ISSA Proceedings 2010 – Concepts And Contexts – Argumentative Forms Of Framing


1. Introduction
The concept of framing – and the underlying theoretical mindset – is familiar to a number of scholarly fields and discussions. Although the notion of framing has its roots in sociological thinking, it has made its way into many other fields. Thus, framing is applied to management studies (Hodgkinson et al., 1999; Conger, 1991; Smircich & Morgan, 1982), rhetorical studies (Kuypers, 2009; 2006; Cappella & Jamieson, 1997), media studies (de Vreese & Elenbaas, 2008; Scheufele, 1999; Entman, 1993; Iyengar, 1991), and linguistics (Tannen (Ed.), 1993) – to name but a few of the most relevant fields. Framing, then, has undergone quite an expansion from being conceived as a tool for micro-analysis of social interaction to its current broad interpretation and diversified application.

When taking this development into account it is not surprising that framing is also to be found within the field of argumentation and that it is used in various ways within this field. An overview of argumentation studies shows that use of the concept is distributed along a continuum from intuitive and implicit to theoretical and explicit. At one end of the spectrum we find a commonsensical use of framing that is often neither expanded nor explained (see inter alia Bertea, 2004; Freeman, 2001; Garrett, 1997). At the other end of the spectrum we find contributions that take their starting point in framing (and the literature on the concept) and bring it to bear on discussions that are of relevance to the theory of argumentation. Be it in the understanding of ‘playful argumentation’ (Hample, Han & Payne, 2009), in the development of ‘interpersonal arguments’ (Hample, Warner & Young, 2008) or in the conceptualization of ‘non-deductive argumentation’ (Wohlrapp, 1998) – again, only highlighting a few relevant examples. Read more

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ISSA Proceedings 2010 – Strategically Manoeuvring With Reporting In The Argumentation Stage Of A Critical Discussion


1. Introduction
This analysis is part of a larger research project[i] which investigates the argumentative potential of reports within the theoretical background of pragma-dialectics enlarged with rhetorical insights, as it has been developed by van Eemeren & Houtlosser (1999, 2000, 2002). We are more specifically interested in exploring the possibilities for strategic manoeuvring with anonymous reports, i. e. reports that provide no specific reference to the information source, but vaguely place it under the responsibility of the community as it is the case with utterances such as People say that, The word goes that, Rumour has it that, etc. This analysis is confined to the investigation of the dialectical and rhetorical goals that might be served in using the specific presentational device of anonymous reports in the argumentation stage. In doing it, we shall first provide a pragmatic description of this type of assertives in order to point to the effects of their use in discourse. In general terms, in using anonymous reports, the speaker has the possibility to advance information for whose truthfulness he cannot be apparently held responsible. Given this peculiarity of presentation in adducing arguments, we shall examine how the dialectical aim of the argumentation stage is fulfilled, while, in point of rhetorical goal, we shall describe to what extent the use of this presentational device makes the speaker’s arguments stronger and more efficient.

2. Anonymous reports: pragmatic description
Anonymous reports such as People say that, The word goes that, Rumour has it that, etc. may be defined as an instance of indirect reported speech characterized by the occultation of the identity of the information source. They belong to the large category of hearsay evidentiality which opposes, according to Gâță (2009, p. 490), two main subcategories, quotative vs. non-quotative and reporting one’s assertions vs. reporting the other’s words. According to this classification, anonymous reports are non-quotative and they are used to report the other’s words. Read more

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ISSA Proceedings 2010 – On ‘Life Expectancy’ Of Dissociated Terms


1. Introduction
This study takes as a premise the idea that dissociation (in the sense of Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca’s New Rhetoric) relies on a semantic mechanism and a conceptual one which translate into linguistic and discursive elaboration, and has as a result the creation of a new notion, or concept. The main hypothesis of this study is that the contents of the notion created by dissociation, its structure and its existence over a specific time interval are determined by contextual (situational and co-textual, or discursive) circumstances.[i] This hypothesis is tested on the basis of evidence provided by various instances of discourse which are provided as empirical data borrowed from other studies on the same topic or related topics or identified as such in communicative interactions. Dissociation is seen in this study as one of the mechanisms allowing creation of new representations, notions or concepts on a discursive basis, in an argumentative context.

2. On the Concept of Dissociation
Dissociation is a discourse technique which the authors of the New Rhetoric (NR, Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1958, vol. II, pp. 550-609) introduce to the field of argumentation studies as used by the speaker to suggest rearrangement and restructuring of notional information in a new way. Dissociation allows the speaker – at least for a limited time interval – to remove an incompatibility between propositions or inside a given notion N0. Through dissociation “a more or less profound change is brought about in the conceptual basis of an argument” (van Rees 2005, p. 53): an existing, given notion N0, displaying a certain – at least apparent – unity, is rebuilt by the speaker into two notions, one of which looks more or less like N0, and the other one is felt or introduced as a completely new notion, N, or presumes as new for the audience a specific discourse addresses. In other words, the rational and linguistic dissociative mechanism starts from an existing notion N0, whose content gives rise to an incompatibility, or to opposed views in the same discussion matter.

