ISSA Proceedings 2006 – Adam Smith’s Ad Hominem: Eighteenth Century Insight Regarding The Role Of Character In Argument.

• by: Jack Russell Weinstein - University of North Dakota

1.
At the last ISSA conference, I argued that Adam Smith’s system of moral psychology contained an implicit account of reasoning that shared much in common with contemporary discussions in informal logic and critical thinking (Weinstein 2003a).[i] First, I argued that for Smith, emotions were, to a large degree, rational. He did not regard passion and reason in opposition to one another. Second, I investigated the place of audience in Smith’s argumentation theory, suggesting that his work anticipated much that is now associated with a rhetorical approach to informal logic and reasoning. Smith’s moral theory is built upon the interactions of actors and spectators.[ii] It necessitates the creation of an imaginary impartial spectator who plays the role of an observing and judging conscience. The relevance of rhetoric to such a theory should be obvious (Weinstein 2001, chapter two; McKenna 2006).
During this discussion, I encountered a question: to what extent does the reunification of passion and reason call certain informal fallacies into question? Obviously, if the two are not fundamentally separate as the Western philosophical tradition has often assumed, the so-called appeal to emotion, for example, may not necessarily be fallacious. For Smith, emotions supply essential information that directs moral actors to normative judgments; appealing to these sentiments is a necessary component of moral reasoning.[iii]

My concern in this paper, however, is not with the appeal to emotion but with the argumentum ad hominem, an investigation inspired by Smith’s comments in the classroom. During his lectures on rhetoric, Smith compares Shaftesbury’s writing to Jonathan Swift’s, arguing throughout that Swift’s clear and simple style is to be praised while Shaftesbury’s more ornate writing is the exemplar of poor prose. In the midst of his discussion, he claims:
Shaftesbury himself, by what we can learn from his Letters, seems to have been of a very puny and weakly constitution, always either under some disorder or in dread of falling into one. Such a habit of body is very much connected, nay almost continually attended by, a cast of mind in a good measure similar. Abstract reasoning and deep searches are too fatiguing for persons of this delicate frame. Their feableness of body as well as mind hinders them from engaging in the pursuits which generally engross the common sort of men. Love and Ambition are too violent in their emotions to find ground to work upon in such frames; where the passions are not very strong. The weakness of their appetites and passions hinders them from being carried away in the ordinary manner,… (LRBL 138 – 139).[iv]
This is not a circumstantial ad hominem; Smith is not suggesting that Shaftesbury is either hypocritical or contradictory. It is abusive. Smith is asserting that because Shaftesbury was either sickly or a hypochondriac that he was unable to engage in sophisticated and in-depth reasoning.
There are no doubt times when individuals are too sick to concentrate. Nevertheless, Smith’s remarks are about Shaftesbury’s constitution, not his circumstance, and are therefore a condemnation of his intellectual capacities in general. Rather than judging Shaftesbury on the merits of his philosophy, he condemns his work based on biographical facts; this appears to be as fallacious as they come. Therefore, the question I pose is whether or not Smith’s comment can be justified. Using his complex notion of moral reasoning as a model, I ask whether character is somehow related to argumentation, and if so, how they are connected. In short, this paper asks whether abusive argumentum ad hominem might not necessarily be fallacious at all.

2.
The history and origin of the ad hominem fallacy is currently in dispute. There is a decade-long disagreement as to whether the fallacy was first introduced by Locke, as is usually argued, or whether its traces can be found in Aristotle (Chichi 2002, Eemeren and Grotendorst 1993, Nuchelmans 1993, Walton 2004 and 2001) In either case, however, Smith would have been familiar with the relevant texts. He read and was heavily influenced by both philosophers, and there are both Lockean and Aristotelian elements throughout his books and lectures. Yet, there is no direct continuum connecting the two philosophers, at least in regards to Smith’s theory of argumentation. In fact, whereas many contemporary informal logicians seem themselves as returning to an Aristotelian framework, Smith regards a rejection of formalism as moving away from Aristotle while finding himself more in line with Locke. Although Smith’s first academic appointment was the Chair of Logic at Glasgow University, he chose to teach rhetoric instead of the Analytics or similar systems of logic. Syllogistics were, according to Smith, an “artificial method of reasoning” (Ross 1995, p. 110). John Millar, Smith’s student tells us that according to Smith:
The best method of explaining and illustrating the various powers of the human mind, the most useful part of metaphysics, arises from an examination of the several ways of communicating our thoughts and speech, and from an attention to the principles of those literary compositions which contribute to persuasion and entertainment. By these arts, everything we perceive or feel, every operation of our minds, is expressed and delineated in such a manner, that it may be clearly distinguished and remembered’(Stewart 1980, 1.16). Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2006 – The Management Of The Burden Of Proof And Its Implications For The Analysis Of Qualified Standpoints: The Case Of Evaluative Adverbials

