The Ideology Behind The ‘Islam Agenda’ Of Far-Right Parties In The European Parliament: Revamping The European Union Into The Multipolar World Model?
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Jan Jaap de Ruiter at the Shanghai Conference – The EU’s 7Ds: Perspectives and the China Dimension
05-18-2026 – Abstract
This paper examines the party positions on Muslims, Muslim migrants, and Islam of four European far-right parties. It concerns the relative veterans, the French National Rally and the Dutch PVV; and relative newcomers, the German AfD and the Spanish VOX. Relatively large Muslim communities live in the four countries where these parties operate. After analyzing the political views of the four parties, the focus is on the two far-right factions in the European Parliament, Patriots for Europe and Europe of Sovereign Nations, and examine how and to what extent the visions of these four parties are reflected in the political platforms of both political families, and how these policies are realized in the European Parliament.
Far-right parties are by nature nationally oriented, and not internationally. Yet, European far-right parties operate within the European Union and have recently adopted a more pragmatic approach to reorganizing the union according to their wishes. In the European Union China relationship context and based on the image of an ‘equal and orderly’ multipolar world as promoted by China, characterized by various centers of power rather than a single central power, it is an interesting question whether an eventual ‘far-right European Union’ will develop within this model. Does the ‘our people first’ aspiration of European far-right parties fit within this multipolar worldview or is it counterproductive? A question very much worth discussing.
Key words: far-right parties, populism, Muslims, Islam, European Union, China
1 Introduction
After the 2024 European elections, far right parties in the European Parliament gained strength. The Patriots for Europe became the third-largest faction with 84 of 720 seats, while the Europe of Sovereign Nations bloc was to hold 27+ seats. These parties promote nationalist agendas and employ terms like ‘remigration’ to describe strategies intended to preserve perceived ethnic homogeneity, frequently singling out longstanding Muslim communities across the European Union. Parties such as Germany’s Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland) and the Netherlands’ Party for Freedom (Partij voor de Vrijheid, PVV) emphasize anti-migrant and anti-Muslim policies. Approximately 5% of the EU population—about 22 million people of roughly 450 million—have a Muslim background. Far right formations prioritize national constituencies and often reject the EU’s broader conception of a shared European identity. Yet many are attempting to reshape the Union from within to secure their goals.
This paper analyzes the political positions on Muslims, and Islam of four far-right parties: the French National Rally (Rassemblement National) and the Dutch Party for Freedom (established actors), and the German AfD and Spain’s VOX (more recent entrants). All four operate in countries with sizable Muslim populations.
After assessing party-level positions on Muslims and Islam, the study examines how these views are reflected in the platforms and actions of the two European parliamentary families—Patriots for Europe and Europe of Sovereign Nations—and evaluates how those policies manifest in parliamentary activity, in particular related to two terms central in the conference, demography and democracy. The central research questions of this study are:
– How do the parties Alternative for Germany, Party for Freedom, National Rally and VOX conceptualize and prioritize demography and democracy with respect to Muslim citizens?
and
– What ideological patterns emerge around these issues?
Although inherently nation-focused, European far right politicians have adopted pragmatic strategies to reorganize the European Union according to their preferences. In the context of EU–China relations and debates about a multipolar world, the paper also considers whether a ‘far-right’ European Union driven by an ‘our people first’ logic, minimizing the role of Muslims and Islam can align with or be integrated into an eventually emerging multipolar international order.
This paper is structured as follows. In the next section (2) the term far-right is discussed, followed by a description of the four parties central to this paper. The focus in that section is on the history and founding principles of all four, and a short description of the current (spring 2026) political situation of each party in each country. In addition, the section briefly describes the two far right groupings in the European Parliament. The following section (3) presents data concerning the Muslim communities in the four countries. In the next section (4), the political views of the four parties are examined per country, notably based on statements on Islam and Muslims by their leaders. The political actions of the two factions in the European Parliament are also central to that same section. Section (5) presents telling quotes of Muslim leaders in the four countries on the party programs and statements of the four far-right parties in their countries. In a concluding paragraph (6) the conclusions are drawn, the research questions are addressed, and the answers are considered in light of how they relate to China’s policy of an ‘equal and orderly’ multipolar world.
2 Far right parties in France, the Netherlands, Germany and Spain
2.1 What is far-right?
This sections first discusses briefly the designation ‘far right’ of the four parties under concern. It is not the aim of the paper to treat this issue extensively, the more so because researchers have until today not reached unanimity on the definition of what far-right means. Smeets (2025) presents an excellent overview of this debate. Basically, most researchers agree that far right parties share the following characteristics: nationalism, xenophobia, racism, anti-democracy, authoritarianism and populism (p. 30). In the context of this debate Smeets (2025, p. 37) quotes Cas Mudde (1996, p 233): ‘We know who they are, even though we do not exactly know what they are.’ European far right parties think and act outside the liberal mainstream. It is tempting to refer to these parties as ‘populist’ but we apply the label ‘far right’ thus following mainstream research on this topic. For a discussion of the debate on what is far right and what is populism, we refer to Smeets (2025). Far right parties furthermore make a stark religion-based distinction between -good- Christianity and -evil- Islam. Religion plays in this respect quite an important role in their ideological considerations. A thorny issue is the anti-democratic characteristic of these parties. Because nearly all of them, and that goes as well for the four parties under concern here, were established within democracies and function within democracies. Cas Mudde states (p, 48) that there are far-right parties that are not against democracy per se, but against the liberal democracy. Many of them demand the reform of democracy as well, striving after more state intervention. Taggart (2000, p 4., in Smeets, 2025, p. 141) coined the term ‘the populist institutional dilemma’. Far-right parties, striving after changes, have to make use of the political system they condemn at the same time. Geert Wilders, leader of the Dutch Party for Freedom once called the Dutch parliament a ‘fake parliament’, illustrating this dilemma, while he, today, i.e. in spring 2026, is the Dutch MP who has served the longest in the legislature (since 1998) . Numerous studies on far-right parties label the four parties under concern in this study as far-right or similar terms and we refer the interested readers to these studies for more information (Maly, 2024; Mudde, 2019).
The following sections present the four parties, in order of the year of establishment, followed by the presentation of the description of the two factions in the European Parliament.
2.2 Front National – Rassemblement National
The forerunner of the Rassemblement National (RN) was founded in 1972 as the Front National (FN) by Jean Marie Le Pen. The FN remained marginal in the 1970s but slowly constructed a durable organizational base by cultivating municipal and regional networks and capitalizing on social anxieties about immigration, unemployment, and insecurity. Electoral visibility increased in the 1980s, most notably with representation in the European Parliament and an entrance into the French National Assembly under the -one time- proportional system used for the 1986 legislative elections with 35 seats (9,65% of the vote). Only later on, in 2012, the party succeeded in entering the Assembly within the electoral district system but modestly with 2 seats only and 13,6% of the vote. Jean Marie Le Pen’s combative style, claiming among other things that the gas chambers of the Holocaust were just a ‘detail in history’, for which he was convicted several times, attracted media attention and controversy, reinforcing both a loyal following and broad establishment resistance [i]. The party was very much associated with a strong sense of antisemitism under the rule of Mr. Le Pen.
The 2002 presidential election was a turning point: Jean‑Marie Le Pen’s unexpected advancement to the second round, 17% against 20% for running President Jacques Chirac, exposed deep protest currents in French politic. The runoff resulted in a large defeat (18% for Mr. le Pen against 82% for Mr. Chirac), but the episode confirmed the FN’s capacity to disrupt mainstream politics. Internal strife and generational tensions followed, culminating in Marine Le Pen’s, daughter of late Jean-Marie le Pen, ascendancy to party leadership in 2011. Her ‘de‑diabolization’ strategy—softening rhetoric, purging extreme notably antisemitic elements (including the eventual expulsion of Jean‑Marie Le Pen), and professionalizing the party—aimed to broaden appeal beyond the traditional far‑right base.
Under Marine Le Pen, the FN (renamed Rassemblement National in 2018) consolidated its position as a major force. The party combined strict immigration and security policies with welfare chauvinism, economic nationalism, selective Euroscepticism, and a strong aversion against ‘Islamist’ currents (see below) in France. Electoral performance under this strategy produced repeated presidential advances to second rounds (notably in 2017, 34% for Mrs. Le Pen and 66% for Mr. Macron and 2022, 41% and 59%).
