ISSA Proceedings 2010 – Argument Schemes, Topoi, And Laws Of Logic

• by: Jean H.M. Wagemans - University of Amsterdam

1. Introduction
For the reconstruction of implicit elements in argumentative discourse, the pragma-dialectical account of “argument schemes” serves as an important heuristic tool[i] Consisting of a description of the various ways in which an arguer may transfer the acceptability of the argument to that of the standpoint, the account enables the analyst to reconstruct the “unexpressed premise”[ii]. However, in reconstructing implicit elements, the analyst may also benefit from other accounts of the transfer of acceptability of the argument to that of the standpoint, such as topoi and laws of logic. These alternative accounts are especially helpful in the reconstruction of academic argumentation – scholarly, scientific, philosophical argumentation – in which the notion “necessity” plays a pivotal role.
In this paper, I will present a formal framework that encompasses the three theoretical accounts of acceptability transfer principles just mentioned (argument schemes, topoi, and laws of logic)[iii]. First, I will discuss some insights from speech act theory that underlie the pragma-dialectical account of argument schemes and that will serve as a starting point for the development of the framework (§2). Next, I will introduce the notion “acceptability transfer principle” (ATP) and describe the four types of this principle that make up the framework (§3). Finally, I will briefly indicate how the existing accounts of argument schemes, topoi, and laws of logic fit into the framework (§4). Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2010 – Burdens Of Persuasion And Proof In Everyday Argumentation

• by: Douglas Walton - University of Windsor & Fabrizio Macagno - Universidade Nova de Lisboa

The concept of burden of proof is fundamentally important in argumentation studies. We know, for example, that it is very closely related to, and necessary for the study of informal fallacies, like the fallacy of argument from ignorance. But procedural methods for dealing with issues of burden of proof in argumentation have been worked out and applied in most detail in the field of law. There is controversy, however, concerning the extent to which legal methods for defining and determining burdens of proof can be applied to the study of problems of burden of proof arising in everyday conversational argumentation, and other context like forensic debate [i].

In the recent literature doubts have been expressed about whether the model of burden of proof in law can be transferred to the study of how burden of proof operates in everyday conversational argumentation. In this paper we argue that the two different settings of argument use share an underlying dialectical structure that brings out some common elements that are useful to know about with regard to studying burden of proof. We argue that knowledge of these common elements enables us to derive many important lessons for argumentation theory as applied to nonlegal settings

Even in law, burden of proof is a slippery and ambiguous concept. Law is divided on how precisely to define burden of proof. Some experts in law distinguish between two types of burden of proof, whereas others take the view that there are three types. We are not in a position in this paper to attempt to give any answer to the question of how burden of proof should be defined or ruled on in law. Still, we think that some of the ways law has worked out for dealing with issues of burden of proof, over a long tradition of practical experience, are useful for building a model of burden of proof can be useful for helping us to analyze and evaluate everyday conversational argumentation outside the legal setting. In this paper we present such a model, and argue that it is structurally similar to the concept of burden of proof used in law in some interesting and important  ways, but also different in certain ways. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2010 – Engineering Argumentation In Marriage: Pragma-dialectics, Strategic Maneuvering, And The “Fair Fight For Change” In Marriage Education

• by: Harry Weger, Jr. - University of Central Florida

1. Introduction
One of the more important innovations in communication and argumentation theory is the recognition of communication research as a design enterprise (e.g., Aakhus & Jackson, 2005; Jackson, 1998; Weger & Aakhus, 2003). Treating argumentation research as a design enterprise highlights the importance of understanding the reflexive nature between practices and processes – often the quality of argumentation reflects the conditions (individual, situational, social, etc.) under which the interaction occurs. Marital argument constitutes an ideal subject for studying communication design properties because, like most other naturally occurring conversation, it is regulated only by cultural norms and routinized practices developed by the speakers themselves. Interpersonal argumentation generally lacks purposeful design in terms of formal procedures, referees, or rules for appropriate contributions to the dialogue. These starting conditions result in participant-regulated interaction that are sometimes fraught with potential obstacles to productive argumentation. Two of the obstacles which pose particular problems for handling marital arguments are the “hot initiation problem,” and the “coherence problem.” Although these obstacles can get in the way of resolving any interpersonal argument, research suggests that they are particularly associated with dysfunctional conflict in marriage (e.g, Sillars & Wilmot, 1994; Retzinger, 1991). Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2010 – Assuring Cooperation: From Prisoner’s Dilemmas To Assurance Games To Mutual Cooperation

• by: Sheldon Wein - Saint Mary's University

1. Introduction
How humans should collectively provide for public (and near public) goods – such as, national defense, environmental protection, infectious disease control, and shared moral values – and common pool resources is a topic to which argumentation theorists have paid little attention. Game theorists have usually modeled the problems of providing such goods as a multi-person prisoner’s dilemma. Here I will argue that argumentation theorists need to contribute to the understanding of how to deal with both apparent prisoner’s dilemmas and with assurance games. I will use classic hypothetical accounts of Thomas Hobbes and Jean Jacques Rousseau to illustrate the problems and the areas to which argumentation theorists should contribute.

