ISSA Proceedings 2014 – Islamic Theological Arguments: An Epistemological Systematisation

• by: Christoph Lumer - DISPOC (Dipartimento di Scienze Sociali, Politiche e Cognitive), University of Siena, Siena, Italy & Serkan Ince - Zentrum für Islamische Theologie, University of Tübingen, Tübingen, Germany

Abstract: This contribution starts a critical analysis and reconstruction of arguments in classical texts of Islamic theology (of the period AD 900-1100) from the viewpoint of the epistemological theory of argumentation. The main question of the analysis is whether these arguments can be reconstructed as being of one of the universal types of argument identified so far by the epistemological approach. The answer is: yes – though non-deductive arguments are not yet well elaborated.

Keywords: deductive arguments, epistemological theory of argumentation, Islamic theological argument, Koran, universality of argument types

1. Aim and structure of this article
Many classical texts of Islamic theology are heavily argumentative; and much of Islamic theology tries to base faith on valid and sound arguments. Some Islamic theologians even think that Islamic doctrines cannot be defended by revelation alone but have always to be justified by rational arguments. The rational approach in Islamic theology was significantly influenced by the Muʿtazila. But also the Māturīdiyya and the As̲h̲ʿariyya have dealt with kalām (Arabic for speculative theology) and applied rational methods in their theology (see e.g. van Ess 1966, pp. 17-33). This argumentative tradition has nearly not been studied in argumentation theory up to this day. This contribution starts to develop a critical analysis and reconstruction of the arguments in classical texts of Islamic theology from the viewpoint of the epistemological theory of argumentation. The theoretical aims of this study are threefold: First, we want to compile (the beginning of) a list of the most important types of arguments used in these texts, giving particular attention to non-deductive arguments. Second, we analyse them with the help of epistemological criteria in order to establish whether they can be captured in this way, in particular whether all of them are intended (in a broad sense) to be or can be reconstructed as being of one of the universal types of argument identified so far by the epistemological approach (deductive, probabilistic or practical arguments or combinations thereof) or whether there are e.g. specifically Islamic types of argument which should extend the present list of epistemologically valuable argument types or whether, on the other hand, there are (frequently used) argument types in Islamic theology which should be abandoned from an epistemological point of view. Third, we assess the examples with the help of the criteria developed in the epistemological theory of argumentation to gain an impression of the state of the art in classical Islamic theological argumentation. The arguments we will analyse in the following are taken from works by Abū Manṣūr Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad ibn Maḥmūd al-Māturīdī (about AD 870-944), by Abū al-Qāsim al-Ḥakīm al-Samarqandī (about AD 890-950) and by Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad, known as al-Ghazālī (AD 1058–1111), i.e. texts which were written roughly between AD 900 and 1100, i.e. in European terms at the end of the Early and the beginning of the High Middle Ages, before Thomas Aquinas or William of Ockham in Western Europe. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2014 – Ethical Arguments For Moral Principles

• by: Christoph Lumer, University of Siena, DISPOC, Siena, Italy

Abstract: Application arguments in ethics, from an argumentation theoretic perspective, are rather trivial; however they always rely on moral principles whose justification is a notoriously thorny problem. A critique of several trials of such justifications helps to formulate adequacy conditions for good justifications of moral principles. The main part of the article develops an adequate conception of the justification of moral principles as an argument for a specific thesis about such principles.

Keywords: adequacy of justification conceptions, epistemological approach to argumentation, ethical arguments, ethical constructivism, function of morals, instrumentalist justification of morals, justification of moral principles, moral motivation, practical justification, reduction of argument schemes.
1. The aim of the paper
The abundance of argument types and reasoning approaches to ethics is a real jungle. An impression of the complexity of the various types of reasoning and argumentation of the corresponding theoretical issues is provided in Walton’s “Ethical Argumentation” (Walton 2002). To try to give an overview of this material here is illusory. Rather, I will focus on some, in my opinion, systematically central questions:
1. What types of good central arguments are there in applied ethics?
2. What are the main approaches to the justification of moral principles, and how useful are they?
3. How does the best of these approaches to justification, an instrumentalist, constructivist approach, work in detail and what argument types are used in it?

