ISSA Proceedings 2006 – The A Contrario Argument: A Scorekeeping Model

• by: Damiano Canale & Giovanni Tuzet - Bocconi University, Milan

1. Is There a Gap in the Law?
Traditionally, the legal literature describes the A Contrario argument as an ambiguous technique of justification. On the one hand, the A Contrario argument can be used to justify a creative interpretation of a normative sentence, namely the interpretation that produces a norm that is implicit in the sentence, although it does not correspond to its literal formulation. In this sense the A Contrario argument is used to claim that the case is regulated by the law: there is no gap in the law relatively to the case. On the other hand, it can be used to justify a literal interpretation of a normative sentence, so as to exclude from the application of the norm the cases that do not correspond to its formulation. In this sense the A Contrario argument is used to claim that the case is not regulated by the law: there is a gap in the law relatively to the case.

It is possible to give an example of this ambiguity drawn from the Italian Constitution (see Guastini 1998, pp. 265-267)[i]. Article 18 of the Italian Constitution states: ‘Citizens have the right to form associations freely’. Now, can foreigners and stateless persons claim they have the same right? Two different answers can be justified by means of the A Contrario argument. The first is: according to the Constitution, only citizens have the right to form associations freely, so foreigners and stateless persons do not have such a right. The second is: the Constitution does not regulate the position of foreigners and stateless persons in this respect.
In order to clarify the ambiguous character of the A Contrario argument, first in this paper we consider some interesting logical features of it, then we propose an inferential analysis thereof based on the scorekeeping practice as described by Robert Brandom. Our aim is not to justify one use of the argument over another, but to clarify the pragmatic structure of the ways it is used. What is at stake is not only a more rigorous use of the argument, but also a better understanding of what the argument depends on.

2. Strong and Weak Pragmatic Negation
The A Contrario argument is also traditionally called A Silentio argument (cf. Jansen 2003b, p. 44 ff.). The subject of this argumentative technique is what a text does not say, not what a text says. It aims at discovering what the silence of the law means for the law, and for the legal regulation of a case in particular.

In this sense, the A Contrario argument is a general practical inference that we often use in our everyday life. In particular, such an inference is used when silence seems to signify, for what is not said, the contrary of what is said. From the normative sentence ‘No smoking in the public area’ we usually infer that smoking is allowed at home; from the normative sentence ‘Driving is permitted at 18’ we infer that driving is not permitted to those who are not in the majority age; etc. The description of the standard use of this inference seems to be the following (where ‘p’ and ‘q’ stand for propositional contents and ‘P’ is the deontic operator for permission[ii]):

If p then Pq
—————
If r then ~Pq.

It is easy to show that this use is logically incorrect. First, at least a further premise is necessary to draw the conclusion: a premise excluding other cases from the regulation stated by the legal sentence. In particular, if the conditional is intended as a material implication, the inference is an instance of the fallacy called “denying the antecedent” (cf. Henket 1992, Kaptein 1993 and 2005, Jansen 2003a). To avoid the fallacy, one should point out that there are no other legal grounds on which the consequence should follow. Second, the A Contrario argument is a de dicto argument and not a de re argument: it concerns what is (not) said by the text, not what is the case as a matter of fact[iii]. A description of a logically correct use of it could be the following:

(1) The text T states ‘if p then Pq’
(2) ‘If p then Pq’ means that iff p then Pq
—————————————————
(3) If ~p then ~Pq.

