ISSA Proceedings 2006 – Creating Controversy About Science And Technology

• by: Leah Ceccarelli - University of Washington

This paper is a response to Tom Goodnight’s ‘rationale for inquiry’ into ‘science and technology controversy’, which was recently published in the forum section of Argumentation and Advocacy.

My first response to his published essay was printed in the same issue of that journal, as were responses by Alan Gross, Carolyn Miller and John Lyne. My purpose in this second response is to summarize some similarities in the arguments that Miller, Lyne and I independently presented in that published forum, and to offer a new critique of the language used to discuss science and technology controversy.
Gross’s response to Goodnight’s call to arms was to reenlist and begin preparing his armaments; he laid out theoretical frameworks for the analysis of scientific controversy borrowed from Joseph Gusfield, Victor Turner, and Jürgen Habermas.
Miller, Lyne and I, who like Gross are career rhetoricians of science, took a somewhat different approach when writing our responses. While we were excited to hear a call for the further support of a segment of our field, we could not help but also act as critics of the argument that Goodnight offered. While failing to advance theoretical frameworks of our own, we did suggest that there might be some problems with the initial map of the field that Goodnight sketched.
All three of us focused on Goodnight’s characterization of science and technology controversy as being generated from a contest between ‘traditional culture’ and ‘modernity’, ‘between community and society, between lifeworld and systems-world’ (p. 27), a repeated ‘struggle between prudencebased reason and modern reasoning [or reasoning] from science/technology’ (p. 28).
Invoking Habermas, Goodnight suggests that ‘systemsworld reasoning’ is ‘usurping lifeworld functions, at too high a price’, and at the same time, science is becoming ‘increasingly tied down by the practices of party politics’ (p. 27).
In response, he says, science and controversy studies should ‘engage the nexuses among risks deliberated from traditionbased, prudential reasoning or assessed by contemporary epistemic strategies’, and find a way to help public deliberation ‘continually negotiate its status, evolve, and reclaim its powers on either side of a divide between forces that would irreparably politicize science or progressively scientize the lifeworld’ (p. 28).

Miller, Lyne and I, well-trained debaters all, recognized an antithesis when we saw one, and we decided it was our duty to complicate it. Miller, looking to some cases of science controversy about which she’s written, points out that what strikes her the most in these studies is ‘the strategic instability of the distinction between epistemic and policy issues, between expert and public forums’ (p. 36). This, she suggests, is evidence that ‘the public sphere and the technical sphere are more intimately intertwined – and perhaps more similar to each other than Professor Goodnight’s earlier work maintains’ (p. 37). ‘Controversy in the technical sphere can involve ambiguity, emotion, and multiple forms of power, much like deliberation in the public sphere’, says Miller.

‘And controversy in the public sphere often is shaped and constrained by influences from the technical sphere’ (p. 37). Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2006 – Revolutionary Rhetoric – Georg Büchner’s “Der Hessische Landbote“ (1834). A Case Study

• by: Manfred Kienpointner - University of Vienna, University of Innsbruck

1. Georg Büchner’s Political Pamphlet “Der Hessische Landbote” (1834): Historical Background and Persuasive Effect
If we want to understand and interpret Büchner’s revolutionary rhetoric in his pamphlet “Der Hessische Landbote”, we have to take into account the political and social context, that is, the historical situation of the duchy Hessen-Darmstadt in the 30’s of the 19th century. In this context, several political reforms initiated by Duke Ludewig I. (1753-1830) have to be mentioned positively, namely, the abolishment of peonage, the declaration of a constitution and the introduction of elective franchise; moreover, the Duke’s theatre and library were opened for the general public. However, these reforms at the beginning of the 19th century remained half-hearted. For example, even after the abolishment of peonage, certain feudal tax privileges remained. In this way, many farmers had to suffer an intolerable double burden of the traditional taxes paid to the nobility and the newly introduced taxes paid to the central authorities of Hessen (cf. Franz 1987, p. 38). The right to be elected remained restricted to the wealthy citizens. Finally, the laws abolishing the traditional guild system and introducing free trade caused the bankruptcy of craftsmen through the newly created competition of cheap factory products from foreign countries.

