ISSA Proceedings 1998 – Magnitude Beyond Measure: Judgment And Justice In The Late Twentieth Century

• by: Thomas B. Farrell - Northwestern University

If classical tragedy has any residual wisdom for our age, it may lie in the possibility that the imperatives of forensic judgment prefigure a renewed sense of genuine civic life. Argumentation becomes rhetorical whenever it engages the priority, urgency, or importance of public matters. In the present century, the once-reliable borders, taboos, and hierarchies for grounding and guiding such argumentation have eroded, while the calamities and exigencies of our time have expanded in scale and enormity. Thus an ongoing dialectic of magnitude takes on the momentum of an irreversible process yielding a foreclosure of human agency, and virtuous reconciliation to catastrophe as fait accomplis. With this essay, I explore three twentieth century concepts designed to stabilize rhetorical argument over “magnitude’ in civic and social life; these are the concepts of the public, the spectacle, and the rhetorical forum. In the West, these concepts are the ironic legacy of three unlikely Nineteenth century rhetorical figures (Henry Thoreau, P.T. Barnum, and Ida Wells). In an institutional sense, these same three concepts are the residue of the three foundational genres of rhetorical argumentation; the deliberative, the ceremonial, and the forensic. Most important, these concepts depict inventional moods of civic argument; the utopian, the tragic/farcical, and the retributive/conciliatory moods of judgment and forgiveness. The body of my presentation will stress the allegorical voices of this latter forensic mood: in the Nuremburg trials, as well as in the International Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Such cases as these, exceptional as they are, help to capture the unfinished inventional possibilities of argumentation and civic culture.

The figures of Nineteenth century America – Thoreau, Barnum, Wells – loom over our still unfinished epoch with an expansiveness that seems larger than life. In mirroring back to us a cultural history more grand, and grandiose, than our own, they introduce nagging questions about what has become of magnitude as solitude, magnitude as magnificence, magnitude as the soul’s tumult: the implacability of rage within. Whether we might actually find or construct a map for the typical nineteenth century consciousness, it is clear that the vast panorama of that vision has receded.
The confident progressive histories, so prominent at a new century’s first moments, have also lost their traction. The not-always-felicitous union of concept and event, a residue of other discredited systems, continues to hover over the damage. It was Marx who once prophesied that philosophy would replace religion, only to be replaced by history and then politics. But the once-vibrant trajectory of modernity resists any easy assimilation. I do want to suggest, however, that even in an era of “dark times,” the work of rhetorical reflection, and all its attendant weights and measures, persists. Specifically, I want to show by way of some culturally specific evidence that magnitude, however momentous its eventful compass, may nonetheless be judged. Such judgment is not only possible. It is absolutely necessary if rhetoric itself has any lingering hope of surviving the crimes of the century. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 1998 – What Went Wrong In The Ball-Point Case? An Analysis And Evaluation Of The Discussion In The Ball-Point Case From The Perspective Of A Rational Discussion

