ISSA Proceedings 2006 – Grice’s Analysis Of Utterance-Meaning And Cicero’s Catilinarian Apostrophe

• by: Fred J. Kauffeld - Edgewood College

1. Introduction
This paper brings a critical analysis of Cicero’s “First Catilinarian” to bear on issues at the heart of Paul Grice’s analysis of utterance-meaning. Grice’s analysis affords a powerful model of how communicative norms can be pragmatically generated in human communication. However, the most defensible and, from the point of view of argumentation scholars, most interesting version of Grice’s analysis has been widely criticized as implausibly complex. Through study of Cicero’s use of apostrophe in his “First Catilinarian,” I will argue that the apparent complexity of Grice’s analysis lays bear the essential structure of seriously saying and meaning something and affords students of argumentation insight into the pragmatics of the commitments which speakers and addressees undertake. We will start with Grice and move to Cicero.

2. The complexity of Gricean speaker-intentions
Properly understood the pragmatics underlying Paul Grice’s analysis of utterance-meaning illuminate the strategic roles played by commitments and obligations in human communication, including the genesis and practical value of a speaker’s commitment to the truthfulness of what she says and to such probative obligations as she may incur. Introduced almost fifty years ago, Grice’s analysis affords insight into the essential components of the communicative act of seriously saying and meaning something.[i] Dennis Stampe has identified the practical calculation which speakers typically employ when performing that communicative act. According to Stampe, when a speaker says, e.g., that Uncle Bill has died, she openly and strategically takes responsibility for the veracity of her utterance. Accordingly, she makes herself inescapably vulnerable to criticism and resentment for mendacity should it turn out that she is speaking falsely. The speaker thereby generates a presumption of veracity on behalf of her utterance, which serves to provide her addressee with assurance that she is speaking truthfully. Given the speaker’s openly incurred commitments, her addressee can reason (ceteris paribus) and is intended to reason that the speaker would not be manifestly willing to risk criticism for speaking falsely, were she not in fact speaking truthfully (Kauffeld, 2001; Stampe, 1967; 1975).
This interpretation of the practical design underlying the constituents identified by Grice’s analysis is a model of normative pragmatics.[ii] It exhibits the genesis of a normative obligation in a familiar communicative practice: in saying that p, the speaker openly incurs an obligation to speak truthfully. And it identifies the potential efficacy of that normative obligation, viz., by openly incurring an obligation to speak truthfully, the speaker generates reason to, e. g., believe what she says. Moreover, variants of Stampe’s strategy for generating presumptions can be seen to be at work in the genesis of probative obligations in such speech acts as accusing, proposing, praising, etc. (Kauffeld, 1998; 2002).
However, Stampe’s account relies on a version of Grice’s analysis which many regard as implausibly complex. As Grice defended his analysis in the face of counter-examples, the conditions posited as necessary to seriously saying and meaning something grew in complexity. The version which informs Stampe’s account holds that it will be true that some speaker (S) means something by an utterance (u), if and only if S produces u with the following complex intention.

S’s primary sub-intention (I1): S intends1 that some addressee (A) respond (r) that p (or at least act as if S intends1 that A r that p);
S’s second sub-intention (I2): S intends2 that A recognize S’s primary sub-intention (or at least acts as if S intends2 that A recognize I1);
S’s third sub-intention (I3): S intends3 that A recognize S’s secondary sub-intention (or at least act as if S intends3 that A recognize I2); and
S’s fourth sub-intention (I4): S intends4 that A’s complex recognition of S’s intentions provide A with at least part of A’s reason for ring that p (or at least acts as if S were speaking with this intention) (Grice, 1969, pp. 154-157; Stampe, 1967; 1975; Strawson, 1964, pp. 439-460). Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2006 – Visual Schematization: Advertising And Gender In Mexico

• by: Pedro Reygadas - Universidad Autonoma de San Luis Potosi (UASLP), Mexico & Josefina Guzman - UASLP (ECC-IFAI), UNAM, Mexico

Abstract:
The theoretical topic developed in this paper is the schematization of a visual object as a cultural and semiotic micro-universe, an ideological construction of a class of objects oriented towards a social representation. The analytical topic is gender ideology and its rhetorical functioning in Mexico. The genre studied is advertising of women’s underwear.

We have developed a model based on an adaptation and change of the simplest proposal put forth by the Neuchâtel School (Grize 1974). Consequently, we have studied five basic visual logical operations:
1) “Introduction” (Finnegan 2002).
2) The object’s visual “determination” (Groupe μ 1992).
3) “Enunciation” (Fontanille 1991).
4) “Involvement ” (Fontanille 1991).
5) Visual taxis (Thürlemann 1982, Everaert-Desmedt 2003).

