ISSA Proceedings 2002 – Some Remarks On Wittgenstein’s Ideas About Ethics

• by: Ines Calvo De Miguel - Institute for Logic, Cognition, Language and Information (ILCLI) The University of the Basque Country

Introduction
The subject of this paper [i] is the delimitation of Ethics in Wittgenstein´s work. For that, I take into account his view on ethics in the Tractatus[ii]  (1921) and in the Lecture on ethics  (1930), in connection with the intuitionism of Moore (Principia Ethica, 1903) and the last utilitarianism of Henry Sidgwick (The Methods of Ethics, 1874).

First I want to expound the main Wittgenstenian ideas about ethics: the relation between his ideas on ethics and language and his view on the essence of ethical language. I will propose an interpretation of the writings of Wittgenstein taking into account  the distinction between what is shown and what is said. After that, my intention is to comment on the posible connections between Wittgenstein´s view on ethics and one of the more decisive work on ethics for the ethical thought in the XX century, The Methods of Ethics  of Sidgwick, through its influence on one of the main founders of analytic philosophy, namely G. E. Moore.

The thesis I claim is the following one: There is a line of continuity between those three philosophers, a line that represents the western philosophical tradition and that leads  ethics to a problematic point. It is interesting to draw a line from Sidgwick´s and Moore’s recognition of ethical intuitions and of the idea that “good” is a simple notion and therefore that cannot be defined, until Wittgenstein´s statement that ethics taken as theory is imposible. Sidgwick, Moore and Wittgenstein are three examples of what I call “the maximum purification of Ethics”: the task of stripping ethics of its several contingent dimensions. Those three philosophers are worried about the grounds of ethics and in their task they tried to distinguish it from natural science and methaphysics. Then, ethics remains free from natural and methaphysical dimensions, its object of study has been limited. But the problem that I can see is the following one: in these ethical views the object of study cannot be defined and, therefore, this object has become more and more diffuse, abstract and indeterminate. In my opinion, Wittgenstein carries out until the last consequences this metaethical task, when he confines the ethical field on the one hand to what is shown, i.e. to what cannot be expressed by propositions, and on the other hand to private experiences. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2002 – A Multidimensional Analysis Of French Modal Verbs Pouvoir, Devoir And Falloir

• by: Jean Caron & Josiane Caron-Pargue - UMR CNRS 6096 "Language and Cognition" CNRS & Université de Poitiers – France

Introduction
Every utterance can be, traditionally, analyzed into two main components: the dictum, and the modus – i.e. the propositional content (dictum) expressing the information conveyed by the utterance, and the way it is expressed (modus). Modal expressions are the most explicit means by which this modus is achieved. Linguistically, they fall under a large number of grammatical categories: modal auxiliaries (can, must...), verbs of opinion (think, believe…), adjectives (probable, necessary…), adverbs (possibly, certainly…). But, beyond this syntactic variety, they share essentially the same semantic properties, namely:
1) to mark the speaker’s commitment to his/her assertions; what Grize (1983) calls prise en charge;
2) to open a set of possible worlds, and to define routes among them; a process which involves a momentary disengagement (what Culioli calls décrochage) from the current representation.
As such, they represent an important tool in argumentative processes, which are essentially a matter of beliefs and of transformations of these beliefs.

Apart from studies on modal logic (which, as we will see, are not really relevant for our purposes), there are a large number of linguistic studies on these terms (to quote only relatively classic studies,see, e.g., in English, Perkins 1983; in French, David & Kleiber 1983; and, for the particular verbs we will study here, Portine 1983 or Fuchs 1989). However, this category of linguistic devices have been poorly studied by psycholinguists, who have, by and large, neglected their specific import in sentence and discourse representation. This neglect is, for a large part, due to the kinds of approaches to lexical semantics which are commonly used in the psycholinguistic tradition. It does not seem easy to represent the meaning of modals in the conventional style of semantic networks – which is the most common approach of meaning in psycholinguistics -, nor, more generally, in the prevalent truth-conditional conception of meaning: indeed, most of psycholinguistic models are essentially conceived for dealing with a referential conception of meaning. And the problem with modal expressions is that they simply do not refer in the usual sense. Of course, the ‘possible worlds’ theory of Hintikka (1969), for example, does deal with modal expressions as referring to some kind of objects; but it is definitely not plausible as a psychological model (cf. Johnson-Laird, 1978). So, the general trend is to consider these terms as belonging to the ‘logical’ component of the utterances, together with connectives and quantifiers. A solution which is equally unsatisfactory in each of these cases, since a common feature of these terms is their polysemy: according to the contexts in which they appear, they take on a variety of values, that cannot be reduced to the logical operators they are supposed to represent (concerning the connectives, see, e.g., Caron 1997). Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2002 – Co-Operational And Conflictual Models Of Discussion