In European Parliament contests the RN has performed strongly, ranking among the largest French delegations in several elections. In the 2024 European Parliament elections the party achieved 31% of the French vote, and with that the largest one, with 30 seats. The party is part of the Patriots for Europe faction.
Mr. Jordan Bardella became party leader in 2022 and was also chosen as leader of the Patriots for Europe group in the European Parliament. Ms. Marine Le Pen was convicted in spring 2025 of embezzling EU funds and was banned from standing as a candidate in French elections for five years, which currently appears to make her planned candidacy for the 2027 presidential election impossible. She is at present leader of the RN faction in the French National Assembly.
2.3 Party for Freedom (PVV)
The Dutch Party for Freedom (Partij voor de Vrijheid, PVV) was founded in 2006 by Geert Wilders after his split from the conservative-liberal party VVD (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie; People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy). From its inception the PVV was built around Wilders’s persona. The party does not have traditional party structures and organs. The party takes the form of an association with only one human member: Mr. Wilders himself. There is no party office, no research institute, no youth division, and there are no party congresses. Mr. Geert Wilders pulls all the strings. The power of the party is concentrated in his person, and he has surrounded himself with a number of loyal followers who closely monitor the functioning of Party for Freedom parliamentarians, eventual government officials, and representatives in municipalities, provinces, and the European Parliament. There is much criticism of the undemocratic structure of the party and its lack of oversight. Nevertheless, the party has functioned in this constellation for years and, evidently, given its electoral victories, successfully. Ideologically the PVV combines hardline immigration restriction, outspoken opposition to Islam, and a welfare‑state stance that privileges native Dutch citizens. Mr. Wilders’ blunt rhetoric and provocative actions became the PVV’s trademark and fueled intense national and international debate.
The Party for Freedom gained electoral success, first during the 2010 parliamentary elections (24 seats out of the total of 150) when it became the third largest party in the House of Representatives and later on, in November 2023 the biggest party (37 seats). After the November 2023 elections, and intensive negotiations, a coalition government was formed between the Party for Freedom and the other winners of the election, the center-right NSC (New Social Contract, 20 seats), the BBB (Farmers-Citizens Movement, 7 seats), and the election loser, the VVD (Liberal Party, securing 24 seats, but loosing 10 seats) of soon to be former Prime Minister Mr. Mark Rutte. During the negotiations, it became apparent that the three coalition parties with which Mr. Wilders was to form a government were opposed to him becoming the prime minister. Traditionally in the Netherlands, the largest party provides the prime minister. The coalition parties, however, were of the opinion that the person of Mr. Wilders was too controversial to represent the Netherlands abroad. Mr. Wilders acquiesced to this demand, and after a challenging search for a ‘neutral’ prime minister—given that the other three parties agreed not to nominate candidates of their own—former security services director Mr. Dick Schoof accepted the position.
The coalition government began in September 2024 and ended in June 2025. While Mr. Schoof led the government, Mr. Wilders had a significant influence on policies. Party for Freedom MP Mr. Martin Bosma became the Speaker of Parliament. Under the Schoof cabinet, Mr. Wilders and Mr. Bosma brought the Party for Freedom to the center of power, a long-awaited achievement However, Mr. Wilders, expressing frustration with alleged hidden political forces in the cabinet, introduced a ten-point plan addressing migration and Islam, demanding accepting it from the other three coalition parties. When they refused, the cabinet collapsed. Political analysts suggested this was a strategic move by Mr. Wilders to improve his position in upcoming elections. However it may be, Mr. Wilders maneuvered himself again in an opposition position, taking his ‘old’ views on Islam and migrants out of the refrigerator. Still, in the November 2025 elections the PVV lost 11 of its seats in Parliament and after a minority government was formed under the leadership of D66 (Democrats 66 ) leader Mr. Rob Jetten, seven PVV MP’s left the party, forming their own faction in the Dutch parliament under the leadership of Mr. Gidi Maszower, former ally and friend of Mr. Wilders. The PVV was left with 19 seats only, loosing considerable political power and influence. ‘Mr. Wilders has had his chances, but spoiled them’, is the general judgement of the political opposition. The PVV has held six seats in the European Parliament since the June 2024 elections (term 2024–2029). The party sits in the Patriots for Europe group.
2.4 Alternative for Germany (AfD)
Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) was founded on 6 February 2013. The party’s founding platform emphasized Euroscepticism, fiscal conservatism, and opposition to eurozone bailouts. In its first phase the AfD presented itself primarily as a technocratic, market‑oriented protest movement against the political establishment’s handling of the euro, attracting voters dissatisfied with austerity and European monetary policy. In the 2013 Bundestag election, shortly after its founding, the AfD won 4.7% of the vote—falling just below the 5% threshold required for Bundestag representation—yet signaling the party’s potential. The following year the AfD entered the European Parliament (2014) with 7,1% of the German vote, securing seven seats, marking its first institutional foothold at the European level. A decisive transformation occurred after 2015, when the European refugee and migration crisis (refugees in particular from Syria) reshaped the party’s profile. AfD moved toward a harder line on immigration and cultural identity; Alice Weidel consolidated that shift, becoming the leader of the party in 2022 until the present day. In the 2017 federal election the AfD entered the Bundestag for the first time, winning 12.6% of the vote and 94 seats—becoming the third‑largest party and the strongest opposition force in a parliament dominated by the center‑right and center‑left blocs. The AfD strength remains geographically uneven: it is significantly more influential in several eastern Länder, being part of the former German Democratic Republic, than in most western states.
In European contests the AfD strengthened its representation further: in the 2019 European Parliament election it won about 11% of the German vote, securing 11 seats. As of July 2024, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party is the largest party (15 seats) of the Europe of Sovereign Nations (ESN) faction in the European Parliament. The ESN group is composed of 27 members from eight countries.
The party doubled its share with 20.8% of the 2025 Bundestag vote, securing 152 seats of the 630 seats of the Bundestag, and achieved its best result in nation-wide German elections, moving into second place, without any other party willing to work with them.
The German Domestic Security Agency labelled the AfD party as a right-wing organization but the administrative court of Cologne ruled in February 2026 that that was not justified. The Agency can at the moment of writing this paper still appeal. In 2025 the Agency concluded that the AfD is extremist and the party filed a lawsuit over that. Until a final ruling is reached, which could take a long time, the agency may no longer classify and treat the party as far-right. While awaiting the final judgment, the Agency itself had already decided not to call the AfD right-wing extremist for the time being. The security service stands by its conclusion but said it would not use the classification publicly for tactical reasons.
2.5 VOX
VOX is a Spanish political party founded in December 2013 by former members of the conservative People’s Party (PP). Initially a small formation, VOX first gained attention by advocating a recentralized Spanish state, an important point of debate in Spanish politics, tougher immigration controls, and strong anti-Islam rhetorics. Mr. Santiago Abascal (1976) belongs to the founders of VOX and as of 2014 he is its leader.
VOX remained marginal until the regional elections in Andalusia in December 2018, where it unexpectedly won 12 seats in the Andalusian Parliament with 11% of the vote. That breakthrough marked the party’s arrival on the national stage and demonstrated its ability to capitalize on regional discontent, debates over Catalan separatism, and voter concerns about immigration and cultural identity.
In the April 2019 national general election VOX made a significant leap, entering the Congress of Deputies with 24 seats and 10.6% of the vote. VOX consolidated and expanded that presence in the November 2019 general election, winning 52 seats, 15.1% of the vote, becoming the third-largest party in the lower house. In the following elections in 2023 it fell back to 33 seats (12.4%).
In European Parliament elections, VOX’s trajectory paralleled its national rise. In the 2019 European elections VOX secured representation, obtaining three seats with a vote share of 6.2% in the May contest—modest compared to its later national performance but still notable for a party barely six years old. Vox currently has six seats in the 10th European Parliament (2024–2029). VOX is part of the Patriots for Europe (PfE) group.