Premise (2) is normally the conclusion of other inferences, whose premises are legal norms or practical principles of communication[iv]. In the first case, such premises are contingent: they depend on the legal system the argument is referring to. In the second case, such premises are not contingent: they do not depend on the considered legal system. In both cases, however, the normative text is interpreted as stating that iff p then Pq. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2006 – A Foundational Principle Underlying Philosophy Of Argument

• by: George Boger - Canisius College

1. Introduction
The study of arguments and argumentations – logic – whether undertaken traditionally as a study of formal implication relationships among propositions or undertaken non-traditionally to involve the dialogical pragmatics of human argumentative discourse, is a decidedly metasystematic activity (consider, e.g., Barth & Krabbe 1982 on various uses of ‘form’). This is not obviated by philosophers of argument considering an argument to be a social activity (see, e.g., van Eemeren et al 1996: 5, Johnson 2000: 168, Govier 1988:1, Freeman 1993: 35, Walton 1989: 1, 3, and Tindale 1999: 1). Of course, philosophers of argument distinguish themselves by intentionally broadening their study to include considering the context and situatedness of argumentative discourse as essential to the discipline. In connection with this special approach to studying arguments, philosophers of argument have variously treated epistemic matters, normative matters, pragmatic matters, and a whole host of humanist issues. Indeed, in this latter respect, the philosophy of argument, whatever controversies it might compass, even to include adherents debating whether there is or can be a theory of argument, has sprung from persons motivated by deep humanist convictions to empower ordinary human beings with sufficient critical faculties to become autonomous members of democratic societies.
This discussion aims modestly only to highlight this important humanist underpinning of many contributors to the modern argumentation discussion. We use ‘humanism’ here in a generalized way to range over various humanisms, such as, secular humanism, religious, scientific, or naturalistic humanism and their individual philosophic expressions, all of which might be traced to their renaissance inspiration and all of which have deep moral predilections. We take humanists, then, to affirm the dignity and worth of human beings and to promote human freedom, especially as expressed by the self-determination of individuals and their communities. Besides promoting freedom, humanists promote a spirit of tolerance and peaceful coexistence, affirm human equality, and embrace cosmopolitanism. Humanists especially consider human nature perfectible and share an optimistic outlook on the possibility of genuine progress. Humanists express profound confidence in human reason to understand nature and society without external mediation, and they promote cultivating our moral sensibility and our sense of shared responsibility. Below we review the remarks of some important philosophers of argument to indicate their deep-seated humanism. The upshot of our discussion is to identify a foundational principle underlying philosophy of argument.

2. An initial humanist impulse motivating the modern study of argumentative discourse
Taking Chaim Perelman, Stephen Toulmin, and Charles Hamblin to have inspired a social movement concerned with the dynamics of human argumentative engagement, many contemporary logicians since the 1970s have taken up the cause of their initial inspiration. Perelman, along with Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, has remarked at various places that he aimed to “combat uncompromising and irreducible philosophical oppositions presented by all kinds of absolutism” (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969:1). Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca were committed to fight absolutism in all its forms and to resist totalitarianism (1969: 510). Perelman has especially addressed the concerns of justice in various essays (see Perelman 1967, 1980). These philosophers had had first-hand experience with the effects of severe anti-democratic and anti-human practices. Toulmin, in much the same vein, has reflected on the social history of logic to locate a split between the reasonable and the rational in the Peace of Westphalia, out of which came absolute sovereignty, established religion, and logical demonstration, all of which share two common features: “[1] all of them operated top-down, and gave power to oligarchies – political, ecclesiastical, or academic – that supported one another … [2] they formed a single [ideological] package” (2001: 156). Toulmin also writes that “[t]he Westphalian Settlement was, then, a poisoned chalice: intellectual dogmatism, political chauvinism, and sectarian religion formed a blend whose influence lasted into the twentieth century” (2001: 158). He is optimistic that in the contemporary world “tolerance and democracy are winning out over elitism in methodology, and over imperialism in the philosophy of science. To that extent, the imbalance in European ideas about Rationality and Reasonableness shows healthy signs of correcting itself” (2001: 167; cf. 205). Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2006 – Seeing Is Believing: The Visual Diary Of Paul Wynne

• by: Catherine Ann Collins - Willamette University

This essay seeks to link visual argument, narrative characterization, and dissociational argument through a case study of a controversial but highly successful weekly San Francisco television news segment called Paul Wynne’s Journal – a diary of a local television personality who was dying of AIDS.