Main words: visual object, visual schematization, visual logical operation, point of view, identification.

In this paper, the premise we take for granted is that we argue by means of images and visual constructions. We consider argumentation models can be adapted to visual arguments (Finnegan, Fontanille, Lisacattani, etc.). Groarke (OSSA 2005) has tried to use the Toulmin model to study visual arguments in its dialectical dimension. Now we are trying to develop the Neûchatel School’s model (Grize 1974) to study visual logic and rhetoric, adopting a more dynamic and dialogical point of view than the original Swiss perspective, and simpler than the current complex Swiss model.
The paper is divided into two main sections: In the first one, we develop the definition of a visual schematization and each of the five basic visual logical operations we propose; in the second section, we apply the model to an advertising campaign launched by Vicky Form, a women’s underwear firm. The selection of the corpus is because of its importance for the emergence of a new and popular gender paradigm in Mexico as reflected by the Advertising Discursive Formation.

1. Schematization of visual objects
The schematization of a visual object is a cultural and semiotic micro-universe, an ideological construction and reconstruction of a class of visual objects oriented towards the social and dialogistic dispute for a point of view, according to certain conditions of production, circulation and interpretation. It indicates how large groups of individuals use the same set and group of arguments (what we may call an “argumentative script”), the same Discursive Formation, the same Ideological Formation, and/or the same historical and cultural horizon of interpretation. Visual objects are schematized in order to persuade, convince or win the other, modifying his state of certainty, belief, emotion, perception or action.

Underlying the dynamic production and interpretation of visual arguments is a logical visual functioning, a sign organization which enables the sense to emerge by means of different possible operations. We will try to define these operations with the help of some semiotic and argumentative theories.

(1) The cultural introduction or how the object is anchored in the cultural field and ground.
(2) The object’s visual determination, the ascription of properties, ingredients and relations to the objects.
(3) The enunciation anchoring the visual to the situation.
(4) The involvement or how the object is considered by the subject of the semiotic production, and/or interpretation in order to make it receivable, plausible and acceptable in accordance with a certain modality.
(5) The visual configuration or visual taxis organizing the visual elements.

Based on the description of the Visual Natural Logic operations, we then evaluate the visual arguments exposed. But please consider that the operations are just analytic, the whole effect is crucial and different, and there are some overlapping operations, specially in the case of (4) and (5), because both are a matter of enunciation.

Anchoring the visual to its cultural field. To be acceptable, every image must first be understood. We do not learn to see as we learn to talk. There is a strictly perceptual and neurophysiologic aspect in a visual identification (Magariños, in Gimate Welsh 2000, p. 1051). But we also recognize and identify objects culturally and, based on that recognition, we interpret images to make the visual correspond to a certain model, a certain idea or a certain affect. In this sense, visual “pre-constructions” (both neural and cultural) determine the arguments, situating us in the realm of certain prejudices, stereotypes, cultural-ideological emotions, identity factors, narratives, values and thoughts that allow us to interpret images in a peculiar way. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2006 – The A Contrario Argument: A Scorekeeping Model

• by: Damiano Canale & Giovanni Tuzet - Bocconi University, Milan

1. Is There a Gap in the Law?
Traditionally, the legal literature describes the A Contrario argument as an ambiguous technique of justification. On the one hand, the A Contrario argument can be used to justify a creative interpretation of a normative sentence, namely the interpretation that produces a norm that is implicit in the sentence, although it does not correspond to its literal formulation. In this sense the A Contrario argument is used to claim that the case is regulated by the law: there is no gap in the law relatively to the case. On the other hand, it can be used to justify a literal interpretation of a normative sentence, so as to exclude from the application of the norm the cases that do not correspond to its formulation. In this sense the A Contrario argument is used to claim that the case is not regulated by the law: there is a gap in the law relatively to the case.

It is possible to give an example of this ambiguity drawn from the Italian Constitution (see Guastini 1998, pp. 265-267)[i]. Article 18 of the Italian Constitution states: ‘Citizens have the right to form associations freely’. Now, can foreigners and stateless persons claim they have the same right? Two different answers can be justified by means of the A Contrario argument. The first is: according to the Constitution, only citizens have the right to form associations freely, so foreigners and stateless persons do not have such a right. The second is: the Constitution does not regulate the position of foreigners and stateless persons in this respect.
In order to clarify the ambiguous character of the A Contrario argument, first in this paper we consider some interesting logical features of it, then we propose an inferential analysis thereof based on the scorekeeping practice as described by Robert Brandom. Our aim is not to justify one use of the argument over another, but to clarify the pragmatic structure of the ways it is used. What is at stake is not only a more rigorous use of the argument, but also a better understanding of what the argument depends on.

