ISSA Proceedings 2002 – Metaphor And Argument In: Ernesto Che Guevara’s “Socialism And The New Man In Cuba”

• by: Patricia Varas - Catherine Ann Collins & David Douglass, Willamette University

It is difficult to overstate the symbolic significance of Ernesto “Che” Guevara in Latin America. One may doubt Fidel Castro’s eulogistic characterization of him as the “model of a human being who does not belong to our time but to the future,” “one without a single stain on his conduct” (quoted in Anderson, 1997, 741). After all, Che died a martyr for the ideals of the Cuban Revolution, and the coincidence of Castro’s personal and political interests with Che’s canonization may be taken as an indictment of his motives in such statements. Less easily dismissed, however, is the astonishing extent of Che’s influence outside of Cuba. Rivaled only, perhaps, by José Martí, Che has become emblematic of socialist revolution, guerilla warfare, and lived commitment to political ideals. His fame is by no means limited to Latin America: A survey of U.S. university students taken the year after his death found Che to be the figure with whom most identified, more so than with any North American political figure or other media personality (A special kind of rebellion, 1969, 70-71). Around the same period, when students in Paris took over their dormitory in a social protest, they named the building “Che Guevara” for the same reason, Julio Cortázar (1969) would later write, “that leads thirst to water or man to woman” (94). Nor has this influence diminished with time. Biographer Jon Anderson (1997) writes of his surprise at discovering the veneration lent Guevara in contemporary contexts ranging from Burma and El Salvador to the Western Sahara and Muslim Afghanistan (xiv).  Indeed, this and other indications confirm Mary-Alice Water’s (1994) opinion that Che’s socialist perspectives and lessons regarding political power have acquired an even greater relevance in the years since his death.

This essay considers the lasting achievement of Che’s (1965) essay, “Socialism and the New Man in Cuba” (Socialismo y El Hombre Nuevo en Cuba). Widely regarded as his most famous work (e.g., Anderson, 1997, 636; Castaneda, 1997, 304), the essay advances Guevara’s conception of revolutionary ideology and the role of the individual. Following its publication in March of 1965, it was to become the central text of the international politics of the revolutionary left in the sixties (Taibo, n.d., 510), and its central figure, the “New Man,” would achieve lasting recognition as a Marxist political ideal. In this essay we argue that the success of the essay in significant measure is owing to the rhetorical virtuosity with which Guevara combined abstract political theory and familiar conceptual metaphor. We will demonstrate through a careful reading of the text that an epistolic framework enabled the articulation of three major metaphorical systems: Journey, Construction, and Oppression. These metaphors function within the text not as simple heuristics or explanatory aids, but as literal instantiations of Guevara’s political theory. In what follows, we will consider not only the metaphors and their function, but also the ethical implications of such argument by analogy. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2002 – Arguing From Facts To Duties (And Conversely)

• by: Txetxu Ausín & Lorenzo Peña - Spanish Institute for Advanced Studies - Dept. of Philosophy (CSIC, Madrid, Spain)

Introduction
One of the most controversial issues about arguments involving deontic and ethical matters is whether statements of duty or right can be inferred from statements of fact, and conversely. Most analytical philosophers have inclined to give a negative answer, alleging that duties or rights are not implied by mere facts (or the other way round), and hence that no combination of facts can imply a duty or a right, and no combination of duties or rights implies a fact.(*)
Not everybody has agreed, of course. Searle (1969) famously tried to derive duty assertions from factual assertions involving promises, but his interesting attempt has tended to be regarded as a failure owing to an equivocation on the meaning of promise. Geach also defended the connection between facts and duties in certain sense.
Most philosophers in the analytical tradition have regarded deontic utterances either as not conveying any real assertion (noncognitivism) or at most as conveying a very special sort of assertion, whose content would really have nothing to do with the content of factual assertions (separatism). Noncognitivism claims that deontic assertions are not real assertions. They lack cognitive content, and are only expressions of emotions, exhortations, or complex utterances which at least in part convey a non-cognitive message which does not depend at all on what is true or exists. According to separatism factual utterances stand for states of affairs which either exist (in this world) or not, whereas deontic utterances, if true at all, would express a peculiar kind of entity – a duty or a permission – whose existence (or whose obtaining) would be independent of the existence (or obtaining) of facts or states of affairs. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2002 – The Rabbit In The Hat: Where Do Dialectical Rules Come From?

• by: Hans Vilhelm Hansen - Department of Philosophy, University of Windsor

It is my guess that what most of us identify with the Pragma-Dialectical theory is the set of  rules for Critical Discussions, or as they were originally styled, the “code of conduct for rational discussants.” (1984: 151)  I think these rules individually, and as a set, have a great deal of intuitive plausibility in their favour. Therefore, in this essay, I propose to look at the rules and ask where they come from, what it is that justifies them, and how they hang together?

