ISSA Proceedings 2002 – On The Use And Misuse Of Analyticity In Arguments

• by: Constantin Antonopoulos - National Technical University of Athens, Greece

1. Argument-by-Analyticity
I go to a concert and hear, among the other pieces, a particularly avant guarde piece where the notes or rather the sounds it is made up of seem to me and to all the rest of the audience to succeed one another at random. Being a bit of a conservative at the end of the concert I remark: “That thing was not music”. I intend that as a statement of  fact, even if to many it looks like a statement of value. None such can be made, unless the piece in question is first admitted to the category “music”. A progressivist friend of mine, with a tendency to radicalism, disputes my aphorism – essentially my classification – by retorting: “Why not? Music doesn’t have to be what it always has been. It can still be music, even if its component sounds come at random. Art is originality and original things cannot be copies of past ways”.

Though both my friend and I are laymen, and lack any pertinent philosophical information, we essentially stand on opposite sides of a Wittgensteinian “family resem-blance” dichotomy. To him the piece in question shares a family resemblance with music, which is thus treated as an open-ended concept, because it is possessed of sound, which standard is deemed sufficient. To me, on the contrary, it falls short of the definition of Music, in that it lacks the specific unity of sound characteristic of what we normally call music. And then music is no longer an open-ended concept, nor is any other, for that matter. The basis of my objection, though in being a layman I may lack the proper philosophical means to express it, rests upon the following, restrictive rule of identification:
[A]  Only Coherent Sound Can Be Music.
This is, paradigmatically, a rule of usage. But it is, fundamentally, an analytic rule. Being a layman I know nothing of analytic truths, synthetic ones, borderline cases between them or what have you. But this much I do know: Not anything can qualify as music. Were I a Popperian, for example, I could qualify this gut feeling of mine with an even more refined version:
[A1]  Nothing Can Be Music, Unless Dissonance Can Occur In It.

This is by strict analogy with “nothing can be science unless falsehood can occur in it” though of course, in being a layman, I know nothing of all this. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2002 – The Constitution, Critical Rhetoric, And Public Argument: The Case Of Democratic Japan

• by: Satoru Aonuma - Kanda University of International Studies

Introduction
During the “occupation” period that followed Japan’s surrender to the Allied Power in the summer of 1945, the Constitution of Japan came into effect on May 3, 1947. Some fifty years have past since then; the Japanese have developed and nurtured a political culture distinct from its prewar predecessor. In the first place, it provides “a new intellectual framework, a fresh set of ideas and values” by which they could form a new identity (Tanaka: 125-6).  In place of their earlier loyalty to the emperor and “his” Constitution, the postwar generation Japanese share a loyalty to the new Constitution not merely as a formal document, but as “a summation of preferred values and guidelines for public action” (Beer 1982: 46-7). At the same time, the new Constitution offers a ground for moral critique in postwar Japan. “Since we have not yet developed a self-oriented behavior pattern in the confusion of the postwar period, we Japanese have tried to organize a new society with the Constitution of Japan as its guiding star” (Ukai 1979: 127).

This paper seeks to offer a brief, critical reading of Japan’s postwar political culture, focusing on the Constitution of Japan as a significant instance of public argument. As an object of study and investigation, significance of a constitutional discourse to student of rhetoric and argumentation is evident. In A grammar of motives, for instance, Kenneth Burke discusses a rhetoric (and a dialectic) of a constitution as an “idealistic anecdote” (1945; also see Anderson 1995). In relation to critical cultural studies, Spivak (1990) has written on a constitutive power of a constitutional narrative that normalizes and regularizes “something called the People… as a collective subject (We)” (134). Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2002 – Cases: Their Role In Informal Logic

• by: Peter D. Asquith - Michigan State University

1. Introduction
One aspect of informal logic is the attempt to apply logic to ordinary discourse.  When attempting to do this, one needs to (a) recognize/determine that an argument is present and (b) be able to reconstruct the argument from the ordinary discourse. Doing both of these might be possible by inspection, e.g., you look and you know that there is an argument and what the argument is.  Indeed, I believe that there are some simple cases or familiar situations in which this occurs.  However, it seems equally clear that there are more complex cases in which neither the recognition nor the reconstruction can be accomplished by inspection.  A review of texts shows that rules, guidelines, lists of indicators, lists of steps to be followed, flowcharts, and examples are all frequently deployed as techniques to assist the student to achieve the objectives of identification and reconstruction.  These complex cases in which these tools are to be utilized are the interesting ones, both theoretically and pedagogically.

What are the situations encountered and how does one make the necessary determinations in these more complicated cases? What I want to do in this paper is to assess the nature of the two tasks listed above, discuss the roles of several of the tools just mentioned – rules and examples,  and look at some ways of conceptualizing what is occurring. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2002 – Constructing The (Imagined) Antagonist In Advertising Argumentation

