ISSA Proceedings 2002 – World Environment Day 2000: Arguing For Environmental Action

• by: Catherine Ann Collins - Willamette University

World Environment Day, established in 1972, is “one of the principal vehicles through which the United Nations stimulates world wide awareness of the environment and enhances political attention and action … [it] is also a multi-media event which inspires thousands of journalists to write and report enthusiastically and critically on the environment” (UNEP Web page). World Environment Day is celebrated on June 5 (more than 100 countries observe the event annually) with a different country selected to host the ceremonies each year. Australia was selected as the host country and Adelaide as the primary site for the 2000 celebrations. I attended the event and took field notes on the activities, arguments advanced, and value appeals invoked in the public rhetoric. I collected available print materials and media coverage on site and later through a Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe review of General News. This essay explores the strategic events and discourse of World Environment Day 2000 including the media’s response, offers a descriptive analysis of the argumentative strategies employed in the activities, and compares the observed events with the media’s coverage of the celebration.
To understand the format and goals for the event, some additional background information is appropriate. The host site organizes public events that focus largely on spectacle as a way of generating public attention to the environment – parades, concerts, rallies, school competitions, clean-up activities, etc. World Environment Day celebrations also have a political component, the official events – symposia, treaty signings, and information campaigns. The political activities reinforce environmental agreements as well as provide a forum where delegates and international guests can exchange strategies for environmental action or garnering desirable media coverage.

In his December 1999 press release, Robert Hill, Australian Environment Minister, articulates an additional agenda for host countries, to garner favorable international attention for their environmental achievements and commitments: “World Environment Day is a cause for national activity and celebrations … to … show the world that Australia’s unique heritage is in good hands” (http://www.environment.gov.au/minister/env/99/mr18dec99.html).
The host country’s agenda and the U.N.’s goals for the commemoration rely on good media coverage of political and public events. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2002 – “The Issue” In Argumentation Practice And Theory

• by: Robert T. Craig & Karen Tracy - University of Colorado at Boulder

1. Introduction
This paper compares metadiscursive uses of “the issue” in two settings (college classroom discussions and public participation in school board meetings), and reflects critically between these empirical cases and the concept of issue in argumentation theory. Our intent is to pursue this critique in both directions; that is, to critique the practical discourse in light of normative argumentation theory while also considering how argumentation theory might be informed by practical considerations. The ultimate goal of our research is a grounded practical theory, a conceptual reconstruction of argumentative discourse that is both rationally warranted and practically useful (Craig & Tracy, 1995).

Jean Goodwin’s (2002) work in the normative pragmatic theory of “Designing Issues” provides an especially useful starting point in argumentation theory. For Goodwin, “an issue is a more or less determinate object of contention that is, under the circumstances, worth arguing about.” For the purposes of argumentation theory, the existence of a determinate issue can often be taken for granted as one of the preconditions for arguments to be made. In reality, however, issues are not always well defined, nor do they “simply lie there” waiting to be argued about. “An issue arises when we make an issue of it” in practical discourse. Issues exist when arguers successfully design them so as to create the pragmatic conditions for argumentation to occur. “In order to make an issue of some matter, the arguer will have to (a) render it as determinate as required for the particular situation, and (b) show that, under the circumstances, it is worth arguing” (Goodwin, 2002).

To understand how issues are designed in practical discourse becomes, then, a task for argumentation theory. As Goodwin points out, the issue itself is at issue in many controversies, and discursive resources for framing and defining issues play important roles in argumentative practice. The task of a normative pragmatic theory is to explain how issues can be designed so as to induce interlocutors to address them. This requires more than a mere classification of issues, for example as provided by the traditional stasis theory of forensic rhetoric. Following Kauffeld (e.g., 1998), Goodwin shows that designing an issue requires the use of available discursive resources to create conditions in which interlocutors will be held responsible for addressing the issue, whether it be an accusation of wrongdoing or a claim about the likely consequences of a policy decision. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2002 – A Normative And Empirical Approach To Petty And Cacioppo’s ‘Strong’ And ‘Weak’ Arguments

• by: Renske van Dijk, Lettica Hustinx & Hans Hoeken(i) - University of Nijmegen

What makes a persuasive message persuasive? According to the Elaboration Likelihood Model (Petty & Cacioppo 1986), argument quality plays an important role in the answer to this question. The present study takes a close look at this factor. First, background information will be given about the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM). Subsequently, the role of argument quality in the ELM will be discussed.  After that, the results will be presented of a normative and empirical study of Petty and Cacioppo’s research material containing strong and weak arguments. These results will provide insight into the role of argument quality in the persuasion process [i].

