ISSA Proceedings 2014 – Cognitive Science And The Model Of Emerging Truth

• by: Mark Weinstein, Educational Foundations, Montclair State University, USA

Abstract: This paper looks at the developing field of cognitive science showing how its epistemic power can be explained using key constructions from my model of emerging truth (MET). The MET sees warrants as tied to a field of models in definable relationships that account for the relative power of the arguments in which they are employed. The paper identifies epistemologically crucial model relationships in various strands of cognitive science accounting for its explanatory potential.

Keywords: argument, brain, cognitive science, epistemology, MET, psychology, truth, warrants

1. Introduction
This paper continues an agenda that has exercised me for more than two decades (Weinstein, 1990; 1994 are early contributions. Weinstein, 2013b is a recent sustained effort). The core of my approach can be succinctly states as follows: evaluating arguments put forward whether in defense or attack essentially requires being able to give a comparative estimate of the strength of the warrants employed, whether tacit or overt (Weinstein, 2006). This challenges much of the theory of argument, since it precludes dialogical and dialectical considerations from being definitive, focusing rather on epistemology. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2014 – “‘Rule Of Law,’ ‘Freedom,’ And ‘Democracy’: Domestic And International Building Blocks Of Contemporary Russian Political Ideology”

• by: David Cratis Williams - School of Communication & Multimedia Studies Florida Atlantic, University Boca Raton, Florida, USA & Marilyn J. Young - College of Communication and Information, Florida State University, Tallahassee, Florida, USA & Michael K. Launer - RussTech Language Services Inc., Tallahassee, Florida, USA

Abstract: We analyze the definitional arguments of Vladimir Putin relative to the terms ‘democracy,’ ‘freedom,’ and ‘rule of law.’ We examine the definitional relationships among these terms in Putin’s rhetoric, with a focus on “rule of law.” We look at primary appeals targeting domestic Russian audiences as well as Putin’s message to the American people on possible US air strikes against Syria, looking for the definitional construction of rule of law in the discourse.

Keywords: Putin, Russia, democracy, freedom, rule of law, argument by definition, rhetorical choices, translation

1. Introduction
Periods of national transition are, by definition, times of change. Sometimes that change is sought, driven by a desire to move to a different place or time. When that happens, change is guided by a rhetorical and argumentative transformation of needs and desires. Although material conditions are clearly part of the equation producing national change, the interpretation of those conditions is at least as important. As Zarfesky (1997) notes,

Although some of the political science literature still mistakenly regards problems as empirical conditions to be found, a growing number of writers recognize that they are categories to be created.

He continues, “To define a condition as a problem is to invoke a frame of reference within which the condition is assessed, causality and blame are determined, and solutions are considered” (1997, p. 6). Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2014 – Some Considerations Concerning Pragmatism And Dialectics In Argumentation Theory

• by: Harald R. Wohlrapp, Universität Hamburg

Abstract: As Argumentation theory’s philosophical fundament stemming from Aristotle is scarcely capable to cover the dynamic and the subjective traits of today’s argumentative practice, an update is advisable. The philosophies of Dialectics and Pragmatism allow to form some new basic concepts which on the one hand embed argumentation into general human activities and on the other hand relate it to the subjective views of individuals, which, however, need to be kept open (concept of transsubjectivity).

Keywords: Dialectics, dialogue, inquiry, objection, orientation, Pragmatism, rationality, reflection, subjectivity, transsubjectivity.

Introduction
Pragmatism and Dialectics seem to be well considered in contemporary argumentation theory. Pragmatism is taken up in the general focus on the practice of argument, particularly in the attention to the relevant speech activities; and dialectics is present in the exercise to take the other person not only as an addressee but as a participant of the argumentative process and to care about differences of opinions. It is true, that in all the established approaches these traditions play a certain role; and in the “Pragma-dialectic” school of Amsterdam they are even exposed as the constitutive parts of the theory. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2014 – Consideration On The Notion Of Reasoning

• by: Xiaojing Wu, School of Humanities, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, China

Abstract: I started my discussion from Ralph H. Johnson’s view, and examined the phenomenon that theorists have used the notion of reasoning in different way and tried to explain why they use it in a confusing manner. I compared the notion of reasoning with the notions of argument and argumentation. I also pointed out some misunderstood concepts related to reasoning, such as soundness, completeness and validity. And hence proposed a new definition of reasoning.

