ISSA Proceedings 2002 – Dialectical Argumentation With Argumentation Schemes: Towards A Methodology For The Investigation Of Argumentation Schemes

• by: Bart Verheij - Department of Metajuridica, Universiteit Maastricht

1. Introduction
Argumentation follows patterns. Here are two examples:

1. P. If P then Q. Therefore Q.
2. All Ps are Qs. Some R is not a Q. Therefore some R is not a P.

The first is known as Modus ponens, which plays a major role in logical proof systems. The second is one of the categorical syllogisms that were already studied by Aristotle. These examples are well-known from logic.
But there are many other patterns in argumentation. For instance, the following:
3. Person E says that P. Person E is an expert with respect to the fact that P. Therefore P.
4. Doing act A contributes to goal G. Person P has goal G. Therefore person P should
do act A.

Scheme (3) expresses a variant of argumentation from expert opinion, (4) one of means-end reasoning.

All four example schemes are sensible patterns of argumentation. In real-life argumentation, the latter two are very relevant, probably more than the former two. Still the former two (or variants of them) are more often encountered in books on argumentation than the latter two.

For present purposes, there is no need to dive deeply into the reasons for this somewhat paradoxical situation. It is however not hard to think of some reasons that may be adduced for this situation:
– The former two fit in neat formal systems: Modus ponens (1) in natural deduction and other logical proof systems, scheme (2) in the complete classification of categorical syllogisms. It is not to be expected that the schemes (3) and (4) will appear in formalisms with similarly neat formal properties.
– The former two are thought of as necessarily valid schemes, and the latter as pragmatical validities or perhaps even as pragmatical contingencies. (How these notions are to be defined and whether such distinctions make sense is here not at issue.)
– The former two are strict in the sense that they allow no exceptions, while the latter are defeasible. For instance, with respect to (3), there is the exception that the expert is wrong, and with respect to (4), there can be many ways to achieve a goal, some better than others.
– The former two express abstract general schemes, where the latter two express concrete context-dependent schemes. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2002 – Discourse And Emblematic Figures Of Presenters In Political Debates On Greek Television

• by: Ioanna Vovou - University of Paris XIII

Introduction
The introduction of political debates to television indicates a specific way to visualize social space. The genre of television debate stands on the crosssroads of two different rationales: conceptually it aspires to be part of the democratic process and pragmatically it is a television programme. This communication proposes an analytical approach of the discourse adopted by the presenter of political debates on Greek television, whose emblematic figure takes an important place in television representations. Its objective is to reveal a form of expression of the Greek society. Our approach is comprised of theoritical concepts related to television enunciation and its relation with politics. A semiological and rhetorical analysis of the presenters discourse reveals a symbolic conception of the television political debates in which principles of democratic dialogue are enacted.

The evolution of political debates in Greece
In order to consider political debates within their historical context, a short review of the evolution of Greek television might be useful. Television broadcasting began in 1966, just before the dictatorship of the colonels (1967-1974). The establishment of television under the dictatorship is characteristic of its role as an instrument in the hands of an autocratic and undemocratic regime.
After the re-establishment of the parliament in 1974 and until the broadcasting deregulation in the end of the 90s, television remained under severe state control. Nevertheless, the genre of political debate makes its appearance on Greek television screens as political dialogue is a democratic demand after a long period of abolition of the democratic regime.
Television deregulation and the creation of private channels from 1989 and on symbolize a new era in media representation of the Greek public space and, more particularly, in the consolidation of television debates. These programs are rapidly developed, occupying a strategic place in the general discourse of channels towards their public.

1. Towards an identification through the presenter
The presenters of Greek political debates are journalists that are, progressively over the years, narrowly linked with their own debate program, becoming a central figure, an image of the program, a key element to its recognition and its immediate identification by the public. In order to understand the extent of this phenomenon, some program titles, containing the first or last name of their presenter are illustrative: “Anna in wonderland” (1991-93, on the public channel ET2, presented by Anna Panayotarea), “Ellispontos” (1995-96 on the private channel Mega, presented by Elli Staï) and “Extremismi” (1997-98, on the public channel NET, former ET2, presented by Olga Tremi). Furthermore, if the above examples refer to women presenters, in some cases, both sexes present the image of their faces in the titles of their program, just before the opening sequence or offer written references to their hair care and clothing providers in the end of the program. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2002 – Conceptualizing fallacies: The Informal Logic And Pragma-Dialectic Approaches To The Argumentum Ad Ignorantiam

• by: Jean Wagemans - University of Amsterdam

1. Introduction
Within the medieval genre of proofs of the existence of God, there is one particular argument that is strikingly brief and simple. In our days, it is used more often to prove the existence of extraterrestrial life forms, but the medieval version goes as follows:
1. It has never been proven that God does not exist. So God exists.

It is not so very hard, however, to give a counterargument that is exactly as persuasive as this one, but leads to the opposite conclusion:
2. It has never been proven that God exists. So God does not exist.

