ISSA Proceedings 2006 – Mill On Argumentation

• by: Hans Vilhelm Hansen - University of Windsor

Half the wrong conclusions at which mankind arrive are reached by abuse of metaphors. (Lord Palmerston)[ii]

In this essay [i] I want to make an approach to understanding Mill’s view of argumentation, especially as his attitude toward this activity can be extracted from his essay, On Liberty.[iii] I will do this in a round-about way by considering three figures of speech, one of them associated with argumentation in general and the other two specifically attributed to Mill’s thought. These figures of speech have the character of metaphors or perhaps what Stephen Barker has called revelatory definitions. His example is, “architecture is frozen music.” As a definition this statement does not say how ‘architecture’ is used in English, nor does it introduce a new meaning for that term; it rather proposes a new way of looking at architecture. “We must reflect,” writes Barker, “about the extent and validity of this comparison between music and buildings; the [revelatory] definition is a good one if the comparison is illuminating.” (Barker 1965, p. 204) So, in this essay I will consider how apt and illuminating are the metaphors, “argumentation is war”, “the marketplace of ideas” and “society is a debating club”, with regard to Mill’s views on argumentation. Respectively these figures suggest that argumentation is war-like, debate-like, and free trade-like. Having done that I will try to identify what it is that is unique and peculiar about Mill’s view.

1. War
Perhaps the most common metaphor associated with argumentation is that “argument is war.” It may well have its roots in ancient Greek dialectic. One interpretation of Aristotle is that he taught “dialectic as a form of self-defence, organizing techniques and strategies … into the structured discipline of a philosophical martial art” (Hill & Kagan 1995, p. 34). A long time later, in the 1830s, Richard Whately used a military metaphor to explain why it is an advantage to have the presumption on your side when engaging in argumentation: an army defending a fort may well be able to turn back any assault, but should the army go “into the open field to encounter the enemy,” – that is, should the army go on the offensive – rather than wait for the enemy to attack, it might be defeated (Whately 1846, p. 113). Recently Ralph Johnson and Anthony Blair have given their informal logic textbook the title, Logical Self-Defense, intimating that some kind of combat-like attitudes and skills are needed as a safeguard against the “species of illogic” (Johnson and Blair 1983, p. xiv). Most recently the metaphor, “argument is war,” has been the point of departure for Deborah Tannen’s book, The Argument Culture. She speaks of a pervasive tendency – she calls it “agonism” – in our society to engage in argumentative behaviour. “In the argument culture,” she writes, “criticism, attack, or opposition are the predominant if not the only way of responding to people and ideas” (Tannen 2003, p. 7). Daniel Cohen, who worries about the metaphor’s implications for education, has written that,
Despite any ambiguities and subtle nuances of the word “argument,” this metaphor manages to dominate our discourse about arguments and our argumentation practice. We routinely speak, for example, of strong, or even killer, arguments and powerful counterattacks, of defensible positions and winning strategies, and of weak arguments that are easily shot down while strong ones carry a lot of firepower and are right on target (Cohen 2004, p. 36).

Tannen (2003, p. 14) points out that ‘war’ is, however, a key term in many other metaphors as well, such as the war on terror, the war on crime, the war on cancer, the war on poverty; to which I may add my own favourite – the battle of the bulge. Whenever we are involved in a struggle or competition, and the stakes are high, we seem to be ready for a metaphorical war. Cohen’s concern for how easily the language of military conflict can be adapted to that of intellectual engagement is shared by many.

Consider what we might be expected to glean from the argument-is-war metaphor.
1. There are opposing sides in the argumentation.
2. The purpose of engaging in defensive argumentation is to resist the imposition of another’s view.
3. The purpose of engaging in offensive argumentation is to impose your view on another.
4. There are few, if any, rules or standards of argumentation to be followed (trickery may be employed; there is no requirement to respect opponents).
5. Winning is more important than getting at the truth.

These may not be the only insights that purveyors of the metaphor wish to impress upon us. I have ordered the insights 1 to 5 in what seems to me to be an ascending scale of war-like behaviour: if only 1 – 3 are satisfied then there is only slight support for the metaphor but should either of 4 or 5 be satisfied as well, then it may be said that argument is war is a telling metaphor. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2006 – A Pragma-Dialectical Response To Feminist Concerns