2. Strong and Weak Pragmatic Negation
The A Contrario argument is also traditionally called A Silentio argument (cf. Jansen 2003b, p. 44 ff.). The subject of this argumentative technique is what a text does not say, not what a text says. It aims at discovering what the silence of the law means for the law, and for the legal regulation of a case in particular.

In this sense, the A Contrario argument is a general practical inference that we often use in our everyday life. In particular, such an inference is used when silence seems to signify, for what is not said, the contrary of what is said. From the normative sentence ‘No smoking in the public area’ we usually infer that smoking is allowed at home; from the normative sentence ‘Driving is permitted at 18’ we infer that driving is not permitted to those who are not in the majority age; etc. The description of the standard use of this inference seems to be the following (where ‘p’ and ‘q’ stand for propositional contents and ‘P’ is the deontic operator for permission[ii]):

If p then Pq
—————
If r then ~Pq.

It is easy to show that this use is logically incorrect. First, at least a further premise is necessary to draw the conclusion: a premise excluding other cases from the regulation stated by the legal sentence. In particular, if the conditional is intended as a material implication, the inference is an instance of the fallacy called “denying the antecedent” (cf. Henket 1992, Kaptein 1993 and 2005, Jansen 2003a). To avoid the fallacy, one should point out that there are no other legal grounds on which the consequence should follow. Second, the A Contrario argument is a de dicto argument and not a de re argument: it concerns what is (not) said by the text, not what is the case as a matter of fact[iii]. A description of a logically correct use of it could be the following:

(1) The text T states ‘if p then Pq’
(2) ‘If p then Pq’ means that iff p then Pq
—————————————————
(3) If ~p then ~Pq.

Premise (2) is normally the conclusion of other inferences, whose premises are legal norms or practical principles of communication[iv]. In the first case, such premises are contingent: they depend on the legal system the argument is referring to. In the second case, such premises are not contingent: they do not depend on the considered legal system. In both cases, however, the normative text is interpreted as stating that iff p then Pq. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2006 – Displaying Reasonableness: Developmental Changes In Two Argument Practices

• by: Susan L. Kline - The Ohio State University

Introduction
Democratic theorists hold that the ability to engage in deliberation is a political virtue (Bohman, 2000; Elster, 1998; Fishkin & Laslett, 2003; Gutmann & Thompson, 1996; Macedo, 1999). Being able to deliberate over problems and differences to emerge with a consensus about how to live presumably involves a range of rhetorical understandings and skills. However, such rhetorical knowledge and skills have only been given lip service by deliberation theorists. As James Bohman puts it, “For all the talk of deliberation among democratic theorists, few tell us what it actually is” (2000, p. 24).
The purpose of this essay is to begin to address this need in deliberation scholarship by examining two argument practices and capabilities that deliberators use to display their reasonableness in social interactions: (a) the capacity to elaborate a basis for one’s standpoint, and (b) the capacity to align one’s own argument with others’ expressed views. After developing a rationale for these two ways of displaying reasonableness, two studies are reported which test the claim that there are developmentally-related differences in each way of displaying reasonableness.

Displaying Reasonableness in Deliberative Discourse
Dialogical Mechanisms in Deliberation
Bohman (2000) has proposed an account of the “actual processes” of public deliberation, which he defines as dialogue that attempts to overcome a problematic situation by solving problems or resolving conflicts. To be convincing deliberators engage in interaction in ways that secure “uptake” and produce “practical effects” on interaction participants (Bohman, 2000, p. 34). Bohman proposes five specific dialogic mechanisms that he believes promote deliberation in social interaction. A first dialogue mechanism is for speakers to “make explicit what is latent” in their common understandings and joint activities. By providing explicit justifications for ongoing practices and interpretations, speakers provide clarity to their “shared” ideas and principles (2000, pp. 59-60). Speakers also benefit from engaging in back and forth exchanges about their biographical experiences. The outcome of this second dialogue mechanism is not mere listening, but making accessible life histories so they can be incorporated into the ongoing joint framework of understanding and norms.

