state that the question of the distinction between representing and showing is primordial, and that the ethical question is put by Wittgenstein in the field of showing. The philosophical thought often make distinctions that in reality walk together: the phenomenon of talking is not a separate case. A proposition says us something, but also show us something. An example of this is the phenomenon of implicatures, where what is shown is really shown by means of what is said. However, the relation between what is said and what is shown is not quiet clear. On the one hand, we can imagine a phenomenon (for example, a face gesture) that expresses something without words. There are also some cases (for example, the above mentioned implicatures) where what is shown is only possible by  means of what is said. On the other hand, we can suppose things that can be said and/or can be shown without altering their essence or sense in a relevant way. Therefore, there are, at least, two ways of showing: with propositions and without them.

Anyway, the important question which matters us is to know the place where Wittgenstein situated the ethical world. He thought that the ethical world belongs to the kind of things which cannot be said, but only be shown[vi]. But, in which way is shown  the ethical space? Of course, there are two alternatives that were already mentioned  above. This point has been broadly discussed and some philosophers have claimed that  Wittgenstein pushed ethics to a irrational space, where language and argumentation are helpless. This is not enterely right even though there could be some true in that opinion. In the Tractatus  Wittgenstein hold a narrow conception of rationality and language, and as a result of this, ethics remained out of rationality understood in logical terms. But, with the last words of the Tractatus Wittgenstein did not mean that ethical questions ought to be left aside, silence being the proper space of ethics. On the contrary, he wanted to say that we cannot stop talking and that we cannot leave aside ethical questions.

According to Wittgenstein, the peculiarity of ethical expressions is their lack of sense, that is, they are lacking a connection with the facts of the world. Said in his own words:
“these nonsensical expressions were not nonsensical because I had not yet found the correct expressions, but that their nonsensicality was their very essence. For all I wanted to do with them was just to go beyond the world and that is to say beyond significant language. My whole tendency and I believe the tendency of all men who ever tried to write or talk Ethics or Religion was to run against the boundaries of language. This running against the walls of our cage is perfectly, absolutely hopeless. Ethics so far as it springs from the desire to say something about the ultimate meaning of life, the absolute good, the absolute valuable, can be no science. What it says does not add to our knowledge in any sense. But it is a document of a tendency in the human mind which I personally cannot help respecting deeply and I would not for my life ridicule it” (Wittgenstein 1965: 11).

This means that ethical expressions are not propositions, if we accept the definition of proposition as figure as Wittgenstein proposes. Its absence of sense does not decrease the importance of ethical questions. On the contrary, for this philosopher, they are the most relevant questions in human life. As we can read in his Lecture on Ethics, these questions show the natural human tendency[vii] to say something that cannot be expressed with the ordinary propositions we use to talk about facts. In short, we have not a descriptive language appropiate enough to say the inexpressible, that is, it will only be shown by means of what is said, being something more than what is said.
To sum up, whithin the relations between what is shown and what is said as description, the ethical expressions show something beyond what is said, but by means of what is said. What is shown cannot be said but it needs what is said, in order to show itself. Paradoxically, Wittgenstein stated that what is shown was contained in what is  said, and furthermore, if I am right, that what is said gets its meaning only as a part of a wide framework where the inexpressible  is a basis, a necessary condition for saying something. This is what I understand when Wittgenstein says that logical truths  are the skeleton of the world, the basis for making possible the activity of thinking and talking. In Tractarian words: “The propositions of logic describe the scaffolding of the world, or rather they represent it. They have no “subject-matter”” (Wittgenstein, 1921: 6.124). “Logic has nothing to do with the question whether our world really is like that or not”  (6.1233) The same is meant in this strange quotation about the logical form (moreover a new vocabulary associated to what is shown is introduced: reflection, mirored, display):
“Propositions cannot represent logical form: it is mirored in them. What finds its reflection in language, language cannot represent. What expresses itself in language, we cannot express by means of language. Propositions show the logical form of reality. They display it.”  (1921: 4.121). And this quote sums up it: “What can be shown, cannot be said”  (1921: 4.1212).

That leads to consider the relation between logical truths and ethical expressions, because it seems to me that both were introduced by Wittgenstein in the sphere of what is shown.  As we have just seen, the difference between the latter and propositions is clear. Propositions represent facts and do not take into account values. For that reason, propositions have sense and are, in consequence, false or true. What logical truths and ethical expresions have in common, in Wittgenstein´s perspective, is that they are not propositions. This is clear, because nor the former neither the latter represent a possible fact. But the great difference, as Anscombe claimed, is the following one: the logical truths are sense-less and the ethical expressions are also non-sensical, because they are illegitimate constructions from the point of view of the right formation of expressions.  Wittgenstein said that we are misusing the language when we try to talk about our ethical experiences[viii]. This clarification can help us to understand Wittgenstein’s view about the typical characteristics of ethical language as non-sensical and sense-less expressions, but very important because they show what cannot be said in a descriptive way. As a consequence, I do not agree with a lot of interpretions of the last pages of the Tractatus which consider that Wittgenstein prescribed silence in ethical matters. In my view, when Wittgenstein talked about “ethical silence” what he meant is the fact that ethics belongs to the space of what is shown. In any case, we should not forget that what is shown can only be displayed by means of what is said. Hence, we are allowed to continue using ethical expressions.

Having discussed some ideas of Wittgenstein’s ethics, I want to discuss now their connetion with the ideas of these two philosophers: Moore and Sidgwick. I will start with Sidgwick, given his influence on Moore.

2. Sidgwick’s and Moore’s intuitionism
Sidgwick is the great last utilitarian. Although he is considered as a traditional utilitarian, he discovered some gaps or vacuums there. He thought that the conflict between individual happiness and universal happiness, between private interest and general good, cannot be resolved by Utilitarianism. Hence, he claimed that the Kantian universal maxim ought to be accepted as an autoevident principle that needs not rational proof. There is no other solution but the acceptation of this principle if we want to hold the utilitarian principle that aims at universal happiness. In fact, it would be reasonable to ask individuals to search universal happiness (when it goes against his own happiness) if the individuals do not feel compelled by the Kantian categorical imperative. With this solution, Sidgwick refused the traditional opposition between Utilitarianism and Intuitionism.

The crucial point in The Methods  is its step toward Intuitionism, as this quotation corroborates: “What definition can we give of “ought” “right” and other terms expressing the same fundamental notion? To this I should answer that the notion which these terms have in common is too elementary to admit of any formal definition. (…). I  find that the notion we have been examinning, as it now exists in our thought, cannot be resolved into any more simple notions: it can only be made clearer by determining as precisely as posible its relation to other notions with which it is connected in ordinary thought, especially to those with which it is liable to be confounded”  (Sidgwick, 1874: 32). These ideas were precisely developed by Moore in Principia Ethica,  in these two theses: first, the main question in ethics is to study what is good (hence, the question about human conduct is only derived from this one) and second, “good” denotes a simple quality, and hence, inanalysable and indefinable. The intuitionism of Moore(ix) makes it clear in this quotation: “If I am asked “What is good? My answer is that good is good, and that is the end of the matter. Or if I am asked “How is good to be defined?” my answer is that it cannot be defined, and that is all I have to say about it.”  (Moore, 1903: I, 6).

The consequences of these theses are not as trivial as they may appear:  “propositions about the good are all of them synthetic and never analytic, and that is plainly no trivial matter. And the same thing may be expressed more popularly, by saying that, If I am right, then nobody can foist upon us such an axiom as that “Pleasure is the only good” or that “The good is the desired” on the pretence that is “the very meaning of the word” (Ibid). According to this, the naturalistic ethics (inside utilitarianism) is mistaken and falls in the naturalistic fallacy.

Anyway, the intuitional thesis of Moore about the impossibility of rational proofs in ethical propositions refers to the irreducibility of ethical thought. With his thesis, Moore wanted to protect Ethics against positive sciences and methaphysics. I think that the intuitionism about the main ethical notions and, as a result, the irreducibility of ethical thought is a step toward the purification of Ethics; the task of stripping Ethics of its several contingent dimensions. Following Moore we cannot confound natural predicates with ethical predicates. “Good” cannot be defined by means of neither natural nor methaphysical objects. From Moore’s saying “good is good and that is the end of the matter” (Ibid) to Wittgenstein’s saying “Ethics cannot be expressed. Ethics is transcendental” (Wittgenstein, 1921: 6.421), there is a line of continuity. There is really a great difference between saying that ethical propositions cannot have rational proof and saying that there can be no ethical propositions, but, in fact, they constitute two steps toward a task which I call “purification of Ethics”.

3. The purification of ethics and moral reasoning
I claim that Sidgwick, Moore and Wittgenstein could be considered as three examples of “the maximum purification of Ethics”. Sidgwick, because he orientated his task to that point, when he claimed that elementary ethical notions are indefinable, but at the same time they are known as intuitions. Moore inherited that orientation and gave a further step in this process of progressive purification of Ethics: the main question in ethics is what is good and the problem of human conduct is only derived from this main question. Sidgwick considered Ethics as “the science or study of what is right or what ought to be, so far as this depends upon the voluntary action of individuals” (Sidgwick, 1874: 4). As we have seen, Moore left aside the considerations about human conduct in the task of the foundations of Ethics. On the other hand, Wittgenstein´s contribution to the purification of Ethics is quite radical, taking into account that he almost carried it to its extinction, given the fact that he claimed the imposibility of finding a theoretical basis for Ethics. However, he claimed that human beings cannot  avoid looking for those grounds, because it is an essential human tendency.

I find some similarities[x] between these three philosophers. All share a strong conception of Ethics in terms of duty, that forces individuals to run the common good often against their impulses and egoistic interests. Also, all three were worried about the fundamentals of Ethics and all three made the choice of an analytical method. Language in general, and ethical language in particular, is a common concern they share. However, each one has his particular point of view about these problems. Sidgwick and Moore thought that there were ethical propositions that cannot be reduced into neither propositions of natural science nor  of metaphysics: they are sui generis ethical propositions. On the other hand Wittgenstein claimed that there cannot be ethical propositions, because they are non-sensical expressions, linguistic misuses. Their view on what is Ethics depend on their conceptions about language in general and ethical language in particular.

As far as their worries go around ethical language, their analyses take into account  moral reasoning. Wittgenstein´s analysis of moral reasoning is grounded in his propositional point of view about language. In his Lecture on ethics  he uses a common distinction between relative and absolute judgments of value. The former can be put in such a form that it loses all the appearance of a judgment of value: it is a mere statement of facts. In this judgment of value “right” depends on a previous purpose. On the contrary, the absolute judgments of value cannot be reduced into statements of facts and these are, in Wittgenstein´s view, the genuine ethical expressions.

In the case of  Sidgwick, he was particularly interested in moral reasoning, as he expressed that in the Preface of The Methods: “in considering how conclusions are to be rationally reached in the familiar matter of our common daily life and actual practice” (Sidgwick 1874: viii). On the other hand he was also interested in ethical thought, in such a way that he wanted “to consider what conclusions will be rationally reached if we start with certain ethical premises, and with what degree of certainty and precision”  (ibid). As a consequence, we can distinguish two points of focus in order to examine moral reasoning: on the one hand, moral reasoning of ordinary people in matters of daily life, and on the other hand, the ethical argumentation that philosophers do in their bussiness to reach ethical conclusions in a rational way (here we can speak of ethical argumentation). With this purpose, Sidgwick intented to “dispel the original vagueness and ambiguity which lurks in the fundamental notions of our common practical reasonings” (Sidgwick 1874: 13) “because men commonly seem to guide themselves by a mixture of different methods, more o less disguised under ambiguities of language” (Sidgwick 1874: 12). According to him, it is the bussiness of  the philosophers to harmonising the different methods, after an impartial and rigorous investigation of the conclusions to which their various claims logically lead. On the other hand, an adequate analysis of moral fundamental notions as “good”, “ought”, “right”, etc, would help to dissipate the confusion in common moral reasoning. This is the focus of investigation of Sidgwick and Moore[xi] as well. These philosophers make a very cleary distinction between an ethical sense and a common sense of these notions. In the common sense these notions are used by the majority of people as meaning merely “conformed” to the standard of moral rules of current opinion. But it is still posible to ask if these moral rules are good or right in the philosophical sense. And, in Moore and Sidgwick’s perspectives, it is precisely this genuine philosophical or ethical sense of the main moral notions that is indefinable. But this is not an obstacle to built up their ethical theories and to extract important claims against ethical subjectivism and other ethical naturalistic theories as utilitarianism.

4. Conclusion
The purpose of this paper has been to examine Wittgenstein´s view on ethics in the light of Sidgwick and Moore’s intuitionism. These three philosophers believed that ethics cannot be reduced to natural science, i.e., that  ethical properties must not be confounded with natural properties. Moore used the distinction natural/supernatural, and Wittgenstein as well. The term “natural” refers to material facts that happen in the world. For that reason, when we read in the Tractatus  that “Ethics is transcendental”[xii] we should understand that it makes sense to speak about Ethics out of the sphere of facts of the world. In fact, Wittgenstein´s purpose was to distinguish ethics from natural science and from logic. I think we should not deduce, from a first reading of the Tractatus, that what Wittgenstein claims is a complete refusal of ethics. His whole bussiness was to limit (to set bounds to) the ethical space and, in order to do this, he used a negative way of speaking about Ethics, telling us what it is not. And what it is not is science.

Finally, I want to make a comment about the relation between Wittgenstein´s conception of language and his view on ethics. According to him, the Tractatus  covers all the main philosophical questions and each answer is like a piece of a puzzle. For that reason, some people believe that Wittgenstein´s ideas about ethics are a logical and natural consequence of his view about language. In fact, one can infer from the notion of proposition that appears in the Tractatus the statement that there cannot be ethical propositions. This is right, but the order of the book does not reveal the real thought of Wittgenstein[xiii].Wittgenstein thought that he had discovered the true solutions to the crucial philosophical problems, because the theoretical system which he built up suits well to his previous ideas about ethics and religion, as well about other presumptions like the isomorfy between language, thought and world.

In my viewpoint, we can connect his rejection of realism about ethics with his figurative conception of language and with his atomistic logic. We can say with Cora Diamond that “The Tractatus approach to ethics is shaped by a general conception of language” (1996: 254), but we cannot support that his whole view on ethics depends absolutely on that conception, because in Wittgenstein’s mind ethics and the ethical sense of the book played a role much more important than the role of the figurative conception of language. If we read his Notebooks  and letters we can find statements where he put  logic and his notion of proposition at the service of the ethical sense of his project.

NOTES
[i] This research is supported by a research grant PB98-0250 from the Spanish Secrretary of State of Education and Culture.
[ii] It could not been forgotten the fact that the whole book´s intention is ethical, as Wittgenstein himself stated, although only a little part of the book is explicitly about ethics. However, for the present purposes I have just considered that little part of the book.
[iii] In fact, Wittgenstein used logical and philosophical tools to investigate ethical expresions.
[iv] It has been discussed whether for Frege sense is an objetive property of language or it is an objective property of extralinguistic reality. What Frege made clear was his antipsychological view on that. According to him, sense was not the “mental ideas” which Fodor claimed, considering it, on the contrary, as something in an ideal Platonic world.
[v] Although Wittgenstein follows Frege in his conception of  “sense”, we should be careful to add that Wittgenstein had different theses about it: according to him names had no sense, but only reference, and propositions did not have reference but only sense. (See Anscombe, 1996: 17)
[vi] In some way this distinction between what can be shown and what can be said and the introduction of the ethical language in the former is reflected in the ethical doctrine of emotivism, since its main thesis is that a moral judgment “evinces” (does not enunciate) a subjetive attitude of approval o disapproval toward an action, a person, etc. Some authors believe that Wittgenstein is very near from emotivism, but I think that there are important differences between them, even if they share a common important distinction between values and facts. This comment allows me the opportunity to separate emotivism from Wittgenstein´s reflections on ethics, since emotivism is concerned, among other things, with a psychological point of view, which is against Wittgenstein´s  Fregean position.
[vii] This human and hopeless tendency that runs against the boundaries of language  recalls the Kantian view that philosophical task runs against the boundaries of reason. I think that Wittgenstein and Kant share a critical spirit: Kant applied it to delimite the boundaries of Reason, Wittgenstein, to delimite the boundaries of language. Moreover, Kant is another important case of “purification of ethics” in the history of ethical theory: with his formulation of the categorical imperative he stripped ethics from all considerations about God (Religion) and Happiness (Aristotelian and utilitarian ethics), putting Reason as the ultimate instance that dictates inconditionally moral rules.
[viii] In the first example that Wittgenstein offers us in his Lecture on Ethics  “I wonder at the existence of the world”,  there is a misuse of the word “wondering”, because we use generally the term “wonder” when we say that we wonder at something that we can imagine it not to be the case. This instance clarifies the fact that ethical expressions can be non-sensical and at the same time can be understood, without any problem, by an ordinary person.
[ix] I will not take part  in the discussion about the validity of the arguments offered by Moore in favour of his intuitionist view about “good”. I only want to say that the analogical argument Moore offers has, in my opinion, an illustrative character rather than a demonstrative one. Moore wanted to show the immediate and appropiate character of ethical intuitions, putting them at the same level with the sensory perception of a colour like yellow.
[x] There are, of course, some important differences between them. One of them is about the nature of the moral agent. In Sidgwick and Moore’s views it is the individual who apprehends intuitively the moral qualities of the reality. On the contrary, for Wittgenstein the moral agent is the philosophical or metaphysical individual, something like a Kantian transcendental will (See 1921:  6.423). Wittgenstein distinguished clearly Ethics from Knowledge Theory and Epistemology: “What ethics says does not add to our knowledge in any sense” (Wittgenstein, 1965: 12).
[xi] Moore´s analysis is basically about the notion  of “good”.
[xii] The same is said in Lecture on Ethics : “Ethics, if it is anything, is supernatural and our words will only express facts; as a teacup will only hold a teacup full of water and if I were to pour out a gallon over it” (p. 7).
[xiii]  As Isidoro Reguera claims in his preface to the Tractatus (1995), the genealogical order (the real order of the matters that Wittgenstein worried about) and the discoursive order of the Tractatus  (the order as it appears in the reading of the book) are not the same. In fact, the way that Wittgenstein took is the following one: from logic to language and world and not as the lineal reading of theTractatus  suggests.

