ISSA Proceedings 1998 – Public Reason And The Political Character Of Reasonableness

• by: Darrin Hicks - University of Denver, Colorado USA

A theory of argumentation is underwritten by a philosophical conception of reasonableness. This standard of reasonableness takes into account the normative character of argumentation. That is, participants engaged in argumentative discussions (of all sorts) assert and defend normative judgments not only about the content of the reasons put forth, but also issue normative evaluations of the character of their own and their interlocutors’ reasons. A philosophical conception of reasonablness explicates the sources, conditions, and consequences of the explicit as well as tacit criteria participants (including argumentation theorists) use to render normative judgments about the form and content of reasoning practices.
Given the fact of reasonable pluralism, democratic legitimacy must be constructed from the process of public justification in the face of social controversy rather than found in the contents of a universal reason, the procedures of rational choice, the conditions set out in natural law cosmologies, or the laws set out in a deep-structure social theory (Unger, 1987). That is, an account of democratic legitimacy is underwritten by a theory of argumentation and a philosophical conception of reasonableness; hence, the importance of accounts of public justification in contemporary liberal-democratic theory. One of the most pressing task for liberal democratic theory is the construction of a conception of reasonableness that could guide persons in their projects of constructing ways to live together in the face of pluralism in a just manner. It is at this point that a theory of argument and a theory of deliberative democracy need to converge.
While the field has geometric, anthropological, epistemic, and critical-rationalist accounts of reasonableness it has yet to formulate a public/political conception of reasonableness. Such an account would focus on the critical functions invocations of reasonableness plays in actual instances of public justification. I contend that the ideal of public reason as set out by Kant and Rawls, if amended to account for the critical use of the concept in actual argumentation, provides a good starting place for formulating a public-political standard of reasonableness. I begin by examining some of the ways in which reasonableness is conceptualized in argumentation theory and advocate a conception attuned to the ways reasonableness is used as a critical standard by participants to regulate argumentative discussions. I then sketch how the ideal of public reason can be amended to serve as a public/political conception of reasonableness that underwrites a deliberative account of democracy. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 1998 – Probabilification

• by: David Hitchcock - McMaster University

1. Introduction
Some arguments have premisses which make their conclusions probable. Or so, at least, it seems. But the attempt to understand how and under what circumstances they do so has proved surprisingly difficult. Carnap’s project of an inductive logic (Carnap 1962/1950) foundered on the inability to single out a unique measure function which would assign initial probabilities to each set of structurally isomorphic state descriptions (Carnap & Jeffrey 1971, Jeffrey 1980). On a Bayesian personalist approach, which goes back to F. P. Ramsey’s 1926 paper “Truth and probability” (1990/1926), an initial purely subjective (hence “personal”) assignment of probabilities is modified according to Bayes’ theorem in the light of subsequent evidence (hence “Bayesian”); Bayesian personalism has recently had vigorous defenders (e.g. Howson & Urbach 1989, Kaplan 1996), but a critical examination by John Earman (1992) concluded that it still faces, among other difficulties, the so-called “problem of old evidence” (explaining how old evidence can make a hypothesis more probable, as the already known perturbation in the orbit of the planet Mercury evidently did for Einstein’s general theory of relativity). John L. Pollock has attempted to ground a comprehensive theory of inductive reasoning and inductive argument on what he calls “nomic probability” (Pollock 1990: 25), the kind of objective probability involved in statistical laws of nature. Various authors have developed criteria for “argumentation schemata” covering such types of argument as enumerative induction (particular and general; cf. Russell (1948)), eliminative induction (inference to the best explanation), and so-called “direct inference”; such ad hoc approaches, exemplified by Grennan (1997), often seem plausible, but need justification.
In this paper, I wish to make a start on developing criteria for determining whether the premisses of an argument make its conclusion probable; we could say that such a situation is one in which the premisses “probabilify” the conclusion, so the subject of this paper is probabilification.
I propose to start from Stephen Thomas’ discussion of an example in the 1997 (fourth) edition of his Practical Reasoning in Natural Language (Thomas 1997: 130-131). In his discussion, Thomas maintains a position adopted in print 13 years earlier (Thomas 1984: 32), even though a subsequently published paper (Nolt 1985: 56) rejected that position. It will turn out that, in this dispute, Nolt is correct and Thomas is mistaken. The textbook discussion makes clear, in a way that the earlier paper did not, why Thomas made his mistake. His reason is a seductive one, and exposing its inadequacy has, I shall maintain, some negative lessons for the evaluation of enumerative induction and, more generally, of inferences from confirmatory evidence to the probable truth of any hypothesis under investigation. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 1998 – Linguistic And Pragma-Rhetorical Characteristics Of Argumentative Discourse In L2 And L1