The brief look at the first question serves only to the discussion, which is thus focused on certain aspects of justification in normative ethics; the article’s main aim is to sketch a systematic conception of justifying moral principles. In dealing with certain questions of how to proceed in normative ethics, the article in itself is metaethical: it provides criteria for good argumentation in normative ethics, but not yet moral principles.

The following analysis of argument types and the criteria for their evaluation are based on the epistemological approach in argumentation theory, according to which the standard function of argumentation is to rationally convince, i.e. to guide an addressee in acquiring knowledge or justified belief.[i] The particular approach to justifying moral principles presented in the following is based on my previous metaethical work, most of which has not yet been published in English.[ii]

2. Argumentation in applied ethics – the recourse to moral principles
According to the most broadly accepted understanding, applied ethics should just apply basic and most general moral principles to groups of more specific typical cases or, in cases of singular decisions of great importance – such as the basic lines of a political or economic system or the determination of climate targets –, even to individual cases. If the moral principles are clear, this application should not be a problem in principle. (“In principle” here means that it is clear how to proceed – which neither rules out the possibility that, for example, very complex or comprehensive empirical information, which is not only expensive to procure and process but may exist only in very uncertain or vague form, is needed, nor precludes that evaluations from the perspective of those affected are very difficult to perform.) The two main types of applied ethical arguments conceived in this way are, first, deontic arguments for deontic judgments (about moral obligations) and, second, consequentialist axiological, in particular welfare ethical, arguments for moral appraisals. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2014 – Gender And Generative Argument: Locating The National Women’s History Museum In The Landscape Of Public Memory

• by: Roseann M. Mandziuk - Department of Communication Studies, Texas State University, USA

Abstract: Historical memory is mediated through public argument that determines which histories are celebrated or silenced. This essay examines the effort of the National Women’s History Museum [NWHM] to establish a significant physical site in Washington, D.C. by exploring in close detail how the case for women’s history that NWHM addressed to the U.S. public developed by focusing in particular on the initial arguments that circulated when the Museum was founded in 1996.

Keywords: commemoration, generative argument, National Women’s History Museum, public memory, women, women’s history

1. Introduction
Among the questions relevant to how historical memory is mediated through public argument, examining whose story is articulated as important, what aspects of history are deemed to deserve a monument or museum at a given time, and why certain aspects of a cultural history are commemorated are significant points of inquiry. In essence, publics argumentatively negotiate what constitutes our “public memory,” designating people, events, and actions that are deemed worthy of remembrance. In particular, the intersection of gender ideologies with the processes of commemoration is a primary locus of rhetorical controversy. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2014 – An Epistemic Theory Of Argumentation For Intercultural Argumentative Dialogues

• by: Danny Marrero Avendaño - Department of Humanities, Universidad Jorge Tadeo Lozano, Bogotá, Colombia

Abstract: In scenarios of legal pluralism, adjudicators cannot always generalize their cognitive standards because some of the reasons put forward only make sense in a cultural context. How can the adjudicators assess arguments that make sense in a culturally different worldview? The answer for this should include a method for the evaluation of the culturally-dependent arguments. I will evaluate the main theories of epistemic justification looking for the most compelling answer for this question.