REFERENCES
Anscombe, G. E. M. (1996). An Introduction to Wittgenstein¥s Tractatus. Bristol: Thoemmes Press.
Diamond, Cora (1996). Wittgenstein, mathematics, and ethics: Resisting the attractions of realism. In H. Sluga & D. G. Stern (Eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein (pp. 226-260). Berkeley: Cambridge University Press.
G. E. Moore (1903). Principia Ethica. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. First revised edition, 1993.
Sidgwick, Henry  (1874) The Methods of Ethics. Cambridge and Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1981.
Wittgenstein, Ludwing (1921) Tractatus  logico-philosophicus. London and New York: Routledge.1997. (Translated into spanish. Madrid: Alianza, 1995. Introduction by Isidoro Reguera).
Wittgenstein, Ludwing (1965): Lecture on Ethics. Philosophical Rewiew, 74,  3-12.

Introduction
Every utterance can be, traditionally, analyzed into two main components: the dictum, and the modus – i.e. the propositional content (dictum) expressing the information conveyed by the utterance, and the way it is expressed (modus). Modal expressions are the most explicit means by which this modus is achieved. Linguistically, they fall under a large number of grammatical categories: modal auxiliaries (can, must...), verbs of opinion (think, believe…), adjectives (probable, necessary…), adverbs (possibly, certainly…). But, beyond this syntactic variety, they share essentially the same semantic properties, namely:
1) to mark the speaker’s commitment to his/her assertions; what Grize (1983) calls prise en charge;
2) to open a set of possible worlds, and to define routes among them; a process which involves a momentary disengagement (what Culioli calls décrochage) from the current representation.
As such, they represent an important tool in argumentative processes, which are essentially a matter of beliefs and of transformations of these beliefs.

Apart from studies on modal logic (which, as we will see, are not really relevant for our purposes), there are a large number of linguistic studies on these terms (to quote only relatively classic studies,see, e.g., in English, Perkins 1983; in French, David & Kleiber 1983; and, for the particular verbs we will study here, Portine 1983 or Fuchs 1989). However, this category of linguistic devices have been poorly studied by psycholinguists, who have, by and large, neglected their specific import in sentence and discourse representation. This neglect is, for a large part, due to the kinds of approaches to lexical semantics which are commonly used in the psycholinguistic tradition. It does not seem easy to represent the meaning of modals in the conventional style of semantic networks – which is the most common approach of meaning in psycholinguistics -, nor, more generally, in the prevalent truth-conditional conception of meaning: indeed, most of psycholinguistic models are essentially conceived for dealing with a referential conception of meaning. And the problem with modal expressions is that they simply do not refer in the usual sense. Of course, the ‘possible worlds’ theory of Hintikka (1969), for example, does deal with modal expressions as referring to some kind of objects; but it is definitely not plausible as a psychological model (cf. Johnson-Laird, 1978). So, the general trend is to consider these terms as belonging to the ‘logical’ component of the utterances, together with connectives and quantifiers. A solution which is equally unsatisfactory in each of these cases, since a common feature of these terms is their polysemy: according to the contexts in which they appear, they take on a variety of values, that cannot be reduced to the logical operators they are supposed to represent (concerning the connectives, see, e.g., Caron 1997).In order to account for this polysemy, the most promising way is, in our view, to rely on some kind of ‘procedural semantics’, which has already proved useful in understanding the meaning of connectives (cf. Caron, 1996, 1997). The general idea is to conceive the meaning of a given term as based on a relatively abstract ‘meaning schema’, which gives rise, according to contextual parameters, to various ‘sense effects’. This ‘meaning schema’ has to be understood as a set of procedural instructions, controlling the hearer’s construction of the discourse representation, and reflecting the speaker’s operations in constructing his/her own representation.

The aim of this paper is to present, in the frame of this hypothesis, an analysis of the three most frequently used French modal verbs: pouvoir, devoir, and falloir. The first of these verbs expresses the possibility and can be considered as corresponding, in English, to the two modal auxiliaries can and may (but also to be able to, etc.); the two others express necessity: devoir can be translated by must (should, have to …), and falloir, which is an impersonal verb (il faut que…) corresponds approximately to it is necessary that… . But each of these verbs is, as will be shown below, highly polysemous (as are also, indeed, their English counterparts). Of course, the correspondence between French and English verbs is a very loose one, and the results we will present are, in part, valid for French language only. But we think that the conclusions which can be drawn from them, and the method of analysis, have a more general significance.

Method
Our aim was not to undertake a more or less intuitive analysis, nor to develop a purely linguistic study of the meanings of these terms, but to try to determine what are the psychological processes to which they correspond, i.e. the representations and cognitive operations of human subjects when dealing with them. So, we attempted to gather experimental data on the way normal French-speaking subjects understand these verbs.

For each of the three verbs (pouvoir, devoir, falloir), a list of 20 sentences was constructed, illustrating a large sample of the different values of these verbs. The three lists are presented in the Appendix.

Two tasks were achieved on each of these lists, by groups of 60 subjects each (French-speaking adults):
– First, they were asked to sort the sentences into classes, on the basis of the similarity of meaning of the modal verb – that is, to put together the sentences where the modal verb seemed to have the same meaning, or at least a similar meaning. So, for each couple of sentences, we obtained a measure of their similarity, given by the number of times the two sentences had been put into the same class: from 60 (when all the subjects had put them together), to 0 (when no one did).
– Secondly, they had to provide a paraphrase of each of the sentences, without employing the modal verb.

Starting from these data, we could obtain:
a. from each matrix of similarity, a hierarchical analysis, giving a small number of clusters representing the main senses (or classes of senses) of the verb;
b. from these same matrices, a multidimensional analysis, defining two or three main factors intervening in the construction of the meaning of the verb;
c. from the typology of paraphrases, a “profile” for each verb, which could then be incorporated into the multidimensional analysis (as secondary variables), and provide a basis for the interpretation.

Figure1 gives an example of the results, showing the first two axes provided by the analysis of pouvoir, the clusters of sentences, and the types of paraphrases (symbolized by triplets of letters, such as AQN = adverbs of quantity, VAV = verb “avoir” [to have], etc.).

Figure 1

Results
The dimensions of this paper do not permit to give a detailed report of these analyses. So, we will only give a brief overview of the results, with a more detailed commentary on the data presented in Fig.1, in order to give an idea of the method of interpretation.

(a) Pouvoir
To begin with, a hierarchical analysis on the matrix of similarity of the 20 sentences with pouvoir yielded five main clusters among which these sentences could be distributed (see the Appendix to find the repartition of sentences into clusters):

– A first cluster obviously corresponds to the sentences where pouvoir has its dynamic (or radical) meaning, expressing a physical ability (translatable by be able to), as in je peux soulever cette valise (I can raise this suitcase); we will note it as ‘dynamic’ (Dy);
– In the second cluster, the meaning is clearly epistemic (Ep), expressing an opinion that the speaker presents only as probable, without fully asserting it, as in il pouvait être minuit quand l’incendie se déclara (it could be midnight when the fire declared);
– A third cluster can be interpreted as ‘sporadic’ (Sp) – borrowing the term from Kleiber (1983): the modal verb expresses here a fact that can be encountered at different moments of the time, or in various circumstances, as in: il peut arriver que je fasse une erreur (it may happen that I make an error), or la vie peut se présenter sous forme végétale ou animale (life may appear either in vegetal or in animal form); it is intresting to observe that two sentences (4 and 10: cf. Appendix), whose meaning entails rather a suggestion (On peut demander aux gens… [we may ask people…]) are found in this same cluster.
– The fourth cluster clearly gathers the sentences where pouvoir has a ‘deontic’ sense (De), i.e. expresses a permission: les élèves peuvent sortir jusqu’à 18 heures (pupils may exit until 6 o’clock);
– Finally, in the fifth cluster, we find sentences where the modal verb refers to an event which is considered as possible in the future, such as il peut bien venir me voir, je ne lui parlerai pas (he can well come to see me, I will not speak with him). We will note them as ‘hypothetic’ (Hy).

Three main factors can be retained (representing respectively 35.1 %, 18.9 % and 15.2% of the overall variance). Their interpretation has to rely, first, on the nature of the clusters which are opposed on each axis, and secondly, on the distribution of paraphrases.

1. The first axis is the most important, since it represents more than one third of the overall variance. It contrasts the epistemic (Ep) and sporadic (Sp) senses, on the one hand, and the deontic (De), dynamic (Dy) and hypothetic (Hy) on the other hand. In the first case, we find essentially paraphrases with adverbs marking quantity (AQN, such as quelquefois [sometimes]), or qualitative proximity (AQL: environ [about]); it is also there that one can find the greatest number of simple suppressions of the modal (000). The most frequent paraphrases, in the second case, use verbs être (to be) and avoir (to have) (VEP and VAV). In other words, in the two first clusters of sentences, the meaning of the modal seems to rely on the representation of the (possible) state of things referred to, in so far as it is related to a set of other objects; while in the three other clusters (on the right part of the graph of Fig.1), it implies the consideration of some properties of the referent itself.

2. The second axis contrasts sporadic (Sp) and deontic (De) senses, on the one hand, with epistemic (Ep) and Hypothetic ones (Hy) on the other hand; it is neutral relatively to the dynamic (Dy) sense. The paraphrases massively correspond, in the first case, with impersonal verbs, of modal (IMO: il est possible [it is possible]), or existential value (IEX: il y a [there is/are]), or at least with verbs at the third person; and in the second case with verbs at the first person (JPN: verbs of opinion, such as Je pense, je crois [I think, I believe], or performative JAC, such as je souhaite (I wish]).

3. Finally, the third axis (not represented in Fig.1) reflects an opposition between deontic (De) and dynamic (Dy) uses of pouvoir; it is neutral relative to the other values. The paraphrases involve, in the first case, either the passive voice, or verbs of authorization (permettre [to allow]); in the second case, verbs of will (vouloir, [will]).

How shall we interpret those data ? Our assumption is that the French verb pouvoir conveys a double operation: first, to assume a set of possible states of things: P; and secondly, to point on one element of this set: p. (The notion ‘possible’ has not to be defined: we shall consider it as a primitive). On the basis of this operation, a number of senses can be constructed, according to contextual parameters. It is these senses that are defined by the three factors defined above:

1. The first (and most important) factor can be interpreted as reflecting the mode of construction of the modal value: in the first case (Ep, Sp), it relies on a scanning of P, leading to the extraction of the element p; in the second case (De, Dy, Hy), it begins with an evaluation of p, entailing its insertion into P.
2. The second factor clearly seems to refer to the source of knowledge of the set of possible states or events(i.e. of set P): either it is present in the situation, and simply found in it (Sp, De), or it is considered by the subject, and constructed by him (Ep, Hy).
3. Finally, the third factor can be interpreted as referring to the source of the constraints that determine the inclusion of element p into the set of posible states: either this source is social (De), or natural (Dy).

Devoir
The same method of analysis has been applied here. Without entering into details, we will only give an overview of the results.

The hierarchical analysis yielded three clusters, which can be defined as:
1. epistemic (Ep): Si la lumière ne s’allume pas, l’ampoule doit être grillée (If the lamp does not light, the bulb must be burnt out): the verb expresses here an opinion which is presented as simply probable, but that will be endorsed in the discourse (or action) which follows (which is not the case with epistemic pouvoir, which does not imply a commitment of the speaker : an utterance with devoir can be followed by donc [therefore], with pouvoir it cannot).
2. deontic (De): Tu dois t’acquitter de tes dettes (You have to discharge your debts); the verb expresses here an obligation.
3. predictive (Pr): ça devait finir comme ça (It had to come to such an end); here, the verb presents an event as the inevitable consequence of a given state of things.

It is interesting to observe that, on logical grounds, the three categories are not fully homogeneous. First, the ‘deontic’ sense of cluster 2 brings together sentences which clearly express an obligation (as in the example above), but also expressions of logical necessity (as in sentence 3 – see Appendix), or even of simple intention (as in sentence 13). As for the third type of sentences, while it could be put, logically, in the ‘epistemic’ category, our subjects clearly chose to give them a specific status – taking into account, together with the problematic nature of the event referred to, its temporal dimension (‘future in the past’, as in the example above, but also future relative to present time, as in sentences 4 or 7 – see Appendix).

On the basis of the data, we propose to interpret Devoir as expressing the selection of one possibility, with exclusion of the others. In other words, Devoir presupposes pouvoir : it implies a first step of construction of the set of possible states (implied in the construction of the meanings of pouvoir), the selection of one element of this set (again, like pouvoir), and then, an operation of exclusion, ruling out all possibilities but one. Thus, rather than expressing logical necessity – what could hardly account for the epistemic and ‘predictive’ senses -, it refers to an operation of decision-making, which can easily explain the three senses described above.

Two main factors can be retained (accounting for respectively 24.4 % and 16.8 % of the variance):
1. The selection can be considered, either from the point of view of the activity that produces it, or as the result of this activity. The first factor accounts for this duality of points of view: deontic sentences (De) focus on the result of the selection, epistemic and predictive sentences (Ep, Pr) on the act of selection.
2. The second factor concerns the source of the selection, which may be the subject himself (Ep), or the constraints of the situation (De, Pr).

Falloir
What emerges from the data is that falloir expresses the perception of a constraint : a given event, or activity, or state, is determined by something else, which may be an explicitly formulated condition, or the general course of the world.

The hierarchical analysis yields four clusters:
– goal-based constraint (Go): Pour que le vin soit bon, il faut un été sec (A dry summer is necessary to have a good wine)
– situation-based constraint (Si): Il faut s’arrêter de travailler, car il est tard (We must stop working, because it is late)
– necessity (Ne): Il faut accepter ce qu’on ne peut éviter (It is necessary to accept what one can’t avoid)
– fate (Fa): Il faut toujours qu’on me téléphone quand je suis occupé (Somebody has always to call me when I am busy !)

Three main factors (resp. 42.8 %, 26.2 % and 10.8 %) can be defined from the multidimensional analysis:

1. the constraint is specific (bearing on current activity: Go, Si) or general (intrinsic necessity: Ne, Fa); in other terms, it comes either from a particular condition, or from the general order of the world. Each of these two cases is, in turn, differentiated by the two other factors :
2. constraints can be understood, or not (necessity Ne vs fate Fa); in the first case, they rely on reasons which could be made explicit ; in the second case, there is no reasonable explanation.
3. constraints are subjective (derived from goals Go), or objective (derived from situation Si).

Conclusion
A first conclusion that can be drawn from these results is that the linguistic functioning of modal verbs has not much to do with modal logic. Pouvoir does not correspond to the pure modal operator of possibility, but develops a number of operations, on the basis of the construction of a set of possible states. Devoir is not – as it is in modal logic – the symmetric term relative to pouvoir: it presupposes the construction of a set of possible states of things, operates a selection among them, and excludes all elements but one. And falloir, which would be logically equivalent to devoir, shows a completely different pattern of meanings: it sets up a relation of dependency between the state or event described and the conditions in which it happens. Thus, each one of these three verbs expresses, not a formal logical operation, but a set of instructions to construct a psychological representation.

Considering these verbs as procedural instructions, leads to a second conclusion. Argumentation is not only a matter of propositional contents, and of logical operations on them; it is also a matter of language. And language must be conceived, not as a simple means of conveying information, but as an effective tool for interaction. From a psychological point of view, linguistic devices can be conceived as processing instructions for information given in the course of discursive process; and the hearer’s cognitive representation is controlled by those instructions (as could already be shown in the case of connectives – Caron, 1997). So, there is no doubt that they play a role in argumentative processes. To speak is not only to convey information: it is also – and perhaps essentially -, as Austin suggested it, “ to do things with words ”: not only at the level of social conventions and rules of the ‘language game’, but in a concrete manner, by triggering cognitive processes in the hearer’s mind.