• by: Ineke Vedder - University of Amsterdam

1. Introduction
The following fragment has been taken from an argumentative essay in Italian, written by a native Dutch university student of Italian. The essay argues that even in a unified Europe, the single European countries will not loose their national identity.

(1) Unificazione europea: perdita dell’identità nazionale?
Non penso che l’unificazione di Europa sarà una perdità dell’identità nazionale (Opinion 1). Secondo me Europa è formato di molto paesi che hanno tutto i propri valori e le proprie tradizione. Questi valori e tradizione sono formati per molti secoli e non camberanno di colpo (Argument 1). Certo, ci sarà uno scambio dei valori e delle tradizione tra i paesi (Counterargument 1 rejected) ma penso che questo scambio sarà utile per arricchere la propria cultura (Argument 2). Ci sono anche le lingue che sono molto diverse (Argument 3). L’inglese sarà la lingua principale (Counterargument 2 rejected), ma penso che non sia possibile (Qualifier 1) di trasformare tutte le lingue nell’inglese (Argument 4). Per me l’unificazione vuol dire che Europa sia un insieme di paesi separati con un zielo uguale: la collaborazione sul campo economico e politico (Conclusion 1).

(European unification: a loss of national identity?)
I don’t think the unification of Europe will lead to a loss of national identity (Opinion 1). In my opinion Europe consists of many countries and each of them has its own values and traditions. These values and traditions have developed over many centuries and will not change all of a sudden (Argument 1). Of course, there will be an exchange of values and traditions between countries (Counterargument 1 rejected), but I think this exchange will be useful and will enrich each country’s culture (Argument 2). Also the languages are very different (Argument 3). English will be the main language (Counterargument 2 rejected), but I think it will be impossible to transform all languages into English (Argument 4). For me unification means that Europe will be a mixture of separate countries with one common goal: collabaration in the fields of economy and politics (Conclusion 1).][i]
To defend his point of view, introduced by standpoint markers like I think, I don’t think, in my opinion, for me, the writer puts forward four arguments. The text also contains a qualifier to mark the degree of certainty with which he regards his standpoint, a conclusion and two counterarguments, which are rejected by the writer. There are only few connectives or argumentative indicators, such as because and consequently. Figures of speech such as metaphors and rhetorical questions are absent. In spite of several language errors, the argumentation is nonetheless adequate.
Producing written argumentative discourse in a foreign or a second language (L2) is a fairly demanding task. L2 writers have to acquire a number of lexical and syntactic devices to enable them to use the argumentative categories that are included in the macro-argumentative structure. The argumentative function of an utterance can be marked linguistically by means of argumentative indicators or by other lexical and syntactic devices (verbal constructions, morpho-syntactic marking, communicative formulas, performatives), which L2 writers must be able to handle. They must also be acquainted with L2 pragma-rhetorical and stylistic conventions. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 1998 – Informal Logic: The Two Schools

• by: John Hoaglund - Christopher Newport University

Introduction
The two schools are those of the fallacy critics and the argument analysts. The distinction I draw is in terms of areas of interest and emphasis within informal logic as exhibited in the writing of several informal logicians, and I will deal very much with general trends and tendencies. The distinction can prove useful, I maintain, even if a fallacy critic responds “I do some of the same things you ascribe to argument analysts.” The heart of the matter is where the writer places his or her highest priority, and how this affects the topics chosen and the methods of work.
Accordingly I will first distinguish the two schools by their different emphases and some typical writers, note what the two have in common, and touch on the development of informal logic as a discipline. There follows a treatment of two differing conceptions of argument. After this, some distinctions within each school are explored. Finally I summarize and conclude this survey and analysis.

