ISSA Proceedings 2014 – "Death Penalty For The Down's Syndrome" – Polish Cultural Symbols In Discussion About IVF And Abortion

Abstract: A basic unit of analysis of ideological systems is a generalized axiological proposition, in which as arguments serve cultural and ideological objects, which have a culturally developed interpretation and convey the subsets of assigned values. The objective of this paper is to present how such objects constitute the base of the discourse. Analysis of chosen texts reveals, how at every stage of argumentation arguers create ideological systems by adopting different ascriptions to cultural objects.

Keywords: abortion, axiological argumentation, collective symbols, cultural objects, ideology, IVF.

1. *Introduction*
The discussion concerning IVF and abortion has lasted in Poland for over 20 years and it still occupies the first pages and covers of many periodicals. Both adherents of these procedures and their opponents are swing from one extreme to the other using fallacious arguments which explore collective symbols that allow the arguers to play on audience's emotions. The stimulus for the following paper was an article under the meaningful title: "Death penalty for the Down's syndrome" (Dueholm, 2013). The following is an excerpt of the aforementioned article:

The war against people with the Down's syndrome (…) just because they look differently, they score lower on the IQ tests, and sometimes they have different diseases, has begun long time ago. The twentieth century has been defiled by their institutionalized extermination on a vast scale, initiated by the action of eugenicists in such 'enlightened countries' as the United Kingdom, the Scandinavian countries, the United States, and the most well-known and effective

one – Germany.

The 1933 law of the Third Reich allowed for the sterilization of mentally disabled people of German nationality, including those with Down syndrome. Later, in the period from 1939 to 1944, disabled people were killed as part of T4. The process of their elimination began precisely from killing children. Some of them were typed 'for termination' by midwives, soon after their birth. Some disabled people died killed by injection, others poisoned with gas, and still others were starved to death (...)".

Hence the number of discussions on the subject is increasing. Conservative arguments of the IVF and abortion opponents radicalized to the extent that most of the protagonists forgot for what they are really aiming. What counts for them is just the victory, not the satisfying solution of this complex problem. Therefore, Polish discussion on IVF can be described as an axiological debate, in which the participants seek to aim different directions of attributions: pro-life or pro-choice (Walton 1999, p. 118).

Works on the bioethics law in Poland were first initiated in 2007, but until now Polish parliament was not able to adopt any conclusive regulations. In result, Poland is the sole country in Europe where this problem is not regulated. On July 1st, 2013, however, the Government launched a program of refunding IVF from the State budget.

In Poland, IVF as a method of treating infertility has been used with great success for the past 27 years. For the first 20 years this method was accepted by society. However, when the draft bill was debated in 2007, there was a sudden, unexpected shift in public opinion that favored the drastic reduction or elimination of IVF.

2. *Axiological argumentation*

Axiological argumentation refers to issues which usually concern matters of ethics, politics, or aesthetics. Aristotle in "Topics" identifies reasonable beliefs called *endoxa*, "accepted things", "accepted opinions". These opinions are formed on the basis of the general axiological dogmas Q (X), which evaluate real objects (X) by assigning them a value (Q) in a way acceptable for specific social group as a product of their culture.

Ideology is understood as a relatively ordered collection of generalized axiological

dogmas recognized as legitimate by a social group. These beliefs have a predicative internal structure, that is to say, the subject of arguments are cultural objects (X), which are different phenomena in the cultural space (i.e. persons, institutions, actions, events, processes, etc.), whereas values and commitments (Q) assigned to the objects serve for predicates (Awdiejew 2008, p. 130). The entire set of generalized axiological dogmas can be written as an ordered list of accepted evaluations and in such way it represents ideology. For example, in the Christian system of values, such cultural objects as: LIFE, CHILD, and HUMAN BEING occur as arguments in the beliefs:

The most valuable thing is life.

ALUE: *IT IS GOOD (LIFE)*
COMMITMENT: PROTECT (LIFE)

Children are persons, not subpersons, and are entitled to all human rights that are necessary to protect them from the beginning of their existence.

VALUE: TO BE (X1: A CHILD, X2: PERSON)
COMMITMENT: RECEIVE ETHICAL TREATMENT (CHILD)

The beliefs establishing such a collection are considered by speakers as a set of axioms which do not require any proof. Ideology, in opposition to theory, does not have a strict internal logical order, and it creates a modular system, in which the relationships between modules are not clearly defined. Therefore, it is possible to ascribe to it any desirable subset of values (*dissoi logoi*).

Since there are no ethical universals, the concepts of good and evil are quite relative, and they depend on the implemented system of values. According to Aleksy Awdiejew, the basis of axiological argumentation is formed by generalized axiological beliefs, which are universal reference values in the process of dialectical reasoning. Procedure of such argumentation consists of three stages (Awdiejew 2008, pp. 132-133):

a. Establishing of a general axiological base, which serves as a general rule of inference. Such a database is represented by a generalized belief.
b. The application of qualifying statement linking up an individual object (x) with the universal class (X).
c. Transfer of the values assigned to X to the individual object x – the conclusion.

While the arguments of the generalized axiological dogmas are cultural objects, the arguments of the individual statements (xn) are real existing things. As a result of such reference the universal values Q are transferred to the real object x, in other words, its social evaluation occurs.

According to Michael Fleischer, the cultural objects are universals operating in a particular culture. That culture extracts and evaluates them as representations of beliefs. This types of objects are the carriers of conceptualizations of the cultural reality and interpreters that allow to understand it. Michael Fleischer assigns to such objects the role of collective symbols, which he defines as follows:

"Collective symbol" is a set of signs with intricate and fully developed interpretant. For this reason they manifest the cultural meanings, depending on the particular manifestation of the culture, as well as strong positive or negative values shared by the entire given culture, hence they give a frame of reference for differentiation of values. In order to properly interpret a collective symbol, the interpreter needs to have a particular knowledge regarding the semiotic and (most importantly) the signifying aspects of the interpretant. This knowledge is acquired both through culturally-influenced process of socialization, as well as by means of communication within the culture's discourse, which allows the participant to adequately communicate in his interdiscourse. The cultural meaning is most often quite different from the lexical, linguistic one. The collective symbols are the most important elements of interdiscourse. (Fleischer 2002, p. 43)

Collective symbols are internally differentiated and they consist of three counterparts:

a. kernel, very stable, functionally responsible for consistency of the symbol and its anchoring in a given culture;
b. up-to-date area, responsible for the particular meaning in the society of a given culture;
c. connotative area, responsible for the dependency of the symbol on the natural language and lexical meanings. (Fleischer 2007, pp. 256-257)

There is also a subclass of the cultural objects, which we will call ideological objects. They differ from the general cultural objects because even within the same culture they can adopt different ascriptions, creating competing ideological

systems, in which they are evaluated differently. In pro-life vs. pro-choice polemics, such ideological objects as CONCEIVED CHILD, HUMAN DIGNITY, and CONSCIENCE CLAUSE have acquired completely new attributions.

Typically any real, individual object has an unlimited number of parameters, and for this reason, the crux of the argument lays in a particular reduction of these parameters and their subsequent evaluation. Biased selection of parameters can entirely change the reference to the ideological space.

3. *Collective symbols in axiological argumentation*
In the following section, I will demonstrate how the previously mentioned ideological objects are being transformed into collective symbols, which play the role of quasi-arguments in the public discourse.

3.1 *Symbol #1: CONCEIVED BABY/ CHILD*
The core of the symbol's function lays in the transfer of the axiology attributed to a child perceived as a fully shaped human being to the pre-implantation forms, such as zygote, morula, and blastula. A child is most definitely entitled to all the human rights, both religious and civil, but the controversy arises when the same rights are sought for a ball of cells.

3.1.1 *The kernel*
The kernel of the discussion is derived primarily from the teachings of the Catholic Church. It focuses on the question whether embryo is a person or not. Undeniably a child is a person. The problem is that in the Bible it is said that the human fetus is not only a biological, but also a spiritual being from the early phases of its existence. However, it never explicitly resolves if it is so from the very conception. The "Dignitas Personae" of the Church also did not decide conclusively whether an embryo is a person or not, but requests for its treating as a person entitled to human rights. Catholic bioethics say that if we are not able to exclude the possibility that from the very beginning of the conception an embryo is a human, we cannot risk its existence. Since we cannot prove it to be otherwise, we shall assume that this premise is genuinely true. If so, we cannot act for the harm of the life from its very conception. The further argument can be built as follows: as long as every human is entitled to preservation of his own dignity, already the first human cells should be entitled to it as well, because the dignity is not gradable – it either exists or not.

The foundation of Church's standpoint might be found in the frequent use of the phrase "she conceived and bore" in the Bible, which allows to combine these two acts into a single continuum, and therefore, to acknowledge humanness from the very moment of conception:

So Sarah conceived and bore a son to Abraham in his old age (Genesis 21:2)
So she conceived and bore a son and said, "God has taken away my reproach." (Genesis 30:23)

3.1.2 *The up-to-date area*
The result of such kernel is that the contemporary Catholic theology advocates simultaneous animation. For that fact, according to Catholic theology, there are 4 evidences confirming the humanity of the embryo / fetus:

a. *The genetic criterion* – it has all the information needed for the further growth and development;
b. *The criterion of continuity of growth* – development of the human embryo demonstrates continuity where none of the steps can be confronted with the previous one and it is not possible to set any threshold to when a fetus would become a human being. The basis of continuity is founded on genotype;
c. *The criterion of identity* – at any stage: zygote – embryo – fetus – child – adult, a human being is the same individual creature and form of entity distinct from other ones;
d. *The criterion of potentiality* – from the very beginning children develop the qualities that they will reveal in adulthood.

For the reasons stated above, further argumentation is formed on the following premises:

P1: The zygotes contain all of the genetic potential of human being from the very beginning.
P2: Thus, from the very beginning they must already be "spiritual" (animated) beings.
C: As such, they are entitled to all the attributes of humanity – including personal dignity and moral integrity. In other words, setting up a moral sense of humanity is synonymous with the act of conception of the human being.

However, these premises constitute an incongruent combination of clearly separate threads of argument: biological and philosophical. Biology (genetics) can

only analyze the cell as an elementary particle that is subjected to mechanisms of creation and development of human 'physis', but assertions on human 'psyche' are not within the competence of this scientific field. The matter of integral relationship of mental factor (human soul) and the substrate material (human body) belongs to fields of philosophy and theology.

Some data from the genetics undermines the idea of simultaneous animation. On the one hand, the percentage of natural miscarriages is high enough to consider that the nature itself (or the Creator) approves this mechanism, because the percentage of both re-implantation miscarriage as well as post-implantation miscarriage is extremely high. Since the woman is not even aware that she is pregnant, the current state of knowledge is impossible to determine, how often does the insemination of oocyte, followed by its defective implantation in the uterus, occur. In case of post-implantation miscarriage, research results indicate that on average 1 out of 5 inseminated cells is subject to loss after the implementation without any noticeable symptoms for the woman.

On the other hand, in genetics laboratories it has been observed that after the fertilization two or even more organisms can emerge from a zygote (e.g. monozygotic twins), or vice versa – two zygotes can be joined into one body.

The reasonable solution of that problem could be the idea of post-implantation animation. According to its followers, a human being in its proper sense arises only after the implantation of the zygote in the uterus. Pre-implantation forms of human life, namely zygote, morula and blastula, are not entitled to the name of 'person'. If we assume that the main subject of protection is maternity, then the moment of nesting shall be considered as its beginning. A mother's body can give no warranties to a fertilized cell before its nesting, therefore separation between the act of human conception and the moment of implantation is more precise and methodically better.

From the philosophical and theological point of view, the most important is the problem of the soul. The Church teaches that each soul is spiritual and it is directly created by God. The soul is not a 'product' of parents – and it is immortal, it does not die, so after its separation from the body at the time of one's death, it is meant to reconnect again with it at the time of the final resurrection.

Thomas Aquinas argued in the "*Summa Theologica*" (Aquinas 1947, I, q. 90, aa.

2-3), that the soul cannot be created from a previously existing material substances; it cannot be derived from spiritual substances existing formerly because spiritual substances are simple and they never transform from one to another. Therefore, the only logical conclusion is that the soul is a direct creation of God (*the soul is of the Divine substance* – Aquinas 1947, I, q. 90, a. 1) — hence, since IVF children have received life, they also have received souls, that is, they became the children of God, in other words, if the IVF method brings the desired grace, it must be the will of God.

3.1.3 *The connotative area*
Taking for granted the personality of embryo, the pro-life protagonists have created a newspeak which transformed cultural object CONCEIVED CHILD into biased, loaded term evaluating proponents and opponents in public debate. Creating such a facility is the base of ideological discussion. The names of different pro-life associations and movements show the variants of the basic symbol:

Polish Association of Defenders of Human Life;
Crusade of Prayer for Defense of Conceived Children;
Spiritual Adoption of a Conceived Children Endangered by Extinction.

Use of the object CONCEIVED CHILD as a discursive symbol creates new kind of newspeak that implies phrases and metaphors making any argumentation pointless, i.e.: gynecologists performing IVF are called "the Nazis" and "murderers"; women who decide for IVF "kill their children", they are "murderers of the unborn children"; abortion is "killing a defenseless, unborn children", and children themselves are "breaking out of the mother's womb" or "murdered before their birth", and "they beget the army of martyrs". Other peculiar metaphors that appear in Polish bishops' sermons: "to conceive a child by IVF causes the death of his brothers and sisters in an embryonic state" (bishop Kazimierz Górny); IVF is "shadow of Herod" (bishop Piotr Libera), "conception in a test tube means implementing the idea of Frankenstein" (bishop Tadeusz Pieronek).

3.1.4 *Summary*
The collective symbol CONCEIVED CHILD is convenient in argumentation, because it allows for numerous fallacies, such as loaded language and false analogy. For example, when professor gynecologist Waldemar Kuczyński, argued

that the freezing is not harmful for the embryos, his opponent, pro-life journalist Mariusz Dzierżawski, replied using astonishing analogy:

The good ones survive, and the bad ones (those which did not survive the procedure) are simply thrown away. This kind of reasoning can be compared to the logics of slave traffickers. 'The good' black slaves survived the trip across the Atlantic on the slave boats, 'the bad' ones were thrown into the ocean.

Conversely, Professor Krzysztof Łukaszuk, director of Infertility Treatment Clinic in Gdańsk, said in an interview with Michał Wąsowski:

Problem with IVF is that someone came up with the idea that a man is created at the time of his conception. But we should be aware that 3/4 of conceived pregnancies end within the fifth week. From the Church's point of view it means that God forbids 3/4 of the population to go to heaven.

Thus, if the embryo is not a person, contraception, early (pre-implementation) abortion, and the freezing of embryos in IVF process shall not be treated as actions insulting human dignity. The phrase "a man is a person since his inception and therefore he has the right to live" belongs to the pastoral discourse.

3.2 *Symbol #2: DIGNITY*

In general, dignity is a concept used in axiological discussions, both religious and secular, to signify that someone has an innate right to be valued and receive ethical treatment. In European culture, human dignity is inviolable. It must be respected and protected.

The defense of human rights and a justice system, based on the full respect of human dignity, is a key part of our shared European values (Jerzy Buzek, European Parliament President (10 October, 2009).

3.2.1 *The kernel*

Extremely stable, well-anchored in the European culture, supported by quotations from the Bible, international law, and the most prominent philosophers (endoxa). The Catechism of the Catholic Church says:

The dignity of the human person is rooted in his creation in the image and likeness of God (article 1); it is fulfilled in his vocation to divine beatitude (article 2). It is essential to a human being freely to direct himself to this fulfillment

(article 3). (Catechism 2003, 1700)

Article 1 of the "Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union" affirms the inviolability of the human dignity.

The dignity of the human person is not only a fundamental right in itself but constitutes the real basis of fundamental rights.

3.2.2 *The up-to-date area*

Although dignity is one of fundamental human rights, the definition of the term is vague, i.e. "The Encyclopedia of Bioethics" defines the primary sense in which human dignity is invoked today as "an attribute of all human beings that establishes their great significance or worth" (Encyclopedia, p. 1193).

Most of discourses left the term undefined, and they do not precise the difference between having dignity, having an awareness of dignity, exhibiting dignity, or being treated with dignity. The Encyclopedia reads:

because human dignity can be invoked on both sides of various issues, there is a pressing need for those who use that term to clarify what they mean by it. At some point they also need to defend the plausibility of the anthropological creed that underlies their view. (Encyclopedia, p. 1198)

In public discourse, dignity is treated as an autotelic value and an indispensable condition for other values, such as freedom and personal autonomy. However, it usually works as an ideological object. Steven Pinker (2008) argues that the concept of dignity is pointless. It is too subjective, and thus it is relative, fungible, and harmful, because people and cultures keep disagreeing on a variety of behaviors, and it is questionable whether those who engage in some of them are acting in a dignified manner, or not. A scheme of the dignity-based argument against IVF:

P1: Human dignity is an intrinsic property possessed by all human beings by nature.
P2: IVF violates dignity of embryo.
C: IVF is immoral.

For example:

IVF does not respect human dignity of embryo – the human being at an early

stage of life, because in the act of 'creation' it does not take into account the will of God, who is 'forced' by man to perform the act of giving new life. The man – the physician in the laboratory, puts himself in the position of the life-giver. (Sadowska, 2007, p. 2)

In case of such argument the most important critical question is: is it possible for a man to force God to do anything?

3.2.3 *The connotative area*
The spiritual consequences of neglecting the embryo's humanity and personality in IVF are characterized as a lack of respect of the conceived child's freedom, autonomy, uniqueness, and right to be loved from the moment of conception.

According to the pro-life followers, infertile couples practicing IVF methods do not treat the child as a person, but as an object which can be bought for a sufficiently large sum of money. Archbishop Józef Michalik, in the sermon during the procession of Corpus Christi in 2013, said that IVF experiments are "associated with sin of breaking the laws of nature". The bishops wrote that "the good can never be achieved by dishonorable means". They regard IVF as one of these "dishonorable methods, because under the laboratory conditions of the conception, siblings of an IVF child are killed or frozen". According to the episcopate, IVF crushes human dignity and human rights.

3.2.4 *Summary*
DIGNITY is a convenient ideological object that allows one to justify the desire to act in accordance with concepts, which are widely believed to be morally right. This desire is understood *de dicto* and not *de re,* due to the lack of a precise definition of the term. In our culture, 'argument' from dignity is always valid, yet in fact it is not sound, because one of its premises is constituted by the collective symbol.

3.3 *Symbol #3: CONSCIENCE PROTECTION*
Conscience is an intuitive ability, which allows humans to judge the value of actions/deeds, both past ones, and those yet to come. It is not only the theoretical knowledge about the good and the evil, but also the practical skill to assert that something was, is, or will be, either good, or bad. Conscience of a person might mean an internalized set of norms, values, moral beliefs, and attitudes, which form that persons' 'moral spine', defining his/her integrity and individuality.

3.3.1 *The kernel*

In Catholic theology, the voice of conscience is God's voice, which manifests God's commandments, and to which one should be absolutely obedient. The Catechism of the Catholic Church says that:

By his deliberate actions (article 4), the human person does, or does not, conform to the good promised by God and attested by moral conscience (article 5). (Catechism, 1700)

Man is obliged to follow the moral law, which urges him "to do what is good and avoid what is evil" (Catechism 2003, 1713). This law makes itself heard in his conscience. The Second Vatican Council, in the constitution "Gaudium et Spes", followed by John Paul II in his "Veritatis Splendor" encyclical, states that "Conscience is the most secret core and sanctuary of a man. There he is alone with God, Whose voice echoes in his depths." (Gaudium 1965, 16,9).

3.3.2 *The up-to-date area*

Conscience understood in this way determines moral identity. Often it is also attributed with vital importance expressed through the order to respect someone's conscience. When we say that a certain decision is a question of someone's conscience, we intend to say, it cannot be forced from outside, but it should come from personal moral beliefs of that person. On the grounds of this principle, we can draw the following scheme of argument from the conscience:

P1: Some deeds, intentions, personality traits, rules are good/ just or bad/ unjust.
P2: Person *P* with particular capabilities *Cap*, being under certain conditions *Cond*, directly, in a non-inferential way recognizes the moral feature *M* of the evaluated thing.
C: The recognized value *M* gives a reason to perform action *A* or sustain from it.

This attitude is reflected for instance in the Polish law (art. 39 "Act on the Profession of Doctor and Dentist", December 5, 1996) which states that a doctor can withhold from performing a medical practice inconsistent with his conscience.

However, on May 25, 2014, three thousand Polish healthcare workers signed a "Declaration of Faith", in which they have recognized the precedence of divine law over human law, and the necessity to "resist imposed anti-humanitarian ideologies of modern civilization". By signing it, doctors and medical students stated that they will not perform treatments contrary to their Catholic conscience.

The statement that the human body and life are the gifts of God is a key element of the declaration: they are sacred and inviolable and consequently the conception and the descent of human depend only on the decision of God. If such a decision is to be taken by a man by committing acts such as abortion, contraception, euthanasia, or artificial insemination, he violates not only the basic principle of the Decalogue, but also discards the very Creator.

"The Declaration", despite its name of the "Declaration of Faith", essentially refers not as much to the teachings of Christ, as to the doctrine of the Catholic Church. Adversaries of the declaration point out to the fact that out of six points of the document, "five prevents performing the profession of doctor," and they call the document "statement of bigotry". They also underline that the document violates not only the principles of Hippocratic oath, but also the Polish law.

According to the "Family Planning, Protection of Human Fetus, and Conditions of Permissible Abortion Act", abortion is legal in three cases: when the pregnancy threatens life or health of the woman, when it is a consequence of a criminal act, or if the fetus is severely and irreversibly damaged. According to the previously mentioned act, a doctor can withhold from performing a medical procedure being contrary with his/her conscience, though he/she is obliged to indicate a viable possibility to receive the treatment from another practitioner or at another healthcare facility. Moreover, this fact has to be recorded in the medical records. Additionally, every doctor is obliged act in any case in which delay of aid could cause death, severe damage of the body, or any other severe health disorders.

3.3.3 *The connotative area*

Meanwhile, there is an increasing number of cases in which the medical aid is being denied, based on the reference to the conscience protection. These are some of the examples of usage of the ideological object CONSCIENCE PROTECTION, as quasi-arguments:

a. A gynecologist from the hospital in Nisko who claimed that the pregnancy resulting from rape is not a gynecological problem, but rather a psychological one.
b. A doctor from a hospital in Kraków who refused to prescribe "the morning after pill" to a 16 year old rape victim.
c. A gynecologist from another hospital in Kraków who refused to send a 36 year old mother for prenatal tests, despite the mother's concerns of possible genetic

defects of her fetus.

3.3.4 *Summary*

Although the autonomy of the conscience is respected in many of the controversial cases, it should not be a universal excuse. The conscience is subjective in its character, and, therefore, it may differ depending on the system of values adopted on the axiological basis. We can thusly assert that the argument from the conscience is an arbitrary derivative of the ideology/philosophy/religion, and not an objectively provable truth.

4. *Conclusion*

The arguer applies the direct axiological definitions, in which individual objects play the role of *definiendum* whereas *definiens* is represented by ideological objects, which are emotionally loaded, often characterized by negative or positive metaphors, depending on the propagandistic direction. The main objective of this type of discourse is not changing beliefs, but generating the excitement of the audience for rudimentary premises that refer to the ideological beliefs shared by the same groups to which the sender belongs.