• by: Eveline Feteris - University of Amsterdam

1. Introduction
In May 1991 a 53-year old woman is found dead in her house. Pathological investigation shows that she has a BIC ball-point inside her head, behind her eye. An accident? A murder-case? The finding is the introduction to one of the most interesting and complex criminal cases of the last years in the Netherlands. The former husband and the son are under suspicion. Rumour has it that the son, during his school years, has referred to the perfect murder more than once. Finally, in 1994, J.T., the son, is arrested. This is done after the police were given a statement by a psycho-therapist in which this therapist contended that the son confessed to her that he killed his mother. He would have shot a BIC ball-point with a small crossbow. On the basis of this statement of the therapist, who wanted to remain an anonymous witness, in combination with the statement of the forensic pathologist and the statement of the police, the prosecutor starts a criminal procedure.
The District Court sentences J.T. on September 29, 1995 for murder to twelve years imprisonment. J.T. appeals and after many procedural complications he is finally acquitted by the Court of Appeals in 1996. The Court of Appeals is of the opinion that, on the basis of what is said by the expert witnesses, it is not possible to formulate a hypothesis of what has actually happened. The expert witnesses, the witness on behalf of defense and the witness on behalf of the prosecution, all testify that when a ball-point is shot at a human head with a crossbow, this always results in a damage to the pen when it penetrates into the head. Therefore, it is impossible to shoot a ball-point at a human head with a crossbow without damaging the pen, as would have happened in this case. The Court also says that, because it could not find a convincing support for the statements of the therapist on the basis of other information, it could not decide that the statements of the therapist are in accordance with what has actually happened. Therefore the indicted fact could not be proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Not only in the media, but also among lawyers, this so-called ‘ball-point’ case raised many questions with respect to the quality of the Dutch criminal system. A lot of mistakes would have been made by the police and by the courts during the trial with respect to the way in which the evidence was handled. Because of my own background as an argumentation theorist, I would like to concentrate on the question what could be said about this case from an argumentative point of view: what went wrong in the discussion about the evidence from the perspective of a rational argumentative discussion? In the reviews of this case, generally speaking, two important points of critique can be distinguished.[i]
The first point is that the decision of the district court was mainly based on the statement of the therapist, which turned out to be a very weak element. The second point of criticism is that the court did not engage in an explicit discussion of the accident theory, that the woman had fallen in the ball-point by accident.
These two points amount to the critique that the argumentation in the justification of the District court was unsatisfactory with respect to the central question whether J.T. had indeed killed his mother. According to the official rules and the official practice of district courts in criminal cases, the court has done nothing wrong. But considered from the perpective of a fair trial ànd considered from the perspective of a rational argumentative discussion, the argumentation of the District Court can be criticized in several respects.
What I would like to do is to go into these points of critique from the perspective of argumentation theory. I will use the pragma-dialectical theory of Van Eemeren and Grootendorst developed in Argumentation, communication, and fallacies (1992) (also known as the theory of the Amsterdam School) as a magnifying glass for highlighting those aspects of the ball-point case which can be criticized from the idealized perspective of a rational discussion. I will use this theory for analyzing and evaluating the ball-point case from the perspective of a rational argumentative discussion. I will connect my analysis and evaluation wit ideas developed by Anderson and Twining (1991 and 1994) and by Wagenaar, van Koppen and Crombag (1993) about ideal norms for the assessment of evidence in criminal cases. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 1998 – A Critique Of The Dialectical Approach: Part II

• by: Maurice A. Finocchiaro - University of Nevada

1. Introduction
This paper is part of a project designed to explore the nature of the dialectical approach in argumentation theory, its relationship to other approaches, and its methodological fruitfulness. The main motivation underlying this project stems from the fact that the dialectical approach has become the dominant one in argumentation theory; now, whenever a given approach in any field becomes dominant, there is always the danger that it will lead to the neglect or loss of insights which are easily discernible from other orientations; this in turn may even prevent the dominant approach from being developed to its fullest as a result of the competition with other approaches.
In a previous paper (Finocchiaro 1995), I undertook a critical examination of two leading examples of the dialectical approach. I argued that Barth and Krabbe’s (1982) demonstration of the equivalence of the methods of axiomatics, natural deduction, and formal semantics to formal dialectics works both ways, so that the former acquire the merits of the latter, and the latter the limitations of the former. I also argued that Freeman’s (1991) demonstration that the structure of arguments as products derives from the process of argumentation is insufficiently dialectical insofar as it involves a conception of dialectics in which dialogue is easily dispensable, and insofar as it suggests that argument structure is rooted more in an evaluative process than in a process of dialogue between distinct interlocutors.

In this paper I plan to examine the ideas of other authors who have written on or have used the dialectical approach. I shall use as a guide the following three working hypotheses suggested by the just stated conclusions reached in my previous paper. The first is the claim that if one takes the point of view of formal dialectics, the formal dialogical approach is not essentially different from the monological approach, but rather the two approaches are primarily different ways of talking about the same thing. The other two working hypotheses involve informal rather than formal dialectics. The second working hypothesis is that perhaps there are two versions of the informal dialectical approach, depending on whether one emphasizes the resolution of disagreements or their clarification. The third working hypothesis is that the dialectical approach is fundamentally a way of emphasizing evaluation, a way of elaborating the evaluative aspects of argumentation.[i] These are working hypotheses in the sense that I shall be concerned with testing their correctness, namely with determining whether they are confirmed or disconfirmed by other actual instances of the dialectical approach. Since I shall be examining only examples of the informal dialectical approach, I will be dealing primarily with the second and third working hypotheses. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 1998 – Truth And Justice In Mass Media Reporting And Commentary: Serving More Than One Master In American Adversarial Contexts