Furthermore, from 1830 onwards, Duke Ludewig II. (1777-1848) returned to a conservative policy, with much less social ambitions than his father Ludewig I. Consequently, Ludewig II. let his prime minister Carl W. H. du Bos du Thil (1777-1859) use authoritarian methods, for example, the brutal knock down of social riots in the northern parts of Hessen.

In 1834, the year of the publication of “Der Hessische Landbote”, the duchy Hessen-Darmstadt had about 720.000 inhabitants, whose majority, especially in rural areas, suffered from extreme poverty. Almost 50% of the population lived just at or below the level of subsistence, 40-45% of the working population (including children over the age of 12 and elderly people) had to work 12-18 hours a day (cf. Schaub 1976, p. 99; Hauschild 2000, p. 19 and p. 43).

In this dramatic situation, Georg Büchner (1813-1827), who is well-known as a brilliant German writer, radical political thinker and distinguished scientist in the fields of medicine and biology, decided to contribute to a revolutionary change of the intolerable social situation via political propaganda. Büchner was born in Goddelau and grew up in the capital of the duchy, Darmstadt. He was the son of the successful physician Dr. Ernst Karl Büchner and his wife Caroline. Among his numerous siblings, Wilhelm Büchner (1816-1892) stands out as the inventor of artificial ultramarine, Luise Büchner (1821-1877) became a distinguished writer and feminist and Ludwig Büchner (1824-1899) was a well-known materialist philosopher.

After finishing grammar school in Darmstadt, Georg Büchner studied medicine in Straßburg, the centre of German political emigration, where he probably established contacts with revolutionary circles in the years 1831-1833. Büchner continued his studies in Gießen 1833-1834, and founded a section of the “Society of Human Rights”, first in Gießen, later in Darmstadt. In this society, pre-communistic theories were discussed. Büchner developed an increasingly critical view of the political reality within the duchy and the other countries of the political confederation “Deutscher Bund” bordering on Hessen-Darmstadt. Through his friend August Becker, Büchner got to know the Protestant pastor Friedrich Ludwig Weidig (1791-1837), the leading head of the liberal-democratic opposition in northern Hessen. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2006 – Legal Argumentation, Constitutional Interpretation, And Presumption Of Constitutionality

• by: Virgílio Afonso da Silva - Professor at the Faculty of Law, University of São Paulo

Abstract: Constitutional interpretation is a very complex task. The main reason underlying this complexity is the open and abstract language of constitutional texts, mainly when it concerns their bill of rights. And when it comes to judicial review of legislation, constitutional interpretation becomes even more complex. Not only the constitution but also ordinary legislation has to be interpreted so that their compatibility can be properly analysed. Although this scheme represents common sense among constitutional scholars, the arguments used in the judicial review are the subject of fierce disputes. The aim of my paper is to analyse one of these arguments, which is frequently employed in Latin American constitutional adjudication: the presumption of constitutionality. I will argue that this kind of presumption entails many problematic issues of which constitutional scholars in Latin America are often unaware. Roughly speaking, these problematic issues can be of two types:
(1) Formal argumentation problems – concerning above all the relationship between presumption and time, as well as between presumption and proof; and
(2) Constitutional theory problems – concerning some consequences of the presumption of constitutionality in the separation of powers.

1. Introduction and definitions
In legal argumentation, presumptions often play an important role. Presuming something to be true under given circumstances – above all when it is difficult or impossible to discover the real truth – is a strategy which has been used in legal argumentation and legal decision ever since the Roman Law. Although the idea is ancient and appears, at least at first sight, quite straightforward, there is no real consensus on its precise definition and on the situations in which presumptions can be used. As will be shown further on, these two variables – definition and applicability – are of great importance to the subject of this paper, the presumption of constitutionality.
Presumptions are usually defined as the acceptance of something as true given certain conditions. But this is not enough, since it is crucial for the concept of presumption to define whether and – if it is the case – how a presumption can be defeated. In legal systems based on the Roman Law tradition, it is common to speak of two kinds of presumptions: the so-called presumptions iuris tantum and the iuris et de iure. Presumptions of the first kind can be defeated while presumptions of the latter cannot. For the aims of this paper, presumptions iuris et de iure are of no importance, since the constitutionality of an enacted law cannot be exempt from a possible defeat, at least in those countries where there is some kind of judicial review of legislation.[i] For presumptions iuris tantum, the presumed fact should be considered true unless stringent evidence to the contrary is introduced to the argumentation. In this sense, it can be said, as a preliminary working definition, that one is facing a presumption (iuris tantum) if, given certain conditions, something shall be considered true, unless there is stringent evidence to believe the contrary.
In her logic formalisation of presumptions, Edna Ullmann-Margalit (1983, 147) includes only the first part of my definition, leaving aside the reference to the evidence and to the possibility of defeat. She represents presumptions through the following formula: pres (P, Q), where P stands for the presumption-raising-fact and Q for the presumed fact. This means “P raises the presumption of Q” or “[t]here is a presumption from Q that P” (1983, 147). Nevertheless, when it comes to an explanation of the “presumption rule”, her idea is completed in the following terms: “Given that p is the case, you (= the rule subject) shall proceed as if q were true, unless or until you have (sufficient) reason to believe that q is not the case.” She calls this last part of the rule the “rebuttal clause” (1983, 149).