Another dialogical mechanism concerns the use of “discourses of application,” as speakers make explicit how they are applying a given norm to the concrete and immediate situation. Deliberation benefits from speakers’ providing detailed descriptions of the situation that help make particular norms appear relevant and applicable. Deliberation also benefits from a “discourse of articulation,” as speakers propose concrete ideas that integrate their viewpoints. Articulation creates a framework in which social norms grow more complex over time as speakers modify their beliefs or goals to integrate competing values.
A final dialogue mechanism is the use of perspective-taking and role-taking. Considering alternative perspectives as well as different moral vocabularies and visions can broaden the perspectives that are built in deliberative discourse. Capacities for role-taking and perspective-taking are called upon as individuals with different perspectives take turns being addressed to and answerable to others.
In sum, while there are probably a variety of dialogue mechanisms involved in deliberative interactions, Bohman believes that these five are used to facilitate thorough deliberation.

Argument Practice #1: Expressing an Elaborated Basis for one’s Standpoint
Common to Bohman’s dialogic mechanisms is the need for deliberators to display their reasonableness as they interact with each other. By displaying reasonableness, arguers manage the interpretations of evidence and reasoning that are constructed in deliberative discourse, which can facilitate their mutual understandings (Taylor, 1992). One type of reasonableness appears to involve speakers making transparent their desires, values and reasoning and articulating what norms and principles are considered relevant in the situation. One general argument capability may simply be the ability of arguers to make explicit their reasons and reasoning in such a way that an elaborated perspective of each participant’s standpoint is presented, sufficient for the purposes at hand. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2006 – Justice As Argumentation

• by: José Julio León - Universidad Diego Portales

“Justice is conflict” (Heraclitus)

In this paper I shall attempt to establish that the idea of Justice- as the ideal regulator or criterium which serves to evaluate positive law critically – has intimate ties with the notion of Argumentation.

How is justice related to legal reasoning? At first sight we can see a relationship
(i) in the method of rational argumentation (the thesis of the unity of practical reason);
(ii) in the object of the Theory of Justice (the first principles of social or distributive justice, and their justification), and
(iii) in the (logical) consequences of the model or rule of justice that we adopt (the positivising and development of principles in Law). A theory of Justice – whether a moral or a political theory – is, like reasoning in law, a part of practical discourse.

Since ancient times the distinction has been drawn between law as it is and law as it should be. The discrepancies, in existing literature, have been rooted in the epistemological feasibility of establishing the second of the terms in the proposition. In my opinion, a democratic system – Politics – demands that the question be admissible, and a rational discussion of what is fair be possible.
On the one hand, the idea of what is fair has been linked to the fulfilling of positive duties; that is to say, duties imposed by the law. According to this point of view the fairness of an act is measured by its conformity with the laws in force. The trouble with this point of view – one which has the advantage of allowing a person to know what is fair, by referring to the laws currently in force – is that it does not allow for guidance over the workings of the legislator or for a critical evaluation of legislation. Dogmatics turn into mere commentator´s work, the judge becomes a blind instrument of the law, and the legislator – the will of the majority – reigns supreme as judge of what is fair. This point of view (Kelsen 1982, for example) gives up any possibility of finding a criterium of fairness beyond positive law, since it considers that project to be irrational. However, it is clear today that Positive Law can be, and must be, evaluated from an external point of view. In fact, judges do get away from the written text on some occasions (although judges generally see justice as consisting of the application of positive law), and scholarship makes critical analyses of current standard practice. Justice does not always consist of adapting oneself to norms which govern society at one particular moment.

Kelsen himself was conscious that a relativist theory of knowledge is exposed to two dangers:
(1) a paradoxical solipsism, since if one´s ego is the only reality which exists, it must then be an absolute reality (which entails an egotistical negation of the you); and
(2) a pluralism which is also paradoxical: if we have to admit the existence of many egos, it seems inevitable that there will be as many worlds as there are subjects to be known. To avoid these problems, Kelsen considered as true knowledge the one resulting from the mutual relationship between different subjects to be known. It is supposed that the subjects to be known are equal, and that the processes of rational knowledge are equal, in contrast to emotional reactions. This enables one to presuppose that the subjects to be known, as a result of these processes, are in conformity with each other. Moreover, a restriction of liberty is needed under which all the subjects are equal (Kelsen 1982, pp. 113-125).