• by: Linda Carozza - York University, Toronto Ontario

1. Introduction
The ideas that motivate this work come from an article written in Informal Logic, Deborah Orr’s “Just the facts ma’am: informal logic, gender and pedagogy” (1989). In this article Orr states that she followed the Informal Logic movement throughout the 1980s, and at first she excitedly implemented the tools of Informal Logic in her classroom teaching. However, Orr comes to find that “the toolbox is less than fully equipped” and so she makes “some suggestions as to where informal logic might look to enlarge its stock of implements” (p. 1). While Orr’s main focus comes from a pedagogical and not a field concern per se, Orr’s contribution to Informal Logic, that its toolbox is in need of feminist tools, is nonetheless an important consideration for the field. In this paper I maintain that her suggestion, that Informal Logicians begin to incorporate feminist concerns within their theories and models of argumentation, is still largely unexplored. I begin by summarizing Orr’s contribution to Informal Logic. I articulate her criticism of Informal Logic further with feminist epistemology and discuss to what extent Informal Logic considers such concerns. Then I turn to Pragma-Dialectics for a better response to addressing such feminist epistemological concerns in argumentation. My investigation shows that the Pragma-Dialectical model provides an adequate foundation for addressing feminist concerns, but it does not provide a very feminist-friendly model of argumentation as it stands.

2. Deborah Orr’s “Just the facts ma’am: informal logic, gender and pedagogy”
Orr does not hold any one system of reasoning, be it Formal Logic, Informal Logic, Pragma-Dialectics, etc., to be faulty or negligent. Rather, it is just a single area of reasoning equipped with a series of the same tool type. Orr thus likens the field of Informal Logic to a toolbox. That is, a good toolbox is equipped with sets of screwdrivers, nails, wrenches, and so on, and each of these series of tools is a part of a single tool type. Having a toolbox with a dozen different screwdrivers does not give a workperson a wide range of tools to access when building her project, since she has only a series of that one tool. A good toolbox has a variety of tools that can be accessed. Thus, if a workperson is building a bookshelf, and she needs to nail the shelf onto the frame, it does not matter how many types of screwdrivers are available. A hammer is needed to complete the project. Orr’s point is that the particular criteria Informal Logic relies on in its approach to argumentation is much like the situation of a toolbox with only a set of screwdrivers. Informal Logic provides a single tool type with a possibility of different rules to work with, just as the workperson has different types of screwdrivers to access. Orr, however, argues that a possibility of multiple tools of reasoning should exist for Informal Logic, so that the Informal Logician has a fuller toolbox (p. 1).
To concretize this point, consider the two argumentative contexts and rationales that follow. First, imagine you are vying for a particular position in a job interview, what you likely need to do is develop reasoning tactics that strongly support you getting the position. It does not matter how many Formal Logic formulas you have at your disposal (modus ponens, modus tollens, etc.), since even if you plug in the appropriate criteria, using them will probably not help you get the position. One of several different strategies might be to develop descriptive analogies between a previous job and the current position being interviewed instead. This could help develop a strong argument in your favour within the interview. This example, it seems to me, is not a contentious example. In fact, Informal Logic recognizes and is a response to the limited nature of Formal Logic (see Johnson & Blair, 2006, p. xiii; Groarke & Tindale, 2004, p. xv; Govier, 2001, p. ix). But, just as Formal Logic is not really helpful in the context of argumentation in job interviews, Informal Logic has its limitations as well. Consider another example: you are in the midst of a custody battle with your former partner. Both of you need to provide solid arguments for sole custody rights. Important to the field of Informal Logic is reasoning devoid of fallacies. And, let’s say you make solid arguments that are not fallacious, ones that meet the requirements for sufficiency. This might not amount to much in your means to resolving, or winning, the custody battle. An alternative helpful strategy could be to focus on finding common ground with the other party instead (see Gilbert, 1997, pp. 111-112), whether or not fallacies are committed. Read more

ISSA Proceeding 2006 – Hidden Obstructions In Discussions Involving Conductive Argumentation. Core And Surface In The U.S. Debate On The Use Of Data Mining Techniques In The Fight Against Terrorism

• by: Frans A.J. Birrer - LIACS (Leiden Institute of Advanced Computer Science), Leiden University

Abstract
This article examines some obstructions to adequate discussion that reside not so much at the level of dialectic procedure, but rather at the level of content and motivation. Such obstructions may arise particularly easy when a discussion involves conductive argumentation, and both discussants have reasons for partially or totally suppressing the discussion of certain aspects, in spite of their relevance to the issue at stake. Such jointly agreed suppression does not formally violate the pragma-dialectical rules, since these rules focus on fairness. As an illustration, an analysis is presented of a US debate on the use of data mining against terrorism. Here two potential obstacles of the nature described above can be observed:
(i) There is an ambiguity in the way the issue of privacy tends to be conceptualised.
(ii) Even though the trustworthiness of government agencies is at the core of the issue, there is sometimes a certain reluctance to explicitly address this aspect.