The ideological object does not serve as the warrant of the argument, but rather as a cliché, to block any argument. Cliché is the kernel of cultural objects, so it does not require justification. It allows arguer to avoid the burden of proof, because it is the opponent that must make an effort to demonstrate that the cliché is idle talk. Therefore, calling dignity or conscience protection a „fundamental value" allows for action/inaction aiming for the axiology of the collective symbol to replace the rational argument. Defined collective symbols are means that allow users to obstruct the argumentation, or permit them to resign from participation. It is difficult, if not impossible, to argue against the collective symbols. They do not allow for the dispute, because they are too comprehensive and they leave no room for the starting point where reasoning could begin. Activists of the pro-life movement have implemented new linguistic rules to the debate on IVF and abortion.

References:
Aquinas St. Thomas (1947). Summa Theologica. Translated by The Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Available online at: http://sacred-texts.com/chr/aquinas/summa/index.htm
Awdiejew Aleksy (2008). Argumentacja aksjologiczna w komunikacji publicznej .

In Habrajska G. (ed.), *Rozmowy o komunikacji 2. Motywacja psychologiczna i kulturowa w komunikacji* (pp. 129-139). Łask: Oficyna Wydawnicza Leksem.

Catechism of the Catholic Church (2003). Libreria Editrice Vaticana. Available online at: http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG0015/_INDEX.HTM

Dueholm Natalia (2013). Kara śmierci za zespół Downa . Available online at: http://www.fronda.pl/a/kara-smierci-za-zespol-downa,30851.html

Encyclopedia of Bioethics (2004), 3rd edition, ed. Stephen G. Post. New York: Macmillan.

Fleischer Michael (2007). *Ogólna teoria komunikacji* . Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego.

Fleischer M. (2002). *Konstrukcja rzeczywistości* . Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego.

Gaudium et Spes (1965). Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World. Promulgated by His Holiness, Pope Paul VI. Available online at: http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-ii_cons_19651207_gaudium-et-spes_en.html

Pinker Steven (2008). The stupidity of dignity. The New Republic. Published: May 28. Available online at: http://pinker.wjh.harvard.edu/articles/media/The%20Stupidity%20of%20Dignity.htm

Sadowska Ludwika (2008). *Piękno życia człowieka przed urodzeniem . paper from conference: Modlitwa za rodziny i w intencji obrony życia człowieka*. Kalisz. Dec. 6, 2007. Available online at: http://www.dsz.archidiecezja.wroc.pl/pdf/modlitwa_zycia_czlowieka_przed_urodzeniem.pdf

Walton Douglas N. (1999). *One-sided arguments. A dialectical analysis of bias.* Albany: State University of New York Press.

ISSA Proceedings 2014 – Conflict

And Tension: The Discursive Dissonance At The UN

Abstract: We aim at examining the governmental political marketing and its rhetorical strategies of maintenance, which also has the task of projecting an innovative image, so that the government survive and perpetuate. Among these strategies, it is included the dialogue with others governments in the international community and the engagement with common causes to the globalized world. This scenario requires an interdisciplinary field, mediated by the theories of argumentation, which constitute the core of all efforts of political nature. Speeches taken from the UN Assembly on September 23rd 2013, pronounced in a moment of great tension, not softened by diplomatic diligences, will be examined. The study of actio, the performance of political actors, is included.

Keywords: Actio, conflict, image, interdisciplinarity, negotiation, political speeches, stasis, strategies, tension, United Nation.

1. *Introduction*

The confrontation of speeches or *stasis* is frequent in contemporary political speeches, in a world that grows more complex and where it is increasingly more difficult to understand the various focuses of the questions. When one thinks of the deliberative discourse as it was conceived in the Greek-Latin world, it is possible to notice that the clash of discourses then was also heated, with the raise of discordant voices against what was being proposed. However, the transition from the Greek *polis* to the modern concept of State has introduced significant changes. In the latter, the political discourse is a conflictive setting in which the many manifestations are exacerbated, modulated, and softened by the norms of courtesy and diplomatic mediation necessary for modern life to work. New genres and formats arise, aiming at diverse audiences and media outlets. Although the concept of politics remains the same as in its origin – that which preserves the Common Good and what is useful and necessary to the collectivity (deliberative), what is fair (judiciary), and the cohesion of society (epideictic) – the process of institutionalization that was gradually taking place gave it new configurations. Conversely, the media, in its role as an agent that presents different angles of a story or fact, exaggerates some aspects more than one can imagine. It is up for the citizen to disentangle the questions and form an opinion about the different

situations.

In the political life, the official voice also has an important role when taking a stand on controversial situations or when communicating serious pieces of news which affect the lives of citizens. This is, many times, carried out by immediate advisors or spokespersons, in order to protect the figure of the Chief of State.

The UN is a privileged environment to observe the aforementioned confrontations, given the circumstances that gather people of distinct origins and cultures, who meet in assemblies, either as members of the permanent Council or as observers.

Created in 1945, following the two World Wars, one of its main roles is to mitigate the world tensions and help the conflicting nations establish dialogue. Lately, however, there have been talks of its weakened performance in this role.

2. *A analyzing two presidentials speeches*
In this study we look into two presidential speeches delivered on the 24th of September 2013, during the 68th edition of the General Assembly, when the President of Brazil, Dilma Rousseff, was the opening speaker. By tradition, Brazil is the first country to speak at the opening for having been the first country to join this organization. It is the third time, since 2011, that she participates in this event.

Immediately afterwards, it was the turn of the President of the United States, Barack Obama. The situation was considerably tense once there had been indiscriminate collection, by the United States, of government data and even personal information of Brazilian citizens, including espionage targeted on the Brazilian president's private mail and government entities, such as Petrobrás. It is worth mentioning that two months prior to this Assembly, the episode related to the revelations of Edward Snowden, former CIA member, was very much alive in the collective memory.

The speech from the Brazilian leader proved to be harsh in rejecting this kind of attitude, characterizing it as espionage, taking the opportunity to outline the principles that underpin her government and what is expected from the UN: multilateral mechanisms that ensure freedom of expression, privacy of the individual and respect for human rights, without prejudice of political, commercial, religious or of any other nature; democratic governance, carried out

with transparency; universality that ensures human development and the construction of inclusive and non-discriminatory societies; respect to cultural diversity, without the imposition of beliefs, customs, and values.

There was no immediate reaction on the part of the American president to the remarks about the interventions mentioned by the Brazilian president. As usual, he presented an overview of the U.S. politics, with emphasis on its weak points in the world panorama: integration of the world economy in a time of crisis, limitation of the use of drones, the work to close the Guantánamo Bay prison; the pacification of regions in turmoil, such as Kenya, Pakistan, the north of Africa and the Middle East, especially Syria, with the elimination of chemical weapons, and the Arab-Israeli conflict.

It is, evidently, what the pragma-dialectics characterizes as a critical discussion, based on certain norms that govern the rules and codes of conduct and by which concrete practices of argumentation are evaluated to attain a critical evaluation of the maneuvers in play.

In Chapter 3 of A *Systematic Theory of Argumentation,* this situation is well described when the authors, Eemeren and Grootendorst affirm:

Argumentation is not just the expression of an individual assessment, but a contribution to a communication process between persons or groups who exchange ideas with one another in order to resolve a difference of opinion.
(…) *In pragma-dialectics, argumentative discourse and texts are conceived as basically social activities and the way in which the argumentation is analyzed depends on the kind of verbal interaction that takes place between the participants in this communication process* (Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2OO4, p. 55).

In this presentation, the theoretical presupposition we adopt is one of an interactional view of argumentation, which encompasses the conjunction of a descriptive view and a normative perspective, considering the presence of a counter-discourse, even if implicit. In case of a debate, it is necessary to focus on the collision points and reflect on the influence each of these projects on its interlocutor or the audience. It is necessary, thus, to know exactly what type of manifestation is in question.

Just as there is not a single and exclusive view on argumentation comprising

these various approaches, likewise the concepts which argumentation deals with are not homogeneous, depending on the adopted points of view and the choices made when constructing its analyses. This is what happens with the concept of rationality and fallacy, among others. In the first case, it is preferred to work with reasonableness, with several nuances, but when fallacies are concerned, they are either seen as reasoning flaws or interaction mechanisms, making part of social convenience depending on the interpersonal relationships, such as white lies, affected modesty, and other forms of interaction in which the affective element is present.

The samples under our consideration are excerpts from the address from the Brazilian president, which is 25 minutes long (equivalent to 08 pages) and the address from the President of the United States, which is 44 minutes long (equivalent to 11 pages). Following the argumentation phases proposed by Eemeren and Grootendorst, we will cover the moment of confrontation, the opening, the argumentation and the conclusion, and we will analyze them according to the chosen argumentative techniques, as well as the figures present within, according to the classification of Perelman and Tyteca, in *The new rhetoric: A treatise on argumentation.* We will pay special attention to the concluding phase, the peroration, based on Chapter 8 of *Argumentative Indicators in Discourse* (Van Eemeren, Houtlosser and Henkemans, 2007, pp.223-230).

The confrontation happens from the problems that motivate the speech, opening to the description that constitutes the grounds for argumentation itself, leading to the conclusion, when appeals to the UN and the international community are made.

In Dilma Rousseff's speech there is, initially, the exordium, with its habitual salutations, followed by the opening for considerations about recent problems of international repercussion, that is, the terrorist attack in Nairobi:

Allow me initially to express my satisfaction in having a renowned representative of Antigua and Barbuda – a country that is part of the Caribbean, which is so cherished in Brazil and in our region – to conduct the work of this session of the General Assembly. You can count, Excellency, on the permanent support of my Government.
Allow me also, at the beginning of my intervention, to express the repudiation of

the Brazilian Government and people to the terrorist attack that took place in Nairobi. I express our condolences and our solidarity to the families of the victims, the people and the Government of Kenya.

Terrorism, wherever it may occur and regardless of its origin, will always deserve our unequivocal condemnation and our firm resolve to fight against it. We will never give way to barbarity.

President Obama, in a concise way, salutes the President of the Assembly as well as his General Secretary, the delegates, and remaining attendees and, in three sentences, makes considerations about the institution, the UN, briefly outlining the history of its foundation, which constitutes an act of *captatio benevolentiae*.

Each year we come together to reaffirm the founding vision of this institution. For most of recorded history, individual aspirations were subject to whims of tyrants and empires. Divisions of race and religion and tribe were settled through the sword and the clash of armies. The idea that nations and peoples could come together in Peace to solve their disputes and advance a common prosperity seemed unimaginable.

It took the awful carnage of two world wars to shift our thinking.

For decades, the United Nations has in fact made a difference – from helping to eradicate disease, to educating children, to brokering Peace.

These movements are made by means of figures of presence, which bring back to memory past facts, contrasting them with the present situation and presenting them as a stimulus for further progress.

Next, reports of his actions in the presidency follow, describing them as a result from collective attitudes, by means of figures of communion, which involve the audience, constituted by the representatives of the countries attending the meeting. When talking about the economic crisis, which he highlights first, he thanks the efforts of all and points to what is still left to be done:

Now, five years after the global economy collapsed, and thanks to coordinated efforts by the countries here today, Jobs are being created, global financial systems have stabilized, and people are once again being lift out of poverty. But progress is fragile and unequal, and we still have work to do together to assure that our citizens can access the opportunities that they need to thrive in 21st century.

The central part of the argumentation of the President of Brazil is developed in three movements:

a. *The global network of electronic espionage*
In reference to it, she expresses indignation and repudiation on the part of large sectors of public opinion around the world. She dislocates and projects beyond her the evoked sentiments, which softens the possibility of an *ad hominem* that would make the continuation of her speech impossible. Next, she anticipates possible arguments from a counter-discourse, by means of a prolepsis figure, in order to refute them:

The arguments that the illegal interception of information and data aims at protecting nations against terrorism cannot be sustained.

When addressing the president, she refers to the president of the Assembly and, at that moment, establishes a tripolar argumentation, in which there is a proponent, an opponent and the question itself, the *ad rem*, before an audience which is also part of the proposal, once she refers to the International Human Rights, the *ad humanitatem*.

Friendly governments and societies that seek to build a true strategic partnership, as in our case, cannot allow recurring illegal actions to take place as if they were normal. They are unacceptable.

b. *Post 2015 Development Agenda*
After enumerating the feats from her government and showing the changes that happened in the country in the social and educational scenario, – after the Rio-20 meeting on poverty and environment, – she sums up her thought in an attempt to make the spirit that governs the 2015 agenda clear:

The meaning of the Post-2015 Agenda is the development of a world in which it is possible to grow, include and protect. Citizens with new hopes, new desires and new demands.

The figure of *repetition*, with which greater stress is associated, besides being deliberate, thus rhetorical, adds the presence effect to what she has proposed and considers feasible within the presented conditions.

c. *The June 2013 demonstrations*

The theme of change is the keynote and, with it, the maintenance of democracy, presenting what she calls pacts, another technique of the figure of communion, once the pact presupposes an agreement, consent:

We were educated day to day by the great struggles of Brazil. The street is our ground, our base.
We cannot just listen, we must act. We must transform this extraordinary energy into achievements for everyone.

Pay attention to the *metaphor*, the street as the foundation, which appeared in posters carried in last June's demonstrations and the language used by the media, metonymically personified in the "voice from the streets," "listen to the streets" and other expressions that overran the news and other genres.

If in the first part the tone of the speech was that of irritation, present in the body language of the orator, projecting her body forward, her facial expression, the eyes fixed on the audience, with a defiant air, the second part is the tone of firm determination that she categorically assumes. All of this constitutes what the architectural system of rhetoric calls *actio*, composing the scenario of the enunciation, which includes all the items involved in the circumstances in which the pronunciation of the question is given: rhythm of speech, pauses, intonation, movement in the scene, body language and gestures and other elements that constitute the act of communication itself. Socially, it is a rite, once it happens in well determined circumstances, following pre-codified parameters with the possibility of predicting the sense effects it will produce. That can be clearly observed in the repercussions broadcasted by the international media on the same day of the event or even on the following day. It is possible to observe the thermometer of these reactions in news outlets such as *The Guardian, New York Times, BBC for World Latin America*; in Brazil, the newspaper *O Estado de São Paulo* and the magazines *Veja* and *Carta Capital*. Let's see some of them in important media outlets:

The Guardian
Brazil's president, Dilma Rousseff, has launched a blistering attack on US espionage at the UN general assembly, accusing the NSA of violating international law by its indiscriminate collection of personal information of Brazilian citizens and economic espionage targeted on the country's strategic industries.

(…) the most serious diplomatic fallout over revelation of US spying.

(…) in a global rallying cry against what she portrayed as the overwhelming power of the US security apparatus.

(…) Brazil's new foreign minister, Luiz Alberto Figueiredo, will remain at the UN throughout the week and will meet his opposite number, John Kerry, Brazilian officials said, in an attempt to start mending the rift between the two countries.

O Estado de São Paulo

In its electronic page, it published a summary of what had circulated in the international press:

For *The Guardian*, the Brazilian president has made a "harsh attack" against the US espionage and accused the American government of violating the international law when it performed an "indiscriminate collection" of information from Brazilians. It has deemed the tone of Dilma's discourse as "furious" and a "direct challenge to Obama," who was waiting to deliver his address immediately afterwards.

The Internet page of the BBC published the headline "Brazil's president Rousseff attacks the US over spy claims" and draws attention to what the address classifies as "untenable," the argument given by Washington that the espionage in Brazil had the object of protecting nations from terrorists.

El País, the most important Spanish newspaper, brings the following headline: "Rousseff denounces espionage practices before the United Nations."

El Clarín, from Argentina, stressed the fact that the US espionage was an affront to Brazil and a lack of respect that cannot be justified by combat to terrorism. *La Nación* called attention to the accusation that the US breached the international right, violated the human rights and civil liberty.

It can be noticed that these do not constitute insult (*ad hominem*), because the argument is amply based on the fact (*ad rem*), confirmed by the media, even if in the speech of President Obama they appear to be diluted, a technique employed by him in order to minimize the question, presenting a highly impacting picture, with considerations that *a fortiori* overshadow those of the opponent.

In his speech, President Obama shows confidence, with an apparently calm countenance, at moments looking to one side of the audience and then to the

other side, with his habitual pauses, which confer certain weight to his affirmations, leaving long-lasting resonances with the intention of leading the audience to reflection. In order to attain that, the figure of communion is present at all times, such as when he affirms "all of us have a work to do", "the interest of all", "the international community".

In this scenario, it is possible to visualize the hierarchy of offices, with the tribune of the leaders from the UN above, and the presidential representatives below. The cameras focus on the room and its ampleness, closing in some personalities such as Obama's Secretary of State, John Kerry, and also the represented parties which are cited in speeches, such as Mali or Libya.

3. *Peroratio: both speeches*
When closing their speeches, the orators must present the results of their argumentation. That is what both do, presenting a follow-up of their programs and executions. We have highlighted the words and expressions that indicate the profiles and decisions, as well as the indicator of the phase of conclusion. Actually, there are two discussions and they do not reach a consensus once the question remains.

In Dilma's speech, three expressions can be found:

'*to reiterate*' (The general debate offers the opportunity to reiterate the fundamental principles which guide my country's foreign policy and our position with regards to pressing international issues);
'*I repeat*' (those arms. Their use, I repeat, is heinous and inadmissible under any circumstances).
'*I renew*' (I renew thus, an appeal in favor of a wide and vigorous convergence of political wills to sustain and reinvigorate the multilateral system, which has in United Nations its main pillar).

In Obama's speech, the conclusion is well characterized and marked by the expressions: '*Finally*', '*To summarize*', '*final point*', '*Ultimately*'. He finished with a figure of example, citing Martin Luther King and Mandela.

It is worth noticing his propositional attitude with *I believe*, which he repeats several times. It is known that this phrase refers not to the knowledge or ideas, but to the belief in something, so he is, with it, expressing his optimistic stance:

I Believe such disengagement would be a mistake. I believe America must remain engaged for our own security.
But I believe we can embrace a different future.

In his last argument, with anaphoric value, he reaffirms everything he has said before in his start point and reinforces the idea of community with a figure of communion:

And that's why we remain convinced that this community of nations can deliver a more peaceful, prosperous and just world to the next generation.

Bringing them both together now, for a final consideration:

Dilma:
a. She maintains her initial point of view, as antagonist in the question of privacy violation. The antagonist's criticism.
b. She was successful, based on the reaction from the press.

Obama:
a. As a protagonist, he did not retract. He did not withdraw his position.
b. He did not have anything to say, to refute, he could not appeal to the argument *ad ignorantiam*.

The pragmatic consequences could be noticed immediately, since the official visit of President Rousseff, that should have taken place the following month (October), was cancelled due to the fact that President Obama did not retract, uttering generic words aimed at the international community.

4. *Conclusion*
Finally, some reflections can be made taking three points into consideration:

a. Interests are always at play: it is possible to understand each other without being in agreement.
b. Diplomatic efforts require negotiations that not always produce effective results in the short run. Democracy demands effort.
c. The art of coexisting is part of the civilizatory movement that societies go through.

In fact, there is an incessant movement of construction of identities in which the individual and collective *ethos* are being molded and project themselves into the

circulating images, either in the maintenance and reinforcement work of what already exists, or by proposing new ways of behaving and living in the world. That is why we consider the argumentation as a dynamic and interactive fact.

References

Angenot, Marc (2008). *Dialogues de sourds. Traité de rhétorique antilogique.* Paris: Mille et une nuits.

Bellenger, Lionel (1984). *La Négociation*. 6ª ed. Paris: PUF.

Conley, Thomas (2010). *Toward a Rhetoric of Insult.* Chicago/London: The University of Chicago Press.

Eemeren, Frans H. van; Grootendorst, Rob (2004). *A Systematic Theory of Argumentation. The pragma-dialectical approach*. Cambridge/UK: CUP.

Eemeren, Frans H. van; Houtlosser, R., Peter; Snoeck Henkemans, A. F. (2007). *Argumentative Indicators in discourse. A pragma-dialectical study.* Dordrecht: Springer.

Grácio, Rui (2012). *Teorias da Argumentação.* Coimbra: Grácio Editor.

Houtlosser, Peter; Rees, Agnès van (2006). *Considering Pragma-Dialectics. A festschrift for Frans Eemeren*. New Jersey and London: L. Erlbaum.

Meyer, Michel (2011). *La Problématologie*. Paris: PUF.

Mosca, Lineide L. S (2007). *O espaço tensivo da controvérsia: uma abordagem discursivo-argumentativa. Filologia e Linguística Portuguesa*, 09, 293-310.

Mosca, Lineide L. S (org.) (2004). *Retóricas de Ontem e de Hoje.* 3ª ed. São Paulo: Humanitas.

Perelman, Chaïm; Olbrechts-Tyteca, L (1983). *Traité de L'Argumentation: La Nouvelle Rhétorique.* 4ª ed. Bruxelles: Editions de l'Université de Bruxelles;

Perelman, Chaïm (1971). *The New Rhetoric: a treatise on argumentation*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

Perelman, Chaïm (2009). L'Empire Rhétorique. Rhétorique et Argumentation. 2a ed. Paris: Vrin.

Meyer, Michel (2010). *Principia Rhetorica. Une théorie générale de l'argumentation*. Paris: Quadrige/PUF.

Meyer, Michel (2010b). *La Problématologie.* Paris: PUF.

ISSA Proceedings 2014 – Bingo! Promising Developments In Argumentation Theory

Abstract: On the occasion of the publication in 2014 of the new *Handbook of Argumentation Theory,* which provides an overview of the current state of the art in the field, van Eemeren identifies three major developments in the treatment of argumentation that he finds promising. First, there is in various theoretical traditions the trend towards empiricalization, which includes both qualitative and quantitative empirical research. Second, there is the increased and explicit attention being paid to the institutional macro-contexts in which argumentative discourse takes place and the effects they have on the argumentation. Third, there is, particularly in the dialectical approaches, a movement towards formalization, which is strongly stimulated by the recent advancement of artificial intelligence. According to van Eemeren, if they are integrated with each other and comply with pertinent academic requirements, the developments of empiricalization, contextualization and formalization of the treatment of argumentation will mean "bingo!" for the future of argumentation theory.

Keywords: contextualization, dialectical perspective, empiricalization, formalization, pragma-dialectics, rhetorical perspective, state of the art

1. *Changes in the state of the art of argumentation theory*
Since the conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation held in Amsterdam in July 2014 was the eighth ISSA conference, argumentation theorists from various kinds of backgrounds have been exchanging views about argumentation for almost thirty years. My keynote speech at the start of this conference seemed to me the right occasion for making some general comments on the way in which the field is progressing.

I considered myself in a good position to strike a balance because during the past five years I have been preparing an overview of the state of the art in a new *Handbook of Argumentation Theory.* I have done so together with my co-authors, Bart Garssen, Erik C. W. Krabbe, A. Francisca Snoeck Henkemans, Bart Verheij, and Jean H. M. Wagemans. In this complicated endeavour we have been

supported generously by a large group of knowledgeable reviewers and advisors from the field. On the 2 July reception of the ISSA conference the *Handbook* was to be presented to the community of argumentation scholars.

The Handbook of Argumentation Theory is the latest offshoot of a tradition of handbook writing that I started with Rob Grootendorst in the mid-1970s. We presented first several overviews of the state of the art in Dutch before publishing the handbook in English, the current lingua franca of scholarship (van Eemeren, Grootendorst & Kruiger,1978, 1981, 1986, and van Eemeren, Grootendorst & Kruiger, 1984, 1987, respectively). The most recent version of the handbook is *Fundamentals of Argumentation Theory*, which appeared in 1996 and was co-authored by a group of prominent argumentation scholars (van Eemeren et al., 1996).