Coming back to our data, it must be said that the limitations of the present work are obvious. First, there are, for each of the three verbs under study, a number of ‘shades of meaning’ which have not been considered (see, e.g. the various examples in Portine 1983). Moreover, the number of sentences in each list, which the experimental constraints inevitably limits, is, of course, very low; and the particular choice of the 20 sentences may have introduced a bias in the subjects’ decisions, which could have been different with another sample. However, the results are, globally, sufficiently coherent to warrant the general conclusions we expressed above.

Another limitation – which can hardly be avoided – comes from the fact, already mentioned at the beginning of this paper, that our results are only valid for French language, making problematic a generalization to other languages. There is no doubt that pouvoir, devoir, and falloir behave differently from may or can, must, should or have to (or from similar terms in German, Russian, and so on). It would be too easy to argue that most of the psycholinguistic (and even linguistic) studies which are often presented as evidence for the general linguistic competence of human subjects, usually rely on a single language – namely on English data. Suffice it to say that analogous studies are needed on a variety of languages. But there is no doubt that similar observations could be made on the modal verbs of other languages, which show the same variety of meanings. It can be expected that those terms will reveal basic features relatively invariant across languages – as we could already show it in the case of the conditional if in various languages (Caron & al., 1987). More generally, the approach we illustrated here seems to offer a promising way to study the psychological semantics of this kind of terms (and perhaps more generally, of all lexical items). As we formulated it elsewhere:

“A given word does not ‘contain’, or ‘point to’ a variety of predetermined meanings (…). What the word conveys is not, strictly speaking, a ‘meaning’, but a pattern of procedures which, in a given context, will produce a particular ‘sense effect’. It is only those ‘sense effects’ that are consciously available; the procedural pattern – which I have proposed to call ‘meaning schema’ – is not: it has to be inferred from empirical data.” (Caron, 1996, 16)

Thus, what we propose is to consider words and utterances, not as containers of thoughts, but as tools for making sense. The variety of senses a word can create are not inherent to it, they are the product of the operations this word triggers on a particular representational context. And there is no doubt that these operations play an essential role in argumentation.

Appendix: Lists of sentences used in the experiment
(The sentences have been re-ordered according to the clusters yielded by the hierarchical analysis – see text for explanation)

Pouvoir
I (Dy)
17. Dès que vous pourrez, venez me voir à mon bureau (As soon as you can, come and see me at my office)
20. Chacun se logeait où il pouvait (Everybody took lodgings where he could)
8. Qu’est-ce que je peux faire pour vous ? (What can I do for you ?)
7. Je peux soulever cette valise (I can raise this suitcase)

II (Ep)
11. Il pouvait être minuit quand l’incendie se déclara (it might be midnight when the fire declared)
16. Cet enfant pouvait avoir au plus six ans (This child might be six years old at most)

III (Sp)
2. Il peut arriver que je fasse une erreur dans mon raisonnement (it may happen that I make an error in my reasoning)
18. Des hommes habiles dans l’analyse peuvent être privés d’imagination (Men skilled in analysis may be deprived of imagination)
12. L’artiste peut ne faire qu’un avec l’exécutant (It may happen that the artist and the executant are the same)
6. La vie peut se présenter sous forme végétale ou animale (Life may appear either in vegetal or in animal form)
4. On peut demander aux gens de faire une pétition (We could ask people to make a petition)
10. En utilisant cette stratégie on peut contraindre l’ennemi à capituler (Using this strategy could force the enemy to surrender)

IV (De)
13. Le séminaire est suivi d’un débat où chacun peut s’exprimer librement (After the seminary, a debate takes place where everyone may freely express himself)
15. Le mineur peut contracter mariage dans certains cas (Teenagers may marry in some cases)
3. Les élèves internes peuvent sortir jusqu’à 18 heures le mercredi (Pupils may exit until 6 o’clock)
9. Christine peut faire n’importe quoi, sa mère ne lui dit rien (Whatever Christine may do, her mother doesn’t say anything)

V (Hy)
14. Qu’est-ce que ça peut te faire ? (Whatever can it be to you?)
19. Il peut bien venir me voir, je ne lui parlerai pas (He can well come to see me, I will not speak with him)
5. Puis-je te faire remarquer qu’il est déjà six heures? (May I point out to you that it is already 6 o’clock?)
1. Puissiez-vous réussir! (May you succeed!)

Devoir
I (De)
1. Je dois rédiger le rapport d’activité pour demain matin (I have to write the report for to-morrow morning)
6. Tu dois t’acquitter de tes dettes le plus vite possible (You have to discharge your debts as soon as possible)
13. Je dois les rappeler un peu plus tard (I have to call them a bit later)
11. Je dois reconnaître que j’ai eu tort de m’emporter (I must admit that I shouldn’t lose my temper)
16. Un tel incident ne doit plus se produire (Such an incident must not happen again)
3. Un nombre premier doit être impair (A prime number must be odd)

II (Ep)
20. Si mon raisonnement est correct, le coffre doit être enterré ici (If my reasoning is right, the chest must be buried here)
14. Si la lumière ne s’allume pas, l’ampoule doit être grillée (If the lamp does not light, the bulb must be burnt out)
2. Tu dois être fatigué après ce long voyage (You must be tired after this long journey)
19. Les choses ont dû se passer de cette façon (Things must have happened this way)
9. Il doit bien y avoir quelqu’un qui est au courant! (There must be somebody who is informed!)
15. Je devais avoir à peu près quatorze ans quand j’ai fait sa connaissance (It must be when I was fourteen that I became acquainted with him)
17. Ces animaux devaient déjà exister à l’ère tertiaire (These animals must already have existed in the Tertiary era)

III (Pr)
8. En 1769 naissait à Ajaccio celui qui devait devenir l’empereur Napoléon Premier (In 1769 was born in Ajaccio the man who was to become Napoleon I)
12. C’était une croyance universelle au Moyen Age que le monde devait finir en l’an 1000 de l’Incarnation (In the Middle Ages, everybody believed that the end of the world had to happen in the year 1000)
5. Ça devait finir comme ça (It had to come to such an end)
7. Si cela devait se produire un jour, je ne le supporterais pas (If that had ever to happen, I would not tolerate it)
18. La nuit semblait devoir ne pas finir (It seemed that the night should not finish)
10. Quand il m’a quitté, il devait passer vous voir (When he left me, he had to meet you)
4. L’exposition doit s’ouvrir dans cinq jours (The show must open five days hence)

Falloir
I (Go)
1. Il faut que j’aie la maîtrise pour m’inscrire en DESS (I have to obtain my MA degree to be registered in DESS)
3. J’ai reçu une proposition d’emploi aux USA, mais il faut que j’obtienne le visa d’entrée (I have been offered a job in the US, but I have to get my visa)
14. J’ai ma carte bleue, mais il faut que j’attende mon code (I have my credit card, but I have to wait for my code)
11. Pour que le vin soit bon, il faut un été sec (A dry summer is necessary to have a good wine)
18. Il faut s’arrêter aux feux rouges (One has to stop when traffic light is red)

II (Si)
10. Il faut que je prépare le repas, il est midi (I must get the meal ready, it’s 12 o’clock)
13. Il faut s’arrêter de travailler, car il est tard (We must stop working, because it is late)
7. Depuis mon échec, j’ai perdu confiance, il faut que je me ressaisisse (Since my failure I lack self-assurance, I have to recover)
12. Mon avion part à 16 h., il faut que je sois à l’aéroport deux heures avant (My plane starts at 4, I have to be in the airport two hours sooner)
16. Martine n’arrive plus à s’en sortir, il faut faire quelque chose pour l’aider (Martine does not manage to get out of that, we have to do something to help her)

III (Ne)
2. Il faut accepter ce qu’on ne peut éviter (It is necessary to accept what one can’t avoid)
4. Pour dire des choses pareilles, il faut être fou (To say such things, one must be mad)
5. Il faut peu de choses pour être heureux (Few things are needed to be happy)
9. Il faut rester calme dans toutes les situations (One has to keep cool in all circumstances)
8. Pierre a enfin trouvé la femme qu’il lui faut (Peter has finally found the woman he needs)

IV (Fa)
6. Il faut toujours qu’on me téléphone quand je suis occupé! (Somebody has always to call me when I am busy!)
15. Il faut que Jacques soit bien malade pour ne pas être venu à la réunion (Since Jacques didn’t come to the meeting, he must be seriously ill)
17. Je t’attends depuis deux heures, et il faut que tu arrives juste quand je viens de partir (I’ve waited for you for two hours, and you must arrive when I just left)

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«The only object of Academic’s discussion is by arguing both sides of a question to draw out and fashion something which is either true or which come as close as possible to the truth» (Cicero, Academica, 2.8)

Debate, the most typical activity of human beings, plays an important and exclusive role in every part of our life. Debate in turn has also become an important object of debate. A great debate occurred and occurs between supporters and detractors of conflictuality vs. co-operation. There was and there is a special controversy about competitive debate, namely about the practice of debating both sides of a question.
Considering that the debate is intrinsically oppositional, adversarial and confrontational, someone would argue the rhetorical creativity and proficiency in argumentation to be kinds of skills an educated person is expected to have. So they think that the controversy-oriented approach and the skill in debating on either side of any proposed argument are inherently pedagogical: they promote rhetorical creative processes and favour training in argumentation. Cicero recommends that the orator should «have commonplaces ready at hand, in which the question is argued and handled on either side». This is the tradition of Cicero and Quintilian, advocated by Erasmus, exemplified by Francis Bacon, taught by Vico, supported by Mill. Toulmin, Perelman, Habermas too are conscious of the importance and promoters of the revival of controversy for philosophy and for social life, today as yesterday when «the life of the mind was exciting because it was framed in conflict». (Ong, 1971, 68)
Against this tradition considering philosophy as war (see: Curi, 2000) and science as argument (see: Pera, 1991) are those who suggest that while co-operation is always moral and proper, conflict is always amoral and vicious; from an educational point of view, to compel students to debate both sides of a question is not pedagogical and consequently they are unfavourable to the pro-con procedures. The opposition conflict/co-operation is expression of a fundamental cultural opposition.

We can reconstruct the whole history of philosophical and scientific thought as the history of the relationship between two opposite models of discussion, a cooperational model and a conflictual model, the first dialogical and the second polemical. Furthermore we find this dichotomic pattern also in other related couples, such as episteme/doxa, theory/practice, reason/unreason, esprit de géometrie/esprit de finesse, conviction/persuasion, demonstration/argumentation, not to mention the fundamental one: logic and rhetoric, an important pair that exemplifies a recurring tension, if not a struggle, existing between two contending points of view, that have interacted controversially since antiquity up to the present: descriptive vs. normative approach to an argument, practical persuasiveness vs. normative uprightness, logical soundness vs. pragmatic belief.

Starting from the observation that the boundaries between rhetoric and logic and between conflict and co-operation have been often reshaped but always kept up, in this paper I will try to deal with the following two questions:
1. What is the nature of the couple co-operation/competition? Is it good to be co-operative or is it better to be competitive? What is the importance of being collaborative compared with the importance of being conflicting?
2. What is the relationship between «to be right» and «to succeed in persuading someone in thinking so»?

Is conflict the opposite of co-operation?
Committing our thoughts and actions to opposed references is a typical, and the most simple, operation for achieving a categorical ordering, an ordering necessary to our thinking and to our living.
Certainly the reference to dichotomies is a clear principle for classification, but sometimes it is a fallacious project and has inhibitory results. Some couples are clearly separable, other are inseparable; some of them are absolute, some are relative; sometimes the two items of the couple are compatible, sometimes they are irreconcilable.

What is the nature of the couple co-operation/competition? Is it an exclusive or a complementary couple? In other words: does co-operation banish conflict or does it incorporate conflict? Can we can get rid of the incompatibilities that apparently subsist between them?
I would like to show that conflict is not the opposite of co-operation and that it is not to be confused with opposition to co-operation.
All participants in a discussion have at least a thesis to defend and a thesis to contrast: so each part will be both proponent and opponent. The debaters both give and ask reasons. Moreover, the agents of a debate are players and referee at the same time. In the same time and in the same way they may be co-operative and oppositive, like Janus, the roman numen of doorways, looking in the opposite directions, the best symbol of matching assertions with counterassertions.

The authentic contradictions, assuredly irreducible, are limited. Many situations we can see as hopeless antitheses may become and be quiet co-existence: the funny side should generate laughter; the tragic side should generate distress. But, as we know, there are also tragic-comic situations: at the roots of the comic spirit of Charley Chaplin we find a tragic quality. Without supporting the classical and controversial «coincidentia oppositorum», commonly we use in our discourses some conceptual and discursive associations that at a first glance seem to be reciprocally exclusive: rational nonsense, thunderous silence. This linguistic, conceptual and rhetorical fact is called «oxymoron», whose etymology (pointedly foolish) is autoexplicative: what is fool from one point of view is genial if considered from another point of view. So the yoking of two terms, that ordinarily are contradictory or incongruous, is not problematic; on the contrary it results apt, startlingly apt, being «compatible by their very incompatibility».

This is logically justified by the fact that a word or a phrase («to use the big stick», for example) can be taken in two sense, both in the “proper” and the “figurative” one. And from the practical point of view, this is justified by the fact that the technique of dissociation («distinguo») can be used for resolving (or dissolving) a difference of opinion. The belief that conflict is not incompatible with co-operation is more and more accepted even in non philosophical quarters. This opinion is not so outrageous and it is fairly admissible if we operate a distinction, namely if we consider that the idea that antagonism is dangerous and contemptible is a normative fact, while the idea that antagonism has an epistemic, a rhetorical and a social function is a historical and descriptive fact.

To be right and to be persuading
Which is the relationship between «to be right» and «to succeed in persuading that we are right»?  This is a perennial and very intricate problem, involving an interplay and a tension between two ideals: logical validity and persuasiveness, strength and validity, conviction and persuasiveness.
A strong aspiration to objectivity pervades all the history of science and of philosophy: the objectivity has been considered, at least in western tradition, a value and a highly desirable thing. “Objective” reason is considered superior because it should provide means to resolve conflicts between “subjective” perceptions.

What is right (if any)? The only thing I can say is that, in a discussion, to be really true without appearing true, is unfortunately not enough: it is necessary for the true or right solution to appear true or right to an audience. The statement that the difficult notion of being right and the corresponding predicate, true (or correct), can be systematically, for many theoretical and practical purposes, replaced by to succeed in persuading someone in thinking so and by the corresponding predicate persuasive, is defended by the supporters of the theory of «truth by means of consensus» as opposed to the theory of «consensus by means of truth». The truth we find in the «argument community» – where a common solution, but not necessarily the right solution, is found – is a notion introduced by some recent approaches in the study of argument.
Certainly, settling a difference of opinion is not resolving a difference of opinion: the first is merely a practical compromise between the parties, the second would be a true resolution. But, considering that the truth emerges more easily if competing sides are given the opportunity to express themselves in mutual opposition, to assume the legal advocacy as a model for argument is perhaps better than to assume the geometrical, Descartes’ model for argument: formalisation of argumentation schemes, diagramming, recently developed argumentation software approaches are surely useful, but have very limited application. And they are not useful when we have to consider the case of war against terrorist threat and the case of alternative responses; or when we have to support anti-abortion positions or pro-abortion positions.

The debate has many facets, meanings and implications: an epistemic facet, a rhetorical facet, and an ethical one. So the question of how and when it is good to debate has at least three kinds of implications.
This means that among the many possible dimensions of analysis of the co-operative/competitive relationship, it is possible to select three aspects: the epistemic-conceptual one, the dialectical-rhetorical one and the ethic-interactional-political one.
Although these three aspects are certainly interconnected, each of them marks a different approach to the problem of understanding what are the mechanisms, the relations and the objectives intervening in a discursive exchange.

Epistemic-conceptual dimension of discussion
Debating is considered a rational, or reasonable, decision making procedure: it is not only a practical modality, action-oriented, but a logical modality, thought-oriented. Furthermore, debating implies the classical opposition episteme vs. doxa. Between the two terms exists the same ancient hostility existing between philosophers and rhetoricians, theoretical knowledge and practical wisdom, contemplatio and actio, (logical) conviction and (emotional) persuasion, reality and appearance. Chaïm Perelman e Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca identify the opposition «reality/appearance» as the primary couple (Perelman – Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1958, § 90).

In every couple there is an axiological implication: the two terms are not judged equal, but one term of the couple is considered right and good, positive and normal, while the opposite one is considered bad, negative and aberrant. But the positive and negative traits are changing and reversing with time.
The normal procedure for selecting one between two contrary positions consists in identifying all significant pro and con points and arguments. Then we should to establish the relevance and importance we assign to each of them and then, by comparison, to “calculate” which is the best or to “weight” which is heavier.
If one group of reasons is significantly “better” or “heavier”, we can make a “right” choice.
Debate is thus conceived as a mean to find an intersubjective truth. Arguing and debating is a kind of self-discovery (a discovery of the self) in order to connect dialogically ourselves with the audience (a discovery of the others). In a debate we want to transform our subjective truth (a truth for the subject, true because it presents the state of subject’s beliefs or attitudes) in objective truth (a truth for many or for all, because it presents the state of many or all subjects participants).
The trouble is that often there is no guide at all for determining which between two contradictory positions is true/false or is appropriate in a particular situation. Folk wisdom or common sense sayings encounter the same trouble: «Look before you leap» vs. «He who hesitate is lost»; or «Out of sight, out of mind» vs. «Absence makes the heart grow fonder», are two examples proposed by W. Mc Keachie and C. Doyle at the beginning of their general psychology textbook Psychology (1966, cap 1).

