ISSA Proceedings 2002 – A Pracmatic View Of The Burden Of Proof

• by: Frans H. van Eemeren & Peter Houtlosser - University of Amsterdam

1. A dialectical profile of the division of the burden of proof
In an earlier paper, entitled ‘Strategic maneuvering with the burden of proof,’ we have explained our dialectical perspective on the division of the burden of proof in a critical discussion (van Eemeren and Houtlosser, 2002). We did so by answering a series of interrelated questions from a procedural view of critical reasonableness: Why is there a burden of proof? A burden of proof for what? For whom? What exactly does the burden of proof involve? When is it activated? What means can be used to acquit oneself of the burden of proof? And when is one discharged? Because our responses were given in a critical rationalist vein, they are attuned to resolving a difference of opinion by critically testing the acceptability of a standpoint in the most systematic, thorough, perspicuous, and economic way. In the present paper we aim to complement this approach by offering a pragmatic solution for an important problem that may arise in ‘mixed’ disputes, where opposite standpoints are put forward regarding the same issue. The problem concerns the order in which the opposing standpoints are to be defended.

Making use of an analytic tool provided by Walton and Krabbe (1995), we describe the interactional situation in which our problem arises with the help of a dialectical profile. This profile specifies the moves that are admissible when dividing the burden of proof in a mixed dispute in the opening stage of a critical discussion. The profile starts from the situation that a mixed dispute has come into being in the confrontation stage between two parties. The profile includes both possibilities: the one in which the party that has advanced a positive standpoint is challenged first to defend this positive standpoint and the one in which the party that has advanced a negative standpoint is challenged first to defend this negative standpoint. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2002 – Fallacies As Derailments Of Strategic Maneuvering: The Argumentum Ad Verecundiam, A Case In Point

• by: Frans H. van Eemeren & Peter Houtlosser - University of Amsterdam

1. The current state of the art in fallacy theory
As we all know, in 1970 Hamblin sketched a devastating portrait of the state of the art in fallacy theory. Since then, several new and constructive approaches have developed. In all these approaches, the fallacies are – more generally – viewed as “wrong moves in argumentative discourse” rather than as “arguments that seem valid but are in fact not” (see van Eemeren, 2001). Such a new approach is not only taken by Hamblin (1970) himself, but also by Woods and Walton (1989), Barth and Krabbe (1982), van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984, 1992a), Walton (1987, 1992, 1995), Johnson (2000), Jacobs (2002), and many others. Although one can safely claim that Hamblin’s criticisms no longer apply to the present state of the art in fallacy theory, a fully satisfactory theory of the fallacies is still lacking. If only because the intriguing problem of the remarkable persuasiveness of (at least some of) the fallacies, which was in the traditional definition of a fallacy indicated by the word “seem,” has been completely ignored. In this paper, we shall argue that taking rhetorical considerations into account in a dialectical approach of the fallacies can lead to a better and more complete understanding of how a great many of the fallacies “work.”

2. Ad hoc theoretical treatments of the fallacies
A major disadvantage of various modern theoretical treatments of the fallacies is that they are, in more than one sense, ad hoc. This is so in the first place when they take the traditional list of the fallacies as it is handed down by history and recorded in the literature as their point of departure. Several informal logicians, and most notably Walton, tend to do so. The traditional list, however, is – in spite of Woods’ (1992) protestations –, instead of a systematic and theoretically motivated catalogue of the fallacies, a more or less arbitrary collection of the diverse kinds of argumentative moves that have been recognized as fallacious in the past. The older work of Woods and Walton (1989) is a good illustration of how this kind of label-oriented approach leads to an entirely different theoretical treatment of each individual fallacy. Such a treatment of the fallacies is therefore also ad hoc in a second sense. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2002 – Responding To Multiculturalism In The Real World: Re-Envisioning Argumentation Pedagogy To Include Culturally Diverse Methods Of Argumentation

