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

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Margot Leegwater ~ Sharing Scarcity: Land Access And Social Relations In Southeast Rwanda



Land is a crucial yet scarce resource in Rwanda, where about 90% of the population is engaged in subsistence farming, and access to land is increasingly becoming a source of conflict. This study examines the effects of land-access and land-tenure policies on local community relations, including ethnicity, and land conflicts in post-conflict rural Rwanda. Social relations have been characterized by (ethnic) tensions, mistrust, grief and frustration since the end of the 1990-1994 civil war and the 1994 genocide. Focusing on southeastern Rwanda, the study describes the negative consequences on social and inter-ethnic relations of a land-sharing agreement that was imposed on Tutsi returnees and the Hutu population in 1996-1997 and the villagization policy that was introduced at the same time. More recent land reforms, such as land

registration and crop specialization, appear to have negatively affected land tenure and food security and have aggravated land conflicts. In addition, programmes and policies that the population have to comply with are leading to widespread poverty among peasants and aggravating communal tensions. Violence has historically often been linked to land, and the current growing resentment and fear surrounding these land-related policies and the ever-increasing land conflicts could jeopardize Rwanda's recovery and stability.

Full text book: http://www.ascleiden.nl/news/sharing-scarcity

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Civil Domains and Arenas in Zimbabwean Settings. Democracy and Responsiveness Revisited – DPRN Five

Harare – goafrica.about.com

Introduction (written 2008 – first published 2010)
A popular remedy for Africa's predicament is the promotion of '*civil society*'. It is conventionally seen as a collection of various kinds of non-profit bodies separate from the state and business sector. It is framed within a consensual model of politics, and thus capable of working in '*partnership*' with both state and business sectors in pursuit of common interests, particularly '*development*' and

'democracy' **[i]**. Since the late 1970s donors sought substitutes for the state in the private sector. In the 1980s they discovered the virtues of the non-profit branch of this sector. They tasked older entities such as mission hospitals and newly-arrived non-governmental organisations (NGOs) with providing a range of services, from schooling and healthcare to small enterprise promotion, that were once considered responsibilities of the public sector.

Under their neoliberal paradigm, donors have tried to raise the nonprofit sector's political status. Beyond service provision, its main task is to counter government power. Here civil society is cast as a hero, who routinely calls a villainous state to account. Yet this model of *'civil society'* has evoked controversy. Questions have arisen about the effects of NGOs not only as substitute providers of basic services, but also as vehicles of public politics, effectively substituting for opposition political parties **[ii]**. A number of writers have called attention to *'the obvious: that civil society is [largely] made up of international organisations*'. Some argue that the whole concept of 'civil society' as promoted by outsiders does not match African sociological or political realities, and can ultimately weaken, rather than strengthen the power of common citizens. There are calls, in short, for a re-think.

Civil domains

How closely does the idea of civil society correspond to the ways Africans themselves go about their associational life and politics? How has it worked in the past? Can it foster robust citizenship in the future? At some times and places, answers to these questions have been affirmative. Where Africans could organize to transform the political order – the ending of minority rule in southern Africa being a major case in point – rights and collective self-esteem have advanced. In this stormy history, consensual politics of the conventional 'civil society' model are hard to detect. Hence the need for more realism. The concept of public space, as derived from the work on the foundations of democracy of the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas **[iv]**, allows us not only to analyze players and issues at stake but also to pay attention to the history of the discourse in that space, which specifically is quite important in an African context with an authoritarian past, colonialism, and often Marxism-Leninism in the years behind.

Hence our preference for another conception of this public space, which we term the civil domain: A social realm or space apart from the state, familial bonds and for-profit firms, in which people associate together voluntarily to reproduce, promote or contest the character of social, cultural economic or political rules

that concern them. Such a conception makes it possible to include other powers as well as a great variety of civil society players (including churches, trade unions, vernacular civil structures – like the sometimes powerful Chiefs in Zimbabwe – groups of intellectuals around universities and social movements).

Yet were this space to comprise the whole of what interests us, a glance at history would rapidly reveal its limitations. For where the interplay of global interests and national vulnerabilities has had the upper hand, the advance of public politics and citizenship has been halted or reversed. Coerced by or colluding with forces abroad, many African leaders have squandered public goods and public trust. Sovereign powers and surpluses have been transferred abroad, open political competition outlawed and space for active citizenship reduced to nothing. In much of Africa, public institutions have decayed. In some cases – Somalia, Congo, Sierra Leone – they have collapsed outright. Explaining why states fail is a complex and disputed matter. Many homegrown villains from Mengistu to Mobutu to Mugabe are blameworthy. But as powers over fundamental political and economic choices have shifted even further upward and outward, to Western-based entities that make the rules – donor agencies, bankers, investors and policy think-tanks – external factors loom very large indeed.

Power in African settings is commonly constructed and deployed in spheres far wider than civil domains: the state, the armed forces, enterprises and the media. These have external as well as domestic dimensions; in a continent where power is highly extraverted **[v]**, relationships with foreign actors are commonly decisive. Hence when talking of governance, democracy, and respect for human rights it is important to keep in mind differing levels – global, national, regional and local – and the interplay among them.

Civil domains in the public arena

Habermas concluded that in the 18th and 19th century 'real' democracy developed in feudal Europe when independent public spaces (such as coffee houses, salons, reading rooms, the beginning of the independent press) emerged where issues at stake were debated, outside the influence of government structures. He argues that the independent media are also in the 'public space'. Their importance lives on in the articles on freedom of speech, opinion, association, assembly, freedom of the media, now cornerstones of the Universal declaration of Human Rights.

Today in Africa public space is not necessarily confined to the media. In Angola, the churches provided a public space for a discourse of peace to emerge in times

of war, as Comerford has compellingly argued **[vi]**. Yet the public space transcends national frontiers. In the case of Zimbabwe, it is internationalized. Much space is today found outside the country, in the diaspora in South Africa, U.K. and beyond. Here we can expand the 'public space model' beyond civil domains to embrace the 'arena model'. A 'public arena' is a complex whole of 'antagonistic cooperation' **[vii]**. The scope of the 'civil domain' allows for conflict, but cannot account for its non-territorial, externalised dimensions. Those are of great importance in accounting for what is really going on in the complex African context.

The arena model allows analysis of the intrinsic power relations in day-to-day struggles. Power relations inside the different organisations figure in the arena model. Here organisations are seen as half-open systems interacting with other organisations in the context but at the same time being influenced by them, which works out differently for different layers in the organisations.
Conventional civil society notions do not draw attention to this. Let us take an example. A large non-governmental organisation in Zimbabwe is dependent on international donors. At the same time it operates in the Zimbabwean political reality where it is dependent on the Zimbabwean Government. It faces further challenges posed by its beneficiaries, in the field where things are really happening. But: these three are in fact different organisations! Although the whole NGO is affected by the decisions of its donors, these are decisions mainly carried out on the level of the directors and the managers: they are judged mainly based on the needs of their donors who are all abroad and influenced by other political realities than that of Zimbabwe, while the organisation's field officers are dealing with the direct needs of the people: the organisation (as well as all others in the arena) is a half-open system. Its inner workings can be described as an arena, nested in the arenas of political reality in Zimbabwe but at the same time in the foreign aid system which in its turn is nested again in overall international relations systems.

This complex 'nesting' of arenas **[viii]** is an important part of the analytical model. International pressure cannot be omitted when analyzing Zimbabwe. This pressure is exerted on many levels. Simultaneously the organisation is a half-open system in the sense that the culture of the programme related officers inside the organisation is more geared towards the beneficiaries than that of the 'Zimbabwe or international related' managers and directors, while the organisation as a

whole is more related to the beneficiaries than the Zimbabwean Government itself. At the same time all parties have a fragile relationship, based on conflict resolution and negotiation, and this relationship is reflected inside the organisation as well.
Thus in the organisation's internal arenas, different players confront each other and may become interdependent **[ix].** These are not in the 'public arena'. But if they are not taken into account, any analysis would overlook many things that drive relations in the 'public arena' and hence the complex power plays that are going on. This is *qualitate qua* of course also the case with media outlets and political parties etc. So it is not enough to analyse 'the' organisation: an analysis needs to be deeper and more encompassing.
It is the public arena in which battles (cold or hot) are fought by various players and powers, resulting eventually in more democracy – or less.

Democracy and state responsiveness
Official aid agencies have expressed their dismay at 'top-down' approaches; they now claim to be paid-up members of the 'participatory methods' club. Yet in practice, those new methods have often camouflaged old-fashioned autocratic power. Donors continue attaching coercive conditions to their loans and grants. Aid-givers' insistence on 'participation' in some places is experienced as manipulation, deception and unpaid local labour. Some now speak of the 'tyranny of participation', and discuss it only with adjectives: 'veneered participation' (going-through-the-motions); 'inequitable participation' (women and minorities marginalized), and 'bureaucratic participation' (planning-by-numbers, discussing-by-checklists)**[x]**

Some wish to drop the term participation altogether. Real citizenship is not served by cheap substitutes; rather it requires 'teeth' – concrete obligations and rights capable of being upheld in courts of law. Citizens should have real powers to 'throw the rascals out', but credible mechanisms (truly competitive elections, independent parliamentary inquires, independent public auditing) for downward accountability are scarce or weak.

In their approaches to the state in Africa, aid donors have shown ambivalence and mood swings. In the 1960s they favored the state and *'nation-building'*. By 1980 they had changed course, mounting an offensive to 'roll back' government through privatization, decentralization and de-legitimation of the public sector. Up to the mid-1990s, donors showed great optimism about the powers of private

for-profit and non-profit sectors. This harmonized with prevailing neoliberal orthodoxies, namely that Greed is Good, and that horse-and-sparrow economics would be sufficient to tackle poverty – that is, *'feed the horse well and some benefits are sure to pass through for the sparrows to eat'*.

Where African governments poured public resources into such luxuries as four-star hotels and automobile assembly plants, cutting back state engagement in the economy was not a bad thing. But deligitimizing the public sector rapidly became a self-fulfilling prophecy. Schools, health services, police and other public sector services – especially those serving the politically weak – rapidly lost good staff and other means to meet citizen needs. Unable to deliver basic services of acceptable quality on a fair basis, and ravaged by corruption, the state lost legitimacy for citizens. Readiness to pay taxes and fees declined. The public sector lost whatever responsive character it may have had. The 'social contract' between states and citizens lost any meaning.

Donors and lenders sped up the decay of African public sectors simply by choosing to by-pass them. They channeled aid via special project units, consulting firms – and nonprofits. NGOs became aid vehicles of choice, and their supply both in the North and the South boomed in response to donor demand. The resulting organizational islands could deliver their agricultural extension, health care and training project services for a while. But disconnected from public institutions and local taxes and fees, those services stopped when the stream of aid dried up.

Institutional decay, combined with low and declining reciprocity between political classes and citizens, have made states dangerously fragile. There has been no lack of disaffected politicians or disgruntled army officers ready to spark a coup or a war. The sequel has collapsed, sometimes with unspeakable violence. Victims have been chiefly civilians. In the case of Rwanda, the system of foreign aid – including that helping to create 'civil society'- set the stage for genocide **[xi]**.

After 11 September 2001, strategists at the centre of world power began paying more attention to the periphery. People in supposedly secure Western countries have turned out to be vulnerable to the breakdown of public order and security in faraway non-Western places. Washington DC today regards weak and failed states as among its top security priorities. Its main development agencies are re-tooling themselves to promote *'nation building'* – a theme of the 1960s. The task is no longer to shrink the state but to reshape it in ways assumed to secure Western interests.

That is not a bad idea. Contrary to some conventional thinking about civil society, stronger states can advance anti-poverty and human rights agendas. Weak and poorly institutionalized states hardly favour emancipatory associational life. But where there are robust public institutions to provide basic services and enable open politics, many things become possible. Citizen action in South Africa, for example, has scored victories for landless people and those living with HIV-AIDS because special courts and official commissions have grown (partially as a result of civil society pressures) to promote provisions of the Constitution's bill of rights. In Mozambique, an important pre-condition for achievement of smallholder land rights was the rehabilitation of the public cadastre (land title office).

