ISSA Proceedings 2014 ~ A Means-End Classification Of Argumentation Schemes

• by: Fabrizio Macagno - ArgLab, Instituto de Filosofia da Nova, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Lisboa

Abstract: One of the crucial problems of argumentation schemes as illustrated in (Walton, Reed & Macagno, 2008) is their practical use for the purpose of analyzing texts and producing arguments. For this purpose, argumentation schemes will be analyzed as prototypical combinations between two distinct levels of abstraction, i.e. semantic (or material) relations and types of reasoning. These two levels can justify an end-means criterion of classification, representing the intended purpose of an argument and the means to achieve it. This criterion is strictly bound to the pragmatic purpose of an argumentative move and the ontological (semantic) structure of the conclusion and the premises.
Keywords: abstraction, argument, argumentation schemes, classification, semantic relations, types of reasoning

1. Introduction
Argumentation schemes have been developed in argumentation theory as stereotypical patterns of inference, abstract structures representing the material (semantic) relation and logical relation between the premises and a conclusion in an argument. They can be regarded as the modern interpretation and reconsideration of the ancient maxims of inference (Walton, Reed & Macagno, 2008; Walton & Macagno, 2006). Many authors in the last fifty years have proposed different sets and classifications of schemes (see Hastings, 1963; Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969; Kienpointner, 1992a, 1992b; Walton, 1996; Grennan, 1997; Walton, Reed & Macagno, 2008; van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004). These approaches raise crucial problems concerning the criteria used for distinguishing and classifying the schemes, and defining the structure of an argumentation scheme. These apparently purely philosophical questions are becoming increasingly important for practical purposes, in particular the application of the schemes to the field of education (Macagno & Konstantinidou, 2013; Nussbaum, 2011; Duschl, 2008; Kim, Robert Anthony & Blades, 2012; Rapanta, Garcia-Mila, & Gilabert, 2013) and Artificial Intelligence (Mochales & Moens, 2009; 2011).

The purpose of this paper is to address the problem of classifying the schemes starting from the analysis of their nature and structure. The different components of the natural patterns of arguments will be distinguished, and in particular the quasi-logical and the semantic levels. These distinctions will be used to show the shortcomings of the existing classifications, and to propose a new model based on the pragmatic purpose of an argument, which is regarded as a move (speech act) in a dialogue.

1. Types of reasoning and semantic-ontological connections
The relationship between the premises and the conclusion of an argument can be reconstructed based on generic principles. What guarantees the inferential passage is a specific major premise that includes the predicates occurring in the minor premise and the conclusion. In order to reconstruct and motivate the inferential structure, we need to distinguish the specific principle of inference from two other different levels: 1) the general rules of inference, i.e. the generic, semantic-ontological connections between the predicates of the argument that establish the acceptability of an argument; and 2) the logical rules governing the formal disposition of the terms or propositions in an argument, i.e. the rules of commitment establishing the acceptance of an argument. These levels of abstraction will be referred to as “specific topoi,” “generic topoi,” and “rules of commitment” (or logical rules). Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2014 ~ The Evaluative And Unifying Function Of Emotions Emerging In Argumentation: Interactional And Inferential Analysis In Highly Specialized Medical Consultations Concerning The Disclosure Of A Bad News

• by: Margherita Luciani, Institute of Argumentation, Linguistics and Semiotics, University of Lugano, Switzerland

Abstract: This paper investigates the functions of emotions in decision-making processes following the disclosure of a bad news in medical argumentation, by taking into account suggestions from psychology and argumentation. I embrace the hypothesis that emotions, due to their capability of unifying the objects of our thought, strongly contribute to reasonable decisions. I claim that a proof that hints to this can be found at the interactional as well as at the inferential level of analysis.
Keywords: Argumentum Model of Topics, bad news, decision-making processes, doctor-patient interaction, emotions, inferential structure, interactional analysis

1. Introduction
Emotions plays a crucial role in doctor-patient interactions, especially in case of bad news’ disclosure; in such highly emotive frameworks a competent usage of emotions through communication strategies can really make the difference in improving patients’ acceptability of heavy treatments and of diseases’ consequences. This competence is often strongly influenced by doctors’ ability to handle in an adequate way their own emotions as well as by the ability to take into account patients’ possible emotive reactions. However, it is not often the case that doctors are able to reach a fruitful communication and an adequate handling of emotions, and this leads to misunderstandings and produces undesired emotive and cognitive reactions in patients. Two are the main approaches to doctor-patient interaction which can be found in literature, namely the patient-centred approach and the disease-centred approach (Bensing, 2000; Mead & Bower, 2000).

