ISSA Proceedings 2002 – Grounding And Counter-Argumentation During Face-To-Face And Synchronous Network Debates In Secondary School

• by: Timo Salminen, Miika Marttunen & Leena Laurinen - Department of Education, University of Jyväskylä, Finland

Abstract
In this study [i] 24 secondary school students engaged in argumentative debates (role play) about nuclear power in pairs in face-to-face or synchronous network chat environments. 14 students defended their personal opinion, six students had to take the role of an antagonist against their personal stand, and four students were asked to defend a stand that was given to them as their original opinion was neutral. The data analysis will focus on the nature and quality of argumentation. Comparisons will be made between face-to-face and network debates, and between students who defended different standpoints.

1. Introduction
Argumentation skills help students to participate as democratic citizens in general debates on many societal questions, such as environmental issues, gender equality, and racism. In these debates students should be able to take a stand and to identify the arguments used by journalists, politicians, scientists, teachers, and their classmates and friends. In the future they will be entitled to vote so they should be able to evaluate the validity and sufficiency of presented arguments during the different phases of decision-making. One possibility to practise these skills is to take part in argumentative dialogues either face-to-face or through the network. When students practise argumentation skills in technological environments it is not guaranteed that the interaction is effective from the point of view of learning. The problem is how to get students to collaborate and carry on argumentative dialogues. In this study, argumentative debates in face-to-face and network (chat) environments are compared.
The use of dyadic argumentation, i.e. argumentative debates in pairs, has been shown to increase cognitive engagement in thinking about the topic and to enhance the quality of reasoning about the topic (Kuhn, Shaw & Felton, 1997). However, according to Golder and Pouit (1999), in order to engage in argumentative dialogue, the discussion topic must be debatable. A debatable topic leaves space for negotiation because it does not offer objective truths. In this study students were asked to debate environmental issues, as they offer points of view to think about.
We (Marttunen & Laurinen, 2001a) have demonstrated earlier that role play is an effective means to promote argumentation skills in Finnish higher education. According to the students who took part in the study, it was easier to engage in face-to-face and e-mail discussions when the standpoint was fixed in advance and the other students knew that the position assigned to a student did not necessarily represent her/his own personal opinion on the issue in question. As the students had the possibility to hide behind a role, they presented stronger arguments and put forward their arguments more clearly than would otherwise be the case. In the present study we compare students who defended their own standpoint with students who were asked to support a standpoint that opposed their own opinion or who were unable to take a stand.  We were interested to see how the use of role play activated students in producing argumentative dialogue and affected the quality of the debate.

The study aims at comparing the quality of argumentation between face-to-face and synchronous network (chat) debates and between students who defended their own standpoint and students to whom a standpoint was given. The specific research questions were:
1. what was the quality of argumentation in students’ debates,
2. did the quality of argumentation in face-to-face and chat debates differ from each other, and
3. did the type of the dyad (either only one member or both members of the dyad defended their own opinion) affect the quality of debate? Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2002 – Dealing With Alternative Views: The Case Of the Big Bad Wolf And The Three Little Pigs.

• by: Clara Maria M. Santos, Magaly P. Mafaldo & Andrezza C. Marreiros - Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte, Natal, RN, Brazil.

1. Introduction
This study is part of a more comprehensive work which focused on the development of argumentative skills. The traditional view in the psychological literature is that these skills develop late in childhood or early adolescence. However, Stein and Berna (1999) have shown that even very young children are able to generate all components of an argumentative discourse. In this study, argumentative discourse is defined as one which involves the justification of a position, and ideally would also include the evaluation of alternative views. Based on this definition, the components of an argumentative discourse would be: a claim, at least one supporting reason, and the evaluation of counterarguments or alternative views.

The evaluation of alternative views is referred to in the literature as a requisite for critical thinking and the development of good argument (Santos & Santos,1999). This evaluation may result from the contact with new information which challenges prior knowledge on a specific topic or subject. Occasionally, the outcome of this evaluative process means the revision of some old and well established beliefs. The revision of beliefs often requires finding ways to deal with contrasting information and integrate them into one’s discourse. The development of this ability seems to be of great relevance to educational purposes, as well as to enable people to deal with the paradoxical nature of various issues in everyday life (Kuhn, 1991). The evaluation of alternative views may also be associated with knowledge building. This study focus on the development of this argumentative skill, and investigated the impact of new, contrasting information on children’s prior beliefs. It was observed how children integrate alternative views into their discourse and whether a developmental tendency was apparent in the elaboration of this ability.