The “subjective” debate (for example, a political one) is normally conducted from the first-person standpoint, while in an “objective” discussion (for example, a discussion between scientists) we should take the perspective of a third person. In the first case the subjective-argumentative attitude prevails, while in the second case the objective-informative one predominates. This distinction is theoretically right and possible; in practice it is very difficult to maintain because these dimensions are mixed. There is an inextricable interplay between objective and subjective.

Summing up the epistemic reasons for debating and for the idea that competition is not incompatible with co-operation, we could say that  disconfirmation, contradiction, disagreement stimulate the search for what is wrong in other’s and in our reasoning, in line with a critical-falsificationist perspective. In other terms, listing the pros and cons of any question is as essential or as useful as the negative and positive atomic charge of an element. And facing disagreement and responding to an adversary is the surest way to assess our positions.

Dialectical-rhetorical dimension of discussion
This dimension refers to the fact that a dialogue/debate is a way of arguing. To conceive a dialogue/debate as a process of argumentation, instead of a simple interaction, or an exchange or a regulated procedure, means to point out the reasons that proponent and opponent give in support of their assertions. The lines of reasoning required when we have to demonstrate or refute a thesis, are very different in different contexts, especially in polemical and in dialogical exchanges.

In few words, we could say that there are many reasons and motives for being rhetorically and dialectically competitive.
First, dealing with alternative views and contrasting information contributes to instil critical spirit and to acquire basic skills of argumentation.
Second, the skill in debating on either side of any proposed argument is intrinsically pedagogical: training in argumentation promotes creative processes; on the other hand, rhetorical creativity and proficiency in argumentation are kinds of skills we should expect an educated person to have.
In the dialectical arena sometimes it is good to be bad, that is to breach the code of a fair discussion: arguer’s dialectical obligations are not the human moral obligations.

Ethical and political dimension of discussion
Do controversy and polemical debate «protect us from exclusivism and ethnocentrism», as says Trudy Govier (1999, 264) or are they deleterious?

This facet includes also a relevant pedagogical peculiarity. The aim of the ancient rhetorical education was to make the student able and versatile in discovering ideas and arguments. Rhetoric should achieve richness in expression as well as richness in content, abundance of style and abundance of subject matter, variety of words and variety of arguments (I refer to Erasmus’s De duplici copia verborum ac rerum). Increasing our inventive resourcefulness by developing ideas on both sides of a question can produce a change towards a broader range of ways to talk to each other and to face issues vital to us. But this has also an argumentative value. «If it is at all possible, we shall show that what our opponent calls justice is cowardice, and sloth, and perverse generosity; what he calls wisdom we shall term impertinent babbling, and inoffensive cleverness, what he declare be temperance we shall declare to be inaction and lax indifference; what he has named courage, we shall term the reckless temerity of a gladiator» (Cicero, Rhetorica ad Herennium, III, 3, 6) for «no one will propose the abandonment of virtue, but let the speaker say… that virtue consists of qualities contrary to those evinced» (ibid.)

«In practice, rhetorical education is education in two-sided argument, argument where the truth is decided by the judge or the jury, where the truth is a dramatic criticism handed down on the forensic drama which has been played out according to the rules laid down, finally, by a rhetorical education» (Lanham, 1988, p. 600.)

Pro/con pedagogy is primarily concerned with the generation and presentation, defence of and attack on claims, argumentation and counter-argumentation, grounding and undermining. An education based on competitiveness and antagonism, on conflict and antitheses, is naturally objectionable. That debating is educationally valuable is an argument debatable and debated. Certainly it is not of great value, in a debate about the value of silence/loquacity, to simply oppose the argument «Silence, like night, is convenient for treacheries» to the argument «silence is the sleep that nourishes wisdom». These are two of the antithetical sentences collected by Francis Bacon in his 47 topics included in his Antitheta rerum, (Antithesis of Things, in Works, IV, 492) and arranged for and against. Even if to set down and collect antitheses may be risky, they are seeds – seeds only, not flowers, says Bacon.
But it is of great value (of heuristic, practical and moral value, that is in the framework of argumentation theory, of practice and of pedagogy) the confrontation of the two theses and of the two supporters in conversation in order to solve, dissolve or resolve a disagreement.
Modern rhetorical theory and practice have implications for contemporary pedagogy. With the words of George Herbert Mead: to learn “to take the roles of another”, in games and in other situations, is vitally important also for the development of thought. (Mead, 1934, pp. 253 ff.)

In 1955 Kenneth Burke suggested the revival of ancient disputatio, in its practice and in its spirit: «were the earlier pedagogic practice of debating brought back into favor, each participant would be required, not to uphold just one position but to write two debates, upholding first one position and then the other. Then, beyond, this would be a third piece, designed to be a formal transcending of the whole issue, by analyzing the sheerly verbal maneuvers involved in the placing and discussing of the issue. Such a third step would not in any sense “solve” the issue, not even in the reasonable, sociological sense of discovering that “to an extent, both sides are right”. Nor would we advise such procedures merely as training in the art of verbal combat. For though such experience could be applied thus pragmatically, the ultimate value in such verbal exercising would be its contribution toward the “suffering” of an attitude that pointed toward a distrustful admiration of all symbolism, and toward the attempt systematically to question the many symbolically-stimulated goads that are now accepted too often without question» (K. Burke, cit. in Sloane, 1997, pp. 290-91)

The moral is simply this: even in a highly controversial framework, a cooperational intent is possible and desirable; the ideal and the most advantageous situation is when an initially irreducible antagonist is finally co-operatively ready to modify his opinion.
We are dealing with two types of exchanges marked by opposite traits, whose major differences are the following.

The importance of being collaborative. The dialogical debating
Conflict has been charged with many misdeeds: from an epistemic point of view it is considered disturbing, methodologically it is considered hazardous, socially and ethically inadmissible. Why?

First, the agents of a conflictual debate tend to be more attentive to defend and to strengthen their position than to interpret the adversarial position or to achieve understanding.
Second: the role and the result of conflict in discussion are eristic, not heuristic.
Third: in systematically debating opposite solutions, there is the dramatic risk of transforming a thinker in a Hamlet, unable to make up one’s mind, vacillating inconclusively between being and not being.
Finally, the competitive argumentation aims at winning, not at finding the best answer. The competition generates winners and defeated.

Using the words of Deborah Tannen: «But when opposition becomes the overwhelming avenue of inquiry – a formula that requiresanother side to be found or a criticism to be voiced; when the lust for opposition privileges extremes views and obscures complexity; when our eagerness to find weaknesses blinds us to strengths; when the atmosphere of animosity precludes respect and poisons our relations with one another; then argument culture is doing more damage than good» (Tannen, 1999, 25)

The importance of being contrasting. The antilogical debating
Why, on the contrary, is the antagonism important in discussion?
First, disconfirmation, contradiction, disagreement stimulate the search for what is wrong in other’s and in our reasoning, in line with a critical-falsificationist perspective. Dealing with alternative views and contrasting information contributes to instil critical spirit and to acquire basic skills of argumentation.
Second, a liberal “mind-set” and a pluralistic society can be created via pedagogical strategies, e.g. by means of competitive debate, being this a condition for a democratic society.
Third, as we said, the skill in debating on either side of any proposed argument is intrinsically pedagogical: it promotes rhetorical creative processes and favours training in argumentation. Rhetorical creativity and proficiency in argumentation are kinds of skills necessary for an educated person.
Finally, “civil” (polite, quiet) discourse can be sometimes a device for demoralizing and silencing some positions and people.

We see that the values that come into play, and into conflict, in the clash between the co-operative pattern and the competitive one are values of a certain, if not vital, importance, such as:
Values of epistemic-conceptual nature:
objective vs. subjective
authenticity vs. manipulation
reality vs. appearance
monism vs. pluralism
consensus by means of truth vs. truth by means of consensus
being right vs. appearing to be right

Values of dialectical-rhetorical nature:
correct vs. convincing
truth vs. persuasion
logic vs. rhetoric

Values of ethic-interactional nature:
morality vs. functionality
end vs. means
conflict as break-up vs. conflict as opportunity
“edifying” vs. destructive
consensus vs. dissent

The different pairs mentioned may be perhaps all unified under the general opposition of “to be right” and “to succeed in persuading someone in thinking so”.
I tried to explore this path: discounting the possibility of eliminating the conflict, I would exclude also both the necessity and the opportunity of doing so.
It is my belief that controversy and subjectivity are not only abundant but also normal, indispensable and desirable. As it has been said, the usefulness of competition is best expressed by one single yet important quality: that the well-known advantages of co-operation may be achieved even better and more assuredly through argumentative competition.

In conclusion it seems that competition is the best partner of co-operation. For this thesis I suggest some reasons, some motives and some causes. All of them try to respond to the interrogative question «why?», but in different ways: a reason tries to explain and justify; a motive tries to find what induces; a cause tries to indicate what determines.

I admit that we have to distinguish among many types of discussions, because someone may be persuaded that s/he is right, whatever the argument of the opponent; in other settings someone else may advance, support, modify and criticise all claims in order to grant the best solution or conclusion. In Cattani 2001 five main types of discussion have been identified, on the basis of half a dozen classifying criteria for including visible contents and relationships, as well as intentions, aims, attitudes and other classifying parameters, such as
– the initial situation;
– the main goal of that type of debate;
– the participants’ particular aims;
– the degree of legitimisation acknowledged to the interlocutor;
– the agreement and disagreement on rules and facts;
– the possible outcome of the debate.

On the basis of these traits it is possible to outline a taxonomy of debates and to identify for each type some typical argumentative schemes, moves, standard of evaluation: Polemic or fighting, Negotiation or trading, Confrontation or playing, Research Dialogue or travelling, and Colloquy or building may be identified as the five modes of arguing and debating. We can sum up the traits of the five types of debates in the following schema.

Polemic  –  war metaphor  –  to debate is to fight
Negotiation  –  market metaphor  –  to debate is to deal
Confrontation  –   sport metaphor  –   to debate is to play
Research Dialogue  –  exploration metaphor  –   to debate is to travel
Colloquy  –  building metaphor  –    to debate is to construct

Polemic
Exemplification: eristic debate; political argument; ideological dispute.
Initial situation: antagonistic conflict; possible disagreement both on rules and facts.
Goal: to defeat, destroy, humiliate the opponent.
Relationship between interlocutors: deep-rooted hostility, distrust and aversion as between enemies.
Possible outcome: a winner and a loser; a competitor, rather than his thesis, prevails on the other.
Associated metaphor: war.
Peculiar fallacies: argument ad hominem, tu quoque, many questions, shifting the burden of proof.

Negotiation
Exemplification: mediation; arbitration; trade-unions negotiation.
Initial situation: conflict of interests.
Goal: to weaken the opponent.
Relationship between interlocutors: antagonism, generally polite, such as between two businessmen.
Possible outcome: partial withdrawal from initial position and comparative valuation of theses.
Associated metaphor: trading.
Peculiar fallacies: argument ad misericordiam, ad baculum, ad metum.

Confrontation
Exemplification: persuasion dialogue; critical discussion.
Initial situation: problems and conflict of opinions on controversial matters.
Goal: to define points of agreement and points of disagreement, in order to persuade the audience.
Relationship between interlocutors: antagonism mixed with co-operation and full legitimisation of the opponent.
Possible outcome: understanding of reciprocal positions, leaving judgement to the audience.
Associated metaphor: play and sport.
Peculiar fallacies: argument ad populum, ad antiquitatem, witty diversion.

Research Dialogue
Exemplification: co-operative exchange, as between two scientific researchers.
Initial situation: shared problems. Disagreement on data and agreement on rules.
Goal: to verify or falsify a thesis.
Relationship between interlocutors: co-operation and cordiality as between two travellers.
Possible outcome: to agree upon the conclusion or resolution.
Associated metaphor: exploration.
Peculiar fallacies: over-generalisation, faulty analogy, post hoc ergo propter hoc.

Colloquy
Exemplification: classroom dialogue, consultation, investigation.
Initial situation: agreement, sometimes in a context of unequal knowledge.
Goal: to remove doubt and strengthen a thesis.
Relationship between interlocutors: confidence, even collusion.
Possible outcome: establishment of a thesis. Neither winner nor losers.
Associated metaphor: building.
Peculiar fallacies: argument from authority, ad verecundiam, wishful thinking, petitio principii.

Each of them is characterised by a different mode of thinking, of conceiving and of perceiving the debate; note that models and metaphors of arguing are also ways of shaping our way for understanding arguments and for establishing our behaviour in arguing, the way in which we theorise, practice and study argument and argumentation.
The difference is particularly clear if we compare the two extreme types of debate, namely polemic and colloquy.
In the polemic there is a clash between two or more parties, each of them having a different or opposite opinion to defend and whose aim is to prevail over the opposite side:  debate is oppositional and is by nature an adversarial procedure, involving proponents and opponents: it is more a dispute or a fight than a rational persuasion. This justifies the repeated «argument-as-war», «argument-as-combat» metaphor.
In Colloquy or Dialogue the parties may disagree on procedures and on goals to be obtained, but accept the so called rules of the game, concerning, for example, the length and the turns of exchange, the admissibility of certain moves etceteras. Co-operation manifests itself also in the fact that each party is prepared to modify his opinion if the other gives new information and new convincing argument.

The abstract relationship between competition and co-operation may be of four kinds: mutual exclusion, complementarity, partial overlap and inclusion.

In the first case, conflict and co-operation is a pair wholly heterogeneous and one term excludes the other: if there is conflict there is not co-operation, if there is the moon there is not the sun. The hypothesis of exclusion implies struggle.
For the case of complementarity, each of the two forms of relationship carries out its own function, without switching off the other. The hypothesis of complementarity implies effective and substantial coexistence.
The third possibility admits that there is some amalgamation between the two. The hypothesis of partial overlap implies co-ordination.
Finally, the hypothesis of inclusion is connected with the idea that conflict is part of co-operation. This pattern admits in abstract also the opposite inclusion (conflict including co-operation). The hypothesis of the inclusion implies some dependence.

Using a metaphor, we may compare the nature of the relationship between conflict and co-operation to the relations between two communicating states. The exchanges between two neighbouring nations can occur in many ways (the case where no relations at all are provided is left out): they may be casual and underground (recreation, pleasure, smuggling, contraband) or continuos and official (import-export, diplomatic services, ambassador’s exchanges) or freely irregular (tourism, seasonal work). In other words, has the relationship – the flux and the influence – between conflict and co-operation to be a clandestine, casual and unwanted phenomenon or an admitted, continuos and desirable fact?

I would argue that the rejection of conflict is not necessary and that to tolerate the conflict within the field of co-operation is not only permissible, but it may be advantageous and perhaps unavoidable.
Without being obliged to decide if the value of free discussion transcends the value of all other values, I would say that the controversy is a paradigm for philosophy, a rhetorical protocol and a good pedagogic practice: conflict is required also where the co-operation is possible and desirable. This is my for argument. Each pro argument obviously corresponds with a con argument, because every question has two sides and everything may be contested. In order to re-establish the equilibrium of the chiasmus «competition with co-operation, co-operation with competition», I’ll do my best for being competitively co-operational with people who will propose an against argument for adopting an exclusively co-operative setting for argumentation theory, practice and pedagogy.

REFERENCES
Cattani, A. (2001), Botta e risposta. L’arte della replica. Bologna: Il Mulino.
Curi, U. (2000), Polemos. La filosofia come guerra. Torino: Bollati Boringhieri.
Dascal, M. (1998), Types of Polemics and Types of Polemical Moves. In Sv. Cmejrková et all. (eds.), Dialogueanalyse VI (pp. 15-33). Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag.
Govier, T. (1999), Argument, Adversariality, and Controversy. In F. H. van Eemeren et all. (eds.), Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (pp. 260-65). Amsterdam: ISSA.
Langsdorf, L. (1999), The tacit dimension in Argumentation. In F. H. van Eemeren et all. (eds.), Proceedings of the Fourth International Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (p. 497). Amsterdam: ISSA.
Mc Keachie, W. and C. (1996), Psychology, Reading, Mass., Addison- Wesley.
Kimball, B.B. (1995), Orators and Philosophers. A History of the Idea of Liberal Education, New York College Entrance Examination Board Publications.
Mead , G.H. (1934), Mind, Self and Society. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
Pera, M. (1991), Scienza e retorica. Roma-Bari: Laterza.
Prezzolini G. (1907), L’arte di persuadere. Firenze: Lumachi. New edit.: Napoli: Liguori, 1991.
Perelman Ch., Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. (1958), La nouvelle Rhétorique. Traité de l’argumentation. Paris: P.U.F.
Richard A. Lanham, R.A. (1988), The ‘Q’ Question, The South Atlantic Quarterly, 87, 600 ff.
Ong, W. (1971), Rhetoric, Romance and Technology. Ithaca, N.J.: Cornell University Press.
Sloane, Th. O. (1997), On the Contrary. The Protocol of Traditional Rhetoric. Washington: The Catholic University of America Press.
Tannen, D. (1999), The Argument Culture. Stopping America’s War of Words. New York: Ballantine Books.