Charitable giving and government subsidies to NGOs are commonly justified by claims about their responsiveness in combating poverty. Indeed in many African settings, a lot seems to be happening: sewing circles, street children centres, HIV-AIDS counseling, kitchen garden and small livestock efforts, micro-lending, literacy, and many other instances of NGO intervention. Africa seems abuzz with little projects supported from abroad. But does this add up to anything people can count on? For many citizens such beehives of activity can be a 'tyranny of structurelessness' – a situation in which benefits are indeed flowing to some, but not according to any priorities or plans ratified by wide popular consent. Nonprofits claiming to be more responsive than the state in service provision seem to have a point when people flock to their clinics and schools. But in the absence of public steering and comprehensive coverage, overall outcomes can add up to fragmentation, instability, unequal access and no reliable ways for citizens to call service providers to account and get what they are entitled to.
Yet it appears that neither '*building civil society*', nor '*building the state*' are in themselves the answer to public issues. Rather, viable answers may be better sought in the '*public arena*' where the question is not one of shrinking or developing substitutes for the state, but challenging it to become more responsive while at the same time helping it gain the capacities to respond.

In this framework an interesting study has been conducted in the Balkans **[xii]** where the authors ask themselves: '*Why is economic growth not generating support for market capitalism and why is state weakness reproduced in the Balkans?*' Their study shows that economic growth is not sufficient to create a social base for a market society and that state building in the Balkans cannot and should not be simply reduced to an EU-guided reform of public administrations

(both of which are assumptions underlying the actual discourse on 'reconstruction' of the Balkans, mainly driven by EU-forces.) The answer of the researchers in the Balkans is that state building should be viewed primarily as a constituency building. The paradigm shift proposed here (a shift from emphasis on the state to one on the constituency of the state, including different civil domains) is a virtual reversal of the neoliberal paradigm shift from state building to civil society.
As the authors of the Balkans study say:
What is needed is a new generation of democratization policies that focus on the quality of political representation. What we see as a priority is a shift from the normative approach to democratization that focuses on democratic institutions (elections, courts, and media) and which is most often expressed with the idea of 'accountable government' or 'good government' to the idea of 'responsive government' that underlines not the state's autonomy from civil society but the influence of major social constituencies over state decisions

In our view that synthesizes the approaches we described in our theoretical notes: a concept of civil domains is more useful than that of civil society. But that in itself is not sufficient. For in the end it is all about the 'balance of powers' in the public arena. This nested constellation of public and private entities has non-territorial, global dimensions; in a place like Zimbabwe, where so many citizens are now 'offshore', it is a crucial concept. A functioning public arena is a precondition for a functioning state as well as functioning constituencies of that state. It makes responsiveness possible, as a first requisite for genuine democracy. To understand the actual situation in Zimbabwe, these mechanisms need to be better understood.

Part II. From model to practice – The public arena in Zimbabwe.
Which institutions, rules and incentives are driving or blocking change? Which ones are shaping the civil domain and public arena in today's Zimbabwe? The following sections consider these questions on several terrains: economic and state-party (including military and justice, section 4); and the 'civil domains': church, civil, vernacular and the media (section 5). Section 6 offers concluding observations.

Zimbabwe's public arena

Economic power

After independence in 1980 Zimbabwe started with one of the best regulated – be it settler-colonialist – regimes in Africa. It was then already a corporatist economic regime, but it worked, generating a relatively high per-capita income and a basis for extending social as well as economic infrastructure. The main sources of income were agriculture, mining and industry. In the first decade of independence the ZANU government effectively maintained this structure, adding important redistributive measures like a minimum wage, increasing expenditure on health and education **[xiv]**. The ruling party did not immediately begin to seek the maximum benefits for themselves out of the system; its rule could be described as 'enlightened dictatorship'. For most Zimbabweans, welfare improved, especially in rural areas where agricultural output boomed.

However powerful outside interests, led by the World Bank and IMF, had concluded that Zimbabwe's economy was underperforming. Therefore, like in the case of virtually every other African economy (never mind the differences) it had to be overhauled. The ensuing Economical Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) began in 1991. Six years later, the World Bank lauded the programme, bestowing on it the Bank's highest rating: 'highly satisfactory'. Yet as a World Bank senior economist, William Easterly, has recently noted, this coercively-imposed economic programme set Zimbabwe on the path to predatory capitalism and economic and political ruin **[xv]**. The massive wave of privatization and deregulation accelerated the creation of a class of politician-owners and well-connected business people whose main interest was in extracting rents, not building up enterprises. Hence the job creation boom promised by ESAP's architects failed to materialize. Instead Zimbabwe saw worsening poverty and inequality. Salaried and wage-earning classes – the social bases of formal associational life – suffered grave setbacks. Some of these were caused by factors beyond the control of the regime (drought, collapsing commodity prices) but most stemmed from the logic of the programme and the interests of the class it empowered: lowered social sector spending, increases in military outlays, and especially moves to redistribute assets to a small elite. Clientelism grew and along with it, a '*political economy of disorder*' **[xvi]**.

Zimbabwe's fall and those who pushed it into the abyss have been vividly documented **[xvii]**. Among others the study by Gunning and Oostendorp **[xviii]** shows how an over-rapid liberalization leads to grave accidents and poor outcomes, especially the explosive increase of poverty. This deterioration, and the emergence of protest toward the end of the 1990s, showed that the support for the ZANU regime was dwindling. Political decisions to maintain this support by all means (from large payments to war veterans in 1997 through land appropriation to outright violent repression after 2002) in order to keep power in the hands of the ruling ZANU elites did the rest. Land grabs, military plunder in the Congo, hyperinflation and the collapse of formal sector employment have led to radical impoverishment, public squalour and private accumulation in the hands of a tiny elite. Eighty percent of the people live below the poverty line and are in fact only kept alive by the remittances from the quarter of the 12 million inhabitants that fled the country….**[xix]**

Zimbabwe is one of the clearest examples of how *political* developments (international as well as national) impacted directly on *economic* policy formulas (corporatism in the 1980s and liberalism in the 1990s) thus backfiring to politics and the society as a whole again in the first decade of the 21st century. As Brett puts it: *'… its continuing need to pay its political debts made it impossible for [the regime] to cut the budget deficit, and this … produced unsustainable threats to its ability to buy political support'* **[xx]**. It finally led to a rampant inflation, destroying most of what was left of the Zimbabwean economy.



Mugabe – en.wikipedia.org

State and party power, military and justice

Up to the year 2000 Zimbabwe could still be considered a '*one party elected state*' **[xxi]**: the power of the ruling party was overwhelming, but it was always more or less legitimized by elections, at least nominally. In February 2000 the ruling party decisively lost a national referendum on a new constitution; later it recouped its standing in the 2000 and 2005 parliamentary elections, the 2002 presidential election and the 2005 senate elections. At the time this chapter was being written in 2008, Zimbabwean politics had been on a roller-coaster ride taking citizens from orderly parliamentary and first-round presidential elections to a period of such intense violence that a second round of voting for president was effectively nullified.

A military junta operating behind the figure of an aging President today essentially runs Zimbabwe. The military has been purged of all possible sympathizers with any form of opposition. The military is thus a trustworthy base for the ruling party, for which it undertakes open and active propaganda. In 2002 the chief of staff solemnly declared that the army would not accept an electoral defeat of the ruling party. Ex-soldiers have been appointed to administer elections from voter registration to the announcement of election results. Militarization of the police and the systematic intimidation of magistrates to force their resignation and replacement by party men make the life of anyone who dares to oppose the ruling party a complete misery. If you are beaten up by the mobs (including a newly formed '*youth league*') of the ZANU-PF, you cannot go to the police or if you do you'll be beaten again (as happened to opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai). When you lodge a complaint to the judiciary you will be arrested yourself, and so forth.

Thus Zimbabwean politics has evolved from a 'one party elected state' to a one party military dictatorship. Party members such as former Finance Minister Simba Makoni, who dare to challenge the candidature of Robert Mugabe *inside* the party quickly find themselves thrown out of the party.

Typology of civil domains in Zimbabwe

Vernacular ways of associating

Chiefs and spirit mediums hold considerable authority, especially in rural areas. Although often underestimated, they form powerful (sub-)elites that cannot be ignored. When Zimbabwe was colonized during the 19th and 20th century, black

inhabitants were – as in so many colonies – pushed onto 'communal lands' and put under the supervision of 'traditional' leaders in fact appointed by the colonial authority. Despite the illegitimacy of their imposition, these chiefs formed the heart of colonial control over rural people and the lands allocated to them. Local cults were thriving (and often still are) in these areas: chiefs and spirit mediums form a 'state in the state' together representing vernacular power. Spirit mediums and chiefs played an important role in many areas in the guerilla war, 'providing a mythic base for the alliance between the people and the guerillas' **[xxii]**, sometimes in happy alliance with the local Catholic missionaries. But in light of many chiefs' active collaboration with the white minority regime, their formal role in land allocation after independence was taken over by the ruling party. Nevertheless inhabitants *de facto* went on to refer land matters to traditional leaders **[xxiii]**.

Today, as central governmental performance deteriorates, local chiefs are again gaining influence.The ruling party's authoritarianism is expressed in the power relations in the 'communal areas', which are often adjacent to commercial farms. The politics of 'traditional' leadership, here and there combined with 'war veterans' (a grouping in civil society revived around 1997 as a useful rent-a-mob in the service of the ruling party) thus helped drive a wave of violent takeovers of commercial farmland beginning in 2000.
But the power of the vernacular 'systems' is real power: in order to get permission to work a certain piece of land in the communal areas people must turn to the chief. Land is collectively owned, or in some places even totally appropriated by the chief. In that way a complicated political economical balance in the rural areas exists, where the chief holds the formal power, the spirit medium the religious and historical power, and the elected (sometimes MDC, not just ZANU) rural councilors hold the formal power, but where the executive power is divided between the ZANU party system and local NGOs, since the latter command (foreign) funding. Quite often a nightmare for a (subsistence) farmer in rural areas! **[xxiv]**

The churches
In Zimbabwe the churches have been divided for many years as far as their answer to the political crisis is concerned. Individuals like Archbishop Ncube of the Bulawayo diocese have been taking a stance against repression and in favour of the needs of the common people. Other church leaders (especially the

Anglicans) are staunch supporters of the regime. All together the churches have been quite inert for a long time, since they withdrew when the *'Movement for Democratic Change*', which was a genuine movement at the time of its inception, developed itself into a political party under Morgan Tsvangirai **[xxv]**.
The Christian Alliance (CA) was formed in 2005 to formulate a joint strategy of the younger clergymen. When in 2005 the government launched a campaign of forced eviction of 700.000 shack dwellers ('operation Murambatsvina' meaning 'throw out the rubbish') the church response reflected growing civil preparedness to defend the people. At that time the churches led civil condemnations of government action and organised practical support for the evicted. These churches' activities have intensified in recent years. Today the Christian Alliance is one of the 'umbrella' organizations trying to (re-)unite non-profit organizations. In 2006 they launched a 'Save Zimbabwe' campaign, a successor to the (older) civil society coalition 'Crisis in Zimbabwe'. In this way, the church has again become a force of its own but also may be a powerful ally for other (civil society) activists.