2. Method

2.1.Participants
Sixty children of ages five, six, and seven, attending the same school in Natal (RN), Brazil, took part in this study. They were divide into three groups according to their age and there was the same number of boys and girls in each group. All children were familiar with the story of ‘The three Little Pigs’.

2.2. Procedure and Material
Each child was interviewed individually and told both the original and an alternative version of the story of ‘The Three Little Pigs’. Two illustrated books, one for each version of the story, were used during the story telling part of the interview. The alternative version of the story described the wolf’s point of view and challenged the belief of the evil nature of the wolf’s character. In his version of the story, the Wolf tried to explain that it was all a misunderstanding, and happened because he had a terrible cold and needed to borrow a little bit of sugar to make his grandmother a birthday cake. This alternative version was presented as “The True Story of the Three Little Pigs”, and can be read below.

“The True Story of The Three Little Pigs”(i)
Well, before I start telling the true story of The Three Little Pigs, let me say something: this thing of The Big Bad Wolf is completely wrong. It’s all a big misunderstanding. It all happened because I had a terrible cold and I needed a bit of sugar to make a birthday cake for my dear little grandmother. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2002 – Two Conceptions Of Openness In Argumentation Theory

• by: Scott Jacobs - University of Arizona

One of the central values in dialectical models of argumentation is that of openness. Sometimes this value is embodied in the form of specific rules – such as those in the pragma-dialectical code of conduct (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992) which specify such things as rights to challenge, burden of proof, and so forth. But usually openness has a more informal quality to it. In any case, the concept lacks the precision one finds with, say, the concept of inferential validity in logical models of argumentation where we find not only well-defined exemplars of deductively valid forms of inference, but also a relatively clear definition of validity in general. It is perhaps because of this informal quality that argumentation scholars have not fully appreciated how the value of openness is used in two distinct ways when evaluating the quality of argumentative conduct. In one way, the concept of openness reflects an epistemic orientation. In the other way, the concept of openness takes on a more socio-political orientation. This paper spells out these two different senses of openness, articulates their rationales, and then explores some of the implications of this distinction for understanding the nature of reasonable argumentative conduct.

1. Two Functions of Argumentation
In large part, these two conceptions of openness in argumentation theory are responsive to two different functions of argumentation: a cognitive function and a social function. So, to get a better lock on the two sense of openness, we begin by considering these two different functions. There has always been a tension in argumentation theory between a cognitive understanding of argument and a social understanding of argument. Logical approaches most clearly exhibit a preference for emphasizing the cognitive function: that of belief management. Logical approaches have a tendency to reduce the argumentative function to processes of individual reasoning – so much so that not only are notions of interaction and audience easily erased from the picture, but discourse itself is largely stripped away until only something call ‘propositions’ remain. But whether or not such a reduction seems prudent, it does isolate this cognitive function of argumentation. Argumentation does clearly have a truth-testing function. It is this epistemological aspect that dominates the study of argument in philosophical traditions. And this concern is quite proper. This concern derives from the very structure of accountability and reason-giving that forms an integral basis for ordinary language uses of argument. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2002 – Hearing Is Believing: A Perspective-Dependent Account Of The Fallacies

• by: Christopher W. Tindale - Trent University

In an earlier project, I have attempted a description of ‘fallacy’ in terms of a “bad  process” between arguer and audience that occurs in the act of arguing. This involves the key feature of exploring fallaciousness from the audience’s perspective, considering ways that prevent the audience from fulfilling its role in argumentation, where it is unable to appropriately supply assumptions required to complete the argumentative exchange.

The current project has two aims:
1. the first is to explore which traditional fallacies may best be categorized as fallacies of “bad process,” and give an account that justifies such a categorization; and
2. the second aim is to organize the traditional fallacies, generally, into a preliminary taxonomy that categorizes them according to whether they involve a problem with the product, procedure, or the process of arguing (and, hence, are primarily logical, dialectical or rhetorical). The question of the value of such a taxonomy will also be explored and the apparent problem of fallacies that seem to have instances that fit under each of the three headings while others belong to only one.
It is a mistake to think that there can be one account of the fallacies, captured under a single definition like ‘a fallacy is an argument that seems valid but is not’, or ‘a fallacy is a deficient move in argumentative discourse’. Such an approach provides the frustrating results of examples that do not fit the account and raises suspicions about the legitimacy of such a project generally.
Rather, we should review the history of fallacy treatments, from Aristotle’s basic lists, through the addition of the so-called ‘ad’ fallacies, to the richer and more varied modern accounts, with a view to asking whether the mistakes (insofar as we must agree that if fallacies are anything they are mistakes) arise in the product that argumentation produces (a logical perspective), the procedural rules that govern the argumentation (a dialectical perspective), or the process of addressing an audience argumentatively (a rhetorical perspective). As the ideal fails to be achieved under each of these headings, we can speak of a bad product, a bad procedure, or a bad process (Tindale, 1999). It is only after exploring the essential characteristics of each of these types that we can step back and ask what, if anything, they have in common and so describe fallacies in a way that captures these essential differences.

