ISSA Proceedings 2006 – Manoeuvring Strategically With Rhetorical Questions

• by: A. Francisca Snoeck Henkemans - University of Amsterdam

1. Introduction
In this paper I investigate what role the stylistic device rhetorical question can play in arguers’ attempts to reconcile their rhetorical with their dialectical aims by manoeuvring strategically when carrying out particular discussion moves that form part of the dialectical procedure for resolving a dispute. The research I shall report on here, forms part of a larger project in which insights from classical rhetoric, pragmatics and modern stylistics are used to explore the possibilities for strategic manoeuvring with specific presentational means.[i]
Authors who have paid attention to the role of rhetorical questions in argumentative contexts, such as Slot (1993: 7) and Ilie (1994: 148) ascribe two main functions to rhetorical questions: they are used as a means of putting forward standpoints and as a means of putting forward arguments. Another function of rhetorical questions is mentioned by van Eemeren, Houtlosser & Snoeck Henkemans (2005): according to these authors rhetorical questions can also be analysed as proposals for a common starting point in the opening stage of a discussion. In this paper, I will concentrate on two of the three abovementioned functions of rhetorical questions: proposing a common starting point and putting forward argumentation. I shall first give an analysis of the way rhetorical questions can fulfil these functions, and then establish what dialectical and rhetorical goals might be served by executing the moves in question by means of a rhetorical question instead of by some other presentational means. Finally, I shall give an indication of how the types of strategic manoeuvring that rhetorical questions can be instrumental in may derail, and in which violations of the rules for critical discussion such derailed manoeuvrings may result.

2. Rhetorical questions in the opening stage and argumentation stage
According to the model for critical discussion, the argumentation stage of the discussion should be preceded by a dialogue in the opening stage by means of which the parties come to an agreement on which propositions they will regard as common starting points during the discussion. The dialectical profile that van Eemeren, Houtlosser and Snoeck Henkemans (2005: 112) have sketched for the opening stage, specifies which moves of the discussants may contribute to achieving the aim of establishing in advance what will be the common starting points for the discussion. According to the profile, the dialogue about the starting points starts with a proposal by one party to the other party to accept a certain proposition as a shared starting point. The other party can accept or refuse this proposal, or accept it only on condition that some other proposition will also be accepted as a starting point for the same discussion.
Van Eemeren, Houtlosser and Snoeck Henkemans point out that it is unlikely that in practice parties will execute the opening move of the starting point dialogue by means of a fully explicit proposal to accept some proposition. Arguers can, however, implicitly make such a proposal, and one way of doing this is to ask a rhetorical question (2005: 115). A rhetorical question is a stronger sign that the arguer is making a proposal to accept a starting point than an ordinary question about the other party’s beliefs. This is so because with a rhetorical question the addresser indirectly makes it clear that a preparatory condition for a proposal has been fulfilled, namely that the addresser thinks that the other party will be prepared to accept the proposition that functions as the presupposed answer to the question. Also, by asking a rhetorical question, the arguer shows that he himself believes that the proposition he proposes to the other party is indeed acceptable, which means that the sincerity condition for a proposal has also been fulfilled. Let us look at an example:
(1) I don’t see why Google’s rent-a-book program would not work. Isn’t it true that libraries do not have many of the popular titles even if they are bestsellers?

The only sign that the arguer is making a proposal is the form of the rhetorical question, but in fact the arguer is making an assertion in which he presents the acceptance of the proposal as unproblematic.[ii] According to van Eemeren, Houtlosser and Snoeck Henkemans (2005: 121) this is the general pattern with rhetorical questions that are being used to make a proposal to accept something as a common starting point.
Similar analyses of the function of rhetorical questions are given by other authors. Ilie (1994), for instance, also describes rhetorical questions as attempts by arguers to arrive at the same commitments:
The addresser’s commitment to the implicit rhetorical answer is indicated by his/her conviction that there is no other possible answer to the rhetorical question. The addresser’s expectation is to induce the same commitment in the addressee. (217).