1. Paul Wynne’s Journal
On January 11, 1990 KGO-TV, an ABC affiliate in San Francisco aired the first of 20 segments on the Thursday evening news that chronicled Paul Wynne’s fight to live with AIDS. Wynne, a former San Francisco television personality and two-time Emmy winner, returned to the air after an absence of five years. The first segment opens with Wynne watching a tape of his earlier on-air performances. He swivels to face the audience and remarks, “I had hair, I had a tan, I had – well – half a body. And here I am today. Only today I have something I would never have dreamed about 10 years ago. I have AIDS” (Wynne, Segment 1, January 11, 1990). Physically altered, he retained his wit and charm. Approximately 4.5 million viewers in the Bay area learned about AIDS from a new perspective, that of Paul Wynne, an HIV patient living with the stigmatized disease.
He explains his purposes in creating the Journal: to dispel ignorance and a fear of AIDS, as a memorial for those who have died, to encourage those who think they might be HIV-positive to get tested and begin early treatment, to insure that the viewers will now know someone with AIDS, and finally with wicked humor he proclaims, to energize himself in the knowledge that the religious zealots will be furious with KGO-TV for letting him tell his story. The segments, placed at the end of the newscast, last from 1 to 4-and-a-half minutes with each addressing a different issue in Wynne’s journey with AIDS (hospitals, the medicine cabinet, canes, the will, telling the parents). All 20 are poignant narratives that are personal, blunt, compelling, and filled with both information and pathos.
Radical television in 1990, Paul Wynne’s Journal received a Cable Car Award, commendation from the American Medical Association’s Committee on Medical Ethics, and a Eugene Block Journalism Award among others. Available for airing throughout the country, and despite letters urging its broadcast outside of California, only one other station, KCET-TV in Los Angeles showed the segments, and they did so concurrent with the sixth International AIDS Conference that was held in San Francisco in 1990.
Wynne also circulated his message through appearances on Good Morning America, CBS This Morning, Entertainment Tonight, and a People Magazine television special. His program was reported in newspapers and magazines throughout the United States, Japan, Britain, Canada, the Netherlands and Australia. The Journal showed the media an alternative way to cover the AIDS crisis at the same time it gave the public a face for AIDS.

2. The Rhetorical Situation
In 1990, even in San Francisco, the Journal’s subject matter and style of argument was seen as groundbreaking and potentially shocking to many viewers as they saw and heard about how a patient experienced the progress of the disease. “All those involved in project were wary that viewer response might be hostile, even ugly” (Gross, 1990, p. A1). In the opening segment, Wynne admits he will probably offend some people. He tells his viewers that he is neither courageous nor political, that the decision to create the Journal, to tell his story was difficult because “there are so many people out there who don’t know me but hate me because I carry the virus” (Wynne, Segment 1, January 11, 1990).
Why the fear of a hostile audience response? Recall first, that AIDS was initially linked to male homosexuals and referred to as GRID, gay related immune deficiency. As such, AIDS was associated with behavior deemed morally unaccepted by many in the heterosexual majority. Once it became clear that heterosexuals, could contract the disease, the association between the patient and AIDS changed to include drug users who shared contaminated needles (equally viewed as morally reprehensible behavior to many in the majority), or what were cast as secondary victims, including children, who were innocent of wrongdoing but received contaminated blood. Other than stories of occasional victims, most of the public discussion of AIDS carried a denigratory association: cleaving that association proved difficult. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2006 – The Argumentative Construction Of Emotions: The Example Of Indignation In Pro-Life Rhetoric

