ISSA Proceedings 2006 – Rules Of Refutation And Strategies Of Dissuasion In Debate

• by: Adelino Cattani - University of Padua

I would briefly consider and pose to your refutational criticism three questions: why to refute, how to refute, when to refute. These questions concern the place of confirmation/refutation between logic and rhetoric and involve the pair apology vs. criticism.
I’ll begin with an apodictical starting, only in order to establish a subjective certainty among many uncertainties.

The logical process of refutation is naturally associated with the act of dissuasion. How can we dissuade? Which are the tools of dissuasion? The typical human weapon of dissuasion should be a discouraging argument, an argument against, a proof of falsehood. Indeed it is unquestionable that ‘the use of reasoning is more characteristic of man than the use of physical strength’, using the words of Aristotle (Rhetorica 1355 b 1). Dissuasion, or changing the belief or the behaviour of an audience, is the perlocutionary effect of refutation, whose illocutionary effect may by confusing, confounding, shedding doubt.
But refuting is not a performative act. And dissuasion is not the simple opposite of persuasion. I would like to consider the origin, the nature and the implications of this difference, a difference that concerns perhaps some other general and problematic couples such as validation/invalidation, affirming/denying, approving/disapproving, constructive analysis/destructive analysis.

The terminology of refutation /dissuasion
There are some curious and interesting linguistic facts. The common language, said John Austin, is not the last, but indeed the first word. The speech acts theory may be yet useful in many ways. For example, in refuting one demonstrates the falsehood, by refuting one dissuades. We can dissuade from believing and from saying, or from doing and making something. Furthermore dissuasion may have a side-effect, a ‘perlocutionary sequel’ (Austin 19752, p. 118), such as to cast doubt, confuse, block, paralyse.

What means ‘to refute’? the three names of refusal
If I deny, object, challenge, I deny, object, challenge just because I say what I say: the speaker names something and, as he names it, it appears. On the contrary if I say ‘I refute’ I’m simply announcing my intention to do that. Saying that I’m confuting is not to confute, while saying that I’m denying (objecting, challenging), is to deny (object, challenge). In the frame of the speech acts theory, the first act is like to utter a descriptive ‘I eat’, the second is like to utter an operational ‘I promise’.
.
To refuse, to object and to refute are three different ways of dissenting.

Who is refusing expresses his disagreement without necessarily offering any reason. He rejects but he does not explain why a thesis or a thing should not be accepted. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2006 – Understanding, Arguments, And Explanations: Cognitive Transformations And The Limits Of Argumentation

• by: Daniel H. Cohen - Colby College

1. Introduction: epistemic and cognitive transformations
Arguments serve many functions. Some of their functions are ethical, social, personal and political. A lawyer arguing on behalf of her client, two conflicting parties agreeing to mediation, people who feel they have been wronged seeking acknowledgement, or someone simply venting a bit of frustration are all using argumentation for some of these purposes.
The most philosophically salient of argumentation’s functions, however, are, broadly speaking, epistemological. Arguments persuade or convince an audience; they justify actions and decisions; they demonstrate truths, expose and refute errors, and test hypotheses; they critically explore; and they help us deliberate. The common element in all these cases is that successful argumentation brings about some sort of transformation in how and what we think. These transformations are all epistemic or doxastic (Pinto 2003, pp. 6f.). At the individual level, arguments may try to raise doubts, justify belief, or even yield knowledge. Arguments can convert nagging suspicions into confident belief as easily as they can transform smug belief into chronic doubt. It can crystallize indecisiveness into a decision, and, in the paradigm case, create knowledge from ignorance. Similar transformations occur at the interpersonal level: argumentation settles disputes, re-opens questions, determines the collective will, and, in the paradigm case for dialectics, forges consensus out of dissensus.