We live in the age of advertising, every space in our culture carries commercial messages. They are used to give  vicarious experience and to shape the consumer’s identity.
Therefore it’s fascinating to find a way to penetrate its strategies, considering that even if we can witness an enormous amount of publications on this topic, many of them reflect much more on its general aims, instead of analyzing its mechanisms.

The language of advertising is very complex as it uses different codes, the verbal and the visual one interacting. Applying Perelman’s simplification of topoi to some advertisements taken from a corpus, collected mainly in Italian and English from women magazines, can be a first step in the inventio of this kind of argumentation. Then, in order to understand the goal of the different messages, it can be useful to apply Stati’s model of “pragmatic functions“ and “argumentative roles” (Stati, 1990, 25-90) through which we are going to interpret the illocutive force of some commercials.
This approach normally reveals that very often the real purpose of the advertisement is “disguised”. This can happen in order to invent creative and surprising effects, but also to manipulate the communication influencing the consumers indirectly. So we will briefly underline how contemporary advertising breaks even the most basically  “communication rules” (Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992, 50).

1. The topos of essence and the topos of persona
Perelmann’s assumption leads to a simplified scheme of the classical topoi. Perelman calls topoi only the general premises which make possible to ground values and hierarchies, the ones that Aristotle studies among the loci of the accident: quality, quantity, existence, essence, order and person (Perelman & Olbrechts Tyteca, 1989, 90).
Under these categories every kind of advertisement can be classified, here I am going to talk about the one of Essence and that of Persona, showing how they have been developed in the world of advertising and how they affect its audience.
Perelman calls Essence the general premises that stress the value of those who represents a particular category (We call loci of essence (…) everything that better represents a type, an essence, a function, (and) is for this same reason made valuable. (Perelman-Tyteca, 1989, 100, translation mine). In advertising a leading role is played by testimonials, who can be real people or fictional characters, the first ones ground on the topos of essence. The fictional testimonials in fact, are created on purpose to represent a particular human character or way of life, with which the audience can identify.
The Marlboro Man, (ex. 1) for instance, grounds on the “western encyclopaedia”. It is a good example of the impact of movie culture on the audience, because in this commercial, the aura of the cowboy “macho” is displayed onto the product. This enhances on the one hand the charme that the cigarettes bestow upon their users, and on the other one attempts at removing doubts of cigarettes unhealthy effects.
Besides commercials based on the concept of essence have a great impact on gender stereotypes and affect the consumer’s perception of femininity and masculinity, becoming at the same time mirror and matrix of society.
The essence of femininity has nowadays become a social space that simultaneously acts upon and is acted upon mass media discourse. According to Dorothy Smith the construction of the feminine social space is both actuated through and on the feminine body. Women contribute to this creation by disciplining their bodies to the social frames proposed by advertising:
“Women aren’t just the passive products of socialization; they are active; they create themselves. At the same time, their self creation, their work, the uses of their skills, are co-ordinated with the market.”(Hall & Bucholtz,  1995, 145)

Advertising creates not only fictional testimonials but also fictional interlocutors, in the case of feminine products, it is as if women were members of a completely different community: the world of women.
This female community does not share however the same mechanisms as the general community. It rather creates an artificial sisterhood, an intimate world, a shelter of secrets, which often leads to dynamics of comparison and jealousy. If we take teen-agers’ fashion advertising we’ll see in the majority of cases two girls dressed in a very similar way, simulating a couple of best friends to create a sense of unity and mutual understanding based on the act of consume.
Let’s take for instance the campaign of Onyx (ex. 2) a fashion label. The image does neither have  headline[i] nor body-copy[ii]. The visual[iii] is staged on the road and depicts two girls dressed with the casual clothes promoted. We can infer that they are about to leave because “Bye, bye” is clearly spelled out within a white cloud like in comics. It’s a micro narration of an everyday scene, cherished by young people, as it is the moment between school and homework, a time of confidences and news. Their similarity implies an attitude of emulation to share with the young customer.
Adult women instead, are portrayed very differently, they are represented as tools that demand constant maintenance. They appear as dissected bodies whose simple parts need specific products. Images concentrate from time to time on face, eyes, feet, nails and breast, giving a synecdochtical vision of the woman (ex. 3).
The emotional universe of girls and women is also dealt with differently. The first are depicted as shameless and cheeky, while they make fun of boys: Sysley (ex. 4). The role of adult women is still instrumental to male desires, here women construct their image in connection with a man. (ex. 5)

The common place of essence can be applied also to material things or to a particular atmosphere. The essence of romanticism, as well as its exotic implication, has never ceased to exist. What has changed however is the romantic landscape.
During the XVIII century exotic overlapped with the sunny orient, now the metropolis and New York in particular has become a source of romantic imagination, the catalyzer of many stereotypes among which also that of “Sehnsucht”, a German term that evokes a nostalgic frame of mind. Most probably after September 11 this will become more and more so.

The topos of Persona too is widely adopted by the advertising discourse, which also heavier relies on real testimonials such as pop stars, politicians, top models etc. These people can be connected or disconnected from the product they promote. In the first case for instance they are used to witness the quality, they are a guarantee for the truth of the argument, as it happens with famous scientists assuring the positive effect of beauty treatments or that of sport champions who promote fitness accessories. In the second case they simply lend the power of their popularity to advertising. In the USA the campaign for dairy products “Got Milk” has created its hall of fame by using many stars sharing the good habit of drinking milk as their white moustache prove.

2. Pragmatic Functions and Argumentative Roles in advertising
The notion of loci could be further used to explore other themes, but it’s not enough to analyze the illucutory force of the messages. That’s why the analysis can be now developed using Sorin Stati’s classification of pragmatic functions and argumentative roles[iv], remembering that these two concepts are relatively similar, but only the second ones transform discourse in argumentation.
“Les fonctions pragmatiques et les rôles argumentatifs sont des facteurs sémantiques relativement semblables, dans la mesure où ils concernent les buts pousuivis par les locuteur, ses intentions communicatives.” (Stati, 1990, 16). (The pragmatic function and the argumentative roles are relatively similar factors, as they concern the goal pursued by the locutor, his communicative intentions) (translation mine).
Anyway, while the pragmatic functions are necessary conditions representing “grosso modo” the illocutory force of the speech act” (Stati, 1990, 26), the argumentative roles are not, they are an added value which can support the function or transform it completely. This distinction is particularly appropriate in the analysis of the verbal part of advertising in connection with the visual, from which we have often to infer the argumentative role.
The interaction between them is surprising because often the first hides the goal of the second one.
Let’s start the analysis with some functions taken from the scheme, underlining each time the argumentative role too:
Leader or follower? Let it be

This is the headline of the shoes Freemod, (ex. 6) which is placed in the middle of the visual. The photo shows hundreds of turkeys and down on the right, there is a small image of the promoted shoes.
Here can be recognized the erotetic function constituted by the couple: question-answer. In advertising this is a good strategy to pretend to have a direct dialogue with the consumers.
In this case the analysis demands interpretation, in other words we need to consider the visual together with the headline in order to understand the argumentative role.
“Leader or follower? Let it be” becomes a sort of dialogue between the advertiser and an hypothetical audience that doesn’t care about its own image.
That’s why the headline is put on the image of a group of turkeys as a metaphor of ordinary people, who are according to that vision similar and ugly. It’s not by chance that these kind of animals who look rather stupid have been chosen for the purpose. Going back to the erotetic function we can see that the question-answer couple here hides the argumentative role of blame.
Another example by the condom’s company Durex (ex.7) shows the same pragmatic function producing a funny effect, through a surreal image.
The headline is:
How good is new easy-on Durex?
Here’s a demonstration

This is placed on the top of an image that depicts a crowd of spermatozoon against Durex. It is a pun between demonstration meaning “protest” and at the same time ”evidence”. The argumentative role is that of an ironical approval.
Another function which is very persuasive is the epistemic, as it underscores that the speaker “knows something”. Advertiser resort to this strategy in order to convince the consumers of the quality of a particular kind of product, to show them that the producer knows what is best for the customer.
Following ad by Adidas, Deo performance for women is an example for this kind of argumentation:
“Because we understand how your body works”

This simple sentence is a declaration of competence, it’s a way to justify (and this is the argumentative role) an implicit thesis: “Buy it trustfully!!”, without using a real argument to support it.
This assumed knowledge is stressed also by the pay off[v], that concludes the message like that:
“Performance through body knowledge”

This time the noun “performance” is used both to evoke the proper name of the product and to support the effect of the product on the woman’s body, while the verb “know” is replaced by the noun “knowledge” in order to strengthen.
The advertisers of Accu 2, (ex. 8) rely on the same strategy although they do it in a more covert way. The headline goes:
“Only you know what goes best with your genes”

This trademark of jewelry shows a watch and a pair of earrings placed as a biological image on human reproduction. The earrings have been shaped in order to remind spermatozoon and the watch on the corner looks like the female ovule. Therefore the subject “you” refers to the watch and to the producer. Here the strategy adopted clearly evidences a paradox, the spermatozoon detect and recognize the ovule, just like the producer knows his customers.

Finally the word “genes” once pronounced reminds the word “jeans”, becoming also a way to underline the young target of the product. The argumentative role is that of an ironical conclusion.
Grounding the assent on emotion is another way to persuade, this happens every time pathos prevails, we have called it expressive emotional function and this is one of the most commonly used in advertising. The trend to evoke emotions mainly through images has caused for a number of advertisements the almost complete loss of the verbal message, as relying just on the force of visual associations. That’s the case of many fashion’s labels, that only use their brand-name and the visual. This attitude has also caused an excessive use of positive emotions, which have become sometimes unbelievable and even ridiculous. This is why many advertisers have started using negative feelings, to chock or also to create participation and compassion, most of the time not directly connected with the promoted product.
One of the last campaign of the fashion label Miu Miu, for instance, places the model in a dark background, trying to escape. An image taken from Kitisho, another stylist, shows a quarrel of two women shouting to a man, communicating the dynamic of a betrayal. Moschino promotes its glasses with a model dressed like an Italian widow. The emotional factor in these cases is used for its own sake and has an effect of surprise on the audience that feels a sort of unconscious recall that we can only infer without having the possibility to determine it linguistically.
But let’s take the campaign of Silfresh (ex. 9) the trademark of a particular kind of fabric, whose good quality makes it difficult to sweat visibly: The visual shows an image of a woman with a fish under her arm connected with following headline:
“Ti sei mai chiesta cosa c’è nei tuoi vestiti?”
(“Have you ever asked yourself what is in your clothes?”)

The fish symbolizes the smell caused by bad quality clothes and contrasts with the good-looking woman. Moreover the ad uses a rhetorical question in which it is possible to recognize the expressive emotive function through the argumentative role of blame.
It is obvious that advertising looks for originality more than many others communicative performances and after years of activity, nearly every strategy has been adopted. The consumer is much more cultivated and is not a passive victim in front of the mass media. So the last thing the advertiser can do is to open the back-stage to unveil his method to the public, this is the play of the metalinguistic function, a version of the so called fatic function, through which the speaker checks if the communication is working, with expressions like, “Do you understand”, “Did you get that?” etc. The metalinguistic function reflects on the language itself. In advertising we find it when the ad speaks about promotion or when the communications strategies are discussed with the ideal reader. A campaign of the Italian olive oil Carli (ex. 10) presents a dialogue of a producer as if he were gossiping with his own customer:
“Avete presente quelle belle storie di famiglia, dove un’arte si tramanda di padre in figlio?
La pubblicità le ha copiate dalla famiglia Carli”
(“Do you remember those beautiful family stories, where skills are handed down from father to sons?
Advertising copied them from Carli Family”.)

This operation of meta-advertising is grounded on an ironic reversal, it shows that Carli is reality, while advertising is fiction. The argumentative role is that of disapproval. The reader feels involved in this striptease-process and at the same time he enjoys the absurdity of stereotypes. He feels part of the backstage as a protagonist and not as a victim. His sensation is that of being able to criticize advertising looking at it directly in the eyes.
The example of argumentative mechanisms analyzed by now have often revealed multiple messages inside the same advertisement, now it could be interesting to see if these messages have respected the conversational norms.

3. Breaking Communication Rules
The art of promoting goods adds new values to the products, but in the previous examples none of them has been demonstrated, as if all the arguments implied were common ground, mutually agreed standpoints. Two of them, instead of explaining, tried even to prevent a potential customer from advancing different points of view, using the argumentative roles of blame and disapproval. This happens in the advertisement of Freemod, where the dissenters are compared to a crowd of turkeys, or in that of Silfresh fabric, where people who don’t use it are implicitly defined “smelly”. Both cases don’t respect the Rule 1 for critical discussion using the argumentum ad hominem, which occurs when the opponent is attacked personally (Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992, 107-115).[vi] This negative attitude was quite uncommon in the past, as the advertisers always tried to please their audience, now they try to shock it, in order to be memorized.
Moreover a relatively new trend of the “hidden persuaders” is not to respect any identity condition[vii]  (Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992, 50), they are obscure. In the past the main rule of advertising and its main strategy was the “reason why”, in other words, the creation of the promotion around one main clear argument strictly connected with the product. Today on the contrary advertisers use difficult associations, they try to attract the consumer with absurdity and unconscious desires, creating sometimes a sort of contemporary art works, whose commercial message just relies on the frame they’ve been put in.

Conclusions
This is just a glimpse on the efficacy of the studies taken for this short analysis, but it should help understanding the importance of a non-dogmatic model opened to several methods including little by little the premises, the development and the normative implications revealing the potential of advertising.
The analysis of topoi offers general frames and narrative schemes to orientate interpretation and to determine the trends of mass media communication.
The distinction of pragmatic functions and argumentative roles within a variable classification, makes possible to unveil different implications of the same commercial, connecting the visual and the verbal part of it.
Finally the brief reflection on the communication rules just opens the problem of understanding contemporary advertisement’s manipulation processes.
We have taken verbal categories to analyze a topic which grounds mainly on the visual, but nevertheless they have revealed a certain capacity of penetrating its goals.
One of the most interesting phenomena registered inside the corpus is the use of negative messages and meta-advertising promotion to create a real-life impact on the audience.
The aim of this path is not very different from that of the ancient rhetoric, but it takes into account contemporary  standpoints too, in order to  analyze argumentation more and more as a performative exchange among complex characters: the human beings.

NOTES
[i]  Slogan.
[ii] Text that articulates the arguments  implied or suggested by the headline.
[iii] Images  or graphic  framed by an advertising
[iv] Sorin Stati, Les transphrastique, Paris, PUF,  1990
Here is a translation of Sorin Stati’s typology of pragmatic functions and argumentative roles.

Translation of Sorin Stati’s typology of pragmatic functions and argumentative roles.

[v] Short sentence that normally concludes the advertising. It is generally placed on the right corner  under the logo of the brand name.
[vi] Rule 1 for critical discussion: Parties must not prevent each other from advancing standpoints or casting doubts on stand points.
[vii] Priciple of Communication: Be clear, honest, efficient and to the point
(…)The commandment  “Be  clear” refers to the identity conditions of the speech act concerned: The speaker has to formulate the speech act in such a way that the listener is able to identify its communicative function and the proposition that are expressed.

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Abstract
This work is concerned with the design and evaluation of a software application that uses the dialectic approach to argumentation to support students in planning the structure of written arguments. The aim is to explore whether planning according to the dialectic method, and assisted by an interactive visual argument structure, the Dialectic program, will improve the quality of students’ essays. Students’ use of the Dialectic software tool was compared against using the dialectic method of planning on paper. A validated analysis of argument structure indicates that use of refutation in written arguments has improved in both conditions. We cannot conclude that using the planning method on the computer is more successful than on paper because the two groups, allocated to the two conditions, were not comparative in terms of ability in English and argumentation skill. Nevertheless, the computer group, which was of lower ability showed a notable improvement in refuting challenging arguments.

1. Difficulties with argumentative writing
Composing argumentative texts involves many skills. Invention of content and accuracy of  language are important and systematically evaluated in most educational systems. But equally important is the argument structure. In this work, argument structure in essays is conceived as a network of opinions and arguments. A whole essay could be visualised as a set of substructures supporting, challenging and refuting a position. These argument substructures may be linked in a coordinated way, thus implying the coverage of multiple themes, or in subordinated manner, favouring an in-depth development. The writer generates these substructures bearing in mind the rhetorical purpose of advancing an opinion that gives an essay the characteristic of “voice”. That is, the thesis of the paper or the implicit of explicit position of the author.

