ISSA Proceedings 2010 – Argumentation In The Context Of Mediation Activity
This paper examines interaction in the course of dispute mediation to explore argumentation in the context of mediation activity. The mediation sessions involve divorced or divorcing couples attempting to create or repair a plan for child custody arrangements. A practical problem participants face when attempting to deliberate is that out of all the possible ways the interaction could go they must create this activity out of their conflicted circumstances. The empirical aspect of this project provides material for reflecting on mediation activity and understanding argumentation.
An existing collection of transcripts from audio recordings of mediation sessions at a mediation center in the western United States serves as a source of interactional data. The transcripts are from sessions held in a public divorce mediation program connected with a court where the judge approves the decision (Donohue 1991). The participants in the mediation sessions are couples going through a divorce or divorced couples (re)negotiating their divorce decrees. The sessions involve one mediator. The mediation sessions are mandatory for participants. If they cannot reach a settlement they can opt to go to court to resolve their dispute. The participants can also choose to have more than one session. The mediation sessions under study took place 2 hours prior to the court hearings. The length of sessions varied but in the majority of cases it was about 2 hours. Read more
ISSA Proceedings 2010 – Argumentation In The Appellative Genre
A speech genre lies between language and speech – it uses (a) beyond-language units (utterances, not words and sentences); (b) proto-speech units (speech models, not real speech).
The Appellative Genre (AG) is a subtype of the business kind of conventional discourse. Let me first consider the genre characteristics of conventionality in this perspective.
Identification features of business written correspondence are these:
(A) social conditionality; (B) communicative-situational conditionality; (C) speech genre conditionality; (D) linguistic conditionality.
(A) Social conditionality means that business correspondence does not only function under social conditions but also is an important component of socio-practical people’s activities that presuppose the presence of social-significant tasks and situations.
(B) Communicative-situational conditionality provides for these:
(1) business interaction is implemented by means of symbolic systems (language, as a rule);
(2) the symbolic system used is functionally-oriented (i.e. it corresponds to the mode of communication, which is businesslike and written);
(3) the language system used by interlocutors is means of communication;
(4) by means of that system communicants accomplish their interrelations as prescribed by the communicative situation;
(5) interrelations between the communicants are conventional and normative;
(6) communicants’ aims are mapped on their norms and conventions and accomplished by strategies, tactics and techniques of communication;
(7) the communicants have socio-cultural and psychological properties. Read more
ISSA Proceedings 2010 – The Appeal To Ethos As A Strategic Maneuvering In Political Discourse
1. Introduction
The aim of this paper is to analyze the appeal to ethos as a strategic maneuver in political argumentation. In section two I review ethos as an Aristotelian persuasive strategy and its two components according to Poggi (2005), i.e. competence and benevolence; in section three I focus on two of the possible ways in which one could convince the other of being competent and benevolent, i.e. either emphasizing his own qualities or highlighting the differences between himself and the opponent; in the fourth section I introduce the notion of dichotomy (Dascal 2008) and focus on the arguers’ possible tactical aims of presenting a mere opposition or contrast as a dichotomy. In the last two sections I briefly introduce the notion of strategic maneuvering and, while providing an example of a case of strategically maneuvering with ethos, I show how employing dichotomies can be seen as an aspect of the strategic maneuvering.
2. The appeal to ethos as a persuasive strategy in political discourse
According to Aristotle, the orator in persuading makes use of three different strategies, logos, pathos and ethos. If the orator tries to persuade the audience by making use of argumentation, then he is employing logos. If he manipulates instead the audience’s emotions, evoking the possibility for the audience to feel pleasant emotions or to prevent unpleasant ones, he is making use of the strategy of pathos. Finally, if the orator tries to persuade the audience by emphasizing his own moral attributes and competences, then he is making appeal to ethos. The appeal to ethos is, according to Aristotle, the most efficient strategy: ‘the orator’s character represents, so to say, the strongest argumentation’ (Retorica, I, 1356a). Poggi (2005) distinguishes two aspects of ethos: ethos-benevolence (the Persuader’s moral reliability – his being well-disposed towards the Persuadee, the fact that he does not want to hurt, to cheat, or to act in his own interest), and ethos-competence (his intellectual credibility, expertise, and capacity to achieve his goals, including possibly the goals of the Persuadee he wants to take care of). These two aspects are the two necessary components of trust and in order to be persuaded, the Persuadee has to believe that the Persuader possesses these two attributes. Read more
ISSA Proceedings 2010 – Argument Schemes, Topoi, And Laws Of Logic
1. Introduction
For the reconstruction of implicit elements in argumentative discourse, the pragma-dialectical account of “argument schemes” serves as an important heuristic tool[i] Consisting of a description of the various ways in which an arguer may transfer the acceptability of the argument to that of the standpoint, the account enables the analyst to reconstruct the “unexpressed premise”[ii]. However, in reconstructing implicit elements, the analyst may also benefit from other accounts of the transfer of acceptability of the argument to that of the standpoint, such as topoi and laws of logic. These alternative accounts are especially helpful in the reconstruction of academic argumentation – scholarly, scientific, philosophical argumentation – in which the notion “necessity” plays a pivotal role.