And Rohde (2006), believes that a shared commitment by the discourse participants is a condition for felicitous rhetorical questions:
To be felicitous, rhetorical questions require that discourse participants share a prior commitment to similar, obvious, and often extreme answers. As such, rhetorical questions are biased, yet at the same time uninformative. Their effect is to synchronize discourse participants’ commitments, confirming their shared beliefs about the world (135). Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2006 – Informal Fallacies As Inferences To The Best Explanation

• by: A. J. Kreider - Miami Dade College

All who teach logic are familiar with informal fallacies such as ad ignorantium (appeal to ignorance) and ad populum (appeal to popularity). While it is easy to give clear examples of poor reasoning of this sort, instructors are also cognizant of what might be called “exceptions”: when it is legitimate to appeal to popularity or to an absence of evidence. Specifying the differences between fallacious and legitimate reasoning in these cases is not obvious. The view I defend here is that appeals to popularity and ignorance (and some other fallacies) should best be viewed as instances of abductive reasoning, or inferences to the best explanation. Thus, determinations of whether these types of arguments are good ones will rest on the criteria that determine good reasoning for abductive arguments generally[i]. As such, determination of whether instances of ad populum and ad ignorantium are indeed fallacious will be decidedly informal.

1. Ad Ignorantium
To begin, let’s look at ad ignorantium in more detail. It is fairly standard to characterize appeals to ignorance as inferring from a lack of evidence for a claim, that the claim is false (or conversely, inferring from a lack of evidence for the negation of a claim that the claim is true). It is not difficult to find examples of such fallacious inferences. Instructors discussing God’s existence will find this student argument familiar:
1. There is no evidence that God exists.
Therefore, God doesn’t exist.

That such arguments are fallacious is fairly straightforward. However, this is not the end of the matter for appeals to ignorance, for it is also not difficult to find examples of appeals to ignorance which seem reasonable; so reasonable, in fact, that it would be irrational for a person not to form beliefs on the basis of the lack of evidence. For instance, it is completely reasonable for me to form the belief that there is no tiger in the room, when my sole reason for having this belief is that there is no evidence of a tiger in the room. Merely remaining agnostic as to the existence of a tiger in the room (were the question posed) would be evidence of a defect of reason. To make things a bit more relevant, this argument seems at least reasonable.

1. Since the time of the coalition invasion of Iraq in the spring of 2003, no evidence of weapons of mass destruction has been found.
Therefore, at the time of the coalition invasion of Iraq in the spring of 2003, there were no significant weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.

How, then, to account for this apparent difference between legitimate and illegitimate appeals to ignorance? Oddly, many textbooks say nothing at all on the matter. Those that do ground the difference in one of two ways: they claim either that there are contextually-dependent pragmatic considerations that can justify appeals to ignorance, or that some appeals to ignorance have suppressed premises that, if made explicit, make it clear that the inferences are justifiable.
Concerning the first explanation, it is claimed that there are some cases such that the consequences of failing to believe truly (or believing falsely) are so dire that a lack of evidence can justify forming the belief (or at least acting as though one had the belief). Taking an example from Douglas Walton’s book, Informal Logic, not having evidence that a gun is not loaded is reason to presume that it is loaded, given the possible negative consequences of being mistaken as to its not being loaded. Similarly, in legal proceedings, it might be reasonable to presume innocence from a lack of evidence of guilt, given the moral cost of restricting the rights of innocent people. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2006 – Citizenship Education And The Teaching Of Argumentation In Schools