Explanations like arguments, also have many functions. And like arguments, their most philosophically important role is in bringing about cognitive transformations in a rational way. Paradigmatically, the perlocutionary act that explanations hope to perform is replacing incomprehension or puzzlement with understanding, rather than replacing ignorance or unreflective beliefs with justified beliefs and knowledge (Achinstein 1983, p. 16).
Not all cognitive transformations are epistemic. Seeing the duck-rabbit now as a duck, now as a rabbit, for example, does not seem to involve epistemé. Nor does coming to regard someone as a friend rather than a rival, or the aesthetic judgment involved in taking an object as an object of art, or learning how to tell a work by Beethoven from one by Mozart. Coming to understand something falls into this category.
Understanding is a cognitive achievement of the first rank, often exceeding knowledge. Understanding generally includes some knowledge: we are said to understand an event, for example, when we know that it occurred and we also know the reasons for or causes of its occurrence. This is the kind of understanding that is on display when we know how to answer the question why the event in question occurred, not just whether it occurred. But knowledge by itself is not always sufficient to produce understanding. There are senses of understanding that involve more: the change from incomprehension to understanding something may entail changes in attitudes, perspectives, associations, and abilities that are not represent-able in purely propositional terms (cf. Wittgenstein 1953, §152-4; Hacker1986, p. 248). And since understanding often goes beyond knowledge, it probably ought to have a higher profile in our epistemic projects and in the discourse of epistemology. However, since the epistemological tradition in large part arose as a response to the problem of skepticism, and has been periodically revitalized over the centuries in response to new skeptical challenges, it might be better to describe the transformations that explanations bring about as cognitive in a very broad sense than narrowly epistemic. But this just helps locate explanations in conceptual space vis à vis arguments rather than clearly defines or distinguishes them.

There are many important and promising areas of research for argumentation theorists arising from the juxtaposition of argumentation and explanation. Moving from arguments to explanations, we can begin by noting that explanations may be logically and syntactically indistinguishable from arguments, in order to ask whether the fallacies that occur in argumentation also infect explanations? Is there a distinctive class of explanatory fallacies to identify and worry about? Second, why is the dominant metaphor for arguments – argument is war – so inapplicable to explanations? That is, how can explanations share so much with arguments, but lack the central – some say defining – adversarial component? When it comes to explanations, the entire ‘dialectical tier’ of questions, objections, disagreements, and challenges are all possible. Even so, disagreement – the initial and, some say, fundamental dialectical factor – does not have to be present to initiate explanation.
Third, how does that dialectical difference manifest itself in the subsequent stages of reasoning in explanations? Since alternative explanations need not be competing explanations, how does the closure reached in successful explanation relate to the resolution reached in successful critical discussion? Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2006 – Rhetoric, Homeland Security, And Geopolitical Context: A Comparative Argument Analysis After Terror Strikes

• by: Elisia L. Cohen - Saint Louis University

Nearly five years after September 11, 2001 United States leaders continue their homeland security campaign. Following the September 11th attacks, President Bush proclaimed to a mourning audience at the National Cathedral that terrorists ‘attacked America because we are freedom’s home and defender’ (Bush, September 14, 2001). After acknowledging the attack that ‘shattered steel’, the President bolstered the American public by promising that the terrorists ‘cannot dent the steel of American resolve. America was targeted for attack because we’re the brightest beacon for freedom and opportunity in the world. And no one will keep that light from shining’ (Bush, September 11, 2001). In the days and years ahead the President promised America would build ‘a House of Freedom’, in a world where ‘freedom and fear areat war’ and to fight freedom’s fight, in the President’s worlds, was ‘the great divide in our time. Between civilization and barbarism’ (Bush, September 13, 2001).