Keywords: Argument, Argumentation, Reasoning

1. Introduction
It is known to us that informal logic has been developed over thirty years since the late 1970s last century. During decades, discussions that mainly concerns on the issues on interpretation, construction and evaluation of argumentation have led to remarkable accomplishment. Although they first started from the demand of pedagogical reform that launched by students and teachers in universities of Canada by rejecting the way symbolic logic treated to our daily arguments, these research were carried out from distinct perspectives, and rapidly developed in north America, Europe and now Asia. Gradually researchers gained accumulated agreement that the strict and artificial symbolic language only can never be enough for us to construct and evaluate arguments in natural discourse. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2014 ~ Chinese Understanding Of Interpersonal Arguing: A Cross-Cultural Analysis

• by: Yun Xie (Institute of Logic and Cognition, Sun Yat-sen University, China), Dale Hample (Department of Communication, University of Maryland, United States), Xiaoli Wang (Faculty of Educational Sciences, South China & Normal University, China)

Abstract: China has a longstanding tradition of stressing the values of harmony and coherence, and Chinese society has always been alleged to be a group where conflict avoidance is viewed more positively than direct confrontation and argumentation. In order to evaluate the validity of this claim, this paper sketches Chinese people’s feelings and understandings of interpersonal arguing by reporting results of a data collection in China, using measures of argumentativeness, verbal aggressiveness, argument frames, and personalization of conflict. Chinese and U.S. data differed in complex ways, but did not show Chinese respondents to be more avoidant. The Chinese correlations among variables were a reasonable match to expectations based on Western argumentation theories. The paper offers evidence that Chinese respondents had a more sophisticated understanding of interpersonal arguing than their U.S. counterparts, and were more sensitive to the constructive possibilities of face-to-face disagreement.

Keywords: argument predispositions, China, confrontation, interpersonal arguing

1. Introduction: Chinese orientations to interpersonal arguing
Most of the existing literature on argumentation and communication studies suggests that the Chinese culture has long stressed the values of harmony, coherence, and holism, implying that Chinese people would prefer non-confrontational, non-argumentative, and conflict avoidance approaches over direct argumentation and confrontation in their social lives (Jensen, 1987, Leung, 1988; 1997; Lin, Zhao, & Zhao, 2010; Oetzel & Ting-Toomey, 2003; Oetzel et al, 2001; Triandis, 1995). Accordingly, Chinese society has always been regarded as a group where conflict avoidance is viewed more positively than direct confrontation and argumentation, and Chinese people’s understanding of, and attitudes towards, interpersonal arguing have been supposed to differ significantly from those of Western people, whose culture has appreciated, from its very beginning, the importance of argumentative practices. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2014 – Denying The Antecedent Probabilized: A Dialectical View

• by: Frank Zenker, Department of Philosophy & Cognitive Science, Lund University

Abstract: This article provides an analysis and evaluation for probabilistic version of arguments that deny the antecedent (DAp). Stressing the effects of premise retraction vs. premise subtraction in a dialectical setting, the cogency of DAp arguments is shown to depend on premises that normally remain implicit. The evaluation remains restricted to a Pascalian notion of probability, which is briefly compared to its Baconian variant. Moreover, DAp is presented as an exam-question plus evaluation that can be deployed as a learning assessment-instrument at graduate-level.

Keywords: affirming the consequent, delay tactic, denying the antecedent, dialectics, inductive logic, modus ponens, modus tollens, probabilistic independence, probabilistic relevance, retraction, subtraction

1. Introduction
We treat the evaluation of DAp, a probabilistic version of what classical logic correctly treats as the formal fallacy of denying the antecedent (DA), i.e., the deductively invalid attempt at inferring the conclusion ~c from the premises a->c and ~a, where a stands for antecedent, c for consequent, and ~ for negation. Examples include:

1. Had my client been at the crime scene (a), then he would probably be guilty (c). But he wasn’t (~a), so he probably isn’t (~c).
2. If the lights are on (a), then probably someone’s at home (c). But the lights are out (~a), so probably no one is (~c).
3. If the product sells (a), then our marketing measures should probably be trusted (c). But it doesn’t (~a), so measures should be reviewed (~c). Read more