1. Discussion failures and obstructions
Discussions are not always as good or as productive as they could be. The reasons for this can reside at various levels:
(i) Certain reasonable principles or standards for discussions are violated by the discussants (failure of procedure).
(ii) Certain arguments that are highly relevant to the issue under discussion are marginalised in the actual debate, or even totally ignored or suppressed (failure of content).
(iii) The discussants are driven by motivations that make them less than willing to address certain ‘faults’ in the discussion (failure of attitude).

An analysis restricted to level (i) addresses no more than what is put forward by the discussants themselves – augmented perhaps with some obvious and uncontroversial background assumptions not explicitly stated. The only ‘faults’ identified then will be violations of formal or logical rules concerning the line of reasoning or concerning the procedure of the discussion. It sometimes happens, however, that certain relevant arguments or issues remain unduly marginal in the discussion, are insufficiently addressed or, worse, not stated in any recognizable form at all. This can be due to negligence. It may also be the case that all participants in the discussion have motives that make them forsake these particular aspects. As an example of the latter, take environmental issues. As soon as concrete measures for improving the environment are to be discussed, most actors have a strong incentive to duck the issue: consumers are reluctant to give up their pleasures, industry fears costly changes that could mean a set-back in the international competition, politicians refrain from advocating unpopular measures, and so on (Birrer, 2004; 2001b).
When the discussants themselves fail to sufficiently discuss (or even fail to discuss at all) certain arguments or issues that are highly relevant to the subject of discussion, such failure will be hard to address when the analysis is restricted to level (i), since such an analysis is forced to remain relatively blind to issues of content – and even more so, of course, when that content is entirely missing in the actual discussion. If it is possible at all to address such a failure at level (i), this is likely to require a long chain of interrogating questions of clarification addressed by the analyst to the discussants, since the analyst can only point to the violation of rules rather than directly enter into the content matter itself. When the discussants are consciously or unconsciously motivated to avoid the issue, the situation is still worse, since the indirectness of the analyst’s approach makes it easy to evade by the discussants.
It looks like in such cases attempts to improve the discussion should put the discussion in a broader perspective, including levels (ii) and (iii). Even if one’s single aim would be to understand what happens in the discussion, it could still be held that such an understanding is incomplete if it does not include an understanding of why the discussion proceeds in the way it does rather than in another, and that therefore it cannot ignore the aspects under (ii) and (iii).

In the next sections, I will illustrate obstructions at level (ii) and (iii) in more detail for a recent discussion in the US on the use of certain computer techniques in the fight against terrorism. More in particular, I will analyse the arguments that can be found in one specific report on this subject. The issues and arguments that I want to address are all in the report, including what I will identify as the “core issue”, so in this case I need not bring in any new arguments or issues that are not already mentioned by the discussants themselves. The potential obstacles to productive debate, however, can be clearly recognised in the arguments in the report – as well as elsewhere in the debate on this issue. The case can thus serve as an illustration of the importance of the broader perspective for understanding the discussion process and for a realistic view on the opportunities for improvement. In the final section, I will return to a few more general questions regarding analysis at level (ii) and (iii). Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2006 – Some Remarks On Interrogativity And Argumentation

• by: Giovanni Gobber - Università Cattolica

1. Introduction
This paper presents some aspects of a theory in which argumentation – as a ‘verbal, social and rational activity’ (van Eemeren 2001: 11) – plays a role in the explanation of the question phenomenon. In fact in linguistic research two levels are usually taken into account – the level of propositional content and that of the illocution or pragmatic function combined with the speaker’s attitudes (Gobber 1999). In this contribution we argue that questions can have a further intrinsic (natural, prototypical) component as a pragma‑dialectical move. This move is intended as a (part of a) dialogue that appears at some stage of a critical discussion (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004: 57-68). This level should be taken into account to explain the functioning of questions in verbal communication.
In fact, the classical rhetoric tradition is interested mainly in non-prototypical uses of interrogative structures such as the so-called rhetorical questions (interrogations, see Quintilianus, Institutio Oratoria, IX, 2, 7-16). This tradition considers nearly always monological texts whose goal is to draw the hearer’s attention, to gain his consent, to dissuade or to persuade him according to the speaker’s intention (‘dicendo tenere hominum mentis, adlicere voluntates, impellere quo velit, unde autem velit deducere’, Cicero, De oratore, I, 30).
This is not the natural, prototypical functioning of interrogatives as questions, i.e. as dialogical moves aiming at a verbal reply. As Edmondson 1981:196 puts it, ‘interrogativisation is a grammatical reflection of the interactional purpose of the language system’. Their role as requests for a verbal reply is relevant for the purposes of a dialogue in which the interlocutors’ task is to reach an agreement on a standpoint in a reasonable way. From this dialogical perspective interrogative structures can be observed both as “real” questions and as moves of another, i.e. non prototypical function.