In its broadest sense, my research argues that it is apparent that since September 11, 2001 the Bush administration’s rhetoric has shifted numerous times, from an initial ‘rhetoric of ideological pronouncement’ featuring the common archetypal metaphors of ‘savagery’ and ‘civilization’ (Cohen, 2004a, 2005), to a ‘rhetoric of indoctrination’ urging the U.S. public to embrace the Bush administration’s shift in National Security Strategy making the grounds for preventive and preemptive war indistinguishable (Cohen, 2004b); to an explicit strategy of global ‘ideological argumentation’ that I will describe in this essay. Throughout this rhetorical sequence, the mechanism of casuistic stretching has enabled the President of the United States to negotiate and transcend certain contradictions inherent in the war on terror. By expanding the circumference of arguments promoting the so-called ‘war on terror’, however, most recently the administration has found itself on unstable argumentative grounds in its global efforts.
Specifically, the continued spector of al-Queda attacks in Bali, Madrid, London, and an Egyptian resort area, among others in the last year clearly shows how al-Queda targets are unambiguously wider than U.S. democratic values or prized symbolic targets. The changing global environment, or scene in the war on terror, invites argumentation critics to consider the ways there is a fundamental rhetorical disorientation tothe Bush administration’s latest anti-terror efforts, since new efforts in the war on terror can advance itself only by means of the leverage received from its September 11th rhetorical antecedents. Informed by this insight into the nature of the nation’s pursuit of its homeland security objectives, my essay will attempt to orient itself around some of the ways in which the Bush administration’s recent ideological argumentation was designed to better align the administration’s foreign policy rhetoric with that of its war objectives. This is not to suggest that the origination of the war on terror was not inherently ideological, but rather I maintain that the effort moved from ideological pronouncements of policy to ideological arguments backing foreign policies that attempted to mystify the stakes of the administration’s actions. I conclude however that this argumentation strategy is ill-equipped to be persuasive to the international audience as they are adopted and recirculated by members of this international community. Thus, the paper concludes by considering the Bush administration’s latest rhetorical strategy from a global perspective. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2006 – Creating Controversy About Science And Technology

• by: Leah Ceccarelli - University of Washington

This paper is a response to Tom Goodnight’s ‘rationale for inquiry’ into ‘science and technology controversy’, which was recently published in the forum section of Argumentation and Advocacy.

My first response to his published essay was printed in the same issue of that journal, as were responses by Alan Gross, Carolyn Miller and John Lyne. My purpose in this second response is to summarize some similarities in the arguments that Miller, Lyne and I independently presented in that published forum, and to offer a new critique of the language used to discuss science and technology controversy.
Gross’s response to Goodnight’s call to arms was to reenlist and begin preparing his armaments; he laid out theoretical frameworks for the analysis of scientific controversy borrowed from Joseph Gusfield, Victor Turner, and Jürgen Habermas.
Miller, Lyne and I, who like Gross are career rhetoricians of science, took a somewhat different approach when writing our responses. While we were excited to hear a call for the further support of a segment of our field, we could not help but also act as critics of the argument that Goodnight offered. While failing to advance theoretical frameworks of our own, we did suggest that there might be some problems with the initial map of the field that Goodnight sketched.
All three of us focused on Goodnight’s characterization of science and technology controversy as being generated from a contest between ‘traditional culture’ and ‘modernity’, ‘between community and society, between lifeworld and systems-world’ (p. 27), a repeated ‘struggle between prudencebased reason and modern reasoning [or reasoning] from science/technology’ (p. 28).
Invoking Habermas, Goodnight suggests that ‘systemsworld reasoning’ is ‘usurping lifeworld functions, at too high a price’, and at the same time, science is becoming ‘increasingly tied down by the practices of party politics’ (p. 27).
In response, he says, science and controversy studies should ‘engage the nexuses among risks deliberated from traditionbased, prudential reasoning or assessed by contemporary epistemic strategies’, and find a way to help public deliberation ‘continually negotiate its status, evolve, and reclaim its powers on either side of a divide between forces that would irreparably politicize science or progressively scientize the lifeworld’ (p. 28).