The overview offered by the newly-completed version of the handbook constitutes the basis for giving a judgment of recent developments in the discipline. It goes without saying that a short speech does not allow me to pay attention to all developments that could be of interest; I limit myself to three major trends that I find promising. They involve innovations which are, in my view, vital for the future of the field.

Argumentation scholars are not in full harmony regarding the definition of the term *argumentation*.**[i]** There seems to be general agreement however that argumentation always involves trying to convince or persuade others by means of reasoned discourse.**[ii]** Although I think that most argumentation scholars will agree that the study of argumentation has a descriptive as well as a normative dimension, their views on how in actual research the two dimensions are to be approached will diverge**[iii]**. Unanimity comes almost certainly to an end when it has to be decided which theoretical perspective is to be favoured.**[iv]**

The general theoretical perspectives that are dominant are the *dialectical*, which concentrates foremost on procedural reasonableness, and the *rhetorical*, focusing on aspired effectiveness. In modern argumentation theory both theoretical traditions are pervaded by insights from philosophy, logic, pragmatics, discourse analysis, communication, and other disciplines. Since the late 1990s, a tendency has developed to connect, or even integrate, the two traditions.**[v]** Taking only a dialectical perspective involves the risk that relevant contextual and situational factors are not taken into account, while taking a purely rhetorical perspective

involves the risk that the critical dimension of argumentation is not explored to the full.**[vi]**

Compared to some thirty years ago, both the number of participants and the number of publications in argumentation theory have increased strikingly. Another remarkable difference is that nowadays not only North-American and European scholars are involved, but also Latin Americans, Asians and Arabs. In addition, an important impetus to the progress of argumentation theory is given by related disciplines such as *critical discourse analysis* and *persuasion research*.**[vii]**

Today I would like to concentrate on some recent changes in the way in which argumentation is examined. In my opinion, three major developments in the treatment of argumentation have begun to materialize that open up new avenues for research. Although they differ in shape, these developments can be observed across a broad spectrum of theoretical approaches. The three developments I have in mind can be designated as *empiricalization*, *contextualization*, and formalization of the treatment of *argumentation*.**[viii]**

2. *Empiricalization of the treatment of argumentation*
Modern argumentation theory manifested itself initially by the articulation of theoretical proposals for concepts and models of argumentation based on new philosophical views of reasonableness. In 1958, Stephen Toulmin presented a model of the various procedural steps involved in putting forward argumentation – or "argument," as he used to call it (Toulmin, 2003). He emphasized that, in order to deal adequately with the reasonableness of argumentation in the various "fields" of argumentative reality, an *empirical approach* to argumentation is needed. On their part, Chaïm Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, who co-founded modern argumentation theory, claimed to have based the theoretical categories of their "new rhetoric" on empirical observations (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969).**[ix]** Like Frege's theory of logic was founded upon a descriptive analysis of mathematical reasoning, they founded their argumentation theory on a descriptive analysis of reasoning with value judgments in the fields of law, history, philosophy, and literature.**[x]**

In spite of their insistence on "empiricalization" of the treatment of argumentation, the empirical dimension of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's own contributions to argumentation theory remains rather sketchy. In fact, all

prominent protagonists of modern argumentation theory in the 1950s, 60s and 70s concentrated in the first place on presenting theoretical proposals for dealing with argumentation and philosophical views in their support. This even applies to the Norwegian philosopher Arne Næss, however practical and empirical his orientation was.**[xi]** The empirical research Næss wanted to be carried out with regard to argumentation was designed to lead to a more precise determination of the statements about which disagreement exists.**[xii]** In his own work however he refrained from giving substance to the empirical dimension of argumentation theory.

Despite the strongly expressed preferences of the founding fathers, I conclude that the development of the empirical component of argumentation theory did not really take off until much later. Making such a sweeping statement however, forces you often to acknowledge exceptions immediately. In this case, I must admit that there is an old and rich tradition of empirically-oriented rhetorical scholarship in American communication studies.**[xiii]** The empirical research that is conducted in this tradition consists for the most part of *case studies*. One of its main branches, for instance, "rhetorical criticism," concentrates on analysing specific public speeches or texts that are meant to be persuasive. An excellent specimen is Michael Leff and Gerald Mohrmann's (1993) analysis of Abraham Lincoln's Cooper Union speech of February 27, 1860, designed to win nomination as spokesman for the Republican Party. David Zarefsky (1986) offers another example of such empirical research of historical political discourse in *President Johnson's War on Poverty.* His more encompassing central question is how Johnson's social program, put in the strategic perspective of a "war on poverty," and laid down in the Economic Opportunity Act, gained first such strong support and fell so far later on.

In my view, in argumentation theory argumentative reality is to be examined systematically, concentrating in particular on the influence of certain factors in argumentative reality on the production, interpretation, and assessment of argumentative discourse.**[xiv]** Two types of empirical research can be pertinent. First, *qualitative* research relying on introspection and observation by the researcher will usually be most appropriate when specific qualities, traits or conventions of particular specimens of argumentative discourse need to be depicted. Second, as a rule, *quantitative* research based on numerical data and statistics is required when generic "If X, then Y" claims regarding the production,

interpretation or assessment of argumentative discourse must be tested. It is basically the nature of the claim at issue that determines which type of evidence is required – examples or frequencies – and which type of empirical research is therefore most appropriate. Although *qualitative* as well as *quantitative* empirical research has its own function in examining argumentative discourse, and the two types of research may complement each other in various ways, carrying out qualitative research is in my opinion always a necessary preparatory step in gaining a better understanding of argumentative reality.**[xv]**

In France, Marianne Doury has recently carried out qualitative empirical research that is systematically connected with research questions of a more general kind (e.g., Doury, 2006). Her research, which is strongly influenced by insights from discourse and conversation analysis, aims at highlighting "the discursive and interactional devices used by speakers who face conflicting standpoints and need to take a stand in such a way as to hold out against contention" (Doury, 2009, p. 143). Doury focuses on the "spontaneous" argumentative norms revealed by the observation of argumentative exchanges in polemical contexts (Doury, 1997, 2004a, 2005). Her "emic," i.e. theory-independent, descriptions contribute to a form of argumentative "ethnography" (Doury, 2004b).

In contrast to theoretical research, in "informal logic" empirical research is rather thin on the ground. Nevertheless, Maurice Finocchiaro has carried out important qualitative research projects focusing on reasoning in scientific controversies (e.g., Finocchiaro, 2005b). His approach, which is directed at theorizing, can be characterized as both *historical* and *empirical.* Finocchiaro states explicitly that the theory of reasoning he has in mind "has an empirical orientation and is not a purely formal or abstract discipline" (2005a, p. 22).**[xvi]** Rather than judging arguments in historical controversies from an *a priori* perspective, as formal logicians do, Finocchiaro holds that the assessment criteria can and should be found empirically within the discourse.

The oldest and most well-known type of quantitative empirical research of argumentation takes place, mainly in the United States, in the related area of *persuasion research.* More often than not however persuasion research does not concentrate on argumentation. When it does, it deals with the persuasive effects of the way in which argumentation is presented (*message structure*) and the persuasive effects of the content of argumentation (*message content*). In the past years, both types of persuasion research have cumulated in large-scale "meta-

analyses," carried out most elaborately by Daniel O'Keefe (2006).

Recently the connection between argumentation and persuasion has been examined more frequently, also outside the United States, in particular by communication scholars from the University of Nijmegen. Their research concentrates for the most part on message content. Hans Hoeken (2001) addressed the relationship between the perception of the quality of an argument and its actual persuasiveness. His initial research, which can be seen as an altered replication of research conducted earlier by Baesler and Burgoon (1994), examined the perceived and actual persuasiveness of three different types of evidence: anecdotal, statistical, and causal evidence. The experimental results indicate that the various types of evidence had a different effect on the acceptance of the claim. However, the differences only partly replicate the pattern of results obtained in other studies. Contrary to expectations, in Hoeken's study causal evidence proved not to be the most convincing evidence. It was in fact just as persuasive as anecdotal evidence, and less persuasive than statistical evidence.**[xvii]** Later research conducted in Nijmegen has focused on the relative persuasiveness of different types of arguments.

Since the 1980s, quantitative empirical research has also been carried out in argumentation theory, albeit not by a great many scholars. In order to establish to what extent in argumentative reality the recognition of argumentative moves is facilitated or hampered by factors in their presentation I conducted experimental research together with Grootendorst and Bert Meuffels (van Eemeren, Grootendorst & Meuffels, 1984).**[xviii]** Dale Hample and Judith Dallinger (1986, 1987, 1991) investigated in the same period the editorial standards people apply in designing their own arguments.**[xix]** And Judith Sanders, Robert Gass and Richard Wiseman (1991) compared the assessments given by different ethnic groups in evaluating the strength or quality of warrants used in argumentation with assessments given by experts in the field of argumentation and debate (p. 709).**[xx]**

Several quantitative research projects have concentrated on ordinary arguers' pre-theoretical quality notions – or *norms of reasonableness.* Judith Bowker and Robert Trapp (1992), for example, studied laymen's norms for sound argumentation: Do ordinary arguers apply predictable, consistent criteria on the basis of which they distinguish between sound and unsound argumentation? Their conclusion is that the judgments of the respondents partially correlate with the

reasonableness norms formulated by informal logicians such as Ralph Johnson and Anthony Blair, and Trudy Govier (p. 228).**[xxi]**

Together with Garssen and Meuffels I carried out a comprehensive research project, reported in 2009 in *Fallacies and Judgments of Reasonableness*, to test experimentally the intersubjective acceptability of the pragma-dialectical norms for judging the reasonableness of argumentative discourse (van Eemeren, Garssen & Meuffels, 2009).**[xxii]** Rather than being "emic" standards of reasonableness, the pragma-dialectical norms are "etic" standards for resolving differences of opinion on the merits. They are designed to be "problem-valid" – or, in terms of Rupert Crawshay-Williams (1957), *methodologically necessary* for serving their purpose. Their "intersubjective" – or, in terms of Crawshay-Williams, "conventional" – validity for the arguers however is to be tested empirically. The general conclusion of our extended series of experimental tests is that all data that were obtained indicate that the norms ordinary arguers use when judging the reasonableness of contributions to a discussion correspond quite well with the pragma-dialectical norms for critical discussion. Based on this indirect evidence, the rules may be claimed to be *conventionally valid* – taken both individually and as a collective.**[xxiii]**

3. *Contextualization of the treatment of argumentation*
A second striking development in argumentation theory is the greatly increased attention being paid to the context in which argumentation takes places. By taking explicitly account of contextual differentiation in dealing with the production, analysis and evaluation of argumentative discourse this development goes beyond mere empiricalization. All four levels of context I once proposed to distinguish play a part in this endeavour: the "linguistic," the "situational," the "institutional," and the "intertextual" level (van Eemeren, 2010, pp. 17-19). Most prominent however is the inclusion of the institutional context I designated earlier the macro-context, which pertains to the kind of speech event in which the argumentation occurs. Paying attention to the *macro*-context is necessary to do justice to the fact that argumentative discourse is always situated in some more or less conventionalized institutional environment, which influences the way in which the argumentation takes shape.

Although in formal and informal logical approaches the macro-context has not very actively been taken into account,**[xxiv]** in modern argumentation theory the contextual dimension has been emphasized from the beginning. In the rhetorical

perspective in particular, contextual considerations have always been an integral part of the approach, starting in Antiquity with the distinction made in Aristotelian rhetoric between different "genres" of discourse. Characteristically, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca see context in the first place as "audience," which is accorded a central role in their *new rhetoric*. Christopher Tindale (1999) insists that in a rhetorical perspective there are still other contextual components than audience that should be taken into account (p. 75).**[xxv]**

According to Lloyd Bitzer (1999), rhetoric is situational because rhetorical discourse obtains its character from the situation which generates it. By the latter he means that rhetorical texts derive their character from *the circumstances of the historic context in which they occur*.**[xxvi]** The rhetorical situation should therefore be regarded "as a natural context of persons, events, objects, relations, and an exigence which strongly invites utterance" (1999, p. 219). Thanks to Bitzer, more and more rhetorical theorists began to realize that their analyses should take the context of the discourse duly into account.

In the 1970s, in "contextualizing" the study of argumentation, American communication scholars picked up Toulmin's (2003) notion of fields. In 1958, Toulmin had maintained that two arguments are in the same field if their data and claims are of the same *logical type.* However, the difficulty is that he did not define the notion of "logical type" but only indicated its meaning by means of examples. Some features or characteristics of argument, Toulmin suggested, are field-invariant, while others are field-dependent. In 1972, in *Human Understanding*, Toulmin had already moved away from this notion of fields, and had come to regard them as akin to academic disciplines.**[xxvii]**

Because, in Zarefsky's view, the concept of "fields" offers considerable promise for empirical and critical studies of argumentation, he thought it worthwhile to try to dispel the confusion about the idea of field without abandoning the concept altogether (1992, p. 417).**[xxviii]** He noted an extensive discussion at conferences of the communication and rhetoric community in the United States on whether "fields" should be defined in terms of academic disciplines or in terms of broad-based world-views such as Marxism and behaviourism (2012, p. 211). It can be observed however that, varying from author to author, the term *argument fields* is generally used more broadly as a synonym for "rhetorical communities," "discourse communities," "conceptual ecologies," "collective mentalities," "disciplines," and "professions." The common core idea seems to be that claims

imply "grounds," and that the grounds for knowledge claims lie in the epistemic practices and states of consensus in specific knowledge domains.**[xxix]**

Currently, in communication research in the United States the notion of "argument field" seems to be abandoned. Instead, a contextual notion has become prominent which is similar but not equal to argument field. This is the notion of *argument sphere,* **[xxx]** which was in 1982 introduced by Thomas Goodnight.**[xxxi]** Each argument sphere comes with specific practices.**[xxxii]** Goodnight offers some examples but does not present a complete list of such practices or an overview of their defining properties. For one thing, spheres of argument differ from each other in the norms for reasonable argument that prevail.**[xxxiii]** Members of "societies" and "historical cultures" participate, according to Goodnight, in vast, and not altogether coherent, superstructures, which invite them *to channel doubts through prevailing discourse practices*. In the democratic tradition, these channels can be recognized as the *personal*, the *technical*, and the *public* spheres, which operate through very different forms of invention and subject matter selection.**[xxxiv]** Inspired by Habermas and the Frankfurt School, Goodnight aims to show that the quality of public deliberation has atrophied since arguments drawn from the private and technical spheres have invaded, and perhaps even appropriated, the public sphere.**[xxxv]**

A rather new development in the contextualization of the study of argumentation is instigated by Douglas Walton and Erik Krabbe (1995), who take in their dialectical approach the contextual dimension of argumentative discourse into account by differentiating between different kinds of *dialogue types*: "normative framework[s] in which there is an exchange of arguments between two speech partners reasoning together in turn-taking sequence aimed at a collective goal" (Walton, 1998, p. 30).**[xxxvi]** Walton and Krabbe's typology of dialogues consists of six main types: persuasion, negotiation, inquiry, deliberation, information-seeking, and eristics, and additionally some mixed types, such as debate, committee meeting, and Socratic dialogue (1995, p. 66).**[xxxvii]** The various types of dialogue are characterized by their initial situation, method and goal.**[xxxviii]**

Over the past decades the pragma-dialectical theorizing too has developed explicitly and systematically towards the inclusion of the contextual dimension of argumentative discourse, especially after Peter Houtlosser and I had introduced the notion of *strategic manoeuvring* (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2002). Strategic

manoeuvring does not take part in an idealized critical discussion but in the multi-varied communicative practices that have developed in the various communicative domains. Because these practices have been established in specific *communicative activity types*, which are characterized by the way in which they are conventionalized, the communicative activity types constitute the institutional macro-contexts in which in "extended" pragma-dialectics argumentative discourse is examined (van Eemeren, 2010, pp. 129-162). The primary aim of this research is to find out in what ways the possibilities for strategic manoeuvring are determined by the institutionally motivated extrinsic constraints, known as *institutional preconditions*, ensuing from the conventionalization of the communicative activity types concerned.

In order to identify the institutional preconditions for strategic manoeuvring in the communicative activity types they examined, the pragma-dialecticians first determined how these activity types can be characterized argumentatively. Next they tried to establish how the parties involved operate in conducting their argumentative discourse in accordance with the room for strategic manoeuvring available in the communicative activity type concerned. To mention just a few examples: in concentrating on the legal domain, they examined strategic manoeuvring by the judge in a court case (Feteris, 2009); in concentrating on the political domain, strategic manoeuvring by Members of the European Parliament in a general debate (van Eemeren & Garssen, 2011); and in concentrating on the medical domain, the doctor's strategic manoeuvring in doctor-patient consultation (Labrie, 2012).

Meanwhile, at the University of Lugano, Eddo Rigotti and Andrea Rocci have started a related research program concentrating on argumentation in context. Characteristic of their approach is the combination of semantic and pragmatic insights from linguistics, and concepts from classical rhetoric and dialectic, with insights from argumentation theories such as pragma-dialectics. The communicative activity types they have tackled include mediation meetings from the domain of counseling (Greco Morasso, 2011), negotiations about takeovers from the financial domain (Palmieri, 2014), and editorial conferences from the domain of the media (Rocci & Zampa, 2015).

Recently the pragma-dialectical research of argumentation in context has moved on to the next stage. It is currently aimed at detecting the *argumentative patterns* of constellations of argumentative moves that, as a consequence of the

institutional preconditions for strategic manoeuvring, stereotypically come into being in the various kinds of argumentative practices in the legal, political, medical, and academic domains.**[xxxix]**

4. *Formalization of the treatment of argumentation*
The third development I would like to highlight is the "formalization" of the treatment of argumentation. When Toulmin and Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, each in their own way, initiated modern argumentation theory, they agreed – unconsciously but emphatically – that the formal approach to argumentation taken in modern logic was inadequate. In spite of the strong impact of their ideas upon others, their depreciation did not discourage logicians and dialecticians from further developing such a formal approach.

It is important to note that in the various proposals "formality" enters in rather diverse ways and a borderline between approaches that are formal and those that are not is not always easy to draw. A theory of argumentation, whether logical or dialectical, can be "formal" in several senses – and can also be partially formal or formal to some degree.**[xl]** Generally, in a "formal logical" or a "formal dialectical" argumentation theory "formal" refers to *being regimented* or *regulated*. Often, however, "formal" also means that the locutions dealt with in the formal system concerned are rigorously determined by grammatical rules, their *logical forms being determined by their linguistic shapes*. Additionally, an argumentation theory can be "formal" in the sense that its rules are wholly or partly *set up a priori*.

A formal theory of argumentation can be put to good use in different ways. The most familiar kind of use probably consists in its application in analyzing and evaluating arguments or an argumentative discussion. Formal systems often used for this purpose are propositional logic and first order predicate logic. Their application consists of "translating" each argument at issue into the language of one of these logics and then determining its validity by a truth table or some other available method.

Using a formal approach to analyse and evaluate real-life argumentative discourse leads to all kinds of problems. Four of them are mentioned in the *Handbook*. First, the process of translation is not straightforward. Second, a negative outcome does not mean that the argument is invalid – if an argument is not valid according to one system it could still be valid in some other system of

logic. Third, by overlooking unexpressed premises and the argument schemes that are used the crux of the argumentation is missed. Fourth, as a consequence, the evaluation is reduced to an evaluation of the validity of the reasoning used in the argumentation, neglecting the appropriateness of premises and the adequacy of the modes of arguing that are employed in the given context. Formal logic can be of help in reconstructing and assessing argumentation, but an adequate argumentation theory needs to be more encompassing and more communication-oriented.

A second way of using formal systems consists in utilizing or constructing them to contribute to the theoretical development of argumentation theory by providing clarifications of certain theoretical concepts. In this way, John Woods and Douglas Walton (1989), for instance, show how formal techniques can be helpful in dealing with the fallacies. Employing formal systems to instigate theoretical developments is, in my view, more rewarding that just using them in analyzing and evaluating argumentative discourse.

From Aristotle's *Prior Analytics* onwards, logicians have been chiefly concerned with the formal validity of deductions, pushing the actual activity of arguing in discussions into the background. This has divorced logic as a discipline from the practice of argumentation. Paul Lorenzen (1960) and his Erlangen School have made it possible to counteract this development. They promoted the idea that logic, instead of being concerned with a rational mind's inferences or truth in all possible worlds, should focus on discussion between two disagreeing parties in the actual world. They thus helped to bridge the gap between formal logic and argumentation theory noted by Toulmin and the authors of *The New Rhetoric*.

Because Lorenzen did not present his insights as a contribution to argumentation theory, their important implications for this discipline were initially not evident. In fact, Lorenzen took not only the first step towards a *re-dialectification* of logic, but his insights concerning the dialogical definition of logical constants also signal the initiation of a *pragmatic* approach to logic. In *From Axiom to Dialogue*, Else Barth and Erik Krabbe (1982) incorporated his insights in a formal dialectical theory of argumentation. Their primary purpose was "to develop acceptable rules for verbal resolution of conflicts of opinion" (p. 19). The rules of the dialectical systems they propose, which are "formal" in the regulative and sometimes also in the linguistic sense, standardize reasonable and critical discussions.

A third kind of use of formal systems consists in using them as a source of inspiration for developing a certain approach to argumentation. Such an approach may itself be informal or only partly formal. In argumentation theory the approaches inspired by formal studies serve as a link between formal and informal approaches. The semi-formal method of "profiles of dialogue" is a case in point.**[xli]** A profile of dialogue is typically written as an upside down tree diagram, consisting of nodes linked by line segments. Each branch of the tree displays a possible dialogue that may develop from the initial move. The nodes are associated with moves and the links between the nodes correspond to situations in the dialogue.

In pragma-dialectics, the method of profiles of dialogue inspired in its turn the use of "dialectical profiles" (van Eemeren, Houtlosser & Snoeck Henkemans, 2007, esp. Section 2.3), which are equally semi-formal as argument schemes and argumentation structures. A *dialectical profile* is "a sequential pattern of the moves the participants in a critical discussion are entitled to make – and in one way or another have to make – to realize a particular dialectical aim at a particular stage or sub-stage of the resolution process" (van Eemeren, 2010, p. 98).

A fourth and last use of a formal approach proceeds into the opposite direction. This is, for instance, the case when insights from argumentation theory are employed for creating formal applications in Artificial Intelligence. In return, of course, Artificial Intelligence offers argumentation theory a laboratory for examining implementations of its rules and concepts. Formal applications of insights from argumentation theory in Artificial Intelligence vary from making such insights instrumental in the construction of "argumentation machines," or at any rate visualization systems, interactive dialogue systems, and analysis systems, to developing less comprehensive tools for automated analysis. Of preeminent importance in these endeavours is the philosophical notion of *defeasible reasoning*, referring to inferences that can be blocked or defeated (Nute, 1994, p. 354). In 1987, John Pollock pointed out that "defeasible reasoning" is captured by what in Artificial Intelligence is called a non-monotonic logic. A logic is non-monotonic when a conclusion that, according to that logic, follows from certain premises need not always follow when more premises are added. In a non-monotonic logic, it is possible to draw tentative conclusions while keeping open the possibility that additional information may lead to their retraction.**[xlii]**

Although in *The Uses of Argument* the term *defeasible* is rarely used, Toulmin (2003) is obviously an early adopter of the idea of defeasible reasoning. He acknowledges that his key distinctions of "claims," "data," "warrants," "modal qualifiers," "conditions of rebuttal," and his ideas about the applicability or inapplicability of warrants, "will not be particularly novel to those who have studied explicitly the logic of special types of practical argument" (p. 131). Toulmin notes that H. L. A. Hart has shown the relevance of the notion of defeasibility for jurisprudence, free will, and responsibility and that David Ross has applied it to ethics, recognizing that moral rules may hold *prima facie*, but can have exceptions. The idea of a *prima facie* reason is closely related to non-monotonic inference: Q can be concluded from P but not when there is additional information R.