• by: Danielle Endres - University of Washington

Recent pedagogical trends in American universities emphasize teaching students “real world” critical thinking skills. Traditional argumentation courses are often perceived as a particularly good venue for teaching critical thinking, (Sanders, Wiseman, and Grass, 1994). This seems to be recognized by administrators at many America colleges and universities as Winkler and Chesier (2000) suggest that university administration “support for argumentation courses has profited from recent nation-wide moves to expand instruction in critical thinking” (102). Traditional argumentation courses are often designed to cultivate reasoning, analytical, evaluative, research, thinking, and, of course, argumentative skills that hopefully extend beyond the classroom and benefit students in academic, professional, political, and personal venues.
Yet, we should consider whether argumentation pedagogy truly fosters critical thinking in a multicultural nation and world. Not only are universities becoming increasingly more culturally diverse, but also contact with people from other cultures is more likely nationally and internationally. Courses in argumentation often teach students the skills to engage in reasoned debate emphasizing certain element of the western tradition of rhetoric and argumentation. Traditional argumentation pedagogy focuses on “rational” inductive or deductive argumentation, analysis of arguments and fallacies, and the pursuit of truth. Mastery of these skills is usually evaluated with formal graded debates with a winner, a loser, and the “best” policy or value. These methods may no longer be appropriate preparation for students’ real world interactions because they neither simulates realistic intercultural interactions nor crosses cultural boundaries both within and outside the United States. If students are taught one method of argumentation and critical thinking that is specific to dominant western culture, valued over alternate ways of arguing and linked to simulated debates that do not accurately reflect deliberation in the real world, can we say that they are prepared to engage in discussion, debate, and argumentation in intercultural settings? Responding to cultural diversity requires rethinking traditional argumentation pedagogy to reflect skills and values necessary for the “real” multicultural world, both inside and outside the classroom. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2002 – Reparations Or Separation? The Rhetoric Of Racism In Black And White

• by: Tom Farrell, Northwestern University Department of Communication & Mark Lawrence McPhail, Miami University School of Interdisciplinary Studies

No issue has received less attention in the rhetorical study of race in American public address than that of reparations for slavery. This essay integrates traditional rhetorical analyses with cultural critique to examine the discursive tactics and strategies of contemporary arguments against reparations. We will consider how anti-reparations rhetoric echoes the appeals of pro-slavery and segregationist rhetoric, and reveals the rhetorical privileging of normative whiteness in the symbolic construction of racism.  Our analysis offers a reading of difference and identity that draws upon theories of rhetorical coherence to interrogate the underlying epistemological assumptions at work in the recovery of race in America and their implications for the our ability to find solutions to the problem of the twentieth century, the color line, as we enter the twenty-first.

If he gives to both North and South this terrible war as the woe due to those by whom the offense came, shall we discern therein any departure from those divine attributes which the believers in a living God always ascribe to Him.  Fondly do we hope, fervently do we pray that this mighty scourge of war might speedily pass away. Yet if God wills that continue until all the wealth piled by the bondsman’s two hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil shall be sunk, and until every drop of blood drawn from the lash shall be paid by another drawn by the sword, as was three thousand years ago, so still it must be said ‘the judgments of the Lord are true and righteous altogether’.
Abraham Lincoln  (Andrews and Zarefsky, p. 295)

And seeing that this is our status in the United States today, it devolves upon us to project a remedy for our condition, if such a remedy is obtainable, or demand of this nation, which owes us billions of dollars for work done and services rendered, five hundred million dollars to commence leaving it; or endorse the petition of the colored lawyers convention, which was held in Chattanooga, Tennessee, asking Congress for a billion dollars for the same purpose.  For I can prove, by mathematical calculation, that this nation owes us forty billion dollars for work performed.
Bishop Henry McNeal Turner
(Foner and Branham, pp. 480-81)

Seven score years ago, John S. Rock “advanced what was probably the first demand for distributions of land to slaves emancipated during the Civil war” (Foner and Branham, p. 368). Since that time, the call for reparations for slavery has gravitated between insinuation and agitation, but has never been silenced. While Rock’s antebellum rhetoric is merely suggestive, John Smyth’s claim during Reconstruction that “a debt of reparation is due from the white man to the black man can no longer be denied” (Foner and Branham, p. 823), expresses explicitly the discursive demand for justice that has continued to reveal itself in African American discourse. Perhaps it is Bishop Henry McNeal Turner’s address of July 21, 1868, however, that most clearly illustrates the telos at the heart of this debate from its inception until today: the choice is between what Burke describes as identification and division, between reparations and separation. Indeed, even as the interest on America’s debt to its citizens of African descent continues to grow, the disinterested hostility toward the issue on the part of America’s citizens of European descent suggests that we are far from crossing over, as we enter into the twenty-first century, the problem of the twentieth: the omnipresent color line that continues to separate us from our better selves. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2002 – Image Vernaculars: Photography, Anxiety, And Public Argument

