ISSA Proceedings 2002 – The Situation Of Argumentation Studies In France: A New Legitimacy

• by: Christian Plantin - CNRS, Lyon 2 University

This presentation of the current state of argumentation studies in France will focus on four points.
Firstly, some remarks about a difference of meaning between the basic terms designating our field of research in English and in French, that is (an) argument, (an) argumentation compared with (un) argument, (une) argumentation.
Secondly, a broad historical perspective will be taken. It will help to understand an intellectual and academic background characterized by a strong distrust for rhetoric and argumentation. This situation prevailed until the 1970s.
Thirdly, Grize’s ‘Natural logic’ and Ducrot’s ‘Argumentation within language’ theories will be briefly discussed. These programs, developed since the early 70s, and very well alive, have restored argumentation studies to favor in France, where they certainly still represent the leading traditions of research.
Finally an attempt will be made to summarize the main trends of the present situation, which seems to favor discourse analytic approaches to argumentation.

1. A caveat: Argument versus argument
The French word argumentation is indeed a good counterpart of argumentation, and the field of ‘argumentation studies’ tallies very well with the field of ‘études de l’argumentation’. But things get more difficult as soon as we take the next step, and consider the English noun an argument and the verb to argue. In a systematic set of occurrences, an argument is not un argument, and to argue doesn’t correspond to argumenter.
Following O’Keefe (1977), the Webster Dictionary, and my English informants, two meanings of to argue, that we will call to argue-1 and to argue-2, must be set apart:
to argue-1 means ‘to give reasons’ (Webster); with this meaning, to argue is followed by a that clause, and designates a monological activity.
to argue-2 means ‘to have a disagreement; a quarrel; a dispute’ (Webster); with this meaning, to argue is followed by the preposition about, and refers to a vast domain of interactions ranging from lively discussions to verbal and paraverbal fights. Arguing with someone about something is a dialogical activity.
The noun an argument has the same duality of meaning, being either a dispute or a good reason – and, sometimes, a good reason put forward in a dispute. The monosemic meaning of argumentation might look surprising ; but morphology has its caprices.
In French, argumenter has a single meaning, always equivalent to to argue that -, ‘to give reasons’. This meaning is inherited by all the words belonging to its lexico-semantic field, including argument and argumentation. Un argument is always a reason, never a quarrel. The verb argumenter is an excellent equivalent of to argue that ‘to give reasons’; but a very poor translation of to argue with, which corresponds to ‘discuter (de manière agressive, in an agressive way)’. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2002 – Evaluating Unclarity In Judicial Decisions: Violations Of The Usage Rule In Legal Argumentation

• by: H.J. Plug - University of Amsterdam

1. Introduction
In everyday discussions as well as in legal procedures, unclear language can have negative consequences for the resolution of disputes. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992, 2001) state that parties in a discussion making use of unclear or ambiguous language are guilty of the fallacy of unclearness. By using unclear formulations, they violate one of the rules for critical discussions: the usage rule.
This discussion rule, although never referred to as such, seems to play an important role in legal procedures as well. Among other things, the Dutch Supreme Court hears grievances against the motivation of judicial decisions that are based on the ground that the motivation of the decision is obscure. One of the legal parties may, for example, complain about the unclear formulation of the arguments, rendering an adequate reaction impossible. Since these complaints are not always allowed, it is worthwhile to address the question when such a complaint about the formulation of an argument may be successful. Van Eemeren and Grootendorst point out that it might be difficult to answer questions such as these. Therefore it is interesting to take a closer look at judicial decisions in which unclearness and ambiguity are explicitly discussed.
In my contribution I will discuss the way in which the Dutch Supreme Court decides on differences of opinion about the obscurity of the motivation of legal decisions. By analysing (legal) discussions on the formulation of the motivation, I will try to find evaluative criteria that reach beyond the specific case at hand.
First I will briefly discuss how unclarity is treated in literature on fallacies. Then I will indicate what type of complaints concerning the motivation of judicial decisions may be submitted to the (Dutch) Supreme Court. Finally I will discuss a number of exemplary cases of complaints concerning the formulation of the motivation that either have or have not been allowed.

