ISSA Proceedings 2010 – “Toulmin’s Analytic Arguments”

• by: Benjamin Hamby - McMaster University

1. Introduction
In this paper [i] I explicate and evaluate the concept of “analytic arguments” that Stephen E. Toulmin articulated in his 1958 book, The Uses of Argument. Throughout this paper I will refer to the 2003 Updated Edition, the pagination of which differs from the original, but aside from a new preface and an improved index, the text of which has remained unchanged.

My thesis is that Toulmin’s definition of analytic arguments, and his corresponding distinction between analytic and substantial arguments, is unclear: it is therefore a mistake to employ the analytic-substantial distinction as if it is clearly established. Furthermore, I suggest that the distinction is not a crucially important component of Toulmin’s model of argument layout, contra his claim that it is. I find that the agenda that Toulmin helped to inspire, of rejecting formal and other deductive standards as the paradigm of argument cogency and inference appraisal (cf. Gerristen, in van Eemeren, 2001; and Govier, 1987 and 1993), can safely proceed without trying to redeem Toulmin’s definition of analytic arguments, or the analytic-substantial distinction. We should therefore bracket Toulmin’s concept of analytic arguments, untroubled by the analytic-substantial distinction or its confusing formulation, while continuing to investigate the still contentious, but more valuable aspects of his theory of argument macrostructure, such as the nature of warrants and their field-dependent authorization. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2010 – The Costs And Benefits Of Arguing: Predicting The Decision Whether To Engage Or Not

• by: Dale Hample - Department of Communication, University of Maryland, Fabio Paglieri - Istituto di Scienze e Tecnologie della Cognizione, Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche & Ling Na - Department of Communication, University of Maryland

1. Introduction
Pragma-dialectical theory (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 2004) explains that a critical discussion has four stages: confrontation, opening, argumentation, and concluding. In the confrontation stage, two people discover that they have a disagreement, and in the opening stage they decide how to pursue it. This study focuses on the transition from the confrontation stage to the opening stage. Not all disagreements are explored or even expressed. When circumstances invite disagreement and then argument, sometimes we move forward and sometimes we move away. This is an investigation of the decision to engage or not. What factors predict engagement and which predict that no argument will be voluntarily forthcoming?

2. A Theory of Engaging in Arguments
Recent work (Paglieri 2009; Paglieri & Castelfranchi 2010; see Hample 2009) has analyzed the circumstances in which face-to-face arguments are most likely to escalate out of control, suggesting that people take these factors into account in deciding whether or not to argue at all. This paper takes that work as a theory of argument engagement. Our most general claim is that people are predicted to engage in an argument when the expected benefits of doing so exceed the expected costs. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2010 – The Absence Of Reasons

• by: Kati Hannken-Illjes - Universität Jena, Jena

In 2003 I started my fieldwork in two law firms. As a part of a comparative ethnographic research project, my objective was to follow criminal cases in their preparation and performance. In addition, one of my own research questions was, how argument themes are prepared and tested during this course of preparation. I was looking for the becoming of arguments. The very first case I encountered was one of child killing. A young woman, already mother of two and married, hid her pregnancy, gave birth in a back yard, covered the newborn with leaves and left. The child was found dead three weeks later. This was certainly a case, especially as my first case, that was difficult to deal with for emotionally. But also with respect to my research question, this case was remarkable: What first frustrated and then struck me as quite significant was the lack of reasons given in this case. It is this absence of reasons that I want to explore in this paper.

In legal procedures argumentation is often viewed as the central means to establish rationality and legitimacy. This assumption is important, even if one would take issue with it, as it has meaning in the field, if only counterfactually. The professional participants in the field work on the assumption that the giving of reasons is essential for the legal procedure, especially in criminal cases.This notion that is at work in the field can be explicated by Habermas’ notion of procedural rationality (1998). This procedural rationality in the legal realm incorporates the concept of communicative rationality. Similar to Habermas, Alexy’s work in legal argumentation (1983) and also the work done in the context of Pragma-Dialectics can be conceived of as subscribing to a procedural rationality (see Feteris, 1999, pp 163). Following this notion, legal proceedings can claim to be rational, if they adhere to certain (normatively formulated) rules of communication as in the ideal speech situation or the rules for critical discussions. One of the basic rules is, that interactants have to give reasons when asked for them. It is through reason giving that legal procedures attain legitimacy. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2010 – Using Argument Schemes As A Method Of Informal Logic