When writing about controversial topics, as in school essays, but also when writing academic assignments, the student faces the difficulty of integrating different knowledge and opinions and avoiding plagiarism. The real challenge for students is to integrate the arguments of others in order to strengthen or weaken their own voice (Mitchell, 2001a). To do this the student has to perform certain argument moves: to support a position, to challenge it or challenge other people’s arguments. Where appropriate, the student must also refute challenging arguments in order to strengthen the main position of the essay. These moves should be communicated to the reader through the argument structure. The position of the essay and the process out of which the position was defined and established should be clear.However, argument structure is less systematically instructed and evaluated in the classroom than grammar, vocabulary and comprehension skills. The issue of argument structure in essays is occasionally introduced through the teaching of prewriting strategies. The essay is evaluated in terms of structure based on the final product.

It is mostly the final written product that receives attention in an educational setting rather than the process (Andrews, 1995), and the form of expressing arguments rather than the ways of generating argument (Mitchell, 2001b). It is difficult for the student to detect whether the problematic aspects of her essay stem from the presentation of argument, or the generation of arguments. The latter is more difficult to instruct. “To make the meanings their own” requires dialogic thinking in a generally monologic form. That is, the student must  master the structure and the form so that it reflects a dialogue (Dellerman, Coirier, & Marchand, 1996).

The general picture from Andrews’ review of the teaching of argument in English in the late 1970s to 80s  is of the inability of students in secondary or high schools to argue well, either in speech or in writing (Andrews, 1995). Writing practice should offer the student more systematic and informed methods to develop experience in defending a position. In an empirical study of problems with argumentative texts in secondary Dutch schools, it has been reported that students failed to state their standpoint in the beginning of the text, although they have been asked to support their own opinion (Oostdam & Emmelot, 1991; Oostdam R., de Glopper, & Eiting, 1994). Students do not understand or choose to ignore what is the task that is being requested of them. They choose a statement with which they agree or disagree and comment on why they do so, even though this is not the task requested (Ryan & Norris, 1991). It is often seen that students develop arguments separately and omit to relate each argument to a high-level structure or to a standpoint (Keith, Weiner, & Lesgold, 1991). Problems with refutation have also been reported. In most cases, students take up an argument against the formulated standpoint and then they reject it without justification.

2. Planning argument structure
Teaching “voice” and integrating opinions, questioning other people’s arguments and refuting them to enhance a personal opinion is at the center of this research. We argue that planning may provide the student with a space for exploring argument moves, trying out thoughts and even rejecting them, reflecting on the importance, sequence and balance of arguments.
However, the evidence from research on the benefits of planning on writing are inconclusive. The benefits are often attributed to the additional planning time, that prolongs the overall writing process and not to the planning process itself (Kellogg, 1994; Kozma, 1991; Scardamalia & Bereiter, 1985; Scriver, 1988).
In these studies, the planning methods are general methods for brainstorming, mind mapping and outlining, and did not anticipate the difficulties associated with argumentative genre.

Kozma (1991) used a computer-based outliner, allowing new topics and subtopics to be inserted and an idea organizer for constructing  relationships between ideas in a tree structure while a list is prompting the user to consider aspects of the topic and the audience. Scardamalia and Bereiter (1985) studied how planning cues administered by the experimenter, a peer or the student herself could facilitated mental planning. Scriver (1988) instructed undergraduate students to set specific goals. His instructions resulted in either general goal setting or content generation plans. In Kellogg’s (1994) experiments,  subjects were allocated to four different conditions and asked to construct a list of ideas as they would appear in the essay,  a graphic plan with nodes and links, an outline and, in the control condition,  to just plan as they would normally do. In this experiment, the outline condition showed evidence of better quality of writing.

Although in most of these experiments the required task was to write an argumentative essay, making a cluster or a list does not necessarily guide the rhetorical structure of  argumentation unless a good use of a the planning method is instructed and learnt (Sharples, 1999). Mind mapping and plan networking may help students to establish relations between ideas but do not specifically envisage position taking, argument direction and balanced development. These planning methods can become a place for exploring ideas but the writer is not instructed on how a well-developed plan should look.  Furthermore, in these studies the quality of the planning outcome (outline, list, cluster) was not generally related to the quality of the final written product. Only one study found that the quality of a finished text was strongly related to the quantity and quality of initial planning (Kellogg, 1994).

Another reason for furthering the investigation on planning methods is to evaluate each method individually. In the above studies, the way of investigating the effectiveness of prewriting strategies was to compare strategies such as drafting, outlining and networking which have different aims and thus are bound to bring different results. The outline aims at providing a linear and hierarchical plan for drafting and so it tackles the difficulty of ordering ideas in a text. Networking and clustering is better for generating ideas and establishing links between them (Kellogg, 1994). Multi-drafting may be beneficial if the writer has time to spent on it. In those studies, even when a planning strategy gained grounds over some other we cannot be sure why some other failed and little has been done to further elaborate the strategies to fit a specific genre, such as argumentation.

More research is needed to investigate one strategy at a time and to examine an important issue: how the method should be instructed, for which writing difficulties, and how students should be supported in applying it. Furthermore, emphasis should be given to how successfully students are applying the method.
Andrews, who investigated what students do if asked to plan an argumentative text, observed that students not only avoid spending time on planning but the plans they produce are “ritualized and superficial: they are either too sketchy or too much like what the subsequent piece of writing is going to become”(Andrews, 1995:168). Isnard and Piolat (Isnard & Piolat, 1994) also argue that unless writers are forced to organize their ideas in a given fashion they do not perform in depth organization, but still the impact of in-depth organisation on text  remains to be investigated. Sharples (1999) comments that although it may be worth creating a structure for the text, there may be little point in organising ideas, if the writer knows what she wants to write.
In Andrews’ study (2001), where students were free to choose their own way of planning, a specific kind of plan with numbered boxes was highest in their choice, while sequential boxes and spider diagrams (similar to clusters and notes networks) came second. The least favoured plan was the polar form, which involved examining an issue from an “in favour” and “against” point of view. It is interesting to note how the polar form is avoided. Is this because it is not intuitive to think in a dispassionate way before putting forward a position? When thinking in a dialectic way, more effort is required to disentangle arguments that support or refute opposing positions let alone to decide which position is more plausible to support.
We might agree with Andrews (1995) that there should be diversity in planning of arguments, but there should also be some insight into how specific planning methods have an impact on writing. On the other hand, elaborating one method and systematically studying the impact of it on writing will inform us as to whether specific difficulties can be overcome by the specific method. Two things are important: devising a planning method that helps the student to produce well structured plans, and defining whether the difficulties the planning method is targeting can be overcome. Our research investigates a specific planning method, instantiated as a computer application, and focuses on how it should be instructed, for what level of writing difficulty, and how students could be supported in applying it.

3. The Dialectic computer program and method for planning argument structure
Our work is concerned with the design and implementation of a software system that uses the dialectic approach to argumentation  to support the planning of argument structure (Chryssafidou, 2000).The aim of this work is to investigate in normal writing conditions whether well-structured argument plans have an impact on the written outcome. It is believed that using the software will help the students to plan better argument structures.
Dialectic integrates a diagrammatic notation for representing argument structure and an interactive mechanism that helps the writer to link well-supported arguments into a logically structured argumentation plan.

The diagrammatic notation has been derived from the predominant argumentation theory (dialectic approach) and a survey of formalisms for representing argument structure (Rittel & Kunz, 1970; Toulmin, 1958).The pragma-dialectic approach (Eeemeren van & Grootendorst, 1994; Eemeren van, Grootendrorst , & Snoeck Henkemans, 1996) considers argumentation as the proceedings of a dialogue between two arguers, a protagonist and an antagonist. It is assumed that in an argumentative discussion two opposite claims are expressed, by the protagonist and the antagonist. In written argumentative discourse, it is assumed that the writer is the protagonist who anticipates the antagonist’s critical and doubting existence (Chryssafidou, 2000).

Figure 1- Screenshot of the Dialectic software

The notation, based on this philosophy, helps the writer to
(i) structure the essay on a thesis or possible positions of a debatable topic,
(ii) keep a balance between arguments and counterarguments,
(iii) anticipate the opposing position to the writer’s own, and
(iv) refute it. The notation and the interactive mechanism guides the user of the Dialectic application to start diagramming by defining two sides on an issue and to continue using the notation in a consistent way. The interaction with the system gives a visual feedback to the writer (figure 1). The notation and the computer feedback facilitate the user to reflect on the argument structure:

When correct use of notation is detected the computer system rearranges the diagram components on the screen and highlights them with colour to show balance of argumentation. Correct use of notation means:
– two sides for each controversial topic are being developed;
– a position should be taken in order for a defense to take place.

By direct observation of the constructed diagram it can be inferred that:
– argumentation for both sides is balanced (the diagram branches are evenly developed);
– development of argumentation is done in depth (subordination of arguments) and in breadth (coordination of arguments or argument chains);
– argumentation and counter argumentation has been considered if both red and green components appear on the diagram.

The automatic colour feedback alerts the user to the balance of arguments and counter arguments:
– challenging arguments, threatening the position of the author, are coloured red.
– an argument refuting a challenging arguments is coloured green.
By inspecting argument chains the user can  identify different themes related to the topic. These subtopics can be prioritized before being written down in the text.

The current system is evaluated against the aim for which it was designed, namely, does computer-supported formulation of argument structure improve the quality of the written outcome?

4. Method
4.1 Participants
A field study was conducted with 36 student volunteers at the University of Birmingham summer school on academic English (EISU- English for International Studies Unit). All the participants were international students, undergraduate and postgraduates, having English as their second language. Three groups of 12 students were recruited. As it was not possible, according to the school policy, to separate each group in two conditions, one group was allocated to the control condition and the two others to the  experimental condition. The group in the experimental condition used the Dialectic computer application and the two groups in the control condition used the dialectic method of planning with pen and paper. Instead of receiving feedback from the system the students of the pen and paper condition would have to colour the diagram themselves. Otherwise, both conditions receive the same training and instructions and were given the same tasks to perform.

The researchers were aware that the students allocated to the computer condition were of lower ability than the group allocated to the pen and paper condition, based on their results in their first week of the academic writing course. It was decided that the lower ability group should be allocated to the experimental condition (computer) to avoid bias in favour of the computer condition. If the computer group would outperform the pen and paper group, and thus our hypothesis would be supported, then we could assume that this did not happen because the computer group was of better ability.

4.2 Procedure
Each student wrote three essays, and participated in a training session and two planning sessions over a 5-week period.
Pretest session: The students wrote a timed essay (60 min) on the subject: “Should comparative educational statistics influence an educational reform?”
Training session: The teacher of each group introduced the notation and method for planning argument structure in the classroom (60 min.). The students of both conditions worked in pairs and practiced the notation on paper (35 min). The computer groups were given an extra training session on using the Dialectic application (45-60 min).
Planning session A: On the same day the students were given a new topic and were asked to plan an essay, on paper or on computer according to the condition they belonged.  Then they had to write an essay as homework using the plan they produced.
Planning session B and Post test: The students were given 1 hour and 45 minutes to plan and write an essay on the topic “Should the least developed counties follow the example of the western world?”.

4.3 Data and measures
An assessment of the essays by the class teachers shows that on average students performed better in the post-test essays than the pre-test ones. However, because each teacher assessed their own group we cannot compare the marks between groups. Further analysis was performed to establish whether the students using the system did better than those using the method on pen and paper. The essay protocols and the diagrams are being analysed in terms of argument structure and balance. The contribution of the diagram to the essay write-up is also studied.  Textual expertise and knowledge of genre are assessed as confounding variables.

In this paper we shall report on a subset of the data analysis and specifically on the analysis of essays. Twenty-four essay protocols, collected from the pre test and post tests, 6 from each condition, were analysed in terms of argument structure complexity and balance of argumentation.
We used Crammond’s model (1998) which identified developmental features and characteristic weaknesses of students’ persuasive writing by referring to argument structure. Her model is based on Toulmin’s (1958) model of informal reasoning but also modifies Toulmin’s schematic representation by allowing two aspects of complex argumentation, very important for our research, to be represented.
First, argument in Toulminian terms is used as a unit of analysis of  persuasive discourse. The basic claim-data and warrant model  is validated elsewhere (Knudson, 1992; Scardamalia & Paris, 1985) as the most significant predictor of holistic writing scores, assigned to students’ texts. But what is more important is that Crammond’s model allows the analysis of extended persuasive discourse. Her elaborative modifications to Toulmin’s model allows the representation of chains of arguments. Chains of arguments can be created by subordinately compound arguments. Chains of arguments, related in coordinated way, form a tree like graph, namely, the entire argument model of extended persuasive discourse (Crammond, 1998:237)
Secondly, Crammond’s (1998) model gives emphasis to counter argumentation and refutation by including some new components  to Toulmin’s basic model. The countered rebuttal consists of a potential rebuttal, in other words a challenging statement, and a response to rebuttal, that is the refutation to the challenging statement (see example in figure 2). The component of potential rebuttal  as well as the reservation component (equivalent to the exception component in Toulmin’s terms, which limits the applicability of a claim) express counter argumentation.

The 24 essay protocols were analysed on the basis of an Argument Grammar formalised in a set of production rules (Crammond, 1997).The components of Argument Grammar (structure, claim, subclaims, data, data backing, warrant, warrant backing, constraint, potential rebuttal, countered rebuttal, reservation and alternative solution) were identified in the essays. The components were then grouped  semantically in 4 greater categories:
1. supporting components: components that support the position,
2. counter components: components that challenge the position or express counter argumentation,
3. refuting components: components that refute the challenging statements
4. neutral components: components that refer to scene setting or background information.

These four categories cover quantitatively the development of the essay in the four approaches and indicate how information  is balanced in an essay. They do not describe whether supporting, counter, refuting and neutral components are developed in depth or in breadth. This is done by observing the argument chains.
An argument chain is created when one of the components of the basic Toulminian model, for example the data component, can be analysed into an argument component. That is an argument component is embedded in the data component (figure 2).
The analysis of each essay according to the Argument Grammar (Crammond, 1997) yielded a tree structure diagram for each essay. The length of argument chains and number of embedded arguments are counted as a measure of argument complexity. An example (figure 2), given by Crammond, illustrates this measure. In the example the SUBCLAIM 1.1 and RESPONSE TO REBUTTAL .2 are analysed into embedded arguments, ARGUMENT .2 and ARGUMENT.3 respectively. The depth of the argument chain is 3 because, starting from the top ARGUMENT.1, two more levels of argument follow, represented by embedded arguments, ARGUMENT.2 and ARGUMENT.3

Figure 2 – Argument structure with depth of three produced by 10th Grade student (Crammond, 1998)

5.Results
5.1 Validity of the analysis
Depth of argument structure chains and embedded arguments are indicators of the depth of development.  No significant results can be found in terms of  maximum depth and total number of embedded arguments between groups (between computer and paper condition groups) or within groups (pre test to post test differences). However, the scores from this analysis are useful because they allow us to compare with Crammond’s (1997) findings, as we employed the same measures and analysis. We found that our findings are in line with Crammond’s findings.
In her doctoral research, she compared  three age categories, 6th, 8th and 10th grade, (where 10th is last grade of secondary education) against an expert writer’s category in order to identify developmental differences and weakness of student writers in persuasive writing. Table 1 reports the means and standard deviations of her sample in terms of density of arguments per text, maximum depth and total embedded arguments. Table 2 reports the means and standard deviations of the current study (EISU study) in terms of the same measures. Here, scores are reported for both conditions and for pre and post tests.

According to Crammond’s findings, density of arguments per text increases with age (with the exception of 6th grade which was not found significant) (Crammond, 1997:76) regardless of the length of  the texts. The scores of the students in the EISU study (Table 2) are in line with the highest score (.24), attributed to experts (Table 1). So, in terms of using argument structures the students in EISU were quite competent. In terms of depth of argument structure and embedded arguments their scores are high but they should still improve a little before they reach the expert level.

EISU students’ average scores for maximum depth are calculated as being between 2.83 and 3.16 (Table 2), while the mean score reported by Crammond for experts is, slightly higher, 4.14 (SD1.57) (Table 1).
EISU students’ average scores in terms of embedded arguments are estimated as being between 4 and 6.16 (Table 2),  while the corresponding experts’ mean score in Crammond’s study is 10 with a standard deviation of 6.61 (Table 1).

Overall, EISU students’ ability in complex argumentation were found to be below the experts category and higher than the 10th grade, as was expected.

5.2    Balance of argumentation
A one-way between-group multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was performed to investigate differences between the pen and paper and computer condition in argument structure. Three dependent variables accounting for argument structure were used: supporting, refuting, counter and neutral components (see data and measures section). The independent variable was group (pen and paper and computer). There was a statistically significant difference between groups on the combined dependent variables:
F(4, 7)=5.08, p=.031; Wilks’ Lambda =.25. When the results for the dependent variables were considered separately, the differences that showed statistical significance were supporting components F (1, 3.40)=10.12, p=.010 and counter components F(1,1.73) =6.61, p=.027. An inspection of the mean scores indicated that the essays planned with the computerised version included more supporting components (M=24.50) than those planned on paper (M=9.17). Conversely, the pen and paper group had more counter components (M=14.67) than the computer group (M=8.33).