2. Linguistic fallacies
In handbooks on fallacies (e.g., Hamblin, 1970, Woods & Walton, 1982, and Walton, 1995) and in textbooks (e.g., Johnson & Blair, 1994), fallacies are divided into two groups: those dependent on language and those independent of language. When dealing with linguistic fallacies, or fallacies of language and meaning, most authors discuss at least the fallacy of equivocation and the fallacy of amphiboly. The fallacy of equivocation is caused by lexical ambiguity. According to Walton (1995, 61) this fallacy occurs when a word that is essential in an argument is used ambiguously in such a way that it makes the argument appear sound, when in actual fact it is not. The fallacy of amphiboly is caused by syntactic ambiguity. This fallacy occurs when the syntactic interpretation of an ambiguous sentence is changed during the discourse(i). Most authors that deal with linguistic fallacies, however, do not discuss them in great detail(ii). Furthermore, not all examples presented of different kinds of ambiguity provide good examples of fallacies. As Woods and Walton (1982, 169) observe, many of the examples cited are, in fact, not arguments at all. It is obvious that ambiguity and vagueness can lead to problems in communication. But when should they be considered as fallacies? This question is closely connected with the definition of the concept fallacy.
In the pragma-dialectial argumentation theory a fallacy is defined as a speech act which frustrates efforts to resolve a difference of opinion, and the term fallacy is thus systematically connected with the rules for critical discussions. By making use of unclear or ambiguous language, parties to a difference of opinion can make the resolution of a dispute difficult or even impossible. In doing so they violate the usage rule, which runs as follows:
Parties must not use any formulations that are insufficiently clear or confusingly ambiguous, and they must interpret the formulations of the other party as carefully and accurately as possible. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2002 – Using An Activity System Model For Analyzing Effective Arguments

• by: Susan Popham - The University of Memphis, USA

This presentation analyzes the arguments of three business managers who worked in privately owned medical practices. Their jobs were to pursue payments for claims that had been billed yet denied by health insurance companies. Their claims for payment were in effect arguments for which they gathered data, offered proof, and stated their claims. I use an activity system model to examine the interrelations between the elements of their workplaces and to highlight their roles as agents of workplaces.

Activity System Theory
Activity systems theory, based heavily on theories by Vygotsky and Leontev, studies groups of people who come together to work for common goals through dialogic, tool-mediated means. According to Beach (1998), activity systems researchers pay close attention to the subjects (the people involved in the activity system) and their (sometimes conflicting) identities, the objective/motive (as Engestrom defines it, “the problem space at which the activity is directed” [Engestrom, 1993, p. 67]), tools (usually genres or texts), rules, community, and division of labor. In simple form, an activity system includes the whole context in which people come together with discursive means to achieve certain outcomes – hence workplaces, classrooms, boardrooms, homes, civic groups, hobbies, even conferences can be theorized as activity systems.
Russell (1997) argues for this model that allows a researcher to understand the relationship between text, context, and writer, and to explore the power, stability, and change in that relationship. He uses activity system theory to combine both genre and community in an “expanded theory of dialectic that embraces objective and motives of collectives and their participants to explain reciprocal interactions among people through texts” (p. 505).
Simply put, Russell proposes a model for systematic, “principled and concrete analysis” (p. 524) of the dynamic, powerful, and complex context of activity systems through the textual practice of agents. His theory offers many benefits: it understands that activity systems have many motives, subjects, and tools; reveals that individual subjects also have many motives and tools; highlights the contradictions and double binds which rise through the various motives and tools; shows activity systems and genres as dynamic in space and time; makes necessary the interrelation between the genres and their contexts; and it underscores the overlapping nature of multiple activity systems and of genre systems.

Russell identifies these tensions as “contradictions” or “double binds;” they are “the dialectical pulls within and among systems” (1997, p. 519). Identifying these areas of “contradictions” can help us understand the ways in which genres can both “stabilize systems… as well as mediate collective change” (Winsor, 1999, p. 202). And this theory gives scholars an avenue for analyzing more fully discourse and contexts. As Winsor theorizes,
Activity theory has the potential to help us stop thinking of context as a container in which text is subsequently produced. Rather, an activity system and the elements making it up (tools, actors, objectives) can be seen as mutually constitutive and always in flux. (p. 201) Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2002 – Logical Dialectics: The Missing Link Between Deductivism And Pragma-Dialectics