• by: Hans V. Hansen - University of Windsor

The method of using argument schemes for evaluating natural language arguments (NLA’s) is based on two assumptions [i]. The first assumption is that there are, if not ‘natural’ kinds of NLA’s, at least sortings of arguments into kinds that can be justified on epistemological or pragmatic grounds. The identity conditions of an argument kind can be represented in an abstract structure called an argument scheme. The second assumption is that with each identifiable kind of argument there is an associated standard that good arguments of that kind should meet.  Accordingly, to use the Argument Scheme Method (or AS Method) of evaluating NLA’s one begins by finding out to what kind a given NLA belongs; this can be done by determining which of the schemes it is an instance of. Having done that one proceeds to evaluate the NLA by determining how well it measures up to the standard associated with the kind to which it belongs. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2010 – An Exploratory Study Of Argument In The Public And Private Domains Of Differing Forms Of Societies

• by: Michael David Hazen - Wake Forest University & Thomas J. Hynes - Clayton State University

1.Introduction
In this paper, we focus on the functioning of argument in the public and private domains of communication in different societal forms. By doing so, we address several weaknesses in contemporary argumentation studies.
Why would such a question be of importance to the study of argumentation? First, while an extensive literature exists on argument’s role in democracy and public spheres, there is no corresponding literature regarding non-democratic societies. Such a concern is of importance because, in both ancient and modern times, most societies have not been democratic. While some might contend that democratic argument is paramount, that position fails to consider the daily lives of citizens in non-democratic societies and, in turn, neglects a fuller understanding of argument in all societal forms.
Second, an examination of the recent argumentation literature reveals extensive discussions of public argument. Unfortunately, there have been few attempts to link our understanding of the two bodies of literature.
Finally, many argumentation studies involve other variables such as culture, society, economics and politics. Most studies focus on argument and one other concept and few look at the argument’s relationship to communication, culture, political systems, and cognitive functioning in terms of their systematic variation between societies.
This essay has two goals. First we explore argument’s structure and functions in three prototype models of the relationship between the public and private domains of communication. Second, we illustrate each model with a historical example. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2010 – Defining “Disruption”: Setting Limits On Student Speech Rights In The United States

• by: Dale A. Herbeck - Boston College

In December of 1965, three public school students – John and Mary Beth Tinker and Christopher Eckhardt – in Des Moines, Iowa, were suspended from school when they wore black armbands express their opposition to the Vietnam War. Although the armbands expressed a legitimate viewpoint on an important political issue, the students were sent home for violating school policy and were not allowed to return to school until they agreed to remove their armbands. Rather than meekly accepting their punishment, the students challenged their suspensions on constitutional grounds. As predicted by many commentators, both the federal district court (Tinker 1966) and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit (Tinker 1967) ruled in favor of school officials. The United States Supreme Court, however, reversed the lower courts and ruled in favor of the students in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District (1969), a landmark decision recognizing the student’s First Amendment rights.

Writing for a 7-to-2 majority, Justice Abe Fortas noted that the armbands were a form of symbolic expression “within the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment,” that such symbolic expression is “closely akin to ‘pure speech,’” and that neither students nor teachers “shed their constitutional right to freedom of speech or expression at the school house gate” (Tinker 1969, pp. 505-506). Although Justice Fortas believed that student speech should be protected, he also recognized that there were instances in which it might be suppressed. In an effort to delineate these circumstances, Justice Fortas noted that student speech could only be limited by demonstrating that it would “substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon the rights of other students” (Tinker 1969, p. 508). Particular attention must be paid, Justice Fortas continued, to distinguish between legitimate regulation of disruptive student speech and efforts to “avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint” (Tinker 1969, p. 509). To insure that school officials did not engage in any content-based discrimination, Justice Fortas called on federal judges to independently review the facts and determine whether there was sufficient evidence to justify suppressing student speech. Read more