2. The Schools Distinguished
Fallacy critics seize on informal logical fallacies as the main object of their study, such as begging the question or the ad hominem. They focus on argumentation in natural language where such fallacies occur, approaching it from the standpoint of a critic. They regard argumentation as a process, much as a drama critic observes the tragedy unfolding before her on the stage. Our drama critic (let us assume she is good at her job) will be sensitive both to the strong points of the production as well as to its weaknesses. But the fallacy critic is by orientation more sensitive to weaknesses or lapses in argumentation, since that is of course what logical fallacies are (whatever else they may be). On the practical side, the fallacy critic scrutinizes a text for fallacies and points them out, or finding none, allows that the text passes muster. On the theoretical side, the fallacy critic is interested primarily in a theory of criticism, which concerns what makes fallacious reasoning fallacious, and secondarily in a theory of argument, an explanation of the kinds of discourse and circumstances in which fallacies occur. The leading writers of this school are Douglas N. Walton, John Woods, Ralph H. Johnson, and J. Anthony Blair.
Argument analysts take argument in natural language as the main object of study. They tend to define argument broadly as any case of a claim or statement backed up with reasons. Argument analysts are inclined to regard argument as a finished product which they then slice up into its constitutent parts for study. Not being guided by traditional or recent notions of fallacies, analysts are more concerned with describing and categorizing discourse. They put more stress on distinguishing argument from related uses of language like problem solving and explanation. The analyst relates to argument much as a scientist to a specimen. The scientist analyzes the specimen then sums up the result of her analysis. Perhaps the main difference between scientist and analyst is that the scientist as such does not evaluate her specimen relative to human purposes, instead aspiring to remaining value free. The work of an argument analyst on a specimen, however, culminates in the judgment that the argument is weak or strong on the basis of how little or much support the premises provide for the conclusion.
On the practical side, the analyst identifies an argument, analyzes it, and then evaluates it. Not being focussed on fallacies, she may be more sensitive to the outcome being that the argument is strong or good. But typically no traditional or current literature provides her with a body of good-making features that would complement the bad-making ones of the fallacy critics. On the theoretical side, analysts investigate matters arising from their central activity like identifying and formulating missing premises of an argument, or distinguishing ways in which premises relate to an argument’s conclusion like convergent and linked. Leading writers of this school include Stephen F. Toulmin, Michael Scriven, Trudy Govier, David Hitchcock, Alec Fisher and James B. Freeman. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 1998 – The Cake Or The Bakery? The Conceptual Structure Of Debates Between ‘Revolutionaries’ And ‘Reformists’