In order to take the possibility of defeating circumstances into account, in Artificial Intelligence the notion from argumentation theory called *argument scheme* or *argumentation scheme* has been taken up.**[xliii]** The critical questions associated with argument schemes correspond to defeating circumstances. Floris Bex, Henry Prakken, Christopher Reed and Walton (2003) have applied the concept of argumentation scheme, for instance, to the formalization of legal reasoning from evidence. One of the argument schemes they deal with is *argument from expert opinion*.

Viewed from the perspective of Artificial Intelligence, the work on argument schemes of Walton and his colleagues can be regarded as a contribution to the theory of knowledge representation. This knowledge representation point of view is further developed by Bart Verheij (2003b). Like Bex, Prakken, Reed and Walton (2003), he formalizes argument schemes as defeasible rules of inference.**[xliv]**

5. *Bingo!*
In my view, argumentation theory can only be a relevant discipline if it provides insights that enable a better understanding of argumentative reality. The empiricalization, contextualization, and formalization of the treatment of argumentation I have sketched are necessary preconditions for achieving this purpose. Without empiricalization, the connection with argumentative reality is not ensured. Without contextualization, there is no systematic differentiation of the various kinds of argumentative practices. Without formalization, the required precision and rigour of the theorizing are lacking.

Only if all three developments have come to full fruition, an understanding of argumentative reality can be achieved that constitutes a sound basis for practical intervention by proposing alternative formats and designs for argumentative practices, whether computerized or not, and developing methods for improving productive, analytic, and evaluative argumentative skills. In each case, however, there are certain prerequisites to the indispensable empiricalization, contextualization, and formalization of the treatment of argumentation.

Case studies, for instance, can play a constructive role in gaining insight into argumentative reality by means of empirical research, but, however illuminating they may be, they are not instrumental in the advancement of argumentation theory if they only enhance our understanding of a particular case. *Mutatis mutandis*, the same applies to other qualitative and quantitative empirical research that lacks theoretical relevance.**[xlv]** Some scholars think wrongly that qualitative research is superior because it "goes deeper" and leads to "real" insight, while other scholars, just as wrongly, consider quantitative research superior because it is "objective" and leads to "generalizable" results.**[xlvi]** In my view, both types of research are necessary for a complete picture of argumentative reality, sometimes even in combination.**[xlvii]** In all cases however it is a prerequisite that the research is systematically related to well-defined theoretical issues and relevant to the advancement of argumentation theory.

In gaining insight into the contextual constraints on argumentative discourse both analytical considerations concerning the rationale of a specific argumentative practice and a practical understanding of how this rationale is implemented in argumentative discourse play a part. In order to contribute to the advancement of argumentation theory as a discipline, the analytical considerations concerning the rationale of an argumentative practice should apply to all specimens of that particular communicative activity type – or dialogue type, if a different theoretical approach is favoured. To enable methodical comparisons between different types of communicative activities, and avoid arbitrary proliferation, the description of the implementation of the rationale must take place in functional and well-defined theoretical categories.

In the recent trend towards formalization, which has been strongly stimulated by the connection with computerization in the interdisciplinary field of artificial intelligence, not only logic-related approaches to argumentation are utilized, but also the Toulmin model and a variety of other theories of argumentation structure

and argument schemes, such as Walton and Krabbe's (1995). However, responding to the need for formal adequacy so strongly felt in information science may go at the expense of material adequacy, that is, at the expense of the extent to which the formalized theorizing covers argumentative reality. Relying at any cost on the formal and formalizable theoretical designs that are available in argumentation theory, however weak their theoretical basis may sometimes be, can easily lead to premature or too drastic formalizations and half-baked results. Because of the eclecticism involved in randomly combining incompatible insights from different theoretical approaches, these results may even be incoherent.

Provided that the prerequisites just mentioned are given their due, empiricalizing, contextualizing, and formalizing the treatment of argumentation are crucial to the future of argumentation theory, and more particularly to its applications and computerization. As the title of my keynote speech indicates, succeeding in properly combining and integrating the three developments would, in my view, mean: "Bingo!".

Let me conclude by illustrating my point with the help of a research project I am presently involved in with a team of pragma-dialecticians. The project is devoted to what I have named *argumentative patterns* (van Eemeren, 2012, p. 442). Argumentative patterns are structural regularities in argumentative discourse that can be observed empirically. These patterns can be characterized with the help of the theoretical tools provided by argumentation theory. Their occurrence can be explained by the institutional preconditions for strategic manoeuvring pertaining to a specific communicative activity type.

Dependent on the exigencies of a communicative domain, in the various communicative activity types different kinds of argumentative exchanges take place. The discrepancies are caused by the kind of difference of opinion to which in a particular communicative activity type the exchanges respond, the type of standpoint at issue, the procedural and material starting points, the specific requirements regarding the way in which the argumentative exchange is supposed to take place, and the kind of outcome allowed.**[xlviii]**

Each argumentative pattern that can be distinguished in argumentative reality is characterized by a constellation of argumentative moves in which, in dealing with a particular kind of difference of opinion, in defence of a particular type of standpoint, a particular argument scheme or combination of argument schemes is

used in a particular kind of argumentation structure (van Eemeren, 2012).**[xlix]** The theoretical instruments used by the pragma-dialecticians in their qualitative empirical research aimed at identifying argumentative patterns occurring in argumentative reality, such as the typologies of standpoints, differences of opinions, argument schemes, and argumentation structures,**[l]** are formalized to a certain degree.**[li]** Further formalization is required, in particular for computerization, which is nowadays a requirement for the various kinds of applications in actual argumentative practices instrumental in realizing the practical ambitions of argumentation theory.**[lii]**

Certain argumentative patterns are characteristic of the way in which argumentative discourse is generally conducted in specific communicative activity types. In parliamentary policy debates, for example, a "stereotypical" argumentative pattern that can be found consists of a prescriptive standpoint that a certain policy should be carried out, justified by pragmatic argumentation, supported by arguments from example. Such stereotypical argumentative patterns are of particular interest to pragma-dialecticians because an identification of the argumentative patterns typically occurring in particular communicative activity types is more insightful than, for instance, just listing the types of standpoints at issue or the argument schemes that are frequently used.**[liii]** Thus documenting the institutional diversification of argumentative practices paves the way for a systematic comparison and a theoretical account of context-independency and context-dependency in argumentative discourse that is more thorough, more refined, and better supported than Toulmin's account and other available accounts. In this way, our current research systematically tackles one of the fundamental problems of argumentation theory: universality versus particularity.

NOTES
i. See van Eemeren (2010, pp. 25-27) for the influence of being or not being a native speaker of English on the perception of argumentation and argumentation theory.
ii. In my view, instead of being a theory of proof or a general theory of reasoning or argument, argumentation theory concentrates on using argument to convince others by a reasonable discussion of the acceptability of the standpoints at issue. My view of argumentation theory is generally incorporated in more-encompassing views that have been advanced.

iii. As we observed in the new Handbook, "[s]ome argumentation theorists have a goal that is primarily (and sometimes even exclusively) descriptive, especially those theorists having a background in linguistics, discourse analysis, and rhetoric. They are interested, for instance, in finding out how in argumentative discourse speakers and writers try to convince or persuade others by making use of certain linguistic devices or by using other means to influence their audience or readership. Other argumentation theorists, often inspired by logic, philosophy, or insights from law, study argumentation primarily for normative purposes. They are interested in developing soundness criteria that argumentation must satisfy in order to qualify as rational or reasonable. They examine, for instance, the epistemic function argumentation fulfills or the fallacies that may occur in argumentative discourse" (van Eemeren et al., 2014, p. 29).

iv. According to the Handbook of argumentation theory, "The current state of the art in argumentation theory is characterized by the co-existence of a variety of theoretical perspectives and approaches, which differ considerably from each other in conceptualization, scope, and theoretical refinement" (van Eemeren et al., 2014, p. 29).

v. See for various views on combining insights from dialectic and rhetoric van Eemeren and Houtlosser (Eds., 2002). Van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2002) have proposed to integrate insights from rhetoric into the theoretical framework of pragma-dialectics. According to Tindale, who considers the rhetorical perspective as the most fundamental, the synthesis of the logical, dialectical and rhetorical perspectives should be grounded in the rhetorical perspective (1999, pp. 6-7).

vi. In our new Handbook we take the position that argumentation theory can best be viewed as an interdisciplinary study with logical, dialectical, and rhetorical dimensions (van Eemeren et al., 2014, p. 29).

vii. According to van Eemeren et al. (2014), a great number of contributions to the study of argumentation are not part of the generally recognized research traditions; some of them stem from related disciplines or have been developed in non-Anglophone parts of the world. See Chapter 12 of the Handbook.

viii. It goes without saying that, depending on one's theoretical position and preferences, other promising trends can be distinguished. A case in point may be the study of visual and other modalities of argumentation.

ix. In spite of various criticisms of the empirical adequacy of Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's taxonomy of argument schemes (van Eemeren et al., 1996, pp. 122-124; van Eemeren et al., 2014, p. 292), Warnick and Kline (1992) have made an effort to carry out empirical research based on this taxonomy.

x. The norms for rationality and reasonableness described in the new rhetoric have an "emic" basis: the criteria for the evaluation of argumentation that Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca provide are a description of various kinds of argumentation that can be successful in practice with the people for whom the argumentation is intended.

xi. In Interpretation and Preciseness, published in 1953, Næss revealed himself as a radical empirical semanticist, who liked questionnaires and personal interviews to be used for investigating what in particular circles is understood by particular expressions. However, he did not carried out such investigations himself.

xii. Although Næss's empirical ideas stimulated the coming into existence of the "Oslo School," a group of researchers investigating semantic relations, such as synonymy, by means of questionnaires, their influence in argumentation theory has been rather limited.

xiii. Already since the 1950s, contemporary argumentative discourse in the political domain has been carefully studied by rhetoricians such as Robert Newman (1961) and Edward Schiappa (2002), to name just two outstanding examples from different periods.

xiv. Because of its ambition to be an academic discipline which is of practical relevance in dealing with argumentative reality, argumentation theory needs to include empirical research relating to the philosophically motivated theoretical models that have been developed. To see to what extent argumentative reality agrees with the theory, the research programme of an argumentation theory such as pragma-dialectics therefore has an empirical component.

xv. Although in general quantitative research is only necessary with regard to more general claims, claims pertaining to a specific case can sometimes also be supported quantitatively. In any case, quantitative research is only relevant to argumentation theory if it increases our insight into argumentative reality.

xvi. At the same time, Finocchiaro emphasizes that "the empirical is contrasted primarily to the a priori, and not, for example, to the normative or the theoretical" (2005a, p. 47).

xvii. Corresponding with its actual persuasiveness, statistical evidence is rated as stronger than anecdotal evidence. Ratings of the strength of the argument are in both cases strongly related to its actual persuasiveness. In contrast, causal evidence received higher ratings compared to its actual persuasiveness.

xviii. See Garssen (2002) for experimental research into whether ordinary arguers have a pre-theoretical notion of argument schemes.

xix. More recently, Hample collaborated with Fabio Paglieri and Ling Na (2011) in answering the question of when people are inclined to start a discussion.

xx. Another type of quantitative research focuses on cognitive processes. Voss, Fincher-Kiefer, Wiley and Ney Silfies (1993), for instance, present a model of informal argument processing and describe experiments that provide support for the model.

xxi. Making also use of an "empiricistic" method, Schreier, Groeben and Christmann (1995) introduced the concept of argumentational integrity to develop ethical criteria for assessing contributions to argumentative discussions in daily life based on experimental findings.

xxii. This research was, of course, not aimed at legitimizing the model of a critical discussion. All the same, by indicating which factors are worth investigating because of their significance for resolving a difference of opinion on the merits, the model gives direction to the research.

xxiii. Within the field of experimental psychology, Hugo Mercier and Dan Sperber (2011) have recently proposed an "argumentative theory" which hypothesizes that the (main) function of reasoning is argumentative: "to produce arguments so we can convince others and to evaluate others' arguments so as to be convinced only when appropriate" (Mercier, 2012, pp. 259-260). Putting forward this hypothesis on the function of reasoning enables them to (re)interpret many of the findings of tests conducted in experimental psychology. As to further research, Mercier (2012, p. 266) proposes to take typologies regarding argument schemes and their associated critical questions developed in argumentation theory as a starting point for experimental studies regarding the evaluation of arguments. In this way, it might become clear which cognitive mechanisms are at play when people evaluate certain types of argumentation.

xxiv. The exception is "natural logic," which studies arguments in a context of situated argumentative discourse in describing the "logic" of ordinary argumentative discourse in a non-normative, "naturalistic" way.

xxv. A first contextual component Tindale (1999) distinguishes is locality, "the time and the place in which the argument is located" (p. 75); a second one is background, "those events that bear on the argumentation in question" (p. 76); a third one is the arguer, the source of the argumentation (p. 77); and a fourth component of context he distinguishes is expression, the way in which the argument is expressed (p. 80). Characteristically, Tindale defines audience relevance – an important element of contextual relevance which is a precondition for the acceptability of argumentation – as "the relation of the information-content

of an

argument, stated and assumed, to the framework of beliefs and commitments that are likely to be held by the audience for which it is intended" (1999, p. 102, my italics).

xxvi. In Bitzer's view, every rhetorical situation has three constituents: (1) the exigence that is the "imperfection" (problem, defect or obstacle) which should be changed by the discourse; (2) the audience that is required because rhetorical discourse produces change by influencing the decisions and actions of persons who function as a "mediator of change"; and (3) the constraints of the rhetorical situation which influence the rhetor and can be brought to bear upon the audience (pp. 220-221). The rhetorical situation may therefore be defined as "a complex of persons, events, objects, and relations presenting an actual or potential exigence which can be completely or partially removed if discourse, introduced into the situation, can so constrain human decision or action as to bring about the significant modification of the exigence" (Bitzer, 1999, p. 220).

xxvii. In spite of the confusion, some argumentation scholars still found the idea of argument fields useful for distinguishing between field-invariant aspects of argument and aspects of argument that vary from field to field.

xxviii. Zarefsky identifies and discusses three recurrent issues in theories about argument fields: the purpose of the concept of argument fields, the nature of argument fields, and the development of argument fields.

xxix. The positions of the advocates of the various denominators can be interpreted by inferring the kinds of backgrounds they presuppose: the traditions, practices, ideas, texts, and methods of particular groups (Dunbar, 1986; Sillars, 1981). Willard, for one, advocated a sociological-rhetorical version of the field theory. For him, fields are "sociological entities whose unity stems from practices" (1982, p. 75). Consistent with the Chicago School, Willard defines fields as existing in the actions of the members of a field. These actions are in his view essentially rhetorical. Rowland (1992, p. 470) also addresses the meaning and the utility of argument fields. He argues for a purpose-centred approach. In his view, the essential characteristics of an argument field are best described by identifying the purpose shared by members of the field (p. 497).

xxx. See Goodnight (1980, 1982, 1987a, 1987b). For a collection of papers devoted to spheres of argument, see Gronbeck (Ed., 1989).

xxxi. Although Goodnight does not reject the notion of argument field, he finds it "not a satisfactory umbrella for covering the grounding of all arguments" (2012, p. 209). In his view, the idea that all arguments are "grounded in fields,

enterprises characterized by some degree of specialization and compactness, contravenes an essential distinction among groundings" (p. 209).

xxxii. Zarefsky (2012, pp. 212-213) proposes a taxonomical scheme for spheres which consists of the following distinguishing criteria: Who participates in the discourse? Who sets the rules of procedure? What kind of knowledge is required? How are the contributions to be evaluated? What is the end-result of the deliberation?

xxxiii. While the notion of "argument field" seems to be abandoned, argumentation scholars still frequently use the notion of "sphere." Schiappa (2012), for instance, compares and contrasts in his research the arguments advanced in the technical sphere of legal and constitutional debate with those used in the public sphere.

xxxiv. Michael Hazen and Thomas Hynes (2011) focus on the functioning of argument in the public and private spheres of communication (or, as they call them, "domains") in different forms of society. While an extensive literature exists on the role of argument in democracy and the public sphere, there is no corresponding literature regarding non-democratic societies.

xxxv. Goodnight (2012) suggests that the grounds of argument may be altered over time: A way of arguing appropriate to a given sphere can be shifted to a new grounding. This means that spheres start to intermingle. It is important to realize that Goodnight combines in fact two ideas (the idea of the spheres and the idea of a threat to the public sphere), but that this is not necessary: One can find the "spheres" notion analytically useful without accepting the idea of a threat to the public sphere.

xxxvi. Walton (1998) defines a dialogue as a "normative framework in which there is an exchange of arguments between two speech partners reasoning together in turn-taking sequence aimed at a collective goal" (p. 30). There is a main goal, which is the goal of the dialogue, and there are goals of the participants. The two kinds of goals may or may not correspond.

xxxvii. In a recent version of the typology (Walton, 2010), the list consists of seven types, since a dialogue type called discovery, attributed to McBurney and Parsons (2001), is added to the six types just mentioned.

xxxviii. An inquiry, for instance, has a lack of proof as its initial situation, uses knowledge-based argumentation as a method, and has the establishment of proof as a goal.

xxxix. The underlying assumption here is that in the argumentation stage protagonists may in principle be supposed to aim for making the strongest case in

the macro-context concerned by trying to advance a combination of reasons that will satisfy the antagonist by leaving no critical doubts unanswered. In the process they may be expected to exploit the argument schemes they consider most effective in the situation at hand and to use all multiple, coordinative and subordinative argumentation that is necessary to respond to the critical reactions the antagonist may be expected to come up with.

xl. Of the three distinct senses of "formal" pointed out by Barth and Krabbe (1982, pp. 14-19), and the two added by Krabbe (1982, p. 3), only three are pertinent to argumentation theory. Krabbe's first sense refers to Platonic forms and need not be considered here. The same goes for the fifth sense, which refers to systems that are purely logical, i.e., that do not provide for any material rule or move.

xli. Walton was probably the first to introduce profiles of dialogues by that name (1989a, pp. 37-38; 1989b, pp. 68-69). Other relevant publications are Krabbe (2002) and van Laar (2003a, 2003b).

xlii. Dung (1995) initiated the study of argument attack as a (mathematical) directed graph, and showed formal connections between non-monotonic logic and argumentation. Just like Bondarenko et al. (1997), Verheij (2003a) developed an assumption-based model of defeasible argumentation. Prakken (1997) explored the connection between non-monotonic logic and legal argumentation.

xliii. In the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation, argument schemes are distinguished from the formal schemes of reasoning of logic. These argument schemes are defeasible. They play a vital role in the intersubjective testing procedure, which boils down to asking critical questions and reacting to them. By asking critical questions, the antagonist challenges the protagonist to make clear that, in the particular case at hand, there are no exceptions to the general rule invoked by the use of the argument scheme concerned.

xliv. Reed and Rowe (2004) have incorporated argument schemes in their Araucaria tool for the analysis of argumentative texts. Rahwan, Zablith and Reed (2007) have proposed formats for the integration of argument schemes in what is called the Semantic Web. Gordon, Prakken and Walton (2007) have integrated argument schemes in their Carneades model.

xlv. A great deal of the qualitative empirical research that has been carried out in argumentation theory is not only case-based but also very much ad hoc. In addition, a great deal of the quantitative persuasion research that is carried out suffers from a lack of theoretical relevance.

xlvi. An additional problem is that the distinction between qualitative and

quantitative research is not always defined in the same way. Psychologists and sociologists, for instance, tend to consider interviews and introspection as qualitative research because the results are not reported in numerical terms and statistics does not play a role. There are also less restrictive views, in which numerical reporting and the use of statistics are not the only distinctive feature.

xlvii. In the pragma-dialectical empirical research concerning fallacies, for instance, qualitative and quantitative research are methodically combined – in this case by having a qualitative follow-up of the quantitative research, as reported in van Eemeren, Garssen and Meuffels (2009).

xlviii. Viewed dialectically, argumentative patterns are generated by the protagonist's responding to, or anticipating, (possible) criticisms of the would-be antagonist, such as critical questions associated with the argument schemes that are used.

xlix. If an argument in defence of a standpoint is expected not to be accepted immediately, then more, other, additional or supporting arguments (or a combination of those) need to be advanced, which leads to an argumentative pattern with a complex argumentation structure (cumulative coordinative, multiple, complementary coordinative or subordinative argumentation (or a combination of those), respectively).

l. We will make use of the qualitative method of analytic induction (see, for instance, Jackson, 1986).

li. To determine and compare the frequencies of occurrence of the various stereotypical argumentative patterns that have been identified on analytical grounds while qualitative research has made clear how they occur, the qualitative empirical research will be followed by quantitative empirical research of representative corpuses of argumentative discourse to establish the frequency of occurrence of these patterns. This quantitative research needs to be based on the results of analytic and qualitative research in which it is established which argumentative patterns are functional in specific (clusters of) communicative activity types, so that theoretically motivated expectations (hypotheses) can be formulated about the circumstances in which specific argumentative patterns occur in particular communicative activity types and when they will occur.

lii. In view of the possibilities of computerization, other theories of argumentation that have been formalized only to a certain degree could in principle benefit equally from further formalization.

liii. An argumentative pattern become stereotypical due to the way in which the institutional preconditions pertaining to a certain communicative activity type

constrain the kinds of standpoints, the kinds of criticisms and the types of arguments that may be advanced.

References

Baesler, J. E., & Burgoon, J. K. (1994). The temporal effects of story and statistical evidence on belief change. *Communication Research,* 21, 582–602.

Barth, E. M., & Krabbe, E. C. W. (1982). *From axiom to dialogue. A philosophical study of logics and argumentation*. Berlin-New York: Walter de Gruyter.

Bex, F. J., Prakken, H., Reed, C., & Walton, D. N. (2003). Towards a formal account of reasoning about evidence. Argumentation schemes and generalisations. *Artificial Intelligence and Law,* 11, 125–165.

Bitzer, L. F. (1999). The rhetorical situation. In J. L. Lucaites, C. M. Condit & S. Caudill (Eds.), *Contemporary rhetorical theory. A reader*. New York: Guilford Press.

Bondarenko, A., Dung, P. M., Kowalski, R. A., & Toni, F. (1997). An abstract, argumentation-theoretic approach to default reasoning. *Artificial Intelligence*, 93, 63-101.

Bowker, J. K., & Trapp, R. (1992). Personal and ideational dimensions of good and poor arguments in human interaction. In F. H. van Eemeren & R. Grootendorst (Eds.), *Argumentation illuminated* (pp. 220-230). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.

Crawshay-Williams, R. (1957). *Methods and criteria of reasoning. An inquiry into the structure of controversy.* London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Doury, M. (1997). *Le débat immobile. L'argumentation dans le débat médiatique sur les parasciences* [The immobile debate. Argumentation in the media debate on the parasciences]. Paris: Kimé.

Doury, M. (2004a). La classification des arguments dans les discours ordinaires [The classification of arguments in ordinary discourse]. *Langage*, 154, 59-73.

Doury, M. (2004b). *La position de l'analyste de l'argumentation* [The position of the argumentation analyst]. Semen, 17, 143-163.