• by: Adelino Cattani - University of Padua

«The only object of Academic’s discussion is by arguing both sides of a question to draw out and fashion something which is either true or which come as close as possible to the truth» (Cicero, Academica, 2.8)

Debate, the most typical activity of human beings, plays an important and exclusive role in every part of our life. Debate in turn has also become an important object of debate. A great debate occurred and occurs between supporters and detractors of conflictuality vs. co-operation. There was and there is a special controversy about competitive debate, namely about the practice of debating both sides of a question.
Considering that the debate is intrinsically oppositional, adversarial and confrontational, someone would argue the rhetorical creativity and proficiency in argumentation to be kinds of skills an educated person is expected to have. So they think that the controversy-oriented approach and the skill in debating on either side of any proposed argument are inherently pedagogical: they promote rhetorical creative processes and favour training in argumentation. Cicero recommends that the orator should «have commonplaces ready at hand, in which the question is argued and handled on either side». This is the tradition of Cicero and Quintilian, advocated by Erasmus, exemplified by Francis Bacon, taught by Vico, supported by Mill. Toulmin, Perelman, Habermas too are conscious of the importance and promoters of the revival of controversy for philosophy and for social life, today as yesterday when «the life of the mind was exciting because it was framed in conflict». (Ong, 1971, 68)
Against this tradition considering philosophy as war (see: Curi, 2000) and science as argument (see: Pera, 1991) are those who suggest that while co-operation is always moral and proper, conflict is always amoral and vicious; from an educational point of view, to compel students to debate both sides of a question is not pedagogical and consequently they are unfavourable to the pro-con procedures. The opposition conflict/co-operation is expression of a fundamental cultural opposition. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2002 – Argumentative Mechanisms In Advertising

• by: Annalisa Cattani - Università degli Studi di Bologna

We live in the age of advertising, every space in our culture carries commercial messages. They are used to give  vicarious experience and to shape the consumer’s identity.
Therefore it’s fascinating to find a way to penetrate its strategies, considering that even if we can witness an enormous amount of publications on this topic, many of them reflect much more on its general aims, instead of analyzing its mechanisms.

The language of advertising is very complex as it uses different codes, the verbal and the visual one interacting. Applying Perelman’s simplification of topoi to some advertisements taken from a corpus, collected mainly in Italian and English from women magazines, can be a first step in the inventio of this kind of argumentation. Then, in order to understand the goal of the different messages, it can be useful to apply Stati’s model of “pragmatic functions“ and “argumentative roles” (Stati, 1990, 25-90) through which we are going to interpret the illocutive force of some commercials.
This approach normally reveals that very often the real purpose of the advertisement is “disguised”. This can happen in order to invent creative and surprising effects, but also to manipulate the communication influencing the consumers indirectly. So we will briefly underline how contemporary advertising breaks even the most basically  “communication rules” (Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992, 50).