• by: Eva Oling - Rijksuniversiteit Groningen

1. Introduction: ‘revolutionaries’ and ‘reformists’
Within most political groups, parties, movements or organizations there is debate between radical and moderate people or groups. A well known example is the debate between revolutionaries and reformists[i] in most European socialist parties at the beginning of the 20th century (Etty 1996, Van Dijk 1982). Modern political parties are plagued by this conflict too, see the debate between ‘fundis’ and ‘realos’ in the German Green Party. But also within so-called new social movements radical and ‘reformist’ wings are fighting each other. In the Dutch women’s movement of the seventies and eighties it was the radical feminists against the ‘careerfeminists’ (Brunt 1979). Within the current anti-fascist movement it is the arrived, ‘neutral’ organizations against the anarchist ‘antifas’(BILWET 1990).
Debates of this kind occur quite often because radical and moderate groups are more involved with eachother than some of their members would admit. As time goes by, lots of groups get closer to their the once loathed enemies: moderate groups get more radical, radical groups loose their sharp edges. Apart from that, radical and moderate groups are often concerned with the same issues. Almost every supposedly too moderate group gets competition from a radical one. In spite of this kind of competition, radical and moderate groups are not drawn into debates because they have completely opposite views. Both groups share at least some general opinions about what is wrong and what is right. Their difference of opinion is about strategy in the broad sense of the word. So debates between ‘revolutionaries’ and ‘reformists’ are about matters like ‘what is useful and important to strive for’. An example of this is the debate in the anti-fascist movement I mentioned before. Although the starting point of this debate was the use of violence by the radical ‘antifas’, the debate has never just been about means. Far more important are the different strategies of both groups: the ‘reformists’ see fascism as a political threat that should be met with a political massmovement; the radicals see fascism as a threat to their lives, therefore self-defense is their first priority.
All these debates between ‘revolutionaries’ and ‘reformists’ differ from each other, but I am interested in what they have in common: their conceptual structure, i.e. the starting-points and patterns of reasoning. In order to get a hold on this structure I have analysed one clear example of a debate between ‘revolutionaries’ and ‘reformists’. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 1998 – Legal Rhetoric And Dialectic In The Renaissance: Topica Legalia And Status Legales

• by: Hanns Hohmann - San José State University

1. Introduction
By the late Middle Ages a greater theoretical interest in legal argumentation, spurred by a much expanded and deepened argumentative practice based on the revival of Roman law since the late eleventh century, had led to the emergence of a distinct genre of specialized commentary sections or separate treatises bearing titles such as De modis arguendi in jure. These modi arguendi systematized and supplemented the discussions of legal interpretation and argumentation which had before been limited to brief remarks in the course of glosses and commentaries on specific provisions of the Justinian Corpus iuris (Hohmann 1998). In this paper, I will discuss the next stage in the development of the theoretical literature dealing with legal argumentation, which is reached as the civil law tradition of the Middle Ages encounters Renaissance Humanism. [i] This development is marked in the sixteenth century by the ascendancy of works with titles such as Dialectica legalis or Topica legalia. Such titles make more explicit a strong reliance on dialectical models for the formal systematization of legal arguments, which had already characterized the earlier modi arguendi. But I will argue that in spite of this greater external emphasis on the instrumentarium of logic, the substance of the Topica legalia was in effect even more focused on rhetorical concerns than had been the content of the modi arguendi.
I will first place the emergence of works explicitly identifying themselves as dealing with legal dialectic in the context of the rhetorical reorientation of dialectic promoted by the De inventione dialectica of Rudolph Agricola (1444-1485), a work written around 1480, which began to exercise its influence even before the appearance of its first printed edition in 1515 (Cogan 1984: 163 n.1). I will relate this development to the explicit discussion of the relationship between legal dialectic and legal rhetoric in the Dialectica legalis (1534)[ii] and the Rhetorica legalis (1541) by Christoph Hegendorff (1500-1540).[iii]
My argument will continue with an examination of additional rhetorical elements accompanying the topoi catalogues offered by 16th century books on legal dialectic, beginning with works marking the transition from the modi arguendi of the medieval Commentators on the Corpus iuris to the legal dialectic of the Humanist jurists in the Renaissance, the Legalis dialectica (1507) of Pietro Andrea Gambari (d. 1528),[iv] and the Topica seu loci legales (1516) by Nicolaas Everaerts (1462-1532).[v]
I will then investigate the use of the rhetorical status legales, a complex of arguments initially designed to be used by forensic advocates in dealing with issues of legal interpretation,[vi] in Renaissance works focused on that subject. Here I will pay special attention to the Iurisconsultus sive de optimo genere iuris interpretandi of François Hotman (1524-1590),[vii] who proposes a return to a reconceptualization of the status legales as the controlling scheme of legal hermeneutics.
Finally, I will discuss some rhetorical considerations which furthered the emergence of such a large number of works on legal dialectic and interpretation in the 16th century, and helped to define their distinctive characteristics compared to the modi arguendi of preceding centuries, considerations related to pedagogical exigencies, solicitude for the scientific status of legal scholarship, and concerns about the political implications of legal argumentation. Read more