Doury, M. (2005). The accusation of amalgame as a meta-argumentative refutation. In F. H. van Eemeren & P. Houtlosser P. (Eds.), *The practice of argumentation* (pp. 145-161). Amsterdam-Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Doury, M. (2006). Evaluating analogy. Toward a descriptive approach to argumentative norms. In P. Houtlosser & M. A. van Rees (Eds.), *Considering pragma-dialectics. A festschrift for Frans H. van Eemeren on the occasion of his 60th birthday* (pp. 35-49). Mahwah, NJ-London: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Doury, M. (2009). Argument schemes typologies in practice. The case of

comparative arguments. In: F. H. van Eemeren & B. Garssen (Eds.), *Pondering on problems of argumentation* (pp. 141-155). New York: Springer.

Dunbar, N. R. (1986). *Laetrile. A case study of a public controversy. Journal of the American Forensic Association,* 22, 196–211.

Dung, P. M. (1995). On the acceptability of arguments and its fundamental role in non-monotonic reasoning, logic programming and n-person games. *Artificial Intelligence,* 77, 321-357.

Eemeren, F. H. van (2010). *Strategic maneuvering in argumentative discourse. Extending the pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation.* Amsterdam-Philadelphia: John Benjamins. (transl. into Chinese (in preparation), Italian (2014), Japanese (in preparation), Spanish (2013b)).

Eemeren, F. H. van (2012). The pragma-dialectical theory of argumentation under discussion. *Argumentation*, 26(4), 439-457.

Eemeren, F. H. van, & Garssen, B. (2011). Exploiting the room for strategic maneuvering in argumentative discourse. Dealing with audience demand in the European Parliament. In F. H. van Eemeren & B. Garssen (Eds.), *Exploring argumentative contexts*. Amsterdam-Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Eemeren, F. H. van, Garssen, B., Krabbe, E. C. W., Snoeck Henkemans, A. F., Verheij, B., & Wagemans, J. H. M. (2014). *Handbook of argumentation theory.* Dordrecht etc.: Springer Reference.

Eemeren, F. H. van, Garssen, B., & Meuffels, B. (2009). *Fallacies and judgments of reasonableness. Empirical research concerning the pragma-dialectical discussion rules*. Dordrecht etc.: Springer.

Eemeren, F. H. van, Grootendorst, R., & Kruiger, T. (1978). *Argumentatietheorie* [Argumentation theory]. Utrecht: Het Spectrum. (2nd enlarged ed. 1981; 3rd ed. 1986). (English transl. (1984, 1987).

Eemeren, F. H. van, Grootendorst, R., & Kruiger, T. (1981). *Argumentatietheorie* [Argumentation theory]. 2nd enlarged ed. Utrecht: Het Spectrum. (1st ed. 1978; 3rd ed. 1986). (English transl. (1984, 1987)).

Eemeren, F. H. van, Grootendorst, R., & Kruiger, T. (1984). *The study of argumentation.* New York: Irvington. (Engl. transl. by H. Lake of F. H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst & T. Kruiger (1981). *Argumentatietheorie*. 2nd ed. Utrecht: Het Spectrum). (1 st ed. 1978).

Eemeren, F. H. van, Grootendorst, R., & Kruiger, T. (1986). *Argumentatietheorie* [Argumentation theory]. 3rd ed. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff. (1st ed. 1978, Het Spectrum).

Eemeren, F. H. van, Grootendorst, R., & Kruiger, T. (1987). *Handbook of*

argumentation theory. A critical survey of classical backgrounds and modern studies. Dordrecht-Providence: Foris. (English transl. by H. Lake of F. H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst & T. Kruiger (1981). *Argumentatietheorie*. Utrecht etc.: Het Spectrum).

Eemeren, F. H. van, Grootendorst, R., & Meuffels, B. (1984). Het identificeren van enkelvoudige argumentatie [Identifying single argumentation]. *Tijdschrift voor Taalbeheersing*, 6(4), 297-310.

Eemeren, F. H. van, Grootendorst, R., & Snoeck Henkemans, A. F., with Blair, J. A., Johnson, R. H., Krabbe, E. C. W., Plantin, C., Walton, D. N., Willard, C. A., Woods, J., & Zarefsky, D. (1996). *Fundamentals of argumentation theory. Handbook of historical backgrounds and contemporary developments.* Mawhah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. (transl. into Dutch (1997)).

Eemeren, F. H. van, & Houtlosser, P. (2002). Strategic maneuvering in argumentative discourse. Maintaining a delicate balance. In F. H. van Eemeren & P. Houtlosser (Eds.), *Dialectic and rhetoric. The warp and woof of argumentation analysis* (pp. 131-159). Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic.

Eemeren, F. H. van, & Houtlosser, P. (Eds., 2002). *Dialectic and rhetoric. The warp and woof of argumentation analysis.* Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic.

Eemeren, F. H. van, Houtlosser, P., & Snoeck Henkemans, A. F. (2007). *Argumentative indicators in discourse. A pragma-dialectical study.* Dordrecht: Springer.

Feteris, E. T. (2009). Strategic maneuvering in the justification of judicial decisions. In F. H. van Eemeren (Ed.), *Examining argumentation in context. Fifteen studies on strategic maneuvering* (pp. 93-114). Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Finocchiaro, M. A. (2005a). *Arguments about arguments. Systematic, critical and historical essays in logical theory.* Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Finocchiaro, M. A. (2005b). *Retrying Galileo*, 1633–1992. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Garssen, B. J. (2002). Understanding argument schemes. In F. H. van Eemeren (Ed.), *Advances in pragma-dialectics* (pp. 93-104). Amsterdam-Newport News, VA: Sic Sat &Vale Press.

Goodnight, G. Th. (1980). The liberal and the conservative presumptions. On political philosophy and the foundation of public argument. In J. Rhodes & S. Newell (Eds.), *Proceedings of the [first] summer conference on argumentation* (pp. 304–337). Annandale, VA: Speech Communication Association.

Goodnight, G. T. (1982). The personal, technical, and public spheres of argument.

A speculative inquiry into the art of public deliberation. *Journal of the American Forensic Association,* 18, 214–227.

Goodnight, G. T. (1987a). Argumentation, criticism and rhetoric. A comparison of modern and post-modern stances in humanistic inquiry. In J. W. Wenzel (Ed.), *Argument and critical practices. Proceedings of the fifth SCA/AFA conference on argumentation* (pp. 61–67). Annandale, VA: Speech Communication Association.

Goodnight, G. T. (1987b). Generational argument. In F. H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, J. A. Blair & C. A. Willard (Eds.), *Argumentation. Across the lines of discipline. Proceedings of the conference on argumentation 1986* (pp. 129–144). Dordrecht-Providence: Foris.

Goodnight, G. T. (2012). The personal, technical, and public spheres. A note on 21st century critical communication inquiry. *Argumentation and Advocacy*, 48(4), 258-267.

Gordon, T. F., Prakken, H., & Walton, D. N. (2007). The Carneades model of argument and burden of proof. *Artificial Intelligence*, 171, 875–896.

Greco Morasso, S. (2011). *Argumentation in dispute mediation. A reasonable way to handle conflict.* Amsterdam-Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Gronbeck, B. E. (Ed., 1989). Spheres of argument. *Proceedings of the sixth SCA/AFA conference on argumentation.* Annandale, VA: SCA.

Hample, D., & Dallinger, J. (1986). The judgment phase of invention. In F. H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, J. A. Blair & C. A. Willard (Eds.), *Argumentation. Across the lines of discipline. Proceedings of the conference on argumentation 1986* (pp. 225-234). Dordrecht-Providence: Foris.

Hample, D., & Dallinger, J. M. (1987). Cognitive editing of argument strategies. *Human Communication Research*, 14, 123-144.

Hample, D., & Dallinger J. M. (1991) Cognitive editing of arguments and interpersonal construct differentiation. Refining the relationship. In F. H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, J. A. Blair & C. A. Willard (Eds.). *Proceedings of the second international conference on argumentation* (organized by the International Society for the Study of Argumentation at the University of Amsterdam, June 19–22, 1990) (pp. 567-574). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.

Hample, D., Paglieri, F., & Na, L. (2011). The costs and benefits of arguing. Predicting the decision whether to engage or not. In F. H. van Eemeren, B. J. Garssen, D. Godden & G. Mitchell (Eds.), *Proceedings of the 7thconference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation* (pp. 718-732). Amsterdam: Rozenberg/Sic Sat. [CD ROM].

Hazen, M. D., & Hynes, T. J. (2011). An exploratory study of argument in the

public and private domains of differing forms of societies. In F. H. van Eemeren, B. Garssen, D. Godden & G. Mitchell (Eds.) *Proceedings of the 7th conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation* (pp. 750-762). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.

Jackson, S. (1986). Building a case for claims about discourse structure. In D. G. Ellis & W. A. Donohane (Eds.). *Contemporary issues in language and discourse.* (pp. 129-147). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Krabbe, E. C. W. (1982). *Studies in dialogical logic.* Doctoral dissertation University of Groningen.

Krabbe, E. C. W. (2002). Profiles of dialogue as a dialectical tool. In F. H. van Eemeren (Ed.), *Advances in pragma-dialectics* (pp. 153-167). Amsterdam: Sic Sat & Newport News, VA: Vale Press.

Laar, J. A. van (2003a). *The dialectic of ambiguity. A contribution to the study of argumentation*. Doctoral dissertation University of Groningen.

Laar, J. A. van (2003b). The use of dialogue profiles for the study of ambiguity. In F. H. van Eemeren, J. A Blair, C. A. Willard & A. F. Snoeck Henkemans (Eds.), *Proceedings of the fifth conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation* (pp. 659-663). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.

Labrie, N. (2012). Strategic maneuvering in treatment decision-making discussions. Two cases in point. *Argumentation*, 26(2), 171-199.

Leff, M. C., & Mohrmann, G. P. (1993). Lincoln at Cooper Union. A rhetorical analysis of the text. In T. W. Benson (Ed.)*, Landmark essays on rhetorical criticism* (pp. 173-187).

Lorenzen, P. (1960). Logik und Agon [Logic and agon]. In *Atti del XII congresso internazionale di filosofia* (Venezia, 12-18 settembre 1958), 4: Logica, linguaggio e comunicazione [Proceedings of the 12th international conference of philosophy (Venice, 12-13 September 1958), 4: Logic, language and communication] (pp. 187-194). Florence: Sansoni. Reprinted in P. Lorenzen & K. Lorenz (1978), Dialogische Logik [Dialogical logic] (pp. 1-8). Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.

McBurney, P., & Parsons, S. (2001). Chance discovery using dialectical argumentation. In T. Terano, T. Nishida, A. Namatame, S. Tsumoto, Y. Ohsawa & T. Washio (Eds.), *New frontiers in artificial intelligence* (pp. 414-424). Berlin: Springer.

Mercier, H. (2012). Some clarifications about the argumentative theory of reasoning. A reply to Santibáñez Yáñez (2012)*. Informal Logic,* 32(2), 259-268.

Mercier, H., & Sperber, D. (2011). Why do humans reason? Arguments for an

argumentative theory. *Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 34, 57-111.

Næss, A. (1953). *Interpretation and preciseness. A contribution to the theory of communication.* Oslo: Skrifter utgitt ar der norske videnskaps academie.

Newman, R. P. (1961). *Recognition of communist China? A study in argument.* New York: Macmillan.

Nute, D. (1994). Defeasible logic. In D. M. Gabbay, C. J. Hogger & J. A. Robinson (Eds.), *Handbook of logic in artificial intelligence and logic programming, 3. Non-monotonic reasoning and uncertain reasoning* (pp. 353-395). Oxford: Clarendon Press.

O'Keefe, D. J. (2006). Pragma-dialectics and persuasion effects research. In: P. Houtlosser & M. A. van Rees (Eds.), *Considering pragma-dialectics. A festschrift for Frans H. van Eemeren on the occasion of his 60th birthday* (pp. 235-243). Mahwah, NJ-London: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Palmieri, R. (2014). *Corporate argumentation in takeover bids.* Amsterdam-Philadelphia: John Benjamins.

Perelman, C., & Olbrechts-Tyteca, L. (1969). *The new rhetoric. A treatise on argumentation*. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. (English transl. by J. Wilkinson and P. Weaver of Ch. Perelman & L. Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958). La nouvelle rhétorique. Traité de l'argumentation. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. (3rd ed. Brussels: Éditions de l'Université de Bruxelles)).

Pollock, J. L. (1987). Defeasible reasoning. *Cognitive Science,* 11, 481-518.

Prakken, H. (1997). *Logical tools for modelling legal argument. A study of defeasible reasoning in law*. Dordrecht: Kluwer.

Rahwan, I., Zablith, F., & Reed, C. (2007). Laying the foundations for a world wide argument web. *Artificial Intelligence*, 171(10-15), 897-921.

Reed, C. A., & Rowe, G. W. A. (2004). Araucaria. Software for argument analysis, diagramming and representation. *International Journal on Artificial Intelligence Tools,* 13(4), 961-979.

Rocci, A., & Zampa, M. (2015). Practical argumentation in newsmaking: The editorial conference as a deliberative activity type. In F. H. van Eemeren, E. Rigotti, A. Rocci, J. Sàágua & D. Walton (Eds.). *Practical argumentation.* Dordrecht: Springer.

Sanders, J. A., Gass, R. H., & Wiseman, R. L. (1991). The influence of type of warrant and receivers' ethnicity on perceptions of warrant strength. In F. H. van Eemeren, R. Grootendorst, J. A. Blair & C. A. Willard (Eds.), *Proceedings of the second international conference on argumentation*(organized by the International Society for the Study of Argumentation at the University of Amsterdam, June

19–22, 1990), 1B (pp. 709-718). Amsterdam: Sic Sat.

Schiappa, E. (2002). Evaluating argumentative discourse from a rhetorical perspective. Defining 'person' and 'human life' in constitutional disputes over abortion. In F. H. van Eemeren & P. Houtlosser (Eds.), *Dialectic and rhetoric. The warp and woof of argumentation analysis* (pp. 65-80). Dordrecht etc.: Kluwer.

Schiappa, E. (2012). Defining marriage in California. An analysis of public and technical argument. *Argumentation and Advocacy,* 48(2), 211-215.

Schreier, M. N., Groeben, N., & Christmann, U. (1995). That's not fair! Argumentative integrity as an ethics of argumentative communication. *Argumentation,* 9(2), 267-289.

Sillars, M. O. (1981). Investigating religious argument as a field. In G. Ziegelmueller & J. Rhodes (Eds.), Dimensions of argument. *Proceedings of the second summer conference on argumentation* (pp. 143–151). Annandale, VA: Speech Communication Association.

Tindale, C. W. (1999), *Acts of arguing. A rhetorical model of argument.* Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

Toulmin, S. E. (1958). *The uses of argument.* Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. (updated ed. 2003).

Toulmin, S. E. (1972). *Human understanding.* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Toulmin, S. E. (2003). *The uses of argument.* Updated ed. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. (1st ed. 1958; paperback ed. 1964).

Verheij, B. (2003a). DefLog. On the logical interpretation of prima facie justified assumptions. *Journal of Logic and Computation,* 13(3), 319-346.

Verheij, B. (2003b). Dialectical argumentation with argumentation schemes. An approach to legal logic. *Artificial Intelligence and Law*, 11(1-2), 167-195.

Voss, J. F., Fincher-Kiefer, R., Wiley, J., & Ney Silfies, L. (1993). On the processing of arguments. *Argumentation*, 7(2), pp. 165-181.

Walton, D. N. (1989a). *Informal logic. A handbook for critical argumentation.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Walton, D. N. (1989b). *Question-reply argumentation.* New York: Greenwood Press.

Walton, D. N. (1998). *The new dialectic. Conversational contexts of argument.* Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Walton, D. N., & Krabbe, E. C. W. (1995). *Commitment in dialogue. Basic concepts of interpersonal reasoning.* Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

Warnick, B., & Kline, S. L. (1992). The new rhetoric's argument schemes. A rhetorical view of practical reasoning. *Argumentation and Advocacy*, 29, 1–15.

Willard, C. A. (1982). Argument fields. In J. R. Cox & C. A. Willard (Eds.), *Advances in argumentation theory and research* (pp. 24-77). Carbondale & Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press.

Woods, J., & Walton, D. N. (1989). *Fallacies. Selected papers 1972-1982.* Berlin-Dordrecht-Providence: de Gruyter/Foris.

Zarefsky, D. (1986). *President Johnson's war on poverty*. Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press.

Zarefsky, D. (1992). Persistent questions in the theory of argument fields. In W. L. Benoit, D. Hample, D. & P. J. Benoit (Eds.), *Readings in argumentation* (pp. 417-436). Berlin- New York: Foris.

Zarefsky, D. (2012). Goodnight's "speculative inquiry" in its intellectual context. *Argumentation and Advocacy,* 48(2), 211-215

ISSA Proceedings 2014 – Self-Argumentative Words: The Case Of Nature And Natural

Abstract: The words nature and natural operate in a specific way while used in an argumentation. Observation confirms that these words are never used with a negative argumentative orientation. This functioning will be illustrated on a corpus of sequences of public debate about same sex marriage. The hypothesis according to which this fact is due to the intrinsic semantic properties of these words will be examined.

Keywords: nature / natural, point of view, semantics, argumentative potential

1. *Introduction*
Several words seem to be arguments in themselves: the choice of those words tend to determine a statement's argumentative potential. This idea, far from

being new, has been sustained for a long time by various branches of *Argumentation Within Language*, a semantic theory developed by the French scholars Ducrot and Anscombre (1983). Its basic thesis consists in the claim that any sentence in any language can be used as an argument for some (but not any!) conclusion (Raccah, 2002). Consequently, this argumentational potentiality ought to be taken into account while semantic descriptions of sentences, and their components, are carried out. This potentiality can be described after shrewd observation of language use and a generalization of the observations results. That also means that observation of language use, in this framework, is not a purpose but a way towards abstraction.

It will be shown that in a debate, *nature* or *natural* are of the kind of words that influence consistently the outcome of an argument. Through the analysis of sequences of public debate on topics such as, for example, same sex marriage, we can observe that the inherent argumentative power of these words is independent of their relevance to reality and, in some cases, prevail over the argumentative power of ideas.

Incidentally, a few theoretical issues will be addressed, among which the instability of words intrinsic value judgments through language evolution, and the relevance of the traditional distinction between connotation and denotation. Indeed, an examination of the words used in this study illustrates the position that, in at least some cases, properties that are usually relegated to the space of connotation are objectively describable semantic instructions, while denotation could only be described in vague terms.

2. *Words as arguments*

It is commonly admitted that the possible conclusions of argumentations are determined by several situational or contextual factors, but also restricted by their linguistic components. For example, any sentence containing the word but follows the same argumentative structure**[i]**. Many other examples could be listed of this kind of structural constraints triggered by connectives or operators.

It has been shown in Bruxelles & al. (1995) that some simple sentences (i.e. sentences without connectives or operators) can also be used in argumentations in a restricted way. This fact is due to the presence of words that crystallize widespread ideas in the language. Thus, said in a schematic way, peoples' ideas affect languages and languages affect peoples' ideas... This matter is abundantly

discussed in Ducrot's and his followers' works, especially in those that deal with the Theory of Topoi. It is not the aim of this paper to repeat those demonstrations. However, the analysis of the words *nature* and *natural* and of their argumentative behaviour in the selected discourse sequences will illustrate and fully corroborate these findings.

2.1. *Examples*

The following examples have been selected with the aim of giving an insight of the way speakers use the words nature and natural in actual argumentations. This is a token corpus**[ii]**, picked out from English speaking web articles, and their comments, about same sex marriage. The close context of the words under study is highlighted. There are arguments of both pro-gay-marriage and anti-gay-marriage.

(1)

If you plant a tomato seed, or a human seed and nourish them, they will grow naturally to bear fruit in the form of luscious tomatoes or a beautiful child. That's nature at work. If you destroy the tomato and the human seeds in their gestation period, you violate Natural Law. If you condone and allow the marriage of two homosexuals, that's also a *violation of natural law*.

http://www.pennlive.com/opinion/index.ssf/2013/09/same-sex_marriage_violates_natural_law_as_i_see_it.html

Comments of Internet users on (1):

(1.1)

I think it would be considered more *"natural" to be with the person you fell in love with*, rather than choosing a partner someone else told you to be with. Should my wife and I utilize any particular position in bed, or should we wait until you approve it first?

(1.2)

I was unaware that tomato plants marry. Also, if humans intervene in the natural activity of something, it is not really breaking a "law" any more than, say, a lion interrupting zebras mid-coitus to eat one of them. Zebras and lions also do not marry. They gravitate together in a family unit, true, but humans are the only species that require someone else to approve and bless their "natural" union. You might say that "marriage" is a violation of natural law because man is interfering

with the natural act of reproduction. How, then, is a church's mandate against pre-marital sex any different than your assertion that stomping down a tomato's right to reproduce is a violation of "natural law"? *If you are a proponent of "natural" law* then I suggest abolishing marriage as it limits what a man and woman can do with their sexual drives and relationships. Marriage is not a "natural" condition but a social contract developed by people to regulate who has sex, when, and why. You can make it whatever you want it to be. Be fruitful and multiply. Some marry without the desire or ability to bring children into the world. Is that interpretation of the word "unnatural"?

(1.3)
He should have noted that he supports *Christian Natural Law* as opposed to the classical liberal believe of natural law as put forth by thinkers such as Cicero and Rothbard. *Natural law simply states that through our creation we are born free and that our actions should not interfere with the freedom of others.* Homosexuals who wish to marry do not interfere with the actions of anyone and cause no harm to anyone except the perceived harm inflicted on Gerard and his ilk. Under the belief that because homosexuals cannot produce offspring as a direct result of their union sets a dangerous precedent. There are numerous traditional unions of heterosexuals that cannot or will not produce offspring. Are you to say now that barren couple of child bearing age or couples past their child bearing age should not marry?

(1.4)
Just because one's own religious texts mislabel the diction concerning effeminate men as spunk pockets (the texts that say "homosexuality" is referring to debasing weaker men sexually, not entering into a whole, meaningful, lifelong relationship), doesn't make it against *natural law, especially considering that natural law actually has a rather set place for homosexual unions in all species.*

(2)
Much of the anti-gay-marriage argument rests on two commonly held assumptions: Life-long exclusive mate-bonding for purposes of rearing joint offspring is natural, and homosexuality is unnatural. Both assumptions have little basis in fact. Homosexual acts have, in fact, now been widely documented across a range of mammal species (that's right – we're 'outing' mammals!), including our closest relatives, apes and monkeys. […] Meanwhile, there seems to be *nothing particularly 'natural' about marriage.* Only about 3% of mammal species are

monogamous – meaning they cohabitate – and few of these species mate for life. And nearly each partner in these 'animal marriages' engage in extra-pair mating. Lifelong sexual loyalty in nature is, it turns out, a vanishingly rare commodity.
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/paul-j-zak/gay-marriage-is-natural_b_112256.html

(3)
Natural law's most elementary precept is that "good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided." By his natural reason, man can perceive what is morally good or bad for him. Thus, he can know the end or purpose of each of his acts and how it is morally wrong to transform the means that help him accomplish an act into the act's purpose. Any situation which institutionalizes the circumvention of the purpose of the sexual act *violates natural law* and the objective norm of morality. Being rooted in human nature, *natural law is universal and immutable.* It applies to the entire human race, equally. It commands and forbids consistently, everywhere and always.
http://www.tfpstudentaction.org/politically-incorrect/homosexuality/10-reasons-why-homosexual-marriage-is-harmful-and-must-be-opposed.html

(4)
Is gay marriage also contrary to natural law? Many argue that it is, but there's no obvious reason to think so. The Vatican states that "marriage exists solely between a man and a woman", but even a cursory look at the history of marriage reveals that that isn't always the case. Marriages with multiple partners, for example, have been very common and same-sex unions have existed in one form or another in many cultures. Catholic teaching also says that the natural purpose of marriage and sex is procreation; thus, any union or sexual act where procreation isn't theoretically possible *isn't in accordance with natural law and is intrinsically immoral.* Curiously, only gay marriages are typically cited as examples of "naturally sterile" unions. Are they the only sort that exists? Of course not – but they are the only sort the Catholic Church wants banned by law. Unfortunately for the Vatican, however, most people today no longer consider procreation the necessary and intrinsic purpose of either sex or marriage.
http://atheism.about.com/od/gaymarriage/a/GaysUnnatural.htm

(5)
Comment of an Internet user on http://guardianlv.com/2014/03/same-sex-marriage-ban-violates-natural-law/
The natural law is what is in keeping with biology. *Same sex revulsion is natural,*

cause it is a species survival instinct.

