ISSA Proceedings 2002 – How Could Official Speakers Communicate Reasonably With Their King?

• by: Um Hoon - Seoul National University

1. Introduction
During the Joseon(i) dynasty (1392 – 1910), there developed special agencies of public opinion. They were usually called the three agencies [Samsa, 三司(ii)] because they consisted of the three agencies Saheonbu, Saganwon, and Hongmun-gwan, and collaborated with each other. The officials of the three agencies were ordinarily called official speakers [eon-gwan, 言官] because they covered institutional speech in the court. They presented their opinions to their king. As is universally known, however, the Joseon state was an absolute monarchy; the kings had absolute dignity. They were regarded as governors who were bestowed with Heaven’s decree[cheonmyeong, 天命]. Therefore, the relation between official speakers and the king was vertical. The conditions under which public discourse took place in Joseon society were not equivalent to those of modern society. In such an unequal relationship, how could it be possible for the official speakers to communicate reasonably with their king?

A key to this problem exists in the characteristics of the leading class of the Joseon dynasty and its political activities; the sadaebu(iii), the leading class of the Joseon dynasty, formed public opinion [gongnon, 公論] in various ways, which was communicated in the court officially and openly. Social scientists have revealed that the public sphere was formed in the early Joseon dynasty, when the public opinion of the sadaebu influenced the real politics of the court(iv).

However, this was only one of the necessary conditions to realize reasonable communication between them; the fact that the sadaebu had sufficient power and ability to form their public opinion was one thing, and the fact that communication between the representatives of public opinion(v) and the king was reasonable was another. In this paper, I pursue the rhetorical strategy that guaranteed reasonable communication between the official speakers and their king.

2. Historical Background
a. Argumentative Discourse in the Public Sphere of the early Joseon Dynasty
The inherent concept of public opinion [gongnon, 公論] was formed in 14th century Korea, during the period of dynastic succession. In fact, the term gongnon had first appeared in the Goryeo dynasty (918 – 1392), but its meaning was quite abstract and idealistic. It meant ‘sound remarks’ that were unchangeable. At the beginning of the Joseon dynasty, however, public opinion was considered as a concrete opinion that was formed and communicated in a special field, the public arena [gongnonsojae, 公論所在(vi)].

The public arena was moved in accordance with the change of initiative in forming public opinion. It originally meant the State Council [Uijeongbu, 議政府], which consisted of ministries above 2nd rank(vii). However it was gradually moved to Daegan(viii) after the ruling period of King Taejong, the 3rd king of the Joseon dynasty. At the beginning of King Seongjong’s reign (1469 – 1494), the notion that Daegan was the public arena was widely accepted in court. Later, this changed once again around the 19th year of King Seongjong (1488). From that time on, the official speakers accepted the notion that Hongmun-gwan was the public arena. This change of notion had great importance, because Hongmun-gwan, by that time, had become the self-advancing path of the students [yusaeng, 儒生] into the court. So, Hongmun-gwan functioned as the channel of outer discussion [we-ui, 外議], namely the public opinion from out of the court. Finally, the public arena moved to the mountain and forest [sallim, 山林], which referred to the literati residing in the countryside (Um, 2002a). Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2002 – Indicators Of Dissociation

• by: M.A. van Rees - Universiteit van Amsterdam

1. Introduction
Dissociation is one of the two main categories that Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca distinguish in their influential taxonomy of argumentative techniques (the other being association). They define dissociation as an argumentation scheme in which the speaker separates elements that previously were considered by the auditorium as a whole or a conceptual unit (1969, 190). Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca distinguish dissociation from an attack against an association connecting or bringing together elements that were previously regarded as separate (1969, 412). Only in dissociation a more or less profound change is brought about in the conceptual basis of an argument: one single unitary concept is separated into two, new, concepts. An example is the separation of the single concept of ‘law’ into two new concepts, ‘the letter of the law’ and ‘the spirit of the law’.
Up till now, not much study has been made of dissociation. Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca are the only authors who have treated the technique in detail(i). In previous publications (Van Rees 2002a, 2002b) I have investigated in which contexts and with which dialectical and rhetorical effects dissociation is actually used in argumentative discourse. In this article, I concentrate on the question how dissociation manifests itself in argumentative discourse, investigating what textual indicators there are for this argumentative technique. As a point of departure for this investigation, I first will seek clarification of the notion of dissociation.