In this paper, I will present a formal framework that encompasses the three theoretical accounts of acceptability transfer principles just mentioned (argument schemes, topoi, and laws of logic)[iii]. First, I will discuss some insights from speech act theory that underlie the pragma-dialectical account of argument schemes and that will serve as a starting point for the development of the framework (§2). Next, I will introduce the notion “acceptability transfer principle” (ATP) and describe the four types of this principle that make up the framework (§3). Finally, I will briefly indicate how the existing accounts of argument schemes, topoi, and laws of logic fit into the framework (§4). Read more
ISSA Proceedings 2010 – Burdens Of Persuasion And Proof In Everyday Argumentation
The concept of burden of proof is fundamentally important in argumentation studies. We know, for example, that it is very closely related to, and necessary for the study of informal fallacies, like the fallacy of argument from ignorance. But procedural methods for dealing with issues of burden of proof in argumentation have been worked out and applied in most detail in the field of law. There is controversy, however, concerning the extent to which legal methods for defining and determining burdens of proof can be applied to the study of problems of burden of proof arising in everyday conversational argumentation, and other context like forensic debate [i].
In the recent literature doubts have been expressed about whether the model of burden of proof in law can be transferred to the study of how burden of proof operates in everyday conversational argumentation. In this paper we argue that the two different settings of argument use share an underlying dialectical structure that brings out some common elements that are useful to know about with regard to studying burden of proof. We argue that knowledge of these common elements enables us to derive many important lessons for argumentation theory as applied to nonlegal settings
Even in law, burden of proof is a slippery and ambiguous concept. Law is divided on how precisely to define burden of proof. Some experts in law distinguish between two types of burden of proof, whereas others take the view that there are three types. We are not in a position in this paper to attempt to give any answer to the question of how burden of proof should be defined or ruled on in law. Still, we think that some of the ways law has worked out for dealing with issues of burden of proof, over a long tradition of practical experience, are useful for building a model of burden of proof can be useful for helping us to analyze and evaluate everyday conversational argumentation outside the legal setting. In this paper we present such a model, and argue that it is structurally similar to the concept of burden of proof used in law in some interesting and important ways, but also different in certain ways. Read more
ISSA Proceedings 2010 – Engineering Argumentation In Marriage: Pragma-dialectics, Strategic Maneuvering, And The “Fair Fight For Change” In Marriage Education
1. Introduction
One of the more important innovations in communication and argumentation theory is the recognition of communication research as a design enterprise (e.g., Aakhus & Jackson, 2005; Jackson, 1998; Weger & Aakhus, 2003). Treating argumentation research as a design enterprise highlights the importance of understanding the reflexive nature between practices and processes – often the quality of argumentation reflects the conditions (individual, situational, social, etc.) under which the interaction occurs. Marital argument constitutes an ideal subject for studying communication design properties because, like most other naturally occurring conversation, it is regulated only by cultural norms and routinized practices developed by the speakers themselves. Interpersonal argumentation generally lacks purposeful design in terms of formal procedures, referees, or rules for appropriate contributions to the dialogue. These starting conditions result in participant-regulated interaction that are sometimes fraught with potential obstacles to productive argumentation. Two of the obstacles which pose particular problems for handling marital arguments are the “hot initiation problem,” and the “coherence problem.” Although these obstacles can get in the way of resolving any interpersonal argument, research suggests that they are particularly associated with dysfunctional conflict in marriage (e.g, Sillars & Wilmot, 1994; Retzinger, 1991). Read more