(6)
Marriage in general is unnatural. A romantic union recognised in law and based in a traditional ceremony isn't something non-humans have much time for. A lion does not fill out extensive legal documents whenever he mates with a lioness [...]. http://www.theguardian.com/science/brain-flapping/2013/may/29/scientific-reasons-oppose-gay-marriage

Comments of Internet users on (6):

(6.1)
The article argues against the point that same-sex sexual interaction is unnatural by claiming that animals don't have marriage ceremonies. The author could have pointed out that some animals accidentally engage in same-sex interaction, but instead makes the pointless comment that animals don't have marriage ceremonies. *That's like saying all deaths are natural because animals don't have funerals.*

(6.2)
[...] when one looks at the laws of nature there is not a gay couple on the face of the earth that can reproduce between themselves. This by itself should tell us that a gay marriage and a heterosexual marriage are not equal.

(6.3)
Marriage is a natural mating habit for humans of opposite sexes and has been for millennia. It is also an expression of their reason which distinguishes them from animals. End of science lesson.

(6.4)
It's funny how they make a conclusion that homosexualism (*sic!*) in humans is natural based on some examples from animal world. I know about some frogs and fish which can change their sex in absence of the opposite sex. Can humans do the same (without any surgeries, etc.)? So how applicable are those comparisons to frogs, birds, and other creatures? It's just ridiculous.

3. *The conception of instructional semantics*
Argumentation Within Language and the *Semantics of Points of View*, a theoretical model arose from the latter, which is the framework of this paper,

belong to the so-called *instructional* branch of semantics. This type of semantics aims at describing the *modus operandi* of linguistic units, thus, the instructions that words (or linguistic structures) supply to their own interpretation. In order to understand the conception of semantics of this approach, an important conceptual distinction between sense and (word) meaning needs to be clarified.

According to this branch of semantics, *sense* concerns *utterances*; hence it is *variable* (with respect to language units), depending on the situation of utterance and other extra-linguistic elements. It is *subjective. Meaning (or sentence meaning)* concerns linguistic units, is stable in every situation of utterance and, therefore, is *objectively describable.*

The understanding of an utterance implies a process of interpretation. According to Raccah (2005, pp. 208-210, 2006, pp. 125,130,), the sense of an utterance is not transmitted from the speaker to the hearer but *constructed* by the hearer, by means of linguistic and extra-linguistic elements. These different inputs to the construction of sense work as *instructions*: each of them demarcates more or less precisely the ways one can, or cannot understand the utterance (if there were no such constraints, there would not be any possibility of understanding each other). Extra-linguistic instruction can be difficult, sometimes even impossible to objectivize, while linguistic instructions – the ones that interest us – constrain the construction of sense in a systematic manner. The latter constitute *sentence meaning*, and is the object of *semantics* as a discipline.

3.1 *Lexicalized points of view*
With regard to the crystallized ideas in language, the Semantics of Points of View maintains that widespread ideologies, value judgements, etc (called in a more neutral way *points of view*) can be carried by words. These points of view become stable semantic instructions, thus, they are part of the *meaning* of these word. According to Raccah,

The points of view carried by words, which combine the yield to the argumentation of utterances are *implicit*: they are not the object of the discourse, but are necessary to accept (perhaps very provisionally) in order to *understand* the utterance. (Raccah, 2011, p. 1600).

The most simple of these points of view are the positive or negative value judgements. The words that carry these points of view are called *euphorical* (for

the positive judgements) or *dysphorical* words (for the negative judgements). The positive (respectively negative) points of view that these words trigger are part of their *meaning*. Thus, they are independent of the situations of utterance. This is the case of words like *beautiful, honest, improve… / horror, spoil, ugly…* An important consequence of the stability of these points of view is that euphorical words cannot be used negatively, and dysphorical words cannot be used positively in argumentations (unless in specifically marked discourses).

3.2. *Nature / natural: euphorical words?*

The hypothesis according to which *nature* and *natural* belong to the euphorical category**[iii]** is likely to explain the above observed phenomenon. In fact, if these words cannot be used negatively in argumentations because their semantic properties do not allow it, it is not surprising that both sides in the debate appropriate the "nature"-argument. It is a simple explanation but it has to be examined and tested before we accept it.

First of all, we have to determine if *nature* and *natural* are euphorical words. Yet, at first sight, they seem to be absolutely neutral, neither positive, nor negative. The hypothesis has to be tested: if it is possible to use these words in a negative way in an argumentation, the hypothesis falls naturally. One single example is sufficient to illustrate the difficulty in using them negatively:

*Ex. * This juice is natural but it is really tasty.*

The oddness of this utterance indicates that a semantic constraint proscribes such an argumentative orientation. Many other examples can be found or invented, but this oddness remains in all cases. As it has been already said, the euphorical (or dysphorical) character of the words does not completely prevent the negative (or positive) argumentations: anything is *possible* in specifically marked discourses (literature, irony, etc). But if so, the oddness of this kind of argumentation is part of the effect of these discourses. So, unless the contrary is proved, we can consider that nature and natural belong to the category of euphorical words. One could object that the fact that the "nature"-argument is used positively is not necessarily bound to the semantic properties of these words but simply to the commonly accepted idea that "natural is good". Indeed, the commonly accepted idea is definitely the origin of its crystallization in the English language. But it could not explain the systematic character of the positive use of this argument. Every reasonable person knows that not everything that is natural is good. Firstly,

philosophers have since long time acquired the painful conviction that there is no possible definition to the concept of nature. And yet, the "natural" argument is ubiquitous in food or cosmetics marketing... and it works. Moreover, we know that diseases and death are natural, too; but the "natural"-argument still remains positive. If we say in an argumentation that death is a natural thing, we do it, for example, in order to relieve the pain a person could feel, facing someone's death.

In summary, the euphorical character of the words nature and natural is more likely to explain the argumentative performance of the utterances containing them than the supposition that people actually think that natural things are always better than others.

4. *Two additional objections of principle*
One can easily observe that the positive point of view conveyed by the words nature and natural is rather a recent phenomenon in history. Indeed, the idealization of nature has progressively come along with the evolution of civilization and languages (not only English) have crystallize this ideology. Which leads us to a first possible objection of principle: this fact seems to be contradictory with the above asserted stability of lexicalized points of view. To answer this objection, it has to be clarified that the stability concerns the situations of utterance *at a given moment.* No stability in language history is claimed. On the contrary, it is interesting to observe that words can carry a specific point of view at a moment in time, and may lose them at some other moment. This fact makes pointless the efforts people can deploy to justify an actual use of a word by its etymology (for example: to pretend that calling someone a *Negro* is not insulting because this word means originally *black*...).

A second objection of principle has to be briefly examined. The introduction of the terms point of view, *euphorical / dysphorical* words may seem to be redundant, given the existence of the concept of *connotation,* which refers to the same kind of phenomenon. Simonffy (2010, pp. 308-310) carries out a detailed comparison between lexicalized points of view and connotation. The main difference is that connotation is seen as *secondary* to denotation, while the different branches of Argumentation Within Language have always claimed the opposite of this assertion. Ducrot's early works (1972, 1980...) contain efficient demonstrations of the primacy of argumentative values over informative ones. Lexicalized points of view, as we have seen, belong to the realm of argumentation and are not considered to be secondary to denotation.

5. *Conclusion*

This short study has aimed at showing how linguistic units can constitute constraints in actual argumentations. We could observe that, in a debate, both sides are likely to be "trapped" by words that impose a specific point of view. Falling in this linguistic trap is not inevitable. Even if it is not possible (and maybe not even necessary) to use nature or natural in a negative way, it is possible to get round the problem by contesting the general relevance of the "nature"-argument. To be fair to the participants of the public debate about same sex marriage, let us cite a few who did so:

(7)

Ultimately, the "homosexuality is unnatural" argument fails to support the case against same-sex marriage because there is no clear and convincing content to the concept of "unnatural" in the first place. Everything that is claimed to be "unnatural' is either arguably very natural, arguably irrelevant to what the laws should be, or is simply immaterial to what should be treated as moral and immoral. It's no coincidence that what is "unnatural" also happens to be condemned by the speaker's religious or cultural traditions. Just because some trait or activity isn't the norm among *humans doesn't make it "unnatural" and therefore wrong.*
http://atheism.about.com/od/gaymarriage/a/GaysUnnatural.htm

(8)

The nice thing about natural law is that it doesn't appeal to sectarian or confessional doctrine to justify its conclusions but on what is determined through the use of "reason" to be "natural" to human beings as rational animals – though it *often requires belief in a divine creator as the source of natural law.* Principles or goods derived from natural law can be things as basic as the duty of self-preservation or the care of children. What it isn't, however, is looking at nature for examples of "good behaviour" – for example, monogamous pairing among bird species is not a natural law argument – or at least not a good one – for monogamous marriage among human beings. You can always find a counter-example in nature; same-sex sexual behavior, for example, is commonly observed among animals.
http://www.uscatholic.org/blog/201212/birds-and-bees-natural-law-and-same-sex-civil-marriage-26711

(9)

The first issue is the massive amount of ground that the naturalness argument concedes to the opponents of gay rights. It is understandable to want to rebut the 'being gay isn't natural' argument, but the way many gay-rights campaigners have chosen to do so commits the exact same error as their opponents: the mistaken idea that morality has anything to do with what's natural. Change the subject of the opening quote above to, say, cannibalism, and the idea that we should look to nature and animals as a guide to what humans should be doing becomes obviously absurd. *Being gay's unnatural? So what?*
http://www.spiked-online.com/newsite/article/just_how_natural_is_homosexuality/13918#.U6_-UZR_vTp

The Semantics of Points of View supplies theoretical tools to the description of the semantic constraints that linguistic units trigger (cf. the concept of *lexical topical field*, Raccah 1990, Bruxelles & al. 1995). As discourse analysis has to deal with the linguistic elements that form texts and discourses, these tools can be used by discourse analysts. This lead has been explored several times, among others in Chmelik (2007), Várkonyi (2012).

NOTES
i. (i) […] the presence of but in a sentence requires that its utterances present the argumentative orientations of the utterances of the two halves of the sentence as opposed […].
(ii) […] the presence of but in a sentence produces the effect that its utterances are presented as arguments for the same conclusion as utterances of the second half of the sentence would be arguments for.
(iii) The presence of but in a sentence does not require an absolute choice of a particular argumentative orientation, nor does it produce any effect in this sense. (Raccah, 1990)
ii. The corpus is not the object, in the sense it could be the object of a sociolinguistic study or one of discourse analysis, but an illustration. Therefore, it has not been relevant to restrict their origin to a specific geographic area, or a particular period.
iii. Unless they are used as technical terms, as terms are supposed to be free from value judgements.

References
Anscombre, J-C. & Ducrot, O. (1983)*. L'argumentation dans la langue.* Bruxelles: Mardaga.

Bruxelles, S., Ducrot, O.& Raccah, P-Y. (1995). Argumentation and the lexical topical fields. *Journal of Pragmatics,* 1/2, pp. 99-114.

Chmelik, E. (2007). *L'idéologie dans les mots. Contribution à une description topique du lexique justifiée par des tests sémantiques. Application à la langue hongroise.* PhD thesis presented October 10th 2007 in Limoges.

Ducrot, O. (1991[1972]). *Dire et ne pas dire.* Paris: Hermann.

Ducrot, O. (1980). *Les échelles argumentatives.* Paris: Minuit.

Raccah, P-Y. (1990). Modelling Argumentation and Modelling with Argumentation ». Bruxelles: *Argumentation* 4, pp. 447-483.

Raccah, P-Y. (2005). Une sémantique du point de vue : de l'intersubjectivité à l'adhésion. *Discours Social, 2004, N° spécial « L'Énonciation identitaire : entre l'individuel et le collectif »*, 205-242.

Raccah, P-Y. (2006). Polyphonie et argumentation : des discours à la langue (et retour…). In Simonffy, Zs. (éd.). *L'un et le multiple.* Budapest : TINTA Könyvkiadó, pp. 120-152.

Raccah, P-Y. (2011). A semantic structure for points of view: about linguistic constraints on argumentation. *Proceedings of the 7th Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation.* 2011, Amsterdam, SicSat, pp. 1596-1604.

Simonffy, Zs. (2010). *Vague : de la sémantique à la pragmatique et retour. Pour une approche argumentative des rapports entre langue et culture.* Saarbrücken : Éditions universitaires européennes.

Várkonyi, Zs. (2012). Vers une identification des potentialités sémantico-rhétoriques de la langue dans la perspective de la traduction des textes et des discours. *SEPTET N°5. La rhétorique à l'épreuve de la traduction*, pp. 132-148.

ISSA Proceedings 2014 – "'Rule Of Law,' 'Freedom,' And 'Democracy':

Domestic And International Building Blocks Of Contemporary Russian Political Ideology"

Abstract: We analyze the definitional arguments of Vladimir Putin relative to the terms 'democracy,' 'freedom,' and 'rule of law.' We examine the definitional relationships among these terms in Putin's rhetoric, with a focus on "rule of law." We look at primary appeals targeting domestic Russian audiences as well as Putin's message to the American people on possible US air strikes against Syria, looking for the definitional construction of rule of law in the discourse.

1. *Introduction*

Periods of national transition are, by definition, times of change. Sometimes that change is sought, driven by a desire to move to a different place or time. When that happens, change is guided by a rhetorical and argumentative transformation of needs and desires. Although material conditions are clearly part of the equation producing national change, the interpretation of those conditions is at least as important. As Zarfesky (1997) notes,

Although some of the political science literature still mistakenly regards problems as empirical conditions to be found, a growing number of writers recognize that they are categories to be created.

He continues, "*To define a condition as a problem is to invoke a frame of reference within which the condition is assessed, causality and blame are determined, and solutions are considered*" (1997, p. 6).

Change, in other words, is directed through definition of the situation. Burke approaches this in different language, suggesting the labels and descriptions of situations must 'encompass' those situations in ways that coherently account for the diverse elements evident in the situation (Burke, 1973, p. 109). Periods of national transition typically highlight themes/grounds related to national identity, in addition to those that concern more tangible or material components of the

'problem' defined in the situation; this requisite element of national identity brings both rhetorical opportunities and constraints to those advancing arguments either for or against specific changes.

In this paper, we sketch our approach to understanding definitional argument in periods of national transition. We discuss definitions of situation, considerations involved in definition of key terms, current approaches to definitional argument, and critical procedures for interpreting definitions of situation. We then analyze the presidential discourse in Vladimir Putin's third term as President, looking specifically at how the terms 'Rule of Law,' 'Freedom,' and 'Democracy' become redefined through argument by definition.

2. *Argument by definition*

Definitions of situation constitute personal and public motives for actions. Arising out of symbolic interaction theory, the theory presupposes the understanding that "Human behavior is based upon the *meaning* the person attaches to objects, events, relationships, or activities of other individuals" (Cox, 198-199. Emphasis added). Or, as Burke puts it, much our "reality" is but an extension of our terms that, according to Burke, select, reflect, and deflect. All interpretations are therefore necessarily partial and contestable (Burke, 1966, pp. 45-46). At the public level, factors affecting the viability of competing definitions of a situation include:

* the adequacy of the definition to encompass the situation;
* the resonance of the definition both with widely shared cultural attitudes, values, and beliefs and with the underlying historical memories; and
* the invention of acceptable analogies between the current situation and previous national or cultural experiences.

Definition of situation "*refers to both individual interpretations as well as 'culturally... shared perceptions and interpretations of situations considered identical or similar....'*" (Cox, 1981, p. 199, citing Gould and Kolb).

Definitions of situations are constructed from language – that is, from words. Collectively, these words form definitions that are salient to the context and can adequately encompass it. The collective definition – that is, the meaning of a definition of a situation – transcends the meaning of the individual words in the sense that the 'interinanimation' of those meanings creates a broader, higher

order of meaning that is not reducible to the unitary meanings of each term (Richards, 1936, pp. 47-66). Yet the definition of the situation is in the most literal sense a collection of individual words. Occasionally, some of the terms in a definition of a situation may be neologisms, but even then the other terms will have conventional meanings (some clearly more ambiguous than others); and if the definition of the situation is to obtain resonance with the public, key terms must carry historical weight. In constructing a definition of a situation, political actors may redefine the individual terms employed in the definition even before it is constructed; moreover, by putting individual terms in relation to each other, the 'interinanimation' among the terms has the effect of redefining the terms in that particular context.

In our analysis of definitions of individual terms, we are guided in part by work on both 'persuasive definition' and ideographs. The concept of a persuasive definition comes from Stevenson, who emphasized that terms have both descriptive and emotive meanings (Walton, 2001, p. 118). Drawing upon the work of Ogden and Richards, "descriptive meaning" is understood as "the core factual or descriptive content of a word, while the 'emotive meaning' represents the feelings or attitudes (positive or negative) that the use of the word suggests" (Walton, 2001, p. 118). Stevenson's theory is that a persuasive definition works "by redefining the descriptive meaning of the word while retaining its old familiar emotive meaning" (Walton, 2001, p. 118). We embed our application of persuasive definition in our consideration of ideographs, a concept advanced by McGee (1980).

An ideograph is a one-term summation of an ideological commitment (e.g., 'democracy'). These are common words that carry historic freight in a given culture: they have a history of significant usage in the culture, and the public has become conditioned to respond more-or-less automatically to the words (but not necessarily to any particular meaning for the words) (McGee, 1980). In the U.S., words such as 'freedom,' 'democracy,' and 'rule of law' are examples of ideographs to which the automatic response is favorable: the public is for 'freedom,' for 'democracy,' etc. Conversely, words such as 'tyranny' or 'communism' are words that generate automatic opposition. In each of these examples, the precise "descriptive meaning" of the words is ambiguous, and there is great range in historical usage of what the term may mean – a diachronic panoply of significant applications of the term. Despite, or perhaps because of,

descriptive ambiguities, these are the words from which ideology is constructed; they are the "building blocks of ideology" (McGee, 1980, p. 7). The legitimacy of a particular ideological construction at a given point in time (which McGee calls the synchronic structure of the ideology) is bolstered by selective appropriation of historical instances in which the ideographs align with the descriptive meaning of the term as it is used in the synchronic construction.

Although concerns with the relationships between definition and argument have been evident since the classical period, the domain of definitional argument is less developed than other aspects of argumentation theory. In an important keynote address to the 1997 Alta Conference on argumentation, Zarefsky (1997) maintained not simply that definitions are important in argumentation (although he did do that, citing among other sources his own self-described aphorism, "The power to persuade is, in large measure, the power to define"), but also that definitional argument may take multiple forms, which he identified as argument *from* definition, *about* definition, and *by* definition.

The distinctions among these forms of definitional argument are important: *argument from definition* proceeds in a deductive form, with the definition taken as an essential or true premise. As many examples demonstrate, argument from definition tends toward "stalemate" because advocates and opponents simply reject the definition, the foundational premise, offered by the other side (Zarefsky, 1997, p. 4). *Argument about definition* tends toward a similar fate. Citing Schiappa, Zarefsky suggests that arguments about definition, that is, arguments about the "'real' nature" of something, become abstracted too quickly, losing connection with people's real life experiences and hence with their values and commitments. This leads to "unproductive impasses" in the argumentation, another form of stalemate (Schiappa, cited in Zarefsky, 1997, p. 4).

The third form of definitional argument developed by Zarefsky is *argument by definition*, and this is the form upon which we will elaborate. In argument by definition, "The key definitional move is simply stipulated, as if it were a natural step along the way of justifying some other claim." In this sense, the key argumentative step of defining one's terms

"is taken by making moves that are not themselves argumentative at all. They are not claims supported by reasons and intended to justify adherence by critical listeners. Instead they are simply proclaimed as if they were indisputable facts"

(Zarefsky, 1997, p. 5).

Yet arguments *by* definition are critical moves that are often deployed in the construction of broader situational definitions. Zarefsky notes that in the examples of argument by definition that he discusses "what is really being defined is not a term but a situation or frame of reference" (1997, p. 5). He suggests four types of argumentative moves that can be employed in producing arguments by definition. These are associations, dissociations, ambiguities, and frame-shifting language (1997, pp. 7-9). Of these, we will focus on two techniques of association suggested by Zarefsky:

1. *"expanding the meaning of a 'term of art,'" that is, of a "seemingly common and non-technical term that, when placed in a particular context, normally is given precise meaning,"* (*e.g.*, rape of the environment).

2. *using persuasive definitions: "A persuasive definition is one in which favorable or unfavorable connotations of a given term remain constant but are applied to a different denotation. In this way, connotations surrounding the original term are transferred to a different referent"* (1997, p. 7), (*e.g.*, the war on drugs).

In our analysis of argument by definition in the contemporary political discourse of Vladimir Putin, we rely heavily on such associative argumentative moves.

We also use the method of textual indexing advanced by Burke, who suggests a "Theory of Indexing" key terms in a text as a procedure by which a critic can discover and "prove" what may be non-obvious "motives" in a text (Burke, 1964, pp. 145-172). In a discussion of "our words for motive," Burke maintains that these words (he gives an example of "duty") are "in reality words for situations," as we have construed or defined those situations (1935, pp. 29-31). We contend that the indexical structures also reveal evidence of redefinitions of terms. We see them as techniques by which to identify the interinanimated meaning of terms when used in relation to each other in specific texts. The four indexical structures suggested by Burke are: Association, Dissociation, Progression, and Transformation (Burke 1964, pp. 145-172)

The use of words in ways that create transparent patterns of association is the clearest illustration of argument by definition, and persuasive definitions could be an example of that. In contrast, dissociation is primarily concerned with the creation of oppositions. These may be polarities (e.g., freedom or death) or more

subtle forms of dialectical play between terms.

3. *Putin's use of argument by definition*
Turning, then, to Vladimir Putin, one might argue that he has been moving toward the Russian version of a 'reset' in relations with the West almost since he became President in 2000. Still, for much of his first two terms, he argued that Russia was "a European nation." Recently, however, by turning the country's focus eastward, Putin has moved Russia into another period of transition, what he terms the "Third Revolution," reanimating the historical and traditional separation of Russia from the West. In doing this, Putin has recontextualized and redefined many of the terms associated with Western ideologies: *rule of law*, *freedom*, even *democracy* itself.

Putin began this reorientation by reclaiming Russian history, including the Soviet period, reviving a sense of nationalism, and identifying both with a renewed relationship between the citizen and the state. The interinanimations of these elements with the reconstituted ideographs of Western democracy produces the "New Russia," oriented eastward rather than toward the West, proud of its 1000 year history, glorifying the defeat of Germany in the Great Patriotic War, with its own interpretations of freedom and democracy.