• by: Henry Prakken - Institute of Information and Computing Sciences, Utrecht University

1. Introduction
For a long time, the fields of formal logic and argumentation theory seemed to ignore each other. However, in more recent years the two communities seem to grow towards each other again. One reason for this is the interest in Artificial Intelligence in the logic of common sense reasoning and everyday argumentation. Partly drawing on insights from argumentation theory, AI has provided formal and computational studies of phenomena that for decades were regarded as the province of informal logic and argumentation theory. Two years ago, the two communities met physically, at the very successful Symposium on Argument and Computation in Pitlochry, Scotland, organised by Tim Norman and Chris Reed. A consensus seems growing that both communities can learn a lot from each other.
The aim of this paper is to illustrate this point with an analysis of one issue with respect to which argumentation theory has long criticised formal logic, viz. the issue whether deductive validity is the only criterion for evaluating arguments. Argumentation theorists such as Perelman have persuasively argued that that there is more to reasoning than the deductive form of mathematical arguments. Perelman (e.g. Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969) stressed that everyday arguments are not simply valid or invalid, but more or less strong, relevant or persuasive. Moreover, Perelman challenged logicians to supplement standard logic with a theory of argumentation that can account for this phenomenon. In this paper, I argue that such an account has become possible by combining various research developments from the last two decades, viz. formal dialogue systems from argumentation theory, models of legal procedure from AI & Law, and models of defeasible reasoning from AI.
I will develop my argument as a critical response to a very interesting recent paper by Leo Groarke in defence of so-called ‘deductivism’ (Groarke 1999). In Section 2 of this paper I will briefly outline and illustrate Groarke’s deductivist account of everyday-argument validity. In Section 3 I shall argue that this account, although definitely illuminating, still ignores some essential elements of everyday arguments. In Section 4 I shall put my analysis in a wider perspective, discussing the relevance of research on argumentation schemes. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2002 – Arguing National Missile Defense: Evaluating The Bush Administration’s “New Framework” For Nuclear Security

• by: Theodore O. Prosise - Department of Communication, University of Washington

Abstract
Addressing the National Defense University on May 1 of this year, President George W. Bush outlined a “new framework” for nuclear security in the post-Cold War world.  This new framework is based on two key policy moves. First, the United States will develop and deploy a robust National Missile Defense (NMD). Second, it will reduce its nuclear arsenal to a minimal “credible” level.  In light of the dangers that nuclear weapons pose and given the historic difficulties in sustaining support for missile defense this essay examines the Bush Administration’s arguments for NMD.  Following the direction Edward Schiappa provides in Warranting Assent, this essay evaluates the Bush Administration’s justification for NMD. The essay considers what the NMD arguments accomplish for the administration. This essay maintains that the Bush Administration is arguing for NMD because it is a necessary component of an overall policy of extending nuclearism from the Cold War to the post-Cold War world.

The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists Board of Directors in March/April of 2002 moved the “Doomsday Clock” from nine to seven minutes to midnight. Despite the initial promise of reducing the nuclear threat after the close of the superpower conflict, this is the third time the clock’s hands have been moved closer to midnight in the post-Cold War era (Bulletin 2002). The specter of nuclear terrorism is growing and India and Pakistan stand perilously close to a nuclear conflict, which should remind us of Robert Manning’s warning several years ago that “the likelihood of nuclear use – either in a regional conflict or by terrorists – is probably greater now than in the bipolar superpower era” (1997-1998: 70-71). Even as threats grow, we have yet to see substantial qualitative movement away from nuclearism. Both the Bush Sr. and the Clinton administrations were progressing on a trajectory of reducing the number of nuclear weapons through verified and binding arms control agreement. But struck by the perceived lack of progress, credentialed anti-nuclear voices since the mid-1990s have sought to bring the debate over nuclear policy from the technical to the public sphere, encouraging public moral argument about U.S. nuclear weapons policy and explicitly advocating a massive and fundamental change in U.S. nuclear policy.  These nuclear “abolitionists” have challenged the nuclear establishment’s exclusive purview over public policy argument, criticized current force structure policy, and the very necessity of nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War world (Prosise 2000).
Partly in response to such criticism, the Bush administration has recently reframed the public debate over nuclear weapons, claiming to offer an alternative to Cold War nuclearism, and, implicitly, nuclear abolition as well (“President Bush’s” 2001)(i).  This “new framework” is explicitly intended to reduce the dangers of nuclear weapons and enhance the security of the United States and its allies by maintaining maximum nuclear flexibility and by shielding vital interests from ballistic missile attacks. While Bush is offering an alternative to Cold War nuclearism, it has not “clashed” with these abolitionists’ arguments directly. Indeed, the Bush administration has barely acknowledged the abolitionists, but they were in the minds of those who crafted the new post-Cold War nuclear posture, informed Bush’s new framework, and set the ground for the recent May arms control accord with Russia (“Rationale” 2001; see also, Doa 2002; Gordon May 9, 2001). Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2002 – Strength And Order In Practical Reasoning: Decision-Guiding Argumentation