Miller, Lyne and I, well-trained debaters all, recognized an antithesis when we saw one, and we decided it was our duty to complicate it. Miller, looking to some cases of science controversy about which she’s written, points out that what strikes her the most in these studies is ‘the strategic instability of the distinction between epistemic and policy issues, between expert and public forums’ (p. 36). This, she suggests, is evidence that ‘the public sphere and the technical sphere are more intimately intertwined – and perhaps more similar to each other than Professor Goodnight’s earlier work maintains’ (p. 37). ‘Controversy in the technical sphere can involve ambiguity, emotion, and multiple forms of power, much like deliberation in the public sphere’, says Miller.

‘And controversy in the public sphere often is shaped and constrained by influences from the technical sphere’ (p. 37). Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2006 – Revolutionary Rhetoric – Georg Büchner’s “Der Hessische Landbote“ (1834). A Case Study

• by: Manfred Kienpointner - University of Vienna, University of Innsbruck

1. Georg Büchner’s Political Pamphlet “Der Hessische Landbote” (1834): Historical Background and Persuasive Effect
If we want to understand and interpret Büchner’s revolutionary rhetoric in his pamphlet “Der Hessische Landbote”, we have to take into account the political and social context, that is, the historical situation of the duchy Hessen-Darmstadt in the 30’s of the 19th century. In this context, several political reforms initiated by Duke Ludewig I. (1753-1830) have to be mentioned positively, namely, the abolishment of peonage, the declaration of a constitution and the introduction of elective franchise; moreover, the Duke’s theatre and library were opened for the general public. However, these reforms at the beginning of the 19th century remained half-hearted. For example, even after the abolishment of peonage, certain feudal tax privileges remained. In this way, many farmers had to suffer an intolerable double burden of the traditional taxes paid to the nobility and the newly introduced taxes paid to the central authorities of Hessen (cf. Franz 1987, p. 38). The right to be elected remained restricted to the wealthy citizens. Finally, the laws abolishing the traditional guild system and introducing free trade caused the bankruptcy of craftsmen through the newly created competition of cheap factory products from foreign countries.

Furthermore, from 1830 onwards, Duke Ludewig II. (1777-1848) returned to a conservative policy, with much less social ambitions than his father Ludewig I. Consequently, Ludewig II. let his prime minister Carl W. H. du Bos du Thil (1777-1859) use authoritarian methods, for example, the brutal knock down of social riots in the northern parts of Hessen.

In 1834, the year of the publication of “Der Hessische Landbote”, the duchy Hessen-Darmstadt had about 720.000 inhabitants, whose majority, especially in rural areas, suffered from extreme poverty. Almost 50% of the population lived just at or below the level of subsistence, 40-45% of the working population (including children over the age of 12 and elderly people) had to work 12-18 hours a day (cf. Schaub 1976, p. 99; Hauschild 2000, p. 19 and p. 43).

In this dramatic situation, Georg Büchner (1813-1827), who is well-known as a brilliant German writer, radical political thinker and distinguished scientist in the fields of medicine and biology, decided to contribute to a revolutionary change of the intolerable social situation via political propaganda. Büchner was born in Goddelau and grew up in the capital of the duchy, Darmstadt. He was the son of the successful physician Dr. Ernst Karl Büchner and his wife Caroline. Among his numerous siblings, Wilhelm Büchner (1816-1892) stands out as the inventor of artificial ultramarine, Luise Büchner (1821-1877) became a distinguished writer and feminist and Ludwig Büchner (1824-1899) was a well-known materialist philosopher.