1. The topos of essence and the topos of persona
Perelmann’s assumption leads to a simplified scheme of the classical topoi. Perelman calls topoi only the general premises which make possible to ground values and hierarchies, the ones that Aristotle studies among the loci of the accident: quality, quantity, existence, essence, order and person (Perelman & Olbrechts Tyteca, 1989, 90).
Under these categories every kind of advertisement can be classified, here I am going to talk about the one of Essence and that of Persona, showing how they have been developed in the world of advertising and how they affect its audience.
Perelman calls Essence the general premises that stress the value of those who represents a particular category (We call loci of essence (…) everything that better represents a type, an essence, a function, (and) is for this same reason made valuable. (Perelman-Tyteca, 1989, 100, translation mine). Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2002 – Computer-Supported Planning Of Essay Argument Structure

• by: Evi Chryssafidou, Mike Sharples - University of Birmingham

Abstract
This work is concerned with the design and evaluation of a software application that uses the dialectic approach to argumentation to support students in planning the structure of written arguments. The aim is to explore whether planning according to the dialectic method, and assisted by an interactive visual argument structure, the Dialectic program, will improve the quality of students’ essays. Students’ use of the Dialectic software tool was compared against using the dialectic method of planning on paper. A validated analysis of argument structure indicates that use of refutation in written arguments has improved in both conditions. We cannot conclude that using the planning method on the computer is more successful than on paper because the two groups, allocated to the two conditions, were not comparative in terms of ability in English and argumentation skill. Nevertheless, the computer group, which was of lower ability showed a notable improvement in refuting challenging arguments.

1. Difficulties with argumentative writing
Composing argumentative texts involves many skills. Invention of content and accuracy of  language are important and systematically evaluated in most educational systems. But equally important is the argument structure. In this work, argument structure in essays is conceived as a network of opinions and arguments. A whole essay could be visualised as a set of substructures supporting, challenging and refuting a position. These argument substructures may be linked in a coordinated way, thus implying the coverage of multiple themes, or in subordinated manner, favouring an in-depth development. The writer generates these substructures bearing in mind the rhetorical purpose of advancing an opinion that gives an essay the characteristic of “voice”. That is, the thesis of the paper or the implicit of explicit position of the author.

When writing about controversial topics, as in school essays, but also when writing academic assignments, the student faces the difficulty of integrating different knowledge and opinions and avoiding plagiarism. The real challenge for students is to integrate the arguments of others in order to strengthen or weaken their own voice (Mitchell, 2001a). To do this the student has to perform certain argument moves: to support a position, to challenge it or challenge other people’s arguments. Where appropriate, the student must also refute challenging arguments in order to strengthen the main position of the essay. These moves should be communicated to the reader through the argument structure. The position of the essay and the process out of which the position was defined and established should be clear. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2002 – The Play Of Presumption: A Derridian Examination Of Whately’s Concept Of Presumption

• by: David S. Chimovitz - Northern Michigan University

The uniquely perspectival lenses that inform what we know, think is true, or consider reasonable are subject to a plethora of contextual variables. We may think we know something at one point and upon further investigation or by mere happenstance, new or unrealized evidence or reasoning urges us to change our mind. These contextual variables are in essence linguistic. Conceptually, language shapes our reasoning, the rules of the known, the knowable, and ultimately serves as an allusive guide in our efforts to communicate with others. The idea of interpersonal argument is no different. Interpersonal argument, like language, is self referential, linguistic, and positioned within varying contexts. The basic tenets of presumption and burden of proof are central to a language of argument, implicit in the functioning of our argumentative discourse and must be understood as such in order to better understand presumption in interpersonal argumentative discourse.

The perspective presented here is not so different from many of the post-modern/post-structuralist notions of culture, language, power, and the relationships between them. This perspective is even more in line with conceptions of pragma-dialectical theory and analysis.
Yet, this perspective of presumption is different in that it aims to marry two unlikely bedfellows: Richard Whately and Jacques Derrida. Through sixteen revisions of Elements of Rhetoric, Whately finally settled on a very socio-psychological perspective of presumption and burden of proof; a transition that is significant to current conceptions of presumption and the inclusion of Jaques Derrida in this essay.
Derrida’s post-structural theory of language is conceptually similar to the theories of argument developed by Whately. Deference, the functional concept for each, becomes an important consideration for understanding the function of presumption in interpersonal argument. This essay examines the interrelationships of Whately and Derrida and attempts to articulate a conception of presumption that reconceptualizes its role in argumentative settings. Read more