• by: Sharon Jessop - University of Strathclyde

The concept of citizenship is one which is currently being scrutinized, debated and revised nationally and internationally. An apparent disengagement from civic society and a breakdown in the sense that we share certain unifying values have contributed to a crisis of legitimacy in governments. Along with these general trends, the two factors of globalisation and immigration have led us to ask questions about the nature of citizenship. Maria van der Hoeven, the Dutch Minister for Education, in a speech given during the Dutch presidency of the European Union in 2004 stated that the lack of a sense of citizenship among people is the ‘largest social problem we are facing’. She went on to argue that the fast pace of change – social and technological – has outstripped the family’s ability to educate citizens, requiring ‘additional efforts on the part of society… to define and further social cohesion’ (Hoeven, 2004). These thoughts are echoed in many countries by people right across the political spectrum. As a result of these trends and ideas, citizenship education has, in the last decade, become one of the most researched, debated and legislated areas in education.
There are a number of different approaches being taken to citizenship education. These differences can be characterised in various ways. David Kerr’s international comparison focused on the degree to which national values are expressed and prescribed was used to distinguish between different educational policies (Kerr, 1999, p. 5). In a report for the European Commission, published last year, a three-way distinction was made between different schools of thought on civil society: as associational life (Putnam), as the good society (Keane) and as the public sphere (Habermas). Maria van der Hoeven’s statement reflects one dominant approach in giving to citizenship education the task of defining and furthering social cohesion. She cites the American Pragmatist, Robert Putnam, in justifying the construct of citizenship with which her government was working. This construct is based on the notion of social capital – bonding and bridging – the development of identity in relation to one’s immediate community and in relation to other communities. I wish to argue that an alternative conception of citizenship in terms of human well-being elevates the status of argumentation skills, as a fundamental aspect of citizenship, to a constituent part of well-being, rather than a strategic instrument or civic competency by means of which we may achieve social cohesion.

The theoretical basis of this preference draws on the Capability Approach as developed by Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen (see, for example, Sen, 1985; Nussbaum & Sen, 1993). This approach addresses the need for a normative account of human well-being for the formation and assessment of national and international policies. Rejecting the relativism of neo-liberalism and drawing on a modified Aristotelian essentialism, the capability approach asserts that there are features of humanness lying beneath local traditions and differences and the identification of these features is achieved by participatory dialogue. The recognition of these ‘parts of the story’, as Nussbaum calls them, gives us the starting off point for thinking about and planning for human well-being. Nussbaum lists ten of these features which map on to human freedoms or capabilities. The one feature which is architectonic -that is, it gives distinctively human structure to the other parts of the story – is what Nussbaum calls ‘affiliation’ which corresponds to Aristotle’s category of association and living together and fellowship of words and actions (Nussbaum, 1993, p. 246). The ability to argue well, taken in the broadest way this may be understood, is a specific human capability which realises affiliation.
I have said that within the various discussions on education for citizenship there are significantly different conceptions of purpose. The exposure of these conceptions in terms I outline above is important because in one view the teaching of argumentation is instrumental – and so limited in its scope. In another view – the teaching of argumentation is connected to an understanding of human well-being – and so not limited in its scope to the achievement of an extrinsic end, the details of which are set by industry or a particular political system or government. I advocate the explicit teaching of argumentation in the curriculum and that a conception of citizenship which is based upon ideas of human well being first and foremost is most conducive to the success of learning to argue well. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2006 – A Role For Dialectic In Science Studies

• by: Gábor Kutrovátz - Eötvös University of Budapest

1. Science studies and the rhetoric of science
In the past few decades, our understanding of the workings of science have been immensely enriched and deepened by various theoretical approaches thriving in the conceptual space opened by the so-called Kuhnian revolution. The field of science studies has developed as a diverse inter- and cross-disciplinary enterprise where the attention shifted from the logical analysis of idealised proposition systems called ‘theories’ to the sensitive study of the actual practices of scientific activity. As the main thrust focused on the social dimensions of what scientists do, and how this is framed on different scales by the social environment, discursive pratices also became a major issue for several studies. While specific and contingent features of the linguistic medium of scientific communication used to be disregarded or ignored as either transparent or irrelevant by most traditional views, numerous recent approaches consider discursive reality to be constitutive of scientific knowledge production.
Typically, discourse-oriented analyses treat scientific communication in rhetorical terms (e.g. Bazerman 1988, Prelli 1989, Gross 1990, Pera and Shea 1991). The focus of attention is directed to scientific controversies where conflicting claims create spaces in which linguistic persuasive techniques become functional. In other words, discursive practices are seen as tools for persuasion, and language operates both as a transmitter of beliefs and a transmitter of cognitive attitudes to beliefs. While there are serious disagreements and divergences between certain approaches within rhetorical analyses of science – all the mentioned authors represent significantly different theoretical standpoints – I will refer to the family of these views with the umbrella term ‘rhetoric of science’. For my purposes a dominant view in this ‘rhetoric of science’ is that belief acceptance is a process that cannot sufficiently be explained by idealised, discourse-insensitive cognitive factors.