To explicate the definitional moves that result in this reanimated Russia, we focus primarily on 4 speeches given in Putin's current term as President: a speech on Russia Day (June 12) 2013; a pair of remarks celebrating the 20th Anniversary of the Russian Constitution (December 12 and 13, 2013); and the address on the annexation of Crimea (March 18, 2014). These speeches illustrate Putin's use of definitional argument to reconstitute *freedom* as prosperity and well-being; *democracy* as an instrumental value rather than a terminal one; and the *rule of law* as law-and-order. In addition, we examine Putin's letter to the American people, published in *The New York Times*, September 11, 2013.

Russia Day is a relatively new holiday, established to celebrate Russian history and to encourage greater national pride at a time when the Russian people were looking outward for moral leadership and validation. There is an instrumental overlay to most of Putin's speeches, and this one is no exception, as Putin collapses all 3 terms that are of interest here into a process-oriented marker melded with a history lesson. After a sentence that encapsulates a decade of economic change and hardship following the fall of the Soviet Union (ironically,

probably the period of greatest personal freedom and freedom of speech in post-Soviet Russia), Putin declares that the character of the Russian people brought the country through the transition and "set our country firmly on a development track that is inseparable from the ideas of democracy and respect for human rights and the rule of law." (June 12, 2013).

Putin's public approach to governance describes Russia as something of a work in progress, constantly in transition, moving along an arc of progress demarcated by ticks on a yardstick visible primarily to Putin. The goal is a "better quality of life" for all Russians, and "democratic procedures, the federal system, the market economy and guarantees for human rights" all "must work" toward this goal. By assuming that the purpose of democratic process, rule of law, and human rights is to progress along this continuum toward a better life, he reduces them to an instrumentality of economic prosperity. Their value lies not in their intrinsic worth as values of a free people, but, rather, in their ability to move the country along the continuum. As instrumentalities, then, if progress is deemed insufficient, they can be modified, truncated, or even eliminated in the interest of progress toward the goals.

By referendum on December 12, 1993, the Russian people approved the Constitution that is in force today. It was one of the earliest acts of the new Russian Federation and represented a major move toward democratization. Last year—2013—marked the 20th anniversary of the passage of the Russian Constitution; the country celebrated that anniversary with a concert and, the next day, a meeting between the Constitutional Court Judges and the President. Presented with a perfect opportunity to discuss the rule of law in Russia, Putin did not disappoint. Again, however, his instrumentalist approach to democratic values prevailed.

As Putin notes, "The Constitution validated the unwavering priority of our people's rights and freedoms and raised the status of the state itself … to a new, democratic foundation." Certainly, the Constitution instantiated the democratic process that followed the years of Soviet rule. Yet Putin sees the Constitution as the initiator of the path to the country's goals, not as the guarantor of rights and democratic process:

"The Constitution opened a new, constructive path to development on the basis of clear goals, intentions and values. …It represents a long-term strategy for

Russia's development, a foundation for strengthening public stability...." (December 12, 2013)

The Constitution, then, functions much as ordinary laws do – providing stability, order, continuous development.

Two events in the past year have grabbed the world's consciousness and focused attention on Russia: Syria and Crimea. In Syria, as the U.S. pondered its response, Putin published an open letter to the American people in *The New York Times* (September 11, 2013). The date was not lost on many. We believe such a move is unprecedented, and even today it is hard to imagine a similar letter from Obama – or any U.S. President – appearing in a Russian newspaper. Putin attributes his strategy to the diminished contact between the U.S. and Russia, and interestingly, ascribes this action to a desire to preserve world order and stability. In the letter, Putin uses a slippery slope argument to set up the definitional move that underlies his message. A strike by the U.S., should it occur, would escalate the conflict and enable it to spread beyond Syria. It would destabilize the Middle East and North Africa even further. And, it would "throw the entire system of international law and order out of balance" (Putin, 2013).

Setting aside the merits or lack thereof with regard to Syria, here we see Putin's conflation of rule of law, international law, and order. In other words, the purpose of the rule of law is order; it is not a guarantor of citizen rights, but serves to strengthen the state. Surely, one purpose of laws is order; but the concept 'rule of law' is a philosophical approach designed to spare citizens the capriciousness of the rule of individuals. Thus its promise is consistency of treatment and a form of justice. In Putin's construction, however, the purpose of law melds into the state's desire to suppress chaos.

Putin posits the conflict in Syria not as a struggle for democracy, but as a conflict between "government and opposition in a multireligious country." [NYT September 11, 2013] In Putin's view, to attempt to restore order from the outside would not only violate international law, it would undermine international law in the world community. After scolding the U.S. about its tendency toward interventionism and belief in its own exceptionalism, Putin urges America to join non-interventionist efforts to resolve the issue. A grateful Obama put any plans he had for a military strike against Syria on hold.

About 6 months later, following the successful completion of the Sochi Olympics, Russia stunned the world by annexing Crimea; on March 18, Putin spoke to the Duma and other Federal officials, as well as the people of Russia, Crimea and the world.

We noted at the beginning of this paper that the legitimacy of a particular ideological construction at any given point in time is bolstered through selective appropriation of historical instances in which the ideographs employed by a rhetor align with the descriptive meaning of the term as it is used in the synchronic construction. It follows, therefore, that if the denotation of a term is materially different in one society – as compared to another society – that single term can be deployed to achieve differing effects in international discourse. Similarly, if a term has one set of associations in one societal milieu, but conjures up a different set of associations in a different milieu, its use (or the choice of a different term instead) can serve varying rhetorical purposes depending on the audience.

A specific instance of speaking to different audiences can be seen on the official website of the Russian presidency – http://www.kremlin.ru/ . This Russian language site provides the text of all official statements, pronouncements, and speeches by Vladimir Putin. But there also exists an English language web page – http://eng.kremlin.ru/ – that mirrors the Russian language site; it provides official government translations of the materials presented originally in Russian.

We studied fourteen public statements by Vladimir Putin that touch upon the themes *democracy, freedom*, and *rule of law.* (Four of these speeches are analyzed here in some detail.) We compared the Russian and English versions of all fourteen statements – primarily to ensure that our English language analysis was based on a correct understanding of the actual Russian statements, but also to determine if there were any substantive differences between the versions heard and read by Russians and the translated versions accessible to English speakers. On the whole there is a high level of conformance between the Russian and English texts: the translations correspond very closely to the source files in content and tone. That is, an English reader can gain from the translations both a reliable understanding of Putin's meaning and a good "feel" for his rhetorical posture. This makes it possible for us to analyze his speeches with a great degree of confidence in our conclusions.

An important exception is the critical speech given by Putin on the annexation of Crimea into the Russian Federation. This was a major political appearance, and here one can discern substantive differences between word choices and phrasing uttered by Putin in comparison to the "equivalent" passages quoted in English below.

We are not concerned with instances where Western readers would simply disagree with the Russian President. Rather, there are a number of instances in which the Russian and English versions of Putin's speech create – and, we contend, purposely so – completely different impressions on his domestic and foreign audiences. We discuss these by type.

3.1 *Great and small*
We have great respect for people of all the ethnic groups living in Crimea. This is their common home, their motherland, and it would be right – I know the local population supports this – for Crimea to have three equal national languages: Russian, Ukrainian and Tatar.

This is pretty innocuous in English, but there are two subtle differences from the Russian – one insignificant, but the other crucial to an understanding of Putin's ultimate geopolitical strategy in the region. Putin actually says, "We respect // have respect for" the various nationalities that make up the local population: nothing in the Russian equates to great respect. More importantly, he uses a common term – *malaya rodina* 'home region' – for "motherland" that presages his later use of the 19th century term *Malorossiya* in reference to all of eastern and southern Ukraine – that portion of the country he needs to control in order to have a land route to Crimea and the Transdnestria region of Moldova, two areas he claims want reunification with the Russian Federation. This is, we believe, the first verbal hint of his ultimate goal.

3.2 *Now and then*
Putin claims that the 1954 decision of Nikita Khrushchev to declare Crimea a portion of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic – a decision that makes geographical sense, but was of no political consequence within the structure of the USSR – was illegal. "What matters now is that this decision was made in clear violation of the constitutional norms that were in place even then." One can agree or disagree with Putin's judgment. However, in the Russian, the text more properly reads: "What is important to us is (something quite) different – this

decision was made...." This is important to me; this is important to Russia.

Putin readily admits that the 1954 decision was a mere formality, since it never occurred to Khrushchev or anyone else that the Soviet Union would ever fall apart. "It was only when Crimea ended up as part of a different country that Russia realized that it was not simply robbed, it was plundered." So, all Russia has done in reclaiming Crimea is take back what had been stolen from it, stolen, presumably, by the Ukrainians.

3.3 *Riots in the streets*
Putin claims that he understands and even supports the protesters

"who came out on Maidan with peaceful slogans against corruption, inefficient state management and poverty. The right to peaceful protest, democratic procedures and elections exist for the sole purpose of replacing the authorities that do not satisfy the people."

But, he says, those who stood behind the events in Ukraine leading to the overthrow of President Yanukovych had a different agenda: *"They resorted to terror, murder and riots. Nationalists, neo-Nazis, Russophobes, and anti-Semites executed this coup."*

Anyone who followed reports of the Maidan uprising knows how violent the protests became. A peaceful demonstration against the government decision not to engage with the European Union for economic and political reasons soon turned nasty. Protesters and the troops deployed to control them battled continuously. Extreme right-wing (nationalist) groups and neo-Nazi skinheads provided muscle in support of the protest. Both pro- and anti-government forces were accused of murdering supporters in the other camp. And many citizens of Ukraine who are of Ukrainian descent (a large segment of population is Russian) do indeed hate the Russian Federation as the successor to a Soviet Union that treated them brutally before, during, and after World War II.

What is wrong with the statement quoted above – beyond the obvious hyperbole and over-simplification – is that in Russian the text actually reads, "... *terror, murders, and pogroms*." In pre-Soviet Russia Ukrainian Cossacks were used by the czar's representatives to carry out pogroms against Jews in their midst. The word itself is guaranteed to inflame passions against all Ukrainians. But neither the Maidan uprising nor any of the events that followed had anything to do with

anti-Semitic impulses among the Ukrainian population. We would contend that the use of *riots* in the English text is a deliberate attempt to mask from Western readers the inflammatory, anti-Ukrainian subtext of this speech. Had the government translators written what Putin actually said, the single word *pogrom* could have undermined any sympathetic reading Westerners might have attributed to this speech.

3.4 *Imposters and executioners*
The word pogroms, which appears about one-third of the way into this speech, introduces a particularly inflammatory segment of Putin's rhetoric – a segment that is masked in the English version. We will highlight two other choices that clearly show the intent behind this speech, which was to make a direct appeal to Russian sensibilities, while hiding that appeal from outside observers by carefully redacting the official translation.

Putin states, "*It is also obvious that there is no legitimate executive authority in Ukraine now.*" To the extent that the elected President has fled the country and most of his inner circle has been replaced in the government without general elections, this claim has credibility. A certain level of interregnum certainly obtained. What is most interesting at this juncture is the manner in which Putin describes that situation: "*Many government agencies have been taken over by the imposters....*"

'*Imposter*' is a fascinating choice made by the government translators: while not incorrect, it clearly lacks the connotative power of the source word – "*samozvanets*" – it represents in the original Russian. Literally that word means '*the self-proclaimed*.' But psychologically it refers unambiguously to the interregnum that occurred at the beginning of the 17th century when Ivan the Terrible died without an heir to the throne (having killed his own son in a fit of insane rage) and to the ascendance of the so-called 'False Dmitry' – a peasant, supported by certain noblemen, who claimed he was that son, still alive and come to claim his rightful place on the throne. This period in Russian history, called the Time of Troubles, led to the installation of the Romanov dynasty that ruled until the 1917 socialist revolution. Upon hearing this word most Russians will immediately think of the chaos and political instability that characterized the period. It is obvious that Putin has chosen his words carefully, playing on their desire for stability, harkening back to the chaos and strife that characterized the Yeltsin years, and striking fear in the minds of the citizenry. '*Imposter*' can never

evoke to a Westerner the visceral impact generated by *"samozvanets"* in the hearts and minds of Russians.

Putin goes on to say, "This is not a joke – this is reality….Those who opposed the coup were immediately threatened with repression. Naturally, the first in line here was Crimea, the Russian-speaking Crimea." One could quarrel with Putin regarding his characterization of the protesters in Ukraine and the manner in which they treated those who supported Yanukovych. But the translation is accurate, insofar as it goes. Unfortunately, the English rendition leaves out one small element: *"Those who opposed the coup were immediately threatened with repression and execution."*

All of the differences in content, tone, and psychological appeal described above make it clear that the Russian government sees its English language website as a rhetorical vehicle to influence Western opinion in ways that differ from its attempts to influence the opinions of the Russian speaking electorate at home. Putin carefully chooses the ideographs he deploys in his public pronouncements. Obviously, his official translators are equally careful in making their rhetorical choices.

The English version of this speech represents the culmination of the definitional moves made by Putin following his inauguration. He constructs the situational definition through a series of carefully selected analogies, thereby illustrating the themes running through the other speeches we have examined: *rule of law* (and *order*), instrumental values, *democracy*, and *freedom* not as intertwined reflexive concepts but as separate concepts that must work to strengthen the state. Thus Putin defines the situation relative not only to Crimea, but also to the West. In so doing he emphasizes themes related to national identity:

"Everything in Crimea speaks of our shared history and pride. This is the location of ancient Khersones, where Prince Vladimir was baptized. His spiritual feat of adopting Orthodoxy predetermined the overall basis of the culture, civilization and human values that unite the peoples of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. The graves of Russian soldiers whose bravery brought Crimea into the Russian empire are also in Crimea.
… we are one people. Kiev is the mother of Russian cities. Ancient Rus is our common source and we cannot live without each other."

Each of these points is an ideograph that carries historical weight and reveals personal and public motives for action. Thus, Putin revealed his synchronic definition of the situation: Russia restored, protecting its people from the depredations of the West. This line of argument also foreshadows the anti-Western [especially anti-American] propaganda that has become commonplace in Russian media.

4. *Conclusion*

Hill and Gaddy interpret Vladimir Putin as a statist, appointed to serve the Russian state and restore its greatness. He is, from this perspective, an executor of the state's interests: The demise of the USSR meant a weakening of the Russian state, its institutions, its reach and influence. Thus, restoring Russia's power has been a clearly stated goal of Putin's tenure from the beginning.

To achieve this goal, Putin must first redefine the situation of the post-Soviet world and Russia's place in it. In doing so, he can change the underlying premises of future action....

References

Burke, K. (1969). *Language as symbolic action.* Berkeley: University of California press.

Burke, K. (1984). *Permanence and change: An anatomy of purpose*. Third Edition. Berkeley: University of California press.

Burke, K. (1973). *The philosophy of literary form.* third edition. Berkeley: University of California press.

Casula, P. (2014). The road to Crimea: Putin's foreign policy between reason of state, sovereignty and bio-politics. *Russian analytical digest*.

Cox, J.R. (1981). Argument and the definition of the situation. *Central states speech journal*, 32, 197-205.

Gaddy, C. and Hill, F. (2013). *Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin*. Washington: Brookings institute.

McGee, M.C. (1980). The "ideograph": A link between rhetoric and ideology. *The quarterly journal of speech*, 66, 1-16.

Putin, V. V. (June 12, 2013). *Speech at Reception on Russia day*. (English) http://eng.kremlin.ru/ ; (Russian) http://www.kremlin.ru/

Putin, V. V. (September 11, 2013). A plea for caution from Russia: What Putin has to say to Americans about Syria. *The New York Times*.

Putin, V. V. (December 12, 2013). *Gala concert to mark the 20th anniversary of*

Russian constitution. (English) http://eng.kremlin.ru/ ; (Russian) http://www.kremlin.ru/

Putin, V. V. (March 18, 2014). *Address by President of the Russian Federation.* (English) http://eng.kremlin.ru/ ; (Russian) http://www.kremlin.ru/

Richards, I.A. (1936). *The Philosophy of rhetoric.* Oxford: Oxford university press.

Zarefsky, D. (1997). Definitions. In J.F. Klumpp (Ed.), *Argument in a time of change: Definitions, frameworks, and critiques* (pp. 1-11). Annandale, VA: National communication association.

ISSA Proceedings 2014 ~ An Argumentative Approach To Policy 'Framing'. Competing 'Frames' And Policy Conflict In The Roşia Montană Case

ABSTRACT: This paper proposes a new theorization of the concept of 'framing', in which argumentation has a central role. When decision-making is involved, to 'frame' an issue amounts to offering the audience a salient and thus potentially overriding premise in a deliberative process that can ground decision and action. The analysis focuses on the Roşia Montană case, a conflict over policy that led, in September 2013, to the most significant public protests in Romania since the 1989 Revolution.

KEY WORDS: decision, deliberation, frame, framing, metaphor, policy, practical argument, Roşia Montană

Introduction
This article develops an approach to framing theory from the perspective of argumentation theory (Fairclough & Fairclough 2012, 2013) by analyzing the public debate on the proposed cyanide-based gold mining project at Roşia

Montană (Romania). It puts forward a view of 'framing' as a process of offering an audience a salient and potentially overriding premise that they are expected to use in deliberation leading to decision and action (Fairclough 2015, Fairclough forthcoming b). It also aims to make an empirical contribution to the study of the Roșia Montană case, a policy conflict that has set the Romanian government and a multinational company against the Romanian population and, in September 2013, led to the most intense public protests since the fall of communism. The outcome was the rejection by the Romanian Parliament of a draft law that would have given the green light to the largest open-cast gold mining operations in Europe.

This study is part of a larger project that analyzes a corpus of over 600 Romanian press articles, covering the months of August and September 2013, with a twofold purpose: (a) to develop and test an argumentative conception of the process of framing; (b) to gain insight into how four major Romanian newspapers have attempted to reflect and influence the public debate, by finding out which aspects of the policy conflict were selected and made salient in the media, and how they were intended to function in the process of public deliberation. For reasons of space, we will not analyze this corpus here, but illustrate the framework with a smaller corpus of campaign material (leaflets, slogans, placards, website information).

ROȘIA MONTANĂ: A Brief Overview
Roșia Montană is a *commune* of 16 villages, located in the Western Carpathians, in an area rich in gold and other precious metals, but also in natural beauty and tradition. It has a recorded history of over 2000 years and has been a gold-mining area since Roman times. The region is however plagued by a range of socio-economic problems which demand a strategy of sustainable development (Plăiaș 2012). The controversial mining project advanced by the Canadian corporation Gabriel Resources Ltd. in partnership with the Romanian state (renamed Roșia Montană Gold Corporation, henceforth RMGC, in 2000) has claimed to provide just such a solution, by "bring[ing] one of the world's largest undeveloped gold projects to production" (*The Roșia Montană Gold & Silver Project: A Project for Romania* 2014). The project would require large-scale cyanide-leaching procedures in order to extract an estimated 314 tons of gold and 1,480 tons of silver from 4 open-cast pits over a 16-year period. While the economic benefits to the Romanian state were invariably presented by the corporation as extraordinary, Romania's projected equity stake in the company was only 19.31%,

the other 80.69% being owned by Gabriel Resources, according to company data in 2014.

Mădroane (2014) has investigated the Canadian company's argument in favour of the project in terms of the framework for analyzing and evaluating practical arguments developed by Fairclough & Fairclough (2012). According to this framework, a practical proposal is advanced on the basis of premises specifying the intended goals and circumstances of action and a means-goal relation, and is evaluated via an argument from consequence. The circumstances include natural, social and institutional facts that enable or constrain the action. Some of these facts constitute the 'problem' to be resolved by means of the proposed action (as 'solution'). RMGC's overall problem-solution argument, as summed up on the company's website (under the heading *Proiectul Roșia Montană/ Roșia Montană Project* n.d.) rests upon circumstantial premises that represent the area as being in a disastrous situation in four areas – economy, environment, patrimony, community – and lacking any viable alternatives for sustainable development. Joint economic benefits (for the corporation, the local area and the Romanian state), as intended goals of action, are prominent on the website, and a number of commitments (as constraints on action) are emphasized. The company claims to be committed to norms of environmental and archaeological protection and rehabilitation, and to respecting the local population's right to property and right to work. Aiming to address all the problems of the local area, the company allegedly holds the key to transforming an "impoverished community with no real alternative" (problem) in accordance with a "vision" (goal) of "prosperity, growth, clean environment", offering a "long term future for Roșia Montană" (*The Roșia Montană Gold & Silver Project: A Project for Romania* 2014). At the centre of the RMGC campaign to win over public opinion in Romania has been the "packaging" of the project as *the* much-needed answer to the economic and social problems of the region, as well as a welcome contribution to Romania's economic growth.

From the very beginning, the Roșia Montană project has been extremely controversial due to the perceived infringement of existing legislation (mining laws, property rights, national heritage protection, planning regulations), the confidentiality of the terms of the concession licence, the intense pressure exerted by RMGC via aggressive lobbying and advertising campaigns, as well as the superficial nature of the public consultation process and the suspicion of institutional corruption. Expert analyses of the project have pointed out numerous

risks and potentially unacceptable costs: the permanent destruction of the local environment, together with long-term environmental and public health risks; the irretrievable loss of ancient cultural heritage (Roman mine galleries); the destruction and displacement of local communities; the comparatively small economic benefits to the Romanian state (the small number of jobs created during the mining operations). The alleged benefits have been dismissed in scientific reports and studies published by reputable national and international research institutions, including the Romanian Academy, the Bucharest Academy of Economic Studies, and the Union of Romanian Architects. Through the ongoing *Save Roșia Montană* Campaign, the Alburnus Maior Association (an NGO set up by Roșia Montană inhabitants in 2000) has become the main pillar of an increasingly strong public protest movement. As a consequence, the technical review of the Environmental Impact Assessment report, a crucial step for RMGC in the process of obtaining the environmental permit, was suspended in 2007. However, the process was resumed in 2010, in the general context of economic recession. On August 27, 2013, the Romanian Government sent to Parliament a draft law which was removing all legal obstacles and giving the corporation significant new powers. Instantly, this sparked off strong public protests in many Romanian cities, lasting over 6 weeks: at the peak of these protests, 20,000-25,000 people were demonstrating daily on the streets of Bucharest. At the moment of writing, the company has lost significant ground following the parliamentary rejection of the special draft law (on November 19, 2013, by the Senate, and on June 3, 2014, by the Chamber of Deputies) and several other unfavourable court decisions. For details of the case see Goţiu (2013); Egresi (2011); Cocean (2012); Vesalon & Creţan (2013); see Chiper (2012) for a discourse-analytical approach.

Analytical Framework: Arguments And Frames

3.1. Practical arguments and deliberative activity types
Practical argumentation is argumentation about what ought to be done, as opposed to theoretical argumentation about what is the case (Walton 2006, 2007a, 2007b; Walton et al. 2008). Deliberation is an argumentative genre in which practical argumentation is the main argument scheme. Van Eemeren (2010, pp. 142-143) distinguishes among *genres*, *activity types* and concrete *speech events*. A particular policy debate (e.g. on the Roșia Montană mining project) instantiates the more abstract category of policy debate as activity type,

which in turn instantiates the abstract genre of deliberation. Deliberation is a genre common to many activity types; its intended outcome is a normative-practical conclusion that can ground decision and action. Policy making involves the weighing together of reasons in favour and against particular courses of action (i.e. deliberation), and on this basis putting forward a policy decision.

Practical argumentation can be viewed as argumentation from circumstances, goals and means goal relations (Fairclough & Fairclough 2011, 2015, forthcoming a, b):

The agent is in circumstances C.
The agent has a goal G.
(Goal G is generated by a particular normative source – desire, duty, etc.)
Generally speaking, if an agent does A in C then G will be achieved.
Therefore, the Agent ought to do A.