• by: Assimakis Tseronis - LUCL, Leiden University

1. Introduction
In this paper, I seek to answer two interrelated questions:
a) what argumentatively relevant information can we draw from the use of stance adverbials when they qualify the utterance that is to be reconstructed as a standpoint?
b) How can we make use of it in the analysis and evaluation of the argumentative discourse in which the qualified standpoint appears?

I start from the theoretical premises of the pragma-dialectical approach (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984, 1992, 2004, van Eemeren and Houtlosser 1999, 2000, 2002a), which considers both the normative and the descriptive aspects of argumentative discourse and acknowledges both the dialectical and the rhetorical aims that arguers have when engaging in argumentative discussions. In answer to the first question, I introduce the concept of the management of the burden of proof as a normative assumption about the choices at the protagonist’s disposal regarding the qualification of a standpoint. In answer to the second question, I look at evaluative adverbials, in particular, and discuss how considering them as one of the ways in which a standpoint can be qualified contributes to the analysis of the argumentative discourse. Before elaborating on the answers to these two questions, I briefly present the pragma-dialectical approach to argumentation and discuss how the qualification of standpoints is to be understood. In the last section of the paper, by way of illustration, I analyse a short fragment of argumentative discourse, in which the standpoint is qualified by an evaluative adverbial.

2. The theoretical framework
Pragma-dialectics (henceforth referred to as PD) proposes a systematic and comprehensive study of argumentative discourse as a verbal, rational and social activity (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004). The aim of the pragma-dialectical approach is to evaluate ordinary language users’ argumentation as it occurs in written or spoken communication by appealing to standards of critical reasonableness. To this end, an ideal model of a critical discussion has been developed, which is the theoretical construct that serves as the lens through which argumentative reality is interpreted, analysed and eventually evaluated.
The ideal model of a critical discussion is conceived as a dialogue between two parties, who perform the asymmetrical roles of protagonist and antagonist of the standpoint. The antagonist casts doubt on the standpoint and subsequently on the arguments in support of it, while the protagonist adduces arguments in response to the antagonist’s challenges. The path to the resolution of the dispute ideally goes through four stages: confrontation, opening, argumentation and concluding stage. A number of procedural rules, inspired by Popper’s critical rationalism and in line with a dialectical approach to argumentation describe which moves may be performed by each party and which not, and at which point throughout the dispute resolution process (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984, 2004).
The model serves a heuristic function for the analysis of argumentative discourse in the sense that it specifies the argumentatively relevant elements that the analyst should look for in argumentative reality or extract from it for that matter. It also serves a critical function in the evaluation of argumentative discourse. When mapping the reconstructed discussion on the ideal discussion, all those moves that were made while they should not have been made and those that were not made while they should have are considered as an obstruction to the goal of reaching a resolution to the dispute and thereby identified as fallacies (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992).

In order to reconstruct argumentative discourse (whether spoken or written) in terms of the ideal model of a critical discussion, PD treats it as a dialogue (explicit or implicit) and attributes to the parties involved in it the joint goal of coordinating their moves in order to critically test the tenability of a standpoint. Van Eemeren and Houtlosser (1999, 2000, 2002a) in a series of articles argue that an integration of rhetorical insights in the pragma-dialectical framework can benefit the analysis by providing a better understanding of argumentative reality. In the light of what is termed strategic manoeuvring, PD acknowledges that the parties, when fulfilling their respective roles and contributing their moves to the dispute resolution process, do not only observe the dialectical standards set by the procedural rules of the discussion but also try to make the best of what is allowed for each of them at the various stages of the discussion. In this integrated view:
– The antagonist is not only assumed to be interested in having the standpoint tested by casting doubt on the arguments in support of it but also in having the other party retract the standpoint as a result of the testing procedure.
– The protagonist is not only assumed to be interested in having the standpoint tested by adducing arguments in support of it but also in having the other party retract the doubt as a result of the testing procedure. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2006 – Prime Minister Mori’s Controversial “Divine Nation” Remarks: A Case Study Of Japanese Political Communication Strategies

