ISSA Proceedings 2010 – The Latin Cross As War Memorial And The Genesis Of Legal Argument: Interpreting Commemorative Symbolism In Salazar V. Buono

• by: M. Kelly Carr - University of Baltimore, Amanda Reid Payne - Florida Coastal School of Law & Marilyn J. Young - The Florida State University

In 1934, the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW), a private organization, erected a Latin cross[i] on federal land in the Mojave Desert to memorialize the veterans of World War I.[ii] The Mojave Cross is located in the Mojave National Preserve, on land known as Sunrise Rock.[iii] The presence of the cross first became an issue in 1999, when the Park Service denied a request from a Utah man to add a Buddhist shrine to the land near the cross. Subsequently, in 2001, Frank Buono, a former Park Service employee, filed suit against the Park Service alleging the cross violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, which sets parameters regarding the relationship between government and religion.[iv]

In 2002, the lower (trial) court found for Buono and ordered the Park Service to remove the Mojave Cross. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (Ninth Circuit) agreed with the lower court, affirming the conclusion that “the presence of the cross on federal land conveys a message of endorsement of religion,” and permanently enjoined the government from maintaining the cross on federal land (Buono v. Norton, 2004). The Park Service prepared to remove it. Meanwhile, in 2001, the U.S. Congress prohibited the use of federal funds to remove the cross (Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2001). Then, in 2002, the Mojave Cross was designated a national memorial (Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2002).[v]  Congress again prohibited the use of federal funds to remove the cross (Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2003). And, finally, Congress transferred one acre of land, on which the Mojave Cross sits, to the Veterans of Foreign Wars with the requirement that if it ceased to be a war memorial the land would revert to the federal government (Pub. L. No. 108-87, 2003).[vi] The Ninth Circuit concluded that this last move was merely an attempt to circumvent the constitutional violation and thus stopped the transfer (Buono v. Kempthorne, 2007). The Department of Justice appealed this latter decision to the U.S. Supreme Court, arguing that the government would have to tear down a “memorial.”[vii] The VFW filed an amicus brief arguing that if the Ninth Circuit’s opinion were to be affirmed, memorials in national cemeteries would have to be removed, including the Argonne Cross and the Canadian Cross of Sacrifice at the Arlington National Cemetery (Veterans of Foreign Wars et al., 2009). In contrast, the Jewish War Veterans of the United States filed an amicus brief arguing that the Mojave Cross is “a profoundly religious Christian symbol,” rather than a universal commemorative symbol of war dead, and that the federal government’s actions toward the cross and adjoining land underscores, rather than remedies, its endorsement of that religious symbol (2009, p. 5). Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2010 – Argumentation Schemes In The Process Of Arguing

• by: Begoña Carrascal & Miguel Mori - University of the Basque Country

1. Introduction
A look to the literature of the last years should be enough to realize that argumentation is a very complex phenomenon with many sides and manifestations and that many of the, some times, contradictory considerations about several aspects relative to the matter have their source in this complexity.
The definition of argumentation, provided by van Eemeren (2001, p. 11), constitutes a good place to start our reflection now, i.e “argumentation is a verbal, social and rational activity aimed at convincing a reasonable critic of the acceptability of a standpoint by advancing a constellation of propositions justifying or refuting the propositions expressed in the standpoint”.
In this definition van Eemeren stresses the role of the argumentation as an activity, but most of the work done in the field is devoted to the analysis and evaluation of argumentations.

We want to stress here that the expressions “rational activity” or “reasonable critic” are related, most of the time, with probable or defeasible truth (Walton, Reed & Macagno, 2008). As Zarefsky (1996, p. 53) pointed out “argumentation should be regarded as the practice of justifying decisions under conditions of uncertainty”. The uncertainty may be relative to the cognitive environment of the interlocutors, as defined by (Tindale, 1999), or it could be an intrinsic quality of the issue in question, as a consequence of the influence of many unknown or difficult to foresee factors. Even if some times there is enough data to reach an unarguable conclusion, the opposite is much more frequent in everyday situations because ordinary argumentations deal, in most of the cases, with issues in which ethical or aesthetic values, personal tastes and other subjective feelings play a decisive role. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2010 – Controversy Over Uncertainty: Argumentation Scholarship And Public Debate About Science

• by: Leah Ceccarelli - University of Washington, Seattle

1. A rationale for studying “manufactured controversy”
The term “manufactured controversy” appears with some frequency in recent scholarship about the public rhetoric of science. But as this paper will show, it tends to be applied in isolated case studies that have not yet been connected with each other into a larger multi-case analysis. As a result, the definitional contours of the term have not been made entirely clear in the rhetoric and argumentation literature. This paper is a first step toward developing a definition of the term.

Scholars in the broader field of science studies have looked at the same phenomenon that rhetoricians have been calling manufactured controversy, but they use a different name for it, calling it the manufacture of public uncertainty about science. This paper will argue that the focus of these science studies scholars has been so effectively filtered through the terministic screen of uncertainty production that they miss some important characteristics of the phenomenon that are related to the way in which public controversy over scientific claims is constructed in the public sphere. Since one purpose of argumentation scholarship is to engage the theorization of controversy (Goodnight, 1991), argumentation scholars should be especially suited to the study of this aspect of the phenomenon.