Formal organisations
In 2000 ZANU-PF was rudely awakened from its slumber of political security when the government soundly lost a referendum to change the country's constitution to give the president far more executive powers and to confiscate commercial (white-owned) land for black resettlement. Leading the opposition to these reforms was a predominantly black civil society organisation, the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA), which was itself an umbrella of several civil society organisations. It demanded reforms along lines of Western liberal and human rights. Shortly thereafter, a key NCA member, the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) with others seized the momentum and established a new political party – the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). That development followed closely on the launch in 1999 of the *Daily News* – a privately owned daily newspaper that intended to promote public demands for a new democratic and human rights order. It rapidly became the prime communication vehicle of the MDC. For the first time, state-owned and controlled media faced serious challenges from a paper with extensive national distribution capacity. The *Daily News* helped MDC come close to winning the 2000 parliamentary election and the 2002 presidential election. Many believe that the MDC did indeed win these elections, but that government control and manipulation resulted in the rigging of the election, giving ZANU-PF a narrow victory in both instances. Both the

Commonwealth and the SADC Parliamentary Forum found these elections to be substantially unfree and unfair **[xxvi]**.

NGOs have tried to gain clout by working more closely together. Many NGO umbrellas and networks have sprung up. Examples include the formation of the Crisis Coalition – a grouping of about 250 Zimbabwean NGOs from all sectors, including the media sector. Both the NCA and the ZCTU also remain as strong forces for change in the country. From 2005 onward, these NGO groupings, plus churches and the MDC opposition, started combining their efforts in planning strategies towards the elections. They initiated new rounds of mass protests, court cases and other challenges to the dictatorship.

Action in this domain, however, never overcame a culture of personality-driven organisations and resulting in inter- and intra-organisational rivalries. These dynamics seriously destabilised the democratic struggle. Strategic unity of division and purpose is needed, and is frequently lacking. We could call this the 'umbrella dilemma': cooperation is necessary but over the last years in Zimbabwe cooperation became an end in itself. A main motivation was commonly to qualify for foreign donor support. The attraction of umbrella organisations for donors and for ambitious leaders is well known **[xxvii]**, but the frequency of collapse and other negative outcomes would suggest that donors have yet to show much respect for lessons learned on this terrain of 'civil society building'.

There are many formal NGOs in Zimbabwe, and almost as many umbrella organizations 'uniting' them. NGOs have been surveyed and critically described on many occasions as for example by Moyo, Makumbe and Raftopoulos **[xxviii]**. They conclude: '*This has led to the pursuit of individualistic NGO survival strategies and power brokerage as instruments of NGO sustainability. The manipulation of this situation by some donors, government officials and NGO leaders has thus generated a hostile context for coordination. In this situation, the result has been that NGOs remain scattered in their development work, lacking an effective development strategy and lacking any significant influence on government policies*' **[xxix]**. NGOs range from simple, very local, (subsistence) farmer associations, through largely a-political service delivery organizations up to the 'chattering class' **[xxx]** formed by many human rights and political NGOs (including those in defense of media freedom etc.) *and* their umbrellas. A Zimbabwean lawyer lecturing in the Netherlands explained: '*It's not uncommon that once a leader loses office in an NGO he goes on to form another one.*

Unfortunately donors buy into their project proposal and consequently Zimbabwe has a lot of organizations doing the same things' **[xxxi]**.

Masvingo Bus Terminus

Many Zimbabwean civilians are all too aware of the need for political change; they are mostly also willing to participate in it. Zimbabwean civil domains have witnessed what could be termed an *overproduction* of awareness, in no small part due to the interest and investments by donors, driven by the best intentions. But a result has been increased competition among NGOs in a shrinking political space, with resulting disappointing outcomes. In short, investments in civil society by donors *lacking adequate knowledge of the public arena* has had counterproductive effects in Zimbabwe. At the moment we see, to a great extent thanks to Western donors, civil society organizations *de facto* taking the place of political organizations that lack the legitimacy, knowledge and member-based structure of political parties.

Sarah Rich Dorman provides us with a 'thick description' of the Rise and Fall of ZimRights, a human rights NGO between 1992 and 2001 **[xxxii]**. She shows how a devastating growth rate (caused by *overinvestment* by donors) from two to forty staff members in seven years, combined with the politically volatile situation in which it operated, brought about the demise of the organization. The most courageous project of ZimRights was the systematic documentation of the 'operation gukurahundi', the slaughter of Matabeleland in 1982-83. The eventual publication of the book in 1999 was delayed for two years by internal infighting; ZimRights was a 'half open organization'. The study details the organization's evolution from a 'volunteer' to an employment base thanks to donor funding; its internal infighting between 'big men'; its infiltration by the secret service CIO; its taking the brunt of government attacks; and its subsequent labeling as a 'sell-out' by the ruling party.

This case (and that of the Zimbabwe Election Support Network – ZESN, studied by the same author **[xxxiii]** are good illustrations of 'operating in the public arena'. Studies of such things within a wider arena can avoid the common traps of over-praising or of rubbishing NGOs. By placing NGOs into wider terrains in which national and international forces are at work, such studies allow realistic understandings to develop. We hold in any case that staying with limited and often romanticizing narratives of 'Civil Society' is not a valid way forward.

Social movements

Zimbabwean resistance to settler takeovers in the 1890s was arguably the country's first national socio-political movement in the modern era. Sixty years later, African nationalism crystallized in two rival political movements, pursuing much the same goal: an end to white minority domination. Led by intellectuals and a few trade unionists, those movements drew on and mobilized discontent in the countryside, including that expressed through vernacular religious groupings. Trade unions emerged in the 1920s under both local and foreign inspiration, but never posed serious threats to the colonial order, which had systematically repressed them and especially their attempts to associate with movements of political nationalism. As a result, Zimbabwe's traditions of social movements as conventionally defined have been weaker than in neighbouring Zambia or South Africa.

In the post-independence period, claims by the ruling party over terrains of public action on the one hand, and NGO-ization on the other, tended to confine civic domains where social movements might have been expected to develop. The authorities moved to organize public action in rural areas through Village and Ward Development Committees; later something called the National Farmers' Association of Zimbabwe emerged, but it represented a small fraction of the African farming population, mainly those using advanced technologies and possessing ample land. Something resembling a movement of the urban poor emerged in 1998 when the Zimbabwe Homeless Peoples Federation was founded. Based on a model developed in India and South Africa, this constellation of member-based organizations grew rapidly, supported by an NGO, Dialogue on Shelter. By 2003 it included about 50 thousand households in poor settlements on the edges of 27 Zimbabwean cities and towns. The Federation had carefully avoided taking party political positions, but was nevertheless one of the targets of the state violence unleashed against the urban poor in May 2005.

The media

'The creation and sustaining of independent media is central to theories of democratisation. However, in the case of fragile states, it may also be misguided and potentially dangerous to assume that encouraging the creation of free and independent media will automatically strengthen civil society, or help establish a democratic system that will hold governments accountable. This approach underestimates the complexity of the contexts of fragile states' **[xxxiv].** Alas, Zimbabwe was not one of the case studies that have led to this report and the conclusions drawn from a workshop held in March 2005; it would have presented quite a challenge to categorise the Zimbabwean (Media) experience. For the sake of clarity, Zimbabwe does not fall under the definition of a 'fragile state'; it deserves a category of its own. *'Zimbabwe is ruled by the law'* is one of Robert Mugabe's favourite phrases countering critics. And it is; if the media is too critical and if bombing and arresting journalists does not work, then you just change the law.

Following the reasoning of the authors of the abovementioned report, Zimbabwe is probably a 'crisis state' where legitimacy and (the lack of) responsiveness of the state has been challenged over and over again, by Civil Society and the Media. It made sense to support Zimbabwe's mainstream media as it contributed to the building of a countervailing power in the struggle for the democratisation of Zimbabwe, specifically in the 1990s. There was a time when Zimbabwe held the promise for the future. Not only was it exporting food to the rest of the region; it was also successful in institutionalising democracy; indeed, there was a time when Zimbabwe was ruled by laws that had a broad consensus within society…

Soon after 2000 the continuous attacks on the private media started and journalism in Zimbabwe was on the defensive, engaged in dogfights with the state Media; uncovering official lies; trying to fence off the vicious misinformation campaigns and black-ops. And it never recovered from this. If there are lessons to be learned with regard to media development in Zimbabwe with the aim of strengthening democratic processes (which is not the same as following the 'liberal agenda') they probably lie in the field of taking a critical look at the kind of support that was rendered.

First of all most of the support went to the private print media. And although Zimbabwe held one of the highest literacy rates in Africa, the private print media never had the capacity to become mass media because of the limited distribution

of newspapers and a reduced purchasing power of people in the marginalised neighbourhoods and outside the mayor cities. It could never comply with the right to information of the population and was not able to compete with the State (Broadcast) Media. This way the private print media had a reduced audience and was contained to the towns and upper echelons of civil society.

Secondly Media development was too narrowly defined. It did not sufficiently address or support other media outlets such as Community Communications projects (which were certainly existing in various forms in the country). Initiatives are being developed to get licenses for Community Radios, but it is an uphill struggle to get these licenses.
Other Radio initiatives such as The Voice of the People and Short Wave Africa suffer from serious financial constraints and Chinese-backed radio interference on the frequencies they are broadcasting on. But as well as 'The Zimbabwean' paper and several on-line publications these 'offshore' media illustrate the enormous potential of the Zimbabwean Diaspora: large part of the Zimbabwean *public arena* is based outside the country.
MISA's **[xxxv]** campaign to transform State Media into Public Media is a strategic campaign on the longer term. Given the political landscape in Zimbabwe there is little chance the Mugabe government will accept such a transformation.

Zimbabwean civic domains and public arenas
ZANU-PF's strategies in recent years are clearly geared towards taking control of all facets of society to ensure its political hegemony. Effectively, the separation of powers among the Executive, the Parliament and the Judiciary has been abolished except in formal appearance. The party has also extended its control over the civil domain including the non-state media, trade unions, human rights and development organisations, the business sector and the agricultural sector. ZANU-PF also controls the traditional chiefs: 'They bought the chiefs, where that did not work they brought in the War Veterans (who were bought a few years ago with high pensions) and generally speaking they had over 25 years to establish a completely closed system of patronage, thus establishing a powerful military-party-state complex' **[xxxvi]**. Continued support from the state (including all-important food support provided by international donors) to individual chiefs is dependent on the political loyalty of the chiefs including the loyalty of all persons who fall under the control of chiefs. The notorious youth brigades, enrolment into which is now compulsory for all school leavers and a condition of admission to

tertiary education, are deployed in these villages (but also in townships). Their role is to observe and ensure that all villages and residents attend ZANU-PF meetings, obtain ZANU-PF cards, do not listen to or read any independent or 'anti-government' media, and to visit violence on those individuals who do not comply. These 'examples' also serve the purpose of warning others about their fate if they deviate from the party line **[xxxvii]**.
Operating in such an environment is extremely difficult, heavily complicated as it is by its setting in the international arena, in which the Zimbabwean ruling party and its president Robert Mugabe managed to manipulate especially African public opinion against Western Governments (happily supported by the stupidities and undiplomatic behaviour of especially the British former colonisers).

Meanwhile African governments have their own reasons to back Mugabe. Recently Moeletsi Mbeki (South African entrepreneur and brother of President Thabo Mbeki) published an article about them: 'short-sighted leadership, *coupled with fear of emerging more democratic political forces in Zimbabwe*' (italics by the authors of this paper). Moeletsi Mbeki sees it in the light of political emancipation ('African Renaissance' in his view) in Zimbabwe: citizens 'demanded a greater say in how their country was run', they are interested in the 'accountability of governance'. Here we meet the cry for *responsiveness* we described earlier in this paper. But unfortunately it is exactly because the majority of the actual ruling nationalist parties *fears* the new wave of democracy, of which the opposition in Zimbabwe (MDC, formed by the newly emancipated business, mass media, organised labour and civil society in general) is the very forebode for the whole of Southern Africa and is as such a new type of party. And that is the reason they are such fierce backers of the old guard, that beat the colonialists out of Africa, but thrives in the (neo-) colonial structures they inherited **[xxxviii]**.