How, then, are we to evaluate this pair of arguments? It would be problematic if someone would try to defend one of them on the basis of a critique of the logical form of the other. The invalidity of one argument implies the invalidity of the other, since both arguments share the same logical form: It has not been proven that not-X, so X(i).
Maybe agnosticism owes part of its popularity to the fact that it solves the problem of the congruence of two arguments with opposite conclusions. Nevertheless, this solution leaves the question open, whether or not this form of argument is valid. In the field of argumentation theory, there is little disagreement on this point. According to most handbooks, the argument is invalid and fallacious, and it is labeled the argumentum ad ignorantiam or argument from ignorance (see Hamblin 1970: 43-44).
Twentieth-Century critiques of the limitations of logical approaches to argumentation have made clear that invalidity and fallaciousness are not synonymous notions. Most present-day scholars agree on the logical invalidity of the argument from ignorance, but that it is fallacious is not granted by everyone. So these critiques have not resulted in a reconsideration of the logical status of the argument, but rather in a transformation and extension of the possible ways to conceptualize it. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2002 – Diagramming, Argumentation Schemes And Critical Questions

• by: Chris Reed - Department of Applied Computing, University of Dundee, Scotland & Douglas Walton - Department of Philosophy, University of Winnipeg, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada

Abstract
Argumentation schemes are forms of argument that model stereotypical patterns of reasoning. This paper is part of a project on the formalization of argumentation schemes. The paper shows how argumentation schemes and critical questions should be fitted into the technique of argument diagramming using the Araucaria software system. This XML system provides an interface through which the user can mark up a text of discourse to produce an argument diagram. We discuss several problems arising from the need to deal with enthymemes.
The formulation of the set of presumptive schemes in (Walton, 1996) was rough and ready. The variables and constants used in the schemes are quite a varied bunch, and have not been all incorporated into any single over-arching formal structure. Only the most rudimentary attempt was made to classify the schemes by a tree-structure exhibiting how some fall under others. In many cases, the organization of the premises of the scheme and the matching critical questions was obviously clumsy. For example, in some instances, it seemed that the critical question merely asked whether one of the premises was true or acceptable. Thus it looked like either the premise or the critical question was redundant. These same problems were perhaps even more evident in Hastings’ (1963) initial attempt to introduce a comprehensive set of schemes with matching critical questions.
Now that we have a new software system for argumentation diagramming that can accommodate argumentation schemes, many of these technical issues of how to clean up the schemes appear more pressing. Before this point they may have seemed relatively minor matters of detail to the working argumentation theorist or teacher of critical thinking. But now they demand our attention. In this presentation, some of the very most elementary of these technical questions of formalization of schemes are raised(i).To begin, some introduction to schemes is presented. But to confine the discussion to reasonable limits, the scheme for appeal to expert opinion is taken as a case in point.

1. Introducing Argumentation Schemes and Enthymemes
Most in this audience are familiar with argumentation schemes, but for those who may not be, it is best to begin with a brief explanation of what they are. Argumentation schemes are forms of argument (structures of inference) representing common types of argumentation. They represent structures of arguments used in everyday discourse, as well as in special contexts like legal argumentation or scientific argumentation. They represent the deductive and inductive forms of argument that we are so highly familiar with in logic. But they can also represent forms of argument that are neither deductive nor inductive, but that fall into a third category, sometimes called abductive or presumptive. This third type of argument is defeasible, and carries weight on a balance of considerations in a dialogue. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, in The New Rhetoric (1969) identified many of these defeasible types of arguments used to carry evidential weight in a dialogue. Arthur Hastings’ Ph.D. thesis (1963) carried out a systematic analysis of many of the most common of these presumptive schemes. The scheme itself specified the form of premises and conclusion of the argument. Hastings expressed one special premise in each scheme as a Toulmin warrant linking the other premises to the conclusion. Such a warrant is typically a defeasible generalization. Along with each scheme, he attached a corresponding set of critical questions. These features set the basic pattern for argumentation schemes in the literature that followed. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2002 – Rhetorical Argumentation And The New Journalism: A Case Study

• by: Stephen J. Ward, PhD - University of British Columbia & Christopher Tindale, PhD - Trent University

1. Critical thinking in journalism: the old model
One way to analyze argumentation in journalism is to use the tools of logic to evaluate the traditional medium of journalism – the printed word. Editorials and other forms of commentary are transformed into logical arguments that are checked for validity, fallacies and dubious premises. We argue that this approach is no longer adequate because journalism has changed. An increasing amount of journalism is on the Internet where journalists use many forms of media and new technology to inform and persuade.  Internet articles debate public issues by combining text, audio and video, supplemented by hyperlinks and ‘chat’ forums. Articles, written with specific audiences in mind, are embedded on web sites surrounded by persuasive elements, from background information to dynamic images. Sites encourage readers to go back and forth between the various levels and components of the presentation.
Let’s begin with a summary of the standard approach to evaluating journalistic argumentation. The analysis begins with a text, usually a newspaper editorial, opinion column or letter-to-the-editor. The text is put into the logical form of an argument – a string of premises attempt to support a conclusion(s). In many cases, a relatively clear logical form is extracted from an opaque, rambling text. The reader, or the student in a classroom, is asked to consider whether the argument is deductive or inductive, whether there are missing premises, whether the argument commits a fallacy and whether the piece contains ambiguous or loaded language. Elements that are not directly relevant to how the premises logically support the conclusion are irrelevant to the evaluation, and treated as distracting rhetoric.