1. The Three Perspectives
We might approach these perspectives in terms of their dependence on (or independence from) the context of argumentation. Thus, one perspective, the logical, treats arguments as products divorced from the contexts in which they arise. The criteria for success or legitimacy are captured by ideas like ‘validity’, ‘soundness’ or ‘propositional relevance’, that allow us to test arguments according to the internal relations of their parts. The corresponding fallacy will arise in terms of this internal relationship.
Thus, we can ask: if there is a mistake here, can we assess it merely by looking at a relationship between parts of the argument and without recourse to its context?
The latter clause needs to be qualified, for we may indeed need to refer to the context to establish meaning, and errors of meaning can arise in this sense. But these precede the (re)construction of the argument itself and its subsequent testing.
The other two perspectives draw us essentially into the context. The dialectical perspective had its basis in dialogue and the idea of argumentation as a series of procedural moves in a dialectical context aimed at establishing one’s thesis and/or refuting the thesis of an opponent. The criteria for success or legitimacy have to do with the correct use of the procedural rules, whether these sit outside as overriding governors of any discourse, or are agreed to by the participants for the purposes of the argument (as Socrates might solicit the commitment of his interlocutor to a particular procedural point during the course of a dialectical exchange). The corresponding fallacy will arise in relation to these rules, through their misuse or the prevention of their use.
Thus, we can ask: if there is a mistake here, can we assess it by looking at the dialogue involved: what stage it has reached, what obligations are incurred, what agreements have been entered into? That is, where it has been and what has been allowed? These considerations require us to be aware of and make use of the context.
The second contextual-based perspective has its basis in the relationship between arguers or between arguer and audience, looking at the make-up of those different players, and what is appropriate or needed to convince the audience. It takes us beyond just the procedures employed to the arguer’s knowledge of the audience and the active involvement of the audience in the development and success of the argumentation. The criteria of success and legitimacy have to do with gaining adherence of the audience. The corresponding fallacy will arise in relation to this goal, as the audience is impeded from performing its tasks or some feature of it (the audience) is misused or misled. That is, this perspective takes us into the domain of the audience. Thus, we can ask: if there is a mistake here, can we fully assess it only by looking at the audience?
This last perspective is the one that has received the least amount of attention, and so will receive more of the focus in what follows. I would point out, though, that nothing precludes a piece of argumentation being fallacious in more than one of these ways, and in fact our experience confirms that this is often the case. This, I think, has been part of the confusion. And it may be that the same ‘standard fallacy’ has manifestations under two or more of these perspectives. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2002 – Developing The Art Of Argumentation. A Software Approach

• by: Bertil Rolf & Charlotte Magnusson - Blekinge Institute of Technology & Lund Institute of Technology

What is reasoning and argumentation?
Reasoning and argumentation are closely related. Reasoning is a cognitive activity, argumentation is reasoning, exercised in a social context.
Reasoning is a process or activity in which an actor constructs, analyses or evaluates inferences. Argumentation is a kind of reasoning, conducted in a social setting where the actors recognize that they are partaking in a social activity. The following definition is useful for our purposes:
Argumentation is a verbal and social activity of reason aimed at increasing (or decreas­ing) the acceptability of a controversial standpoint for the listener or reader, by putting forward a constellation of propositions intended to justify (or refute) the standpoint before a rational judge.  (Eemeren et al., 1996, 5)

Teaching reasoning with uncertain effects
Reasoning and argumentation are pervasive in a modern complex society. Quality of reasoning is not. Several features indicate the deplorable state of reason.
There are strong indications that natural reasoning capacities of men are flawed.  A number of embarrassing fallacies are performed by a large majority of subjects. (Nisbett & Ross 1980, Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky 1982, Dawes 1988) The early findings about the fallacies from the 1980’s have been questioned from an evolutionary standpoint. If men were as bad in reasoning as the findings suggested, it is hard to explain the evolutionary success of mankind. Furthermore, if some of the early experiments were reframed, correct reasoning was forthcoming. (Gigerenzer 1991, Gigerenzer & Hug 1992, Cosmides & Tooby 1992). Not all fallacies are explained away, however. Considerable doubts about the natural reasoning capacities therefore remain. (Samuels, Stitch & Tremoulet 1999).
Furthermore, there is a large, consistent set of results showing faulty reasoning at everyday professional tasks. Since the 1950’s the accuracy of clinical judgement has been compared to diagnostic judgement or prediction, based on a statistical formula. The outcome of these investigations is that in several domains, well educated and experienced professional judgement perform no better than intelligent and inexperienced subjects, employing no domain knowledge beyond a statistical formula. (Meehl 1954, Brehmer 1980, Dawes 1994)
However, another finding of Deanna Kuhn is that education matters and has a general impact on reasoning. Reasoning skills transferred between domains and college educated were consistently better than non-college educated subjects. Her studies indicate that college education is related to a kind of reflective metaskills or a kind of thinking about one’s own knowledge.