Rhetoric of science fits in the main genre of science studies in several respects. First, by focusing on the influence of communicative performances on receptive communities, it places scientific discourse in a social dimension. Second, by studying the linguistic medium of scientific communitcation, it contributes to broadening the complex of perspectives from which science is analysed, as opposed to the strictly ‘cognitive’ (i.e. logico-conceptual) interest of classical approaches. Third, since explanatory factors – rhetorical devices – are markedly different from the explicit evaluative criteria used by scientists, rhetoric of science relies on a clear distinction between actors’ categories and analysts’ categories, thus taking a meta-scientific attitude that does not fall back on its subject level. Fourth, it aims to provide empirical descriptions of the efficiency of persuasive techniques in specific situatuions, and refrains from formulating normative claims or ‘universally’ valid criteria.
The latter two points, distance from actors’ categories and avoidance of normativity, are strongly interconnected notions, traceable back to the original commitments of science studies. According to a central commintment of the field, the way science studies reflects upon science is analogous to the way science reflects upon nature. In Bloor’s highly inspirative Strong Programme, sociology of knowlede is a naturalistic enterprise where explanations of belief acceptance are formulated in terms of casuses, instead of reasons referred to by actors (e.g. Bloor 1992). The normative charge inherent in the concept of ‘reason’ is lacking from the entirely naturalistic concept of ‘cause’, and evaluative terms such as ‘rationality’, ‘objectivity’, or ‘truth’ are expelled from Bloor’s programme where knowledge, instead of being ‘justified true belief’, is “whatever people take to be knowledge” in the purely descriptive sense (Bloor 1992, p. 5). Norms that govern or inform scientific research themselves become objects of explanation, and hence their normative force on the analyst of science cannot be accepted by her without facing the danger of blunt circularity.

However, such a strong rejection of normativity has been challenged even within science studies, where the influence of anthropology introduced participant observation methods at the expense of the ‘stranger’s perspective’ favoured by sociologists (e.g. Latour and Woolgar 1979). The ‘third wave of science studies’ proposed by Collins and Evans (2002) attempts to bridge the gap between actors’ and analysts’ categories, by making use of a form of normativity that is simultanously binding for both scientists under study and those examining science. According to them, since the concept of ‘expertise’ informs both the analyst and the actor, a normative theory of expertise may facilitate a deeper insight to the workings of science without having to rely too much upon other norms of scientific activity. In other words, while the analyst keeps some distance from the field she studies in order to benefit from the advantages of an external perspective, she remains close enough to understand some inherent properties hidden from the eyes of a complete stranger.
Nevertheless, ‘expertise’ seems too broad a concept to efficiently deal with the discourse of science. While it is apt to cover a number of aspects having to do with the ‘craftmanship’ profile of experimental science Collins and others investigate, discursive expertise needs further specification before building a normative theory of scientific communication while keeping an eye on fruitful insights of science studies. I propose that this form of expertise lies in the utilisation of argumentation-theory. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2006 – Cinematic Arguments: The Efficacy Of The Day After Tomorrow In Public Arguments On Global Warming