For instance, when referring in a particular context to a notional content such as that of the truly needy, the speaker dissociates from the given (old) notion N0 = (THE) NEEDY[ii], which is thus – explicitly or implicitly – qualified as pure appearance, a new notion N = (THE) TRULY NEEDY, the latter not being necessarily defined or elaborated, but – explicitly or implicitly – qualified as reality. The old notion is also referred to in the NR as the first term of the dissociation (Term I, T I, here N0), and the new notion as the second term of the dissociation, or the dissociated term (Term II, T II, here N or N’). In Goodwin’s words, “Term I, therefore is aligned with whatever is deemed, for cognitive or social purposes, merely apparent, illusory, insubstantial, irrelevant, erroneous. Term II, on the other hand, corresponds with whatever is considered to be actual, substantial, relevant, coherent, true.” (1991, p. 150) While N0 is discarded in the argumentative context, N or N’ is valued argumentatively, i.e. N will serve as a new starting point of an argumentation on the same matter in which the use of N0 proved unsuccessful or led to incompatibilities between the views of the speakers or conflicts or did not appear as stable or adequate enough for one of the parties(’ purposes). The main goal of dissociation is to distinguish and contrast appearances from reality. Read more

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ISSA Proceedings 2010 – Nonverbal Communication As Argumentation


Do politicians argue with their bodies? Argumentation deals with attitudes and opinions proposed through claim and ground. It thus appears impossible for a person’s nonverbal communication to make arguments. Neither body nor voice – it seems – can create the verbal two-part structure of an argument. However, if such nonverbal communication can work as a stimulus evoking a receiver’s cognitively generated argument, then also non-verbal communication may function as rhetorical argumentation.

In this article we explore the nonverbal argumentative communication of Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama in the 2008 televised primary debates for the Democratic Party. Our aim is neither to describe the communication styles of the two contenders, nor to make generalizations about the nonverbal communication they employ in the debates. Instead we primarily use the analysed instances to exemplify that nonverbal communication can have argumentative functions, and to illustrate how such communication works. More specifically, we examine how nonverbal communication performs argumentative functions in acclaiming and defending the debater’s own ethos and in attacking the opponent’s ethos. Read more

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ISSA Proceedings 2010 – Hidden Premises, Hidden Treasures?


1. Introduction
Suppose one is confronted with the following argument:
(1) Argumentation theory is crucial to world peace. John Doe says so in his book Argumentation and the Rise and Fall of Empires.

How would one go about criticizing this argument? The most obvious reaction seems to be ‘who is John Doe?’ Or maybe: ‘John Doe is just saying so because he wants his research funded.’ Another criticism could be ‘Frans van Eemeren says exactly the opposite’. Or ‘John Doe also says that the moon is made of green cheese!’.
If we take look at the original argument, it is not right away clear what this criticism is directed at. It does not challenge the premise – the antagonist is not wondering whether in his book John Doe indeed did say that argumentation theory is crucial to world peace. Yet it is an effective way to argue against the argument.

It is (almost) generally accepted among argumentation theorists that critical reactions like these are directed at the hidden premise of the argument: a premise that is unexpressed but nevertheless forms part of the argumentation put forward. Moreover, most scholars agree that this premise is different from what Van Eemeren and Grootendorst have named the ´logical minimum´ a conditional sentence of which the antecedent contains the premise (or premises, in the case of coordinative argumentation) and the consequent the claim under discussion. Read more

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ISSA Proceedings 2010 – Reason & Intuition: The Kisceral Mode Of Communication


There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, 
Than are dreamt of in your philosophy.
Shakespeare, Hamlet 166.

1. I have facts, you have axioms, she has intuitions
In 1994 when I first wrote about multi-modal argumentation I described four modes arguers employ when putting forward arguments, making points, defending positions, and so on. The first three were the logical, the emotional, and the visceral, this last involving physical and contextual communication. The fourth mode, and the one I viewed as most likely to cause trouble and discomfort was the kisceral mode. Let me quote myself.
The term ‘kisceral’ derives from the Japanese word ‘ki’ which signifies energy, life-force, connectedness. I introduce it as a generic, non-value-laden term to cover a wide group of communi­cative phenomenon. The kisceral is that mode of communication that relies on the intuitive, the imaginative, the religious, the spiritual, and the mystical. It is a wide category used frequently beyond the halls of academe.

I will not reiterate here my arguments for pursuing the study of kisceral arguments within Argumentation Theory, except to say that from a descriptivist point of view, we need to examine all forms of argumentation used by real arguers. (Vide Gilbert, 1997; Willard, 1989).
My purpose here is to describe a number of forms of kisceral argument some of which are very familiar and academically acceptable in order to examine the difficulties that arise when we try to find order in what some think to be chaos. Read more

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