VOX entered the coalition governments in some Spanish regions or lent its external support to some of them. Still, after the conservative People’s Party granted asylum to several undocumented underage immigrants in their respective regions, VOX announced on 11 July 2024 that it would withdraw from the regional coalition governments it had joined in Aragón, Castile and León, Murcia, Extremadura and the Valencian Community, and end its external support for the governments of the Balearic Islands and Cantabria.
2.6 Patriots for Europe and Europe of Sovereign Nations
Patriots for Europe (PfE) is a sovereigntist, right‑wing to far‑right political group that coalesced in late June–early July 2024 as a new transnational force in the European Parliament [iii]. The PfE’s composition includes Hungary’s Fidesz, France’s National Rally (RN), Italy’s Lega, Spain’s VOX, the Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV), Austria’s FPÖ, Belgium’s Vlaams Belang, the Czech ANO, Portugal’s Chega, the Danish People’s Party and several smaller delegations. PfE became the European Parliament’s third‑largest group after the June 2024 elections with 84 seats. On 8 July 2024 Jordan Bardella (National Rally) was elected president of the new group.
The practical influence of PfE depends on the issue and on whether the center‑right (EPP) or other groups are willing to seek ad hoc majorities that include PfE votes. Where PfE aligns with parts of the center right, it can reshape outcomes (for example on softer climate targets or migration controls); where it remains isolated, it functions instead as a loud oppositional bloc [iv].
The Europe of Sovereign Nations faction (ESN) is a far‑right, political group formed in the European Parliament in July 2024. It emerged in the aftermath of the 2024 European elections as one of two new hard‑right blocs that reorganized parties formerly linked to the Identity & Democracy family; ESN positioned itself as the most radical of the newly created sovereigntist groupings [v] . The grouping is centered on Germany’s Alternative for Germany (AfD) and Poland’s Confederation and includes MEPs from Bulgaria’s Revival (Vazrazhdane), and France’s Reconquête. It counts 27 MEPs, making it the Parliament’s smallest formal group among the major blocs created after the 2024 vote [vi]. ESN adopts a strongly sovereigntist platform that emphasizes national border control, rejection of further EU federalization, cultural conservatism and stricter migration policy. Its founders stress a common agenda of national self‑determination and resistance to what they describe as overreaching Brussels regulation. Party president is the Bulgarian MP Stanislav Styanov.
Voting behavior of both factions On voting behavior, PfE shows strong internal cohesion on core sovereignty and migration issues: the group tends to vote together to oppose proposals seen as enhancing EU centralization, deepening integration, strengthening compulsory climate targets, or liberalizing migration policy. On those themes the PfE regularly forms a coherent parliamentary minority (and sometimes a decisive swing) that opposes a possible center‑left and green majority. At the same time, cohesion is lower on many economic and social dossiers where national interests diverge; on defense and foreign‑policy issues — notably positions on Ukraine and relations with Russia — PfE members also display heterogeneous patterns, with some delegations taking more Russia‑friendly or non‑interventionist stances than others. Analysts and parliamentary monitoring note PfE’s high unity on anti‑establishment motions but more variation on trade, fiscal and detailed regulatory files [vii].
With its 84 seats the Patriots for Europe faction is a political force that cannot be ignored in the 720-member parliament. With Christian-democrats (188 seats), conservative parties (78 seats) and liberals (77 seats), majorities can be reached. Referring to new migration legislation, rumors went that WhatsApp groups consisting of far-right MPs and direct talks with EPP representatives would have led to political pressure of the far right and the relevant amendment of texts of the new migration law [viii].
The ESN faction is as said, much smaller than the PfE faction, but in general it follows the same voting lines as its sister faction does. ESN typically votes coherently on core sovereignty and migration dossiers, where its members form a unified opposition to measures perceived as deepening EU centralization or liberalizing asylum rules. However, cohesion is weaker on many economic, social and foreign‑policy dossiers: member parties diverge on fiscal policy, defense and relations with Russia, producing heterogeneous patterns on specific roll calls. Observers describe ESN as a reliable partner to the far right on symbolic and migration items but less predictable on technical regulatory files [ix].
Still, speaking of a unified front of far-right parties is a bridge too far, Papakostas, Blavoukos & Matsoukas (2025) state that ‘… PfE and ESN, … have a low degree of internal cohesion. Not only are they located at a significant distance from the political groups of the ‘governing coalition’, but they are also characterized by significant internal political fragmentation’ (Papakostas et al., 2025, p.23).
3 Muslim communities in the four countries
This section describes the position of Muslim communities in the four countries under concern [x].
3.1 France
France is home to a large Muslim population, though precise figures are uncertain because French law restricts the collection of statistics by religion or ethnicity [xi]. Estimates therefore rely on surveys and demographic modelling. Most authoritative studies put the number of Muslims in France between about 4.7 and 6.5 million people (roughly 7–10% of the total population). Pew Research Center’s mid‑2010s estimates are commonly cited (around 5.7 million, ~8–9%), while national surveys such as IFOP and INED produce similar ranges depending on methodology.
Places of worship and associations: the number of buildings used for Muslim worship has grown substantially since the 1990s. Estimates for purpose‑built mosques and prayer rooms range from roughly 2,300 to 3,000+ sites nationwide; broader counts that include small prayer rooms and association‑run spaces push the figure higher (several thousand). Islamic associations are numerous: thousands of local associations register cultural, charitable and religious activities, and national umbrella bodies such as the French Council of the Muslim Faith (Conseil Français du Culte Musulman, CFCM [xii] coordinate institutional representation, alongside regional federations, local mosque associations and independent organizations.
The Muslim population in France is diverse but dominated by migrants and descendants from former French colonies in the Maghreb and Sub‑Saharan Africa. Roughly speaking, the largest component traces roots to the following countries. Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia (the Maghreb): the single largest origin group, often estimated to represent a majority or plurality of people of Muslim background. Sub‑Saharan Africa (Senegal, Mali, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, etc.): an important and growing share, particularly in urban areas and suburbs. Turkey and the Middle East: smaller but significant communities, concentrated in specific cities or localities. Other origins (South Asia, Europe) and an increasing number of second‑ and third‑generation French citizens of Muslim heritage. Concrete percentage breakdowns vary by source and are approximate because of data limitations.
3.2 The Netherlands
The Netherlands’ Muslim community is a significant and diverse minority shaped by several waves of migration and by domestic religious evolution. Reliable precise counts are constrained by privacy laws and the Netherlands’ limited collection of religion statistics, so most figures are estimates based on surveys and demographic research [xiii].
Estimates put the Muslim population in the Netherlands at roughly 800,000–1,000,000 people, about 4.5–6% of the total population (figures vary by methodology and year). Islamic infrastructure has grown with the community: there are several hundred formal mosques and Islamic prayer spaces — commonly cited totals range from about 400 to 550 sites when counting both purpose-built mosques and smaller prayer rooms or community centers [xiv]. In addition, there are many local Islamic associations and umbrella organizations active in religious, social and educational work; the number of registered Islamic associations runs into the low thousands, including cultural clubs, charitable bodies and mosque committees.
The community’s composition reflects post‑war labor migration, decolonization and later humanitarian migration. The largest origin groups are the following. Morocco: one of the biggest single-origin groups, often accounting for around one-third of people of Muslim background. Turkey: traditionally the other major component, representing roughly a quarter to a third in earlier cohorts (proportions vary by cohort and region). Suriname and Indonesia: sizable Surinamese and Indonesian‑background Muslim minorities, particularly in specific urban areas. Sub‑Saharan Africa and the Horn (e.g., Somalia, Eritrea) and the Middle East (Iraq, Syria, Iran, Afghanistan): these groups have grown through asylum migration since the 1990s and 2010s. Smaller numbers come from Pakistan, Bangladesh and other countries. Second and third generations (born in the Netherlands) now form an increasing share of the community. National and regional umbrella bodies (such as the Contactorgaan Moslims en Overheid historically, though organizational landscapes shift [xv]) engage with government on religious accommodation, integration and counter‑radicalization.
3.3 Germany
Germany hosts large and diverse Muslim communities, shaped by decades of labor migration, family reunification, refugee arrivals and natural growth. Exact figures are imprecise because German statistics do not systematically record religion for the whole population; estimates therefore rely on surveys, registration data and demographic modelling [xvi]. Most recent assessments put the Muslim population at roughly 5.0–6.0 million people, about 6–7% of Germany’s population, with upward variance after the 2015–2016 refugee influx and later migration flows [xvii].