By way of historical background, we should recall that the first rules for argumentation were not developed in Amsterdam. Some have found rules of argumentation in Aristotle’s Topics; the Medievals had stylized, rule-governed games of disputation (Rescher 1977: 1-2); Whately, in the nineteenth century, explicitly relies on rules of argumentation in his discussion of  ad hominem arguments (Hansen 1995: 405-06).  More recent but less well-known authors have also proposed rules of argumentation. One interesting set of rules is found in James Johnson’s Logic and Rhetoric.  Johnson defined ‘argumentation’ as the kind of rhetoric “which tries to convince us of a certain point of view or attitude.” (Johnson 1962: 143) Since the activities of convincing and the discovery of facts are independent endeavours we are surprised to see that a few pages later the function Johnson ascribes to argumentation is “to discover the truth, that is, to establish facts.” (Johnson 1962: 147). Johnson apparently belonged to that benign age in which it was thought that once the facts were made plain, conviction was inevitable.

James Johnson’s ten “elementary ground rules,” lightly edited, are these:
J1. Be sure that your statements are accurate representations of what you really think. [Unless your words assert clearly the opinions you hold, you cannot convince anyone of your point of view nor can you test and confirm that view for your own benefit.  Say what you believe.]
J2. Define the areas of agreement and disagreement between yourself and those whose views you oppose. Do not waste time arguing over things you are really agreed upon.
J3. Never, never argue about established facts. Look them up in one or more authorities.
J4. Be sure you know whether the argument is founded upon differences of opinion concerning causation, obligation, evaluation, or generalization. [The evidence you present to support your view must be determined by the nature of the disagreement.]
J5. Summon up from memory, collect from reliable sources, and compare from common experiences between yourself and your opponent all relevant data or evidence, not just evidence to support your point of view. [You are supposed to be finding out facts, not humiliating an enemy.]
J6. Keep yourself emotionally detached and stay cool. [Lost tempers do not win arguments. The tone of your voice or your written composition must stay moderate and composed. Remember the Biblical injunction, “A soft answer turneth away wrath.”]
J7. Examine all evidence thoughtfully and objectively. [Use what you know about the principles of logical order to arrange and evaluate all information pertinent to the issue.]
J8. Stick to the issue or question under discussion. [… Failure to do so can result in a fallacy such as ignoring the question, ad hominem or begging the question.]
J9. Do not appeal to the emotions of your opponent or your readers when you find yourself being tested intellectually. [… It is a fallacy to appeal to pity, or fear, or patriotism, or “just plain folks.”]
J10. Reach whatever conclusions seem justified by the evidence calmly considered. If you think the evidence insufficient, then postpone your decision until more evidence is available.
J11. If you decide your original decision was wrong, admit it and accept the right one. [No one loses face by admitting his mistakes.] (Johnson 148-49) Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2002 – The Accusation Of Amalgame As A Meta-Argumentative Refutation

• by: Marianne Doury - C.N.R.S., UPR 36

This paper proposes a descriptive approach of the question of norms in argumentation; it is based on a case study: the accusation of amalgame in everyday arguments.
We consider after Hymes (1984) that speakers possess a communicative competence, which may be defined as a set of aptitudes owing to which one can communicate efficiently in various situations. This communicative competence comprises, besides the linguistic competence, an argumentative competence which enables speakers to take a stand and to elaborate their position through discursive devices in order to hold out against contention. The argumentative competence thus enables speakers to elaborate argumentative discourses; it also enables them to interpret argumentative discourses they are exposed to. Such an interpretative process implies at least two cognitive processes: a categorizing process, and an evaluative process.

In order to interpret an argument, speakers first “label” it owing to spontaneous argumentative categories provided by the language they use (Plantin 1995). Such categories may rely on general lexical items such as “argument”, “to argue”…, or they may refer to specific argumentative moves (such as “to concede”, “to refute”, “to justify”, “to object”…). They may even designate a precise type of argument: “example”, “analogy”, “appeal to authority”… Once the argument has been identified, it is characterized as acceptable or unacceptable by means of evaluation criteria which are often left implicit. The existence of the normative dimension of ordinary argumentative competence is attested through meta-comments which are frequent in polemical contexts. Such claims may be quite general (for instance: “that’s not a valid argument”); they may also be related to a specific argumentative device: “don’t appeal to authority”, “you should discuss facts rather than persons”, “stop making hasty generalizations”…
The whole interpretative process has in turn some effects on the production of arguments. Actually, once a speaker has received an argumentative utterance and has deemed it fallacious, he may reject in on behalf of this fallaciousness judgement through a refutative move. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2006 – Why Do Journalists Quote Other People, Or On The Functions Of Reported Speech In Argumentative Newspaper Discourse