2. Prisoner’s dilemmas and assurance games
The prisoner’s dilemma derives its name from the following story. Row and Column have been accused of some crime. They have agreed with each other not to confess to the crime. But the prosecuting attorney tells Row that if she confesses to the crime and Column remains silent, Row will not be punished. If both confess, both will go to jail for a medium length of time. If both remain silent, both will go to jail for a short time. Of course, since the prosecutor is offering the same deal to Column as she is offering to Row, if Row remains silent and Column confesses, then Row will go to jail for a long time and Column will not be punished. Row must decide whether she should cooperate with Column and remain silent, or defect and confess to the prosecutor. Column also faces this choice. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2010 – Arguing Towards Truth: The Case Of The Periodic Table

• by: Mark Weinstein - Montclair State University

1. Preliminaries
For over a decade I have been presenting papers that include a theory of emerging truth that I feel is contribution towards understanding the relation of substantive arguments to their evaluation (Weinstein, 2009, 2007, 2006, 2006a, 2002, 1999). Substantive arguments address crucial issues of concern and so, invariably in the modern context, rely on the fruits of inquiry for their substance. This raises deep epistemological issues; for inquiry is ultimately evaluated on its epistemological adequacy and basic epistemological concepts are none to easy to exemplify in the musings of human beings. The traditional poles are knowledge and belief; in modern argumentation theory this is reflected in the distinction been acceptance and truth (Johnson, 2000). Crudely put, the rhetorical concern of acceptance is contrasted to the logical concern for truth with acceptability being a bridge between them in much of informal logic and argumentation theory.

It seems to me that the legacy of formal logic, embedded without much notice, in much of informal logic and argumentation theory creates a problem for an account of the logic of substantive inquiry and a muscular identification of acceptability with truth. The root problem is the model of argument as premise conclusion relations and argumentation seen as a series of such. In a recursive model, so natural in formal systems, evaluation works from the bottom up, in the standard case, by assigning truth to propositions. But ascertaining the truth of elements, except in relatively trivial circumstances, points away from the particulars and towards the context. This is particularly true of inquiry, and so is essentially true of substantive arguments that rely on the fruits of inquiry. For if we take the best of the fruits of inquiry available we find that truth of elements, although frequently a pressing local issue, is rarely the issue that ultimately drives the inquiry. Truth of elements is superseded by what one might call, network concerns. And it is upon network relations that an adequate notion of truth in inquiry can be constructed. My ultimate goal is to defend a model of emerging truth as a bridge between acceptability and truth. That is, to indicate a logical structure for acceptability that, at the limit, is as true as we can ever hope for. In this paper I want to show that the model of emerging truth captures the large structure of the inquiry that supports the acceptance of the Periodic Table, about as true a thing as we can expect. Read more

ISSA Proceedings 2010 – The Emotions’ Impact On Audience Judgments And Decision-Making In Aristotle’s Rhetoric

• by: Andreas Welzel - Universität Bielefeld & Christopher W. Tindale - University of Windsor

1. Introduction: Emotions in the Rhetoric
Plato’s antagonistic model of cognition and emotion was highly influential among many of his successors, as we see in the Stoic sage and Skeptics who strove for relief from emotional states (Bett 1998), and it was adopted by the Catholic church during the Middle Ages, with adherents encouraged to subdue their emotions by means of reason and acts of the will (Lazarus 2001, p. 60). This model also formed the root of modern philosophy in Descartes’ strict separation of body and mind – what Damasio (1994, p. 249) has referred to as his most serious error. Aristotle corrects Plato’s picture, providing the first clearly cognitive account of the emotions, insofar as the speaker arouses emotions in the audience by cognitive means. There is also much more to Aristotle’s treatment that takes it beyond the attention to cognitivism. The discussion of “intentionality” below captures one such structural feature. It is the details of that account and how the emotions are thought to figure in persuasion, along with a related notion of intentionality that interest us in this paper.

After analyzing Aristotle’s theory of the emotions in a way that stresses the social nature of his account, we turn in Part 2 of the paper to show how the social emotions in the Rhetoric require a different model of intentionality from that which the tradition assumes. Social emotions are embedded in social interactions and thus such emotions require a structure of intentionality that is both other-directed and directed back on the agent (we illustrate the nature of this structure by modeling it on a game). This understanding of full intentionality presents the foundation for person worth to develop, and in Part 3 of the paper some aspects of person worth apparent in the Rhetoric are explored. Read more