• by: Cara A. Finnegan - University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, USA

1. Introduction: Visual Argument as Discourse About Images
There exists the assumption in rhetorical studies that visuality (often described in terms of “surveillance” or “spectacle”) is inherently antithetical to the goals of rational discourse in the public sphere. Indeed, John Dewey’s infamous charge in The Public and Its Problems that “vision is a spectator; hearing is a participator” seems to suggest no positive place for the visual in the practice of deliberation (1928/1954: 219). And Dewey is not alone; as Martin Jay (1993), David Michael Levin (1993), and others have observed, suspicion of the power of visuality dominates political theory and philosophy in both the European and American traditions. One goal of my research is to challenge such conceptions by encouraging us to think more productively about how visual images function as inventional resources in the public sphere.
Of course, one need not turn to theory to find examples of anxiety about the relationship of images to deliberation. The presence of visual images in public argument tends to produce a certain amount of anxiety in the general public as well. Part of that anxiety stems from fear that images can be “manipulated,” in often undetectable ways, and thus pollute the apparent “purity” of public deliberation. In our increasingly digital age, the litany of notorious examples is by now quite familiar: the digitally “altered” O.J. Simpson mug shot in Time magazine, for example, or National Geographic’s publication of a photograph in which the pyramids of Giza were moved closer together to facilitate production of the image on a vertical cover (Ritchin, 1990: 17). Indeed, “exposing” such “faked” photographs has become something of a cottage industry in recent years.
But such charges are not unique to digital culture, and of course, photographs could be manipulated long before computers came along. In working on a book about documentary photographs produced by the U. S. government during the 1930s (Finnegan, in press), I encountered several instances in which public actors charged the government with lying, staging, or manipulating its photographs. In my study of one of these controversies (Finnegan, 2001a) I became fascinated not with the question of whether the photographs had been manipulated, but with the rhetorical resources that the argument about manipulation afforded the arguers. One of the ontological foundations of photography is, of course, its apparent transparency or “realism”; Bryson (1983) calls this the “natural attitude,” Barthes (1977) refers to it as the “message without a code.” The assumption of the inherent truth of the photograph grounds many controversies about visual images. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2002 – Reconfiguring Practical Wisdom

• by: Walter R. Fisher - University of Southern California

At the 1999 Conference on Argumentation in Alta, Utah, I presented a preview of my move to develop the other side of the narrative paradigm, the ethics side (Fisher, 2000, 1-15)[i]. Since then, I have written several chapters, one of which is composed as a conversation among philosophers, theologians, and scholars – from Plato to Levinas – who address the question: what does being ethical require of one? From their responses, I derived four different answers, four different requirements. I shall use these ideas to analyze a decision a young Frenchman had to make during WWII: to stay with his dependent mother or to leave and join the Free French Forces in England. The story of Pierre’s plight comes from Jean-Paul Sartre’s essay on “Existentialism” (Sartre, 1998, 9-51).

Forms of Life and Practices
Before getting to the Pierre’s dilemma, I think it is prudent to review key concepts that underlie my attempt to reconfigure practical wisdom. The foundation for the approach I am taking is an adaptation of Wittgenstein’s concept of “forms of life” (Wittgenstein, 1977, 8e, 11e, 88e) and Alasdair MacIntyre’s definition of a “practice. By form of life, I shall mean an enduring, historically, culturally developed interpersonal relationship, such as a family or friendship. MacIntyre defines a practice as “any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended” (MacIntrye, 1984, 187). Examples of practices include government, medicine, business, science, scholarship, and sports. Forms of life concern “private” virtues; practices are the home of “public” virtues. As will be noted later, private and public virtues are not always separate; they inform one another.
Forms of life and practices are alike in how they are constituted and how their constitutions inform and regulate judgment and action within them. They differ in their sites: interpersonal versus public and professional. The argument is that different forms of life and different practices are constituted by sets of values which prescribe norms of character, role performance, interaction, and ideal aspiration. Put another way: the values, norms, and ideals that constitute interpersonal and institutional relationships provide the vocabulary that informs discussion, dialogue, and debate about ethical matters. They also provide the grounds for justifying and evaluating ethical judgments and conduct. They are empowered to serve these functions because they are, though they evolve and may be conflicted, the abiding themes of the narratives we live by. Read more