• by: Alla V. Smirnova - Saint Petersburg State University

The main purpose of any newspaper article is to make the reader agree to share the journalist’s viewpoint. That is why newspaper discourse is necessarily argumentative. And it is mainly by means of language that the journalist tries to persuade his reader to accept his argumentation.
If we look at any newspaper article we’ll readily notice how often any journalist quotes other people. Naturally we can conclude that if reported speech is so frequently used it plays some important role in building argumentation. In the present work we try to figure out the functions of reported speech in argumentative newspaper discourse.
The research was based on the articles of quality British papers (the Times, the Guardian, the Financial Times, the Herald) and yielded the following results.
Analysis showed that in the structure of argumentation reported speech can be found in two possible positions: in the position of the thesis and that of an argument.
Only one third of the argumentations analyzed used reported speech as the thesis. This can be easily understood: if a journalist formulates the thesis himself he is free to put it any way he likes and further interpret it accordingly. And if his thesis is a quotation from some other person’s utterance, he is bound by what was actually said and not so free in interpretation. In spite of this, a number of argumentations still had its thesis in the form of reported speech. Then we must ask ourselves, what are the advantages of this use that compensate the abovementioned inconvenience.
As the thesis of argumentation reported speech performs the following functions: function of additional support of the thesis at the very stage of its proclamation, function of a shift of responsibility, aesthetic function and indication of the authorship of the article.

Function of additional support of the thesis at the very stage of its proclamation is the most important one. Here the thesis partially gains characteristics of an argument. As soon as the thesis is proclaimed it is immediately supported by the authority of a person who said it.

(1) In Liverpool last week, Tony Blair himself said: “We need to renew ourselves for times to come” (Guardian, Wednesday July 9, 2003, p. 22).

As soon as we see such a thesis, even before any support is given, we already tend to believe it or at least take it less critically, especially if the quoted person is an authority to us (as Tony Blair is, or at least was at the time the article was published, to the majority of British citizens, as the elections showed). It is interesting to note that the wording itself coincides with the name of an argument to authority: “ipse dixit” = “himself said”.
We called the next important function of reported speech as the thesis of argumentation “function of a shift of responsibility”. By this we mean that the author of the article uses reported speech to introduce an antithesis that will be refuted further on in his article. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 1998 – Table Of Contents

ISSA Proceedings 1998 

Frans H. van Eemeren et al – Preface
Aakhus, M. – Reconstruction games: Assessing the resources for managing collective argumentation in groupware technology
Aldrich, A.W. – Framing Blame and Managing Accountability to Pragma-Dialectical Principles in Congressional Testimony
Amossy, R. – The argument ad hominem in an interactional perspective
Azar, M. – Refuting counter-arguments in written essays
Baaske, K. – Arguing Over Values: The Affirmative Action Debate and Public Ethics
Baker, M. – The function of argumentation dialogue in cooperative problem-solving
Balter, S.J. – ‘The Search for Grounds in Legal Argumentation: A Rhetorical Analysis of Texas v Johnson’
Bedau, H.A. – What are the ‘Anarchical Fallacies’ Jeremy Bentham Discovered in the 1789 French: Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen?
Beer, F.A. & De Landtsheer, C. – Metaphorical politics: mobilization or tranquilization?
Berkenbosch, R. & Van der Geest, I. – Practical guidelines for justifying decisions about major projects
Birrer, F.A.J. – Asymmetry in the dialogue between expert and non-expert
Blair, J.A. – Walton’s argumentation schemes for presumptive reasoning: A critique and development
Brandon, E.P. – What’s Wrong with God?
Branham, R. – Abolitionist reconstructions of July Fourth
Brashers, D.E., Haas, S.M. & Neidig, J.L. – Satisfying the Argumentative Requirements for Self Advocacy
Cattani, A. – Bad Reasoning, Good Humor
Chan, W. – Wittgenstein and Cognitive Psychology
Cohen, D.H. – How To Lose an Argument
Coleman, E. – Acts of argumentation: beyond spoken dialog
Collins, C.A. & Schmid, J.D. – The Power and Perceived Truthfulness of Visual Arguments in U.S. Political Campaign Biofilms
Conley, T.M. – The Renaissance Roots of Perelman’s Rhetoric
Craig, R.T. & Sanusi, A.L. – “I’m Just Saying …”: Discourse Markers of Standpoint Continuity
Danblon, E. – Is Praise a kind of Advice? Read more