To ground a call for scholarship on the argumentative dynamics of the “manufactured controversy”, this paper reviews some recent literature on the rhetoric of science and some recent literature from the broader field of science studies that explores cases where public uncertainty is created through the manufacture of scientific controversy in the public sphere. The goal of this paper is to set out a path for scholars of argumentation and rhetoric to make a useful contribution to the study of this phenomenon, and to briefly preview some of my own findings from a study that I have undertaken along that path, findings that I more fully develop in another longer paper (Ceccarelli, 2011). Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2010 – The Collective Making Of Temporal Aspects In Public Debates

• by: Francis Chateauraynaud - EHESS, Paris & Marianne Doury - CNRS, Paris

1. A cross-disciplinary perspective on argumentative indicators in contemporary public controversies
The starting point of this paper is the observation that arguers engaged in the defence of their standpoint in a controversy devote a significant part of their discursive activity to the representation of the debate in which they take part. Such a representation does not contribute directly to the exchange of arguments. It nevertheless provides the addressee with an interpretative frame which may be called upon in order to reach the real, deep meaning of the arguments that are being presented. To take an example, in the controversy surrounding astrology, the representation of the debate as the struggle between reason and obscurantism, or between light and darkness, is one that is favoured by the astrology detractors. As far as the astrology supporters are concerned, they portray themselves as the Galileo of modern times, as being the victims of a dominant institution – the Inquisition in Galileo’s case, the “official science” in the case of astrology supporters (Doury 1993).

When representing the controversy, the construction of a temporal frame may constitute an important strategic stake for the participants. This construction has a double nature: it is events-constrained in that it depends on the factual chronology of the debate; it is also fundamentally discursive, in that the participants make a choice among the available events which punctuate the controversy in order to select some of them which will be given a specific argumentative relevance. The combination of the order of events and the order of discourse, to borrow Foucault’s terminology, makes the temporal dimension a privileged ground for the integration of sociological and argumentative insights into the study of controversies, an integration that may contribute to the cross-fertilization of Argumentation Theory and Sciences Studies, from which both fields can benefit according to Keith and Rehg (2008).

The discursive construction of the temporality of a controversy may serve as a basis for various argumentative moves, such as arguments from the precedent, arguments from consequences, and analogy arguments. It can be realised linguistically by a number of grammatical or lexical elements. In this paper, we will adopt a lexical approach and focus on the French adverb “désormais” [from now on], in particular. We will show how “désormais” can be used to introduce a temporal breach in the chronology of a debate and how this temporal breach may be exploited in order to fulfil various argumentative purposes. We thus mean to illustrate how the linguistic investigation of discourse indicators such as “désormais” may enrich a sociological questioning within the theoretical frame of a socio-ballistics of controversies (Chateauraynaud 2009). Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2010 – Going For Broke: The Meta-Argumentation Of Desperation Strategies

• by: Daniel H. Cohen - Colby College

I have always been intrigued by Hans Reichenbach’s pragmatic justification for induction (Reichenbach 1938; Salmon 1974). It is curiously compelling even as it leaves a lingering and unsatisfying aftertaste. The source for both its attraction and it aftertaste is its almost desperate appeal at the meta-argumentation level: we do not know if anything will work to give us knowledge of patterns in nature – we cannot even assume that there are patterns in nature – but if anything will work, inductive reasoning will work!
When the conditions are right, desperation arguments can be very strong. Reichenbach’s argument meets some of those conditions, but only some of them.

1. Measures for arguments
There is something exciting about desperation strategies like the “Hail Mary” passes on the last plays of American football games, when a team down to it last play throws caution to the winds and throws the ball up for grabs with hope and a prayer that it might be caught rather than dropped or intercepted, or the decision by a hockey team, down by a goal near the end of regulation time, to pull its goalie for a sixth attacking skater. The chances for success may be small and the risks may be high, but the potential payoff is great and they seem to be perfectly reasonable strategies in the circumstances. However, the reasoning behind those strategies is worth a closer look because not all structurally identical arguments are as compelling as Reichenbach’s appeal. We need the resources to tell them apart. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2010 – Agent-Relative Fallacies

• by: John M. Collins - East Carolina University

1. Introductory
My topic is an issue in the individuation and epistemology of fallacious inferences [i].  My thesis is that there are instances of reasoning that are fallacious not in themselves, that are not intrinsically fallacious, but are fallacious only relative to particular reasoning agents. This seems like a peculiar notion. It would seem that if it was fallacious for you to reason a certain way, and I do the same thing, I would be committing a fallacy as well. Bad reasoning is bad reasoning, no matter who is doing it. But it is useful to ask: What would it take for it to be possible for there to be such a thing as an agent-relative fallacy? Here are two sets of conditions, the obtaining of either of which would be sufficient for the existence of agent-relative, or extrinsic, fallacies. Type One is that there are two agents who are intrinsically alike, molecule-for-molecule doppelgangers, one of whom is reasoning fallaciously while the other is not, due to differences in their respective environments. The other scenario, Type Two, is that there are two agents (who are not doppelgangers) who engage in intrinsically identical instances of reasoning, one of whom reasons fallaciously while the other does not, due to differences located elsewhere in their minds that affect the epistemic status of their respective inferences.  I will attempt to demonstrate that it is at least possible for agents to meet either set of conditions, and that in fact some people do meet the Type Two conditions, so agent-relative fallacies are not only possible, but actual. Read more