Inside Zimbabwe there is a paradox: the further the political-economical situation worsens, the more 'impotent and demobilized the people directly effected become' **[xxxix]**. Eldred Maunungurure (University of Zimbabwe) argues that the 'fear thesis' is not sufficient to explain this; he concludes that 'reckless elites', headed by President Robert Mugabe himself, are prepared to take any risk to oppress any form of opposition. Apart from the fact that over one third of the population (over three million mostly educated professionals) have now decided not to risk their lives and their families and have left the country for greener

pastures, risk-averseness is according to Masunungurure now the predominant characteristic of the Zimbabwean masses, having been produced by three historical layers of authoritarianism: traditional political, settler colonial and commandist liberation war discourses and practices **[xl]**.

All this does not make Zimbabwe into a *'failed state'*. It has indeed failed in delivering the most needed public goods to its constituency, but *'it is far from failing with regard to the delivery of coercion'*. He further argues that given this political culture it would be best to resort to decentralized, passive resistance, not confronting, but eroding the state. In this sense 'stay-aways' (e.g. from work), rent boycotts, etc. have been already more successful than street protests **[xli]**.

Needed now are alternative strategies and donors who are willing to invest in them: from 'guerilla media' up to 'local uprisings' in order to erode the legitimacy of the actual state. The point is not to replace the state by civil society, but to make the state and its rulers accountable to their citizens. That will take a lot of time and effort; it will by no means be a 'walk over', given the enormous coercive apparatus of the same state.

Conclusions

Can public 'arenas' be restored *inside* Zimbabwe? Current surviving (micro-)initiatives at community levels and with regard to the media offer no immediate prospects for rapid scaling-up, given the level of repression. But at least they have established precedents. The 'public arena' in Zimbabwe is far from being a reality, but is not an impossibility. *Outside* Zimbabwe in any case, in the diaspora in surrounding countries, USA and UK, as well on the Internet, the civil domain is lively, though not kicking enough.

Up until recently, elections appeared to be a way of claiming what little public space there is; but this is far from providing robust ways forward. Supporting organizations of the diasporas in UK, South Africa and elsewhere may have to suffice for the time being. Newspapers, websites and e-publishing flourish outside the country and are imported, becoming part of the public space; radio from London and SMS messages contribute further to public debate.

The public *arena*, though, has to be fought in Zimbabwe itself: to this end supporting links between the *outside* public space and the *inside* public arena deserve attention. Of course many funders (especially in the media, and funders of organizations like Crisis in Zimbabwe) are already doing these things: we hope to provide them with some more (theoretical) notions that can bring about new ideas and initiatives if worked out well with different (inside and outside) actors.

To sum up:
Zimbabwe illustrates the limitations of the conventional civil society story. NGOs are far newer and far less rooted and effective politically than are many institutions of vernacular associational life, and some large, established churches.

Being anchored in global flows and arrangements with powerful actors in (Southern) Africa, and therefore operating with no public accountability, the decisive institutions of power in Zimbabwe are beyond the reach of most citizens and their organisations. Furthermore, given the level of oppression by the regime and the level of control by the state of the vernacular and even some churches, a simple solution like 'whom to support in order to get more leverage' is hard to find: it will be a painstaking process, where sideways and internal discrepancies (the Simba Makoni factor?) need to be explored and exploited.

Investment in conventionally defined civil society, NGOs as independent agents of 'countervailing power' is in many cases still provided under terms (scale, duration, level, apolitical intent and disconnection to actual political processes) that make it incommensurate with the challenges. Initiatives like 'Zimbabwe Watch' in the Netherlands (where a group of donors tries to exchange views and align actions) may have contributed to public knowledge; these kinds of efforts should be brought to a world level, with more active following of the process, and more active adaptation of policies and investments: the 'free for all' mentality where new groups consisting of old players always seem to find new donors has done more harm than good.

In the end the heart of the matter is a responsive state: A functioning set of formal political institutions (constitution, openly and freely chosen political representations at all levels, an independent judiciary, independent powers of public inquiry etc.) certainly merits pursuit. Public space for associational life is also without question a good thing. But a responsive state, built around public services and the active pressure of their constituents (users and producers) to

make them work well, seems to us to be an even more pressing and probably more feasible objective in the middle run. Therefore a chief priority for foreign support should be geared more and more towards those types of organisations which are actively enlarging public space and fighting in the public arena, as well as towards the means (e.g. media, communication) that de facto enlarge and protect the public domain.

We believe that the insight our approach allows into the interplay of various powers suggests pointers for future international politics in cases of self-destructive regimes. As this article was being prepared, developments in Zimbabwe took a dramatic course, possibly signalling the endgame for Mugabe and his cronies. The conceptual approach presented in this paper appears to be validated in that a solution to the crisis could not come from inside the country alone; rather, it had to be sought in the wider international arena, especially among Zimbabwe's neighbouring African states. Now that mining is becoming a factor again improvements in corporate responsibility also regarding Zimbabwe will require confronting corporations in their global settings, where politics and governance are still weak and unresponsive to publics at large.

To go on supporting civil society (e.g. in providing services) as if nothing has happened, while the state is seriously weakened is a highly doubtful strategy. Aid in the future should be focused on restoring a responsive state, restoring the rule of law and other mechanisms that will restore and strengthen citizen-state reciprocity.

Support to civil society should aim to restore a balance in the public arena, to bring back a much needed public debate about the future of the country. Experience elsewhere suggests that vultures are ready to swoop at moments of regime change to advance their private interests in non-transparent ways. Open, public discussion is the main defense against new kinds of internationalised domination.

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Published in Justino Pinto de Andrade and Nuno Vidal: Civil Society, Democracy and Human Rights in Angola (Luanda & Lisbon: Angolan Catholic University and University of Coimbra, 2008) and on Do not beat a drum with an axe, master's thesis (2004) by Bob van der Winden.

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Post-Apartheid South Africa And The Crisis Of Expectation – DPRN

Four

Nelson Mandela
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The collapse of the apartheid state and the ushering in of democratic rule in 1994 represented a new beginning for the new South Africa and the Southern African region. There were widespread expectations and hopes that the elaboration of democratic institutions would also inaugurate policies that would progressively alleviate poverty and inequality.
Fourteen years into the momentous events that saw Nelson Mandela become the president of South Africa, critical questions are being asked about the country's transition, especially about its performance in meeting the targets laid down in its own macro-economic programmes in terms of poverty and inequality, and the consequences of the fact that the expectations of South Africans have not been met.

At a general level the euphoria of 1994 has come up against deepening inequality, rising unemployment, the HIV pandemic and bourgeoning violent crime. The latter has led one writer to conclude that South Africa is *'a country at war with itself'* (Altbeker 2007).
South Africans have trusted democracy with the hard task to deliver jobs, wealth, healthcare, better housing and services to the people. But now that all of this is slow in arriving, there is growing disquiet and increased community protests that have sought to challenge the government on the pace of service delivery.
It is the level of what we have labelled a crisis of expectation that this paper

speaks to. It looks at what under lies this crisis of expectation and what are the potential consequences.

The crisis of expectation and the political context

Whilst it can be said that under Mbeki's leadership, efforts were made to develop and adopt some forward thinking policies and that his major contribution was his policy on modernizing the state, it can also be said that under his leadership several state institutions were set up to ensure good governance, the effectiveness of which is being contested at the moment. The relevance and the efficacy of these initiatives of the Mbeki government have taken precedence in the debate on the declining human development index in South Africa and in the run up to the '*changing of the guard of the ruling party*'.

Since the first democratic elections in 1994, the ANC has dominated the South African political scene and has shaped the way this country is today. The first term of ANC government was largely characterized by legislative developments with the purpose of creating a non-racial, non-sexist and democratic country. The government provided democratic policies and practices in order to ensure a checks-and-balances system of powers. This basically meant the independence of the judiciary, the promotion and protection of media freedom and the accountability of political institutions.

At the same time, during this decade of democracy, the ANC political leadership earned international recognition, and the reputation of being a good reconciler, mediator and peace-maker in relation to the political turmoil afflicting some African governments (DRC, Burundi and Zimbabwe). South Africa has taken the lead of African pan-unionism.The significance of its political leadership in the continent has been underlined by granting South Africa the chairpersonship of the African Union Commission on the occasion of the inauguration of the first session of the Pan-African Parliament, on 18 March 2004.

However, while the institutions of democracy have been elaborated and South Africa's role in the continent enhanced, the challenge of economic upliftment of the poorest South Africans remains fundamental to the success of the transition.

This side of the mandate with which voters have trusted the ANC for three consecutive terms cannot be disputed. Since 1994, the ANC government has passed a significant amount of social legislation that claims to help address the inequities of the past. Starting from 1992-1993, spending on social services has grown from 44.4% of general government expenditure to 56.7% in 2002-2003.

The government has facilitated the construction of 1.6 million new houses, supplied water to nine million households and sanitation to 6.4 million, and created two million net new jobs. Government also embarked on policies and programmes geared toward ensuring economic development.

The Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) and the Growth Employment and Redistribution Strategy (GEAR) sought to address the issue of economic development and sustainable growth. The efficacy of these programmes remains debatable. While on one hand the recent sound performance of South Africa's macro-economy is attributed to the implementation of the fundamentals underlying GEAR, on the other hand GEAR has had negative consequences for the poor in South Africa.

This combination of social policies in some areas and of a conservative macroeconomic programme in others led to a sort of de-racialisation of the apex of the class structure but left the largest part of the population exactly where it was: marginalised, poor and overwhelmingly black.

Miceli (2007) is of the opinion that the fundamental challenge facing South Africa is the need to find sustainable means to overcome the apartheid legacy of racial division, poverty, and inequality; to reverse decades of distortionary political, social, and economic policies that disfavoured, rather than promoted, development. Seekings in 2000 argued in the same vein when he said that the end of apartheid may not have seen extensive racial desegregation, but it has seen the emergence of a clear class division in South African populace including the African populations. More importantly, the authors argue that if people have sufficient stake in their country, they will not destroy it and their fellow citizens.

The crisis of expectation and crime

Crime and violence have dominated South Africa's transformation over the past two decades. High crime rates cause widespread feelings of insecurity and fear which undermine popular confidence in the democratisation process. Considering both trends and public perceptions, this paper explores changing crime levels over the past decade, elaborating on the problems associated with crime statistics in South Africa, and the salience of the transition for current crime levels. Data is drawn from official police statistics and from victimisation and other surveys. Crime has been increasing gradually in South Africa since 1980. It is, however, since 1990 –

and not more recently, as popular belief has it – that levels have risen sharply. An examination of the statistics shows that despite general increases, not all crimes have been committed with equal frequency and not all areas of the country are similarly affected. These trends are a product of the political transition and are associated with the effects of apartheid and political violence, the breakdown in the criminal justice system and more recently, the growth in organised crime. High crime levels are taking their toll on South Africans. Surveys show that crime rather than socio-economic issues now dominates people's concerns, and that fear of crime is increasing. Currently, fewer people feel safe and believe the government has the situation under control than in previous years. Faced with widespread unemployment on the one hand, and the prospects of development on the other, the levels of property crimes will probably continue to increase. While violent crime levels should decline over the medium term, improved relations with the police and a culture of reporting crimes like rape and assault may result in more crime being recorded.

The crisis of expectation and the declining human development trajectory
There is no doubt that the policies and RDP agenda of Government over the past 14 years have attempted to address the legacy of apartheid, but its implementation and the resultant outcomes were not 'in sinc' with these intentions. The declining Human development index is indicative of this reality.

According to Ul Haq, the objective of development is 'to create an enabling environment for people to enjoy long, healthy and creative lives'**.[i]** In this regard, South Africa's stated commitment in its constitution to the attainment of 'a better life for all', not just a better life for small pockets of this once-divided nation, should drive whatever we do to promote sustainable development. Mbeki in responding to the Human Development Report 2006 agreed that
… development and security complement mutually reinforce each other. It is clear that one simply cannot be achieved without the other, and neither is sustainable without respect for human rights, which empowers individuals and communities with the freedom to make better choices.
Yet, the statistics reflect otherwise.