• by: Luis A. Pérez-Miranda - ILCLI-The University of the Basque Country (UPV/EHU)

Abstract
Beliefs are the only evidence available for an agent making decisions about whether what he wants to do is justified under the circumstances or not. We think the connection between beliefs and goals can be evaluated according to order and strength criteria. Order among supporting reasons constrains the decision-guiding argumentation process to only those decisions that are relevant for the agent while just excluding or postponing the others. Strength determines the expected degree of utility derived from the adoption or non-adoption of a goal. An agent would only be justified in adopting a goal when the reason that supports it remains undefeated.

Introduction
Practical reasoning seems to help the agent in the way of constructing strategies and plans in his pursuit of a better situation for himself. The goals and objectives of an agent can be of diverse nature, from mere intrinsic desires to sub-goals of already intended plans. For instance, to be thirsty is usually a reason for adopting the goal of finding water or some other refreshment to quench one’s thirst. Similarly, the obligation of starting work at nine o’clock every morning can be a sufficient reason for adopting the goal of getting up at half past seven daily. Other goals just respond to exigencies arising from intended plans (e.g. getting a ticket for the Symphony Hall can be just a sub-goal of my intended plan for the weekend). One of the tasks of practical reasoning is to cope with conflict situations of decision-making among an agent’s potential goals. To be sure, sometimes an agent is forced to choose among different relevant options that are jointly incompatible.
Our approach assumes that, though not always, in many cases, the adoption of goals is plan dependent. Generally it happens that a goal cannot be adopted before the agent realizes that he is able to bring a plan about for the occasion. Often an important amount of the value of a goal is directly obtained from the expected utility value of the plan in which it is embedded (Beaudoin 1994). In more detail, the adoption of a goal would be related to three factors: the value of the goal itself, the possibility of constructing a plan pursuing a previously learnt strategy for that goal, and the agent’s commitments to previous plans (Pérez Miranda 1997). Hence to justify the adoption of a goal the rational agent must be able to construct a solid decision-guiding argument. That is, the practical argument constructed for the occasion should remain undefeated after the reasoning process. ‘Practical reasoning is based on an agent’s goals relative to a situation and on his knowledge of what is usually (reasonably expected) to obtain, according to his knowledge of the situation. …Typically, this pragmatic type of reasoning is based on rules or regularities that admit exceptions. Hence the conclusion is based on a kind of plausible reasoning – it represents a type of provisional presumption that could be subject to rejection or revision in the face of the new evidence, or of new developments in the situation’ (Walton 1990: 84).
Once the agent has recognized that a potential goal is obtainable, the next step in determining the adoption of a goal is to detect any incompatibilities between that goal and other possible intended goals derived from previous intended plans or single urgencies that ought to be accomplished without delay. Hence the agent must look for scenarios in which both potential goals and ongoing adopted goals fit together insofar as fulfilling one may be at odds with fulfilling another or with maximum fulfilment of the overall set. We are concerned with explaining how an agent could manage to make these factors fit together appropriately by adopting a behaviour consisting in, so to speak, following some rational patterns.
The evaluative mechanism proposed here is only concerned with those goals that have a motivational or cognitive grounding (see below). According to our model, the rational agent selects only those goals whose supporting reasons are undefeated according to the agent’s doxastic states. The mechanism embodies two levels of decision-making depending on the order and strength of the supporting reasons. An agent only would be justified in adopting a goal when the reason that supports that goal remains undefeated. Read more