After finishing grammar school in Darmstadt, Georg Büchner studied medicine in Straßburg, the centre of German political emigration, where he probably established contacts with revolutionary circles in the years 1831-1833. Büchner continued his studies in Gießen 1833-1834, and founded a section of the “Society of Human Rights”, first in Gießen, later in Darmstadt. In this society, pre-communistic theories were discussed. Büchner developed an increasingly critical view of the political reality within the duchy and the other countries of the political confederation “Deutscher Bund” bordering on Hessen-Darmstadt. Through his friend August Becker, Büchner got to know the Protestant pastor Friedrich Ludwig Weidig (1791-1837), the leading head of the liberal-democratic opposition in northern Hessen. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2006 – Legal Argumentation, Constitutional Interpretation, And Presumption Of Constitutionality

• by: Virgílio Afonso da Silva - Professor at the Faculty of Law, University of São Paulo

Abstract: Constitutional interpretation is a very complex task. The main reason underlying this complexity is the open and abstract language of constitutional texts, mainly when it concerns their bill of rights. And when it comes to judicial review of legislation, constitutional interpretation becomes even more complex. Not only the constitution but also ordinary legislation has to be interpreted so that their compatibility can be properly analysed. Although this scheme represents common sense among constitutional scholars, the arguments used in the judicial review are the subject of fierce disputes. The aim of my paper is to analyse one of these arguments, which is frequently employed in Latin American constitutional adjudication: the presumption of constitutionality. I will argue that this kind of presumption entails many problematic issues of which constitutional scholars in Latin America are often unaware. Roughly speaking, these problematic issues can be of two types:
(1) Formal argumentation problems – concerning above all the relationship between presumption and time, as well as between presumption and proof; and
(2) Constitutional theory problems – concerning some consequences of the presumption of constitutionality in the separation of powers.

1. Introduction and definitions
In legal argumentation, presumptions often play an important role. Presuming something to be true under given circumstances – above all when it is difficult or impossible to discover the real truth – is a strategy which has been used in legal argumentation and legal decision ever since the Roman Law. Although the idea is ancient and appears, at least at first sight, quite straightforward, there is no real consensus on its precise definition and on the situations in which presumptions can be used. As will be shown further on, these two variables – definition and applicability – are of great importance to the subject of this paper, the presumption of constitutionality.
Presumptions are usually defined as the acceptance of something as true given certain conditions. But this is not enough, since it is crucial for the concept of presumption to define whether and – if it is the case – how a presumption can be defeated. In legal systems based on the Roman Law tradition, it is common to speak of two kinds of presumptions: the so-called presumptions iuris tantum and the iuris et de iure. Presumptions of the first kind can be defeated while presumptions of the latter cannot. For the aims of this paper, presumptions iuris et de iure are of no importance, since the constitutionality of an enacted law cannot be exempt from a possible defeat, at least in those countries where there is some kind of judicial review of legislation.[i] For presumptions iuris tantum, the presumed fact should be considered true unless stringent evidence to the contrary is introduced to the argumentation. In this sense, it can be said, as a preliminary working definition, that one is facing a presumption (iuris tantum) if, given certain conditions, something shall be considered true, unless there is stringent evidence to believe the contrary.
In her logic formalisation of presumptions, Edna Ullmann-Margalit (1983, 147) includes only the first part of my definition, leaving aside the reference to the evidence and to the possibility of defeat. She represents presumptions through the following formula: pres (P, Q), where P stands for the presumption-raising-fact and Q for the presumed fact. This means “P raises the presumption of Q” or “[t]here is a presumption from Q that P” (1983, 147). Nevertheless, when it comes to an explanation of the “presumption rule”, her idea is completed in the following terms: “Given that p is the case, you (= the rule subject) shall proceed as if q were true, unless or until you have (sufficient) reason to believe that q is not the case.” She calls this last part of the rule the “rebuttal clause” (1983, 149).

A more complete formalisation of the idea of presumptions can be found in Daniel Mendonca (1998, 408). According to him, the formula of presumption should take the following form: [Pro (P) & ¬Pro (¬Q)] → O Pres (Q). This means that proven that P is the case – Pro (P) – and not proven that Q is not the case – ¬Pro (¬Q) – it is then obligatory to presume Q. The importance of Mendonca’s formulation lies in its emphasis on the necessity of proving something in order to rebut a presumption. This necessity will be explored further on (see section 2.3). Read more