Keywords: Epistemological theories of argumentation, legal pluralism, argumentation in intercultural scenarios, theories of justification, adjudication

1. Introduction
I believe that scenarios of legal pluralism pose certain question to theories of argumentation. Broadly speaking, scenarios of legal pluralism are either legal communities where the cultural diversity of their populations is legally recognized and protected such as Australia (Mabo and Others v. Queensland 1992) Canada (Canadian Multicultural Act 1985) or Colombia (Const. 1991), or international tribunals where legal agents (e.g., judges, juries, prosecutors, defendants, witnesses, and so on) belong to culturally differentiated groups (Cryer 2007; Kelsall 2009). In scenarios of legal pluralism, some of the conflicts involve members of culturally differentiated groups who justify their allegations with arguments that only make sense in the culture to which they belong. If the adjudicator does not share the same cultural worldview as the parts under litigation, how can he/she come to make a decision determining the parties’ rights and obligations? Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2014 – Argumentation In Bulgarian Political Virtual Forums And Social Networks

• by: Ivanka Mavrodieva, Department of Rhetoric, Sofia University, Bulgaria

Abstract: This study examines specific features of the argumentation in virtual political forums and social networks. The subjects of research are political forums and Facebook groups as a part of the civil protests in Bulgaria over the period of two years (2012-2013). The main goal is investigation on arguments used by Bulgarian citizens in virtual dialogues, appropriateness and effectiveness of argumentation. The second goal includes survey of specific verbal, visual and multi-modal arguments used in the social networks.

Keywords: argumentation, visual and multi-modal arguments, political virtual forums, social networks

1. Introduction
The new Bulgarian state has reached 135 years of independent history and form of government since 1879. From 1945 to 1991 (during socialism) the form of government was a specific kind of republic (the People’s Republic of Bulgaria). The Constitution from July 1991 states that Bulgaria is a parliamentary representative democratic republic. The multi-party system was established after 45 years of socialist and totalitarian government. A transition towards a pluralistic and democratic society is taking place.

Bulgarian political communication plays a role in the civil society; it continues to be a function of the state institutions and political parties. Political and civil rhetoric practices and influence have immensely grown during the Bulgarian civil protests and demonstrations (1989, 1990, 1996–1997). Political communication has transformed since 2010 and Bulgarian citizens vow their demands in more definite forms combining direct, media and virtual channels. Bulgarian citizens largely use the Internet as a tool for increased social activities in the civil society. The participants in the protests in Bulgaria (2012–2013) use Facebook as an instrument of civic activity and acceleration of the protests. The protesters use Facebook as virtual tribune and Internet forums as virtual discussions where they raise topics and conduct dialogues. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2014 – The Role Of “Ethos” In Presidential Argument By Definition

• by: Maureen C. Minielli - Department of Communications & Performing Arts, City University of New York, USA

Abstract: This paper examines “ethos” in conjunction with an orator’s use of argument by definition. Scant research exists regarding the use of definition in an oratorical situation by a notable figure holding a position of power. This paper argues that the American president’s position and institution are additional elements of ethos that may enhance or detract from his ability to successful employ a definition of “x.”

Keywords: ethos, American president, argumentation, persuasion, definition, argument by definition

1. Introduction
Ragsdale & Theis III (1997, p. 1281) point out that research on the American presidency as an institution embraces a long-standing position that the “key feature of the office is the president” and that these studies often focus on “how presidents differ – in personality, leadership, and decision-making.” This paper shifts the focus toward the Office and Institution of the American Presidency as an extension of how presidents employ argument by definition and its subsequent implications for the concept of ethos.

Substantial literature exists about the role of ethos in the fields of argumentation and rhetoric, political science, history, and philosophy, among others, but scant research exists regarding the use of definition in an oratorical situation by a notable figure holding a noteworthy, powerful position of leadership. This paper rectifies that oversight be examining definitional usage based from the perspective of the office, or the daily job, and institution, or the storied, gloried executive branch, of the American presidency.

This paper confects ideas, theories, and positions from the communication studies, political science, political theology, philosophy and comparative literature disciplines, particularly the works of Lee Sigelman, Ruth Amossy, and David Zarefsky, to examine how presidents extend beyond defining “x” via their personal ethos, to the American presidency’s office and institution as additional definitional means in order to obtain their intended objective. It begins with a review of the difference between argument from definition and argument by definition. It then summarizes what is known about the President as a definer before examining argument by definition from the office and institutional standpoints. The paper concludes with positive and negative implications when definitions of these types are engaged. Read more