• by: Raphaël Micheli - University of Lausanne

1. Introduction
For a little more than a decade, the field of argumentation studies has seen a growing interest for the topic of emotions. The aim of the present paper is twofold. I will first attempt to tackle the complex theoretical debate which opposes normative and descriptive approaches (2.). As far as normative approaches are concerned, the treatment which emotional appeals receive in Douglas Walton’s pragmatic theory of fallacies will be the center of my attention (2.1.). I will then look at Christian Plantin’s model, which aims not so much at evaluating emotional appeals as to describing how emotions are argumentatively constructed by speakers (2.2.). In the second part of the paper, I will proceed to a case study and examine a recent example of American pro-life rhetoric (3.). Focusing on a corpus of short essays written by an anti-abortion writer named Larry Bohannon (“Evil in Our Time” and “What About Abortion?”), I will try to capture the essential features of the argumentative construction of a particular emotion – namely indignation.

2. What about emotions? Contrasting two lines of thought in argumentation theory
When it comes to emotions, two lines of thought can be distinguished in argumentation theory. From a normative point of view, a fully-fledged argumentation theory should be able to evaluate emotional appeals – and not merely to describe them. Thus, the analyst is to specify the criteria which allow to discriminate between “ reasonable ” and “ fallacious ” uses of emotional appeals. From a descriptive point of view, however, the analyst’s main task is to provide an accurate description of emotional appeals without necessarily passing judgment on their degree of reasonableness.

2.1. Douglas Walton’s normative approach: a pragmatic theory of fallacies
I will start by taking a look at normative approaches – which, in my view, are best represented by Douglas Walton’s work on emotions (1992, 1997).
This work can be considered as pioneer work, as it firmly rejects the negative ontology which dismisses emotional appeals on the ground that they are emotional appeals and cannot thus be anything but fallacious. Walton claims that “ there is nothing wrong per se with appeals to emotion in argumentation, even though appeals to emotion can go wrong and be exploited in some cases ” (1992, p. 257). It is important to notice that Walton does not consider emotional appeals as fallacious a priori: in his view, potential fallacies lie in contextual uses of emotional appeals, but not in their very essence. Far from an essentialist perspective, Walton aims to sort out the “ right ” uses of emotional appeals from the “ wrong ” ones. What is at stake, then, is not the mere linguistic description of emotional appeals, but their explicit evaluation in a given context of dialogue. The analyst must ultimately pass judgment and label emotional appeals as “ right ” or “ wrong ” considering the textual and contextual evidence at hand. Walton’s refusal of a merely descriptive approach appears quite explicitly in the first pages of The Place of Emotion in Argument : “ [T]his book […] is a normative analysis of the conditions under which appeals to emotion are used correctly or incorrectly in argumentation ” (1992, p. 28).

This normative approach to emotional appeals is to be situated within the more general framework of Walton’s theory of fallacies. Following the revised version of this theory, arguments are evaluated as “ reasonable ” or “ fallacious ” according to communicative norms rather than according to universal logical standards. Whereas Charles Hamblin (1970) laid considerable emphasis on the criterion of deductive validity and defined fallacies as arguments which seem valid but are not, Walton chooses a more pragmatic perspective. He claims for his part that fallacies are “ technique[s] of argumentation that may in principle be reasonable, but that ha[ve] been misused in a given case in such a way that [they go] strongly against or hinde[r] the goals of dialogue ” (1992, p. 18). This definition suggests that in order to pin down a fallacy, the analyst first needs to subsume the context in which speakers are interacting under a normative model of dialogue[i] and then determine whether or not a given argument is in compliance with the rules set by this model of dialogue. Walton’s methodology rests on the assumption that each model of dialogue involves specific goals which speakers are bound to pursue conjointly and thus claims that an argument is reasonable insofar as it makes a contribution to these goals. How does this pragmatic view of fallacy underpin Walton’s specific work on appeals to emotion ? Walton writes: “ [E]motional arguments can be used fallaciously in particular uses so that they go contrary to the proper goals of […] dialogue that participants are supposed to be engaged in. Contrary to the common assumption that an argument based on emotion is not a rational (reasonable) argument, such an argument can be good and reasonable insofar as “good” and “rational” argument is that which contributes to the proper goals of dialogue ” (1992, pp. 25-27, my emphasis). The degree of reasonableness or fallaciousness of an emotional appeal depends on its fitting a particular model of dialogue and on its contribution to the latter’s goals.
At this point, I would like to make a general comment on normative approaches. In my view, what these approaches primarily seek to do is to determine whether a given emotional appeal will have positive or negative effects, and this with regard to the ideal progression of the argumentative process which is normatively fixed by a model of dialogue. If emotional appeals have the effect of contributing to the goals of the model of dialogue which speakers are supposed to be engaged in, they will be considered “ reasonable ”. If, however, they have the effect of violating these goals, they will be considered “ fallacious ”. In what follows, I would like to look at an alternative way of approaching emotions in argumentative discourse, which is less normative than comprehensive – in the same sense that sociology can be comprehensive and study the meaning which social actors themselves confer to their actions and, in our case, to their emotions. This perspective draws on Christian Plantin’s work (1999, 2004), which I will briefly discuss before engaging in the case study. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2006 – A Methodological Approach To Argument Evaluation