In June 2006, the Presidency released its *A nation in the making: A discussion document on macro-social trends in South Africa*. The study found that between 1995 and 2000, the rural share of income poverty declined by approximately 5%, while it increased by 5% in the urban areas. In 1995, 28% of households lived

below the estimated poverty datum line of R322 per month, while the figure for 2000 was just under 33%.
In terms of inequality, data shows that in 2000, the poorest 20% of households accounted for 2,8%. In contrast, the wealthiest 20% of households accounted for 64,5% of all expenditure. The income and expenditure Gini coefficients point to a rising inequality amongst Africans.
In terms of unemployment, the 2001 Labour Force Survey shows that that the distribution of those aged 15-65 by labour market status is as follows: 35,9% of Africans, 21,8% of Coloureds; 18,4% of Indians, and 6% of whites were unemployed. In September 2005, the figures were as follows: the unemployment rate amongst Blacks was 31,5%, 22,4% amongst Coloureds, and 5,1% amongst whites.

A further racial imbalance is that 50% of Africans live in households of four or more people, compared with 30% of whites. Yet, in terms of number of rooms available to households, 73% of Africans have four rooms or less to live in, including kitchens and toilets, while 86% of white households have four or more rooms in the household.
In terms of electricity, 40% of Africans use it as the energy source for cooking, while for whites this percentage is 96,6%. Of all the top management positions in the country, white males constitute 77,3%, compared to 5% Black males, 2% Coloured males, and 3.3% Indian males. For females, the percentages are 10,2% white females, 1,2% Blacks, 0,7% Coloureds, and 0,5% Indians.
Research shows that 51% of Black matriculates are still looking for employment, compared to 14% of Whites; 30% of Coloureds, and 28% of Indians. The less skilled are also caught in a poverty trap. As the Macro-social Report puts it: '*The lack of knowledge is linked to social status*'. In terms of gender, some 52,2% of the country's population is female, but the male gender dominates political, economic and social life in the country.

Moving now to causes of death and social demographics, research shows that young Blacks and Coloureds are more likely to die of unnatural causes of death – mainly violence and car accidents – than other sections of the population. The macro-social report states that AIDS-related causes of death increased from about 15% of all deaths in 1997 to about 25% in 2001. It also states that '*central in determining social behaviour is the system of ownership and distribution of resources, Coloured – in the South African setting – by race'.*

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The crisis of expectation and poverty

Poverty is inseparable from politics in South Africa, whether looking at origins and causes, its current form, or solutions. Since the turn of the century, a growing literature has sprung up attempting to answer the burning question of whether the South African income distribution has improved in terms of a reduction in poverty and inequality since political transition. In per capita terms South Africa is an upper-middle-income country, but notwithstanding this relative wealth, the experience of most South African households is one of absolute poverty or of continuing vulnerability to being poor. In addition, the distribution of income and wealth in South Africa is among the most unequal in the world, and many households still have unsatisfactory access to education, health care, energy and clean water. This triggered the famous quote in the 1998 parliamentary debate on reconciliation and nation-building, when then deputy president Thabo Mbeki (Mbeki 1998) famously argued that

Material conditions … have divided our country into two nations, the one black, and the other white. … [the latter] is relatively prosperous and has ready access to a developed economic, physical, educational, communication and other infrastructure … The second, and larger, nation of South Africa is black and poor, with the worst affected being women in the rural areas, the black rural population in general and the disabled.

This nation lives under conditions of a grossly underdeveloped economic, physical, educational, communication and other infrastructure. It has virtually no possibility to exercise what in reality amounts to a theoretical right to equal opportunity.

Measuring poverty is not a straightforward matter, as it depends on a critical assumption: what level of income constitutes the poverty line? Despite being considered an upper-middle income country, South Africa is a country of stark contrasts. The extreme inequality evident in South Africa means that one sees

destitution, hunger and overcrowding side-by-side with affluence.

Poverty in South Africa has racial, gender and spatial dimensions, a direct result of the policies of the successive colonial, segregationist and apartheid regimes. Poverty is distributed unequally among the nine provinces. Provincial poverty rates are highest for the Eastern Cape (71%), Free State (63%), North-West (62%), Northern Province (59%) and Mpumalanga (57%), and lowest for Gauteng (17%) and the Western Cape (28%). Three children in five live in poor households, and many children are exposed to public and domestic violence, malnutrition, and inconsistent parenting and schooling. Redistribution of income in South Africa in order to address disparities is not a story of only the post-apartheid era. From the late 1970s, expenditure on Africans began to rise, first in response to increasing political instability from 1976, which led to rising education spending. Between 1990 and 1993, expenditure on Africans accelerated sharply as the apartheid government desperately tried to buy black support during the constitutional negotiations for the forthcoming universal franchise election (Gelb 2003: 11). In the post-apartheid era robust measures ranging from slowing down population growth in the black community to Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) have been initiated to address issues of poverty and inequality.

By the beginning of the new century the South African government had increased the social grants, which form the safety net for the poor, to 22 Billion Rand (Berg et al. 2006: 23). May (1998) points out that by early 1996 it had become clear that without new macroeconomic initiatives by the government, economic growth rates could not be attained that were both sustainable and high enough for effective poverty alleviation, income redistribution, employment creation and financing of essential social services. The government then formulated the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy. GEAR reiterated government's commitment to the existing economic policy framework, identified many of the structural weaknesses inhibiting economic growth and employment, and focused attention on market-based policies to address them. This helped to address employment creation, public works programmes, equity and discrimination, labour standards and job security, minimum wages and training for skilled labour. In order to address inequality in the health sector, the government also introduced universal access to primary health care in South Africa. In the Education sector the government gives leniency to Black South Africans' access to tertiary education, allowing them to be enrolled despite having

low academic grades.

Last but not least, the South African government needs to keep an eye on corruption which seems to be working against some of the initiatives like Black Economic Empowerment (BEE). Instead of tackling inequality, BEE has created a clique of very rich Black South Africans, thus causing more intra-racial inequalities.

The crisis of expectation and a de-racialised democracy
The radicalised and class-divided spaces created by the apartheid state did not automatically disappear after democratisation but have in fact become even further entrenched. The social structure of post-apartheid cities remains a neglected subject and in order to address some of the inequalities equitable allocation of housing should be made a priority. Government policies and the strategies of organised social actors with which these policies interact are fundamental, for they provide a framework through which change is enabled. It is the grinding together of different South Africans at grassroots levels, the white residents in the edges of the mountains in Cape Town, the black proletariat in the shacks in Khayelitsha and those eking a living at the edges, which will shape their common future (Dickinson 2002: 11). Some critics argue that this has become further entrenched by the very economic and developmental policies that were to prevent this from happening. Others still argue that these poverty-ravaged spaces have become fertile ground for crime and to some extent, pre-determine criminal behaviour amongst its residents. Government in its planning did not envisage the impact of the chain reaction that the instability in neighbouring states and the resultant migration of refugees would have on development in South Africa. The influx of refugees and migrants seeking a better life in South Africa resulted in heaping poverty on poverty, which has created a self-reinforcing cycle in which levels of crime within certain regions of the country have fostered a climate that favoured the current xenophobic behaviour of people within these areas.

The year 2009 is likely to see president Mbeki's successor being confronted with the same harsh human development realities which confronted his predecessors Mandela and Mbeki. South Africa during the last ten years has dropped 35 places to being 120th on the UN's global Human Development Index (HDI), mostly due to the AIDS pandemic.**[ii]** The main opposition however holds the government responsible for increasing '*the gulf between the rich and poor*' to levels far higher than during apartheid through failed economic policies **[iii].**

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Social policies and expenditure on people

Since 1994, there has been a qualitative shift in how government addresses the problems of poverty. In aid-dependent countries like Mozambique and Malawi, the governments enjoy little policy autonomy to set their countries' development agendas. Post-settlement South Africa found itself in the fortunate position that it enjoyed almost total control of its agenda, and the development path it would pursue.

Anybody who would like to understand post-apartheid South Africa's social policy landscape would be well-advised to consult a range of policy instruments and strategic documents which capture the country's approach to social and development policy. Government's goals are spelt out in the Constitution; the White Paper on the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP); Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR); State of the Nation Addresses of the President; the Annual Budget of the Minister of Finance; the Strategies of national departments; the Ten-Year Review; the Medium Term Expenditure Framework; the Medium Term Strategic Framework; Integrated Development Plans (IDPs); and the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative of South Africa (ASGISA)**[iv]**.

Whereas the apartheid state and government were committed to guarantee the security and the prosperity of the white population first and foremost, the post-apartheid government took its leave firstly from the 1996 Constitution, which calls for a '*progressive realization of rights*', therefore calling for the incremental redress of poverty and inequality. Specifically the Constitution places an onus of responsibility on the state. In the words of the Constitution, '*The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of this right*'. The Constitution is thus clear in that the state must act reasonably and decisively in the sphere of addressing

socio-economic inequalities, namely redressing inequalities, and unequal access to housing, electricity, water, health, and other sectors **[v]**.

From a policy perspective, government adopted the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) in 1994, a development vision cutting across all spheres of societal development. The RDP was accepted as the de facto policy framework of the new government, functioning as a 'blueprint' for social and political transformation in South Africa.**[vi]** The RDP was institutionalized in the form of the RDP Ministry and the RDP Fund. The erstwhile RDP office formed a focal point of donor support from 1994 to early 1996. The RDP sought to facilitate cross-cutting policy approaches and encouraged new approaches to public sector management and budgeting to meet government's overall reconstruction objectives.

Critiques of the RDP's institutional arrangements and operational mechanisms broadly centred on the increasing understanding within the state that the RDP was not a full strategy for governance and development and was open to wide interpretation.

Government subsequently developed what it said was a more comprehensive macro-economic policy, Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR); there was recognition that RDP priorities would only take place in the context of economic growth.**[vii]** Thus GEAR is predicated on the need for economic growth and provides a strategic framework within which decisions on monetary, fiscal and labour market policy have been taken since 1996. It involves, *inter alia*, liberalization of the economy, privatization of government assets and a reduction of state spending. GEAR is a key driver of the government's trade strategy and has been recognized by the private sector both locally and internationally as a sound economic framework.
But outside these constituencies, GEAR has been consistently criticized by among others, the labour movement and the South African Communist Party (SACP). The view held by these parties is that, even if GEAR does facilitate growth, it will do so in such a way that income redistribution will remain unaffected, resulting in a widening of the gap between rich and poor. These critics argue that poverty is on the increase and the country lacks a comprehensive framework on poverty alleviation.

One response from the state to articulate a comprehensive poverty alleviation

framework has been the introduction in 1998 of a three-year budget cycle, the Medium Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF).**[viii]**
The MTEF's priorities are as follows:
– Meeting basic needs – principally in education, health, water and sanitation, social services, welfare, land reform and housing;
– Accelerating infrastructure development – ensuring investment in infrastructure, upgrading of roads, undertaking of spatial development initiatives (Spatial Development Initiatives), and addressing urban renewal – principally via private-public partnerships;
– Economic growth, development and job creation – the stimulated building of the economy to achieve sustainable, accelerated growth with correspondent redistribution in opportunities and income;
– Human resource development – the education and training of citizens in pre-primary, formative, tertiary, technical institutions and lifelong education and training for adults, the unemployed and out-of-school youth;
– Safety and security – the transformation of the criminal justice, police and prisons administration and the improvement in national defence and disaster management;
– Transformation of government – the strengthening of administration and good governance and the implementation of a code of conduct (*Batho Pele – People First*) for service delivery by the public sector.