The German Muslim population is heterogeneous. Historically the largest origin group are people of Turkish background, stemming from the Gastarbeiter guest‑worker programs of the 1960s and 1970s; including descendants, people with Turkish roots remain the single largest origin cohort. Subsequent and parallel waves added migrants and refugees from the Balkans (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo), the Middle East (Syria, Iraq, Iran), and various countries in North and Sub‑Saharan Africa; labor migration and family reunion also brought communities from Pakistan, Afghanistan, and South Asia. More recent humanitarian arrivals since 2014–2016 have increased the share from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. Exact proportional breakdowns vary by source and region: in some cities Turkish-origin Muslims remain a plurality, while in others Arabic‑speaking communities or Balkan-origin Muslims form large shares.
Places of worship and organizations have expanded accordingly. Conservative counts identify around 2,500–3,000 mosque buildings and prayer rooms across Germany when including purpose-built mosques, converted prayer halls and numerous mosque associations’ facilities; broader tallies that include small prayer spaces and community centers raise the number further. Islamic organizations number in the thousands: formal mosque associations, cultural and charity organizations, sport and youth clubs, and national umbrella bodies such as the Central Council of Muslims in Germany (Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland, ZMD), the Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs (DITIB), the Islamic Council in Germany (Islamrat), the Islamic Federation Milli Görüş, the Alevi federations, and the Ahmadiyya community [xviii]. These groups play roles in religious services, education, social work and public representation.
3.4 Spain
Spain’s Muslim community is a sizable, diverse minority shaped by post‑war labor migration, decolonization-era links with North Africa, more recent asylum flows and natural growth [xix]. Precise counts are limited because Spanish official statistics do not systematically collect religion data; researchers therefore work from surveys, residency records and demographic models. Most recent estimates place the Muslim population roughly between 2.0 and 2.6 million people (about 4–6% of Spain’s total population), with variation by method and year.
Religious infrastructure and organizations have expanded alongside the community.; Conservative estimates of purpose-built mosques, converted prayer halls, and formal prayer rooms place the total number of mosque sites and Muslim prayer spaces at roughly 1,000–1,500 nationwide. There are thousands of registered Islamic associations — local mosque associations, cultural centers, charitable organizations and immigrant mutual‑aid groups — plus national and regional umbrella bodies such as the Islamic Commission of Spain (Comisión Islámica de España), which acts as an interlocutor with the state on matters of religious practice, education and halal certification [xx].
The community’s composition is heterogeneous but dominated by origins in North Africa and West Africa. The largest single-origin group are people of Moroccan background (including both immigrants and descendants), often estimated to represent a plurality or majority of Muslims in Spain. Other important origin groups include the following. Algeria and Tunisia (smaller than Moroccan-origin populations but notable in certain provinces); sub‑Saharan Africa (Senegal, Gambia, Mali, Guinea) — significant in urban and coastal areas; Pakistan and Bangladesh — concentrated in some urban districts and marketplaces; Turkey and various Arab countries (Syria, Iraq, Lebanon) — smaller but visible communities, including recent refugees; Latin America and other origins — including converts and migrants from diverse backgrounds.
Exact percentage breakdowns differ by source and are approximate because of data limits and internal diversity. Islamic associations run language and religious schooling, social services, halal businesses oversight, faith‑based civil society projects and cultural mediation programs. The Islamic Commission of Spain and regional federations engage with authorities on religious holidays, burial rites and the presence of Muslim chaplains in institutions [xxi].
4 The four party programs and politics on Islam and Muslims
This section discusses the political positions of the four parties, focusing on their views of Islam and Muslims. The section relies on two sources. The first source consists of written texts, preferably manifestos, from the four parties; the second source consists of statements, particularly by the parties’ leaders. It is known that political parties generally tend to produce fairly ‘conciliatory’ texts in manifestos and party programs that present their positions as broadly and acceptably as possible (although not all of them necessarily)while party leaders are often much sharper in debates or interviews. The texts and quotes below speak for themselves and are no accompanied by -elaborate- comments
4.1 Rassemblement National
4.1.1 Party program
In 2022 the Rassemblement National suggested a law ‘to prevent the spread of Islamist ideologies in France’ [xxii]. The text is telling for what the FB stands for when it comes to Islam and Muslims and it reads, in abridged form, as follows.
It states that ‘too long, successive governments have failed to prevent the spread of Islamist ideologies in France. This movement (i.e. these ideologies, JJdR) aims to establish parallel religious authorities on French soil and to promote an alternative social model at odds with republican values. On 2 October 2020 the President (i.e. President Macron, JJdR) identified the problem as ‘Islamist separatism,’ describing a coordinated attempt to flout the Republic’s laws and create a parallel order with the ultimate objective of seizing control. The government’s subsequent bill, however, fell short of that diagnosis: instead of targeting the specific threat, it proposed broad measures that, as the Council of State noted, would apply widely even though the danger concerns a small minority. The present bill presented by Marine Le Pen and the Rassemblement National deputies is a focused counterproposal. It concentrates exclusively on the conduct of the minority that actively defends, promotes or seeks to impose totalizing ideologies—doctrines incompatible with France’s values, history and culture and akin to a totalitarian vision. The draft law is expressly aimed at isolating these ideologies and does not target the large majority of residents, French or foreign, who abide by the Republic’s laws and values. The draft begins then by defining Islamist ideologies through their radical opposition to fundamental rights and freedoms—human dignity, freedom of conscience and expression—their rejection of secularism, their divisive effects, their links with foreign organizations or powers, and any expression that glorifies or normalizes crimes committed in their name. It also includes acts that coerce individuals, physically or psychologically, to adopt or abandon a religion. Building on this definition, the proposal establishes a legal principle banning the practice, propagation and public display of such ideologies. It covers all sectors where these currents are already entrenched or could spread, and it makes the suppression of Islamist ideologies a national priority, assigning responsibility across institutions and society to prevent their dissemination’.
It is interesting to note that the law proposal turns against the spread of Islamic ideologies (my italics). This is notable because enforcing such a law in France would require a sort of Orwellian thought‑police, and even then it would be difficult to penetrate the minds of people who hold such beliefs. The obfuscated language of the bill conceals the fact that the law is effectively aimed at people who hold those beliefs, and in practice those are often fundamentalist non nonviolent Muslims or Muslims who pursue jihadist and therefore violent goals. Thus, if enforced the law could lead to actual prosecution, punishment, and expulsion of supporters of ‘Islamist ideologies’, not necessarily violent ones, simply for what they think.
There are ‘other measures’ as well to be taken according to the 2022 document. It proposes ‘the stop of uncontrolled immigration by giving the French people a voice through a referendum; end mass immigration and family reunification; process asylum applications only abroad; reserve social benefits for French citizens and make access to welfare benefits conditional on five years of work in France; ensure national priority for access to social housing and employment; eliminate residency permits for any foreigner who has not worked in France for one year; systematically deport undocumented immigrants, delinquents, and criminals; abolish birthright citizenship and limit access to nationality solely to naturalization based on merit and assimilation’.
In the text of the ‘other measures’ the words Muslim(s) or Islam do not appear. Still, given the fact that immigrants to France mostly come from Islamic countries, it may be clear that those people in particular are targeted.
4.1.2. Statements of party leaders Marine le Pen and Jordan Bardella
Marine Le Pen, former leader of the National Rally in France, has maintained a long-standing, controversial stance on Islam, often focusing on ‘radical Islam’ and its incompatibility with French secular values (what the French call laïcité).