• by: Richard Fiordo - University of North Dakota

1. Background
When writing for the mass media, reporters must usually explain complex matters in simple terms (Fiordo, 1997). Were media reporters to explain complex matters in complex terms, they would employ a style generally unsuited to their audiences. Writing for the mass media requires a style that is plain and direct (Roth, 1997; Harrigan, 1993). Although the principle of clarity is frequently violated for commercial and thematic media purposes, plainness remains a primary criterion of style (Kennedy, Moen & Ranly, 1993; Knight & McLean, 1996). Mass media writing should also have substance and be ethical (Zelezny, 1996).
A problem existing in American mass media reporting and commentary is analyzed in this paper. Two cases are used to illustrate a difficulty that surfaces frequently in American journalism. While this same troublesome condition may occur in the journalism of other countries, its manifestation in US journalism alone is examined here. For this study, 127 American television news broadcasts were viewed and 132 American newspaper and magazine articles read. All had content pertaining to the problem addressed. Because of its straightforward use in journalism (Kennedy, Moen & Randy, 1993), general semantics has been selected for this analysis. General semantics separates reports from inferences and judgments.While reporters utilize all three, the most heavily weighted should ideally be the report. The report is a statement verifiable through our senses (or the scientific extensions of our senses). An inference is a statement about the unknown made on the basis of what is known. And, a judgment is an evaluative or emotive statement highly autobiographical in its function. Reporters will be understood in this paper to be writers or speakers who ideally communicate to us through reports primarily and inferences and judgments secondarily (Hayakawa & Hayakawa, 1990). Reporting and commentary are thus distinguished through higher frequency of inferences and judgments in commentary.
Subsequently, the reporter might construct an accurate and just account of the facts related to a topic or issue. The account should take the context of the facts into account (whether the context is the field of medicine, law, education, or whatever). Without reference to a context, we lack appropriate standards. What a statement means in relation to one set of criteria depends in part on what it means in relation to some context (Morris, 1964; Albrecht & Bach, 1997, 153). For example, a woman speed skater in the Nagano Olympics had to cover 500 meters in 39 seconds or less to win an Olympic medal; however, a woman speed skater in a regional 500 meter race may win a medal with a time of 47 seconds or less. Apart from the context of Olympic versus regional competition, the time would have a limited meaning since the context would be undefined. We would merely know the time it takes a particular female skater to cover 500 meters. In a medical report about reducing sodium in our diets, a “lite” soy sauce with 540 milligrams per tablespoon would be endorsed over one with 1130 milligrams per tablespoon. However, the diet of people with hypertension might require that soy sauce be avoided entirely. So, a 65 year old woman with a threatening case of hypertension may have to minimize sodium from all sources while a 20 year old female with no health problems may be able to consume an all-you-can-eat salty supper with minimal risk. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 1998 – Standpoints In Literary Reviews

• by: Mas Fopma - University of Amsterdam

1. Argumentation in literary reviews
In this paper I want to report about my analysis of the main standpoints in literary reviews from a pragma-dialectical point of view. This first exploration was carried out on a corpus of literary reviews in Dutch newspapers.
The main standpoint in a literary review is a value judgement about the quality of the book as a whole. There are more standpoints to be found in reviews. Reviewers advance arguments to support the acceptability of their standpoint. If they say the book is beautiful, they have to bring in arguments like ‘it is well-written, it opens new horizons for the reader’ etc. These arguments relate to certain characteristics of the book. They are value judgements on aspects of the book, such as style, reality, innovation, and information. These arguments serve as sub standpoints in the literary reviews, whereas the main standpoint is an utterance about the book as a whole.

2. Standpoints and value judgements
The term ‘standpoint’ is broader than the term ‘value judgement’. A standpoint not only can relate to the truth of propositions but also to their acceptability in a wider sense. Since a judgement may refer to the value of the subject of the utterance, it is a special kind of standpoint.
In literary reviews, the main standpoint is a judgement about the value of the book as a whole (and not about the values of certain aspects like style as pointed out before). Only relative terms can be used to express the value of books. Relative terms are always based on a scale. A scale is defined by two extremes: e.g. beautiful and awful, and the line between these extremes. In my survey, I postulated four different scales, on which the value of a book might be given.