A more complete formalisation of the idea of presumptions can be found in Daniel Mendonca (1998, 408). According to him, the formula of presumption should take the following form: [Pro (P) & ¬Pro (¬Q)] → O Pres (Q). This means that proven that P is the case – Pro (P) – and not proven that Q is not the case – ¬Pro (¬Q) – it is then obligatory to presume Q. The importance of Mendonca’s formulation lies in its emphasis on the necessity of proving something in order to rebut a presumption. This necessity will be explored further on (see section 2.3). Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2002 – Preface

It is with great pleasure that the planning committee of the Fifth Conference of the International Society for the Study of Argumentation (ISSA), which was held in Amsterdam in 2002 (June 25-28), presents all interested students of argumentation now with the Proceedings of this Conference.

We are sad that, due to his untimely death in 2002, this time Rob Grootendorst, who was a member of our team at all four previous ISSA Conferences, is no longer among the editors of the Proceedings. However, we are happy that Francisca Snoeck Henkemans was willing to take his place and join the editorial company. In honor of all the important work the late Rob Grootendorst did to stimulate and promote the study of argumentation, these Proceedings are dedicated to his memory.

It is our emphatic opinion that the Proceedings of the Fifth Conference include a great number of very interesting papers. They are written from a variety of perspectives and theoretical backgrounds. Besides philosophical, theoretical and empirical papers, there are, for instance, papers that deal specifically with public argumentation or with legal argumentation and there are also a number of case studies. Among the general topics that are treated are, as always, the fallacies, the teaching of argumentation, and argumentation in the media, but studies of linguistic aspects of argumentation and artificial intelligence are also represented. The Proceedings of the Fifth ISSA Conference reflect the richness of the contributions that were made to the Conference.

Since the First Conference in 1986, the ISSA Conferences in Amsterdam have become an important meeting-place for argumentation scholars from different disciplinary fields and with a great variety of interests. The number of participants has increased over the years, and so has the number of countries that are represented. We are convinced that the Fifth ISSA Conference has been as fruitful and stimulating as we hoped it would be. In our opinion, the average quality of the papers and the intellectual exchanges has reached a very high level. We hope that these Proceedings will prove our point to the readers. All the papers submitted for publication were reviewed by the editors. In some cases, this has led to further improvements. Despite the fact that we intended to publish Proceedings that provide a comprehensive and representative overview of the conference as a whole, only those papers were accepted that met our quality standards.

It goes without saying that the editors could only accomplish their task in such a short time because they received a lot of help from others. In the process of preparing these Proceedings, just as during the Conference itself, they were able to rely on the assistance of the faculty members of the Department of Speech Communication, Argumentation Theory and Rhetoric of the University of Amsterdam and other members of the research group ‘Argumentation in Discourse’ of the Amsterdam School for Cultural Analysis (ASCA).
It seems only fair, however, to mention one name in particular: Bart Garssen. We are grateful to Bart for his technical assistance in getting the manuscripts ready for publication. Thanks to his help. We are also able to include a CD-rom containing the electronic versions of the papers.

For financial and other kinds of assistance we are grateful to the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW), the Dutch-Belgian Speech Communication Association (VIOT), the Amsterdam School for Cultural Analysis (ASCA), and, last but not least, the International Center for the Study of Argumentation and Speech Communication (Sic Sat).