Here are some key quotes of her:
– I’m opposed to wearing headscarves in public places… The people who come to France, why would they want to change France, to live in France the same way they lived back home? ’ [xxiii]
-‘I’m sorry, but for those who really like to talk about World War II, if we’re talking about an occupation, we could talk about the [street prayers], because that is clearly an occupation of territory,’ she had said. ‘There are no tanks, there are no soldiers, but it is an occupation nevertheless, and it weighs on people .’ [xxiv]
-‘The hate preachers must be expelled. The Islamist mosques must be closed ’. [xxv]
-Despite this, she has stated that, ‘Our Muslim compatriots must no longer be hostage to radical Islamists ’. [xxvi]
-‘France isn’t burkinis on the beach. France is Brigitte Bardot. That’s France ’. [xxvii]
Jordan Bardella, present leader of the party and leader of the Patriots for Europe faction in the European Parliament:
-‘The veil is a militant garment that intends to secede.’ [xxviii]
-‘The government remains passive in the face of the establishment of miniature Islamic republics.’[xxix]
It is striking that both Marine Le Pen and Jordan Bardella make that strict distinction between ‘ordinary Muslims’ who could behave like ‘ordinary French people’ and Muslims who are supposedly committed to the radical ideology of Islamism. The picture emerges that the Rassemblement National displays a general aversion to Islam and Muslims, regardless of the distinction it makes between ‘fanatical’ Muslims and ordinary Muslims. The written texts speak volumes and the statements of the party’s leaders reinforce the negative image the party has of Muslims and Islam.
4.2 PVV
4.2.1. Party program
Based on the consecutive party programs in national elections and the books of Mr. Wilders (2012) and his second man Mr. Bosma (2012) the following image emerges of the party (see as well de Ruiter, 2025). The Party for Freedom centers on a leader-driven, single-member party whose ideology fuses cultural conservatism, anti-Islamism, and populist anti-elite rhetoric. The party is personalist; it is built around its leader, Mr. Wilders’ persona; organizational organs are minimal and discipline is strict. The party prizes a Judeo‑Christian/Western civilizational identity as superior: democracy, tolerance, work ethic and ‘Western’ values are extolled as the foundation of prosperity (Bosma: pp. 23–31; Wilders: pp. 93–101). This cultural pride underpins exclusionary policy preferences. Anti-Islamism is a central doctrine. Islam is the defining adversary. The party regards Islam primarily as a political ideology (not merely a religion) with purportedly totalitarian and expansionist aims; Islamization and sharia are presented as existential threats (Bosma: pp. 31–42, 34–41; Wilders: pp. 85–115). Islam ‘cannot’ change and that its presence will corrode public discourse and institutions (Bosma: pp. 34–41, 36–41). Practical proposals of the party include strict immigration controls, closing Islamic schools and mosques, banning the Koran, and aggressive assimilation demands; expulsions for criminality or failure to assimilate are advocated (Wilders: pp. 113–117; Bosma: pp. 60–69). In coalition negotiations PVV has at times ‘put Islam positions on ice’ strategically (Intro, pp. 12–14; see above as well), but the ideological aims remain prominent. PVV frames itself as the voice of ‘ordinary people’ against a multicultural, leftist elite accused of enabling mass immigration and cultural decline (Bosma: pp. 51–69, 66–69). Anti-elite rhetoric links contemporary left politics to historical totalitarianisms in party narratives (pp. 51–61). The party strongly supports Israel and courts Jewish sympathy as part of its anti-Islam posture; Israel is cast as a bastion of Western freedom (Bosma: pp. 43–51). This alignment is often instrumental and framed against Muslims.
4.2.2 Statements of party leader Geert Wilders
Mr. Wilders expressed the following statements on Islam and Muslims in his 2012 book Marked for Death. It concerns the following:
-‘Islam is not just a religion … but primarily a political ideology in the guise of a religion.’ (p. 25)
-‘Armed only with our pens, we must defy Islam’s axes and knives. … The truth will set us free.’ (p. 4–5)
-‘Islam is one of those evil empires and it too will collapse once people begin telling the truth.’ (p. 209)
-‘Muslims must defeat Islam.’ (p. 212)
-‘If they (Muslims) could liberate themselves from the yoke of Islam, if they would stop taking Muhammad as a role model, and if they got rid of the hateful Koran, they would be able to achieve amazing things.’ (p. 212)
4.3 Alternative für Deutschland
4.3.1 Party Manifesto
The party manifesto of the AfD contains some sections specifically treating Islam and Muslims and Islam related issues [xxx]. Section 7.6 addresses Islam and its relationship to Germany’s constitutional values, affirming freedom of belief and conscience while insisting worship must respect public law, human rights and the country’s cultural foundations. The text argues that practices aimed at undermining the liberal‑democratic order, or legal systems that claim precedence over national law, are incompatible with Germany’s legal and ethical framework, citing the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam as illustrating divergent norms.
The manifesto states that Islam ‘does not belong to Germany,’ framing the religion’s growth as a potential threat to the state, society and shared values when it refuses to conform to German law or seeks exclusive authority. The policy calls for ending parallel social structures based on sharia courts and seeks measures to prevent radicalization leading to Salafism or violence.
Criticism of Islam is defended as a legitimate exercise of freedom of expression and art, with the party rejecting the idea that such criticism is inherently islamophobic. Religious satire and caricature are explicitly protected under the right to free opinion.
On organizational and financial matters, the text calls for strict controls. It urges bans on associations deemed hostile to the liberal constitutional order and opposes foreign funding of mosques, arguing that external financing serves political and religious influence rather than integration. The party demands that organizations with anti‑constitutional aims be barred from building or running mosques, asserting these groups pose security risks and hinder social cohesion.
Proposed regulatory steps include requiring imams to obtain governmental authorization to preach and to pledge allegiance to the constitutional order; sermons should generally be delivered in German except for Quranic quotations. Imams involved in anti‑constitutional agitation are to be banned from preaching and deported were legally permissible. The manifesto also argues for abolishing theological chairs for Islamic studies at German universities and shifting related positions to non‑confessional religious studies departments.
Symbolic and public‑space measures are advocated: the party rejects minarets and muezzin calls as signs of perceived Islamic dominance and incompatible with tolerant interfaith coexistence. It opposes granting Islamic organizations the legal status of public bodies, asserting they fail to meet criteria of representation, permanence and respect for state‑church law, which requires acceptance of religious freedom, state neutrality and equality among faiths.
Concerning dress and gender equality, the text calls for a general ban on full‑body veiling (burqa and niqab) in public spaces and public service, citing social integration and interaction concerns and noting European Court of Justice precedent. It further proposes prohibiting headscarves for public servants and disallowing them in schools for teachers and students, following the French model. The headscarf is characterized as a political‑religious symbol of female submission that allegedly undermines integration, women’s equal rights and individual development.
4.3.2 Statements of party leader Alice Weidel
Here are quotes and statements from Alice Weidel regarding Islam and related issues, with sources.
– ‘Islam is not part of Germany because there wasn’t any such thing as one religion of Islam [xxxi].
– ‘Burqas, girls in headscarves, knife-wielding men on government benefits and other good-for-nothing people are not going to ensure our prosperity [xxxii].’
– ‘Islamization is expanding rapidly and aggressively within schools, where fanatical youths are terrorizing non-believing peers and teachers [xxxiii].’
– ‘We have exploding crime figures, foreigner criminality (and) migrant violence, because we have open borders… ’ [xxxiv]
– ‘Those in Germany who then refuse to return to the country can, of course, also be deported in the near future .’ [xxxv]
– ‘The AfD wants to ban on wearing a headscarf in street .’ [xxxvi]
– ‘I am in the AfD not despite my homosexuality, but because of it, as it is the only party to address the issue of Muslim immigrants’ hostility towards LGBT+ people’ [xxxvii]
– A 2013 email attributed to Weidel used the term Überfremdung (foreign infiltration) and referred to the government as ‘pigs’ and ‘puppets of WWII allies’, alleging they were ‘overrun by culturally foreign people such as Arabs, Sinti and Roma’ [xxxviii].
4.4 VOX
4.4.1 Party Manifesto
In its fundamental manifesto VOX presents itself as a political movement dedicated to renewing and reinforcing Spanish democracy by restoring national unity, improving state efficiency, strengthening institutions, ensuring public integrity, and promoting broad-based economic growth [xxxix].
The manifesto frames Spain as facing a multifaceted crisis—economic, institutional, moral and territorial—aggravated by repeated corruption scandals that have undermined public trust. VOX calls for an active civic response: diagnosis must give way to action, mobilization and ethical renewal. It insists that sound economic policy requires firm moral principles—effort, merit, honesty, patriotism—and that recovery depends on restoring public confidence in political leadership. The party rejects alliances that tolerate forces seeking to erode national unity and demands political alternatives that place citizens’ rights above partisan interests.