Practical reasoning is a causal argumentation scheme (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004). Actions have both intended and unintended effects, and the same effect can result from a multiplicity of causes. The unintended effects can be such that the action had better not be performed, even if the intended effect (goal) can be achieved by doing A. If this is the case, then a *critical objection* to A has been exposed and the hypothesis that the agent ought to do A has been falsified (or rebutted). A pragmatic argument from negative consequence (the left-hand side of Figure 1) can potentially rebut the practical proposal (conclusion) itself. This argument has the following form:

If the Agent adopts proposal A, consequence (effect) E will follow.
Consequence E is unacceptable.
Therefore, the Agent ought not to adopt proposal A.

A succinct way of representing the type of argumentation in deliberative activity types is as follows, where the conclusion of the practical argument from goals, values and circumstances is tested by a pragmatic argument from consequence (Fairclough 2015, Fairclough forthcoming a, b):


Figure 1. Practical reasoning in deliberative activity types: the deliberation scheme

Figure 1. Practical reasoning in deliberative activity types: the deliberation scheme

As Figure 1 suggests, we reason practically from an assessment of the circumstances of action (this includes the problem we have identified, but also other facts enabling or constraining action), from the goals and values whose realization we are pursuing, from means-goal relations, as well as from premises that refer to the potential consequences of our proposed action, in light of which it may follow that we ought to discard our proposal for action or, on the contrary, we may go ahead with it. If the consequences are, on balance, unacceptable, then the proposal is unreasonable and ought to be abandoned. If however the potential consequences are not unacceptable, or if – in the event that negative consequences should materialize – it would be possible to change course or redress undesirable developments, then the agent may tentatively proceed with A (always subject to future rebuttal, as unacceptable consequences may always come to light at a later date).

A critical objection against a proposal (e.g. an unacceptable consequence or cost) is one that cannot be overridden by other reasons in favour (e.g. by any potential benefit). Deliberation involves a 'weighing' of reasons, and the conclusion is arrived at on balance, in a context of facts that both enable and constrain action, and in conditions of uncertainty and risk. The institutional facts (obligations, rights, commitments) of the legal, political, moral domain (what Searle 2010 calls deontic, desire-independent reasons) are, in principle (though not always in practice) non-overridable. For example, an agent might come to the conclusion that Proposal A ought to be abandoned because it is against the law, full stop, regardless of any benefits that might have counted in favour of going ahead with A.

3.2. Framing theory
According to Entman, writing in 1993, Framing Theory is a good example of a "fractured paradigm", with a highly "scattered conceptualization" at its core. While everybody in the social sciences talks about framing, there is no clear understanding of what frames are and how they influence public opinion (Entman 1993, p. 51). Many often-cited definitions in the literature are vague and unhelpful, e.g. those of frames as "organizing *principles* that are socially shared

and persistent over time" (Reese 2001, p. 11), or as "*principles* of selection, emphasis and presentation composed of little tacit theories about what exists, what happens, and what matters" (Gitlin 1980, p. 6). The same type of criticism still occurs twenty years later (see D'Angelo & Kuypers 2010), with Nisbet noting the persistent loose usage of the term 'frame' and every researcher's tendency to "reinvent the wheel" by identifying their own (often highly idiosyncratic) set of frames, without thereby producing a clear operationalization of the concept that might be used across different sets of data (Nisbet 2010, pp. 45-46).

There is at least one clear definition of 'frames' in the cognitive semantics literature, though this is not the definition that most framing theorists working in political communication and media studies seem to start from. This is Fillmore's (1985, 2006) definition of frames, as developed in Frame Semantics and the FrameNet project (International Computer Science Institute n.d.) – a new dictionary concept, in which words are defined in relation to world knowledge. On this understanding, frames are *structures* of inter-related concepts, such that in order to understand any one concept it is necessary to understand the entire structure (frame). To understand what risk is, one needs to understand the entire RISK frame, involving agents, situations, actions, intended gains or benefits, potential harm and victims, an element of chance, and so on (Fillmore & Atkins 1992). Any one individual concept within a frame will activate the whole frame (e.g. 'week' activates the whole system of calendric terms: 'day', 'month', 'year').

A substantial part of framing theory research seems to be underlain by an understanding of the framing *process*, rather than of *frames* as Fillmorian systems of concepts. On this view, "framing refers to the process by which people develop a particular conceptualization of an issue"; framing therefore involves taking or promoting a particular *perspective* or *angle* on an issue. It is this selective angle that is responsible for the highly vexing phenomenon of "framing effects", where "(often small) changes in the presentation of an issue or an event produce (sometimes large) changes of opinion" (Chong & Druckman 2007, p. 104). The most often cited definition in these terms is Entman's view of framing as *selection* and *salience*:

Framing essentially involves *selection* and *salience.* To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item

described. Typically frames diagnose, evaluate, and prescribe... (Entman 1993, p. 52).

Entman's selection-and-salience definition is a definition of *framing*, not *frames*. Framing involves inclusion, exclusion, selective emphasis, putting forward a particular conceptualization, a particular angle. I may, for example, choose to emphasize the benefits of a course of action and correspondingly de-emphasize the costs, in order to sway an audience towards accepting my proposal. However, unless frames are also structures of inter-related concepts, what are we selecting from? How can one element be selected and highlighted unless it is part of a structure where other elements are correspondingly de-emphasized?

Although Entman does not develop his view in relation to a theory of argument, his definition is compatible with an approach from argumentation theory. If the framing process aims to define and diagnose problems, as well as suggest solutions, then it is a form of practical, deliberative reasoning. In framing an issue in a particular way, a communication source is supplying those particular premises that may lead the audience towards a particular conclusion or line of action. The communication source can talk about an issue by means of any complex speech act – argument, narrative, description, explanation; the audience however are expected to use these as sources of premises in the construction of arguments leading to decision and action. I suggest that, from the audience's perspective, the aspects that are being selected and made salient are elements of a DECISION frame.

The gist of the argumentative approach to framing being proposed here is this: to frame an issue is to offer the audience a salient and thus potentially overriding premise in a deliberative process that can ground decision and action. Values, goals, potential consequences, as well as various facts pertaining to the context of action can all be made selectively more salient in an attempt to direct the audience towards a particular, preferred conclusion. This may also involve the use of metaphors (Lakoff & Johnson 1980), analogies and persuasive definitions (Walton 2007a) to redefine facts in rhetorically convenient ways, thus lending support either to the conclusion that the proposed action is recommended or not recommended.

Based on the deliberation scheme, a DECISION frame can be outlined (on the model of Fillmore's RISK frame), including arguers/agents in a situation of

incomplete knowledge (uncertainty and risk), putting forward and evaluating proposals for action, amongst which they will choose and decide in favour of one. They have goals and values, and are acting in a context of facts (circumstances), some of which enable or constrain action – for example there are laws, rules, norms that constrain what can be done. Their proposal has potentially negative consequences, some of which will be critical objections against the proposal. Within this frame, as system of inter-related concepts, various premises can be emphasized in principle as being the most relevant and important reasons, i.e. the ones that should arguably decide which course of action is adopted. For example, it can be argued that a policy proposal should be adopted because it will create jobs, or it can be argued that it should not be adopted because of the negative impact on the environment. What is being made more salient and potentially overriding in these two arguments are the intended positive consequences (goals) and the (unintended) negative consequences, respectively. In a process of weighing reasons, the audience may come to see either the benefits (jobs) or the negative consequences (pollution) as "heavier" or more relevant reasons, and the conclusion (and decision) they will reach may shift accordingly. Alternatively, the circumstances of action may be made salient (the severity of the problem, the external constraints on action, the uncertainty and risks involved) and presented as potentially overriding other reasons.

Briefly, making one element of the deliberation scheme more salient, while correspondingly de-emphasizing others, is expected to result in a shift in the decision for action that the audience will arrive at, given that the salient element is expected to override non-salient elements in the process of weighing reasons. It does not follow, of course, that the audience will be actually influenced in this way, and that they will automatically ground their decisions in the premises made salient through framing. In real-world contexts, framing effects are weakened by the public's exposure to alternative arguments, their ability to come to their own conclusion, as well as by their pre-existing beliefs and values (Sniderman & Theriault 2005; Chong & Druckman 2007).

Figure 2. The relationship between the deliberation scheme and argumentation by analogy or definition

An additional mechanism is often at work, whenever metaphors, analogies or persuasive definitions are embedded under the premises of the deliberation scheme (Figure 2). Premises of the form *a = b* (*a is similar to b*, or *a is a kind of b*) can provide justification for various premises in the arguments from goals or consequences. For example, it can be argued that a policy proposal will have potentially unacceptable negative consequences if these can be seen to amount to a form of *robbery* or *treason*; if this is so, then the proposal should not be adopted. If, on the contrary, the context of action is one of *national emergency* or *crisis* that the proposal can successfully resolve, then it follows that the proposal should go ahead. Similarly, it can be argued that the effects of the policy will be in fact beneficial, because they amount to actually *saving* the Roșia Montană area from either poverty or environmental catastrophe. If the proposed action amounts to salvation from harm or danger, then the action is recommended (Figure 2). The spin or bias that such persuasive definitions or metaphors will introduce into the premises of an argument will be reflected, via their entailments, in the particular conclusion that can be reached on the basis of these premises (Fairclough 2015, forthcoming b).

Analysis
This article is part of a larger study of the August-September 2013 coverage of the Roșia Montană case in four Romanian daily broadsheets: *Adevărul*, *Jurnalul Naţional*, *Gândul* and *Cotidianul*. Our search for the keyword 'Roșia Montană' in the online archives of the newspapers resulted in 670 articles, divided as follows: 323 in *Adevărul*, 217 in *Gândul*, 93 in *Jurnalul Naţional* and 67 in *Cotidianul.* A detailed discussion of this corpus is beyond the scope of this short paper and is being undertaken elsewhere. In order to test and illustrate how the analytical framework described in section 3 can shed light on framing processes, including

framing effects, we will discuss a few examples taken from the campaigns in favour and against the mining project, and particularly from the slogans used by the protesters.

The campaign in favour of the project (see RMGC's official website, *RMGC: Roșia Montană Gold Corporation – Proiectul Roșia Montană* n.d.) tended to emphasize the company's intended goals, among which the benefits to the Romanian state and the local area – jobs and local development, income for the Romanian state – and particular circumstances of action: poverty, underdevelopment, as well as people's right to work. In general, the benefits were said to outweigh the costs, and the impact on the environment and cultural heritage was presented as minimal, with emphasis on the redressive action allegedly in place. Thus, the argument went, given the significant economic benefits to all parties concerned, particularly the Romanian side, and given that these would clearly outweigh any negative impacts, and also given the population's right to work (a deontic reason, in principle non-overridable), the Roșia Montană project ought to go ahead. By contrast, not allowing the project to proceed would not only damage these goals, but would also undermine the local population's rights. Framing the deliberative process in this way, i.e. making these particular premises salient and potentially overriding, was intended to support a decision in favour of the project.

Arguments against the project (e.g. the Alburnus Maior Association website: rosiamontana.org – Campania Salvați Roșia Montană n.d.) emphasized primarily a range of unacceptable negative consequences: the destruction of four mountains, the environmental and health impact of the cyanide-based technology (12,000 tons of cyanide would be used and 13 million tons of mining waste produced each year, eventually leaving behind a lake containing 215 million cubic metres of cyanide-contaminated water); the definitive loss of a precious resource that the Romanian state ought to be able to exploit in its own interest. These were presented as negative consequences that cannot be overridden by any benefits, particularly as job creation would be minimal and only for a limited period of time. The argument was also sometimes framed as an issue of inter-generational justice (it is our duty towards future generations to keep the gold in the country for future exploitation) and predominantly as a legal issue: the violation of existing (environmental) laws and (property) rights was deemed unacceptable, and the draft law was also said to be "unconstitutional". Framing the conflict in terms of unacceptable negative consequences that cannot be overridden by any

benefits and in terms of non-overridable deontic reasons (rights, duties, laws, the Constitution) was intended to sway the deliberative process in favour of the conclusion that the project ought to be rejected.

The framing of the conflict developed over time, and new premises were made salient in the attempt to influence public opinion. Starting as a battle over the environment, the conflict eventually developed into a battle over democracy and the rule of law in Romania and against the capture of the state by the interests of global corporations (Vesalon & Creţan, p. 449). Reporting on the situation in Romanian last September, an article in *The Guardian* (Ciobanu 2013) cited an NGO activist as saying the following:

It is very interesting that such a revolt began with a case of protecting the environment, but this is not only about the environment … (…) The Roșia Montană case – in which you see legislation custom made to serve the interests of a corporation – highlights some failures of both democratic institutions and of the economic system, capitalism in a broader sense… Roșia Montană is the battle of the present and of the next decades… It illustrates the end of post-1989 cleavages [communist vs. anti-communist, European vs. non-European] and the emergence of new ones. People today confront a corrupted political class backed up by a corporation and a sold out media; and they ask for an improved democratic process, for adding a participatory democracy dimension to traditional democratic mechanisms.

The conflict therefore was no longer only about the environment, but about how global corporations can buy out national governments and national media and force them to act in their interests, as well as about the population's demand for a truly representative democracy (one slogan was: "Not in my name" ("Nu în numele meu"). The unacceptability of bending legislation so as to facilitate the handing over of Romania's resources to a multinational corporation, mostly for the benefit of the latter and for the personal gain of politicians, was reflected in the slogan: "A corporation cannot dictate legislation" ("Nu corporaţia face legislaţia"). The slogan captured the protest against the subordination of the state to corporate interest – what Monbiot (2001) has theorized as the "captive state", or the "corporate takeover" of states, a situation where the power of multinational corporations is threatening the foundations of democratic government and undermining national sovereignty. Framing the deliberative process in this way made the legal and political aspects salient and potentially overriding,

emphasizing that allowing a corporation's interests to prevail was against the Constitution and against Romania's democratic form of government. As deontic constraints on action, these reasons were intended to lend overriding support to the argument against the project.

A widely used metaphor was that of the Roșia Montană project as a case of *robbery*, with slogans saying "Halt the Great Robbery" ("Opriţi Marele Jaf"), or "Thieves" ("Hoţii"), framing the project by primary reference to the rule of law. These metaphors fit into the argument from negative consequence, supporting the premise that the effects will be unacceptable. (On what grounds are the consequences unacceptable? On the grounds that the whole project amounts to the illegal attempt to appropriate someone else's property.) To say that the project is framed as *robbery* is to say that the premise containing the metaphor is made salient; as a consequence, via its entailments (i.e. if it is robbery, then it is illegal, or a crime), the metaphor will lead to only one possible conclusion: if the project is illegal or criminal, it follows that it should be abandoned (Action A/Policy A is not recommended).

Other metaphors function in a similar way. The protests were called a *revolution* (with placards saying: "Our generation's own revolution" ("Revoluţia generaţiei noastre") or "Europe's Green Revolution", while the government's stance was equated with a *declaration of war* (in publicity material saying: "The Government and RMGC have declared war on us all", "Guvernul şi RMGC ne-au declarat război") or with a *siege* ("do not forget that Romania is now under siege…", "nu uitaţi că România e acum în stare de asediu"), as well as with the attempt to *sell* the country out to a foreign corporation (in slogans saying: "My Romania is not for sale", "România mea nu e de vânzare"). Such metaphors provide justification for various premises in the deliberation scheme and support the conclusion that the project ought not to go ahead.

Conclusion
This paper has tried to make a contribution to framing theory by suggesting that framing is equivalent to a process of making salient, and thus potentially overriding, a particular premise in a deliberative process that the audience is supposed to engage in. This process is supposed to lead the audience to decision and (possibly) action. Based on how they weigh a variety of reasons against each other, which in turn may depend on which reasons have been made salient and which have been omitted, and on what importance or weight has been attached to

them in the framing process, the audience is supposed to reach a particular practical-normative conclusion and on this basis a decision to act in a particular way. Framing effects may be stronger or weaker depending on how the framing process interacts with the audience's own beliefs and values, and on the audience's exposure to alternative arguments, as well as their ability to weigh these arguments together in a deliberative process.

What is selected and made salient in the framing process is a particular premise in a deliberation scheme, i.e. a structure with a number of elements which can be selectively filled in or instantiated. Figure 2 shows a range of premises that can be selected and made salient, in the attempt to direct the conclusion of the arguments involved in the Roșia Montană debate: the circumstances of action, for example the institutional constraints (laws, rights) or the problem that needs solving (poverty); the goals or intended benefits (jobs, national revenue); the unintended negative consequences (environmental degradation, loss of cultural heritage), and so on. In addition, premises that attempt to support the premises of practical reasoning (containing metaphors, analogies, persuasive definitions) can be made salient, and their entailments will be transferred upwards towards particular conclusions (if the project amounts to "robbery", then it is illegal; if it is illegal, it should be abandoned).

This study is developed in several other papers. Fairclough (2015) and Fairclough (forthcoming b) develop the argumentative approach to framing in more detail, with application to the austerity debate in the British media and the parliamentary debate on university tuition fees. Starting from the brief analysis presented here, a systematic analysis of the entire media corpus of 670 media texts, in terms of the framework outlined here, will be carried out in Mădroane (in preparation).

REFERENCES

Chiper, S. (2012). Roșia Montană and its publics: governance and participatory democracy at community and corporate level. *Argumentum: Journal of the Seminar of Discursive Logic, Argumentation Theory and Rhetoric*, *10*(1), 82-105.

Chong, D., & Druckman, J. N. (2007). Framing theory. *Annual Review of Political Science*, *10*, 103-127. doi: 10.1146/annurev.polsci.10.072805.103054.

Ciobanu, C. (2013, September 17). Romanians mobilise in protest against gold mine plans, *The Guardian*. Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/sep/17/romanians-mobilise-gold-

mine.

Cocean, P. (Ed.). (2012). *Roșia Montană in universal history* (Romanian Academy, Babeș-Bolyai University, ICOMOS Romania). Cluj: Cluj University Press.

D'Angelo, P., & Kuypers, J. A. (Eds.) (2010). *Doing news framing analysis. Empirical and theoretical perspectives.* New York: Routledge.

Eemeren, F. H., van & Grootendorst, R. (2004). *A systematic theory of argumentation. The pragma-dialectical approach*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Eemeren, F. H., van (2010). *Strategic maneuvering in argumentative discourse*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Egresi, I. (2011). The curse of the gold: discourses surrounding the project of the largest pit-mine in Europe. *Journal of Studies and Research in Human Geography*, *5*(2), 57-68.

Entman, R. M. (1993). Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm. *Journal of Communication 43*(4), 51-58.

Fairclough, I., & Fairclough, N. (2011). Practical reasoning in political discourse: the UK government's response to the economic crisis in the 2008 Pre-Budget Report. *Discourse & Society*, *22*(3), 243-268.

Fairclough, I., & Fairclough, N. (2012). *Political discourse analysis: A method for advanced students*. London: Routledge.

Fairclough, I., & Fairclough, N. (2013). Argument, deliberation, dialectic and the nature of the political: A CDA perspective. *Political Studies Review*, *11*(3), 336-344.

Fairclough, I. (2015). Evaluating policy as argument: the public debate over the first UK austerity budget. *Critical Discourse Studies*, DOI: 10.1080/17405904.2015.1074595.

Fairclough, I. (forthcoming a). A dialectical profile for the evaluation of practical arguments. In B. J. Garssen, D. Godden, G. Mitchell & A. F. Snoeck Henkemans (Eds.), *Proceedings of the 8th Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation.* Amsterdam: SicSat.

Fairclough, I. (forthcoming b) Deliberative discourse. In J. Richardson & J. Flowerdew (Eds.), *The Routledge Handbook of Critical Discourse Analysis*. London: Routledge.

Fillmore, C. J. (1985). Frames and the semantics of understanding. *Quaderni di Semantica 6*(2), 222-254.

Fillmore, C. J. (2006). Frame semantics. In Brown, E. K. (Ed.), *Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics*. (Vol. 4, pp. 613-620). Oxford: Elsevier.

Fillmore, C. J., & Atkins, B. T. (1992). Toward a frame-based lexicon: The Semantics of Risk and its neighbours. In A. Lehrer & E. F. Kittay (Eds.), *Frames, fields, and contrasts: New essays in semantic and lexical organization* (pp. 75-102). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

Gitlin, T. (1980). *The whole world is watching: Mass media in the making and unmaking of the New Left*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Goțiu, M. (2013). *Afacerea Roșia Montană*. Cluj-Napoca: TACT.

International Computer Science Institute at Berkeley, California (n.d.). FrameNet Project. Retrieved from https://framenet.icsi.berkeley.edu/fndrupal/.

Lakoff, G., & Johnson, M. (1980). *Metaphors we live by,* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Mădroane, I. D. (2014). Citizens' Consultations – Public spaces of argument evaluation? A view from critical discourse analysis. *Romanian Journal of English Studies*, *11*(1), 203-214 (1-12). doi: 10.2478/rjes-2014-0024.

Mădroane, I. D. (in preparation). Framing the Roșia Montană Protests: Arguments in the Romanian Press.

Monbiot, G. (2001). *Captive state. The corporate takeover of Britain.* London: Pan Books.

Nisbet, M. C. (2010). Knowledge into action: Framing the debates over climate change and poverty. In P. D'Angelo & J. A. Kuypers (Eds.), *Doing news framing analysis* (pp. 43-83). New York: Routledge.

Plăiaș, I. (2012). Reflection upon the usefulness of the Roșia Montană project. In P. Cocean (Ed.), *Roșia Montană in universal history* (Romanian Academy, Babeș-Bolyai University, ICOMOS Romania) (pp. 58-67). Cluj: Cluj University Press.

Proiectul Roșia Montană/ Roșia Montană Project (n.d.). RMGC: Roșia Montană Gold Corporation – Proiectul Roșia Montană [Roșia Montană Gold Corporation Website]. Retrieved from http://www.rmgc.ro/ proiectul-rosia-montana/proiectul-minier/timeline-proiect-rosia-montana.html.

RMGC: Roșia Montană Gold Corporation – Proiectul Roșia Montană (n.d.). Roșia Montană Gold Corporation Website. Retrieved from http://www.rmgc.ro/.

Reese, S. D. (2007). Framing public life: A bridging model for media research. In S. D. Reese, O. H. Gandy & A. E. Grant (Eds.), *Framing public life: Perspectives on media and our understanding of the social world* (pp. 7-31). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.

rosiamontana.org – Campania Salvați Roșia Montană (n.d.). Alburnus Maior Association Website. Retrieved from http://www.rosiamontana.org/en.

Searle, J. R. (2010). *Making the social world. The structure of human civilization,*

Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sniderman, P.M., & Theriault, S.M. (2004). The Structure of political argument and the logic of issue framing. In P. M. Sniderman & W. E. Saris (Eds.), *Studies in public opinion: Attitudes, nonattitudes, measurements, error and change* (pp. 133-155). Princeton: Princeton University Press.

The Roșia Montană Gold & Silver Project: A Project for Romania (2014, February 25). Gabriel Resources: Roșia Montană Website, Investors Presentations [BMO Capital Markets 23rd Global Metals & Mining Conference]. Retrieved from http://gabrielresources.com/documents/ GBU_Pres_Feb2014_BMO_000. pdf

Vesalon, L., & Creţan, R. (2013). "Cyanide kills!" Environmental movements and the construction of environmental risk at Roșia Montană, Romania. *AREA*, *45*(4), 443-451.

Walton, D. (2006). *Fundamentals of critical argumentation*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Walton, D. (2007a). *Media argumentation*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Walton, D. (2007b). Evaluating practical reasoning. *Synthese*, 157, 197-240.

Walton, D., Reed, C., & Macagno, F. (2008). *Argumentation schemes*. New York: Cambridge University Press.