Table 3 – Means and Standard Deviations of argumentation components

This could be explained by looking at the means and standard deviations of the pre test and post essays together (Table 3). However these numbers should be treated with caution as a similar analysis (MANOVA), investigating the same dependent variables in the pre test essay did not yield significant differences for any of the argumentation components individually. There was a statistically significant difference between groups in the pretest essays but only on the combined dependent variables:  F(4 7,)=6.38, p=.017; Wilks’ Lambda=.21.

The computer group produced more supporting components than the pen and paper group in the post essay, but the computer group had improved very little (0.33) since the pre test essay. The counter components of the computer group increased only slightly while almost none of the counter components in the pre test essay (7.33) was refuted (0.67). An improvement can be seen in the post essay of the computer group, where almost all the counter components (8.33) are refuted or at least corresponded to refuting components (7.17). This can be explained by the fact that in general the rhetorical style of the computer group changed from pre to post essay, which, with some reservation, could be claimed to be the effect of the method. In the pre test essay, the computer group mainly stated a position with reservation, that is they acknowledged certain limitations to their position on Comparative Educational Statistics. In the post tests, a position is more firmly declared and a succession of challenging moves (counter components) and refuting moves dominates in the essays.

The pen and paper group appears to be more familiar with the challenging and refuting schema from their first essay. However, there is improvement in their post test. It could be argued that the increase in refuting components (10.17) is accounted by the decrease of the supporting components (-3.33), as refutations of counter arguments are, in essence, supporting components. Refuting components eventually support the position after having counter argued some challenging arguments. The same increase of refuting components (10.17) could be attributed to the increase of counter components (3.83), which are refuted because they are challenging the position.

5.3 Qualitative improvement: case studies
An improvement in style is noted beyond the hypothesised effect of increase in supporting, refuting and counter components, in at least two separate cases of post test essays of the pen and paper group. This improvement is noted irrespective of the kind of treatment -paper or computer, but it could be attributed to the dialectic method.
Being reasonably competent in argumentative writing, as shown in one student’s pretest essay, there may not be sufficient opportunity for improvement that could be attributed to the method. The student’s pretest essay fulfils all the criteria of a good argument: clear position, consistent development and conclusion, evidence of counterarguments and refutation. However, an interesting change is noted in the post test. Non argumentative discourse, for example definition, narration, and description, alternates with argumentative discourse. The essay adopts a rhythm reminiscent of  a speech. So, although there may not be space for improvement that could be attributed to the method, more text space is given to background information or to definitions and then this information is then connected to argumentative discourse. The essay reflects the balance of the diagram plan but does not closely follow its structure.
Could this change be motivated by reflection on the diagram and creative exploitation of the diagram content? The student, being sufficiently competent in the challenging and refuting scheme, suggested by the method, may have attempted a different way of developing an essay. Does the planning task releases mental space so that the writer can consider integrating other means of persuasion? This may imply forgetting the diagram structure but remembering the position taken.
Although the analysis of how a diagram develops to an essay is not yet completed, inspection of the diagram plans and the essays written with the aid of these shows that the students follow closely the diagram content and sequence. Unsuccessful attempts to support a position on the diagram, signalled by leaving challenging arguments unrefuted,  have lead some students to change their position and adopt the opposite one. Doing so they can use the content of the diagram in reverse to support their (new) position.

6. Discussion
Scores attained in at least four different measures indicate that EISU students’ ability in complex argumentation is estimated below the experts category and higher than the 10th grade (final year of secondary education). Indeed, the participants in the EISU study are first year undergraduate or postgraduate students and second language English speakers attending an intensive course on academic writing. The fact that our findings are in line with Crammond’s results support our analysis. An implication for our study, however, could be that at this stage of their academic life the EISU students are already competent writers, at least in their native language, and so gain little additional benefit from planning. Or that their approach to writing processes and habits of planning writing may be established by this age and therefore difficult to change. However, a ceiling effect cannot be argued, as improvement in terms of increasing refutation has been observed in both groups.

As presented in the results section, there is an increase in supporting and refuting components as result of the intervention, that is, as result of using the dialectic method. However, it is not possible to claim that the computer group benefited more than the pen and paper one. What can be said though is that the computer group was no worse than the pen and paper. It should be noted that the students allocated to the computer group were of lower ability than those allocated to the pen and paper group, according to their results in their first week of the academic writing course. It would thus be unlikely for the lower ability group (computer group) to reach and outperform the higher ability group (pen and paper group).
However, what is striking is the improvement of the computer group in the number of refutations. In the pretest essays,  these students have almost no refuting arguments and quite a few counter argumentation components. In their post test essays they increased substantially their refuting arguments, although their counter argumentation remains almost the same. Thus, it can be argued that the computer group refuted challenging argumentation in their post essays as result of using the dialectic method.
The work presented in this paper should be seen as a stage in the design of a system that supports formulation of argument structure in written argumentation. At this stage, an interactive visual argument is evaluated. Further development of the Dialectic application  is considered with more active computer-based tutorial intervention. In addition, further studies with comparative groups will allow us to establish the impact of the Dialectic application on the essays.

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The uniquely perspectival lenses that inform what we know, think is true, or consider reasonable are subject to a plethora of contextual variables. We may think we know something at one point and upon further investigation or by mere happenstance, new or unrealized evidence or reasoning urges us to change our mind. These contextual variables are in essence linguistic. Conceptually, language shapes our reasoning, the rules of the known, the knowable, and ultimately serves as an allusive guide in our efforts to communicate with others. The idea of interpersonal argument is no different. Interpersonal argument, like language, is self referential, linguistic, and positioned within varying contexts. The basic tenets of presumption and burden of proof are central to a language of argument, implicit in the functioning of our argumentative discourse and must be understood as such in order to better understand presumption in interpersonal argumentative discourse.

The perspective presented here is not so different from many of the post-modern/post-structuralist notions of culture, language, power, and the relationships between them. This perspective is even more in line with conceptions of pragma-dialectical theory and analysis.
Yet, this perspective of presumption is different in that it aims to marry two unlikely bedfellows: Richard Whately and Jacques Derrida. Through sixteen revisions of Elements of Rhetoric, Whately finally settled on a very socio-psychological perspective of presumption and burden of proof; a transition that is significant to current conceptions of presumption and the inclusion of Jaques Derrida in this essay.
Derrida’s post-structural theory of language is conceptually similar to the theories of argument developed by Whately. Deference, the functional concept for each, becomes an important consideration for understanding the function of presumption in interpersonal argument. This essay examines the interrelationships of Whately and Derrida and attempts to articulate a conception of presumption that reconceptualizes its role in argumentative settings.First, this essay discusses the dominant reading of Whatelian presumption, burden of proof and their concurrent operations. Second, the essay explores the socio-psychological and cultural predispositions of the audience and suggests that these variables, or considerations, compose an implicit language by which argument functions. Third, the essay discusses the relationship between Whately and Derrida and proposes the functional potential of presumption in interpersonal argumentative settings. This linguistic reading of presumption suggests that it is a general conceptual function of argument rather than a specifically placed or locatable component of argument. In some ways this perspective helps to clarify the role of presumption.  In other ways it confounds our ability to analyze its functioning due to its wide ranging, changing, and unknowable nature.

Whately
In Elements of Rhetoric (1846), Richard Whately discusses the concepts of “presumption” and “burden of proof” as central to the way argument works. Whately pulls his rhetorical theories of argument from the conventions of the day such as liberalism and the British court system to develop a fundamental rhetorical concept – the plurality of presumptions in any particular case. The dominant reading of presumption places it on one side of an argument and burden of proof on the other while a socio-psychological reading of Whately’s theories suggests that many presumptions function within an argument regardless of their stipulated placement.

The Placement Perspective
Traditionally, scholars and practitioners of argumentation viewed argumentation as perspectives that compete to establish which perspective is best for a particular conclusion.
The perspective that coincides most closely with the status quo, or the prevailing collective beliefs of the audience is said to have the presumption of an argument.  In this sense, presumption is a “benefit of the doubt” that is awarded to the perspective of an argument that shares the collectively accepted views of the audience. This is not to say that presumption is awarded to the most probable perspective of an argument in any objective sense but rather that presumption is awarded by an audience to the perspective that is most in-line with the collective beliefs of community. The communal conventions are what determine the force of what consitutes probable reasoning.

Whately explicitly emphasizes the point that presumption does not reside with the most probable of the two perspectives in an argument. He states that “presumption” in favor of any supposition is not a “preponderance of probability in its favour” (Whately, 112).  Here he establishes a view of presumption where the likelihood of a particular belief over the other does not necessarily constitute that belief as having the presumption in an argument. Rather, Whately urges that “presumption” is a “preoccupation of the ground” in any particular argument (Whately, 112). The ground, or the functional context of the argument, the underlying conditions and circumstances that serve as the rationale for an audience’s presumptive stance, provides the context for an audience to perceive the prevailing opinions within an argument.

For Whately a benefit of the doubt (presumption) is awarded by an audience to the perspective that coincides most closely with the prevailing beliefs associated with the context found in the ground of an argument. If a student were to disagree with a professor about a grade then presumption would most likely lie with the professor. Presumption is awarded to the professor because the grounds of the argument rest in the generally accepted view of the professor as an authority in the field.  Such a view holds that a professor’s position in the class, position within the institution, and association with the field of study that he or she teaches affords the professor the authority and expertise to determine the value of assignments handed in for the completion of a course. The student is also bound by these general perceptions of the ground due to the student’s relative positioning within the institution and to the professor. The idea of presumption holds for the professor until evidence is brought against the professor’s judgment of the assignment at which time a paradox, or seemingly contradictory statement of of what is presumed, puts the professor’s presumption into question.

For Whately, presumption also exists “against anything paradoxical, i.e., contrary to the prevailing opinion” (Whately, 115). Here, presumption is not only a “preoccupation of the ground,” but is also the way an audience holds a prevailing belief in favor of the status quo and against anything that conflicts with it. The professor may have “good reasons” for assigning a particular grade to the student’s work but the student may also provide “good reasons” in his or her appeal to change the grade. The students’ contestation of the grade creates a paradox that puts the status quo on trial, makes necessary a rebuttal by the professor, and suggests that the professor now has the burden of rejoinder (the responsibility held by the person who had presumption but in light of newly presented prima facia evidence, needs to defend the original position). The paradox created by the students’ contestation of the grade makes manifest the point where change of the “prevailing belief” can occur. The paradox establishes where presumption lies for this portion of the argument.

The face value significance of Whatlian presumption to argumentation consuption, design, and theory is that by establishing the preoccupation of the ground, a rhetor who wishes to change audience beliefs will be most successful if she or he attempts to argue from the ground in accordance with an audience’s presumptions. Since the audience, or speech community, is the subject who holds the prevailing beliefs in an argument, their predispositions to particular points of authority have a substantial influence on where presumption resides in any particular argument. As Sproule (1976) notes, “audience orientation is seen to be a major agency in the determination of the locus of presumption” (Sproule, 1976, 120). As Sproule attests, Whatelian presumption is treated as a place in which an argument rests relative to the ground of a particular case. Thus, the organizing principles that determine how argument occurs conventionally rest upon the notion of presumption and its placement within a particular argument.

Burden of Proof
People who argue for a change in the presumption of a case stand in opposition of the prevailing belief and hold the responsibility for showing why that belief must be changed. For Whately, presumption, or the preoccupation of the ground, “implies that it must stand good till some sufficient reason is adduced against it,” and that “burden of proof lies on the side of him who would dispute it” (Whately, 112). Whately states that “burden of proof lies with him who proposes an alteration; simply, on the ground that since a change is not a good in itself, he who demands change should show cause for it” (Whately, 114). In the example of the contested grade, the student bears the burden of proving the inaccuracy or unreasonableness of the teacher’s assessment of the student’s work. In order for the professor to change the grade, the student must show sufficient reasons for the presumption to be abandoned, adjusted, or overturned.

The reasons and evidence, which are deemed good and sufficient by an audience, are such when they follow the prevailing presumption of a particular case. For reasons and evidence to be considered applicable in an argument, those reasons must be in accordance with the ground, or context, in which they occur. Therefore, in the example of the student and the professor, the student carries the burden of proof and the student’s appeals for the professor to change the grade are the responsibility of the student because the professor carries the presumption. Each party participates in a collective presumptive ground and if the student fails to overturn the presumption attributed to the professor, as Whately states, the presumption “must stand good” and that, “no man should be disturbed in his possessions till some claim against him shall be established” (Whately, 113).

From Placement to Function
Up to this point my discussion illustrates how Whatelian presumption is understood via a very basic reading of presumption and burden of proof.  This reading implies that presumption exists on one side of an argument and burden of proof on the other. This notion is problematic because it limits our conception of argument by artificially giving preference to one side of an argument and placing a possibly undue burden on the other. The question then is how can the role of presumption be understood outside of the locatable and discernable nature in which it is generally described?
Although academic debate and courts of law generally treat Whately’s theory of presumption as stipulated rules by which presumption is artificially assigned to respective sides of an argument, the placement of presumption is not so simple. Nicholas Burnett (1992) notes that there are “special” circumstances that need to be taken into consideration when applying presumption to arguments outside of policy debate or conventional courts of law.  He states, “we clearly have not done enough to teach students to think through the special challenges offered by non-policy debate to the application of presumption” (Burnett, 1992, 37).
A reasonable extension of this claim might be that there are special considerations in everyday arguments that traditional teachings and notions of presumption do not provide adequate resources to deal with. We need to see presumption from a different perspective. This perspective encourages a view of presumption outside of placement to an understanding of how it functions in a psychological, social, and cultural language of argumentation.

Through the evolution of Whately’s Elements of Rhetoric, specifically from the fifth edition  forward, presumption is treated as a wholly unstable factor in an argument.  Although a dominant presumption may exist in an argument, there are likely innumerable presumptions affecting an audience’s perception of a case. Through J. Michael Sproule’s (1976) analysis, the chronological progression of Whately’s revisions to his theory of presumption and burden of proof reveal that, “in actual operation the impact of presumption was determined by sociological and psychological factors independent of any logical placement of the burden of proof” (p.120). Sproule suggests that presumption is more complex than placing its locus on a particular agent or institution. Sproule views, “Whatelian presumption as consisting of (1) a potentially great number of argumentative advantages, which (2) may be simultaneously conferred on both sides of a dispute, resulting from (3) audience preferences for particular arguments or sources of information, while (4) some of the presumptions may be explicitly claimed by advocates, all such claims are subject to factors of audience member perception” (115).

Sproule (1976) explains presumption from a perspective where the audience determines the loci of presumption, its relative importance to, and within a particular argument. This view questions the dominant notion that that presumption exists on one side of an argument and burden of proof on the other and suggests that presumption exists on multiple planes and in multiple facets of argument simultaneously. Since presumption is an audience centered phenomena we might reasonably assume that an audience may not be versed in, capable of, or willing to attend to the rules of formal logic, courts of law, or academic debate. For this reason, the explicit statement and agreement of presumption may not be enough to make presumption exist in a particular place at a particular time. Even within the structured argument of courts of law, Sproule’s concept of a psychological presumption implicates the stipulated placement in an argument because the psychological predispositions of an audience (jury, judge, or the viewing public) may well overturn any stipulation of where presumption and burden of proof are to be placed. As Sproule notes, “the ‘legal’ or logically-objective assignment of presumption may be overturned by a psychological presumption attending to things novel” (Sproule, 1976, 120).

Although the nature of presumption is one of a “stipulated rule” where the “agency of apportionment is the court and the beneficiary is one of the two sides before the bar” (Sproule, 120), or as an organizing principle that allows one to determine the “nature” of the argument (i.e. academic debate), this view of presumption is far too limiting and does not account for the many audience presumptions at play within a particular argument.
Given Sproule’s position on presumption, the use of a jury in a court of law undermines the very notion that presumption or burden of proof is actually assignable to either side of an argument. It would seem that the more people involved in a decision and the processes that lead to that decision (a verdict) the more potential presumptions an advocate has to deal with in a given situation. Even in such a case as the court of law, the explicit statement of where presumption and burden of proof should lie within an argument can only exist artificially as a procedural rule of the court. The proponents of each side still easily manipulate jury member presumptions, their beliefs in a case, and their concurrent operation in argument. Although a judge may be more apt to adhere to the artificial stipulation of presumption and burden of proof due to rules of court and the authority of his or her position, rules and authority may not be sufficient in offsetting the novel arguments brought forth by the proponents of each side of a case.
Another dynamic to be considered with the psychological components of argument articulated by Sproule include the sociological/cultural components of presumption. From the perspective that presumption is an audience-oriented phenomena, it stands that the values held by a particular audience are integral considerations in the way presumption functions in argument. It is not so much the particular values that come into question when considering how presumption functions in argument, but rather the varying levels of force attributed to those values. For a sociological/cultural understanding of presumption a rhetor must consider how an audience organizes the values that affect the function of presumption. Joseph Tuman (1992) suggests that values act as screens through which cultures and societies determine the presumptions at play in an argumentative setting. The way a culture or society organizes their values and the way they structurally prioritize them affects how presumptions function in argument. While citing Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, Tuman states that, ‘value hierarchies are, no doubt, more important to the structure of an argument than the actual values. Most values are indeed shared by a great number of particular audiences, and a particular audience is characterized less by which values it accepts than by the way it grades them’ (p.14) Here, the weight and/or force attributed to the values held by an audience are considered to have more practical importance than the values themselves.