VOX critiques the current decentralized State of Autonomies as politically dysfunctional and financially unsustainable, contending that excessive decentralization has intensified separatism, fragmented the internal market, and burdened public finances. It advocates evolving toward a strong, efficient unitary state with administrative decentralization that acknowledges Spain’s cultural and regional plurality while preserving a single national government, parliament and a Supreme Court as final judicial authority.
On democratic governance, VOX condemns the degeneration of the constitutional order into a party-dominated system where closed lists and centralized party control weaken the bond between representatives and citizens. It calls for comprehensive political reform: a new Political Parties Law to ensure internal democracy and funding transparency, and a revamped Electoral Law to create a mixed majority‑proportional system that strengthens the link between voters and their representatives and enhances governability.
Civic and social aims include promoting a culture of ethics, family support, solidarity with the vulnerable and a rejection of mediocrity and corruption. The party stresses Spain’s historical and geopolitical role and calls for active participation in the EU and the Ibero‑American sphere while defending national interests.
Operationally, VOX commits to internal democracy, accountability, transparent funding from members and supporters, audited accounts, protection of members’ rights, and the use of primary elections. It opposes public subsidies to parties and favors direct citizen participation through modern consultation tools. VOX pledges consistent policies nationwide, promotion of Spanish language use, and immediate pursuit of reforms achievable by ordinary legislation while maintaining constitutional change as a long‑term objective.
The Manifesto of VOX is very much directed to the unity of Spain and how Spain functions in its current political constellation, issues that, it was referred to above, are central in earlier and contemporary Spanish political debates. It is interesting to note that the text of the manifesto does not contain the words Islam or Muslim or related terms while the VOX leaders very often aim their words against Islam and Muslims, as shown in the following section 4.4.2.
4.4.2 Statements of party leader Santiago Abascal
The current leader of VOX, Santiago Abascal made the following Islam related statements.
– ‘They (i.e. the group Musulmanes contra la Islamofobia ) are not ‘Muslims against islamophobia’, they are the Trojan horse of jihadism in Spain [xli] .’
– ‘The Islamists who want to destroy Europe and Western civilization celebrating the #NotreDame fire. Let’s take note before it’s too late [xlii].’
– ‘Wherever Islamism advances, freedoms recede, women are denigrated, homosexuals are persecuted, children are harmed [xliii].‘
VOX wants to:
-‘…ban the entry into Spain of immigrants from countries with an Islamic culture if their correct and peaceful integration cannot be guaranteed’ [xliv].
– ‘Yes, we must defeat them (i.e. immigrants from counties with an Islamic culture), yes, all the fiends who bring hatred, pain and death. And if possible, they must be defeated before they kill a single innocent person,’ Abascal wrote on X, formerly Twitter. [xlv]
5 Reactions of Muslim leaders in the four countries
There are numerous reactions of Muslim leaders, and Muslim people ‘in the street’ in the four countries on the statements of the leaders of the four parties under concern on Islam and Muslims. Necessarily we present a selection of them.
Abdallah Zekri, General Delegate of the French Council of the Muslim Faith (CFCM):
– ‘When we enter an election period, Muslims get it in the neck, through stigmatizing speeches, through a hysteria about the veil’. ‘We are French citizens, we want to live in peace, we want to live in fraternity,’ he argues, before insisting: ‘I wish people would leave Muslims alone a bit’[xlvi].
And:
– ‘Islamophobia is no longer a marginal phenomenon. It has become structural, normalized, sometimes even openly claimed. Anti-Muslim rhetoric is multiplying amid chilling indifference, even to the applause of TV panels turned into ideological courts. This normalization of hatred inevitably paves the way for more serious violence’[xlvii].
Kamel Kabtane, rector of the Grand Mosque of Lyon:
-‘For the government, ‘Islam has become the beast to be taken down [xlviii]’.
And:
– Kamel Kabtane expressed deep concern over the RN’s agenda for the parliamentary elections of 2024, fearing it would lead to a: ‘..closure of many mosques and Islamic schools, the deportation of foreign imams and stricter bans on wearing hijab [xlix].’
And:
– ‘When you see part of the traditional right, which built France for years, laying down its arms and placing itself under the orders of the RN, one can only be worried’. ‘And it’s not only Muslims who are worried’ [l].
5.2 The Netherlands
Muhsin Köktas (CMO – Contact Group Muslims and Government):
– ‘I don’t know if Muslims are still safe in the Netherlands. I am worried about this country’ [li].
Habib el Kaddouri (SMN – Association of Moroccan Dutch):
– ‘The distress, but also the fear, is very great among Dutch Moroccan people. Wilders is known for his ideas about Muslims and Moroccans. We are afraid that he will portray us as second-class citizens’ [lii].
Stephan van Baarle (Leader of Denk, a minority rights political party), after the great win of the PVV in the 2023 elections:
– ‘The fact that the PVV is the biggest party is a threat for a million Dutch Muslims’ [liii].
Muhsin Köktas (CMO):
– ‘We have great concerns about the future of Islam and Muslims in the Netherlands’ [liv].
Muslim Rights Watch (in response to a 2025 anti-Islam image posted by Wilders):
– ‘The imagery portrays Muslims as ‘dangerous and unwanted’ and closely resembles Nazi-era propaganda that depicted Jews as ‘inhuman, threatening, and unwanted’ [lv].
5.3 Germany
Aiman Mazyek (Chairman of the Central Council of Muslims in Germany):
– ‘It is the first time since Hitler’s Germany that a whole religious community is discredited and existentially threatened… The AfD is riding a wave of Islamophobia. This is not an anti-Islam path; it is an anti-democratic path’ [lvi].
– ‘Of course we have some fears. We worry about attacks targeting Muslims, which has already risen to alarming levels in Germany.’ [lvii]
– ‘Whipping up resentment and dividing society between Muslims and non-Muslims was always the bread and butter of the extreme Right. The AfD completely took that over’ [lviii].
Ali Haydar Gunes (German Turkish community member):
– ‘The rhetoric of far-right politicians is absolutely wrong; they are pursuing a wrong policy’ [lix].
Nurettin Demir (Cologne resident):
– ‘I think that if they come to power in the future, we will have very big problems. Not only me but all the foreigners here, especially the Turks, are very worried’ [lx] .
Hayrettin Kurt, a resident of Cologne:
– ‘When we remember the Second World War, it is frightening that a country like Germany has such a high level of support for a right-wing party.’ ‘In the future, they will try to send foreigners back to a large extent,’ Kurt said, referring to if the AfD came to power at the federal level. ‘They would try to send back asylum seekers. Xenophobia will necessarily rise. Exclusion will rise. Daily life will become more difficult for foreigners.’
5.4 Spain
Mohammed Azahaf, adviser in the Spanish Ministry of Inclusion and Migration, criticizing a Vox proposal to restrict nationality for people from Islamic culture:
– ‘It is a disgrace that Vox is putting forward a proposal so obviously in breach of the constitution… The proposal is not only absurd, but also xenophobic, as if everyone from such a broad collective can be judged as a potential terrorist.[lxi] ’
The Islamic Commission of Spain (representing 2.5 million Muslims) in an official statement regarding a Vox-backed ban on Islamic celebrations in public spaces in the Spanish city of Jumilla in August 2025:
– This is a worrying deterioration of the democracy and pluralistic coexistence that characterizes our country.
Hicham Oulad Mhammed, a member of the Islamic Commission of Spain, regarding the same ban:
– ‘I don’t know what traditions they are talking about, but they are clearly targeting the Muslim community and defining it as an alien community [lxii].’
Mounir Benjelloun Andaloussi Azhari, president of the Spanish Federation of Islamic organizations, told El País newspaper on the proposed ban:
– ‘Islamophobic and discriminatory’. ‘They’re not going after other religions; they’re going after ours.’ ‘We’re rather surprised by what’s happening in Spain. For the first time in 30 years I feel afraid [lxiii].’