This paper aims to contribute to the study of doctor-patient interactions’ dynamics by connecting existing studies in health communication and psychology with argumentation studies, in order to demonstrate the crucial role of argumentatively played out emotions. For what concerns the theoretical and methodological framework, we follow the Pragma-Dialectical approach (Eemeren van, 2004) for the interactional analysis and the Argumentum Model of Topics (henceforth AMT) for the analysis of the inferential structures of arguments (Rigotti, 2009; Rigotti & Greco Morasso, 2010).
In medical argumentation studies there is a gap in the analysis of doctors’ argumentatively played out emotions, which concerns both the interactional as well as the inferential level of analysis. The reasons why doctors’ emotions emerging in argumentation during this type of communicative practice have a strong influence in patients’ acceptability of treatments and of disease consequences remain still unclear.

In this study I propose to combine a fine-grained argumentative and inferential analysis of doctors’ experienced emotions in doctor-patient interactions concerning the disclosure of a bad news. Three are the main aims of this paper. Firstly, I set out to explore the role of doctors’ argumentatively played out emotions in the management of the painful communication and of the subsequent patients’ decision-making processes. Secondly, I will investigate the importance for doctors to take into consideration the possible patients’ emotions and the importance of arguing in favor of them, and lastly I will prove that emotions have an evaluative and unifying function which can be retrieved in the inferential structure of arguments. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2014 ~ Practical Reasoning And Multi-Party Deliberation: The Best, The Good Enough And The Necessary

• by: Marcin Lewinski, ArgLab, Institute of Philosophy, FCSH, Universidade Nova de Lisboa,Portugal

Abstract: In this paper, I elaborate the complex scheme of practical reasoning by proposing its context-independent and context-dependent elements. Further, I focus on its means-goal premise (“We should do X, because X leads to Y, and Y is desirable”). I argue that the practical inference can be licenced in three basic ways: when “X leads to” signifies a necessary means, the best means or the means that is good enough.
Keywords: argumentation schemes, inference licence, optimising, practical reasoning, satisficing

We deliberate not about ends but about what contributes to ends. […] Having set the end [deliberators] consider how and by what means it is to be attained; and if it seems to be produced by several means they consider by which it is most easily and best produced. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1112b12-15)

One’s choice is rational only if one did not recognize clearly better reasons for choosing any of one’s forgone alternatives. (Schmidtz, 1995, p. 38)

1. Introduction
Practical reasoning (PR) is reasoning about what (to intent) to do, as opposed to theoretical reasoning, reasoning about what (to believe) is the case. When expressed in language, PR takes the form of practical argumentation (PA), which has been analysed as a separate argument scheme with its own set of premises, inference rules and critical questions (e.g. Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012; Feteris, 2002; Ihnen Jory, 2012; Walton, 2006; 2007).[i]

In this paper, I propose a detailed scheme of complex PA which, while building on previous proposals (esp. Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012), clearly lays out the context-independent and context-dependent elements of PA. I elaborate the scheme by focusing in particular on its causal or means-goal premise (“Let’s do X, because X leads to Y, and Y is desirable”). This premise is crucial, as it points to an inference licencing our step from the premises to the conclusion that X is the reasoned action to be taken. I will argue that in principle, when acting rationally, we are licensed to do three things: the best thing, the thing good enough or the necessary thing. Which of the three applies (and whether it obtains) is determined contextually in deliberation with others who might suggest alternative options. In this way, we end up with a multi-party deliberation where different alternative options are advocated by different parties to argumentation.

2. Practical reasoning as practical argumentation
Aristotle is credited with providing one of the first methodical accounts of PR and deliberation. It has been argued that he was deliberately vague on the distinction between private (internal) and public (collective) deliberation as chief activities of practical reason, in order to expose “a deep analogy between his conceptions of the two domains” (Dascal, 2005, p. 52). Indeed, the limits of private PR can be overcome or reduced by engaging others: “We call in others to aid us in deliberation on important questions, distrusting ourselves as not being equal to deciding” (Nicomachean Ethics, 1112b11).

Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca take up these arguments and claim not only simple similarity between public and private deliberation but rather primacy of the former over the latter:
[…] inward deliberation […] appears to be constructed on the model of deliberation with others. Hence, we must expect to find carried over to this inner deliberation most of the problems associated with the conditions necessary for discussion with others. […] Accordingly, from our point of view, it is by analyzing argumentation addressed to others that we can best understand self-deliberation, and not vice versa. (1969, pp. 14, 41) Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2014 ~ Analyzing Political Discourse In Georgia: A Critical Discourse-Analytical Perspective On Political Imageries And Means-Goal Arguments

• by: Mariam Keburia - Faculty of Humanities Ivane Javakhishvili, Tbilisi State University, Georgia

Abstract: Georgia has undergone remarkable socio-economic changes and political unrest on its difficult road to statehood. Re-establishing itself from the collapsed Soviet Union as an independent, sovereign state has been a painful process. This paper looks at number of speeches delivered by the political leader of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili (presidential term: 2004-2013) in order to analyze argumentative public communication, focusing on how practical arguments in favour of the advocated policies are developed in the selected speeches.
Keywords: critical discourse analysis, Georgia, practical argumentation

1. Introduction
This article analyzes Georgian political discourse, namely annual report speeches of the Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili (presidential term 2004-2013) delivered at the Parliament of Georgia. It draws particular attention to practical arguments and rhetorical devices used in the selected political texts. Although President Saakashvili is acknowledged as a charismatic and persuasive public speaker, I argue that his speeches reveal lack of argumentative communication and fail to suggest a clear political vision while strongly advocating policies.

Over the past two decades, republic of Georgia has undergone remarkable socio-economic and political changes. Re-establishing itself from the collapsed Soviet Union as an independent state has been a painful and rather complex process. The recent history of the country has included the overthrow of communism, revolutionary change of the government and the first constitutional transfer of power through elections (leading to the so called ‘cohabitation’). Georgia’s shift from a former soviet republic into an independent state has been analysed within various disciplines. Historical timeline and accompanying processes have been observed in terms of social or political studies, identity and ideology related debate and other fields of research. In recent times, there has been growing interest in applying discourse analysis to study politics and power. According to the Constitution of Georgia, “The president is authorised to address people and the Parliament, and once a year submits a report to parliament on the most important issues concerning the state”. The present paper looks into 7 institutional the speeches delivered by the president of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili to the supreme legislative body of the country. I am primarily interested in identifying practical arguments in the selected political texts and analyzing relevant schemes pursuant to Critical Discourse Analysis. This paper addresses the following questions: What particular argument schemes is the arguer using to justify particular lines of action (policies)? How can these arguments be evaluated from a dialectical and rhetorical perspectives?

The article will first discuss analytical framework of the research, that is of Critical Discourse Analysis (Fairclough 2010) and particularly the more recent version of CDA that gives primacy to practical argumentation and deliberation in political discourse (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012). Critical Discourse Analysis is especially relevant due to the focus it has on texts and its encouragement to have a dialogue between disciplines while conducting analysis. Second, I continue with the analysis of 7 institutional speeches with specific attention to practical arguments in favour of the advocated policies – how practical argumentation scheme is used to legitimize foreign policy and implemented and/or planned reforms. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2014 ~ The Persuasive Powers Of Text, Voice, And Film – A Lecture Hall Experiment With A Famous Speech

• by: Henrik Juel, Communication Studies, Roskilde University, Denmark

Abstract: This paper presents and discusses a lecture hall experiment concerning the rhetorical impact of different media. The experiment brings out notable differences in the effects of persuasion and argument embedded in the same set of words – in this case an extract from a historic speech – when presented respectively in writing, as speech, and on film.

Keywords: argument, experiment, film, mountaintop, persuasiveness, rhetoric, soundtrack, text, visual, voice.

1. Introduction
For a number of semesters I have conducted a lecture hall experiment with international university students about persuasion and argument and how they appear to differ in their impact, dependent on whether they are presented in writing, as speech or on film.

It is hardly surprising that the medium used to present a text can influence how its message is perceived by an audience, but the eye-opening trick of this experiment is that I present my students with exactly the same “text” or “content” in each case, first in writing, then as a voice recording, and finally on film. The students’ conceptions and evaluations of each type of presentation of the “text” alter dramatically as it changes from reading mode to listening mode and then to film-viewing mode. Naturally film-viewing here includes the sound track with its associated background sounds and voices heard among the audience.

2. Persuasive features of the text
The piece of text that I use is taken from a fairly well known speech, but I have deliberately chosen a part of it that does not give the orator, the context or the situation away too obviously. I want the students to focus first on the text as written material, tell me what it says, how it is structured and styled, and how it affects them. I also ask them not to let it be known, at this point, if they have recognized the text or are able to make an intelligent guess either as to its origin or who wrote it. I then ask them whether they have found any sound arguments in the text and whether, and in what manner, they find it persuasive. The text runs as shown in figure 1:

Like anybody, I would like to live a long life. Longevity has its place. But I’m not concerned about that now. I just want to do God’s will. And He’s allowed me to go up to the mountain. And I’ve looked over. And I’ve seen the Promised Land. I may not get there with you. But I want you to know tonight, that we, as a people, will get to the promised land!
And so I’m happy, tonight.
I’m not worried about anything.
I’m not fearing any man!
Mine eyes have seen the glory of the coming of the Lord!!
(Figure 1: This is the text image that I project on the screen in the lecture hall[i])