1. The value of the book can be placed on a general scale from positive to negative. The general scale is between beautiful (or any other related positive qualification) and awful (or any other related negative qualification). Unlike the qualifications in the next scales, these qualifications are not exclusive for literature. “Fear could have been a terrible book because of all this, but it is a beautiful novel from the very start” (N. Hylkema, Leeuwarder Courant, 19-5-1995).
2. The value of the book can also be expressed by comparing a book with a general accepted standard of literature, a ‘literary scale’. For example: ‘This book is like a new Shakespeare. ’The value of Shakespeare’s work is generally accepted, so the book is evaluated in a positive way.[i]
3. The value can also be expressed by comparing a book with another book from the same author as in ‘This book disappointed me (…). His previous novel was much better. ’This scale can be called an oeuvre-scale. This is an example from the corpus: ‘The award has caused quite a stir. That is not so surprising, because the book is an average book that in the light of Llosa’s previous works looks particularly pale’ (S. de Vaan, de Volkskrant, 19-5-1995).
4. The value can also be given within a certain genre as in: ‘This book is a moving historical novel.’This utterance doesn’t specify the value of this book as a novel, but it does express the value as a historical novel. In this example ‘historical novel’ can be replaced by all genres: from historical novel to pulp fiction, from experimental novels to thrillers. I called this the genre-scale.[ii] Genre is used here in a broad sense: Dutch books can be called a genre as well. I found this example in the corpus: ‘Van Teylingen’s writings enriched Dutch literature’ (J. Diepstraten, de Gelderlander, 17-5-1995). Read more

ISSA Proceedings 1998 – Argument Structure And Disciplinary Perspective

• by: James B. Freeman - Hunter College of The City University of New York

Many in the informal logic tradition distinguish convergent from linked argument structure. How intuitively we may present this distinction is quite familiar. In some arguments, several premises may each be offered to support some conclusion but these premises are apparently intended to be taken together, to work together to constitute a case for the conclusion. Each premise given is somehow incomplete in itself. Its removal would leave the argument with a gap. As Stephen N. Thomas puts it in Practical Reasoning in Natural Language, the “reasoning involves the logical combination of two or more reasons,… each of which needs the others to support the conclusion.” (Thomas 1986: 58) Following Thomas, we say that such an argument has linked structure. By contrast, some arguments will have what Thomas calls convergent structure, where two or more premises are intended to support the conclusion separately, independently giving evidence for it.

The problem of distinguishing linked from convergent structure has proved vexing; indeed so vexing that it is currently the central problematic issue for understanding argument structure. The terminology in which Thomas and others have drawn the distinction is one obvious explanation for this difficulty. What do these key concepts of logical combination, premises needing each other, or being separate or independent mean? These characterizations are shot through with terms whose precise meaning is far from clear. What does it mean to say that reasons logically combine, that they need the others, that they fit together? What does it mean to say that they are completely separate or independent?

The metaphorical nature of the terms in which the linked-convergent distinction is frequently cast may betray a more fundamental difficulty with this distinction. It is a confusion over just exactly what this distinction is to mark. It is the thesis of this paper that the linked-convergent distinction, which we regard as a logical distinction, is frequently confused with a dialectical or pre-logical distinction, the distinction between multiple and co-ordinatively compound argumentation as defined by the pragma-dialectical school. This distinction is sometimes regarded as marking the linked-convergent distinction, but only using different terminology. However, as I shall argue, the distinction is quite different. According to van Eemeren and Grootendorst in Speech Acts in Argumentative Discussions, a multiple argumentation consists of “a series of separate and independent single argumentations for or against the same initial expressed opinion.” (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984: 91) Each argumentation is (or is intended to be) individually sufficient to justify accepting (or rejecting) the initial expressed opinion. With co-ordinatively compound argumentation, the single argumentations are “only sufficient together” (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1984, 91). In Argumentation, Communication, and Fallacies, they point out that in “multiple argumentation, the constituent single argumentations are, in principle, alternative defenses of the same standpoint” (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992: 73). Again, “What matters most is that the individual arguments should count as independent defenses of the same standpoint” (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992: 75). By contrast, “Compound argumentation consists of a combination of single argumentations that are…presented collectively as a conclusive defense defense of a standpoint….In a coordinative argumentation, each argument individually is presented as being a partial support for the standpoint, but it is only in combination with the other arguments that it is presented as a conclusive defense” (van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1992: 76, 77).[i]

Why should we not see van Eemeren and Grootendorst as drawing the linked-convergent distinction, only using different terminology? Why does the multiple versus co-ordinatively compound terminology mark a different distinction from the linked-convergent contrast? The answer comes, as I have already suggested, from the fact that the multiple-co-ordinatively compound distinction is dialectical, whereas the linked-convergent distinction is logical. We have two different disciplines here out of which these distinctions have come, disciplines with different perspectives on argumentation. Let me make it clear that by saying that these perspectives are different, I am not suggesting that one perspective is valid and the other not, or that one perspective is superior to the other. The perspectives of these disciplines may be equally valuable, but they are different, have different goals, and should not be confused. Read more