The Islamic Commission of Spain, which represents the country’s estimated 2.5 million Muslims, said in an Aug. 9 statement that the ban (mentioned in previous quote) represented a
– ‘…worrying deterioration of the democracy and pluralistic coexistence that characterizes our country. [lxiv]’
Muslims Against Islamophobia (reporting on complaints against Vox official Ortega Smith regarding rhetoric that links Islam to violence).:
– ‘The statements are ‘flatly false’ and constitute ‘an attack against social harmony by encouraging an atmosphere of fear and rejection of Muslim communities. [xlv] ’
6 Conclusions and discussion
This paper intends to formulate answers to the following two research questions:
-How do political parties, presented in this study, conceptualize and prioritize demography and democracy with respect to Muslim citizens,
and
-What ideological patterns emerge around these issues?
Furthermore, the paper is interested in shedding some light on the question whether a ‘far right’ European Union driven by ‘our people first’ logic, minimizing the role of Muslims and Islam and supported by partners like the Trump administration, can align with or be integrated into an emerging multipolar international order.
The paragraphs preceding this conclusion formed a picture of the program points of the four parties central to this study, of the statements made by the leaders of the four parties, and of their political functioning, including within the two factions in the European Parliament. In addition, the paper contains descriptions of the Muslim communities in the four countries where the parties operate and presents a selection of statements by Muslim leaders on the emerging far-right parties.
Demography and democracy
When it comes to the demographic factor, we observe that the Muslim communities in the European Union are large minority groups, whose percentages are around 5% of the total population of the four countries and of the Union. These Muslims have lived in Europe for more than two or three generations; they have formed their own social, economic, and cultural structures and they participate as citizens in the various countries. It is a community that cannot be disregarded in Europe and the European Union.
The programs of the four political parties make no bones about it; virtually none of them view the Muslim presence in Europe positively. The German AfD is the most outspoken, followed by the Dutch PVV, then the Spanish VOX and the French Rassemblement National. The latter party draws a rather unconvincing distinction between Muslims who adhere to a form of Islamism and ‘French Muslims’. But from their political positions and their rhetoric a picture emerges that they would prefer Islam and Muslims to literally disappear from the diverse nations. And although the leaders often make statements that reinforce that image, they do not go so far as to actively and openly pursue a Muslim- and Islam-free Europe—although the Dutch PVV leader once stated he aimed for a Netherlands ‘without Moroccans [lxvi].’
The problem with what is called remigration or ‘cleaning up’ ‘our’ streets and neighborhoods is that, if such policies were put into practice, democracy would seriously be endangered. After all, the four countries mentioned, and the European Union as a whole are governed by (constitutional) laws that stipulate every citizen is equal before the law and that no distinction may be made on the grounds of -among other things- religion. The far-right parties, whose rise they owe to democracy, would then collide with that same democracy. This is the democratic dilemma referred to above (Taggart, 2000). Implementing a program that leads to a Muslim- and Islam-free Germany, Netherlands, France and Spain would imply a break with democracy. But as long as these parties cannot force breakthroughs through that same democracy—like Hungarian leader Orbán did—they bide their time and can increase their following. But they can also fade away if opportunities arise that they fail to seize, as happened with the Dutch PVV. It was the largest party in the Schoof government but it brought that same government down, after which Mr. Wilders’s PVV suffered a serious loss of influence. Still, observing the general image, far-right parties constitute a potential danger to democracy.
The philosopher Claude Lefort (1986, 2016) argues that democracy consists of a permanent struggle for power. All parties try to influence decision‑making processes as much as possible to achieve their goals. They do this in observance of the rules of democracy, and the basic rule is that decisions are taken through dialogue and negotiation with mutual respect. These are not empty words. At the same time Lefort says that the same democracy can easily become the cradle of totalitarianism. If parties in a democracy pursue only their own goals and have no regard for the other(s), there is a risk that the strongest party will destroy democracy and abolish it to establish a totalitarian system, as we saw in Germany in 1933 when Hitler’s NSDAP came to power. Democracy contains a whole system of checks and balances, so it will not necessarily come to that. But if history teaches us anything, it is that the unexpected can always occur. The extreme example of Hitler proves that, but we see it to some extent in Mr. Orbán’s Hungary, and the Trump administration also shows totalitarian tendencies. Thus we can conclude that, regarding Muslims in Europe and the view of — in this case four — far‑right parties toward these communities, democracy has come under severe pressure. That said, democracy in the European Union is not on its deathbed; the electorate for far‑right parties generally fluctuates around 20%, and established and new other political parties still play an important role, but vigilance is (more than) necessary to preserve the democracies in the European Union.
The European Union and China
China seeks to create an ‘equal and orderly’ multipolar world with several power centers that balance one another in some way. At present we can say there are at least two world powers: China and the United States. Russia has been severely weakened by the war it started with Ukraine, but it remains one of the two largest nuclear powers. The European Union is economically very strong, but militarily and strategically not very significant, also because it was weakened by the United Kingdom’s exit from the Union. In addition, the Union faces an American president whose conduct justifies the observation that Europe, with such a friend, needs no enemies. The question is whether the world is developing into such a multipolar order at all. The United States is wary of China as a world power, and in the West it is asserted that China seeks to attain the first place in the world in terms of economic and political power. Returning to the question of a European Union that would become far‑right by nature, what would the political consequences be? We will see that such a union would do everything possible to make the population ethnically homogeneous again, by causing Muslims to leave, voluntarily or forcibly. Such a population policy would then put an end to the democracies within the Union and to the democratic Union itself.
Ideology
It is not a foregone conclusion that all far‑right parties operate at the same political level or that they are genuinely interested in cooperating with one another. They are above all nationalist parties, so there can be various emphases from country to country. For example, Hungary’s Fidesz party opposes LGBTQ+ emancipation, whereas the Dutch PVV is much more liberal on that issue. The division and tribal rivalry among far‑right parties is actually a characteristic of them, and that brings us to the question of these parties’ ideological color. Above, reference was made to Smeets (2025), who already indicated that far‑right parties are not so much defined by a specific ideology as they are by the following aspects: nationalism, xenophobia, racism, anti‑democracy, authoritarianism and populism (p. 30), and we see from the descriptions in this paper that all four parties more or less meet those criteria. And there is not much more to say than that. There have been many historical debates about what fascism is (see Paxton, 1990), but no conclusive definition has been reached. The same is essentially true for the ‘ideology’ of the contemporary far right. Cas Mudde (1996, 2019) argues that populism is not a fully developed political program but a ‘thin’ ideology, a framework that can be filled with diverse content. The core is always the same: the world is divided into two camps, the ‘pure people’ versus the corrupt elite’, as Dutch researcher De Vries (2026) points out in her incisive analysis of what she calls radical right in Europe. That explains the splintering within far‑right movements (plural). In my view, a far‑right European Union would, in any case, be doomed. It would fall apart, and Europe could revert to a collection of nation‑states as in the nineteenth century. If that happens, Europe’s political power, already small, would only shrink further. From a power‑politics perspective that is advantageous for the great powers—the United States, China and also Russia—but from the ‘equal and orderly’ multipolar power model promoted by China it would be a loss. From that perspective, it would be best for Europe to remain a significant power factor and a stable partner for the other world powers. Liu (2023, p.697) in his study on ‘Chinese academic representations on the rise of populism in Europe’ states that ‘Chinese academics will … provide policy recommendations to avoid or reduce the negative impact of populism on the policies of the EU and major European countries toward China.’ Or, in the words of Jing Men (2023, p.17): ‘Despite the huge differences in their views, Brussels and Beijing share at least one common understanding that EU–China relations are important and indispensable. A well-handled bilateral relationship benefits both sides’. Far right parties form political voids and do not produce policies for the benefits of all inhabitants of the countries where they operate. From these perspectives a democratic Europe benefits the multipolar world as envisaged by China much better than a far-right or populist one.