Reasoning skills are an outcome of college education. At present, however, it is unclear whether, and to what extent, reasoning skills are improved through courses particularly designed for that purpose, e.g. courses in logic or in critical thinking. After reviewing evidence of  effects of courses in critical thinking (CT), Tim van Gelder concludes:
Currently it is difficult to make a convincing case …that CT courses are of any substantial benefit. On one hand there are various studies indicating no significant benefit from CT instruction. On the other, there are some studies which do appear to find some benefit. … The belief, common among CT teachers, that CT courses are better for improving CT than formal logic courses does not appear to be supported by the available evidence, such as it is…. An important question, which is left unresolved by these studies, is whether CT courses harm their students. It appears possible that typical CT courses actually reduce CT performance. (van Gelder 2000b) Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2002 – Processing Syllogisms And Enthymemes In Relation To Their Logical And Pragmatic Function

• by: James F. Voss & Julie A. Van Dyke - University of Pittsburgh

1. Introduction  
This paper reports the results of two experiments comparing the mental processing that occurs when individuals are presented with a two premise and conclusion syllogism or a single premise and conclusion enthymeme. Typically, the processing of these two forms of argument structure takes place with different goals in mind. For the syllogism the individual’s goal is usually determining whether the syllogism is logically valid; for the enthymeme, it is usually concerned with the enthymeme’s pragmatic function, such as the extent to which the enthymeme is persuasive.
While these are the most prevalent relationships between a person’s goal and the particular argument structure, others may be found. For example, a person may employ a pragmatic goal when processing a syllogism or employ a goal of determining logical soundness when processing an enthymeme. However, each of these goal-structure relations raises questions. Considering first the pragmatic goal used in the context of a syllogism, a question is whether the syllogism’s logical soundness or the lack thereof may influence the pragmatic judgment, as for example a judgment of persuasion. Will the persuasiveness of a syllogism be greater when the syllogism is logically sound than when it is not, given roughly equivalent contents?

In the case in which a judgment of logical soundness is being made in reference to an enthymeme, there are at least two types of processing that may occur. One is that the individual may construct the missing premise and then evaluate the syllogism. This possibility relates to the distinction made by van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992), and later by Gerritsen (1999) in an ISSA paper, indicating that an enthymeme has at least two functions, the logical and the pragmatic, with the logical interpretation defining the enthymeme as a syllogism with a premise missing. The individual adding the missing premise and then judging the syllogism for soundness is applying the logical interpretation of the syllogism. Govier (1987), however, has pointed out that by adding one or more such premises, one can always make the syllogism logically sound.
A second way in which an individual may process an enthymeme when being asked to determine its logical soundness is to consider the enthymeme as an argument in itself, an issue discussed in an ISSA paper by Hitchcock (1995). In this case the individual would likely consider soundness to be a function of the traditional enthymeme evaluation components, the perceived strength of the supporting premise and the extent of support that premise is taken to provide for the conclusion. In support of the latter view are the findings of an informal study we conducted. When college students were asked to evaluate the soundness of an enthymeme they not only did not generate the missing premise, they usually could not generate such a missing premise when asked to do so. While having a knowledge of logic or of Toulmin’s (1958) model could perhaps lead to successful generation, the inability of college students to perform these tasks at least suggests that missing premises are not generally considered when there is the goal of examining for their logical validity.

The purpose of the comments made thus far is to point out that there are a number of questions concerning how people process argumentative language structures. The two experiments reported in this paper were designed to study the operation of particular variables in such processing, especially emphasizing the goal of the processing, the form of argument structure, and the pragmatic quality of the arguments under study, that is, whether they are strong or weak. In the first of the two experiments, participants rated syllogisms or enthymemes on a 6-point scale for logical soundness or for persuasion effectiveness. In the interest of brevity the hypotheses being tested are presented in relation to the results. Read more