ISSA Proceedings 2014 – Arguments By Analogy (And What We Can Learn About Them From Aristotle)

• by: Manfred Kraus - Philologisches Seminar, University of Tübingen, Tübingen, Germany

Abstract: The paper contributes to the debate about arguments by analogy, especially the distinction between ‘deductive’ and ‘inductive’ analogies and the question how such arguments can be ‘deductive’, yet nonetheless defeasible. It claims that ‘deductive’ and ‘inductive’ are structural, not normative categories, and should not be used to designate argument validity. Based on Aristotle’s analysis of enthymemes, examples, and metaphors, it argues that arguments from analogy are complex arguments that involve inductive, abductive, and deductive components.

Keywords: abduction, analogy, comparison, deduction, enthymeme, example, induction, metaphor, similarity.

1. Introduction
Arguments by analogy have been a much-disputed subject recently. The most controversial issues in that discussion have been whether or not there are different types of analogical arguments, whether they are to be regarded as basically inductive or deductive or as a completely distinct category of argument of their own, whether or not they involve any hidden or missing premises, and whether it is possible for analogical arguments to be deductive and yet defeasible. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2014 – Evidence-Based Practice: Evidence Set In An Argument

• by: Tone Kvernbekk - Department of Education, University of Oslo, Norway

Abstract: Evidence-based practice (EBP) is currently a dominating trend in many professional areas. But what do we want evidence for in EBP? Evidence generally speaks to the trustworthiness of our beliefs, but EBP is practical in nature and truth is not really what is at stake. Rather we are after effectiveness in bringing about changes. What we need evidence for is a prediction to the effect that what has worked in one context will also work here. In this paper I argue that is makes good sense to view this prediction as the conclusion of an argument. To set the evidence in an argument will structure our thinking and help us focus on what kinds of evidence we need to support the likelihood that an intervention here will work.

Keywords: Argument, causal role, EBP, effectiveness, enablers, evidence, external validity, local facts, RCT, stability of context

1. Introduction
There exists a vast literature on EBP, hardly surprising given the status of ‘evidence-based’ as a buzzword in contemporary professional debates, such as education, medicine, psychiatry and social policy. Researchers are responding in many ways to political demands for better research bases to inform and guide both policy and practice; some by producing the kind of evidence it is assumed can serve as a base for practice; others by criticizing or even rejecting the whole enterprise of EBP – the latter frequently, but not exclusively, couched in terms of worries about instrumentalization of practice and restrictions in the freedom of professionals to exercise their judgment. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2014 – Shameful Corinthians: A Pragma-Dialectical Analysis Of 1 Corinthians 6:12–20

• by: Niilo Lahti - School of Theology, University of Eastern, Finland

Abstract: Biblical scholars have fundamental differences in defining Paul’s argumentative and rhetorical goal in 1 Corinthians 6:12–20. There is no convincing explanation for why the apostle brings 6:12–20 up in the letter. I conduct a pragma-dialectical analysis to account for the argumentation, rhetoric and their interplay in 6:12–20. It turns out that Paul aims at shaming the audience in order to break their resistance.

Keywords: 1 Corinthians, argumentation, Bible, New Testament, Paul, pragma-dialectics, rhetoric, shame, strategic maneuvering, theology.

1. Introduction
Biblical scholars have had significant difficulties in interpreting the argumentation in 1 Corinthians 6:12–20 (Goulder 1999, p. 341; Rosner 1998, p. 336). Two frequent and general problems are brought up to motivate the upcoming analysis of the section in the letter.

The first problem deals with the goal of the section. What does Paul want to argue in the section? Two alternative standpoint options are common (Rosner 1998, p. 336):
a. The apostle argues that the Corinthians should stop a specific behavior, that of having relations with harlots (Drake Williams III 2008, p. 20; Fee 1987, p. 250; Rosner 1998, pp. 341-342);
b. Paul wishes to smother a broader phenomenon: sexual immorality (Conzelmann 1975, p. 108; Lambrecht 2009, p. 486; Rosner 1998, pp. 337-338). Topically speaking, the two themes are related. The question arises, which of the two notions supports the other. Does Paul employ sexual immorality to support the avoidance of harlots or vice versa?

Furthermore, why does the apostle bring up the issue in the first place? Is the control of the Corinthians’ sexual morality an objective in itself for him or does Paul use it to achieve another goal? Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2014 – Pragma-Dialectical Rules And The Teaching Of Argumentation In Philosophy For Children

• by: Celso López & Ana María Vicuña - Instituto de Filosofía, Facultad de Filosofía, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Santiago, Chile

Abstract: A Philosophy for Children teacher must model a discussion that complies with a critical ideal of reasonableness and use effectively all tools necessary to attract the students’ involvement and participation in a meaningful philosophical dialogue. We distinguish the stages of a Philosophy for Children class where the pragma-dialectical rules and the pedagogical devices instrumental to enhance the students’ participation in a community of inquiry ought to be applied.