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Notes
[1] https://nos.nl/artikel/2058288-wilders-tweede-kamer-is-een-nepparlement
[ii] https://www.worldjewishcongress.org/en/news/french-far-right-leader-le-pen-reaffirms-infamous-gas-chamber remarks#:~:text=Jean%2DMarie%20Le%20Pen%2C%20the,the%20history%20of%20the%20war.%22
[iii] ([en.wikipedia.org](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Patriots_for_Europe))
[iv] ([lemonde.fr](https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2024/07/10/bardella-heads-the-third-largest-group-of-the-eu-parliament-patriots-for-europe_6679639_4.html?utm_source=openai))
[v] ([politico.eu](https://www.politico.eu/article/new-far-right-group-european-parliament-germany-afd/))
[vi] ([politico.eu](https://www.politico.eu/article/new-far-right-group-european-parliament-germany-afd/))
[vii] ([swp-berlin.org](https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2025C39/?utm_source=openai
[viii] https://brusselssignal.eu/2026/03/nervousness-over-epps-vote-on-stricter-migrant-return-rules-after-berlin-firewall-debates/
[ix] ([en.unav.edu](https://en.unav.edu/web/global-affairs/the-fragmentation-of-the-european-parliament-after-the-2024-elections?utm_source=openai))
[x] Major data and statistics in section 4 stem from PEW research: https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2025/06/09/religion-in-europe/
[xi] For France statistics and data mostly stem from: https://www.ined.fr/fr
[xii] https://cfcm-officiel.fr/
[xiii] https://longreads.cbs.nl/nederland-in-cijfers-2024/welk-geloof-hangen-we-aan/
[xiv] https://www.kis.nl/sites/default/files/2022-08/moslims-in-nederland.pdf
[xv] https://www.cmoweb.nl/
[xvi] https://www.deutsche-islam-konferenz.de/EN/DatenFakten/daten-fakten_node.html
[xvii] https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2017/11/29/the-growth-of-germanys-muslim-population-2/
[xviii] https://www.deutsche-islam-konferenz.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/EN/Publikationen/muslime-organisationen-eng.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=1
[xix] https://www.statista.com/statistics/989902/muslims-in-spain-by-nationality/?srsltid=AfmBOopwCIOzx_3tPSswA8dn1zh226D8lSRgjkUW1qC7jnCWBL8eH8vC
[xx] https://www.statista.com/statistics/989942/muslim-groups-and-spaces-in-spain/?srsltid=AfmBOoqkQBT-MavXTsqaOr7teHrTXkOUk5KDpUE8bXdGKeQgxCf0pPeC
[xxi] https://comisionislamica.org/
[xxii] https://rassemblementnational.fr/documents/mesures/proposition-de-loi-ideologies-islamistes.pdf
[xxiii] https://www.azquotes.com/quote/1574041#google_vignette
[xxiv] https://time.com/4045803/marine-le-pen-muslims-nazis-trial/
[xxv] https://www.newstalkzb.co.nz/news/world/marine-le-pen-hate-preachers-must-be-expelled-mosques-must-be-closed/
[xxvi] https://time.com/4117119/paris-attacks-marine-le-pen/
[xxvii] https://www.cbsnews.com/news/frances-marine-le-pen-to-appear-on-60-minutes/
[xxviii] Context: Comment by Bardella / RN about the party’s proposal to ban the veil from public space (reported Jan 29, 2021). leparisien.fr
[xxix] Context: Bardella’s statement criticizing the government after the re-election of the mayor of the French city of Trappes (October 2021; reported in subsequent coverage). tf1info.fr
[xxx] https://www.afd.de/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/2017-04-12_afd-grundsatzprogramm-englisch_web.pdf
[xxxi] https://www.dw.com/en/afds-alice-weidel-the-pride-of-the-populists-a-mystery-to-everyone-else/a-40356769
[xxxii] Reuters (February 21, 2025 – quoting a 2018 speech)
[xxxiii] YouTube/Catch News (July 9, 2025)
[xxxiv] InfoMigrants (July 16, 2024 – quoting a TV interview)
[xxxv] Reuters (November 4, 2025)
[xxxvi] DW.com (May 27, 2017)
[xxxvii] Source: Frankfurter Allgemeine/DW.com (December 7, 2024 – referencing a 2017 statement)
[xxxviii] DW.com (September 20, 2017)
[xxxix] https://www.voxespana.es/espana/manifiesto-fundacional-vox periodistadigital.com
[xl] periodistadigital.com
[xlii] https://www.revistaeic.eu/index.php/raeic/article/view/205#:~:text=bulos%2C%20en%20los%20que%20el%20islam%20es,parte%20de%20grupos%20radicales%20y%20de%20extrema
[xlii]i https://www.lasexta.com/noticias/nacional/abascal-envalentona-gracias-pide-prohibir-velo-islamico-instalaciones-publicas-espana-andalus_202508086895b87a6d08be7a8a49f6c7.html
[xliv] https://www.euronews.com/2023/10/19/spains-far-right-vox-wants-to-freeze-residence-permits-for-people-from-islamic-culture
[xllv] https://www.euronews.com/2023/10/19/spains-far-right-vox-wants-to-freeze-residence-permits-for-people-from-islamic-culture
[xlvi] https://www.rtl.fr/actu/debats-societe/port-du-voile-qu-on-laisse-les-musulmans-tranquilles-dit-abdallah-zekri-du-cfcm-7799243612
[xlvii] https://algeriepatriotique.com/2026/01/27/interview-abdallah-zekri-ce-sont-les-partis-qui-dictent-lagenda-mediatique-en-france/
[xlviii] https://www.liberation.fr/societe/religions/kamel-kabtane-recteur-de-la-grande-mosquee-de-lyon-pour-le-gouvernement-lislam-est-devenu-la-bete-a-abattre-20250717_TGAK6DFKKZHHLJ5QX2QU3DIZOE/
[xlix] https://religionnews.com/2024/07/05/with-national-rally-showing-strength-in-sundays-vote-french-muslims-hold-their-breath/
[l] https://www.lefigaro.fr/lyon/le-recteur-de-la-mosquee-de-lyon-appelle-a-faire-barrage-au-rn-20240619
[li] https://nltimes.nl/2023/11/22/groups-muslims-moroccans-climate-activists-worried-pvv-victory
[lii] https://nltimes.nl/2023/11/22/groups-muslims-moroccans-climate-activists-worried-pvv-victory
[liii] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/23/dutch-muslims-fearful-for-future-after-shocking-election-results-geert-wilders
[liv] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/23/dutch-muslims-fearful-for-future-after-shocking-election-results-geert-wilders
[lvi] https://www.trtworld.com/article/54650cd1e759
[lvii] https://www.reuters.com/article/world/german-muslims-compare-anti-immigrant-afd-party-to-hitlers-nazis-idUSKCN0XF1G7/
[lvii] https://www.reuters.com/article/world/german-muslims-compare-anti-immigrant-afd-party-to-hitlers-nazis-idUSKCN0XF1G7/
[lviii] https://www.dw.com/en/german-election-afd-islamophobia-could-help-get-muslims-to-vote/a-40588142
[lix] https://5pillarsuk.com/2024/09/05/germanys-muslims-worried-as-far-right-parties-gain-ground/
[lx] https://5pillarsuk.com/2024/09/05/germanys-muslims-worried-as-far-right-parties-gain-ground/
[lxi] https://hyphenonline.com/2023/11/01/spains-far-right-pushes-for-a-ban-on-spanish-nationality-for-people-from-islamic-culture/
[lxii] https://www.nytimes.com/2025/08/07/world/europe/spain-muslim-ban-vox-conservative-right.html
[lxiii] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/aug/06/spain-local-authority-ban-muslims-public-facilities-religious-celebrations
[lxiv] https://www.americamagazine.org/news/2025/08/13/spain-vox-catholic-bishops-muslims/#:~:text=Nevertheless%2C%20she%20defended%20the%20measure,respect%2C%E2%80%9D%20the%20commission%20said.
[lxv] https://english.elpais.com/elpais/2019/04/03/inenglish/1554300350_838434.html
[xlvi] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/20/dutch-politician-geert-wilders-moroccans-outrage-pvv-party-anti-islam
About the author:
Jan Jaap de Ruiter (1959) is a retired Arabist who worked in Tilburg University (the Netherlands). He published extensively on the Arabic language, Arabic sociolinguistics, on Muslims and Islam in Europe and North Africa and the Middle East and on the ideology (concerning Islam) of far-right parties in Europe. He has been engaged in the Dutch and international (al Jazeera; BBC) media on issues related to his fields of expertise and to political developments in Europe, North Africa and the Middle East. For more information on his academic publications and media performances please consult the Academia website and his personal website.
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