2. The notion of dissociation
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca do not give a more precise definition of dissociation than the rather vague one cited above. In various places in the chapter in which they treat this argumentative technique, however, they do mention various characteristics of dissociation. From these places we may deduce that Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca conceive of dissociation as an argumentative technique that serves to resolve the contradictions that a notion that originally was covered by a single term, and up till then was considered a unity, gives rise to. The speaker using a dissociation resolves these contradictions by distinguishing various aspects within that notion, some of which are subsumed under a new denominator(ii). The now reduced old notion and the new notion that has been split off are not equally valued, one is considered more important or more essential than the other; therein lies the source of the argumentative potential of the technique(iii).
The expanded definition just given can help to distinguish dissociation from other, related notions. First of all, dissociation can be distinguished from the notion semantic shift (Depperman 2000). In semantic shift, different participants in a discussion use the same term (for instance, “freedom”) in a different sense. Semantic shift differs from dissociation in several respects. Firstly, the multiple meanings with which the term is used suggest that no single, unitary concept actually is in use. Moreover, none of the participants tries to separate one meaning from the other one. Nor does anyone try to resolve the contradictions that result from using the term in different meanings (for instance, the consumptive society limits vs. extends my freedom) through reserving the term for one of the meanings while excluding and devaluating the others(iv). Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2002 – A Semio-Argumentative Perspective On Enthymeme Reconstruction

• by: Lev G. Vassiliev - Kaluga State Pedagogical University, Kaluga, Russia

Natural language communicants always construct implicit messages. Implicitness can be regarded as a universal phenomenon, irrespective of what language we use. Implicitness can also be viewed as a matter of degree: some messages are “more elliptic” than others. Therefore, there must be criteria for defining implicitness. With that in mind, messages are implicit linguistically, cognitively, and pragmatically. These three aspects closely interrelate, still, for technical purposes they can be differentiated.
Linguistic implicitness regularly occurs in dialogues where there is enough context information not to use one and the same word or phrase. It also occurs in titles where the text information is presented as a “chunk” or “topic”. More often than not we encounter cases when condensed information is used in the body of a text, p.ex. Have you ever been to a topless bar?
Cognitive implicitness occurs in any type of texts, since it is impossible to clarify everything the communicant grounds her message on, for fear of vicious circle (that usually concerns the parts of an argument). Cognitive implicitness is necessary when we have several embedments like in the so-called consecutive subordination, p.ex. preceding structures for the house that Jack built… The number of such embedments is usually not more than 3 structures; presumably it will hardly exceed the Miller’s number 7(2, with the previous example being left for very specific cases like nursery rhymes.
Pragmatic implicitness has to do with intentions because in sincere argumentation a sender would want his message to be purpose-sufficient (thus leaving some pertaining information aside), precise (leaving elaboration aside) and laconic (leaving details aside). Clarification of implicit information can be the matter of degree depending on communicative purposes: we can clarify a standpoint (a claim) and suppress premises hoping for skills of our vis-à-vis to restore the latter; we can clarify one of the premises that could be more difficult to get independently; we can, on the last account, clarify all the premises immediately supporting the standpoint in order to “give the complete picture” of our argument (leaving alone the masochistic reasons of attracting possible criticism to all the components of our argument). These factors must be taken into account for analysing comprehension activities of argumentation recipients: to what extent do the latter need to reconstruct the unexpressed information? Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2002 – Dialectical Argumentation With Argumentation Schemes: Towards A Methodology For The Investigation Of Argumentation Schemes

• by: Bart Verheij - Department of Metajuridica, Universiteit Maastricht

1. Introduction
Argumentation follows patterns. Here are two examples:

1. P. If P then Q. Therefore Q.
2. All Ps are Qs. Some R is not a Q. Therefore some R is not a P.

The first is known as Modus ponens, which plays a major role in logical proof systems. The second is one of the categorical syllogisms that were already studied by Aristotle. These examples are well-known from logic.
But there are many other patterns in argumentation. For instance, the following:
3. Person E says that P. Person E is an expert with respect to the fact that P. Therefore P.
4. Doing act A contributes to goal G. Person P has goal G. Therefore person P should
do act A.

Scheme (3) expresses a variant of argumentation from expert opinion, (4) one of means-end reasoning.

All four example schemes are sensible patterns of argumentation. In real-life argumentation, the latter two are very relevant, probably more than the former two. Still the former two (or variants of them) are more often encountered in books on argumentation than the latter two.

