ISSA Proceedings 2002 – Cases: Their Role In Informal Logic
1. Introduction
One aspect of informal logic is the attempt to apply logic to ordinary discourse. When attempting to do this, one needs to (a) recognize/determine that an argument is present and (b) be able to reconstruct the argument from the ordinary discourse. Doing both of these might be possible by inspection, e.g., you look and you know that there is an argument and what the argument is. Indeed, I believe that there are some simple cases or familiar situations in which this occurs. However, it seems equally clear that there are more complex cases in which neither the recognition nor the reconstruction can be accomplished by inspection. A review of texts shows that rules, guidelines, lists of indicators, lists of steps to be followed, flowcharts, and examples are all frequently deployed as techniques to assist the student to achieve the objectives of identification and reconstruction. These complex cases in which these tools are to be utilized are the interesting ones, both theoretically and pedagogically.
What are the situations encountered and how does one make the necessary determinations in these more complicated cases? What I want to do in this paper is to assess the nature of the two tasks listed above, discuss the roles of several of the tools just mentioned – rules and examples, and look at some ways of conceptualizing what is occurring. Read more
ISSA Proceedings 2002 – Constructing The (Imagined) Antagonist In Advertising Argumentation
1. Introduction: the problem of the imagined antagonist
O’Keefe’s (1977) well known and well-used classification and definitions of argument1 and argument2 need little introduction: for clarity, we assume that argument1 “is something one person makes” while argument2 ‘oppositional argument’) “is something two or more persons have (or engage in)” (O’Keefe, 1977: 121). Despite this familiarity there are, nevertheless, certain contentious aspects to the division, not least on whether argument1 represents a form of pseudo-dialogue between protagonist and an imagined antagonist – O’Keefe (1977) himself pointed out that the distinction was only ever “a starting-point for analysis” out of which “[v]ery thorny issues immediately arise concerning how one is to delimit” them (p.127). Here we assume that arguments “require dissensus” (Willard, 1989: 53). Given that such differences of opinion logically entail more than one participant, in cases of argument1, pragma-dialectical theory assumes that arguments exist as dialogue. Indeed examples of rhetorical argument – or argument1 – can be shown to proceed in accordance with the four dialectic stages pragma-dialectical theory identifies (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 1994), with speech acts operating in these various stages directed at resolving difference of opinion (van Eemeren, Grootendorst & Snoeck Henkemans, 2002; Richardson, 2001). Van Eemeren et al (1996) for example, states:
Argument does not exist in a single individual privately drawing a conclusion: It is part of a discourse procedure whereby two or more individuals who have a difference of opinion try to arrive at agreement. Argument presupposes two distinguishable participant roles, that of a ‘protagonist’ and that of a – real or imagined – ‘antagonist’. (p.277)
In order that the argument1 be as persuasive as possible, its rhetorical moves must, at all dialectical stages of the discourse, “be adapted to audience demand in such a way that they comply with the listener’s or the readership’s good sense and preferences” (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 1999: 485). With cases of argument1 in which the antagonist is imagined it becomes necessary, indeed essential, to develop as accurate a projection of this antagonist as possible in order that the rhetorical moves employed by the protagonist be as persuasive as possible. In short, arguments should be written or spoken “in such a way that optimal comprehensibility and acceptability”, on the part of the antagonist, is ensured (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1994: 223). Read more
ISSA Proceedings 2002 – In Defense Of The Realm: Administrative Responses To Anti-Globalization Argumentation
“The world is in a rush, and is getting close to its end.”
Archbishop Wulfstan, York, 1014
Seattle, November 1999. Between 35,000 and 65,000 activists gathered in Seattle to protest the meeting of foreign ministers of the World Trade Organization, a little known – at the time – organization formed to resolve trade disputes. Peaceful marches turned violent as police sought to contain and remove the protesters. The resulting conflagration shocked the world and forever changed the media’s treatment of globalism issues. “Seattle was a real watershed. It raised the awareness of the world. Before that, people didn’t even know what the WTO was – maybe they thought it was the World Tourism Organization or something” (Ransom, 2001, 26).