Keywords: Community of Inquiry, Philosophical dialogue, Philosophical novel, Philosophy for Children, Pragma-dialectical rules

1. Introduction
The Philosophy for children program, created by Matthew Lipman (Lipman, 1980, 1991), centers around the building of a Community of Inquiry through the practice of philosophical dialogue. The Community of Inquiry is considered as a way to foster critical and cooperative thinking through the balance between competition and cooperation in an atmosphere of mutual respect and understanding, similar to the scientific community in that it pursues similar goals through identical methods (Lipman, 1998, p. 57). The Philosophy for Children teacher is a member of the Community of Inquiry with no special privilege but she must see to it that the logical rules that conduct critical thinking are respected and guide the dialogue among the participants. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2014 – Islamic Theological Arguments: An Epistemological Systematisation

• by: Christoph Lumer - DISPOC (Dipartimento di Scienze Sociali, Politiche e Cognitive), University of Siena, Siena, Italy & Serkan Ince - Zentrum für Islamische Theologie, University of Tübingen, Tübingen, Germany

Abstract: This contribution starts a critical analysis and reconstruction of arguments in classical texts of Islamic theology (of the period AD 900-1100) from the viewpoint of the epistemological theory of argumentation. The main question of the analysis is whether these arguments can be reconstructed as being of one of the universal types of argument identified so far by the epistemological approach. The answer is: yes – though non-deductive arguments are not yet well elaborated.

Keywords: deductive arguments, epistemological theory of argumentation, Islamic theological argument, Koran, universality of argument types

1. Aim and structure of this article
Many classical texts of Islamic theology are heavily argumentative; and much of Islamic theology tries to base faith on valid and sound arguments. Some Islamic theologians even think that Islamic doctrines cannot be defended by revelation alone but have always to be justified by rational arguments. The rational approach in Islamic theology was significantly influenced by the Muʿtazila. But also the Māturīdiyya and the As̲h̲ʿariyya have dealt with kalām (Arabic for speculative theology) and applied rational methods in their theology (see e.g. van Ess 1966, pp. 17-33). This argumentative tradition has nearly not been studied in argumentation theory up to this day. This contribution starts to develop a critical analysis and reconstruction of the arguments in classical texts of Islamic theology from the viewpoint of the epistemological theory of argumentation. The theoretical aims of this study are threefold: First, we want to compile (the beginning of) a list of the most important types of arguments used in these texts, giving particular attention to non-deductive arguments. Second, we analyse them with the help of epistemological criteria in order to establish whether they can be captured in this way, in particular whether all of them are intended (in a broad sense) to be or can be reconstructed as being of one of the universal types of argument identified so far by the epistemological approach (deductive, probabilistic or practical arguments or combinations thereof) or whether there are e.g. specifically Islamic types of argument which should extend the present list of epistemologically valuable argument types or whether, on the other hand, there are (frequently used) argument types in Islamic theology which should be abandoned from an epistemological point of view. Third, we assess the examples with the help of the criteria developed in the epistemological theory of argumentation to gain an impression of the state of the art in classical Islamic theological argumentation. The arguments we will analyse in the following are taken from works by Abū Manṣūr Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn Maḥmūd al-Māturīdī (about AD 870-944), by Abū al-Qāsim al-Ḥakīm al-Samarqandī (about AD 890-950) and by Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad, known as al-Ghazālī (AD 1058–1111), i.e. texts which were written roughly between AD 900 and 1100, i.e. in European terms at the end of the Early and the beginning of the High Middle Ages, before Thomas Aquinas or William of Ockham in Western Europe. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2014 – Ethical Arguments For Moral Principles

• by: Christoph Lumer, University of Siena, DISPOC, Siena, Italy

Abstract: Application arguments in ethics, from an argumentation theoretic perspective, are rather trivial; however they always rely on moral principles whose justification is a notoriously thorny problem. A critique of several trials of such justifications helps to formulate adequacy conditions for good justifications of moral principles. The main part of the article develops an adequate conception of the justification of moral principles as an argument for a specific thesis about such principles.

Keywords: adequacy of justification conceptions, epistemological approach to argumentation, ethical arguments, ethical constructivism, function of morals, instrumentalist justification of morals, justification of moral principles, moral motivation, practical justification, reduction of argument schemes.
1. The aim of the paper
The abundance of argument types and reasoning approaches to ethics is a real jungle. An impression of the complexity of the various types of reasoning and argumentation of the corresponding theoretical issues is provided in Walton’s “Ethical Argumentation” (Walton 2002). To try to give an overview of this material here is illusory. Rather, I will focus on some, in my opinion, systematically central questions:
1. What types of good central arguments are there in applied ethics?
2. What are the main approaches to the justification of moral principles, and how useful are they?
3. How does the best of these approaches to justification, an instrumentalist, constructivist approach, work in detail and what argument types are used in it?

The brief look at the first question serves only to the discussion, which is thus focused on certain aspects of justification in normative ethics; the article’s main aim is to sketch a systematic conception of justifying moral principles. In dealing with certain questions of how to proceed in normative ethics, the article in itself is metaethical: it provides criteria for good argumentation in normative ethics, but not yet moral principles.

The following analysis of argument types and the criteria for their evaluation are based on the epistemological approach in argumentation theory, according to which the standard function of argumentation is to rationally convince, i.e. to guide an addressee in acquiring knowledge or justified belief.[i] The particular approach to justifying moral principles presented in the following is based on my previous metaethical work, most of which has not yet been published in English.[ii]

2. Argumentation in applied ethics – the recourse to moral principles
According to the most broadly accepted understanding, applied ethics should just apply basic and most general moral principles to groups of more specific typical cases or, in cases of singular decisions of great importance – such as the basic lines of a political or economic system or the determination of climate targets –, even to individual cases. If the moral principles are clear, this application should not be a problem in principle. (“In principle” here means that it is clear how to proceed – which neither rules out the possibility that, for example, very complex or comprehensive empirical information, which is not only expensive to procure and process but may exist only in very uncertain or vague form, is needed, nor precludes that evaluations from the perspective of those affected are very difficult to perform.) The two main types of applied ethical arguments conceived in this way are, first, deontic arguments for deontic judgments (about moral obligations) and, second, consequentialist axiological, in particular welfare ethical, arguments for moral appraisals. Read more