Amsterdam, December 10, 2002
Frans H. van Eemeren, University of Amsterdam
J. Anthony Blair, University of Windsor
Charles A. Willard, University of Louisville
A. Francisca Snoeck Henkemans, University of Amsterdam

ISSA Proceedings 2002 – Considering Culture In The Analysis Of Arguments

• by: Alan W. Aldrich - Central College, Pella, IA 50219

The study of arguments within the pragma-dialectic program (Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992) removes arguments from their situated contexts (e.g. Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson, & Jacobs, 1994, pp. 60-89) in order to present them as a series of opposing standpoints designed to press towards a resolution within the framework of a critical discussion. Maximal Dialectic Analysis (MDA) is a technique used to reconstruct arguments and identify missing premises that relies on Grice’s (1975) system of interpretation based upon the Cooperative Principle (CP) and Conversational Maxims of Quantity, Quality, Relation, and Manner. The CP requires speakers to: “Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage in which it occurs, by the accepted purposes or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged” (p. 45). Quantity Maxims require interlocutors to be as informative as is necessary (for the purposes of the exchange) but to not be over or under-informative. Quality Maxims require speakers to say what they believe to be true and to not say that which they have reasons to believe might be false. The Relation Maxim requires speakers to be relevant. Unlike the first three maxims that deal with content, the Manner Maxims are concerned with how an utterance gets expressed. Speakers are expected to say things in ways that are clear, concise, orderly, and to the point.

According to Brown and Levinson (1987), the CP provides “an ‘unmarked’ or socially neutral (indeed asocial) presumptive framework for communication” (p. 5) that emphasizes rational efficiency above deviations without principled reasons. Deviations are identified by the utterance’s distance from the CP and conversational maxims. Principled reasons for violations of the CP and Maxims become resources for alternative interpretations that move beyond the literal surface meanings of the utterance while serving to repair the deviations from the CP and Conversational Maxims.

The Gricean framework as a set of guiding principles seems well suited for MDA analysis of arguments made by a variety of people in a variety of situations (Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson, & Jacobs, 1994). However, MDA has paid attention to the maxims of quantity, quality, and relation at the expense of the manner maxim (Aldrich, 1995). How interlocutors make an utterance carries interpretive weight in addition to what is said. For this reason, analysts using MDA must be responsive to the manner maxim if overly charitable or less than charitable interpretations are to be avoided (Aldrich, 1995). Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2002 – Leff’s Account Of The Aristotelian Roots Of The Boethian Theory Of Dialectical Reasoning: A Contemporary Reconsideration

• by: R. P. Alford - University of New Mexico

This paper is an attempt to call attention to the need for a reconsideration of the evolution of the concept of dialectic that took place between the time of Aristotle and Boethius. The central allegation of the paper is that Anicius Manlius Serverinus Boethius was a central figure in the development of a formalised concept of the dialectic, one that was far from Aristotelian. This perspective on the dialectic was made possible through Boethius’ reinterpretation of the dialectical topoi. The key evidence for this shift provided in the paper is the refutation of the presentation of the Aristotelian dialectic as being a theory of proofs. Rather, Boethius successfully convinced many contemporary authors, including Leff, that this interpretation was Aristotle’s own.

The point of departure for the paper is Leff’s stance on the Boethian theory of the commonplaces (1974, 1978, 1983), which was focused on the rhetorical topoi. The aim of the paper is to demonstrate that a focus on the evolution of the rhetorical topoi does not allow for an adequate evaluation of the way in which Boethius’ works affected the medieval understanding of the dialectic. Rhetorical theorists have failed to note how Boethius catalysed an important shift in the relationship between dialectical theory and the theory of the analytic demonstration, which subsequently affected the relationship between dialectical and rhetorical theory.

The importance of demonstrating the origin of the trend towards the conflation of the theories of dialectic and analytics is of more than merely historical interest. This is because of the fact that Boethius’ work provides an example of one of the first instances of an attempt to create a hierarchy between theories of argumentative justification. A reconsideration of the way that Boethius attempted to reconstruct dialectical disputation as an attempt to produce proofs might allow those interested in the reconciliation of rhetorical and dialectical approaches certain critical insights. The recognition of the importance of Boethius in the history of the medieval dialectical might allow these theorists to more forward towards a reconciliation that might do justice to both traditions of argumentation theory. Read more