At first the students often hesitate, probably because they suspect that I am setting some sort of trap or test, and also because they do not find the text particularly clear or easy to categorize. I often have to help a little with getting them started on what could be called a common pragmatic analysis, or an analysis of the content and form of the text. For example, I may ask them what sort of text it seems to be: is it like a love letter? Is it perhaps more like a note from one’s bank about some problem with an account? Or is it perhaps an announcement from their university about upcoming exams? Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2014 – Logical Validity, Bounded Rationality, And Pragma-Dialectics: Outline Of A Game-Theoretic Naturalization Of Classically-Valid Argumentation

• by: Justine Jacot, Emmanuel Genot & Frank Zenker - Department of Philosophy, University of Lund, Sweden

Abstract: This paper outlines how classical propositional logic, particularly the notion of ‘obtaining a classically-valid logical proof’, can be understood as the outcome of an argumentation-game. We adopt two game-rules from dialogical logic under which obtaining such as proof is a matter of due course, as both rules together guarantee a winning-strategy for one player when logical consequence holds. We then show how these rules can arise from players’ preferences, rather than be imposed externally, and can hence count as ‘player self-imposable’. Subsequently, this game is shown to comply with the Pragma-dialectical Code of Conduct, while some of the Code’s rules become gratuitous as their content arises directly from player’s preferences instead. Our discussion is oriented towards future inquiries into how logics other than its classical variant can be similarly “naturalized.”
Keywords: game theory, classical logic, proof, proponent, opponent, winning-strategy, pragma-dialectical code of conduct rules.

1. Introduction
Viewing logic as one language game among many, Ludwig Wittgenstein had offered an analogy between having a proof and winning a game (Wittgenstein, 1953). The formal details of this analogy have been mostly studied by formal logicians who, in viewing logical proofs as regimented argumentation-procedures, sought to give an argumentative characterization of logic.[i] Game-theory in particular became a natural framework to model episodes of natural language argumentation that characterizes logical inference, giving rise to game-theoretic semantics (GTS) (Hintikka & Sandu, 1997) and dialogical logic (DL) (Rahman & Keiff, 2005) as the two main approaches.

GTS and DL partially reduce logic to argumentation-procedures by restricting players’ strategies so that games realize the model-checking procedures and proof procedures typical of logical inference. The motivation for such restrictions, however, remains internal[ii] to the model, receiving primarily pragmatic justification through successfully recovering logical inference formally from particular constraints on argumentation. This article shows DL-restrictions that are imposed to recover first-order logical consequence from argumentation to be instead forthcoming from preference-profiles of boundedly rational players. Such players, we take it, cannot optimize their strategies because they lack the ability to compute complete representations of a game, while we understand constraints on such a game to be player-self-imposable through strategic reasoning (provably) equivalent to the elimination of dominated strategies.

The following outlines how classical propositional logic, particularly the notion of ‘obtaining a classically-valid logical proof’, can be understood as the outcome of an argumentation-game (2.1), and introduce two game-rules under which obtaining it is a matter of due course, for both rules together guarantee a winning-strategy (2.2), then raise the claim that the strategies adopted by players in this game are ‘player self-imposable’, because these same strategies may be inferred from players’ preferences by (reasoning employing) a maximin-principle (Sect. 2.3 to 2.5). Subsequently, this game is shown to comply with the Pragma-dialectical Code of Conduct (3.1), but that some among the Code’s rules are gratuitous, so to speak, whenever normative content already arises from player’s preferences (3.2). Our discussion, in Sect. 4, is oriented towards future inquiries into how logics other than its classical variant might similarly be “naturalized.” We close with brief conclusions in Sect. 5.

2. The game-theoretic apparatus
To start, we will sketch the elements of an argumentation-game as they appear from a game-theoretic perspective, introducing further relevant notions as we go along.

2.1. Logic as an argumentative game
The players’ choice of a language, L, is a preliminary step to any language game. Agreement on the language in which the argumentation will be couched determines the actions arguers can take (e.g., how to attack and defend complex sentences; how to assess an atoms’ truth value). We restrict L to a propositional language corresponding to a fragment of vernacular English where basic sentences (aka atoms) contain a subject phrase referring to individuals, a verb phrase, and terms referring to individuals, e.g. “The cat is on the mat”; “Alice is taller than Bob.” Complex L-sentences combine atoms through connectives (and, or, if… then…), and locutions equivalent to negation (is not, or it is not the case that), or locutions that combine such complex sentences, collectively called operators. Read more