1. Petty & Cacioppo’s Elaboration Likelihood Model
According to the Elaboration Likelihood Model, people can be persuaded into adopting a claim by walking two different routes. The first route is called the central route. At this route, people systematically examine the quality of the given arguments. If they agree with these arguments, they adopt the claim. If they disagree with the arguments, they reject the claim. The second route is called the peripheral route. At this route, people are persuaded by peripheral cues. Peripheral cues are all non-argumentative features of a message that are capable of influencing the formation or change of the receiver’s attitude. Commonly used peripheral cues are rules of thumb, such as ‘If this authority says so, it must be true’ or ‘If hundreds of people used this product before me, it must be a good product.’
Which route is being taken is determined by two factors: motivation and ability. Motivation is about wanting to process the persuasive message. If people want to be very sure of the correctness of their attitude, they will be very motivated to examine the given arguments carefully. So, for example, motivation is higher when a house is to be bought than a detergent. The second factor is about being able to process the message. The easier it is for people to examine the given arguments, the quicker they will perform this task. Motivation as well as ability is required in order to follow the central route. If these conditions are not met, the peripheral route will be taken. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2002 – Reconfiguring Practical Wisdom

• by: Walter R. Fisher - University of Southern California

At the 1999 Conference on Argumentation in Alta, Utah, I presented a preview of my move to develop the other side of the narrative paradigm, the ethics side (Fisher, 2000, 1-15)[i]. Since then, I have written several chapters, one of which is composed as a conversation among philosophers, theologians, and scholars – from Plato to Levinas – who address the question: what does being ethical require of one? From their responses, I derived four different answers, four different requirements. I shall use these ideas to analyze a decision a young Frenchman had to make during WWII: to stay with his dependent mother or to leave and join the Free French Forces in England. The story of Pierre’s plight comes from Jean-Paul Sartre’s essay on “Existentialism” (Sartre, 1998, 9-51).

Forms of Life and Practices
Before getting to the Pierre’s dilemma, I think it is prudent to review key concepts that underlie my attempt to reconfigure practical wisdom. The foundation for the approach I am taking is an adaptation of Wittgenstein’s concept of “forms of life” (Wittgenstein, 1977, 8e, 11e, 88e) and Alasdair MacIntyre’s definition of a “practice. By form of life, I shall mean an enduring, historically, culturally developed interpersonal relationship, such as a family or friendship. MacIntyre defines a practice as “any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended” (MacIntrye, 1984, 187). Examples of practices include government, medicine, business, science, scholarship, and sports. Forms of life concern “private” virtues; practices are the home of “public” virtues. As will be noted later, private and public virtues are not always separate; they inform one another.
Forms of life and practices are alike in how they are constituted and how their constitutions inform and regulate judgment and action within them. They differ in their sites: interpersonal versus public and professional. The argument is that different forms of life and different practices are constituted by sets of values which prescribe norms of character, role performance, interaction, and ideal aspiration. Put another way: the values, norms, and ideals that constitute interpersonal and institutional relationships provide the vocabulary that informs discussion, dialogue, and debate about ethical matters. They also provide the grounds for justifying and evaluating ethical judgments and conduct. They are empowered to serve these functions because they are, though they evolve and may be conflicted, the abiding themes of the narratives we live by. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2002 – Intractable Quarrels

