ISSA Proceedings 2010 – Practical Reasoning In Political Discourse: Moral And Prudential Arguments In The Debate Over Bankers’ Bonuses In The British Press

• by: Isabela Fairclough & Norman Fairclough - University of Lancaster

This paper makes a proposal about the structure and representation of practical reasoning in political discourse. We provide an overview of the arguments that were used in a particular public debate on the fairness of bankers claiming and receiving bonuses in the present context of economic crisis and discuss the structure of those arguments. We adopt an instrumentalist approach to practical reasoning, which regards all reasons for action as means-end reasons. We argue that an instrumentalist approach is supported by the particular logic of political discourse: various types of action that are defended in political discourse are supposed to be means towards the realization of political goals, seen as states of affairs or modes of social organization informed by a normative commitment to various moral-political values (justice, equality, freedom).

We start from a distinction made in philosophy between two types of practical reasoning, “prudential” and “moral” (Gauthier 1963). Prudential arguments take the agent’s desires (wants, needs, interests) as premises: if the agent desires a certain outcome, then a certain course of action is recommended; if he doesn’t desire the outcome, the he has no reason to do the action. Moral arguments do not seem to have this conditional (hypothetical) structure, they present an action as necessary in itself, regardless of the agent’s desires or interests, regardless of any further goal that is desired, regardless of circumstances. Prudential reasoning corresponds to Kant’s hypothetical imperative, while moral reasoning corresponds to his categorical imperative. This might suggest that the structure of moral arguments is significantly different from that of prudential arguments.
The view we will defend here is that the two types of arguments have the same means-goal underlying structure, involving the same type of premises, but with significant differences in the agent’s relationship towards the goal (which he may or may not desire) and in the nature of the reasons that support or inform the goal (internal or external reasons). We suggest that, together with an adequate understanding of the Speaker-oriented (as opposed to Subject or Agent-oriented) nature of deontic modality, the distinction between internal (motivating) and external (normative) reasons for action is crucial to understanding the structure of practical reasoning, including practical reasoning in the political field. Our more general concern is to arrive at a conception of practical reasoning that can be used in the analysis and evaluation of political discourse and its characteristic genres (deliberation, debate) – see Fairclough and Fairclough (forthcoming) – within a version of Critical Discourse Analysis (Fairclough 2003, 2010). Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2010 – Strategic Manoeuvring In The Case Of The ‘Unworthy Spouse’

• by: Eveline T. Feteris - Department of Speech Communication, Argumentation Theory and Rhetoric - University of Amsterdam

 1. Introduction
In research of legal argumentation different aspects of the process of legal justification have been the object of study. Some researchers consider legal justification as a rational activity and for this reason are interested in the rules that should be observed in rational legal discussions. Others consider legal justification as a rhetorical practice and are interested in the way in which judges operate in steering the discussion in the direction that is desirable from the perspective of certain legal goals.

That both aspects of the legal ‘enterprise’, rational dispute resolution and a rhetorical orientation to a particular result through strategic manoeuvring, can also be reconciled is something that has received little attention in research of legal argumentation. The aim of this contribution is to analyse the way in which courts try to reconcile the dialectical goal of resolving the difference of opinion in a rational way with the rhetorical goal of steering the discussion in a particular direction that is desirable from the perspective of a particular development of law. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2010 – Argumentative Valences Of The Key-Phrase Value Creation In Corporate Reporting

• by: Ioana Agatha Filimon - Università della Svizzera italiana, Lugano

« Qui donc crée de la valeur, à part les dieux? »
Édouard Tétreau, Analyste. Au cœur de la folie financière (2005, p. 62)