2. Interrogatives and questions
Let us consider first the difference between interrogatives and questions. First we take into account the main pragmatic functions of the general type “questions”. Other uses of interrogatives which are relevant for critical discussion are described in a sketchy way.
Questions should be kept qualitatively distinct from interrogative structures. The latter are items and patterns of a given language, whereas the former are text sequences (Rigotti 1993), i.e. “moves” in a dialogue or in a monologue.
There is a “many-many relation” (Gatti 1992) between interrogative structures and questions. Of course, the most typical use of interrogatives is that of making questions.

As text sequences, questions have a propositional content and a pragmatic function (Stati 1990). Two sorts of propositional content are generally considered. Their structure results from the unknown element they exhibit. According to the sort of propositional content, two types of semantic structures are then distinguished. If the content calls for verification, a propositional question is given (i.e. “Yes-No Question” or “alternative Question”) and the propositional content has the cognitive status of an assumption (Alexius Meinong called it Annahme: see Meinong 1910). If the content calls for interpretation of (a) variable(s), an x-question (wh-question) is given and the propositional content has the semantic status of an open proposition. It has been observed that
[…] we can assume that the listener has understood the question if he knows what kind of information must be given as an answer – though, perhaps, he has no such information at hand. In other words, the listener understands the question if he can characterize correctly the semantical scheme of the answer (Padučeva 1986: 374).

X-questions have a premise (a propositional content condition), a “datum” (the propositional content) and an “obiectum quaestionis” (the range of the variable in the content) (Ajdukiewicz 1926/27).

In a dialogue questions are posed with a specific illocution. A bundle of illocutions is also possible (‘amalgame pragmatique’, Stati 1990). Specific illocutions can be traced back to two generic ones: most questions require an answer, and some of them can get the answer from the same questioner (e.g. the so-called expository questions). But there are also questions which do not wait for a verbal reply, although an answer is still possible and accepted. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2006 – A Normative Reconstruction Of Arguments From Reasonableness In The Justification Of Judicial Decisions

• by: Eveline T. Feteris - University of Amsterdam

1. Introduction
In the law arguments from reasonableness play an important role. Judges often refer to reasonableness in ‘hard cases’ where there is a tension between the requirement of formal justice to treat like cases alike and the requirement of equity (or substantial justice) to do justice in accordance with the particularities of the concrete case. In such situations judges often use an argument from reasonableness to justify that an exception should be made to a general rule for the concrete case. However, the question arises how judges must account for the way in which they use their discretionary space in a situation in which they depart from the literal meaning of a general rule and establish the meaning of the rule for the concrete case on the basis of considerations of reasonableness and fairness. The central question I will answer in this paper is what an adequate justification based on an argument from reasonableness exactly amounts to from the perspective of the application of law in a rational legal discussion.
Although arguments from reasonableness are considered to be an important form of argumentation to defend a judicial decision in a hard case, in the legal literature little attention has been paid to the standards for argumentation underlying the justification of such a decision. Insight into such standards is important from the perspective of the rationality of the application of law because only on the basis of such standards it can be established whether the judge has used his discretionary power in an acceptable way. In order to establish the standards for an adequate use of arguments from reasonableness, I will develop an argumentation model that can be used for the analysis and evaluation of arguments from reasonableness.
In this paper I will proceed as follows. First in (2) I will discuss the legal background of the use of arguments from reasonableness and fairness and I will establish under what conditions they form an acceptable justification of a judicial decision. Then, in (3) I will develop an argumentation model for the analysis and evaluation of legal arguments from reasonableness to be able to make the underlying choices and assumptions explicit. In (4) I will apply this argumentation model to an example from Dutch law in which this form of argumentation is used and establish in what respects it can be considered an acceptable contribution to a rational legal discussion.