It is possible – or, at least, we must act as if it were – to deal rationally with the term justice, and elaborate rigorous conceptual constructions, in order better to understand the set of problems of justice. Justice, then, exists prior to Law and it operates as the legislator´s goal. Only in line with this second point of view can we speak of a Law – Nazi Law, for example – as being unjust. The trouble lies in deciding what is fair and what basic criterium will sustain a theory of justice.
Once the attempts at a substantial definition have been abandoned (justice is not just something available over there, among the universe´s furniture, registered in nature, and attainable by the senses), a rational approximation to the problem of justice is still feasible. What is fair is what derives from a particular procedure of rational debate, where the participants see each other as free and equal. It is not enough that the precept should be a reflection of the will of the majority, because the majority may cease to be such, and its laws may be repealed. What is required is a procedure which ensures the truth of the norm – at least, a truth arrived at by consensus.
The main contribution of theories like those of John Rawls or Jürgen Habermas is the possibility of positively evaluating our institutions. The question they try to answer is this: How to have at one´s disposal a common rational basis for our institutions without betraying their diversity? The answer is the argumentation model underlying a Theory of Justice. In other words, a Theory of Justice must be based on a methodological construction – a theory of argumentation – that recognizes and channels the opposition which is essential to politics.
To this effect, we understand argumentation as an act of complex language which it is only appropriate to practice in a dialogue (whether real or ideal) when a declaration (or something which presumes to be the truth) runs into problems, and we accept that the problem must be solved by discussing it, without resorting to physical force (Atienza 1996, p. 235). Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2006 – Undoing Premises. The Interrelation Of Argumentation And Narration In Criminal Proceedings

• by: Kati Hannken-Illjes - Freie Universität Berlin

1. Introduction
Criminal proceedings produce facts about an instance that is often controversial. These facts are employed in argumentative practices during the entire course of the proceeding and function as premises. In this paper I will describe and analyze a production process of such facts, following Prior’s (2005) request for an ethnography of argumentation that moves to the study of the production of grounds for argument (see p. 133). I suggest that the interaction of narrating and arguing in criminal trials offers a lens through which this process can be viewed beneficially. Hence, this paper will address the questions: What relation do narration and argumentation as persuasive means entertain? How distinct are they and how do they interact? What does their relation say about the production of facts in criminal proceedings?
First, I shall briefly lay out the different perspectives on criminal trials from the views of narrative and argumentation theory, focusing on works from the rhetorical perspective.
Second, I am going to analyze the development of a theme in an actual criminal case with regard to its narrative and argumentative employment. On the basis of this analysis, I shall then discuss if and how narration and argumentation interact. In criminal proceedings stories are established as products by transforming them into premises that are used argumentatively (Hannken-Illjes, submitted). In this paper I will follow a case from the verdict through to the appeal hearing and finally the acquittal. My argument is that premises as products of the fact-finding process can be unbuild by re-transforming them into narratives.

2. Narration and Argumentation in Legal Rhetoric
In classical legal rhetoric, two parts were central for convincing the addressee or the audience: the narratio and the argumentatio. Roughly 2000 years later, narration and argumentation are still considered central to the establishment of facts in criminal proceedings. On the one hand, a series of works presumes that criminal proceedings should be understood as stories which are subject to a narrative rationality. On the other hand, acts of reasoning are considered paradigmatic for the legal procedure.
The basic notion of narration as an essential part of criminal proceedings is probably not controversial. During my fieldwork lawyers would often be skeptical when hearing what my work was about: the development of criminal proceedings, the connection between preparation and performance. However, as soon as I mentioned that one question was how stories developed in the course of the proceeding, there was a lot of nodding going on: Indeed, that could be an interesting topic.
Following Cicero the narratio in legal rhetoric is “the exposition of actual or apparently actual events“ (Knape 2003, p. 100, translation mine). As part of a speech that is designed to convince the other, the narratio does not serve as an objective description of the occurrences but is an essentially partial description that should be designed to fit the party’s overarching strategy. In that sense, Quintilian describes narratio as fundamentally persuasive: “Narration is the depiction of an actual or apparently actual event useful for persuasion” (1995, p. 449, translation mine).

In the course of the narrative turn, contemporary rhetoric, too, has turned its attention to narrating in legal discourse. White (1987), for instance, argues that the activity of defense lawyers, and moreover that law itself, is by nature narrative: “At its heart it [the law] is a way of telling a story about what has happened in the world and claiming a meaning for it by writing an ending to it”. The lawyer is repeatedly saying, or imaging himself or herself saying: ‘Here is ‘what happened’; here is ‘what it means’, and here is ‘why it means what I claim’. The process is at heart a narrative one because there cannot be a legal case without a real story” (p. 305). Not only does White in this paragraph link storytelling to persuasion but to some extent also to argumentation, even though he does not further elaborate this connection. The history of what has happened is interpreted for the audience and this interpretation is backed up by reasons. This understanding of a narrative rationality underlying all legal discourse is reminiscent of Fisher’s concept of the narrative paradigm (1987). Fisher understands narrative rationality as being constituted by coherence and fidelity – that is inner and outer congruence. Read more