For present purposes, there is no need to dive deeply into the reasons for this somewhat paradoxical situation. It is however not hard to think of some reasons that may be adduced for this situation:
– The former two fit in neat formal systems: Modus ponens (1) in natural deduction and other logical proof systems, scheme (2) in the complete classification of categorical syllogisms. It is not to be expected that the schemes (3) and (4) will appear in formalisms with similarly neat formal properties.
– The former two are thought of as necessarily valid schemes, and the latter as pragmatical validities or perhaps even as pragmatical contingencies. (How these notions are to be defined and whether such distinctions make sense is here not at issue.)
– The former two are strict in the sense that they allow no exceptions, while the latter are defeasible. For instance, with respect to (3), there is the exception that the expert is wrong, and with respect to (4), there can be many ways to achieve a goal, some better than others.
– The former two express abstract general schemes, where the latter two express concrete context-dependent schemes. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2002 – Discourse And Emblematic Figures Of Presenters In Political Debates On Greek Television

• by: Ioanna Vovou - University of Paris XIII

Introduction
The introduction of political debates to television indicates a specific way to visualize social space. The genre of television debate stands on the crosssroads of two different rationales: conceptually it aspires to be part of the democratic process and pragmatically it is a television programme. This communication proposes an analytical approach of the discourse adopted by the presenter of political debates on Greek television, whose emblematic figure takes an important place in television representations. Its objective is to reveal a form of expression of the Greek society. Our approach is comprised of theoritical concepts related to television enunciation and its relation with politics. A semiological and rhetorical analysis of the presenters discourse reveals a symbolic conception of the television political debates in which principles of democratic dialogue are enacted.

The evolution of political debates in Greece
In order to consider political debates within their historical context, a short review of the evolution of Greek television might be useful. Television broadcasting began in 1966, just before the dictatorship of the colonels (1967-1974). The establishment of television under the dictatorship is characteristic of its role as an instrument in the hands of an autocratic and undemocratic regime.
After the re-establishment of the parliament in 1974 and until the broadcasting deregulation in the end of the 90s, television remained under severe state control. Nevertheless, the genre of political debate makes its appearance on Greek television screens as political dialogue is a democratic demand after a long period of abolition of the democratic regime.
Television deregulation and the creation of private channels from 1989 and on symbolize a new era in media representation of the Greek public space and, more particularly, in the consolidation of television debates. These programs are rapidly developed, occupying a strategic place in the general discourse of channels towards their public.

1. Towards an identification through the presenter
The presenters of Greek political debates are journalists that are, progressively over the years, narrowly linked with their own debate program, becoming a central figure, an image of the program, a key element to its recognition and its immediate identification by the public. In order to understand the extent of this phenomenon, some program titles, containing the first or last name of their presenter are illustrative: “Anna in wonderland” (1991-93, on the public channel ET2, presented by Anna Panayotarea), “Ellispontos” (1995-96 on the private channel Mega, presented by Elli Staï) and “Extremismi” (1997-98, on the public channel NET, former ET2, presented by Olga Tremi). Furthermore, if the above examples refer to women presenters, in some cases, both sexes present the image of their faces in the titles of their program, just before the opening sequence or offer written references to their hair care and clothing providers in the end of the program. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2002 – Conceptualizing fallacies: The Informal Logic And Pragma-Dialectic Approaches To The Argumentum Ad Ignorantiam

• by: Jean Wagemans - University of Amsterdam

1. Introduction
Within the medieval genre of proofs of the existence of God, there is one particular argument that is strikingly brief and simple. In our days, it is used more often to prove the existence of extraterrestrial life forms, but the medieval version goes as follows:
1. It has never been proven that God does not exist. So God exists.

It is not so very hard, however, to give a counterargument that is exactly as persuasive as this one, but leads to the opposite conclusion:
2. It has never been proven that God exists. So God does not exist.

How, then, are we to evaluate this pair of arguments? It would be problematic if someone would try to defend one of them on the basis of a critique of the logical form of the other. The invalidity of one argument implies the invalidity of the other, since both arguments share the same logical form: It has not been proven that not-X, so X(i).
Maybe agnosticism owes part of its popularity to the fact that it solves the problem of the congruence of two arguments with opposite conclusions. Nevertheless, this solution leaves the question open, whether or not this form of argument is valid. In the field of argumentation theory, there is little disagreement on this point. According to most handbooks, the argument is invalid and fallacious, and it is labeled the argumentum ad ignorantiam or argument from ignorance (see Hamblin 1970: 43-44).
Twentieth-Century critiques of the limitations of logical approaches to argumentation have made clear that invalidity and fallaciousness are not synonymous notions. Most present-day scholars agree on the logical invalidity of the argument from ignorance, but that it is fallacious is not granted by everyone. So these critiques have not resulted in a reconsideration of the logical status of the argument, but rather in a transformation and extension of the possible ways to conceptualize it. Read more