2. The role of arguments from reasonableness in a legal discussion
Judges use an argument from reasonableness to justify that in a concrete situation an exception should be made to a legal rule to avoid an unacceptable result. The need for an argument from reasonableness for this purpose can already be found in the classical literature with Aristotle who claims that an argument from ‘equity’ can be used as an argument to make an exception to application of a universal legal rule in a concrete case if this would yield un unacceptable result. A judge is allowed to correct the law on the basis of ‘equity’ if it would be unjust because of its generality. According to Aristotle, in such cases equity amounts to justice to correct the injustice that would be caused by strict application of a universal rule in a concrete case.[i]
A similar view is defended by Perelman (1979) who argues that the requirement of reasonableness is a requirement for the judge to apply the law in a just way, that is the requirement to treat like cases alike und unlike cases differently. This may result in an obligation for the judge not to apply a legal rule if application would be incompatible with the rational goal of the rule. A rational legislator can never have intended that a rule would be applied that would lead to a result that would conflict with the goal of the rule. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2006 – Investigations And The Critical Discussion Model

• by: J. Anthony Blair - University of Windsor

1. Introduction: The alleged scope of the Critical Discussion model
This paper is an investigation of the scope of the Pragma-Dialectical theory of argumentation, and in particular of its ingredient concept of a Critical Discussion (see van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984, 1992, 2004). The Pragma-Dialectical theory is explicitly designed to apply to argumentation aimed at the rational resolution of a difference of opinion, what Walton and Krabbe (1995) call “persuasion dialogues.” On the face of it, there are other uses of argument besides attempting to resolve disagreements, for example, to inquire about what is true. But the proponents of Pragma-Dialectics seem either to regard that theory has having universal application or to regard all uses of argument as reducible to disagreement-resolution argumentation. The evidence for this claim is found in their application of a central component of their theory, the model of a Critical Discussion.

A “Critical Discussion,” as that term is defined in the Pragma-Dialectical theory, is a technical concept – a term of art (hence here capitalized, as is ‘Pragma-Dialectics’ and its cognates, for the same reason). The Pragma-Dialectical Critical Discussion is an ideal model of a discussion between two parties with a difference of opinion who agree to use arguments and follow an instrumentally rational procedure in doing so to try to resolve their difference. The model aims to specify the conditions that an actual argumentative exchange would satisfy if the parties were orderly and reasonable. They would order their discussion in the way best designed to resolve their disagreement, and they would carry out their discussion according to norms that make it rational for them to agree to (or to decline to) make concessions and to accept (or to reject) alleged implications. In the end, one party would convince the other to withdraw the commitment or the doubt that started the discussion, or the parties would remain in disagreement.
The model of a Critical Discussion is introduced as applicable to argumentation exchanges aimed at resolving a difference of opinion, but it is taken to apply generally, as the following passage in van Eemeren and Grootendorst’s latest statement of their theory (2004) makes clear:

The aim of a pragma-dialectical analysis is to reconstruct the process of resolving a difference of opinion occurring in an argumentative discourse or text. This means that argumentative reality is systematically analyzed from the perspective of a critical discussion…. What exactly does such an analytic reconstruction of an argumentative discourse or text entail?… In the reconstruction, the speech acts performed in the discourse or text are, where this is possible with the help of the ideal model of a critical discussion, analyzed as argumentative moves that are aimed at bringing about a resolution of a difference of opinion. (p. 95)
Notice the glissement that occurs in this text – not from one dialogue type to another (see Walton and Krabbe 1995, p.102) – but from one claim to another. The first sentence notes that a pragma-dialectical analysis focuses on the process of argumentation aimed at resolving a difference of opinion. But the very next sentence mentions subjecting “argumentative reality” – without qualification now – to analysis from the perspective of the Pragma-Dialectical model of a “critical discussion.” So argumentation aimed at resolving a difference of opinion is quickly identified with argumentative reality in general. An argumentative discourse or text, the next paragraph declares, is to be reconstructed, using the ideal model of a critical discussion. And what the authors are referring to is a Critical Discussion – the ideal construct they designed expressly to model argumentation aimed at rationally resolving a difference of opinion. So any argumentation text or discourse is to be modeled as if it were argumentation aimed at bringing about a resolution of a difference of opinion.
The text quoted above makes clear the commitment of the proponents of the Pragma-Dialectical theory. It has two related aspects. One is to assimilate all argumentation to opinion-difference resolution argumentation. The other is to treat the ideal model developed as an element of that theory as applicable to any argumentation whatever. From a perspective internal to the theory, these are two sides of the same commitment, but they are two distinct claims, since it is in principle possible for either to be false while the other is true. It is in principle possible that not all argumentation functions to resolve a difference of opinion yet the critical discussion model can be usefully applied generally. And it is in principle possible that all argumentation does boil down to attempts to resolve differences of opinion rationally yet the critical discussion model is flawed and does not apply as neatly as its proponents believe it does. Read more