• by: Richard Friemann - York University

1. Introduction
Logical tradition defines the term ‘argument’ quite narrowly. Copi’s definition is well known: “An argument, in the logician’s sense, is any group of propositions of which one is claimed to follow from the others, which are regarded as providing support or grounds for the truth of that one” (Copi, 1994, 5). Immediately following this definition he says, “Of course, the word “argument” is often used in other senses, but in logic it has the sense just explained” (Copi, 1994, 5). In whatever other senses the word ‘argument’ can be used, for the layperson, an argument, typically, “is a conflictual experience charged with emotion where opposing beliefs, desires and/or attitudes are involved” (Gilbert, 1997, 32). It is this sense of argument, what Gilbert calls the “Ordinary View”, that many Informal Logicians have chosen to exclude in their definition of argument. Indeed, some Informal Logicians try to make it clear what they mean by their definition of argument by explicitly contrasting it with what they call a ‘quarrel’, ‘fight’, or ‘dispute’. For example, (Govier, 2001, 4); (Diestler, 2001, 3-4); (Levi, 1991, 25-27); (Fogelin, 1987, vii); (Thomas, 1986, 10); (Missimer, 1986, 6); (Cederblom & Paulsen, 1982, 1); (Fearnside, 1980, 4); and (Shurter & Pierce, 1966, xii).
In contrast to this “Dialectical view” of argument held by Informal Logicians, the “Rhetorical view” as conceived by Gilbert (1997, 34) includes the quarrel as a type of argument. The inclusion of the quarrel into the realm of argument for Argumentation Theory has been made easier by the work of Communication Theorists, in particular, by Daniel J. O’Keefe’s (1977) distinction between argument1 and argument2. Arguments1 are products which people make, while arguments2 are social interactions which people have. With the recognition of arguments2, quarrels became almost, but not quite, a legitimate subject of study for Argumentation Theory. There was still the troublesome question of emotion. At the end of O’Keefe’s paper he raises (but does not try to answer) some important questions about arguments1 and arguments2. One question is whether or not quarrels are “genuine” arguments2. The issue here is that we well might hold that “an argument2 necessarily involves the exchange of arguments1 and counterarguments1” (O’Keefe, 1977, 127). If there are no arguments1 exchanged in an argument2, then all that is occurring is the (typically) heated expression of emotion. And it was not obvious that in such a situation an argument, in any sense, was taking place. In Wayne Brockriede’s (1977, 129) response to O’Keefe’s question, he states “Although persons can make arguments without engaging in the process of arguing, I do not see how they can argue without making arguments.” Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2002 – The Wiles Of Argument: Protodeliberation And Heroic Prudence In Homer’s Odyssey

• by: G. Thomas Goodnight - Northwestern University

“Rhetoric, in the most general sense, is the energy inherent in emotion and thought, transmitted through a system of signs, including language, to others to influence their decisions or actions” (Kennedy, 1991, 7). In Rhetoric 1.3 Aristotle identifies a powerful form of advancing interests, political deliberation. Such argumentation is directed toward “future action in best interests of a state” (7). Aristotle believes that this form of discourse has a distinctive temporal quality, which “for the deliberative speaker [is] the future (for whether exhorting or dissuading he advises about future events).” A rhetor connects present to future through weighing excess and deficiency in alternatives. Public policy is tested by estimating its future consequences for advantage and justice. Similarly, personal decisions of “what ought to be done or not to be done,” he tells us in the Nichomachean Ethics, may be so informed by practical reasoning (Ross, 1988/1925, vi.10). Whether public or private, all deliberation is “reasoning involved in choice,” “a kind of seeking – into what action both is possible in the circumstance and will lead to the goal in question” (Bostock, 2000, 79).
Aristotle’s outlook on deliberation appears appropriate to peacetime circumstance with its plans for progressive reform, support for engaged scientific inquiry, and rising prestige in foreign policy. Of course, the deliberations of a post-war period are somewhat distinct. Such an era cannot rely upon commonly shared connections between past and future. As the lives of ordinary citizens and ruling classes are affected differentially by concerted violence, the processes of social legitimation are thrown into question. Whether prewar goals can flourish in postwar society is always an open question. The duration recedes to a distant past for the fortunate, but for the still grieving its effect remains. Some move on; others cannot. A culture languishes in between times, knowing neither the untroubled, irenic diversions of peace nor the desperate unity of sacrifice. The past – the war that framed deliberative argument in a singular, urgent, and mounting discourses of bloody struggle – is over; and, yet, its business is not finished.

This essay analyzes the protodeliberations of the Odyssey as the rhetoric of an archaic, postwar rhetorical culture. Throughout history, the remaindered trauma of war, with its memories of individual and collective destruction, periodically disrupts lives, alters politics, and unhinges communicative norms. A postwar culture can neither dwell entirely in its losses, nor easily move on to a future; so events drift; issues fail to statiate, if they are raised at all; and reasons tangle in cross-expectations. Who will or will not return? How can men of violence reenter a society based on norms of civility? How is lost time made up or forgotten? Was it worth it after all? Answers to these questions play out controversially in intimate family relations and across the landscape of Attic politics in Homer’s comic epic of return and renewal. Read more