• by: Ron Von Burg - Christopher Newport University

1. Introduction: Science Fictions and Public Understandings of Science
The proposition that science fiction films play a role in shaping public discussions and understandings of science receives limited academic attention (Frank, 2003; Kirby, 2000, 2003a, 2003b; Vieth, 2001). Although science fiction films do succeed as texts that open intellectual space to consider the philosophical, cultural, and ethical dimensions of scientific and technological advancements (Aldridge, 1983; Kuhn, 1999, 2000; Stork, 1997; Suvin, 1979, 1988), popular science fiction films rarely are embraced by the scientific community for advancing a particular scientific argument. More often, scientists identify fictional films as irresponsible and inaccurate depictions of science that frustrate efforts to educate lay publics on the value of “real” scientific knowledge and, in an effort to stem the risk of public confusion, occupy the role of epistemic gatekeepers who parse out the science fact from the science fiction (Corbett & Durfee, 2004; Lewenstein, 1995; Nelkin, 1987; Silverstone, 1991; Wynne, 1995).
The scientific commentary on the global warming disaster film, The Day After Tomorrow, however, marks a departure from the rhetorical practice of just isolating science fact from science fiction as a way to promote proper scientific knowledge. Instead, scientific interlocutors commenting on the film craft a rhetorical space where obscuring the distinctions between “real” global warming science and its fictional representations functions as an argumentative commonplace to endorse a specific scientific argument. Despite substantial evidentiary support, the scientific arguments for combating global warming that circulate in public spheres often lose persuasive force when juxtaposed against skeptical arguments that identify shortcomings in global warming science and the potential economic risks associated with efforts to address global warming. Consequently, scientists and advocates spreading the word about climate change encounter a number of rhetorical difficulties, including how to communicate the dangers of global warming in ways that are both scientifically valid and effectively dramatic.
I argue that the public scientific discourse surrounding The Day After Tomorrow highlights a paradoxical rhetorical practice that mobilizes a patently fictional film as a topos for promoting a scientifically grounded argument in an effort to elucidate the dangers of global warming. I argue this rhetorical move functions as a form of oppositional argumentation that challenges the norms of public scientific discourse. In addition to using the blockbuster as an opportunity to focus public attention on global warming, scientific interlocutors employ the film’s visual potency and pointed political commentary to buttress scientific arguments that illustrate the dangers of global warming. This paper illustrates how the scientific discourse on The Day After Tomorrow blurs the distinctions between fact and fiction to bolster arguments on global warming by first, examining the rhetorical difficulties inherent in public debates on climate change, and second, exploring the potential for oppositional arguments to alter the norms of public discussions of global warming.

2. The Day After Tomorrow and the Public Debate on Global Warming
In the weeks prior to its 2004 Memorial Day weekend release, The Day After Tomorrow became enveloped in a sustained public scientific discourse on global warming where scientific interlocutors capitalized on the opportunity to educate publics on the “reality” of global warming (Bridges, 2004; Coren, 2004). In addition to numerous newspaper articles and television specials, the National Resource Defense Council, Greenpeace, the Environmental Literacy Council, the Union of Concerned Scientists, National Snow and Ice Data Center, the Energy Future Coalition, and the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution all created websites to answer questions about the science in the film and the reality of global warming. Each website employed a variety of images and quotes from the film throughout its website, highlighting the various dangers of global warming (Griscom, 2004). On the days leading up to the film’s release, many major newspapers featured stories on the global warming debate that used The Day After Tomorrow as a qualified attention-getting device designed to spur informed public debate on global warming (Bowles, 2004; Hager, 2004; Munoz, 2004; Sennott, 2004; Vancheri, 2004). Gretchen Cook-Anderson, a National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) spokeswoman, notes “Whether its premise is valid or not, or possible or not, the very fact it’s about climate change could help to spur debate and dialogue” (qtd. in Barollier, 2004). Likewise, Geochemist Michael Molitor suggests that the movie “is going to do more for the issue of climate change than anything I’ve done in my whole life” (qtd in. Booth, 2004). Wallace Broecker, the earth scientist who first identified the link between ocean currents and abrupt climate shifts, believes the film is “wolf-crying science,” but he concedes that no researcher will turn down “an opening to get our message out” (qtd. in Dayton, 2004). Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2006 – Reading Direct-To-Consumer Advertising Of Prescription Medicine. A Qualitative Study From Argumentation Theory On Its Dialectical And Rhetorical Features

• by: Sara Rubinelli - Peter J. Schulz, Health Care Communication Laboratory, University of Lugano, CH & Kent Nakamoto - Department of Marketing, Virginia Tech, USA