This analysis can be found in journalism classrooms, media textbooks and manuals on how to detect biased media messages. The approach depends on assumptions about the form of communication being used and the most appropriate logical tools for this style of journalism.
The journalism to be analyzed is assumed to have the following features:
1. The argument uses only one medium, typically print, and the nature of the medium does not play a substantial role in the evaluation process.
2. The journalism article uses a “transmission” form of informing and arguing:
(i) The journalist (author) of the article transmits the results of his research and analysis
The journalist is active in researching, verifying and constructing an argument. The reader is a relatively passive recipient of the transmission.
(ii) The journalist writes from the article from a position of ‘authority’- a firm, settled view about a topic or issue.
2. The act of communication is from one person to many. It is not interactive.
3. The communication is a completed text, a finished product, not an on-going process or dialogue. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2002 – A Pragma-Dialectical Analysis Of Televised Town Hall Meetings Following The Murder Trial Of O.J. Simpson: Competing Demands And The Structure Of Argumentation Practices.

• by: Harry Weger, Jr. - Department of Communication Studies, Indiana University Southeast, New Albany, U.S.A & Mark Aakhus - School of Communication, Information, and Library Studies Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, New Brunswick, U.S.A

The “televised town-hall meeting” was originally instituted by the American Broadcasting Company on the television program Nightline. The program featured a round table of scientists, military experts, politicians and journalists joined by the people of Lawrence, Kansas. Lawrence was the setting for a controversial television movie entitled ‘The Day After’, a fictional account of the aftermath of a nuclear war. The basic idea behind the televised town meeting is that a well known newsworthy person (or group of people sometimes joined by a group of experts on the topic) sits among a group of ordinary citizens to discuss the issues of the day. Given that anyone is allowed to voice an opinion, and that all participants are, at least in principle, to be treated equally, the program is fashioned to reflect the value of open and free democratic deliberation. The town meeting gives ordinary citizens access to government officials and to a mass communication outlet. Even the name of the program, “town meeting” brings to mind an old fashioned forum where the citizens of a town can gather together and test values and policies important to the future of the community. Although the televised town meeting was introduced on Nightline, a large variety of variations have arisen since. Both cable networks and the traditional broadcast networks routinely invite callers from around the country to engage in critical discussion with experts regarding issues important to the polis.

Televised town meetings present a significant research problem for argumentation critics for at least two reasons. First, televised town meetings provide an opportunity for argumentation researchers to extend and refine dialectical models of argumentation theory. Televised town meetings can be reconstructed as critical discussions and evaluated in terms of normative standards for ideal argumentation practices. The pragma-dialectical program of argumentation research and criticism attempts to understand argumentation practices as the result of the way in which argumentation forums are engineered.  Evaluating argumentation from this perspective requires that critics move beyond analyzing the logical rigor of individual arguers and arguments to the ways in which the communication environment invites or discourages ideal argumentation practices.
The second reason televised town meetings provide an important subject for argumentation scholarship involves the role of mass media and public sphere deliberation. Several scholars have discussed the loss of public argumentation in which ordinary citizens are able to engage each other in deliberative discussions concerning matters of public policy (e.g., Goodnight, 1982). By taking telephone calls from viewers or by allowing audience members to participate in discussions with a panel of experts, televised town meetings transform passive reception of media controlled messages into a potential platform for the common person to contribute to public dialogue. As Willard (1990) contends, argumentation scholars have a responsibility to examine and evaluate communication platforms and their potential for increasing the quality of public discourse.
Given the significance of studying televised town meetings, the aim of this essay is to examine the ways in which choices made by discussion moderators in response to competing situational demands help to structure the communication environment, as well as the degree to which this environment invites or discourages rational discussion in the public sphere. In order to accomplish this goal, transcripts from the television programs Nightline, and Rivera Live will be examined. All of the episodes of these programs revolve around the controversy surrounding the verdict in trial of the N.F.L hall of fame runningback, actor, and public personality O.J. Simpson for the murder of his ex-wife and her friend. The Nightline episodes aired on A.B.C. October 4, and October 5, 1995. The Rivera Live transcript is from an episode that aired on C.N.N. on October 3, 1995. Read more