• by: Albert Atkin & John E. Richardson - University of Sheffield

1. Introduction: the problem of the imagined antagonist
O’Keefe’s (1977) well known and well-used classification and definitions of argument1 and argument2 need little introduction: for clarity, we assume that argument1 “is something one person makes” while argument2 ‘oppositional argument’) “is something two or more persons have (or engage in)” (O’Keefe, 1977: 121). Despite this familiarity there are, nevertheless, certain contentious aspects to the division, not least on whether argument1 represents a form of pseudo-dialogue between protagonist and an imagined antagonist – O’Keefe (1977) himself pointed out that the distinction was only ever “a starting-point for analysis” out of which “[v]ery thorny issues immediately arise concerning how one is to delimit” them (p.127). Here we assume that arguments “require dissensus” (Willard, 1989: 53). Given that such differences of opinion logically entail more than one participant, in cases of argument1, pragma-dialectical theory assumes that arguments exist as dialogue. Indeed examples of rhetorical argument – or argument1 – can be shown to proceed in accordance with the four dialectic stages pragma-dialectical theory identifies (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1994), with speech acts operating in these various stages directed at resolving difference of opinion (van Eemeren, Grootendorst & Snoeck Henkemans, 2002; Richardson, 2001). Van Eemeren et al (1996) for example, states:
Argument does not exist in a single individual privately drawing a conclusion: It is part of a discourse procedure whereby two or more individuals who have a difference of opinion try to arrive at agreement. Argument presupposes two distinguishable participant roles, that of a ‘protagonist’ and that of a – real or imagined – ‘antagonist’. (p.277)

In order that the argument1 be as persuasive as possible, its rhetorical moves must, at all dialectical stages of the discourse, “be adapted to audience demand in such a way that they comply with the listener’s or the readership’s good sense and preferences” (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 1999: 485). With cases of argument1 in which the antagonist is imagined it becomes necessary, indeed essential, to develop as accurate a projection of this antagonist as possible in order that the rhetorical moves employed by the protagonist be as persuasive as possible. In short, arguments should be written or spoken “in such a way that optimal comprehensibility and acceptability”, on the part of the antagonist, is ensured (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1994: 223). Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2002 – In Defense Of The Realm: Administrative Responses To Anti-Globalization Argumentation

• by: Kevin T. Baaske - California State University Los Angeles & Patricia Riley University of Southern California

“The world is in a rush, and is getting close to its end.”
Archbishop Wulfstan, York, 1014

Seattle, November 1999.  Between 35,000 and 65,000 activists gathered in Seattle to protest the meeting of foreign ministers of the World Trade Organization, a little known – at the time – organization formed to resolve trade disputes. Peaceful marches turned violent as police sought to contain and remove the protesters. The resulting conflagration shocked the world and forever changed the media’s treatment of globalism issues. “Seattle was a real watershed. It raised the awareness of the world. Before that, people didn’t even know what the WTO was – maybe they thought it was the World Tourism Organization or something” (Ransom, 2001, 26).

In city after city, Washington, Melbourne, Prague, Davos, Quebec, Goteberg, Salzburg, Genoa, Doha, New York, when elite members of the international community gathered to promote globalism, large crowds of frequently violent protesters also gathered. Whether it is the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the World Economic Forum, the Summit of the Americas, the European Union, or the G8 – each organization represents a transnational effort to promote economic growth through their own notion of what will encourage economic development.  And each time they meet to set new policy, revamp existing regulations, or work out their differences, they now encounter the stratagems and visceral responses of anti-globalism activists. This shift in the discourse of globalization was rapid and violent.  Trade across nation-states and very long distances is not new and neither is the concept that the world is shrinking. But the rather benign view of globalization that was presented in the U.S. media prior to Seattle was rapidly reconfigured into a war between the “haves” and the “have-nots,” or the powerful versus the powerless. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2002 – Designing A Computer-Supported Collaborative Learning Situation For Broadening And Deepening Understanding Of The Space Of Debate

• by: Michael Baker, Matthieu Quignard, Kristine Lund - UMR 5612 GRIC, Groupe de Recherches sur les Interactions Communicatives, Équipe Interaction & Cognition, C.N.R.S. & Université Lumière Lyon 2 & Marije van Amelsvoort - Department of Educational Sciences, Utrecht University

1. Introduction: Collaborative Argumentation-Based Learning (CABLE)
In the continuation of research on the role of socio-cognitive conflict in cooperative learning (Doise and Mugny, 1981), it has been conjectured that the cooperative resolution of such conflicts in argumentative interactions could be the most important factor (Mevarech & Light, 1991). More recent research has begun to elucidate the processes by which the types of argumentative interactions that arise spontaneously during cooperative problem solving can lead to co-construction of knowledge (Baker, 1996, 1999). For example, the interactional pressure imposed by mutually recognised verbal conflict can lead students to refine meanings, to dissociate notions and to elaborate more coherent discourses, either during argumentation phases, or else as a means of resolving, dissolving or closing them.[*]

However, such argumentative interactions — particularly those that operate on a conceptual plane — are relatively rare, especially in scientific and other disciplines taught in school. There are undoubtedly good reasons for this (see e.g. Golder, 1996; Quignard & Baker, 1999; Quignard, 2000). For example, the topic must be intrinsically debatable, students must be motivated to argue with respect to it, there should be an appropriate intersubjective distance between students’ points of view (c.f. Rommetveit, 1979), students should have sufficient knowledge of the topic, interpersonal relations and socio-institutional factors should not prevent free expression of divergent views, and so on. One particular paradox concerning conditions for argumentative interaction and for learning itself is especially important here: in learning situations that are designed so that students will co-construct new knowledge, by hypothesis, they will not have the kind of coherent and firmly entrenched points of view that could lead to dialectical confrontation (Nonnon, 1996). We should thus expect that students’ discussions would rather correspond to a cooperative exploration of a dialogical space. In this paper, we refer to such a space that is explored by students’ in cooperative learning situations during their argumentative interactions, as the space of debate. Read more