The present paper proposes an analysis of the argumentative use of the key-phrase value creation in corporate reporting discourse, in line with Rigotti and Rocci’s theoretical model of keywords as lexical pointers to unexpressed endoxa (2005). By means of a brief quantitative analysis of concordances conducted on a corpus of full-text reports, and a detailed argumentative analysis of a relevant sample of letters to shareholders (and stakeholders), the study attempts to grasp the main patterns of pragmatic meaning and argumentative moves prompted by value creation (as one single unit of meaning) in both annual reports and corporate social responsibility reports[i]. This twofold methodological approach will enable a concomitant focus on the two main keyness criteria envisaged by Stubbs’ generic definition of keywords as “words with a special status, either because they express important evaluative social meanings, or because they play a special role in a text or text-type” (in press, p.1). Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2010 – Meta-Argumentation: Prolegomena To A Dutch Project

• by: Maurice A. Finocchiaro - University of Nevada, Las Vegas

What I want to do in this essay is to discuss the notion of meta-argumentation by summarizing some past work and motivating a future investigation (which, for obvious reasons, I shall label the “Dutch” project). The discussion is meant to make a plea partly for the theoretical and methodological importance and fruitfulness of meta-argumentation in general, and partly for approaching from the viewpoint of meta-argumentation a particular (Dutch-related) topic that is especially relevant on the present occasion for reasons other than methodology and theory. I hope that the potential appeal of this aspect of the essay – combining methodological orientation and theoretical conceptualization with empirical and historical content – will make up for whatever shortcomings it may possess from the point of view of substantive detail about, and completed attainment of, the Dutch project.

1. Historical Context of William the Silent’s Apologia (1581)
In May 1581, the States-General of the Low Countries met here[i] in Amsterdam to draft a declaration of independence from Philip II, King of Spain, who had ruled this region since 1555. In the course of the summer, this congress moved to The Hague, where the declaration was concluded at the end of July. This declaration is called the “act of abjuration”, meaning that these provinces were thereby abjuring their allegiance to the King of Spain.[ii] Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2010 – Wellman And Govier On Weighing Considerations In Conductive Pro And Contra Arguments

• by: Thomas Fischer - University of Houston Downtown, Houston, Texas

1. Introduction
The concept of conductive argument remains unsettled and controversial in theory of argument. Carl Wellman (1971, p. 52) defined conduction as follows:
Conduction can best be defined as that sort of reasoning in which 1) a reason about some individual case 2) is drawn non-conclusively 3) from one or more premises about the same case 4) without appeal to other cases.

Wellman identified three types of conductive argument: Type One with a single pro reason, Type Two with multiple pro reasons, and Type Three with one or more pro reasons and one or more con reasons. Arguments of the conductive type are clearly non-deductive and, most theorists would argue, non-inductive as well. The term “conductive” indicates a ‘bringing together’ of independent reasons, much like an orchestra conductor brings together many instruments and musicians into a single performance. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2010 – Can Argumentation Really Deal With Dissensus?

• by: James B. Freeman - Hunter College of The City University of New York

1. A Case of Unreconciled Dissensus
Book V of Milton’s Paradise Lost presents a striking dissensus between Satan and the Archangel Abdiel over the nature of the Deity. Each presents an argument for his view which – not unsurprisingly – the other rejects. Milton sets the scene – The Almighty before a convocation of all angels has decreed his Son their Lord and has mandated that “to him shall bow/All knees in Heav’n, and shall confess him Lord” (V, 607-608) This decree Satan cannot abide. He resolves to rebel, never bending the knee, nor, if he can persuade them, will any of the angels under his command. Paraphrasing to bring out the underlying argument, Satan first proposes
(1) Prior to this decree, all Natives of Heaven (including the Almighty and his Son) have been equally free.
(2) No one has a right to assume monarchy over one’s equals in freedom. Hence
(3) The Almighty has no right to proclaim this decree.

Although Satan offers two further arguments, Abdiel turns his critical questions exclusively to Satan’s first. Again paraphrasing, his argument can be laid out quite straightforwardly:
(1) The Almighty created you and indeed all the spirits of heaven, and endowed all with their glory. Therefore
(2) Neither you nor all angels taken together are equal to the Almighty. Therefore
(3) Justice gives you  no right to enter with God in determining what are the laws or principles governing your relation. Therefore
(4) The Decree of the Almighty is just. Read more