• by: Marcin Koszowy - The John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin

1. The methodological approach to argument evaluation defined
The methodological approach to argument evaluation may be expressed by the following claim: argumentation can be successfully evaluated by applying tools elaborated by the general methodology of science. Among those tools, there are rules of performing various knowledge-gaining procedures such as reasoning, questioning, defining, and classifying objects. In what follows I call these rules methodological. At first glance this approach is plausible, because the argumentation theory and the methodology of science have in fact a common aim: to establish rules for evaluating activities of some special kinds. In the case of argumentation theory, these are speech acts performed within an argumentative discourse; in the case of methodology these are knowledge-gaining activities performed either in scientific research or in everyday life. The aim of this paper is to show that this approach works. I illustrate its usefulness by discussing two cases of argument evaluation by means of the rules of defining elaborated by the methodology of science.
Although elements of the methodological approach to argument evaluation are present in philosophy, informal logic, and argumentation theory, they have not so far been systematically elaborated. By “elements of the methodological approach to argument evaluation” I mean claims concerning applications of various methodological rules to evaluation of arguments. Some of these claims have been advanced or examined by thinkers who belong to various philosophical traditions. Among them I mention Jaakko Hintikka who points out to the need of evaluating arguments within the framework of questioning (e.g. 1984a; 1984b; 1992); Douglas Walton who examines fallacies of questioning, also by means of some methodological rules of questioning and answering (1991) and analyzes some rules of formulating persuasive definitions (2001); Alvin Goldman who applies some rules of justification (which are also applied by the methodology of science) within the epistemological approach to argumentation (2003); Louise Cummings who shows the relation between scientific norms and argument evaluation (2002). I should also mention Polish philosophers and methodologists from the Lvov-Warsaw School: Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz who develops the program of pragmatic logic (1974) within which methodological rules of performing various knowledge-gaining procedures are elaborated and Tadeusz Czeżowski who formulates such methodological rules for the procedures of describing and defining (2000).

A careful analysis of the elements of the methodological approach to argument evaluation present in writings of the philosophers listed above shows that many methodological rules are in fact used in argument evaluation. This is why they deserve to be described in a systematic way.