In terms of funding its national development programmes, South Africa raises the bulk of its resources itself. Donor funding constitutes less than 0,5% of the national consolidated revenue of the country. From around 1998, the social security safety net expanded with the introduction of the Child Support Grant for children between the ages 0 and 7.**[ix]** In 2003, this increased to cover children 7 to 8 years old. From 2005/06, all children up to the age of 14 would qualify for grants.**[x]**

The extension of the post-apartheid social security net is one of the greatest successes of post-apartheid South Africa.**[xi]** The number of beneficiaries increased from 2,5 million in 1997 to 5,6 million in 2003. By 2004, the social grants system delivered about 7,4 million grants; spending on social grants increased to over R40 billion in 2004.**[xii]** By 2005, there was a further increase in the numbers, with an estimated 9,2 million beneficiaries of the system.**[xiii]**
In 2003, Cabinet approved the Operational Plan for Comprehensive HIV and AIDS Care, Management and Treatment for South Africa.**[xiv]** This combined a progressive anti-retroviral roll-out.

More recently, government adopted the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGI-SA), a broad framework of steps that need to be taken to raise growth to much higher levels.**[xv]** ASGISA grew out of the 2003 Growth and Development Summit and the Micro-economic Reform Strategy (MERS).
The main focus of ASGI-SA is to deal with a set of binding constraints that inhibit faster growth. These constraints are currency volatility and macro-economic stability; cost and efficiency of the national logistics system; skills shortages; high levels of inequality; barriers to compete in the sector; the regulatory environment for small and medium sized enterprises; and deficiencies in the capacities of government and parastatals.**[xvi]** A key proposal is to increase infrastructure spending to over R370 billion over the medium term expenditure period, fast track skills development, reducing the regulatory burden on small enterprises and improving capacity at the local and international level.**[xvii]**

As a development strategy, ASGI-SA does have specific sections on poverty eradication, equity, and distributional issues. First, there is a key Poverty Reduction dimension; this includes budget reform and reprioritisation, increasing access to income and employment opportunities for the poor, including the Extended Public Works Programme, ensuring food security and providing nutrition, meeting the demand of housing, providing comprehensive free primary health care, building and upgrading clinics, and revitalising hospitals and expanding the immunisation programme.**[xviii]**
Expenditure on HIV and AIDS programmes has increased incrementally over the cause of the past decade. Expenditure across national departments has increased from about R30 million in 1994 to R342 million in 2001/02. Expenditure is set to

increase to R3,6 billion in 2006/07, and focuses on prevention, care and treatment.**[xix]**

In the areas of TB, malaria control, medicine supply, and human resources are priorities. At a broader level, broadening access to, and improving the quality of education, land reform, water and sanitation, universal access to electricity and improving transport are all chief priorities.**[xx]**
Over the past twelve years, education and health gradually emerged as the two sectors getting most of the budget allocation. This is very important if South Africa is to become a developmental state. Such a state typically prioritises social sectors such as health and education.

It is important to point out here that since the 1997/98 budget, government started to provide for special poverty relief programmes. In 1998/99 these allocations were broadened to include a focus on temporary poverty relief, and extended in 1999/00 to include commitment at the Presidential Job Summit. Programmes funded through this source complemented other key poverty alleviation interventions such as social security grants, and the delivery of basic services to communities like education, health, welfare, housing, water and sanitation, electricity, waste removal and municipal roads.
The 2006 national budget was a balance between addressing the needs and wants of various economic actors. That year's budget represented an increase in social grants and spending. 60% of the budget went towards social spending.**[xxi]** In 2008/09, social spending declined to 49,5%, from 51,7% in the previous year's budget.**[xxii]** This was mainly because of massive expenditure in energy and infrastructural development.

Institutional arrangements to South Africa's HDI
In South Africa, several institutional actors play roles in crafting development and social policy in the country. These range from Cabinet, National Ministers and their various Departments, Provincial Premiers, Members of the Executive Councils in provinces, Mayors and local councils, Working Groups, and others.**[xxiii]** But the Department of Social Development is the pivotal player in the area of social policy, social protection, social security and social affairs. The aim of the Department of Social Development is to ensure the provision of comprehensive social protection services against vulnerability and poverty within the constitutional and legislative framework, and create an enabling environment for sustainable development.**[xxiv]** The Department further aims to deliver

integrated, sustainable and quality services in partnership with all those committed to creating a caring society.**[xxv]** The Department is responsible for policy and oversight in the critical areas of social assistance and social welfare assistance. Social assistance refers to means-tested cash benefits to vulnerable groups in South Africa, whereas social welfare services refer to probation and adoption services, child and family counselling and support services, and secure centres.**[xxvi]**

The Department runs approximately nine (9) programmes.
Programme 1 is Administration, and its goal is to provide for policy formulation by the ministry and top management, and for overall management and support services.
Programme 2 is Social Security Policy and Planning. The purpose of this programme is to develop, coordinate and facilitate the implementation of policies and strategies, and facilitate financial planning for social security in line with the national macro-economic goals and development objectives.
Programme 3 is Grant systems and service delivery assurance. This programme designs operational systems to ensure that services are provided to social assistance and disaster relief beneficiaries; it also monitors and evaluates service delivery and compliance to minimize fraud and assess the impact of policies.
Programme 4 is that of Social Assistance. This programme makes funds available to provinces to administer and pay social assistance in terms of the Social Assistance Act (1992), and fund and manage the establishment and development of the South African Social Security Agency.
Programme 5 is Welfare Services Transformation, a programme with the purpose of facilitating the transformation of development-oriented social welfare services to vulnerable individuals, households and communities.
Programme 6 is Children, Families and Youth Development. This programme seeks to ensure the protection and empowerment of vulnerable children, youth and families.
Programme 7 is Development Implementation Support. Its purpose is to develop, implement and monitor strategies to promote the delivery of integrated and well-co-ordinated and well-structured poverty alleviation and community development services to vulnerable groups, households and individuals.
Programme 8 is HIV and AIDS, with the express purpose of developing policies, strategies and programmes aimed at mitigating the social impact of HIV and AIDS. It also seeks to develop and implement strategies for children and families

infected and affected by HIV/AIDS, and facilitate the rollout of home community-based care and support programmes.

So, judging from the above, the Department of Social Development is a key, if not the most pivotal player in the area of social development in South Africa. But we have to appreciate that South Africa takes the question of cooperative and integrated governance seriously; thus Social Development was also part of a Cluster System in South Africa. The Social Cluster, which includes the Departments of Social Develop¬ment, Education, Labour, Health, Housing, Arts and Culture, and Sports and Recreation, also plays a crucial role in terms of social policy in the country.

Thus, the question of overseeing the impact of policy-making on poverty, ensuring that the different sectors from transport to health serve the needs of the majority of citizens, involves a number of actors. So, while the Ministry of Social Development is the lead agent in dealing with social affairs, policy and governance in South Africa has become a shared responsibility.
Turning now to the important question of partnerships that exist between public–private sector or civil society organizations, it is important to point out that it has a key responsibility in working with a key civil society partner, and overseeing it, the National Development Agency (NDA). The Department is also busy setting up South African Social Security Agency, a schedule 3 Agency or public entity that will be responsible for administering social assistance grants, and relating to provinces.

Why is South Africa's HDI so poor?
It is very easy and very tempting to do what many analysts do and blame South Africa's poor human development record just on policies, and to lay the blame especially on 'policies as pursued by the Mbeki administration'. It has indeed become fashionable to go for such single factor explanations. We are however going to break with what is clearly becoming a trend out there; instead of this quixotic rationale we are instead going to opt for a multi-causal set of explanations and variables that could help to shed light on South Africa's human development conundrum. This is not to shrug off the centrality of policies adopted by government, and their impact on the human development in the country. It is

conceivable that the growth trajectory embedded in South Africa's policy positions played a key role. It has been said that South Africa has pursued something of a neo-classical, modernisationist economic model during the course of the past decade. Timothy Murithi reminds us that '*neo-liberal economics*' represent a '*type of laissez faire capitalism*' which '*undermines social welfare programmes and creates a fictional perception of a free-market system*' **[xxvii]**. One of Africa's most respected development thinkers, Adebayo Adedeji said about South Africa's GEAR strategy:

*Just as the rest of black Africa has failed to deconstruct its inherited colonial political economy, so post-apartheid South Africa, in deference to a compromise based on sufficient consensus, has not chosen the path of fundamental socio-economic transformation.***[xxviii]**

But the problem was not just policy per se, the problem was also how policy was arrived at, or the policy style, to use a different phrase. In spite of its stated commitment to bring about a Developmental State, government has consistently struggled to mobilise social partners behind an all-encompassing interest – a Social Compact. Government dominated policy-making and social partners, and even those close to the ruling ANC like COSATU, the SACP, and SANCO felt excluded and marginalised from policy processes. Many of them held the view that the Presidency, especially the Policy and Advisory Services (PCAS) unit, dominated policy-making and coordination efforts. Government has to understand that it cannot tackle the country's vast socio-economic challenges on its own. It needs the efforts of social partners and should therefore democratise the policy, development and governance processes.

The third explanation we have to advance here is that of the enduring legacies of apartheid. It is easily forgotten that the apartheid state left a trail of human misery in its wake, and it will take decades, maybe even centuries to overcome these legacies.

Conclusion: Way forward

South Africa is going through some important changes at a political level. The recall of President Thabo Mbeki, talk of a breakaway party and the increased influence of COSATU and SACP within the ANC are some indicators of these changes. These changes have also brought in their wake an increased sense that there has to be a renewed debate about the way in which the state is challenging and confronting poverty and inequality.

One of the central lessons to be learnt from the last decade is that changes cannot be a top-down process while civil society has to develop strategies to engage with the state. Civil society actors should appreciate their pivotal role in engaging providers of services at local, provincial and national levels, and their place in creating opportunities and space for communities to influence policy and development processes. So, the participatory opportunities for communities to get more directly involved in policy, planning and governance should be broadened.
A partnership and participatory approach presupposes that the skills levels of local government and municipal levels would become more strategic. Skills at this level have been poorly developed and many of them have reached a state of crisis over the course of the last decade.

The capacity of local and provincial government to integrate HDI issues such as gender, HIV/AIDS, the rural question, and other key aspects, into policy needs to be enhanced.
It is absolutely critical that that the service delivery capacity of the state in general, and of local and provincial government in particular be bolstered. At a minimum, the interface between national, provincial and local government spheres must become tighter and better coordinated so as to have maximum impact on the delivery of services.
While the quest to create a more equal society in South Africa has come up against numerous problems and is now faced with a crisis of expectation, there exists an opportunity to put right past mistakes and accelerate the delivery of basic services.

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Notes

i. Discourse is defined as 'a set of meanings embodied in metaphors, representations, images, narratives and statements that advance a particular version of '*the truth*' about objects, persons, events and the relation between them' (Long 2002: 52). Institutions and actors may have 'their own' discourse and way of thinking about development, which may conflict with the discourse owned by others.

ii. See United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 2007-08, UNDP, New York, 2008.

iii. AFROLNews, 'Human Development Report Shocks South Africa', 7 April 2008.

iv. African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), Country Self-Assessment:

Government's Submission, Third Draft, March 2006.

v. Ibid.

vi. For an assessment of the Reconstruction and Development Programme, see Tobie Schmitz and Claude Kabemba, Enhancing policy implementation: Lessons from the Reconstruction and Development Programme, Research report no 89, Centre for Policy Studies, Johannesburg, September 2001.

vii. See Zondie Masiza and Xolela Mangcu, Understanding policy implementation: An exploration of research areas surrounding growth, employment and redistribution (GEAR) strategy, Centre for Policy Studies, Research Report no. 78, Johannesburg May 2001.

viii. This information is borrowed from government's 10-year review process in which this author is a participant.

ix. Republic of South Africa, National Treasury, Intergovernmental Fiscal Review 2003, April 2003, p. 95.

x. Ibid.

xi. Ibid.

xii. Republic of South Africa, National Treasury, Budget Review 2004, 18 February 2004, p. 121.

xiii. Republic Of South Africa, National Treasury, Estimates of National Expenditure 2005, February 2005, p. 403.

xiv. Republic of South Africa, National Treasury, Budget Review 2004, op. cit, p. 122.

xv. See Government's perspective on issues raised in the APRM Country Self-Assessment Questionnaire, January 2006.

xvi. Ibid.

xvii. Ibid.

xviii. Ibid.

xix. Ibid.

xx. Ibid.

xxi. See Global Insight Perspective, 18 February 2006.

xxii. See Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), The 2008/09 National Budget, Weather the Storm, Invest for Growth, IDC, Sandton, 21 February 2008.

xxiii. African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), Country Self-Assessment: Government's Submission, Third Draft, March 2006.

xxiv. Republic Of South Africa, National Treasury, Estimates of National Expenditure 2005, op. cit., p. 403.

xxv. Ibid.

xxvi. Ibid.
xxvii. Timothy Murithi, The African Union, Pan-Africanism, peace-building and development, Ashgate Publishing, 2005, p. 145.
xxviii. Adebayo Adedeji, 'South Africa and Africa's political economy: Looking inside from the outside', in Adekeye Adebajo, Adebayo Adedeji and Chris Landsberg (eds.), South Africa in Africa: The post-apartheid era, University of Kwazulu-Natal Press, 2006, p. 55.