Following the assumption that cultures and societies develop a collective hierarchy of values, Tuman argues, “a ‘natural’ hierarchy may be designated, depicting the perceived cultural preferences for values in rank of significance” (p.14). A rhetor can analyze the way a cultural body structures their presumptions by considering the value preferences of an audience instead of simply focusing on the values themselves. This view of presumption and culture is neither exhaustive nor complete but suggests that there is a more complex functioning of presumption in interpersonal settings than dominant conceptions allow us to indicate. Past the particular placement presumption of Whatelian interpretations lies the larger question; how does presumption function in interpersonal argument?
By treating presumption as a socio-psychological predisposition of an audience, stipulated placement of presumption becomes even less tenable. Presumption, as a function of argument, suggests that there are, and may potentially be, many implicit and explicit presumptions at work. Furthermore, the stipulated rules of due process found in Western courts of law do not necessarily transfer to common uses of presumption in less structured, real world argumentative settings.

The audience, and multiple audience conceptions of where presumption should reside, and the degrees to which various presumptions will carry argumentative weight do more to determine the placement of presumption in an argument than do objective, logical, and authoritatively determined placements of presumption. Karen Whedbee (1997) states, “the placement as well as the strength of presumptive allegiance cannot be known a priori, but is itself negotiated through the process of deliberation” (p.6).  Whedbee suggests here that deliberation is a process in the functioning of presumption in an argument. It would seem that deliberation can shed considerable light on audience perceptions of where presumption rests prior to the onset of an argument and may illustrate its potential and relative strength during in an argument.  Deliberation may be sufficient at determining the various presumptive points of an issue, yet deliberation alone will only evidence the explicitly acknowledged presumptions. The implicit, less acknowledged, and possibly more salient presumptions at play are less directly addressed if at all. Deliberation may give rhetors a starting point from which the presumptions will rest for a portion of argument, but as the argument progresses, presumptions change. The values and their relative weights in the minds of the audience change as new and different claims and/or evidence is brought to bear on the topic(s) of debate. This perspective on deliberation presumes a central route process to presumptive reasoning. Whately, on the other hand, suggests that some peripheral processes have more bearing on the process of presumption.

Whately’s concept of novelty illustrates the psychological predispositions that can lead an audience to prescribe greater, lesser, or due degrees of presumption upon various points in an argument. Novelty problematizes the positive effects that deliberation could have for determining the strength and presumptive allegiance in an argument because an audience, while attending to those things novel, may not even be cognizant of their own presumptive preferences. It is this less than conscious, yet operant functioning of presumption that makes it so allusive in real world applications. While deliberation may bring a rhetor closer to understanding audience presumptions, deliberation can never fix the presumptions in an argument or be conclusive of their actual placement.
To view presumption as a function of argument is to view it as a potential for reaching certain conclusions, not the probability, actuality, or truth of those conclusions. To further elucidate the complexity of the function of presumption, we must consider the role of novelty.

Novelty
Whately’s concept of novelty is an important consideration in the way presumption functions. Whately claims that an audience member’s presumptive orientation is, in part, based in novelty, or those things that are socio-psychologically salient to an audience member.Whately is somewhat ambiguous as to whether novelty is a singular or collective operation in argument. By this I mean that the notion of novelty may be specific to a particular person or to particular groups of people with similar interests. By this same reasoning, a person is never separate from the cultural entailments that define their relationship with their social and physical environment.
This step in Whately’s thinking suggests that presumption does not necessarily lend
itself to those things that are determined logically or through traditional lines of reason. For Whately, novelty is the notion that psychological factors “such as pity, contempt, love, joy…” (Whately, 1846, 121) towards points of authority, are capable of leading an audience to the “conviction” that those points of authority “deserve” those feelings.

In other words, feelings, not formal logic, are capable of putting presumption upon points of authority in an argument.  For example, “a person will perhaps describe himself (with sincere good faith) as feeling great deference towards someone, on the ground of his believing him to be entitled to it” (Whately, 1846, 121).  Furthermore, Whately states “men are liable to deceive themselves as to the degree of deference they feel towards various persons” (Whately, 1846, 121).  Although Whately implies that there is a correct amount of deference one should have towards another, he attests to the fact that it is more likely that a person will be “deceived” based in the novel feelings one has towards another person.

This realization, for Whately, is fundamental to our understanding of how presumption functions in argument. Since the placement of presumption and burden of proof are not necessarily logical or fixed places within an argument, and they exist moreso as socio-psychological predispositions of an audience, then the feelings one has towards another person (or object) are the means by which presumption is deferred upon points of authority. It is not so much the placement of presumption but the process of deference that is fundamental to the functioning of presumption.

Whatley attests that feelings alone will not determine where, and to what degree presumption will be placed upon points of authority. For Whately, the affiliation one has with differing persons or groups has a profound effect on the functioning of presumption.  As Whately states, “with some persons, again, authority seems to act according to the law of gravitation,” in that a person is, “inclined to be of the opinion of the person who is nearest” (Whately, 1846, 121). A person’s affiliation with particular groups or people to which they have novel feelings will determine what feelings will be conferred upon particular points of authority.

This analysis of novelty has shown that, for Whately, authority has more to do with socio-psychological factors than the marked rules of argumentation or prescriptive placements of presumption and burden of proof. Therefore, the concept of novelty, or the feelings one has towards a person, subject, or institution, lends further support to the idea that there may be multiple presumptions at play within an argument because of their unaccountability by the persons who reason through novel feelings. Since a person is “liable to deceive themselves as to the degree of deference they feel towards various persons” (Whately, 121), a rhetor’s determination of what points of authority an audience member has favorable or unfavorable feelings towards is even more complicated and may still not be determinable through simple deliberation.

Deference
Central to the point of multiple presumptions, and this essay, is Whately’s concept of deferrence. For Whately, presumption functions by deferring to something or someone else. “Deference,” Whately states, “ought to be, and usually is, felt in reference to particular points” and that, “personal affection…in many minds, generates deference”(Whately, 1846, 121).  Whately attests here again to the notion that presumption is not located in a particular place within an argument and that socio-psychological predispositions produce the ways in which an audience determines presumptive judgment.  More importantly, deference is the way one projects presumption by generating deference upon any number of points of an argument simultaneously. The generation of deference is exactly the way presumption acts as a function of argument. The specific placement of presumption is even further untenable because as Whately states, “deference is apt to depend on feelings; often on whimsical and unaccountable feelings” (Whately, 1846, 120). A person defers presumption as an argument progresses throughout the argumentative process.

Whately views emotions and feelings as a “personal affection that generates deference”; or as a personal sense of “want” that drives us to project our beliefs onto something else. He states that an audience forms, “a habit of first, wishing, secondly, hoping, and thirdly, believing a person to be in the right, whom they would be sorry to think mistaken,” (Whately, 1846, 121). Thus, those things one projects belief upon are those things to which one’s presumption attends; or as Sproule notes, “deference was seen to be recognition of the authority conferred on a object by a presumption” (p.121). Sproule states that, “deference was described as being addressed to the faculty of ‘feelings,'” (Sproule, 1976, 121).  In this sense, logic does not necessarily apply to the way deference functions in an argument.  Rather, deference functions by deferring presumption through “feelings” an audience member has towards particular points in an argument.

Whately discusses deference primarily in reference to points of authority assumed and presumed by those engaged in argument. Although Whately scarcely discusses all of the possible points to which an audience can defer (and given the socio-psychological perspective of this essay it would be difficult to claim that he could), he does position those points of presumption in points of authority. Importantly, presumption may be conferred upon multiple points of authority. As Whately states, “It is conceivable that one may have a due degree of deference, and an excess of it, and a deficiency of it, all towards the same person, but in respect of different points” (Whately, 1846, 121). The inverse is also true in that a lack or an excess of deference to one or more points may be considered due deference to another. Because deference of presumption to multiple points of authority can occur simultaneously, to different degrees, and “in respect to different points”, Whately’s positioning of deference in points of authority does less to solidify the placement of presumption in an argument and more to illustrate the way presumption functions as a component of a larger language of argumentation.

Whately’s claim that one can have a due, an excess, and a deficiency of deference in respect to different points and that “deference may be misplaced in respect of the subject, as well as of the person” (Whately, 1846, 121), suggests that what might be considered reasonably due deference to one point may actually be an excess or deficiency of deference to others.

He states, “That the degree of deference felt for any one’s Authority ought to depend not on our feelings, but on our judgment … but it is important to remember that there is a danger on both sides;-of an unreasonable Presumption on the side of our wishes, or against them.” (Whately, 1846, 121). Although Whately states here that “Authority ought to depend not on our feelings,” this statement is merely prescriptive and does not overturn the way feelings affect the function of presumption in argument. This passage also suggests that those points to which presumption defers do not necessarily rely upon good judgment and that “unreasonable presumption” exists on both sides of our wishes “in respect of different points.” (Whately, 1846, 121)

Up to this point I have argued that presumption, as a function of presumption and while attending to those things novel, is conferred through deference upon points of authority an audience has favorable, or unfavorable feelings toward. It seems appropriate to insert here that if presumption is a function of, rather than a place in argument, then Whatelian theories of presumption and burden of proof are more representative of a language of argumentation, a systematic economy of symbols through which argument works. As components of a socio-psychological language of argument, presumption and burden of proof do not constitute a language inasmuch as they illustrate the conceptual capacity these components carry with them.
Similarly, Jaques Derrida’s discussion of deference, play, and how signs function in language lends further evidence to the notion that presumption is a linguistically conceptual function of argument.

Différance
In Jaques Derrida’s (1982) essay Différance, he argues that the “the play of difference, which, as Sausurre reminded us, is the condition for the possibility and functioning of every sign, is in itself a silent play” (Derrida, 1982, 5). In this seminal thesis, Derrida asserts that a sign functions through the condition that a person is able to distinguish meaning from signs within a language because of their ability to tell the difference between signs.
For example, Derrida uses the term “Différance” to illustrate the difference between a word that does not exist in any language (e.g. Différance) and a reader’s ability to distinguish the difference between Différance through the simple placement of an “a” or an “e”. To illustrate this point further Derrida explains that “the ‘a’ of Différance, thus, is not heard; it remains silent, secret and discreet…”(p.4) and that, “inaudible is the difference between two phonemes which alone permits them to be and to operate as such” (p.5) and that, “if there is not phonetic writing, it is that there is no phonetic phone” (p.5). Here Derrida shows the reader that the difference between signs, determinable in their apparent opposition in writing, is inaudible in speech itself. The play of speaking and writing is found in the understanding that there is a difference between these two signs, and not a difference inherent in and of the signs themselves. For Derrida it is not so much that signs actually do play upon and with each other in language, but rather that the “play of difference” is the condition or circumstance bestowed upon signs by language. Derrida explains play in the sense that every concept is inscribed in a chain or in a system within which it refers to other concepts by means of the systematic play of differences. Such a play, différance, is no longer simply a concept, but rather the possibility of conceptuality; the rhetorical condition for a conceptual process in general (p.11).
The function of a sign in language is a function of Différance:  a sign differs from other signs in the sense that what a sign signifies is not the sign itself. A sign defers to other signs in the sense that its meaning is not to be found in the sign itself but in the infinitely reciprocal process by which one sign defers to another. A sign functions in language not only because it differs but because it defers from its very own presence. As Derrida states, “a sign takes the place of the present. When we cannot present or show a thing, state the present, the being-present, when the present can not be presented, we signify, we go through the detour of the sign… the sign, in this sense, is deferred presence” (p.9).

By deferring presence, a sign functions to simply represent the thing that does not exist at the point in which a sign is employed in language. It is important to note that the economy of language, or the conceptual process and systems that make concepts and conceptuality possible, bear upon the functioning of every sign. Language, here, is the authority of the sign, and language thereby confers meaning upon the sign through its ability to empower “the possibility of conceptuality.” As Derrida states, “whether we take the signified or the signifier, language has neither ideas nor sounds that existed before the linguistic system, but only conceptual and phonic differences that have issued from the system” (p.11).

Derrida attests here to the notion that différance “is immediately and irreducibly polysemic,” (p.8). The polysemy of the symbol is ultimately its illusion and allusion. For example, in French the words differents (things that are different) and differends (differences of opinion), which are audibly the same, are discernable in writing. The impact of Derrida’s idea of difference is in operation by illustrating the non-essential and necessarily contextual nature of interpretation of texts. In other words, the use of one sign implies all of the possible conceptions of that sign to the point that a word is discernible. Audibly, and outside of context, these words are not immediately discernable. In writing and within context they are. The use of a sign, symbol, or word is understandable to the degrees that it is not all other possible signs or symbols and that it is reasonably iterable with in a particular context. Derrida further states that, “in its polysemia (deférance), of course, like any meaning, must defer to the discourse in which it occurs, its interpretive context…” (p.8).

The significance of Derrida’s theory of the sign to Whately’s theory of presumption is that each defers to something other than itself. In the case of the sign, it defers to the conventions of language that empower its use by implying all of the other possible signs it is not. This process subsequently determines what the sign is. In the case of Whatelian presumption, favorable feelings towards an object defer presumption onto that object which determines, for the audience, the authority and presumption of a case. Derrida’s notion of différance applies here in that different degrees of deference, in accordance with favorable feelings, and in opposition to those which are unfavorable, do a great deal to entertain the multiple presumptions at play in any particular argument. In this sense, there is no locus of presumption. Rather, deference is Whately’s acknowledgment that feelings and affiliations are constitutive of a socio-psychological language of argumentation that informs the multiple points of authority to which presumption may exist. Deference, in this sense, is the potential and possibility that presumptions might play within a psychological and socio-cultural language of argumentation. Furthermore, given Whately’s claim that different degrees of deference may exist at the same time and upon many points of simultaneously, he implicates presumption in a matrix of presumptions, presumptive grounds, and burdens of proof. Like the sign, presumption functions as the potential for play in argumentative discourse.

This perspective of argument serves to partially re-validate presumption as a stipulated rule in courts of law. If we consider a court a discourse of the justice system then those rules that come to bear upon both fictive and real adjudicators may function in accordance with, by deferring to, the authority of court as an authoritative discourse. In a court of law it is presumed that the participants of that court will adhere to the placement of presumption on one side of an argument and burden of proof on the other. This revalidation is partial because presumptive placement in court is still subject to an audience’s socio-psychological and emotive predispositions.
More importantly, such a reading of Derrida implies that presumption exists within a larger matrix of presumptive language: one that spans the boundaries of any cognitive socio-psychological predispositions an audience has in an argument. Presumptions represent the potential for play, a constant push and pull of relative forces in the minds of the audience. Derridian theories of how signs function in language has implications for the functioning of presumption, and its corollary burden of proof, in a language of argumentation. Here, presumption and burden of proof exist only inasmuch as they differ from each other and defer as a function in argument. Presumption, in this sense, is more a potential of argumentation rather than a pivotal, locatable, or identifiable belief structure.

Conclusion
By synthesizing contemporary interpretations of presumption and introducing the metaphor of play, I have attempted to show the multidimensional and polysemic qualities as significantly different than the traditional conceptual framework in which it is generally understood. A rhetor would be better able to move an audience to action not only by determining what feelings or affiliations contribute to the deference of presumption, but by determining the various systems of opposing presumptions at “play” within an argument. Although many of these points may not necessarily be known to the arguer or the analyst, the general treatment of presumption as a potentiality within a language of argumentation makes points and placement less necessary in the consideration of presumption and presents a linguistic move toward quantum and the inter-textual avenues of investigation.
I hope that my reading of Whately’s notion of presumption expands our concept of presumption in argument and aids in the development of a theory of presumption that is  multi-dimensional and adequately complex. Furthermore, I hope this reading articulates a concept of presumption as a function endemic to a systematic economy of language, embedded in culture, and is itself, as allusive as a the symbols, the subjects of its design.

REFERENCES
Burnett, N. (1991). Archbishop Whately and the concept of presumption: Lessons for CEDA debate. Paper presented at the 77th Annual Meeting of the Speech Communication Association, 2 Nov. 991. Atlanta, GA.
Derrida, J. (1972). Différance. In Margins of philosophy. A. Bass (Trans.). Chicago: U of Chicago.
Perelman, C. H. & Olbrechts-Tyteca, L.  (1969). The new rhetoric.  Notre Dame: U of Notre Dame.
Sproule, J. M. (1976). The psychological burden of proof: On the evolutionary development of Richard Whately’s theory of presumption. Communication Monographs, 43, 115-129.
Whately, R. (1846). Elements of rhetoric.  In Bizzell, P. & B. Herzberg (Eds.). The rhetorical tradition: Readings from classical times to present (pp.831-858). Boston, MA: St. Martin’s.
Whedbee, K. (1998). Authority, freedom and liberal judgment: The presumptions and presumptuousness of Whately, Mill and Tocqueville. Quarterly Journal of Speech,Vol. 84 (2), 171-189.