A possible set of methodological rules which are to be used in argument evaluation is based on the list of some typical knowledge-gaining procedures which are investigated by the general methodology of science. Among these procedures the most significant are:
(1) reasoning,
(2) questioning,
(3) defining,
(4) classifying objects and
(5) formulating and testing hypotheses[i]. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2006 – Normatively Responsible Advocacy: Some Provocations From Persuasion Effects Research

• by: Daniel J. O'Keefe - Northwestern University

This paper addresses one aspect of the relationship between argumentation studies and social-scientific persuasion effects research. Persuasion effects research aims at understanding how and why persuasive messages have the effects they do; that is, persuasion effects research has descriptive and explanatory aims. Argumentation studies, on the other hand, is at its base animated by normative concerns; the broad aim is to articulate conceptions of normatively desirable argumentative practice, both in the abstract and in application to particular instances, with a corresponding pedagogical aim of improving discourse practices. That is, one of these enterprises is dominated by descriptive and explanatory concerns and the other by normative interests.
In some previous work I have explored the relationship between these two undertakings by taking up the question of whether there is any intrinsic conflict between normatively-sound argumentation practices and practical persuasive success. The empirical evidence appears to indicate that a number of normatively-desirable advocacy practices – including clearly articulating one’s overall standpoint (O’Keefe, 2002), spelling out one’s supporting evidence and arguments (O’Keefe, 1998), and refuting counterarguments (O’Keefe, 1999) – commonly improve one’s chances for persuasive success.
This paper approaches the relationship of normative argumentation studies and descriptive persuasion effects research from a different angle, by pointing to several empirical findings that raise questions or puzzles about normatively-proper argumentative conduct. My purpose here is less to offer definitive conclusions about normative analyses of advocacy, and more to point to some social-scientific research findings that indicate some complications in the analysis of normatively desirable argumentative conduct – including some ways in which practical persuasive success may not be entirely compatible with normatively-desirable advocacy practices.

1. Background
As a preliminary, it may be useful to notice that at least some of what I have to say will intersect with some of the concerns of pragma-dialectics. Van Eemeren and Houtlosser have in recent years taken up questions concerning the nature of “strategic maneuvering” and its analysis from a pragma-dialectical standpoint. “Strategic maneuvering” refers to the advocates’ “attempt to make use of the opportunities available in the dialectical situation for steering the discourse rhetorically in the direction that serves their own interests best” (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2001). One of the questions van Eemeren and Houtlosser have addressed is specifically the question of when strategic maneuvering is normatively questionable (as opposed to normatively unobjectionable). At least some my discussion will be seen to address that same question.
However, a complexity is introduced by the natural divergence between (a) the circumstance contemplated by (pragma-dialectical and other) ideals for critical discussion and (b) the circumstance in which argumentation and advocacy often are undertaken. Ideals for critical discussion often seem to contemplate a situation in which (at a minimum) two advocates undertake the articulation and defense of different points of view. There may be some third party to which the advocates’ arguments are addressed (as in legal proceedings), or each advocate may act as the other’s audience, but the key feature to which I want to draw attention is that there are two advocates.

But advocacy sometimes occurs in circumstances in which only one advocate is heard, such as consumer advertising. Yes, one may here think of the audience as (implicitly) the other advocate, but one would immediately want to acknowledge that the audience may not always be in the same sort of argumentative position as the advocate (for instance, the audience may not know as much about the relevant subject matter as does the advocate). And, yes, sometimes opposing views are available elsewhere; for instance, in the case of consumer advertising, consumer advocacy groups may publish opposing views or critical information. Even so, especially in instances of advocacy (such as commercial advertising) delivered through traditional media of mass communication, there is some asymmetry between the audience and advocate.
Moreover, there are circumstances in which there is (potentially) argumentation (in a broad sense) but not necessarily advocacy (in the usual sense). The kind of circumstance I have in mind is exemplified by those medical decision-making situations in which a patient is to choose among alternative courses of action. In such situations, health professionals can provide arguments and evidence that bear on that decision, even if they advocate no particular option.
So my interest here is broadly with any situation in which persons consider some potentially-argument-based claim, that is, some claim that might be supported by argument. I mention these contextual variations and divergences (between the circumstances of critical discussion and other circumstances) because I think that they bear on the task of transferring normative ideals from one circumstance to another – and because they foreshadow some of the complications to which I want to point. Read more