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Het ontrafelen van criminele carrières van hoog-risico jongeren

Photo: explorepahistory.com

“Stel je voor dat je wordt geboren in een sociaal achtergesteld gezin. Het opleidingsniveau van je ouders is laag en hun inkomen evenzeer. Daarbij zijn alcoholmisbruik, drugsgebruik en werkeloosheid bekende problemen in jouw familie. Door deze omstandigheden zijn je ouders niet instaat om voldoende te investeren in jouw toekomst. Al sinds de basisschool heb je het gevoel dat je achterloopt. Huiswerk kost veel moeite en je cijfers zijn laag. Op de middelbare school verandert er niet veel. Je cijfers blijven laag en je wordt vaak de les uitgestuurd.

Buiten school gaat het ook niet echt goed. Naar mate je pubertijd vordert maak je steeds meer ruzie met je ouders en hang je voornamelijk rond op straat. Op gegeven moment ga je te ver en word je gearresteerd door de politie. Geen probleem denk je in eerste instantie. Veel van je vrienden zijn ook een keer gearresteerd en je hebt niet het idee dat dit grote gevolgen zal hebben. In de maanden die volgen word je nog een paar keer gearresteerd en uiteindelijk besluit de kinderrechter dat je naar een besloten jeugdinstelling moet. Hier aangekomen tref je andere jongeren aan die vergelijkbare problemen hebben. Tijdens je verblijf in de jeugdinstelling worden je gedragsproblemen behandeld en krijg je laaggeschoold onderwijs. Rond je 17de levensjaar loopt je verblijf in de instelling teneinde en loop je de poort uit naar een volwassen leven.”

Introductie
De situatie die hierboven wordt geschetst is karakteristiek voor een kleine groep jongeren in Nederland die al vanaf jonge leeftijd grote problemen kennen op

verschillende domeinen. Het doel van dit artikel is om de bevindingen van het proefschrift *Disentangling Criminal Careers for Disadvantaged Youths* op een toegankelijke manier te beschrijven zonder afbreuk te doen aan de gecompliceerdheid van de conclusies. Het doel van het onderzoek was om een conceptueel en empirisch raamwerk te ontwikkelen om de effecten vast te stellen van een aantal verschillende facetten, voor jongeren met een "achtergestelde jeugd", op uitkomsten gedurende het volwassen leven. We onderzochten of de cognitieve en sociale vaardigheden, het opleidingsniveau en contact met justitie de volwassen sociaal-economische uitkomsten beïnvloedden. Tegelijkertijd erkenden we dat transities gedurende volwassenheid, zoals transities van en naar werk en intieme relaties, de daaropvolgende volwassen uitkomsten kunnen beïnvloeden. De focus van het proefschrift ligt op het verklaren van de uitkomst "criminaliteit" voor adolescenten en volwassenen, maar verschillende andere sociaal-economische uitkomsten worden ook onderzocht. In het bijzonder onderzoeken we ook arbeidsmarktuitkomsten, uitkeringen, drugsgebruik en intieme relaties.

In totaal worden er ongeveer 4.000 jongeren jaarlijks geïnstitutionaliseerd in een straf- of jeugdzorg instelling in Nederland (CBS, 2013). Op basis van hun vroege contacten met justitie en/of hun gedragsproblemen, kunnen deze jongeren worden beschouwd als behorende tot een kansarme subgroep van jongeren die een hoog risico hebben voor het plegen van criminaliteit, het vaak lastig hebben op de arbeidsmarkt en relatief vaak de ontvangers zijn van sociale uitkeringen (van der Geest, 2011; Mesters, van der Geest en Bijleveld, 2014; Verbruggen, 2014). Tijdens hun verblijf in de instelling worden ze behandeld voor hun gedragsproblemen en krijgen ze laaggeschoold onderwijs aangeboden. In hun late tienerjaren verlaten deze jongeren vertrekken meestal de instelling en en begint hun "volwassen" leven. Gezien hun moeilijke jeugd hebben ze vaak moeite met deze transitie naar volwassenheid (Osgood, Foster, Flanagan en Ruth, 2005). Ons doel is om aan te geven op wat voor soort kenmerken van deze jongeren interventies het beste kunnen aangrijpen om de volwassen sociaal-economische uitkomsten van deze jongeren te verbeteren.

De ontwikkeling van een raamwerk dat in staat is om de sociaal-economische uitkomsten voor volwassenen te verklaren in termen van vroeggemeten factoren en andere uitkomsten gedurende het volwassen leven is een uitdagende taak. In dit proefschrift proberen we deze puzzel stap voor stap te benaderen. Het raamwerk is gebaseerd op inzichten uit de criminologie, sociologie, economie en psychologie. De theorieën die uit deze disciplines naar voren komen vormen het

conceptuele raamwerk dat wordt vertaald naar een empirisch model in wiskundige formulering. Deze vertaling maakt het mogelijk om het conceptuele raamwerk te testen met behulp van observationele gegevens en econometrische methoden.

Economische methoden

Het is instructief om eerst uit te leggen waarom econometrische methoden nodig zijn om de oorzaken van criminaliteit te achterhalen. In de ideale situatie zouden we in de wetenschap altijd experimenten willen gebruiken om hypotheses en vragen te onderzoeken. Denk bijvoorbeeld aan exacte wetenschappen zoals natuurkunde of scheikunde waar proeven worden gedaan om de natuurwetten te achterhalen. Deze proeven leveren, mits goed en onder exact dezelfde omstandigheden uitgevoerd, altijd dezelfde resultaten op. Doordat ze op deze manier herhaalbaar of reproduceerbaar zijn nemen we de uitkomsten van deze proeven aan als waarheden.

In principe zijn experimenten ook mogelijk in de sociale wetenschappen. Om bijvoorbeeld de effecten vast te stellen van sociale vaardigheden zouden we de helft van de populatie intensieve sociale vaardigheden training kunnen geven en de andere helft niet. Hierna zouden we de uitkomsten in termen van criminaliteit en de arbeidsmarkt van de twee groepen met elkaar kunnen vergelijken. Als de twee populaties groot genoeg zijn kunnen we op deze manier een ideaal experiment benaderen en het causale effect van sociale vaardigheden op criminaliteit vast stellen. Dit soort experimenten halen weliswaar niet de standaard van de exacte wetenschappen maar komen dicht in de buurt.

Echter, in de praktijk zijn dit soort sociale experimenten praktisch niet haalbaar en dikwijls moreel verwerpelijk, want waarom zou de ene helft van de bevolking wel geholpen worden en de andere niet? Dit soort complicaties vormen de reden waarom veel onderzoek in de sociale wetenschappen afhankelijk is van observationele data. Er zijn uitzonderingen en we verwijzen naar Heckman en Kautz (2013) voor een overzicht van relevante sociale experimenten, veelal uit de jaren ’70 en uitgevoerd in de Verenigde Staten.

Observationele data wordt veelal verzameld enerzijds door officiële instanties, zoals justitie en het ministerie van sociale zaken (beiden onder andere voor criminologisch onderzoek), en anderzijds door middel van interviews met respondenten (zowel plegers van criminaliteit als slachtoffers). In dit soort data zien we dus alleen de uitkomsten en kennen we niet het proces, of mechanisme,

dat tot deze uitkomsten heeft geleid. Om dit soort data goed te analyseren en het proces erachter te achterhalen zijn econometrische en statistische methoden noodzakelijk. In het bijzonder, om effecten van verschillende factoren op criminaliteit vast te stellen moet gecontroleerd worden voor effecten van andere factoren.

Om een voorbeeld te geven, stel dat de verzamelde data aangeeft dat het plegen van criminaliteit en het hebben van werk negatief met elkaar gecorreleerd zijn. Dan zou een conclusie kunnen zijn dat werk leid tot minder criminaliteit. Maar het zou ook kunnen dat mensen die meer sociale vaardigheden hebben vaker werk hebben en minder vaak criminaliteit plegen. In dit laatste geval zijn het dus de sociale vaardigheden die de negatieve correlatie veroorzaken. Op deze manier is het mogelijk om allerlei factoren te bedenken die van invloed zijn op zowel het hebben van werk als het plegen van criminaliteit.

Methoden die het scheiden van verschillende verklaringen mogelijk maken zijn noodzakelijk om correcte conclusies te trekken uit observationele data. Deze methoden, veelal afkomstig uit de statistiek en de econometrie, zijn vaak moeilijker te begrijpen dan experimenten, maar ze zijn noodzakelijk als men relaties tussen verschillende variabelen wilt blootleggen. Om maatschappelijke problemen zoals criminaliteit aan te pakken is het noodzakelijk dat men de oorzaken van criminaliteit kent en niet alleen de factoren die correleren met criminaliteit.

Observationele data

In het proefschrift bestudeerden we observationele gegevens van een een groep “achtergestelde” jongeren met behulp van verschillende econometrische methoden. De gegevens hebben betrekking op een populatie van achtergestelde jongeren die geïnstitutionaliseerd waren in een behandelingsinstelling in Nederland in de jaren ‘90. We maken gebruik van twee verschillende populaties: een populatie van mannen (N = 270) en een populatie vrouwen (N = 270). De gegevens van deze jongeren zijn volledig geanonimiseerd en ook de behandelingsinstelling blijft anoniem. De populaties beslaan een segment van de Nederlandse samenleving dat oververtegenwoordigd is in de criminaliteitsstatistieken (Boendermaker, 1999). We verwijzen naar de jongeren als achtergesteld, terwijl we erkennen dat andere karakteriseringen als kwetsbare jongeren of hoog risico-jongeren evenzeer toepasselijk zijn.

We combineerden verschillende bronnen om een compleet beeld te krijgen van het leven van deze jongeren. Ten eerste maken we gebruik van strafbladen. Deze

vertellen ons wanneer welke delicten zijn gepleegd door de jongeren. Tevens bieden de strafbladen informatie betreffende de straf die was opgelegd door de rechter. De tweede bron van informatie betreft officiële arbeidsmarktgegevens die aangeven wanneer personen werk en of een uitkering hadden. Deze twee bronnen van officiële informatie worden aangevuld met behulp van interviewgegevens waar een grote hoeveelheid informatie betreffende verschillende levensdomeinen worden uitgevraagd.
De interviews met de respondenten uit de jaren '90-steekproef zijn uitgevoerd tussen 2010 en 2013. De respondenten waren gemiddeld rond de 35 jaar tijdens het interview. We vroegen veel van deze mensen. Hun hele leven werd uitgevraagd vanaf hun jeugd tot nu. Zonder de welwillendheid van de respondenten was dit onderzoek niet mogelijk geweest. Een belangrijk instrument dat we gebruikten om de respondenten te helpen hun leven te reconstrueren was de levensloopkalender. Deze kalender beschrijft het leven van de respondenten op verschillende domeinen en door middel van associaties worden perioden met elkaar verbonden.