• by: Hiroko Okuda - Nanzan University

The 2000 general election was of great significance because it would decide the direction Japan was to take in the twenty-first century. Prior to the general election, on the funeral day of his predecessor, Obuchi Keizo, Prime Minister Mori Yoshiro made a toast at a party of the pro-Shinto parliamentary organization. In his speech, Mori described Japan as a “divine nation,” and sparked controversy across the country. To play to the pro-Shinto religious side, Mori did not just magnify Japan’s pride and self-regard, but also intensified the sentiment of its national identity by calling in Japanese cultural uniqueness (Hobsbawm & Ranger 1983).[ii] For his pro-Shinto audience, Mori’s cultural assertiveness and defiance was a common sense support for the traditional values of Japanese society. To the public ear, however, the strong-sounding words sounded very conservative. Mori’s pronouncement adversely affected public trust both in his cabinet and in his leadership of the ruling coalition consisting of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), new Komeito, and the newly-born Conservative Party. Controversy over his “private” remarks at the party spread from the political sphere to the public sphere. Troubled by the emotional trauma of loss for more than a half century after World War II, many Japanese people questioned his capacity as the Prime Minister.[iii] Following a decade of dissatisfaction with empty promises of administrative reform in the 1990s, public cynicism now seemed to run so deep that public desire for strong leadership appeared to seek even authoritarian alternatives.
In this paper[i], I observe the social, political, and historical context in which the nationwide backlash against Mori’s calling Japan “divine” circulated in concert with a particular mood that was influencing opinion polls. Observations of the contexts of his “divine nation” remarks will provide a more realistic picture of the two-fold quality of Japanese polity, in which everything has a front “tatemae,” the pretense designed for public acceptance (i.e., de jure) and a back “honne,” the actual intent of the private self “I” (i.e., de facto). For that purpose, I would explicate first how the news reported his “private” remarks and questioned his genuine intent, and then examine how Mori attempted to defend the controversial phrase “divine nation” by shifting the issue from his “mistake” of advocating Shinto religious ideas to the public’s “misunderstanding” of his remarks. This includes his implicit, but strong censure of the news media that made his private comments public. Mori’s strategic approach to publicly explaining his questionable remarks failed, but the sympathy vote for Obuchi saved him from having to resign.
Prior to examining the controversy, I explain the context in which Mori was attacked by the opposition parties and the general public for having “hawkish” views.

1. The Context
Mori’s toast, delivered on May 15, 2000, at a party held by the Shinto Seiji Renmei parliamentary league (consisted of pro-Shinto Diet members) at Hotel New Otani in Tokyo, was extemporaneous. Its purpose was to pay tribute to those Shinto priests who for a long time had supported the LDP members in their respective electoral constituencies.[iv] In his toast, Mori called Japan the “nation of the kami centered on the emperor”: “I would like people to acknowledge that Japan is the divine nation with the Emperor at its center. Everything we have done in the last 30 years has been done with that in mind.”[v] In front of Shinto leaders and pro-Shinto lawmakers, he made a respectful gesture toward Shinto religious ideology. By creating a friendly atmosphere among his immediate political associates, Mori sought to strengthen his relations with Shinto LDP supporters for the 2000 general election.[vi] Here he ignored the importance of making a clear distinction between his public obligation as Prime Minister and private matters. Especially, his choice of Shinto religious terminology exposed his particular political views to public scrutiny. To the public, his yearning for Japan’s prowess under a divine Emperor appeared to have troubling echoes of Imperial Japanese military power and its devastating results. On the whole, Mori’s “private” remarks ended up being reported in political news coverage, and then criticized by opposition leaders as well as subjected to negative national attention.