In city after city, Washington, Melbourne, Prague, Davos, Quebec, Goteberg, Salzburg, Genoa, Doha, New York, when elite members of the international community gathered to promote globalism, large crowds of frequently violent protesters also gathered. Whether it is the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the World Economic Forum, the Summit of the Americas, the European Union, or the G8 – each organization represents a transnational effort to promote economic growth through their own notion of what will encourage economic development. And each time they meet to set new policy, revamp existing regulations, or work out their differences, they now encounter the stratagems and visceral responses of anti-globalism activists. This shift in the discourse of globalization was rapid and violent. Trade across nation-states and very long distances is not new and neither is the concept that the world is shrinking. But the rather benign view of globalization that was presented in the U.S. media prior to Seattle was rapidly reconfigured into a war between the “haves” and the “have-nots,” or the powerful versus the powerless. Read more
ISSA Proceedings 2002 – Designing A Computer-Supported Collaborative Learning Situation For Broadening And Deepening Understanding Of The Space Of Debate
1. Introduction: Collaborative Argumentation-Based Learning (CABLE)
In the continuation of research on the role of socio-cognitive conflict in cooperative learning (Doise and Mugny, 1981), it has been conjectured that the cooperative resolution of such conflicts in argumentative interactions could be the most important factor (Mevarech & Light, 1991). More recent research has begun to elucidate the processes by which the types of argumentative interactions that arise spontaneously during cooperative problem solving can lead to co-construction of knowledge (Baker, 1996, 1999). For example, the interactional pressure imposed by mutually recognised verbal conflict can lead students to refine meanings, to dissociate notions and to elaborate more coherent discourses, either during argumentation phases, or else as a means of resolving, dissolving or closing them.[*]
However, such argumentative interactions — particularly those that operate on a conceptual plane — are relatively rare, especially in scientific and other disciplines taught in school. There are undoubtedly good reasons for this (see e.g. Golder, 1996; Quignard & Baker, 1999; Quignard, 2000). For example, the topic must be intrinsically debatable, students must be motivated to argue with respect to it, there should be an appropriate intersubjective distance between students’ points of view (c.f. Rommetveit, 1979), students should have sufficient knowledge of the topic, interpersonal relations and socio-institutional factors should not prevent free expression of divergent views, and so on. One particular paradox concerning conditions for argumentative interaction and for learning itself is especially important here: in learning situations that are designed so that students will co-construct new knowledge, by hypothesis, they will not have the kind of coherent and firmly entrenched points of view that could lead to dialectical confrontation (Nonnon, 1996). We should thus expect that students’ discussions would rather correspond to a cooperative exploration of a dialogical space. In this paper, we refer to such a space that is explored by students’ in cooperative learning situations during their argumentative interactions, as the space of debate. Read more
ISSA Proceedings 2002 – She Blinded Me With Science: Material Argument In The Indianapolis Children’s Museum
Children’s museums, which have been in existence for just over 100 years, are the growth sector of the museum industry. While other museums and tourist attractions have struggled to sustain attendance, children’s museums have welcomed record numbers of visitors. In 2000, the 400 children’s museums in the United States attracted 33 million visitors (Sangiorgio 2002: 70). The popularity of these museums is so high that the Association of Youth Museums reports that 100 new Children’s museums are currently in the planning phase (Atkin 2000: 15). While these museums naturally attract children and their parents, there is also a close association between children’s museums and educational institutions. Thus, the children’s museum serves not only as a place of play, but also a place of serious intellectual activity. Critics of children’s museums have complained that they are “frivolous; lacking content, rigor or standards; and dangerously blurring the lines between playgrounds, Disneyland, and museums” (Schwarzer 1998: 66). Yet, few scholars have closely examined the types of materials that are being offered to children in these museums. Despite these criticisms, there is no doubt that exhibits presented in children’s museums are carefully planned and executed, and that much pedagogical theory is involved in the implementation of the displays offered to visitors. This very careful attention to display begs for critical scholars to analyze the types of arguments that are being presented to visitors in these museums, especially given the power that these institutions have in formulating claims about the importance of culture and science to very impressionable audiences.
This paper will investigate how the Indianapolis Children’s Museum, recently ranked by Child Magazine as the top children’s museum in the country, creates arguments about science in its displays. While children’s museums include much more than science alone, science is usually given a preferred position within the museum. In fact, the Indianapolis Children’s Museum devotes nearly half of its exhibition space to scientific exhibits. Scientific discovery and the knowledge of science are two themes that resonate both in contemporary children’s museums and in the development of the children’s museum, so it seems apropos to investigate what types of arguments these sites make about science and scientific discovery to their audiences. Read more
ISSA Proceedings 2002 – Linked And Independent Premises: A New Analysis
Most introductory logic and critical thinking textbooks include a discussion of linked and independent premises. The core intuition underlying this distinction is clear. In some arguments, the premises work together as a logical unit in such a way that the amount of support offered by one or more of the premises is dependent on the other(s). Example:
Case 1
1. All members of the Oakwood Society are over 50 years old.
2. Bert is a member of the Oakwood Society.
3. Therefore, Bert is over 50 years old.
Here, neither of the premises provides any support for the conclusion without the other. Taken together, however, the premises validly imply the conclusion. Thus, the premises interact to produce a degree of support that is not simply the sum of the supports of the individual premises. Premises of this sort are said to be linked[i].
In other arguments, the premises work completely separately and independently of one another, in such a way that the degree of support they provide for the conclusion remains the same even if some or all of the other premises are omitted or assumed to be false. Example:
Case 2
1. Harry’s car has a flat tire.
2. Harry’s right leg is in a cast.
3. Harry’s driver’s license was recently suspended.
4. Therefore, Harry won’t drive his car to the game. Read more