Effecten cognitieve en sociale vaardigheden
In de eerste stap in het proefschrift ontwikkelden we een econometrisch model waarin vaardigheden die zijn opgedaan gedurende de jeugd verklarende factoren vormen voor criminaliteit gedurende het volwassen leven. De vaardigheden uit de jeugd omvatten cognitieve vaardigheden en een breed scala aan sociale vaardigheden, die gemeten worden aan de hand van persoonlijkheidskenmerken. Hoewel de rol van cognitieve vaardigheden van oudsher van groot belang is in de sociale wetenschappen, heeft de rol van de sociale vaardigheden minder aandacht gekregen in het verklaren van crimineel gedrag (Hill, Roberts, Grogger, Guryan en Sixkiller, 2011). Het model dat we ontwikkelen onderschrijft de intuïtief aansprekende stellingen dat meerdere vaardigheden belangrijk zijn voor het verklaren van criminaliteit en dat verschillende vaardigheden belangrijk kunnen zijn in de verschillende stadia in het leven (Cunha en Heckman, 2007).
Deze eerste stap leerde ons dat de vaardigheden die waren opgedaan tijdens de kindertijd en adolescentie blijvende effecten hadden op criminaliteit gedurende het volwassen leven. Dit houdt in dat individuele verschillen in crimineel gedrag gedurende de volwassenheid tot op zekere hoogte kunnen worden verklaard door verschillen in vaardigheden die zijn opgedaan tijdens de kindertijd en adolescentie. Belangrijker was de bevinding dat de effecten van deze vaardigheden niet stabiel waren over de levensloop. In het bijzonder bleek dat de

grootte van effecten – van zowel de cognitieve als de sociale vaardigheden – veranderden tijdens de adolescentie en volwassenheid. Dit houdt in dat verschillende vaardigheden belangrijk zijn om mee te nemen voor het verklaren van criminaliteit voor verschillende levensfasen.

Cognitieve vaardigheden, gemeten door intelligentie, bleken belangrijke voorspellers voor criminaliteit van mannen na de adolescentie. Tijdens de adolescentie waren de cognitieve vaardigheden minder belangrijk, maar in deze periode waren verschillen in sociale vaardigheden in staat om de piek in delinquent gedrag van adolescenten te verklaren. Voor vrouwen bleken sociale vaardigheden in het algemeen belangrijker dan cognitieve vaardigheden. De belangrijkste persoon(lijkheid)skenmerken die werden gebruikt werden om de sociale vaardigheden te meten, waren neuroticisme, extraversie en spanningsbehoefte. Deze eigenschappen zijn vooral belangrijk voor het verklaren van criminaliteit tijdens de adolescentie voor zowel mannen als vrouwen.

Interacties tussen werk, uitkeringen en criminaliteit
In de tweede stap ontwikkelende we een model dat expliciteert dat verschillende uitkomsten gedurende volwassenheid elkaar dynamisch beïnvloeden. In het bijzonder onderzoeken we in hoeverre crimineel gedrag, werk en uitkeringen elkaar beïnvloeden gedurende het volwassen leven. Crimineel gedrag kan de kans op werk verminderen en werk kan op zijn beurt crimineel gedrag reduceren (Lageson en Uggen, 2013). Dergelijke bi-directionele relaties moeten worden ontward om de zogeheten relatieve opbrengsten te kunnen beoordelen van investeringen in het volwassen leven. Meer specifiek: als de interventie arbeid faciliteert dan kan dit een reducerend effect hebben op criminaliteit en uitkeringen, maar daarna kan deze reductie in criminaliteit weer leiden tot betere arbeidsmarktmogelijkheden.

De Nederlandse welvaartsstaat biedt mensen de mogelijkheid om, onder voorwaarden, een uitkering te krijgen. Door het gelijktijdig onderzoeken van criminaliteit, werk en uitkeringen, kunnen we de samenhang tussen deze keuzes onderzoeken. Dit maakt het mogelijk om twee zaken te onderzoeken. Ten eerste kunnen we dieper ingaan op de motivatie voor criminaliteit. Dit kan als volgt gezien worden. Gegeven dat uitkeringen alleen financiële middelen bieden en niet leiden tot meer sociale banden met de maatschappij, kan gesteld worden dat als werk en uitkeringen hetzelfde reducerende effect hebben op criminaliteit, dat dan geld een belangrijke motivatie is voor criminaliteit. Ten tweede, als uitkeringen

criminaliteit verlagen, dan is dit een extra factor waarmee rekening moet worden gehouden als de kosten van uitkeringen worden bepaald.
We vonden dat een aanzienlijk deel van de relatie tussen werk en criminaliteit verklaard kon worden door derde variabelen. De statistische controlevariabelen voor werk en criminaliteit bleken negatief gecorreleerd wat erop wijst dat individuen die gemiddeld een hogere neiging tot crimineel gedrag toonden ook minder vaak werk hadden. We deden geen pogingen om dit spurieuze deel van de relatie te interpreteren, maar zoals we hieronder uitleggen kan een deel van deze spurieuze relatie worden verklaard door verschillen in cognitieve en sociale vaardigheden.
In plaats van het interpreteren van de spurieuze relatie tussen criminaliteit en werk, lag de nadruk in deze stap op het duiden van de structurele relaties tussen criminaliteit, werk en uitkeringen. We vonden significante bi-directionele negatieve dynamische structurele effecten tussen werk en criminaliteit. Dit impliceert dat werk toekomstige criminaliteit vermindert en dat criminaliteit de kans op werk vermindert. Enkele verfijningen van het model toonden aan dat slechts "reguliere" arbeid en niet uitzendwerk in staat was om vermogenscriminaliteit te verminderen, terwijl zowel gewelds- als vermogenscriminaliteit grote negatieve gevolgen bleken te hebben voor de toekomstige kansen op werk.
De relatie tussen uitkeringen en criminaliteit was gecompliceerder. Alleen bijstandsuitkeringen verminderden de kans op vermogenscriminaliteit. Het effect van bijstandsuitkeringen op vermogenscriminaliteit was net zo groot als het effect van werk op criminaliteit. Dit benadrukt de belangrijke rol van geld, en economische theorieën, voor het verklaren van het structurele deel van de relatie tussen werk en vermogensdelicten voor achtergestelde jongeren. Ook impliceert dit dat bijstandsuitkeringen een belangrijke rol spelen in het voorkomen van criminaliteit. Dus als de "kosten" van bijstandsuitkeringen worden berekend is het belangrijk dat deze neveneffecten ook worden meegenomen.

Een "compleet" levensloopmodel
In de derde stap combineren we de inzichten van de eerste twee stappen en stellen we dat als we de effecten van een achtergestelde jeugd op volwassen uitkomsten willen kwantificeren, dat dan de transities die zich gedurende het volwassen leven voordoen zelf ook moeten worden meegenomen. Overgangen tijdens het volwassen leven kunnen in deze zin fungeren als "multipliers" die de effecten van investeringen in jongeren verhogen of verlagen. Stel dat vroegtijdige

interventies gericht op het verbeteren van sociale vaardigheden in staat zijn crimineel gedrag te verminderen tijdens de adolescentie, dan kan deze vermindering van criminaliteit de kans op werk gedurende het volwassen leven vergroten bovenop het marginale effect van de investering in sociale vaardigheden op de kans op werk. De ontwikkeling van dit dynamische conceptuele raamwerk, de vertaling hiervan naar een empirisch model en het testen van het empirische model vormen de belangrijkste bijdragen van het proefschrift voor het verklaren van criminaliteit en andere sociaal-economische uitkomsten voor achtergestelde jongeren.



Het schema hiernaast geeft een gesimplificeerde weergave van het complete conceptuele model dat we gebruikten. In de jeugdperiode worden cognitieve en sociale vaardigheden ontwikkeld. Tevens worden tijdens de jeugd signalen gevormd. De signalen bevatten gegevens over het opleidingsniveau en de zwaarte van het jeugdstrafblad. De signalen worden onder andere bepaald door de vaardigheden. Na de jeugd volgen twee perioden van volwassenheid (in het proefschrift zijn dit er veel meer maar twee perioden zijn voldoende om de ideeen uiteen te zetten). In de eerste periode worden de volwassene uitkomsten van criminaliteit, werk, uitkeringen, drugs gebruik en intieme relaties verklaard door de vaardigheden en de signalen uit de jeugd. De uitkomsten in de tweede periode worden verklaard door de vaardigheden en de signalen uit de jeugd en ook door de uitkomsten van de eerste periode. Door zowel de jeugd factoren als de interacties gedurende het volwassene leven te modelleren kunnen we schatten wanneer interventies het beste plaats kunnen vinden.

De resultaten suggereren dat cognitieve en sociale vaardigheden blijvende effecten hebben op de volwassen uitkomsten bij mannen voor criminaliteit en werk. Bij vrouwen hebben alleen sociale vaardigheden langdurige gevolgen voor criminaliteit en werk. Voor criminaliteit komen deze bevindingen overeen met de resultaten uit de eerste stap. Hier vonden we ook dat deze vaardigheden blijvende effecten hebben op criminaliteit. Voor vrouwen vonden we tevens dat sociale vaardigheden de kans op drugsgebruik en intieme relaties gedurende de

adolescentie verminderen. Het signaal van het opleidingsniveau is belangrijk voor het verminderen van uitkeringen tijdens de adolescentie en het vergroten van de kans op werk tijdens volwassenheid. Het strafblad signaal verhoogt gedurende de adolescentie en volwassenheid de kans op criminaliteit en drugsgebruik.

Naast deze aanhoudende gevolgen van jeugdige vaardigheden en signalen vonden we vele structurele dynamische interacties tussen de volwassen uitkomstvariabelen. De belangrijkste bevindingen met betrekking tot de structurele relaties tussen criminaliteit, werk en uitkeringen, die in de tweede stap werden gevonden, worden hier bevestigd. Daarbovenop vonden we dat de kans op criminaliteit werd verminderd door intieme relaties, terwijl drugsgebruik de kans hierop verhoogde. Voor vrouwen bleken intieme relaties meer verklarende kracht te hebben dan voor mannen. Voor vrouwen voorspellen intieme relaties verminderingen in uitkeringen gedurende de adolescentie en ze zijn negatief verbonden met drugsgebruik.



Om te analyseren wat al deze bevindingen gezamenlijk impliceren maken we gebruik van simulatiemethoden. Deze methoden simuleren het volgende hypothetische experiment: stel dat we voor iedere respondent zijn sociale vaardigheden konden verhogen met ongeveer 4% op het 16de levensjaar (4% op een schaal van 1 tot 4). Wat zouden dan de gevolgen zijn voor de kans op criminaliteit en de kans op werk. De resultaten voor de mannelijke respondenten van dit pseudo-experiment worden gegeven in de hiernaast staande twee figuren. De eerste figuur laat zien dat de kans op crimineel gedrag wordt verlaagd door de verhoging van sociale vaardigheden. Deze verlaging is significant voor vrijwel de gehele volwassen periode die we bestuderen. De tweede figuur laat de kans op werk zien voor en na verhoging van de sociale vaardigheden. We vinden dat de kans op werk vanaf het 22ste levensjaar significant verhoogd wordt door de verhoging van sociale vaardigheden. We kunnen concluderen dat een redelijk kleine verhoging van sociale vaardigheden zowel criminaliteit kan reduceren als de kans op werk kan verhogen. Een belangrijk punt voor toekomstig onderzoek is om te gaan kijken of het verhogen van sociale vaardigheden op een kosten efficiente manier kan geschieden.

Het proefschrift van Geert Mesters is hier te vinden: *Disentangling Criminal Careers for Disadvantaged Youths*

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