Prime Minister Mori’s description of Japan as a “divine nation with the Emperor at its center” caused a series of political and public attacks on his personality. At first, he overlooked the political and public backlash against his “divine nation” remarks. His belated response missed an opportune time to mute growing consciousness-raising as well as to restore his image of ineptness played up in the news coverage. The growing criticism affected his initiative in keeping the tripartite ruling coalition united. The leaders of New Komeito and the Conservative Party, Kanzaki Takanori and Ogi Chikage, publicly expressed their concern that the Prime Minister’s choice of language might have an adverse effect on the election, and even on their political alliance. Prior to his formal apology delivered on May 19, 2000, Mori privately apologized to the leaders of those two coalition partners for his “mistaken” performance that caused the political fiasco.[vii] Both of the leaders accepted his explanation along with his pledge to be more careful not to offend anyone holding different political views (Mori sets June 25 poll amid resignation calls 2000).[viii]
Even members of his cabinet voiced misgivings and puzzlement about Mori’s mishandling of the situation. Implicitly Chief Cabinet Secretary Aoki admitted that Mori’s remarks were indiscreet, saying that the Prime Minister should have been more careful about the choice of language in his capacity as the nation’s top political figure.[ix] Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2006 – The Dynamics Of Right-Wing Populist Argumentation In Austria

• by: Martin Reisigl - University of Vienna

Right-wing populist argumentation is best analysed within the framework of a transdisciplinarian, politolinguistic approach that connects concepts of political science, argumentation theory and critical discourse analysis. In the following, this claim will be justified and exemplified with a selective analysis of right-wing populist argumentation in Austria. I will especially focus on the question of how populist argumentation articulated by members of an opposition party differs from populist argumentation verbalised by members of a governing party.[i]

1. The concept of populism
There are many different proposals as to the meaning of the political fighting word “populism”. To mention just a few of them:
The German political scientist Dieter Nohlen (1998, p. 514f.) distinguishes among three different meanings of the word.
(1) First, “populism” denotes – according to Nohlen – a politics that is either judged negatively or positively.
(2) Second, Nohlen speaks of “populism” in terms of a social-political movement that concentrates on masses of people on the one side and on single politicians as leaders on the other side. The concentration on the appeal to masses here often relates to nationalism. If this is the case, we are faced with so-called “national populism”.
(3) Third, Nohlen conceives “populism” as a political strategy of mobilisation and unification.

The positive evaluation of the word is especially advocated by those who promote populism, who see themselves as populists; in Austria for example by Jörg Haider, who has repeatedly and proudly adorned himself with this predicate, as one can see in example 1, 2 and 3.

(1) “In case of doubt we have put a limit on the presumptuousness of the powerful and have strengthened the back of the citizens. Although the ruling class has never forgiven us for this, the people has thanked us for this by supporting us. Our politics has thus thoughtlessly and condescendingly been denounced for being populist. But whatever.
Populism is nothing but a politics that is obliged to the people. Very unlike the politics of the rulers in the ivory tower, who like so much to speak of the ‘people out there’, in order to also express their distance from the people. With respect to the ruling class, one has often the impression that one’s own people is a nuisance to the powerful and often stands in their way. But the citizens are not willing to be permanently abused as applauding and approving scenery. Also the citizens in the former German Democratic Republic have finally scanned every week during big demonstrations: “We are the people!” (Haider in his speech “On the state of the Republic and the situation of the FPÖ”, November 12, 1999; the German original is quoted in Reisigl 2002, p. 154)

(2) “For this we [= the FPÖ, M.R.] have gotten the reproach for populism, and we consider this to be definitely honourable. The people must be heard and taken seriously in a democracy! Issuing of orders coming from the ivory tower of the ruling class, whose contempt for the common people thus becomes visible, have nothing in common with a system of freedom. But especially state-political responsibility should demand to take seriously the worries and anxieties of the people and to keep away in good time dangers and threats by political action.” (Haider 1994, p. 57; the German original is quoted in Reisigl 2005, p. 64)

(3) “Populism is readily used as a swearword for politicians close to the people whose success consists of raising their voice for the citizens and in suiting their mood. Thus, I felt this designation always as an honour. We live in a mediatised democracy. Where much democracy is written on, there is, in reality, mostly very little democracy in it. For this reason the citizens who do not belong to the ruling class and their society need reliable advocates of their interests. I always considered this as my role.” (Haider in Worm 2005, p. 9; the German original is quoted in Reisigl 2005, p. 64) Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2006 – The Ad Verecundiam Fallacy And Appeals To Expert Testimony