1. Introduction
The expression Direct-to-Consumer Advertising (thereafter DTCA) refers to “any promotional effort by a pharmaceutical company to present prescription drug information to the general public in the lay media” (Huh et al. 2004, p. 569). Currently, DTCA is allowed only in the United States and New Zealand. Yet, its introduction in the early 1980’s has inflamed a debate that today seems to have assumed a seemingly chronic non-conclusive orientation both at an academic and institutional level (Areni 2002; Tanne 1999; Raven 2004).
The core of the debate on DTCA essentially concerns the identification of DTCA either as a beneficial procedure to be promoted or as a damaging procedure to be abolished and consequently not introduced in other countries. Promoters of DTCA present several arguments supporting its positive educational influence on people’s health literacy. DTCA is here seen as a way to provide people with adequate information for them to have a safe use of medication, as well as a way to create effective knowledge for evaluating the benefits and risks of drug products, and generally managing health autonomously and appropriately. For promoters of DTCA, pharmaceutical companies can provide more accurate, balanced and scientifically based information than any other sources. Opponents of DTCA emphasise the financial gains of the pharmaceutical industries and the fact that DTCA enhances medicalization of normal human experience. In this last perspective, DTCA is depicted as being devoid of any effective educational value insofar as it does not give adequate information on side effects and non-pharmacological options for treatment and prevention. To cut a long story short, prescription drug advertising generally contains some information about diseases or treatment options, but according to a conspicuous part of the literature, its primary aim is to create name and brand recognition with a view to enhancing the use of the products advertised (Murray et al. 2004; Bonaccorso & Sturchio 2003; Lexchin & Mintzes 2002; Calfee 2002).

The literature on DTCA suggests that the debate over DTCA is getting bogged down in chains of arguments pro and con, yet the issue per se is surely of crucial social importance, especially because there is strenuous lobbying in many countries to relax national restrictions on DTCA (Raven 2004). In addition, de facto DTCA in the form of unbranded advertising about specific diseases and conditions increasingly occurs outside the United States and New Zealand (Raven 2004). As some scholars have pointed out, not a lot is known about the effect of DTCA of prescription drugs (Calfee 2003; Areni 2002; Jones & Garlick 2003). Consumer surveys, in particular those by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), which has regulatory responsibility for DTCA in the United States, and Prevention magazine (Calfee 2002) show that consumers are generally aware of DTCA and that they find it useful. Nevertheless, such surveys are limited in that they do not permit a definitive determination of the impact of DTCA on people’s health (GAO-03-177 (2002).
Recently, a few studies have addressed the issue of how to improve the regulations of the Food and Drug Administration. These studies focus mainly on the comprehension level of the information delivered by the adverts, on the need for a ‘fair-balanced disclosure’ between information on risks and benefits and for less superficial information (Kaphingst et al. 2005; Spence et al. 2005; Maubach & Hoek 2005; Huh & Cude 2004; Chao 2005). Although these factors are important for promoting a positive impact on consumers’ health literacy, they do not seem to get to the core of the communication problem involved in DTCA, namely that these adverts are not simply informative as claimed by the pharmaceutical industry (Bonaccorso & Sturchio 2003), but they present information framed in potentially misleading argumentative structures (Rubinelli 2006).
Drawing on argumentation theory, we claim that DTCA can lead readers to make wrong inferences and misunderstand the drugs’ characteristics as a result of its interplay between dialectical and rhetorical features. In what follows, the nature of this interplay will be explored in detail, with the perspective of investigating the potential tension between practical persuasive success and normative directives about argumentative conduct.

2. Preliminaries
These preliminary observations introduce theoretical concepts that will be useful for the analysis of DTCA presented in this paper. In particular, we shall deal with the definition of dialectic and rhetoric, and with the main factors which they involve.
Following the evaluation made by Leff (2006), dialectic and rhetoric have been differently assessed by scholars. Weaver (1953) saw a fundamental distinction between the two disciplines; dialectic consists in winning rational assent for abstract matter, while rhetoric deals with ways of proceeding in individual situations. Contrary to the interpretation of Weaver, recent scholarship – including the authors of this paper – perceives a crucial overlapping between dialectic and rhetoric; the same overlapping that, we add, Aristotle saw in the Rhetoric while stressing in the opening lines of the treatise that dialectic is the counterpart (antistrophos) of rhetoric. As Wenzel (1990) claims, dialectic is a way of settling disputes through critical discussion. Rhetoric relates, however, to the persuasive factors of argumentative encounters. The main point stressed by Wenzel is that dialectical and rhetorical perspectives can both appear in concrete arguments.
According to the above perspective, dialectic results in the generation of norms for reasonable conduct. In particular, there are three broad principles – among those representing the asset of a critical discussion as codified by pragma-dialectics – which become relevant for our context: that arguers make clear what overall claim is being advanced, present support for the claim, and defend their views against objections (O’Keefe 2003; 2006). Let us discuss these principles in more detail. Read more