• by: Michael J. Shaffer - St. Cloud State University

1. Introduction.
Much recent work in epistemology focuses on the role of testimony in generating warranted beliefs. One of the main views about this topic is known as non-reductivism. This view involves the idea that warrant by appeal to (expert) testimony does not involve inductive reasons that support belief in the reliability of the source in question. Tyler Burge’s particular version of this view (Burge 1993) is based on an a priori principle that all testimony is (at least defeasibly) probative, even to the degree that will sometimes qualify those sorts of beliefs as knowledge. Moreover, on Burge’s view, the kind of warrant that this principle imparts on certain beliefs is externalist in nature and so in forming warranted beliefs on the basis of testimony it is neither necessary that a believer know that the source of that testimony is reliable nor is it necessary that the believer know of and/or understand the (a priori) principle that Burge claims is sufficient often to warrant those beliefs. Finally, such warrant is supposed to be a priori in nature. In this paper it is argued that Burge’s view fails to provide resources sufficient to make an adequate distinction between fallacious ad verecundiam appeals to authority and legitimate appeals to authority and so Burge’s epistemology of testimony is deficient in this respect.

2. Ad verecundiam arguments.
The standard approach to the informal fallacies is to treat them as sorts of deficient arguments, most often as deficient deductive arguments. In line with this idea, ad verecundiam arguments have been most often understood to have the following sort of form (A1):

P1. A states that p is true.
P2. A is not an expert with respect to p.
C1. p is true.

Similarly, legitimate appeals to expert testimony are supposed to have the following form (A2)[i]:

P3. A states that p is true.
P4. A is an expert with respect to p.
C2. p is true.

Ad verecumdiam arguments would then seem to be best defined as invalid deductive inferences that involve appeals to inappropriate authority or appeals to the testimony of non-experts. What is epistemically important about A2-type inferences is that, when valid, they are justification preserving, and so if one is justified in accepting the premises then one is justified in accepting the conclusion. Recognition of this point highlights the error involved in A1-type inferences. Such inferences are bad because the premises do not support the conclusion such that were one justified in accepting the premises, then one would be justified in accepting the conclusion.
Of course there has been considerable debate about the adequacy of A1 as the proper analysis of appeals to inappropriate authority on a number of fronts, the two most important of which are (1) whether such arguments should be understood to be deductive in nature and (2) whether appeals to expert testimony are arguments at all (see Walton 1997, ch. 4). The first of these issues will not be addressed here, as it is largely tangential to the main point of this paper. However the second issue, the issue of whether or not fallacious and legitimate appeals to non-expert testimony are arguments is an important issue in the context of the general epistemic significance of appeals to authority. More specifically, the issue of whether appeals to expert testimony are arguments at all is an important for both the evaluation of the adequacy of certain epistemological approaches to testimony and for the evaluation of the adequacy of A1 and A2 as the standard analyses of the logical and epistemic features of appeals to authority. In any case, we can begin by noting a few things about the nature of quasi-formal treatments of fallacies that will ultimately be relevant to this discussion.
Recall that from the more or less standard perspective of informal logic A1 is supposed to be a formal, or more properly a quasi-formal, analysis of canonical examples of everyday inappropriate appeals to expert testimony that we often see exhibited in advertising and elsewhere in our epistemic exchanges. As such, A1 is supposed to represent an important and generic logical cum epistemic reconstruction of a kind of case of reasoning that fails to adequately justify belief in the conclusion. Again, this is supposed to be because the premises do not entail the conclusion. In this case this it is because P1 and P2 are supposed to fail to be relevant to the truth of C1. This is why ad verecundiam arguments are supposed to be a species of the fallacies of relevance and so are typically reconstructed as a kind of deficient argument.

Given this general understanding, the more or less informal logical analysis of evidential appeals that is part and parcel of quasi-formal logic is simply a kind of epistemological reconstruction aimed at explicating the basic logical structure of garden-variety attempts to justify certain beliefs by appeal to reasons and simple logical rules. At this point, in order to make things a bit more clear and concrete, it will be useful to examine some detailed cases. So let us consider the following two wholly typical sorts of appeals to testimony where the bracketed information describes relevant contextual factors:

(E1) Gary Neville says that Amanita phalloides is deadly. [Gary Neville is a famous Manchester United defender and a member of the English national team].[ii]

(E2) Gary Lincoff says that Amanita phalloides is deadly. [Gary Lincoff is the author of Toxic and Hallucinogenic Mushroom Poisoning: A Handbook For Physicians and Mushroom Hunters. In that book it is explained that Amanita phalloides, the death cap, is deadly because it causes cyclopeptide poisoning which is characterized by the following gruesome pathology:

(i) A long latent period of up to 1 day between the ingestion of the mushrooms prior to the onset of the first symptoms;
(ii) The occurrence of diarrhea, abdominal cramps, nausea and vomiting;
(iii) A 1 day period of remission of the symptoms noted in (ii), followed by
(iv) possible liver and kidney failure, and consequent death] (1977). Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2006 ~ Table Of Contents

Table of Contents ISSA Proceedings 2006 – Work in Progress

Frans H. van Eemeren, J. Anthony Blair, Charles A. Willard & Bart Garssen – Preface
Mark A. Aakhus & Alena L. Vasilyeva – Managing Disagreement In Multiparty Deliberation
Donn P. Abbott – Modern Rhetoric And The End Of Argument
Andrew Aberdein – Virtue Argumentation
Theodora Achourioti  – Fallacies And Context-Dependence: Considering The Strategic Maneuvering Approach
Martin T. Adam – Classes Of Moral Agent And The Art Of Persuasion In The Pali Nikayas Jesús Alcolea-Banegas -Visual Arguments In Film
Jesús Alcolea-Banegas – Visual Arguments In Film
Habibe Aldağ & Ahmet Doğanay – The Effects Of Textual And Graphical-Textual Argumentation Software As Cognitive Tools On Development Of Argumentation skills
Donka Alexandrova – Agonistics Among The Wooden, Democratic And Monarchic Discourses In Contemporary Bulgaria
J. Francisco Álvarez – The Risk Of Arguing. From Persuasion To Dissuasion Rodica Amel  – The Challenging Force Of Dissuasion
Rodica Amel – The Challenging Force Of Dissuasion
Bilal Amjarso  – Addressing Anticipated Countermoves As A Form Of Strategic Manoeuvring
Corina Andone – The Strategic Use Of Antithesis In The Argumentation Stage Of A Critical Discussion
Kevin T. Baaske & Megan A. Baaske – Hurricane Katrina: An Argumentative Analysis Of Race And Gender Issues In The Media Coverage Of A Natural And National Disaster
Susan J. Balter-Reitz & Karen A. Stewart – A Perfect Circle: Visual Argument Field And The Definition Of The Middle Class
Hilde van Belle – When You Don’t Have Anything To Prove Strategic Manoeuvering And Rhetorical Argumentation
Lilian Bermejo Luque – The Justification Of  The Normative Nature Of Argumentation Theory
Barbara A. Biesecker – Memorializing In A Time Of Terror: A Case Study Of Public Argument
Frans A.J. Birrer – Hidden Obstructions In Discussions Involving Conductive Argumentation. Core And Surface In The U.S. Debate On The Use Of Data Mining Techniques In The Fight Against Terrorism
J. Anthony Blair – Investigations And The Critical Discussion Model
George Boger – A Foundational Principle Underlying Philosophy Of Argument
Åsa Brumark – Argumentation At The Swedish Family Dinner Table
Lilit Brutian – Arguments In Child Language
Andrew J. Burgess – Irony As Ethical Argumentation In Kierkegaard
Ann E. Burnette & Wayne L. Kraemer – The Argumentative Framework Of Imperial Righteousness: The War Discourse Of George W. Bush
Damiano Canale & Giovanni Tuzet – The A Contrario Argument: A Scorekeeping Model
Linda Carozza – A Pragma-Dialectical Response To Feminist Concerns
Adelino Cattani – Rules Of Refutation And Strategies Of Dissuasion In Debate
Leah Ceccarelli – Creating Controversy About Science And Technology
Mathieu Chaput & Milton N. Campos – A Pragma-Dialectical Analysis Of Online Political Argumentation
Sara Cigada – Past-Oriented And Future-Oriented Emotions In Argumentation For Europe During The Fifties
Daniel H. Cohen – Understanding, Arguments, And Explanations: Cognitive Transformations And The Limits Of Argumentation
Elisia L. Cohen – Rhetoric, Homeland Security, And Geopolitical Context: A Comparative Argument Analysis After Terror Strikes
Catherine Ann Collins – Seeing Is Believing: The Visual Diary Of Paul Wynne
Peter A. Cramer – Controversy Participation As A Function Of Direct Reported Speech In News
Nathaniel I. Córdova – Between Radical Democracy And Civic Virtue: Political Piety And Public Moral Argument

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